Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 24 Jan 1984

Vol. 347 No. 3

Security Matters: Statements.

Minister for Justice (Mr. Noonan

, Limerick East): I am glad to have the opportunity to address the House on security matters.

This debate takes place in the aftermath of some Garda setbacks and suggestions that morale in the Garda Síochána has been damaged. There is no crisis of morale in the Garda Síochána. There are of course problems.

They are not problems that arose from anything done or not done last week or last month or last year. And, just as they did not arise overnight, they cannot be resolved overnight, but they are being tackled and I want to say very clearly that the Government have every confidence in the ability of the Garda Commissioner to meet the challenge which recent events have posed.

Most of the past year was in fact a very successful period for the Garda Síochána. Many successful operations were carried out. Kidnappings were dealt with successfully and attempted kidnappings were successfully thwarted. Very substantial progress was made in dealing with the scourge of drugs particularly by the removal from the scene of many of the bigger criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking.

Good police work was also evident in finds of arms and explosives and in particular in the discovery of arms and ammunition that had been consigned to the INLA from Australia.

These successes have substantially raised the morale of the Garda over the past 12 months. The concern which is now being expressed for the morale of the Garda Force is not something new. It is hardly necessary for me to remind the House that not long ago similar fears were being expressed but for very different reasons from those which have given rise to the current expressions of concern. Members of this House, while they must be free to criticise any action of the security forces, have a serious responsibility to ensure that they do not, through careless or exaggerated language, paint a misleading picture that damages public confidence.

I would like to deal with one further matter before commenting on specific recent events that have obviously given rise to this debate, and that is the personal attacks that have been made on the Garda Commissioner. I am not unduly concerned when I am attacked about Garda failures — it is part and parcel of the cut and thrust of political life. I am concerned however when people are attacked in public when those attacking them know full well that they cannot retaliate in a similar manner. Linked with those criticisms there have been hints — perhaps more than hints — that relations between him and me have become strained over recent events. I do not intend to make a habit of denying every wild allegation that may be circulated but on this occasion I think it is right to say, simply, that what has been hinted or said is without any foundation whatsoever.

I now come to events at Ballinamore and I would first of all like to say that the main objectives of this operation were achieved — to secure the release of the kidnapped man and to ensure that no randsom money would be paid. I do not for one instant forget that it was a success that involved a very high price, the loss of two young and innocent lives and the grief and loss which the families of Garda Sheehan and Private Kelly face. None of us, in this House or outside it, should forget that. It is a salutary reminder of what we as a community are up against.

The Ballinamore operation has led to criticism for the fact that the perpetrators escaped. It may be that not everything was done as well as it should have been. A full review and evaluation began some time ago and if there are lessons to be learned they will be learned. But even at this stage some facts can be noted.

The situation was unprecented in so far as the Garda Síochána and the Army were concerned certainly in recent years. Furthermore the Garda Síochána did not know that the kidnappers of Mr. Tidey were holding him in the specific area in which he was found. From the time the kidnapping occured, gardaí throughout the country were involved in a nationwide search to find the kidnappers. This involved door-to-door inquiries in many parts of the country and searches of vacant and derelict houses particularly in remote areas. As time passed the Garda, putting various pieces of evidence together, came to the conclusion that the Ballinamore region was a likely spot and arrangements were made to check the entire area within a ten-mile radius of Ballinamore. The size of the area within this radius which was to be combed out may perhaps be more clearly pictured when I mention that it amounts to over 300 square miles or almost 200,000 acres. The perimeter of the circle would be over 60 miles.

Once the size of the area is appreciated, it will be obvious that a search, if it was to be carried out within a reasonable time scale, required the deployment of as many men as could reasonably be assigned and, given the fact that the Garda Síochána is by and large an unarmed force, it will be realised that many of those involved in the search would, of necessity, have to be unarmed uniformed gardaí.

Criticism has been made of the fact that recruit gardaí from Templemore were used in the search and I have been asked if I endorsed the Commissioner's decision to use recruits and his statement that if a further search of this nature became necessary he would use them again. The very fact that such questions should have been asked in such fashion shows a misunderstanding of the circumstances. There was, unfortunately, a risk for everybody in the search but the recruit gardaí were in no greater danger than any of their more senior unarmed colleagues. The young recruit who lost his life did not lose it because he was not fully trained. Any other unarmed member who might have been on the spot would have been equally vulnerable and his level of training had nothing to do with it. The nature of the terrain, especially in the particular area where the kidnappers were hiding out, was such that the recruit gardaí, because of their exceptional physical fitness, more than played their part. I have spoken to officers in charge of the operation and the vital contribution of the recruit gardaí was strongly stressed. I was very pleased to have had the opportunity to say this to the assembled recruits at Templemore at a passing-out ceremony shortly afterwards.

As I have already said, the size of this operation and the fact that the Garda are an unarmed force meant that of necessity unarmed uniformed gardaí were involved in the search. This of course involved risk, serious risk as events showed, but it is really absurd to suggest that it involves any more risk for a young unarmed member than for an older unarmed member. Each search unit had substantial firepower. There were ten units involved in the actual search operation, each unit under the leadership of a garda inspector comprising about 25 men and made up of recruits, local uniform members who knew the area, armed members of the detective branch and armed members of the Defence Forces.

Given the extremely difficult heavily wooded terrain that was being searched, the fact that the kidnappers had a radio tuned to the Garda channel which enabled them to monitor the movements of the searchers and the fact that when confronted they were prepared to open fire on whoever came upon them, it is perhaps fortunate that there was not a greater loss of life. The fact that the recruit garda was a recruit was not a relevant factor. The fact that he was unarmed may or may not have been relevant — one has to consider that his companion was both an armed and experienced member of the Defence Forces, a man who had had ample training in the use of firearms and who had the benefit of service overseas with the United Nations peace-keeping force.

The circumference of the circle enclosing the area was over 60 miles in length. All roads leading out of the area were covered by armed checkpoints — it will be appreciated that to seal off the area in any other sense would be totally beyond the resources of the Garda and the Army and, I would stress again, the gardaí did not know that the kidnappers were inside that circle, so there was in any event a limit to what numbers should be committed to the task.

A full review of the Ballinamore operation was carried out by the Garda authorities and in a few days' time a joint Garda-Army review of the operation will also take place. I am satisfied that both forces will learn from Ballinamore and that if another operation of this type presents itself they will be able to use the experience to advantage.

The Garda operation at Claremorris was a different matter. I have now read some preliminary reports in the matter and I am afraid that it is clear that in a number of ways the operation was not conducted with the level of efficiency we are entitled to expect from the Garda Síochána. I would emphasise that I am not suggesting that the gardaí should or even could have used firearms to prevent the escape. I am speaking of the planning and execution of the operation to surround the house. I have been informed by the Commissioner that the events surrounding the failure to apprehend the occupants of the house in Claremorris are being gone into in detail and that remedial action will be taken.

There is understandably great disappointment in the force over the events at Claremorris more particularly having regard to the fact that the exercise was carried out mainly by armed members of the divisional task force but I have no doubt that lessons will be learned from this failure.

There have been comments from Opposition spokesmen regarding Garda equipment and indeed suggestions that the Government have failed to equip the Garda adequately to carry out their tasks. If these comments were well founded then I would suggest that it could not be this Government but past Governments that were remiss in this area. However, in fairness to my predecessors, I have to say that my information is that suggestions that the Garda Síochána are lacking in equipment to deal with crime are totally unjustified and, in fact, the equipment available to the Garda compares very favourably with the equipment available to other police forces.

There have also been suggestions that Garda communications were inadequate during the search at Ballinamore. I have spoken to a number of the gardaí who were involved in the search operation, including one of the members involved at Derrada Wood, and I have been assured that the only problems encountered were technical ones that did not reflect on the quality or quantity of the equipment.

