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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 10 Nov 1981

Vol. 330 No. 9

Anglo-Irish Talks: Statement by Taoiseach.

It is my duty to report to the House on the discussions that took place in London on Friday last between representatives of the Irish Government, including the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as myself, and representatives of the British Government, including the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and the Secretary of State for Energy.

Recalling the expressed wish of the Leader of the Opposition when Taoiseach, that a right of reply should be accorded to the Taoiseach when statements of this kind are made, I proposed to the Leader of the Opposition yesterday that I should be given the opportunity to reply to his remarks, but he was not agreeable to this procedure and is, of course, perfectly entitled not to agree.

It would have been open to me in these circumstances to have substituted for a statement a brief debate, in which I would have had such a right of reply, following the precedent set by my predecessor on two recent occasions. However, I decided that I would not follow these precedents, in view of the possibility — danger even — that such a debate, however, brief, might raise unnecessary controversy and operate against the national interest. Rather than risk the damage that this might do, I have preferred to forego the right of reply to which I would have been entitled in such a debate.

I also proposed to the Leader of the Opposition yesterday that an independent Deputy should be allowed to make a contribution for a maximum period of ten minutes, but the Leader of the Opposition also refused to agree to this procedure and was, of course, also within his rights in doing so. I have to accept this on the present occasion but I propose to have raised in the Committee of Procedure and Privileges when it is appointed the matter of a contribution by an Independent to a statement of this kind.

I have to say at the outset that I regret that the Leader of the Opposition should have chosen to make the matter of this London meeting a matter of controversy. I agree with the sentiments expressed by The Irish Press yesterday, under the heading “Not a Party Fight”. In this leader it was stated that the prospect of a political dogfight in the Dáil over the outcome of the London meeting was profoundly depressing, and could only be sad and damaging. It called for a measured sense of responsibility in presenting the arguments. I shall endeavour to respond to this call, not only by foregoing the right of reply that a debate would have afforded me, but as suggested, by endeavouring to tease out the matters at issue in a calm and reasoned manner.

In this connection, I would point out that after both the May and December meetings last year I supported the approach of my predecessor. On 29 May 1980, I said in this House as reported at column 1085, volume 321, of the Official Report:

In the meantime...and can concentrate on bringing to its full and logical conclusion the concept of unity by consent, he will have the support of this party....

On 11 December 1980 at column 985, volume 325 of the Official Report I said:

But at this time we must wish his efforts well — for our country's sake and above all for the sake of our fellow countrymen in Northern Ireland...

What has been achieved by this meeting in London can be summarised under nine headings, the first three of which relate to new institutional arrangements with the United Kingdom.

Before detailing what has been agreed under these three headings with respect to new Anglo-Irish institutional arrangements, I should like to recall the genesis of this concept. The view that the problems which all of us in Ireland face must be resolved in the context of progress in the wider arena of Anglo-Irish relations was made explicit in 1979 both by my own party in its policy document, "Ireland — Our Future Together" and in the SDLP policy document "Towards a New Ireland — A Policy Review".

Be it said to the credit of the SDLP, a party too frequently criticised nowadays for narrowness of approach, that they presented the concept primarily as a method designed to resolve the anxieties of the Unionists rather than as a means to advance their own political priorities. In fact they conceived of the Anglo-Irish institutions as a network of dialogues through which North-South exchanges would be conducted, as it were, across a United Kingdom-Ireland table. Thus, on one side of that table, Unionist and Unionist interests would find themselves, together with Northern minority interests, represented in British company, and, thus reinforced in a United Kingdom framework, the Unionists could face with greater confidence our representatives on the other side. The intention, in short, was to create confidence and thus over time to facilitate dialogue; it was not to create institutions which would in themselves produce constitutional change.

Following these Fine Gael and SDLP proposals, my predecessor, in May 1980, initiated discussions with the British Government which by December had brought the concept of an Anglo-Irish approach to the forefront. I welcomed these discussions; I did not, as one press comment suggests, "set them at nought".

However they appeared as being pursued subsequently in a different, almost opposite light, from that originally envisaged by the SDLP. Instead of being seen as a strategy for the creation of confidence and the promotion of dialogue, the approach became perceived as tending to weaken confidence and to inhibit dialogue. The unhappy consequences of this are apparent in some extreme Unionist reactions to last Friday's London meeting.

Turning now to the first of the three institutional tiers, it was agreed to establish an Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council, through which institutional expression can be given to the unique character of the relationship between the two countries. This council will involve regular meetings between the Governments at Ministerial and official levels to discuss matters of common concern. This body corresponds to that which the Leader of the Opposition proposed in his BBC interview of 30 October last when he said:

First of all there would of course be inter-governmental Ministerial meetings, that is Ministers from Westminster and Ministers from Dublin. Now this body would subsume all the existing contacts between different Ministers and put these contacts on a much more formal regular basis.

I have to say without rancour that I find difficulty in reconciling Deputy Haughey's commendation of such an inter-governmental council 12 days ago with his remarks last Saturday when he dismissed the inter-governmental council now established as "limited to just ministerial and administrative considerations ... just giving a name to a series of meetings which have already begun".

Second, it was agreed that it would be for the Parliaments concerned to consider at the appropriate time whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established in Northern Ireland. I was conscious of the fact that within the only parliamentary bodies that at present comprise representatives elected in Northern Ireland — namely, the British and European Parliaments — the membership is grossly unrepresentative as between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland, a ratio well under one-half the proportion of that community that belongs to the Nationalist tradition.

I do not exclude in principle the possibility of the membership of the Parliamentary Council being drawn from existing parliamentary bodies, especially in circumstances where the representation of the different sections of the community in Northern Ireland in these bodies were more proportionate to their actual size than at present. But as things stand, and given the possibility, at least, that an elected assembly might come into being in Northern Ireland before long — I can only say `possibility' because I know that the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has not yet had time to consider even whether to propose the establishment of such an assembly to his Government — it seemed to me preferable not to press ahead with an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Council at this time in view of the difficulty of securing from the existing Parliaments a fair representation of Northern Ireland opinion on such a body.

I was fortified in my judgment on this point by the comment of Mr. John Hume, Leader of the SDLP, on RTE last Friday. He asserted that "sensible progress was made today", and said that he "did not expect the parliamentary ties at this stage, because of the problem of adequate representation from the North".

The Leader of the Opposition, in his comment that "the lack of parliamentary participation is a retrograde step" appears to me not to have been sensitive to the consideration that has influenced both Mr. Hume and myself in our approaches to this matter. On the basis of his own proposal, made in an interview on the "Today Tonight" programme on 28 October that the Parliamentary Council should include 12 representatives from Northern Ireland, it would appear that he is prepared to envisage a Northern Ireland representation on a Parliamentary Council comprising at least ten representatives of the Unionist section of the community, and, on the Nationalist side, at most Gerry Fitt, MP, and John Hume, MEP.

I would not wish my concern on this point to be seen as in any way underplaying the importance of the role of representatives of the Unionist section of the community in such a council. It has been suggested that I have shown myself insensitive with regard to whether they participate in such a council or not. This is emphatically not the case. I am most concerned that they should be fully and fairly represented there, and when questioned on this issue after the London meeting I pointed out that they would have a strong interest in being so represented in order that they could ensure that their viewpoint would not go by default.

I am aware that some Unionist politicians have spoken of boycotting such a council, but, as I have already stated when interviewed on this point, I find it hard to believe that most elected representatives of the Unionist tradition would wish to follow the abstentionist practice which they have always deplored in relation to the Stormont and Westminster Parliaments, and I believe that any abstention on their part, if it occurred, would be short-lived. Commonsense and a proper concern for the protection of the interests of their section of the community, which their electors would expect of them, would, I believe, resolve any such problem.

I believe indeed that among the Unionist section of the community in Northern Ireland there are many who rejoice at the proposed strengthening of ties between Ireland and Britain, and who, whatever their attitude to Irish political unity, would welcome the opportunity for closer co-operation between North and South within the framework of an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Council. The warmth of the reaction I have experienced from many Unionists to my constitutional initiative has confirmed my lifelong belief that there exists among the Northern majority a store of untapped goodwill towards a better North-South relationship, goodwill which for far too long we have ignored, disdained and discouraged.

I must, however, move on to my third point. This is the Advisory Committee associated with the inter-governmental council, which, as the communiqué says, would have a wide membership, and would concern itself with economic, social and cultural co-operation. An expansion of this co-operation, both between Britain and Ireland, which have shared such a long, if troubled, history and whose peoples are so closely intermingled, and between the two parts of Ireland, must surely be welcomed by people of goodwill throughout these islands and there are many millions of such people.

These three tiers of the Anglo-Irish Council when they fall into place, as I believe they will before long, will together provide the means of reflecting what has been referred to as the totality of relationships between the peoples of these islands.

It has been suggested that the outcome of the recent meeting in London is in some way a drawing back from or a diminution of what happened at the Dublin Summit last December. Nothing could be further from the truth. What was agreed last December was that officials from this country and from Britain should co-operate in drawing up joint studies covering the range of issues I have mentioned.

I cannot emphasise strongly enough that there was no agreement then on the establishment of any type of council whatsoever, inter-governmental, administrative, parliamentary or advisory. There was no agreement on anything other than what was stated in the communiqué issued at that time. There was simply an agreement that studies should be made.

I turn now, as my fourth point, to another and very serious aspect of our relationship. While both Governments have noted with approval the efforts now being made under the criminal law jurisdiction legislation to ensure that those who commit crimes should not be able to escape their consequences because of the border that divides our island, the British Prime Minister and myself have felt it worthwhile to invite our two Attorneys General to consider what further improvements towards that end might be possible.

I have already been asked whether this means that the two eminent lawyers in question might consider the establishment of an All-Ireland Court as an additional element in our system of justice in this island, and I have replied that such a proposal would come within the ambit of their study. I look forward to seeing the outcome of their deliberations; even before this London meeting they had already established a useful and friendly contact with each other, and I know they will lose no time in tackling this task.

My fifth point concerns another matter that affects the relations between our two peoples, namely, the imbalance of treatment of each other's citizens with respect to voting rights — Irish citizens in Britain having the right to vote in parliamentary elections while British citizens in Ireland have no such right. Now that Britain's new nationality legislation has taken shape, we are in a position to proceed in this matter, and I had the pleasure of informing the British Prime Minister that the Government have approved the heads of a Bill to be introduced very shortly which will extend to British citizens voting rights in elections to the Oireachtas. This is a very much overdue move, offering a belated reciprocity, and will help, I hope, to still those voices in Britain which from time to time criticise the rights accorded to Irish citizens to vote in British elections.