As the House will be aware, a new Garda communications network is currently being installed. I am glad to acknowledge that this project was initiated by my Limerick colleague, Deputy Gerard Collins, when he was Minister for Justice. It has been processed with all due speed under every Government since and will come into use in a number of areas in a few months. When it becomes fully operative I am advised that the Garda will have one of the best communications systems in Europe. I would at this stage like to pay tribute to the painstaking dedication of the committee who are looking after this project and who have voluntarily given their services to this huge task, which is now nearing completion.

Critical mention has also been made of the provision of air support for the Garda Síochána. The present position is that the Garda rely on the Air Corps for support in this area. The picture has from time to time been painted that the Garda Síochána are the only police force in Europe without a helicopter wing. Even if they were, which they are not, I would have to point out that we are also one of the smallest and economically weakest countries. But let us look at our neighbour, Britain. There they have a big number of regional police forces rather than a single one as here. Inquiries in 1982 established that out of all their police forces, only one, namely the London Metropolitan Police, had helicopters of their own and the London force then had just two helicopters. Furthermore, they got them only after prolonged study of the pros and cons extending over many years. If we go further afield to a small country which is often compared with ours, Denmark, we find that any helicopter service the police use is supplied by the Army. When it comes to other countries, it is necessary to bear in mind that continental countries tend to have a number of different types of police force, some of them of a para-military type with functions that we would associate more with the Army.

The Leader of the Opposition in a radio interview as recently as 5 January expressed himself as being very annoyed that although, he said, his Government had taken steps to provide the Garda with an air arm, nothing had been done about it yet. In the Adjournment Debate before Christmas Deputy Haughey also referred to the fact that only £1,000 was allocated in the Estimates to the helicopter project.

In regard to the latter point, most Members of this House are no doubt fully aware of the process of providing token votes in Estimates for projects that are under consideration. Deputy Haughey seems to have overlooked the fact that since the helicopters were promised by Deputy Collins in August 1980, the only provision for them that ever appeared in a subsequent Estimate was a token sum of £1,000.

As far as Ballinamore was concerned, the Army provided helicopter assistance as they do on many occasions. It is valuable assistance but the role of helicopters in Garda operations cannot be assessed without reference to their cost and to a cost-benefit analysis. Because of the recent criticism, I think it only fair that I put the record straight. The project referred to by the Leader of the Opposition was announced, as I have said, in August 1980. Subsequently while there were visits to a number of foreign countries to check on their experience and while a Garda officer was appointed to take charge of the project, there is no evidence of any action towards the actual purchase of helicopters. I do not by this seek to criticise those of my predecessors who were supposed to be committed to this project.

From my reading of the papers I am satisfied that the project is both complex and costly and one that would require very detailed advance analysis and planning by a team of experts. Given our current financial situation and the fact that the assistance given by the Air Corps appears to be reasonably adequate, I do not hold out much hope of providing separate air support for the Garda in the near future. I am, however, arranging discussions with the Army authorities to see what in the short term the Air Corps may find it possible to give to the Garda by way of additional aerial support.

I am satisfied that the Garda Síochána have the manpower and equipment to enable them to do a satisfactory job. There have been talks of cutbacks and also attempts to make political mileage out of the monitoring of expenditure in the light of our current economic circumstances. Garda expenditure has been very carefully scrutinised in the past year and I have no apology to make for that. It could not be otherwise in a situation of serious unemployment where every available penny of the States resources needs to be mobilised in the provision of jobs for our young population. I am satisfied that the funds being made available to the Garda in the current year are adequate for their needs and represent a very fair share of the available national resources. I have no doubt that with proper and prudent management of these funds the force will be able to provide the nation with a satisfactory police service.

There have also been many adverse comments about the redeployment of the Garda Divisional Task Forces many of them, I am afraid, based on an incomplete knowledge of the background of the setting up of these units. The divisional task forces were set up following the approval of a crime plan to deal with the prevention and detection of armed robberies submitted by the Garda Commissioner in August 1980. The plan recommended, inter alia, that special crime patrols be set up in each Garda division outside the DMA. The plan stressed that to be effective it would be necessary to have six patrols operating in each Garda division and operating generally between the hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.

It subsequently became clear to Garda management that it would not be possible to recruit members for the new duty unless they could be guaranteed unsocial hours and overtime payments. The net result was that the patrols that were introduced operated over the full week — seven days — and on the basis of two rosters per day. This effectively meant that three patrols was the maximum number that could operate in any division between the hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and even that figure would be unlikely to be achieved when annual leave, rest days and sick leave were taken into consideration. The plan was further watered down by a decision by the Commissioner in May 1982 that only five patrols would be allocated to each division.

The net effect of the foregoing was that only about two cars would be operative in a division at any given time.

Additionally, the patrols operated directly to Chief Superintendents. This meant that they were not amenable to directions from district officers, Superintendents, in whose areas they operated, a very unsatisfactory state of affairs in a disciplined and structured force.

As I have already informed the House in response to parliamentary questions, the Garda authorities decided last year on certain organisational changes under which the members of the divisional task forces were integrated with the detective units in the various Garda divisions in which they had been operating. I would once again like to stress that these changes were made by the Garda Commissioner solely in the interests of better Garda organisation and efficiency. The moves were in no way made necessary because of any financial restraints. There was also no question of reducing the detective strength. The members of the divisional task forces were already of detective rank and remain so.

The Garda authorities are also satisfied that the service provided by the Garda Síochána is more effective as a result of the changes. I understand that the matter was reviewed at the recent conference of Chief Superintendents, who with the Commissioner and other senior headquarters officers constitute the management structure of the force. The consensus was that the new arrangements should stand.

Exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims have been made about the effectiveness of the previous organisation of the task forces in dealing with armed bank robberies. The recruitment of members for the task forces began in the last few months of 1980 and it was some considerable time before they became operative on any wide scale. Indeed, on 1 July 1981 the patrols had not become operable at all in four Garda divisions — this included the Kerry division which was recently mentioned in this context — and at that time only one patrol was operating in eight other divisions. The incidence of armed bank robberies was already declining when the decision was taken to establish the divisional task forces and in the first half of 1981, when those forces could not possibly have had any serious effect, there were only two armed bank robberies outside Dublin and four such robberies in the whole of 1981.

The figures for armed crime in general have not changed appreciably in the past few years. There is, therefore, nothing to suggest that the divisional task forces have had any appreciable effect on this particular type of crime. Nevertheless, reorganised as they now are, they are considered to be worthwhile.

It is also important to remember that the recruitment of the divisional task forces was at the expense of the uniform force — it was to some extent a robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul type of exercise because vacancies created in the uniform branch were not filled for some considerable time.

The recent events involving the stripping of gardaí by armed terrorists have come in for quite an amount of comment. Suggestions have been made that the gardaí involved have been humiliated and that Garda morale has suffered as a result.

There is little doubt that incidents of this nature affect Garda morale. There is, however, a wider policy issue involved here because if we reach a situation where armed criminals continue to treat members of the Garda Síochána in this way a question will inevitably arise as to whether we can adhere to a policy of having an unarmed police force. The Garda themselves are not in favour of their members being armed. The public would hardly relish the prospect of an armed force — it would inevitably lead to more violence, because there is little doubt that guns breed more guns.

I do not think that we have yet reached a situation where we need seriously consider arming the Garda. However, there is not doubt that if unarmed gardaí at checkpoints continue to be treated in the way that has been happening there will be growing pressure for changes that, I think, every Member of the House would regret. For the moment, let us all recognise that armed men will always have the short-term ability to impose their will on those who are unarmed. Incidents such as have occured can recur and it is time that people who should know better stopped suggesting that the Garda by some means can gurantee otherwise. Gardaí on normal duties, be they checkpoint or other, are not armed and may at any time be faced with this problem.

One of the ways that could render the making of such decisions unnecessary would be by each and every citizen making a conscious decision that he or she would co-operate fully with the Garda in dealing with serious crime. Many people will have been shocked to see the attitude displayed by persons interviewed on a recent television programme when asked if they would give information to the Garda relating to the kidnapping at Ballinamore. There is, of course, a historical taint attached to informing. However, I would like to point out that this is not 1784 or 1884 — we have had an Irish Government for more than 60 years and it is about time that every citizen realised that the Garda Síochána are our own national police force employed by us to ensure that law and order prevails, and by law and order I am not talking of some esoteric concept — what I am talking about is the right of every citizen to go about his or her daily life without fear of being mugged, robbed or intimidated.