My sixth point relates to an important element of the wide-ranging agreement reached at this meeting, namely, that relating to economic issues. Many potential areas of economic co-operation are set out in the joint studies, to the publication of which I shall return in a few minutes. I was struck by the enthusiasm of our British colleagues for progress in these fields — whether they affect economic relations between Ireland and Britain or between the two parts of Ireland. Of immediate practical importance is the negotiation of the terms on which natural gas from the Kinsale field might be supplied to Northern Ireland — a negotiation whose successful outcome would lead to immediate steps to extend the Cork-Dublin pipe-line to Belfast, with the aim of providing gas to that city, and no doubt surrounding areas, by the end of 1983, if all goes according to plan.

Of great importance, too, would be the restoration of the electricity inter-connector between Northern Ireland and the Republic, which has been out of action since 1975 because of repeated attacks on it by the Provisional IRA. As the principal beneficiary of the operation of this inter-connector are the people of this State, who if it were rendered operational again and remained so, would be spared the need for a further investment of £50 million in electricity generation plant, — the equivalent of the capital required to build 2,000 houses — the repeated destruction of this inter-connector can only be seen as an act of sabotage directed against the people of this part of Ireland. Even by the distorted logic of this illegal organisation, the severance of this link makes no sense. I hope that we can find means of restoring and maintaining it.

A new inter-connector between the south-eastern corner of our island and south Wales would bring significant benefits to both Ireland and Britain. It would end our island isolation so far as electricity is concerned, and reduce the whole island's need for spare capacity to cope with emergencies — all the more so as it would link us not merely to Britain but also, through Britain's existing and proposed new inter-connector with France, to the whole continental network. I am glad that in London the Tánaiste was able to reach agreement on pursuing economic and technical studies on the possibility of such an electricity link, studies for which I believe the two Governments could legitimately seek EEC assistance under the terms of reference of Community regional policy.

I come now to my seventh point. I have already referred to the joint studies carried out on behalf of the two Governments by our civil servants, under five headings: new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic co-operation, measures to encourage mutual understanding, and, finally, security matters. It has been my view ever since these studies were commissioned last December that the confidentiality which understandably is attached to work undertaken by our civil servants carried with it dangers of misunderstandings which could be dispelled only by publication of these studies, excepting, of course, the study on security matters, which of its nature is not amenable to publication. I believe that it would have been wiser if the two Governments when they commissioned these studies had announced there and then that they would be published when completed.

The fact that this was not done enabled some people who are hostile to any improvement in relations between Ireland and Britain, or between the two parts of Ireland, to arouse and foster suspicions which had no foundations in reality. The so-called `Carson Trail', which deeply alarmed many members of the Nationalist section of the community in Northern Ireland, and disturbed very many Unionists as well, was one of the consequences of not making it clear that these studies would be published.

I stated in Opposition that, if elected to Government, I would seek to have these studies published so that the opportunity to make mischief would be removed. Since election to Government, I have pressed this matter with the British Government, and I am very pleased that the British Prime Minister agreed to my proposal when we discussed the matter on Friday last. These studies will be published here and in London tomorrow. They will be found to contain nothing dramatic, but much solid, useful work, upon which we can build closer relations between Ireland and Britain, and between North and South in the months and years ahead.

There is one point I should like to add concerning the security study which is not being published. This study which was, of course, carried out at official level, contains nothing that impinges in any way on our neutrality or raises any other issue which would require the authority or attention of this House. I would like to assure the House that since the change of Government, neither I nor any of my colleagues in Government nor any Government official has raised any such matters in our contacts with British counterparts.

I come now to my eighth point, the question of the British Government's attitude to the re-unification of Ireland by consent — a principle to which the two parties forming this Government have been publicly committed since the autumn of 1969, and which Fianna Fáil had made their own also by the time the Sunningdale Agreement was signed.

The communiqué first notes that the British Prime Minister affirmed, and that I agreed, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This statement has evoked from the Leader of the Opposition an affirmation that there was no mention of what he described as a `constitutional guarantee' in the Dublin communiqué of last December, and that in last Friday's communiqué, "not alone is the guarantee introduced in the most unreserved and naked form, but for the first time there is a clear agreement by the head of an Irish Government to the maintenance of that guarantee", and he described this as "a serious and retrograde step".

I have already had occasion to comment on this statement, which ignored the fact that the phraseology Deputy Haughey complains of was drawn almost verbatim from the communiqué issued after his May 1980 meeting with the British Prime Minister. This quoted Deputy Haughey as "agreeing with the Prime Minister that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". I think I am not alone in being puzzled as to how Deputy Haughey's apparently innocuous and beneficient formulation that re-unification "would only come about" on this condition is converted into "an unreserved and naked guarantee", offering for the first time "a clear agreement to the maintenance of that guarantee", by the simple substitution of the word "requires" for the words "would only come about". No amount of reflection on these two alternative verbs — and I have pondered them at great length since last Saturday — has revealed to me the significance of a purported distinction between them, never mind one justifying the striking language which the Leader of the Opposition used to condemn the shorter formulation employed in Friday's communiqué, nor yet the attempted rationalisations of the distinction by a Fianna Fáil spokesman in the Sunday Press and in yesterday's Irish Press.

The only credible explanation for Deputy Haughey's statement on this matter is that he failed to check the May 1980 communiqué before giving his Saturday press conference, and, forgetting what he had then committed himself to, launched an attack which cannot be sustained. It would have been better for him if he had simply admitted his error of recollection.

But leaving on one side what must be seen as a casuistic verbal rationalisation, I want to come to the essential element of this part of the communiqué, the commitment by the British Prime Minister that if the consent of a majority to a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland were given, "the British Government would of course accept their decision, and would support legislation in the British Parliament to give effect to it". It is undeniable that no British Government has, since Sunningdale, expressed itself in quite these terms, indeed, in the interval statements by successive British Governments on this issue have been uniformly expressed in purely negative language.

This communiqué sets out in clear and positive language the particular and specific meaning of the support to which the Sunningdale communiqué had earlier referred. It has now been made clear that the present British Government would be prepared to support legislation to give effect to a majority wish for unity. The positions of the British and Irish Governments are, as a result, in closer accord.

But let me insist that the essential element in this, as in all formulations of the aspiration to unity that successive Irish Governments have put forward during the past decade, or have sought to have made by British Governments, is the principle of the free consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. In our insistence on that principle lies the key to the eventual removal of Unionist fears, which were built up over many years by verbal Republicanism in this part of Ireland, by talk such as that of "getting back our lost Six Counties".

I know that it will take a long time to still the fears that were aroused by those decades of unthinking irredentism. I know that so long as our Constitution asserts a right of the Oireachtas and Government established by the Constitution of this State to make laws for the part of Ireland that is not a part of this State, these fears will survive, with all the lethal consequences that flow from them for the embattled people of Northern Ireland.

But if our course is a steady and firm one, if we stick fast by the principle of reunification only with the consent of a majority, and are joined in this approach by an equivalent British commitment to accept any decision a majority in Northern Ireland may eventually make in favour of a change in their constitutional position and to support that decision by legislation in the British Parliament, then both sections of the community in Northern Ireland can feel that their aspirations are equally protected and assured. In time, given this assurance, they will find it easier to live in amity with each other and to root out the men of violence on either side who seek to destroy that part of our island.

Our task must be to seek reconciliation — between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and between North and South. This brings me to my ninth and final point. The communiqué records the joint recognition by the Prime Minister and myself on behalf of our respective Governments of "the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two sections in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland."

While I supported the initiative of my predecessor in embarking on the Anglo-Irish approach, I must now pay a tribute to another Fianna Fáil predecessor. For it was Jack Lynch who, during the terrible and dangerous summer of 1969 and throughout the events of 1970, which threatened our State even more directly, insisted that the only way forward to Irish unity, the only peaceful and realistic way, was the reconciliation of the traditions that exist on this island. In doing so he calmed the fears of many in the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and his words and his actions saved lives.

I am glad that my discussions in London have led the British Government for the first time to join with us in a commitment towards this end: the reconciliation of the peoples of the two parts of Ireland. Only those with a vested interest in dissension and disaffection can quarrel with this joint commitment by both of us to set about bringing an end to the bitterness that has divided this island for so long.

Let none of us have any illusions that the path ahead will be short, or smooth. There has been too much violence, too much hatred, through too many centuries, for it all to be extinguished at one stroke, or without great and sustained effort. But our two Governments are now jointly committed to the task of reconciling the Irish people. That is a great first step along the difficult road ahead. I am glad to have been able to participate in taking that step. I was encouraged by the warmth and sensitivity shown by the British Prime Minister during our discussions. When we meet again next spring we shall, I am convinced, make further practical progress with many matters set in train on Friday last. I commend to the House the results of our work.

When I was elected Taoiseach I pledged to make a peaceful solution to the problem of Northern Ireland my first political priority. My criterion therefore for assessing Friday's London meeting between the present Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister is whether or not further progress has been made towards securing a settlement of the urgent and tragic situation in Northern Ireland. Has Friday's meeting brought us any closer to a settlement, or has it in fact taken us further away? The meeting may or may not have done other things, but to my mind without progress on the main issue these other things are of relatively little importance.

It is necessary to put last week's meeting in the context of the previous meetings I had with the British Prime Minister. When I became Taoiseach in 1979 there had been nearly a decade of failed political initiatives within Northern Ireland since Stormont fell, making it abundantly clear that no purely internal settlement could succeed. Since the collapse of Sunningdale the Irish Government had not been involved or been invited to take part in the search for peace in Northern Ireland. Its role and its aspirations were confined to ineffective cross-Border economic co-operation under a steering group of officials.

In the Dáil on 29 May 1980 I indicated my view of Northern Ireland initiatives. Volume 321, columns 1059-60 of the Official Report states:

... my heart sinks at the prospect of the people of Northern Ireland being forced once more to travel down the old sterile road of failed initiatives.

Because every time hope is falsely renewed violent men take advantage of the inevitable disillusionment that follows. Repeated collapse of what are called new initiatives, but which in fact are merely old initiatives in newer and more unconvincing disguise, adds gravely to the feelings on both sides of the channel that there is really nothing that can be done. This, in turn, breeds a sort of fatalism which perhaps is as depressing as anything else that has emerged.

I was determined that the problem of Northern Ireland should be lifted on to a new plane in order to bring permanent peace and stability to the people of these islands and to avoid any settlement which would merely sow the seeds of future discord.

When I first met the British Prime Minister on 21 May 1980 I emphasised the need to develop closer political co-operation between our two Governments and we took a decision to meet regularly. It is now claimed that the meeting of last Friday represents progress, because there will be regular inter-governmental meetings. That principle, however, was established 18 months ago and set out in the May 1980 communiqué which also spoke for the first time of the unique relationship between the two countries. To announce these two things now as important new developments from Friday's meeting in London is totally misleading.