Dr. Woods

I am somewhat disappointed that the Minister has not given us firm assurances that the recent difficulties in terms of security will be tackled vigorously through the provision of the necessary resources and with commitments in regard to the manpower, specialist or otherwise, which will be required. It was disappointing to find the Minister taking so much of his time to talk in very general terms of the problem and spending so little time specifying what exactly he will do to overcome the difficulties.

Listening to the Minister one would think that there is hardly a problem at all, although from his side of the House in the past weeks and months suggestions were made for very harsh measures to deal with the serious breakdown in security. That situation demands that the Minister should have put more effective suggestions before us today to deal with it and give us less of an apology to the criticisms of anybody, from the media or Members of the House who offered constructive criticism in recent weeks.

The recent breakdown in security was highlighted by the events at Ballinamore and Claremorris and the failure to apprehend a number of well known subversives. It is a direct result of the policies pursued by the Minister for Justice since January of last year. It is not a case of being wise after the event, because I warned the Minister during 1983, when it became clear that the security and intelligence networks established by his predecessors were being disestablished systematically. The breakdown was a result of management and policy decisions taken at the highest level. Now there appears to be a concerted attempt to find scapegoats among rank and file detectives and gardaí. The Minister cannot avoid his overall responsibility for management of security measures.

In this respect, the Minister pointed in cleverly veiled terms to the kind of steps taken by management in recent years, but if one translates those steps into direct language one finds that the Divisional Task Force were disbanded and put back to more normal duties of various kinds. That happened during last year, and all the talk about re-deploying them, that they are still there, that they were in Claremorris, are misrepresentations because the Divisional Task Force were not operating as such at Claremorris and it is hardly fair to refer to those on duty there as members of the Divisional Task Force. Those on duty in Claremorris may have been former members of the force.

Garda security and intelligence were greatly strengthened following the murders of the Gardaí Morely and Byrne in Roscommon in 1980. The Fianna Fáil Government of the day demanded action to curb armed bank robberies and other serious crimes which had become commonplace. Anyone who had experience of those events knows quite clearly that the bank robberies were very daring, they were commonplace, and they were belittling the State and the Garda. Both the Garda and public representatives demanded action by the Government, and the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, and the Minister for Justice, Deputy Collins, met the Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner in charge of security to consider what action could be taken and the new resources that would be required. We saw that as a duty and a function of the Government.

The chief of security believed that bank raids could be stopped and serious criminal activities greatly curbed by re-organising the detective branch, by supplying necessary extra transport and equipment and by intensive training. The Commissioner concurred with these views and the Government undertook to supply resources on a longer term basis, and the Divisional Task Force was born. That force grew and expanded so that by 1982 they reached the full strength of 45 units, strategically placed, with 300 members, all highly trained, physically fit, armed and specialised. One of the key aspects of the force was that they were people expected to be specialised, expected to stay physically fit. I found that force to be exceptionally agile, attentive to and sharp in their duties. They were called to do a special task and they did that task and took it seriously.

That force established systems of divisional patrols, intelligence gathering, surveillance, communication and action plans for specific incidents. Their special task was to counter serious crime, such as bank and post office robberies, kidnapping, hijacking and general subversive activities. They were very successful. Serious crime was put down, bank and post office robberies were reduced to a minimum and the movement of subversives was greatly restricted not only in Border counties but throughout the country.

Consequently, confidence in the Garda was at a high level. Indeed, the crime report for 1982 makes it quite clear that serious crime became stabilised in that period and that the rate of increase had been stopped. The task force to tackle the problem of serious crime, particularly in the Dublin area, had a number of major successes against the more habitual criminal elements. I am citing the Commissioner's Report for 1982 which came out late last year.

If one goes back to media reports one finds areas in which that task force were successful, particularly in preventing and foiling kidnappings, bank robberies and other episodes. The unarmed peace corps were able to go about their duties secure in the knowledge that a corps of specialists existed both in the special task force and the divisional task force to deal effectively with subversives and armed criminals. The special task force, based in Dublin, were set up in 1978 under Fianna Fáil to deal with serious crime in the Dublin Metropolitan area. By 1982 they had a strength of 120 men and it was planned to increase that to 200. They were equipped with high powered transport and communications. They were not expected to escort cash or to become involved in routine protection. They were given freedom of action and movement to carry out their special task. They patrolled Dublin by day and by night and also went to the Border areas for limited periods. They were highly successful in their endeavours. They prevented crimes and they restricted the movement of subversives from north to south and within the Republic. They stopped bank robberies in Dublin, they stopped the movement of arms and explosives and cash to subversives. They were asked to do this in the first instance. Their operation from our point of view was very successful.

At the end of 1982 between the two task forces and the air to ground surveillance systems, which operated outside Dublin, subversives' movements were completely disrupted. An effective security and intelligence system had been established and provided a basis for further improvement and refinement. At the same time the uniformed gardaí remained an unarmed force. I am not suggesting they had reached the pinnacle of their success or capabilities. A basic security and intelligence system had been established and there was obviously scope for learning from experience, for refinement and for the development of that force with that experience. What went wrong in 1983? How did this effective system break down? New management took over both at ministerial and Garda levels. The new management had its own style and swept in amid massive publicity. The new Minister became so preoccupied with scoring political points over his predecessor that he neglected his fundamental responsibility. He never once conceded the major successes in intelligence gathering which his predecessors had achieved and their breakthrough in tackling subversives and in bringing well-known drug dealers to court. One only has to look at the crime report for 1982. That report concedes that major breakthroughs were made by his predecessors in this area. It also points to the fact that the increase in seizures in 1982 went up by 55.56 per cent of heroin in particular. It pointed out that the most disturbing factor in this area was the increasing amount of heroin being seized, which increased from 107 to 1,264 grams in 1982 and pointed out that the largest single seizure was 367.84 grams.

Some of the people who were caught in that period did not, of course, come before the courts until 1983. This was something which the Minister should have been prepared to recognise because in recognising it he was not just recognising his predecessor but he was recognising the system which had been set up, which was there for him to modify and develop as he saw appropriate and to carry on with from there. He knew that he would benefit from the continuation of those developments as more of the drug dealers were caught and as those already apprehended came before the courts. He concentrated instead on the Government's primary political objective of discrediting their political opponents. He also propounded the whitewashing principle of the separation of the Minister for Justice from responsibility for the management of the Garda.

It is quite clear from the 1924 Act, the Ministers and Secretaries Act, that the Department of Justice are responsible for the police. I am quite sure that the Department of Justice are very fully conscious of their responsibility in that respect and I am quite sure that they are very closely involved in the financial and other controls of the operations of the Garda. The 1925 Police Forces (Amalgamation) Act gave the general administration of the Garda to the Commissioner but it pointed out that the Minister may, subject to Government approval, make regulations concerning maintenance, training, discipline, efficiency of the force and various other things and that the Minister is responsible for funds.

How can the Minister do this and how can he know how to do it if he does not keep in touch with the Commissioner and what is happening within the force so that he can be there to provide the support which the Commissioner needs? In the course of the year he allowed the situation to develop which resulted in the most humiliating and embarrassing breakdown in the nation's security since the foundation of the State. This did not happen overnight. It was the result of a whole chain of events which occurred since the beginning of 1983.

The first step in the chain was taken by the Minister when he cut over £3 million from the allocation for Garda pay and overtime made by his predecessor. The second error was made by the Minister when he cut a further £8 million from the published allocation for Garda pay and overtime. I received a reply to a parliamentary question about this matter today at 3.30 p.m. It pointed out that the figure is £7.08 million so it is that figure plus £3 million which is £10.08 million instead of £11 million. It also points out that expenditure on overtime was less than had been provided for because of a number of factors including a more careful monitoring of expenditure undertaken with a view to improving efficiency.