Six months later, in December 1980, at a time when the dangers of a lack of resolution of the Northern problem were obvious to all and when tensions were at their height, the British Prime Minister came with a team of her most senior Ministers to Dublin — an event without precedent. The British Government then agreed to my proposal that the British and Ireland Governments had joint responsibility for the resolution of the Northern Ireland problem and for bringing forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability. It was agreed that the best means of attaining these objectives was the further development of the unique relationship between the two countries and that the next meeting in London would give special consideration to the totality of relationships within these islands, a totality which includes first and foremost the problem of Northern Ireland.

In addition joint studies were commissioned in five areas: possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic cooperation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The study that was clearly of key importance was the one looking into possible new institutional structures which would give institutional expression to the joint responsibility of the British and Irish Governments to bring forward a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland implicit in the earlier part of the communiqué I have referred to.

It was widely accepted after the Summit that this agreement marked a major advance. The communiqué itself stated, in a manner which finds no echo in last week's communiqué, that "the discussions were regarded by both sides as extremely constructive and significant". Only last month the chairman of the British Conservative Party's backbench committee on Northern Ireland stated that history would say that the meetings between the British Prime Minister and myself in Dublin and London "represented the most significant political move in Anglo-Irish affairs since the end of the Second World War". This was reported in The Irish Times of Monday, 17 October. The present Taoiseach, on the other hand, has failed to grasp the significance of what was decided.

During the months that followed, the achievement of the Dublin Summit was constantly denigrated by the present Taoiseach and by the then leader of the Labour Party. We were accused of trying to settle matters over the heads of the people of Northern Ireland when in fact we were seeking to set up a political framework in which they could participate without prejudice to their principles. We were accused, without a shred of evidence, of selling out Irish neutrality. Does everyone not recall the silly motion Fine Gael put down on that issue? We were accused of excessive secrecy. The then Opposition constantly proclaimed their scepticism about the studies, and indeed they joined and re-inforced much of the opposition being expressed by the more intransigent Unionist politicians.

The progress of the studies was monitored closely by both Governments. The general approach on key matters by Irish officials was approved personally by me. My aim, put simply, was that the studies should reflect the spirit and the letter of the Dublin communiqué.

I was determined that the studies should be a significant exercise, and I would have firmly insisted on progress of a major kind in London last Friday.

At the beginning of July this present Government took over headed by a Taoiseach who had already made it abundantly clear the he had no particular commitment to the studies. His unhappy dealings with the British Government were concerned with other matters. It is obvious to me, even from the summary of the studies, that no attempt was made to hold the Irish position in the areas where the two sides differed, and that the British view was allowed to prevail without serious contest. I have already expressed my profound disappointment at the outcome of the meeting in London on Friday last between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister. My disappointment derives from a realisation that a great opportunity has been lost. It is not so much a question of little having been achieved or even that ground has been conceded in crucial areas. Rather it is the failure to keep up the momentum, to grasp the full potential of the Anglo-Irish initiative, begun in Dublin Castle in December 1980. The commitment in Dublin Castle to a new broadly-based initiative has clearly been greatly watered down. It is in that overall sense that the London Summit has disappointed and depressed, and all the intense lobbying and propaganda undertaken by Government agencies and spokesmen cannot conceal this simple fact.

To fully understand the extent of this failure to grasp a great opportunity it is necessary to go back and look fully and carefully at the communiqué issued from Dublin Castle. I want to put before the House again the key elements in that communiqué. First of all, there is the acknowledgment in paragraph four by both heads of Government that the economic, social and political interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic have been put under strain by division and dissent in Northern Ireland and the consequential acceptance by the Heads of Government of the need to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability. Second, there was the firm and clear decision by the two Heads of Government to devote their next meeting in London, in other words, the meeting which took place last Friday, to special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands and, for the purpose, to commission joint studies which would cover, among other things, new institutional structures and measures to encourage mutual understanding.

In the place of the clear recognition in the Dublin Castle communiqué of the fundamental impact which the situation in Northern Ireland has had on relationships between Britain and Ireland last Friday's communiqué substitutes the following verbiage:

The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister affirmed the importance which their two Governments attached to the maintenance and development of close Anglo-Irish relations

and

agreed on the need for efforts to diminish divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland.

I believe there is very real contrast between those two stated positions. Last Friday's communiqué represents a diminution of importance and significance of the problem of Northern Ireland as an international matter — an issue between the two Governments. It returns it to a domestic Irish context and refuses to see it as something which will continue to distort relations between Britain and Ireland as long as it is permitted to continue and which will prevent full and fruitful co-operation between two neighbouring countries.

I want to demonstrate the main area of the studies where the British view differed from ours, and where it has prevailed over ours. As I have said, the key area from the point of view of political progress was that devoted to new institutional structures. Naturally, the British did not object to institutionalising inter-governmental meetings and to having the same sort of body as they have with France and Germany. In fact this would suit them very much. The British concept was simply a form which would cover the existing pattern of meetings. They wished to substitute a narrowly-based inter-governmental administrative machinery for the broadly-based, politically-active Anglo-Irish Council which we envisaged. The British concept may have a limited usefulness but it contributes little or nothing to a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. I need hardly point out that the functions of the new council to be established are minimal in character and differ radically from the Irish concept of an Anglo-Irish Council at the time I left office. I would have rejected the qualification "intergovernmental" which has clearly been inserted at the insistence of the British, for two reasons. One reason is because it deliberately excludes parliamentary participation and involvement. The second and related reason is that the qualification "intergovernmental" deliberately excludes Northern Ireland and the totality of relationships, which should be the basic reason for the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Council.

With regard to the functions, which are "to discuss matters of common concern" the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council will not possess the right or the duty, to discuss the political problem of Northern Ireland. The first public signs of this outcome were signalled in the Queen's speech on 4 November 1981. That speech clearly separated Anglo-Irish relations and the relationship which exists between the Dublin and London Governments from the situation in Northern Ireland. It first of all stated: "My Government will seek to maintain close relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland". Then seven paragraphs later, and quite separately from this, the speech states: "My Government will continue to devote themselves to the complex problem of Northern Ireland. The search will go on for acceptable ways of enabling the people of Northern Ireland to play a fuller part in its administration" (Financial Times, 5 November, 1981). In other words the British Government have underlined, that so far from seeing Anglo-Irish relationships as a totality, they regard relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic as quite separate and distinct from the problem of Northern Ireland.

In my view the British Government now want to establish an Anglo-Irish council which will be exactly the same as the Anglo-French Council, ignoring completely the fact that between Britain and France there exists no problem like Northern Ireland, and there is no British political or military presence in Calais, for instance, or Normandy. For their own reasons the British Government clearly want to make this separation and they have succeeded. The point was further emphasised in a statement by the British Prime Minister at her press conference subsequent to the London meeting on Friday. I quote from “The Irish Times” of 7 November 1981.

Asked if she felt that greater co-operation with the Republic could bring about a political settlement, the Prime Minister answered: "A political settlement in Northern Ireland really has to be a matter for the Secretary of State and for the United Kingdom Government. I think anything that helps to reduce tension, to reconcile the differences between the two communities in Northern Ireland, is good.

Those paragraphs in the communiqué then which the Taoiseach favours do no more in the view of the British Prime Minister than give the Irish Government a useful, auxiliary role in helping the Secretary of State and the United Kingdom government to govern Northern Ireland more effectively. This represents a major departure from the whole basis of the process established in Dublin Castle in December 1980. There is now a clear demarcation between the development of relations between Dublin and London as a relationship between two Governments on the one hand and as a separate matter, a proposal to bring forward some devolved Government structure for Northern Ireland. That is the kernel of the matter; that is where the watering-down has occurred. Britain will now proceed to deal with Northern Ireland, as if it were an internal British problem with, regrettably, the full agreement and acquiescence of the head of the Irish Government. At the same time Britain will be able to turn to the world at large and say that all is well between Britain and Ireland because there has been established an Anglo-Irish Council, which indicates that relationships between the two countries are satisfactory and there are no problems. That is where the damage has been caused. That is why the meeting in London in fact represents a major setback to the cause of Irish unity.

All that emerged from London was to institutionalise the regular meetings which take place between the British and Irish Ministers. It is clear that special consideration was not, in fact, given to the totality of relationships within these islands, as agreed in Dublin Castle, nor were worthwhile policies or proposals brought forward at the discussions which would achieve peace, reconciliation and stability, as was decided in Dublin. Let me remind the House that in the Dublin communiqué of December 1980 it was stated as follows: "The Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the useful exchanges of ministerial and official levels since their last meeting, leading to new and closer co-operation in energy, transport, communication, crossborder, economic development and security".

That paragraph in the Dublin communiqué makes it abundantly clear that the programme of meetings was already well settled and in operation at that time. In effect, therefore, all that happened in London last Friday was that a name was given to a programme of meetings which were already taking place. I believe I have elaborated sufficiently on the British view. I now want to explain what our view was, and to express my profound disappointment that there is no reflection of it to be found in the communiqué. In our view, one of the primary functions of the ministerial part of an Anglo-Irish Council would be to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability and to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries.

If that had been agreed, and I would not have been prepared to settle for any less, it would have formally expressed the acceptance in Dublin of joint responsibility for bringing forward a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland.

What we had in mind and what would have flowed naturally and logically from the Dublin Summit and the joint studies was an Anglo-Irish Council which would have provided a framework within which political proposals for the solution of the problem to Northern Ireland could have been devised. It is difficult to see why such a council was not proposed and adopted in London on Friday. An essential part of such a council would, of course, have been the parliamentary element.

This was central to our thinking. Such a parliamentary body has now been relegated far into the distant future and even then, it is quite clear, from all that has been written and said, that if and when it is formed, the parliamentary forum will not necessarily be organically linked to the council which has now been established. That is the big disappointment; that is the big weakness in the outcome of the London meeting. An inter-governmental council, of the attenuated, limited kind envisaged and with minimal functions, may not strictly require a parliamentary body. To an Anglo-Irish Council with the sort of functions I have described, a parliamentary body, organically linked, would have been essential. It would not be appropriate to have a ministerial council responsible for bringing forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability without Northern Ireland participation and involvement at a parliamentary level.