I am beginning to understand that language very well. I would not like to have my budget monitored by the Minister if it means cutbacks of that order. He reduced the prudent provision of his predecessor by £10.08 million. In a situation in which security and the tackling of crime within the country was a massive priority—nobody will disagree with giving priority and we gave it that priority and told the Government that when they came in we would support them in allocating resources — a cutback of that order had to have major effects on the operations of the Garda.

Where did these massive cutbacks occur? Did the Minister take steps to ensure that security and the fight against serious crime would not be put at risk? Did the Minister, in addition to his public campaign, also pursue or condone a purge against the special security personnel, the task forces and arrangements established by the former chief of security? In any event it is abundantly clear that the structures and the intelligence procedures, which had been carefully established since 1978 were demolished during 1983. From the beginning of the year special training was stopped. The divisional task force were returned to routine detective duties and many members were transferred to new locations. The Minister has made various attempts to disguise the facts that the divisional task force has been disestablished and the special task force has been reduced in personnel and limited in resources and in its availability. One could very easily be misled, while listening to the Minister's speech today, into thinking that those special forces were there just as strongly supported and backed up as they were previously and with the same capacity and capability. We now know they are not.

As a result, serious crime is on the increase again with armed robberies by day and by night. Subversives like McGlinchey are moving freely about the country. Gardaí are shot at and humiliated and the number of kidnappings greatly increased. All these culminated at the end of the year in the tragic events at Ballinamore and Claremorris. Ballinamore was a success for the traditional painstaking investigative work of the Garda. It was a disaster in terms of security and intelligence work. The intelligence information, which over the last three years had foiled numerous kidnap attempts, was missing because of the regional task forces being dismantled. The Minister knows from his own records, which are not published, that this is true. Hence the kidnappers knew that there was less likelihood of being detected for a long time in the woods near Ballinamore. The Garda station at Ballinamore, like many others around the country, had been reduced in September 1983 from Border status and its complement of 12 gardaí, including two sergeants and a patrol car, was cut to six gardaí, including one sergeant, on reduced working hours without a patrol car and with the station closing at 1 p.m. daily.

These facts emerged in an answer to a parliamentary question last Thursday. This is the Ballinamore to which the Minister saw fit to make reference in a television programme after the incidents which occured there. The 24-hour opening of the Garda station in Ballinamore was discontinued in September and the opening hours were reduced to 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. on weekdays and 12 noon to 2 p.m. on Sundays. Amazingly in reply to a parliamentary question on 19 January the Minister said:

The Garda authorities consider, however, that the revised arrangements for policing at Ballinamore introduced in September, 1983 are adequate to meet the normal police needs of the area.

But this is not a normal country area. Surely the Minister realises this by now. It seems as if the people of Ballinamore are to be left unprotected even after these events. The Minister criticised the people there and said that many people would be shocked to see the attitude displayed by persons interviewed on a recent television programme when they were asked if they would give information to the Garda in relation to the kidnapping in Ballinamore, or any other information for that matter. How can anyone be shocked by their attitude if they know that the Garda station is only to be opened for three hours a day, that the number of gardaí in the area was halved and that the patrol car they had was taken away? How do the people in Ballinamore feel now that the media and so on have left? They know the mobility and freedom of movement granted to subversives in that area. They have to live with the reality. I call on the Minister to look again at the situation and allow the people in the area to be properly protected as they get on with their lives.

In addition, the task forces have been disbanded from their key base locations. When we look at these locations it is particularly startling. They are Carrick-on-Shannon, Sligo, Donegal, Castlebar, Claremorris, Ballina, Roscommon, Cavan, Monaghan and Longford. People in these areas had been talking about the fact that the task forces were to be disbanded. Some members of the forces wanted to remain in the areas because they had children at school and for other reasons. The local people knew what was happening even though we did not. The members had been returned to routine detective duties with severe curtailment on their availability outside normal working hours. This ties in with the massive savings on overtime and other expenditure during the year. The subversives knew that security, surveillance, patrolling and intelligence gathering was reduced and that they were freer than they had been for three years to go about their business. The people of Ballinamore and other areas were left without adequate protection or support.

Mr. Tidey was kidnapped by people wearing Garda uniforms. It is well known that subversives operate frequently in combat jackets. If the task forces had been in operation continuously over the last 12 months, Ballinamore should not have been a safe place for subversives. It is also known that 19 people had escaped from the Maze Prison and it was likely that at least some of them had made their way south. If the special task force was operating from Dublin with the divisional task forces as they had been previously then the subversives would not have had the freedom of movement they obviously enjoyed.

In a parliamentary question I asked the Minister for Justice when the ground to air surveillance patrols on the movement and activities of subversives and serious criminals was stopped or greatly reduced in 1983 and the reason. In his reply, which I received at 3.30 p.m. today, the Minister said that these patrols were discontinued with effect from 28 February 1983 following an analysis of their effectiveness in preventing crime and subversive activity. That was very early after the new administration took over. If I had been in that position I would have been very careful to ensure that it was kept for some time until I had assessed it.

It was clear that the Garda and the Army were on a highly dangerous mission in seaching for the kidnappers of Mr. Tidey. The procedures for such an operation require that uniformed gardaí must be accompanied by an adequate number of armed detectives and task force members backed up by the Army as necessary. Why, then, were recruits used on this dangerous mission? If the figures given on the "Today Tonight" television programme on 10 January 1984 are correct then of the 13 uniformed gardaí in the 25-man search party nine were recruits. If the total number involved in the search was of the order of 400 and not 2,000 which the public were led to believe, why then was it necessary to use raw and inexperienced recruits? The Minister emphasised again today the physical fitness of the recruits. Between the Army, the Rangers, the task forces, the detective units and the 11,200 members of the Garda surely it could have been possible to find the required search party of physically fit and experienced men. Surely there are men throughout those forces who would be physically fit. The Commissioner repeatedly mentioned "physically fit" in press releases. The recruits generally are to be commended for their bravery and for the fact that they acted expeditiously. In particular, the recruit who pushed the car in front of the escaping car showed forethought and presence of mind. However, that is not the question. The question is why so many recruits were used, particularly in the front line, to go after people who would cut your throat in a church and smile as they came out. These were young men who were only weeks into their training programme. Surely the training programme must mean more than that.

There are many other questions the Minister must answer. It has been stated that advance information was available that Mr. Tidey was in a dugout in Leitrim and possibly in the Ballinamore area and that the Commissioner visited the area in advance of the operation. Special aerial equipment for such a situation was to have been purchased in 1983. It could have been borrowed. It had been tested. Was it offered to the Garda? The Minister should answer that because it was strategic to the whole operation. If it had been used there could have been a different approach to the situation. Radio communications were disastrous. Every few months the Minister makes a statement to the effect that the proposed new system is coming. It was not available in Ballinamore. It is not available for the daily prevention of crime in Dublin and elsewhere throughout the country. Without it the criminal has the upper hand.

For some time, the Border areas have been less protected due to the cutbacks and policy changes in 1983. These are the withdrawal of the divisional task forces, the reduction of special task force visits from Dublin and the reduction in staff and overtime in Border areas. Consequently, both criminals and subversives have enjoyed much greater freedom in recent months. This was known to us because people told us what they saw on the ground. It must also have been obvious to the Minister and to the Commissioner, who are privy to intelligence information, that security and curtailment were slipping. The Garda are looking for the support they had in 1982 and the restoration of a definite programme of training and equipment. This programme must now have definite time limits for completion.

The Garda representative association called for a review of operational readiness for kidnapping, hijackings and subversives and the return of the divisional task forces. The operation of checkpoints has left much to be desired. The uniformed garda must be backed up by task force or other armed personnel. Several recent incidents demonstrate this reality. The most obvious was the shooting of the two unarmed gardaí at the checkpoint at Rooskey following an armed raid on the post office in Galway. Previously they would have been backed up by the divisional task force from Carrick-on-Shannon but not this time because it had been disbanded. Similar situations arose at Ballycroy and in the attempt to stop McGlinchey in Wexford. It seems pretty clear that McGlinchey's car should have been followed and urgent help sought. But there also the divisional task force was not operational. The units which had operated from Enniscorthy and Wexford were disbanded.