It is the Taoiseach who has criticised the whole Anglo-Irish study process on the basis that it did not include representatives from Northern Ireland. Surely, on that ground alone, he should have insisted on a parliamentary element in a new Anglo-Irish Council which would provide a forum in which Northern representatives could be involved in all future political developments. This is a matter of very deep significance and importance and I want to direct the attention of the House to an aspect of the current state of affairs in Northern Ireland which, in my view, has not received anything like the attention it deserves. In fact, I suggest that the speeches, comments and approach of the Taoiseach all clearly indicate that he is unaware of the significance of one vitally important aspect of life in the North today. I refer to the need to understand and to cater for the anxieties, the wishes and the aspirations of that section of the community in Northern Ireland who adhere to the Nationalist tradition.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

In my view, the Unionists' point of view is constantly and clearly articulated, and not alone is it articulated, but it is accommodated. The attitude and the stance of Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland have had a predominant influence on the thinking of British Governments. They have defeated all attempts to secure political progress. By way of contrast, the views of the Nationalist minority are hardly ever adverted to. What is virtually ignored is the biggest source of tension on this island, the mistreatment of the Nationalist minority in the North. The position of the Northern Nationalist is something to which I believe increasing attention must now be given.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

There is a very real danger that the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland will become alienated, not alone from London and Westminster, but also from Dublin, and that they increasingly regard themselves as being on their own, isolated and, in particular, as having been let down by those in the Republic from whom they might have expected much more understanding, sympathy and support. The greater such alienation, the worse the problem of violence is likely to become. It is from that angle that I see the failure to provide a parliamentary forum in the new Anglo-Irish Council as being especially devastating.

I have shown in a number of ways how, in my view, the Taoiseach had deviated from the course set at the Dublin Summit. This deviation stems partly, I believe, from the fact that his principal political concept in relation to the North seems to be motivated by the desire to see some form of devolved Government in the North. The Taoiseach has given implicit support in the communiqué to the setting up of a devolved assembly, and the Anglo-Irish initiative now seems to occupy only a very subordinate place in his approach. We could find an explanation of why so little was achieved, in the fact that the Taoiseach preferred to place his trust, not in a new framework of political co-operation between Dublin and London but in some new initiative brought forward in a purely Northern Ireland context.

In my opinion, the Taoiseach is moving down a sterile road and putting the whole problem of Northern Ireland on the long finger.

Government spokesmen have been endeavouring to attach some significance to the statement in the communiqué about the British Government accepting Irish unity, if that is what a majority in Northern Ireland wish. All, in fact, that was obtained was a promise that the wishes of the majority would be respected, if they expressed support for unity. There is, in my view, no particular significance to be attached to that. It has been implicit in the situation for over sixty years that the British would support, and in all probability with enormous enthusiasm, any desire by the Unionists to join with the rest of Ireland. Any British Government now, who tried to hold back for strategic or any other reasons, would, of course, be overwhelmed by public opinion. It seems to me, therefore, that the wording in the communiqué is entirely empty, and marks no progress whatever. It is only a fluctuation in language used without significance. The only declaration of value would be one by the British Government of support for unity, and this, of course, is what we on this side of the House have been seeking.

Many of us eagerly sought some concrete expression in the communiqué of the positive and progressive ideas expressed by the new Northern Secretary of State, Mr. James Prior, in regard to the desirability of abolishing the economic border in Ireland. The absence of any reference to this objective is another serious omission from Friday's communiqué.

The scene was set for such positive economic measures by Deputy Colley as long ago as May 1980, when he firmly expressed our political will to make Kinsale gas available to the people of Northern Ireland, by means of a pipeline from Dublin to Belfast.

The words "economic co-operation" can become an empty phrase, a meaningless cliché, or they can represent something positive and practical. The London Summit meeting was the place to decide to bring forward specific concrete proposals and the communiqué was the document in which to outline those specific, concrete proposals. Regrettably, this has not happened, and it seems to me that going to London, the Irish side did not sufficiently concentrate on what their objectives should be, or what they should seek to achieve.

One such objective should have been the establishment, for one or more sectors of the Irish economy, of a body which would have the responsibility of promoting particular sectors on an all-island basis, a body which would integrate and administer the sectors of the economy in a way that would secure the highest level of development for the benefit of the people of this island as a whole. There are many sectors of the economy where this sort of integrated approach would clearly bring specific and substantial benefits. Instead of establishing any such structures, the communiqué in paragraph 10 falls back merely on well-worn clichés and trite expressions of intent.

May I deal briefly with the Taoiseach's unworthy attempt in Cork, and here again today, to personally discredit my viewpoint and the expression of that viewpoint. He accused me of having a defective memory about the May 1980 London communiqué. Unfortunately for him, every journalist who was present at my press conference in the Burlington Hotel on Saturday last can verify that not alone was my memory not defective, but that I dealt specifically in reply to questions, with the May 1980 communiqué and with the subsequent elaboration of that communiqué which I subsequently gave in Dáil Éireann.

In view of the controversy that has developed, and as this is a central, crucial matter, I believe I should devote some time in examining the two London communiqués and their treatment of this issue, namely the communiqué of May 1980 and the communiqué of last Friday.

First of all, let me state for the benefit of the House, exactly what was stated in the communiqué of May 1980. The relevant portion is as follows:

While agreeing with the Prime Minister, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach re-affirmed that it is the wish of the Irish Government to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace.

Subsequently in the Dáil, I pointed out the significance and importance of the words "come about with the consent of". I gave it as my view that those words merely recognised the practicalities of the situation and that consent would be part of the solution and not a prerequisite. There is the fundamental difference, I suggest, between that wording and the wording used in the London communiqué of last Friday, where the Taoiseach agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would "require" the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

My clear view is that this constitutional guarantee should be set aside now and that we can then proceed to bring forward arrangements or structures to which the majority of the people of Northern Ireland would consent. To put such consent in the form of a basic requirement is, in my opinion, tantamount to ensuring that any process designed to secure a settlement will never, in fact, get off the ground.

Stripped of all the cleverly orchestrated propaganda build-up, the London meeting was clearly a setback from the point of view of this country. The Taoiseach and spokesmen for the Government have cast around widely in an effort to find some excuse for the failure of Friday's London Summit meeting.

Two notions are now being canvassed to explain this failure — the alleged secrecy surrounding the joint studies and the fact that I indicated in advance my view of what I would like to see emerging from the London Summit.

The Taoiseach and others, for some time now, have been seeking to make political capital out of the alleged secrecy of the work undertaken by the officials of both the Irish and British administrations in preparing the joint studies.

I do not believe that anyone giving careful consideration to the matter could find any validity in this criticism. The need for confidentiality was agreed upon at the time by the British Prime Minister and myself. In my view this was simply a commonsence and well-established approach to work of this nature. If permanent officials are to work together to produce something constructive and worthwhile, it is essential that they be allowed to do so in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. To suggest that permanent officials engaged in such studies should try to carry out their task in the full glare of publicity is nonsense. Nothing could be achieved in that way and in going along with criticism the Taoiseach was merely pandering to those who did not want the studies to succeed anyway.

It was always my intention and I relterated this intention on several occasions that when the studies had been completed and the results brought forward for consideration and political decision by the respective heads of Government, the results of the studies would be published at that stage. This is exactly what has happened. Far from attributing the failure of last Friday's Summit to the confidentiality with which the studies were carried out, the Taoiseach should gratefully acknowledge that if it had not been for these studies, nothing whatever of any importance would have emerged from last Friday's Summit.

I have debunked totally any suggestion that my outlining what I hoped last Friday's Summit would achieve could in any way have affected the outcome of the Summit meeting. I maintained a complete and honourable silence about the work of the joint studies, and about our input into that process, until first of all the Taoiseach in an interview with the Belfast Telegraph gave a clear indication of what was under consideration, and then following that inspired leaks and informed rumours began to surface in the media in Britain and Ireland as to what was under consideration.

Valuable and constructive work was carried out by the officials on both sides between December 1980 and June 1981. I am not in a position to say what falling-off took place in the level of activity subsequent to the general election or what weakening of the determination on our side to achieve progress followed the change of Government.

I cannot say whether there was any lack of enthusiasm on the Irish side from June onwards for an effective political Anglo-Irish Council or really significant economic co-operation. But I suspect that there was such, and it was for this reason that the Taoiseach is now attempting in a most unworthy fashion to denigrate the valuable work carried on by the officials of both administrations. The failure of the London Summit cannot be traced to any lack of substance in the joint study process, but rather to the vacillation of the present Taoiseach on fundamental and crucial issues, principally on the issue as to whether or not we were to have an Anglo-Irish Council, which would survey the totality of relationships between Ireland and Britain with particular reference to the problem of Northern Ireland.

Perhaps the weakest argument brought forward as a follow-up to last Friday's communiqué was the specious one that only the Parliaments in London and Dublin could establish a parliamentary forum as part of an Anglo-Irish Council. I have already pointed out that there are many precedents for governments establishing such a parliamentary forum and appointing the members thereof. The first European Parliament was a case in point. Nor does the argument about the difficulty of securing representation from Northern Ireland hold water either.

There have probably been more elections to assemblies and bodies of one kind and another in Northern Ireland than in any other part of Europe during the last decade. There would be no difficulty whatever in the British and Irish Governments between them nominating suitable and appropriate representative people from Northern Ireland to participate in the parliamentary forum of an Anglo-Irish Council had the Taoiseach insisted on such a forum as an integral and essential part of the new council. During my time in office the studies in no way envisaged the parliamentary body being dependent on the location of a new devolved assembly.

In conclusion, I would like to sum up my assessment of the outcome of the Summit meeting in London on Friday last. My disappointment at the outcome is based on three major aspects;

Firstly, there is the restoration in a new categoric form of the constitutional guarantee of the Unionist position in Northern Ireland by the British Government and now agreed to by the Taoiseach.

Secondly, there is the narrow attenuated form of the new Anglo-Irish Council, a form which almost completely negatives its effectiveness by restricting its activities to an east-west, Dublin-London, axis and which by excluding any political development in regard to the North limits its scope and deprives it of any potential to bring forward a solution to the tragedy of Northern Ireland.

Thirdly, there is the loss of the momentum in Anglo-Irish relations established in Dublin in December 1981; the rowing back from the philosophy enshrined in the communiqué issued after that meeting in Dublin and the deflection of the political process then initiated.

In my view, the currents have been turned awry. A great opportunity for really substantial and significant progress has not been grasped. There has been no statemanship, no far-seeing determination to place the problem of Northern Ireland in a new political framework, within which progress towards a final solution could be achieved.

I believe it to be my solemn duty to direct the attention of this House and the Irish people to the detrimental trends I see emerging from London last Friday. I want to warn against the Anglo-Irish initiative launched in Dublin Castle being diverted down a dead end and against a return to a stalemate situation in which the problem of Northern Ireland is treated as an internal UK matter. This can only lead to further frustration and continuing violence. The way forward is through the sort of broadly based Anglo-Irish Council that we envisaged and I urge the Government to continue by every political and diplomatic means at their disposal to continue to work for the achievement of that objective.

Tairgim: go n-ainmneoidh Dáil Éireann Pádraig L. Mac Domhnaill ——

Gaibh mo leith scéal. Sílim go bhfuil tú ar uimhir 4.

Not untypical.

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