We in Fianna Fáil call on the Government to take immediate steps to deal with the emergency which has been allowed to arise in national security. These steps will include the provision of adequate finance, equipment and personnel to allow gardaí to do their work effectively. This will require a revision of the recently published Estimates for the Department of Justice which show that inadequate finance has again been provided for 1984.

There should be the re-establishment of a regional security task force to replace the divisional task force which was disbanded during 1983. A new name can be provided for this force to lesson the political embarrassment for the Government. This force should again be provided with the training, equipment and operational flexibility to master these subversives.

There should be the restoration of comprehensive Border security through the location of task force units at strategic points, as applied prior to their disestablishment, and the use of the special Dublin-based task force in support of these units. There should be the restoration of systematic task force surveillance with ground-to-air back-up which had proved so successful in disrupting serious crime and the movement of subversives.

There should be the restoration of Border post status to Ballinamore, including the previous complement of personnel and patrols and the restoration of similar status to other posts which have been downgraded during 1983. There should be a full inquiry into the events that led to the breakdown in intelligence and security in 1983 and action taken to ensure that the humiliating mistakes in management demonstrated by Claremorris, Ballinamore and the rise in subversive activity will not be repeated.

The reduction in security which resulted from management decisions, cutbacks and reorganisations in 1983 cannot be allowed to continue. No amount of smokescreen or public relations — such as the Minister's suggestion that internment was being considered — will replace the provision of resources and the strategic deployment of personnel. The Government must heed the call from the Garda Representative Bodies and from this House for urgent and practical action in the area of security. Serious crime and subversion must be contained again and this can only be done through the allocation of resources to intelligence and prevention.

The Minister should recognise that mistakes have been made in 1983 and take the steps that are clearly necessary. In so doing he can be assured of our full support. In our view the security of the State and of its citizens should be above party politics.

Mr. De Rossa

In his speech the Minister acknowledged that this debate takes place more or less as a result of the murders of two men in the Tidey kidnapping operation at Ballinamore. It is important to note one of the statements of Deputy Woods in relation to subversion when he said the aim must be to contain subversion and that the necessary powers and facilities should be provided to the Garda and the security forces to do this.

In case there is any misunderstanding about anything I may say during the debate, I wish to state that I have utter and total contempt for the terrorism, the aims and objectives of the Provisional IRA and the INLA. If we are talking seriously about the security of the State and attempts to defeat subversion we must go further than simply looking at matters such as the adequacy of communications and equipment and the management of the Garda. It comes down to a question as to what are the elements in our traditions on which subversives feed, to what extent do the ambiguities that exist in our society feed the activities of the Provisional and INLA subversives.

We have had examples of this kind of ambiguity in the recent weeks and months.

It is also useful to compare the kind of publicity given to the murder of the garda and the Irish soldier at Ballinamore with the few inches given last Friday in our daily papers to the murder of an unarmed UDR man. By giving two inches to the murder of the UDR man and front page coverage to the killing of the garda and the Irish soldier, are we implying in some way that it is less of a crime to kill a UDR man, whether he be armed or unarmed? How often have we heard condemnations in the State of the killing of people in Northern Ireland, whether they be British Army soldiers, UDR men or RUC men? How often have we heard the term "innocent victims" when all the victims, whether they be armed or unarmed, of the Provos, the INLA or the UVF are innocent victims? We have to be very careful of the terminology we use and of the ambiguities we may convey by the use of our language in relation to subversives.

The Provos and the INLA seek justification for their activities in the history of this State. It is not too long ago that a leading member of the Provos was invited to speak at a commemoration of the Kilmichael ambush in Cork, again by prominent political people who are represented in this House. There is an ambiguity in that kind of invitation and in that kind of activity. There was much condemnation about what was said by that spokesman for the Provos, but the ambiguity remains. Is it all right for the Provos and the INLA to kill whom they like when they like in Northern Ireland provided the people concerned wear the crown or are associated with the crown, but it is not all right if they turn their guns on us down here?

I wish again to stress that in no way am I giving any kind of support to the Provos or the INLA by my remarks. I am simply drawing attention to the fact that security is not simply a matter of the number of gardaí on the beat, the number of gardaí who are armed and the amount of equipment and so on. It depends ultimately on our objectives as a country. It has to be said that Deputy Blaney accepted responsibility for the creation of the Provisional IRA in 1972 in the debate on the 1976 Offences Against the State Act. During that debate we were assured that the Provisional IRA would never in any circumstances turn their guns on the people of this State. Obviously that has been proved to be untrue many times since the establishment of the Provos and the subsequent establishment of the INLA.

It must also be recognised that despite the rhetoric of these people concerning unity — recently they have taken on the rhetoric of socialism also — it is clear from their activities that their primary aim and the drive of all their activities is to create a civil war in Northern Ireland that will embroil everyone on the island. There is no other logical explanation of their activities at this time.

However, that is not to exonerate the security failures that have taken place. As a lay person it seems to me there are gaps in the communications of the Garda. It seems to me it should not be possible for a number of incidents to occur one after another where gardaí have been stripped of their uniforms. It appears the system of communications of the force has played a large part in enabling that kind of humiliation of the Garda to take place.

It must also be said that the morale of the Garda has been hit and not only by the failure to provide adequate training, facilities and communications. About a year ago the Minister for Justice announced that there would be an inquiry into allegations of political interference in the Garda Síochána. That led then to the resignation of two of the most senior members of the force, but to date the inquiry has not been held. That must also bear heavily on the morale of the gardaí in their everyday work.

The primary point which I wish to make in this debate on behalf of The Workers' Party is that the Garda must have adequate management structures, adequate communication and adequate numbers involved but also there must be a political fight back against subversion and terrorism.

Deputy Cooney on a previous occasion in this House called on the Catholic Church to condemn the Provos and those who support them. That, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing. However, it is foolish for politicians to expect any church, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, to do the job which we ourselves should be doing, that is, providing the political fight back at subversion. The first step in that regard is for all politicians in this House to root out any ambiguity in themselves towards what are euphemistically called "the lads".

Mr. Cooney

Does that include the Official IRA?

Mr. De Rossa

Yes, it includes the Official IRA, without any doubt whatsoever.

Mr. Cooney

Good.

Mr. De Rossa

That ambiguity is fairly widespread. It does not exist merely in this House but in the media. I have already referred to the space allocated to the murder of a UDR man in Northern Ireland, consisting of two inches on the front page of The Irish Times and two inches on page nine of the Irish Independent of last Friday. That is not good enough. Giving such coverage appears to be making it less of a crime.

The politicians of this State must revive respect for politics by ending what is generally known as stroke politics — the ability to have one up on one's opponents by pulling off a stroke.

The question of the economy must also be dealt with. There is no doubt whatsoever that our economic recession is providing recruits for subversive organisations who are offering a simplistic solution to the problems of this island. We are told: "Brits out and the problems of the island will be solved".

We must examine our rhetoric, particularly at election times, in relation to what is euphemistically called the national question. Politicians of various views and from various sides attempt to gain advantage over their opponents on the basis of appearing to be more nationalistic than the others and more concerned about what they call the British occupation of our island.

In addition, we in this House must encourage politicians in Northern Ireland to become involved in politics in Northern Ireland, by using the Assembly which exists there. It is not good enough to encourage the SDLP, for instance, to participate in the New Ireland Forum, in Westminster and in the European Parliament but to ignore the Assembly of elected representatives in Northern Ireland. It is a condemnation of the politicians of Northern Ireland that they are able to meet in the European Parliament and Westminster and have talks between Unionist and Nationalist. They are able to come together, shoulder to shoulder, at the graveside of people shot dead, but cannot come together in the Assembly in Northern Ireland to talk about the problems affecting that State.

This Government must look at the question of incitement to religious and racial hatred. Speeches made on various occasions down through the years have fuelled the idea that in some way the people in Northern Ireland who do not cling to a belief that we should have a united Ireland are in some way inferior and are not entitled to the same civil rights and freedom to express their own political views as the nationalist population there.

Basically, while it is fairly obvious that there are gaps in the security services and a need to improve communications, in particular in the Garda, tightening of security is not all that is needed. I welcome the Minister's recent statement that he does not intend to arm the Garda. Apart from the question of providing adequate security forces, adequately equipped and with adequate communications, we as politicians must decide not to give solace of any kind by word or deed to those who claim to act in our name in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.

Mr. L.T. Cosgrave

I, too, welcome the opportunity of saying a few words in relation to timely aspects of security, particularly in the aftermath of disturbing events. A debate like this is relevant as it gives an opportunity to discuss, even briefly, matters of eminent importance affecting the country at present. It should not be only in the aftermath of certain events that we examine the situation but from time to time in this House we should do so in relation to the operation of our Defence Forces or semi-State bodies. It is to be hoped that some of the committees will make this examination and that their report will be brought into this House so that the Minister concerned will respond and action can be taken.

As the Minister stated, the basic aspect of security is the right of every citizen to go about his or her daily business without fear of being mugged, robbed or intimidated from any quarter whatsoever. This is the basic reason for the existence of security forces, who are there to maintain the rule of law. It is only by a combination of all efforts that the rule of law will be maintained here and at a satisfactory level. Unfortunately, some people are quite happy to attack those who maintain that security and other individuals. The message from this House should be clear and unequivocal, in the aftermath of the death of Garda Sheehan and Private Kelly. We owe them, in view of their dedication and their service to the country, the assurance that the Army and Garda are given every resource possible to meet the situation as it evolves whenever there is an apparent breakdown of law and order.

Hopefully the Minister, his officials and the Government will respond to recent criticism about the Ballinamore incident in order to ascertain what has gone wrong to date, what may have happened either there or in Claremorris, to ensure that it will not happen again. There may have been some bad luck involved in those incidents but certainly some questions remain unanswered in regard to policy in regard to such events. Luckily, however, Mr. Don Tidey was recovered alive with no ransom having been paid. Then there was the situation in which the security forces came upon Mr. Tidey and his captors and when two members of the security forces lost their lives. There was then the aftermath, the hunt for his kidnappers. The Minister did mention the radio facilities available to the forces or that apparently the kidnappers were able to listen in. It would seem strange in this day and age that frequency alternator or scramblers could not be used on such radio equipment. However I am not an expert on this subject. But some of these questions will have to be answered. In such situations radio equipment should be available to the Garda into which only they can tune. There might also be cause for the use of tracker dogs or any other assistance that might well have been used there. Certainly it would appear that there is need for such in some cases and that through their usage there might have been a more fruitful outcome. The morale of some of the Defence Forces has suffered in recent days. However we should not forget the successes of the Garda in the past year, in recovering Mr. Tidey, in thwarting a kidnapper in another incident and various successes in deterring other robberies and in regard to the bringing to trial of some drugs barons.

We must from our various experiences ascertain what other regulations or rules may need to be reviewed. In regard to the Clarmorris event it would appear that some procedures were not complied with. We shall have to ascertain the directions given to members of the task force or Army personnel involved there. For example, were they to fire in the air only or were they to return fire? It is clear that the people belonging to the various para-military organisations who throw grenades, use machine guns or other weapons — people who stage some of these horrific robberies — will kill members of our Defence Forces and innocent people into the bargain if it suits them. We should not be under any illusion in relation to the policies of such so-called para-military groups. It is clear that when it suits the IRA, the INLA, or any other group in the course of robberies or otherwise they will shoot members of the Defence Forces and innocent people if it happens to suit their purpose. It may well suit them not to carry on their activities on such a large scale this side of the Border. The Opposition spokesman mentioned the situation in Roscommon, the killings there. It is quite clear that the perpetrators of such incidents will stop at nothing when somebody happens to get in their way and we should ensure that all our policies are geared towards having the maximum security effect.

Security is too serious a matter for Members on either side of the House to score political points in regard to successes or failures on any aspects of it. I am sure all Members would agree with me in this. Another situation has arisen recently in regard to Garda checkpoints. The situation must be re-evaluated in regard to routine checks around this city, examining vehicles for motor taxation as distinct from those when there is a hunt on for a certain well-known subversive who may either have shot a member of the Defence Forces or murdered people in the past. We must have a different set of rules or regulations in regard to the various types of checkpoints. Where there is obvious danger to unarmed gardaí they must be backed up either by detectives or Army personnel. When replying I hope the Minister will indicate that some of these procedures are being examined. Since the Minister for Defence is present also I might add that there is need for an on-going review of situations involving Garda/Army personnel, ensuring that they co-operate to the full with one another. In massive manhunts it is obvious that both Garda and Army personnel will have to be drafted into a given area to assist in bringing the perpetrators of such incidents to justice.

It is vital that there be no ambivalence shown from this House towards any of these activities. Some Members of the House, including the present Minister for Defence, were criticised some years ago that they were over-concerned with security. Indeed, some people contended that instead they should be getting on with the general business of running the country. I should like to have known the response of such people in the aftermath of the Ballinamore or Claremorris incidents. I would ask: could we have had too much security in those cases? Can there be too much security while there are people being mugged, people's houses being broken into, people being shot, with innocent people being injured or caught up in bank or other raids? Therefore it is important that there be no ambivalence at any level because the very fabric of society is at stake here. Economic stability and progress are linked to a stable society. If there is to be economic progress, if we are to endeavour to get people back to work, there must be a stable situation obtaining, with a Government democratically elected by the people seen to be governing.

I am glad to note that Garda recruitment is being maintained at a certain level; I think it is the highest ever at present. However, we must examine various aspects of their training in Templemore. They will have to be equipped and trained to combat the modern criminal, ensuring that the rule of law is maintained. It is important also that their rostering procedures be examined, because at certain hours of the day it would be important that there be more Garda on the beat so that, with their presence, the public may feel more confident. Obviously the Garda will have to take into account that robberies take place in the mornings, early afternoons and evenings. Certain times of the day are more critical than others, when the vast number of crimes take place. It is important that all these aspects be reviewed.

When the Minister has meetings at regular intervals with the Commissioner I am sure he is briefed and that he asks if the Garda superintendents in various districts are satisfied with the way the situation is being handled. We must also look at cutbacks in money because the public demand that they should be able to go about their ordinary business without fear of intimidation, robbery or being mugged. No matter how serious the general financial situation is, if extra money has to be found it will be found and I am sure the Minister would support such a policy.

The main Opposition spokesman made great play with regard to the altered manpower at Ballinamore station. I think he was trying to make political capital out of the fact that there were fewer men there than heretofore. Obviously there is difficult terrain around Ballinamore but it could have taken place anywhere and it is physically impossible to have men on every mountain watching for the possibility of kidnappings and so on. We must be realistic in regard to this matter. When such a search is taking place we must ensure that there are enough gardaí and Army personnel in the area with full facilities and the necessary resources to enable them, as far as possible, to bring the perpetrators of crime to justice. That should be our basic objective.

I believe that the morale of the Garda and the Army is still good. It is up to all the Members of this House to give them the necessary support. Both Ministers, in conjunction with their various chiefs in the Army and the Garda, should review what happened in Ballinamore. They may have had bad luck but mistakes were also made. There should be no ambivalence on the part of any Member of this House at any time, not just in the aftermath of a kidnapping or robbery which gets the headlines. That should apply two years after the events in Ballinamore as well as two days after the events. The message should go out from this House that the Army and the Garda who have served the State well will get the necessary back-up and the necessary resources. If certain reviews have to be made in relation to their operations, to extra finance, extra manpower or redeployment to a certain area, that will be done. There is no foolproof method, the problems did not arise overnight. Ballinamore has been one in a litany of incidents over the past decade or so. We must be very concerned at all times in relation to all aspects of security because we owe it to every man, woman and child to go about their daily lives without fear of being intimidated. There must be no ambivalence about murder; murder is murder for whatever purpose it is committed. We must be concerned about all aspects of security because if there is even one person instilling fear into a citizen, we have a problem.

I hope the Minister will indicate what matters are kept continually under review. I also hope that we will have the necessary response to the report of the Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism.

Mr. Barrett

(Clare): This debate on security is timely because of the recent violent events and the discussion in the media on the roles of the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces in countering the activities of people who have no regard for human life, no respect for the democratic process or the rule of law and order.

The price paid by our security forces engaged in these tasks was tragically highlighted by the deaths of young Garda Sheehan and Private Kelly during the search for Mr. Tidey. Like all Members of the House, my sympathy goes out to the parents and family of Garda Sheehan and to Mrs. Kelly and the members of her family. From time to time our Defence Forces suffered casualties on active service when they were peacekeeping overseas with the United Nations. Examples that come to mind are Southern Lebanon and, further back, Niemba in the Congo. Tragic though such happenings are, they arise from disturbed situations in which the United Nations intervene and in which the soldiers volunteering for service with the United Nations forces are fully aware of the risks and dangers involved. Against that background, it must come as a great shock to all right minded people when members of our security forces are done to death in their own country by their own countrymen. This is not a time for criticism of the security forces but it is a time for a review of security arrangements. The tasks of the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces are heavy and dangerous. Since the commencement of the troubles in Northern Ireland, the security forces have been involved in various aspects of internal security, geared towards denying subversives the material and money needed by them and in curbing their activities within the State.

As has been said in this House, the primary responsibility for internal security rests with the Garda Síochána. Over the years, Governments have endeavoured to give that force the resources required for these additional tasks. The Minister knows that when internal security problems of the kind we have to cope with extend over a number of years, it is essential to have a continuous review of methods and equipment. I would ask the Minister to ensure, even in these times of financial restraint, that the needs of the Garda Síochána are fully catered for in manpower, communications and equipment. The force are entitled to adequate and modern resources to enable them to continue, with success, the good work which they have been doing during the past year. The Minister might also consider whether the current situation calls for any changes in the structure of the force to ensure the most effective use of manpower.

Another important aspect is training. I was pleased to note recently the announcement made by the Minister of the acquisition of premises to expand the training facilities of the force. I hope these facilities will be fully used with the objective of having a Garda force trained to the highest level.

In case the Minister or anyone else may take my remarks as being critical of the Garda Síochána, I should stress that I have nothing but the highest admiration for the way members of the force carry out their duties. The various successes of good police work over the years are evident to anyone who wishes to acknowledge them. Too often, unfortunately, the hard work that goes into these achievements is quickly forgotten in the wake of criticism of some incident where success has not been achieved.

The Minister will appreciate the natural anxiety that the force should have the fullest support of the Government in the matter of essential resources. As has been said by Ministers for Defence many times in this House, while the primary role of the Defence Forces is to defend the State against external aggression, their main task for many years past has been the provision of support and aid to the civil power, the Garda Síochána, in internal security matters. Joint Army-Garda patrols operate continuously in the Border area and in other areas as required and requested. The Defence Forces also provide on a continuous basis, personnel and transport for escorts of cash in transit or explosives in transit. They attend blasting operations and Army bomb disposal teams are called on by the Garda as required. They also support the Prison Service.

It is appreciated that all these activities call for an adequate force in addition to well trained men. The Defence Forces personnel acquit themselves in an exemplary fashion and fulfil their tasks in a way which shows their true loyalty and devotion to duty. During my time as Minister for Defence, I never heard a real complaint about the long hours or disturbance involved in many of the duties which have to be undertaken. Having regard to what I have just said, it is important that the Defence Forces, as well as the Garda Síochána, should have the full support of the Government for the resources they need.

In recent years recruiting to the Army has been on a restricted basis. This has resulted in some loss of strength. In my experience increases in the strength of the Garda Síochána have not led to a reduced demand for the services of the Defence Forces in a supporting role. On the contrary, the increased activity of the Garda appears to have resulted in greater demand for military assistance. The need for maintaining military strength at an adequate level is, therefore, obvious and I hope this will be borne in mind continually by the Government.

The demands made on the Defence Forces have grown rapidly in recent years because of the troubles in the northern part of our country. For example, there are three battalions on full-time duty along the Border from Donegal to Dundalk. There has been an increasing demand for escort duties and other security duties, such as assisting the Prison Service and elsewhere and we have one battalion continuously on duty with UNIFIL in Lebanon. Other members of our Defence Forces are acting as observers with the United Nations in Cyprus, Israel, Syria and Egypt. These continuing demands for personnel create a very great drain on the Defence Forces. I ask the Minister to reactivate a recruiting campaign for the Defence Forces to ensure that we will have the necessary personnel when they are called on to help the police. Because of our unfortunate unemployment situation we can be assured that the people recruited to the Army will be of the very highest calibre and will make excellent members of the Defence Forces.

The question of arming gardaí has been mentioned many times but their representatives would not agree to such a suggestion. I agree with them because the Defence Forces, who are armed, are available to assist them at any time. I would like to know if the Minister gave any thought to requesting Army personnel for the Ballycroy road block. If there had been two armed Army personnel properly positioned at that roadblock, the situation might have been different.

Mr. Kenny

It was a poteen roadblock.

Mr. Barrett

(Clare): That was a very dangerous situation because at that time, the tension was very high in that area and those manning the roadblock could not be sure they would only meet poteen makers.

As I said, I would not agree with the suggestion to arm the Garda. This is not an occasion to criticise the Garda or the Defence Forces, as other Deputies have rightly said. We should admire what they are trying to do in present circumstances. They are a credit to this nation. The Ballinamore exercise could not be regarded as having been a complete success but at least it succeeded in rescuing the kidnapped person, Mr. Tidey. The unfortunate incidents which followed were most regrettable.

Deputy Woods mentioned the fact that some of the personnel stationed permanently in Ballinamore were withdrawn some time around September and that they were below strength. Deputy Cosgrave misinterpreted what Deputy Woods said when he made that remark. He meant that the people of Ballinamore as shown on the television programme — their reluctance to give any co-operation and the way in which they answered questions — were affected by the fact that fewer personnel were stationed in the town for some months and that they were under the proper strength.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Cooney)

I should like to intervene in this debate to make some points arising out of what I heard so far. The debate takes place in the aftermath of recent tragic events. I should like to take this opportunity to express our sense of sympathy with the relatives of those who lost their lives in such a cruel fashion in Ballinamore. The cold-blooded ruthlessness of those murders shocked many people out of their complacency about the underlying dangers to our society from those who are engaged in subversive terrorist activities.

The operation there has caused a lot of soul searching about the efficiency of the response the State can make to subversive terrorism. Quite obviously there are lessons to be learned from the operation in Ballinamore, which is the operation to which I will refer because the Defence Forces were heavily involved there. The lessons essentially are those which can be learned from any joint operation — for example, the difficulties of co-ordination, co-operation and command when two forces are involved. The effects of that joint operation are being assembled and assimilated and the necessary corrective measures will be taken where such appear to be necessary and are in the course of being taken already.

I should like to repeat Deputy Barrett's tribute to the spirit and morale of the Defence Forces. In my comparatively short time in the Department of Defence, and in my contacts with members of the Defence Forces, I have been consistently impressed by their total dedication to the tasks they have to perform. This does not relate to officer rank only; it refers to all ranks. At a time such as the operation at Ballinamore the demands on their time are quite extraordinary. These demands are responded to in a total spirit of co-operation and, I can say deliberately, goodwill.

I had occasion on Christmas day to meet some of our troops who had just come off duty and were prepared to go back on duty. They had not seen their families for some time. I was impressed by their cheerful approach to the task they had to carry out, their recognition of the seriousness of their task and their sense of responsibility about it.

In 1983 the Army had to provide 18,000 military parties in the course of providing joint Garda-Army checkpoints. A further 10,000 patrols were sent out onto the road network along the Border. A further 4,000 patrols operated in areas other than the Border; 1,000 escort parties were supplied for explosives and blasting operations; and almost 3,000 parties escorted cash in transit. Those figures will give the House some idea of the demands which have to be made on the Defence Forces. As those demands are heavy, obviously we have to keep the strength of the Defence Forces under constant scrutiny to ensure that the demands do not impinge too heavily on the Defence Forces and their morale might be damaged or service in the Army as a career might become unattractive.

Obviously a constraint on all activities of the Government is the financial one. We have to balance the financial constraint with the need to have efficient and satisfied Defence Forces. This is a balance to which the Government give constant attention. I have no doubt that, should the Government find it necessary to increase the strength of the Army during the course of this year, if we find that the burden of duties is becoming excessive or that the efficiency or capacity of the Army to respond to given situations is prejudiced by virtue of numbers, the House will respond generously to any request to vote extra money in that regard.

I want to assure the House that the numbers are being kept at the level which we consider to be appropriate to discharge the duties which the Army face from time to time. Last year there was recruiting to ensure that units which had fallen below a satisfactory level of strength were brought up to a desirable figure. Recruiting was selective. It did not take place in all the commands, but in the commands where numbers had fallen to an unacceptable level. The position is monitored on a constant basis.

Sometimes I am asked can we afford to have a battalion of troops in the Lebanon when there are such demands on the forces at home. The continued maintenance of the battalion in the Lebanon is one factor in the equation which we keep under review. Our strengths are geared to enable us to continue to provide the battalion in the Lebanon. For a number of reasons it is important that we should continue to maintain the battalion in the Lebanon and it is Government policy at the moment so to do. The contribution of that battalion to the UNIFIL operation is important. The UNIFIL operation is of vital importance to preventing a worsening of the situation in that country. From the point of view of our obligations to the United Nations, we have a serious duty to maintain a presence in UNIFIL.

From the point of view of our Defence Forces, service abroad with the United Nations is of immense value to their morale and their professionalism. Over the years that service has done an immense amount of good for our Defence Forces. I have no doubt that it would be detrimental if we were to cease to have this involvement in the UN overseas operations. For these reasons, as of now the Government are continuing to maintain an Army battalion in the Lebanon. I have no doubt that recruiting will ensure that that policy will be continued.

Any lessons learned from recent joint operations are being assessed and will be taken into account. Quite clearly there is a difficult security situation on this island, and a growing one in this jurisdiction. The incidence of ordinary crime has reached such a level that there is a considerable amount of fear and apprehension among ordinary citizens in situations which should be free from fear. To some extent there is a breakdown in society. The stigma of crime no longer deters many sections of our population from committing crimes. Even the fear of detection, which was regarded traditionally as being the strongest deterrent, does not seem to have the same effect now as it had in the past. Obviously we have reason for worry.

As far as ordinary crime is concerned, the causes of that are so complex and so many that they could provoke a detailed social analysis of the state of contemporary Irish society and that is beyond the scope of this debate. There is one factor to which I would draw attention, that is, the need for the public to co-operate fully with the police force of this State. The word "inform" has pejorative meanings because of Irish history. I recall when I was in Justice some years ago using the word deliberately in a speech calling on the people to inform on criminals and for my pains I was castigated and criticised that I wanted to turn the Irish people into a race of informers. We must face up to the harsh reality that our police force and our Defence Forces will be only as efficient as we, the community, decide to make them be, and we can make them efficient by giving them the information that will enable them to detect and apprehend criminals. We as a nation must face up to the fact that the guards are our police and that we have an obligation to stand behind them and support them in the most practical way possible, that is, by giving them information.

One of the reasons that information has not been forthcoming — I say this not in the context of ordinary crime but in the context of terrorist crime — is that it is beginning to emerge that there is a considerable amount of intimidation in certain parts of the country. Deputies who, like me, saw a television programme some weeks ago in the aftermath of the Ballinamore incident saw interviews with a number of citizens outside their church where they had been urged by their pastor only a short time previously to co-operate and who condemned the activities of terrorists. They were asked what their views were and whether they would give information. Uniformly they indicated that they did not want to deal with the question. I am satisfied that those people were not sympathisers. They may have been confused and ambivalent but a significant number of them, the decent people, were afraid. In parts of the country such as the Border counties we have perhaps underestimated the degree of fear on the part of people living in isolated areas, fear of the visit at night from the subversive. This fear has provoked co-operation and has made the safe houses available. This fear has contributed to the success of some terrorist operations or, if not to their success, to their continuation.

We as a community will have to decide how to remove that fear from these people and encourage them to trust the forces of the State to protect them from any possible retaliation should they do their duty as citizens. It will be a difficult task because when fear to that extent begins to pervade a community the rule of law becomes damaged and freedom does not exist because freedom and fear are incompatible in that context. We will have to consider how the resources of the State will be made available in these vulnerable areas to ensure that the nocturnal activities of terrorists intimidating their neighbours are brought to a halt, that fear is removed and that the water in which these terrorist fish seek to swim will be removed from them.

I was very heartened in the course of this debate by the contribution by Deputy De Rossa. His condemnation of terrorism and the activities of the Provisional IRA, the Official IRA and INLA was quite unequivocal and to my ears was very welcome. I do not say that in any patronising way. I welcome the entry of The Workers' Party into democratic politics. I would be less than honest if I did not say that my welcome has a slight reservation and it is this: The Workers' Party was previously known as Sinn Féin, The Workers' Party and before that it was known as Official Sinn Féin. In that transition the name has changed, the personnel have not changed and the structures have not changed. The philosophy, which is the important thing, is changing. We might not agree with the direction in which it is going, but when it was Official Sinn Féin a decade or more ago I do not think anyone had any doubt that there was in existence at that time the Official equivalent of the Provisional IRA. One of the question marks is that the Official IRA has never publicly announced that it is disbanding and that question mark I have about the total commitment of The Workers' Party to democratic politics will only be removed when the Official IRA officially announces that it is disbanding and proves that by handing up its arms. I would dearly love to see that happen so that the democratic process would be enhanced by the unreserved and unqualified participation of a body that in the past, even as lately as a decade ago, was opposed to the democratic process of this State. I would dearly like to see that happen. I do not particularly mind if the political philosophy is Marxism, even though we must be alert to the dangers of Marxism to our democracy because Marxism and the democratic process are incompatible. So long as it is out in the open and the Irish people can make their choice, then that is a welcome development.

I repeat what I believe to be the most important message that can come from this debate: that the people of this country are the first defenders of their own freedoms and they can discharge that obligation most effectively by total co-operation, by standing up to the criminal and by preferring the regular forces of the State by giving them total co-operation and all the information which comes to their knowledge or is in their hands. Our guards will only be as efficient as we the people choose to make them. I hope the message that goes out to the country from this debate is that we, the elected representatives, want to ensure that our country is as free and as safe for our citizens to live in as any western democracy and that we will do our part to ensure that happens but that ultimately it is for the citizens of the country to do themselves.

Mr. O'Malley

I have read the speech which the Minister made at the outset of this debate. While there is not a great deal in it with which I would take any serious issue, it is markedly very defensive. It keeps referring back to events that have happened already. There is no element that is forward looking or indicates any new thinking in respect of the security problems we have had for well over a decade and which, unhappily, it is only realistic to say we are likely to have for quite a number of years to come. There are ten or 12 different references to his predecessors and previous Commissioners and the decisions which they took. I can only describe those references to predecessors and to previous Commissioners as being in a somewhat defensive vein which is hardly necessary.

More appropriately an effort should be made to stimulate not only in this House generally but throughout the country a fresher approach to the very serious security problems we face. When I talk of security problems in the context of this debate, I am talking of those problems that are terrorist- or subversive-related because they are the ones which perhaps impinge most on us. Consequently most of what I have to say will be related to that aspect. At the same time it is well to recognise that in respect of what the Garda refer to as the ordinary side of crime, there is an extremely serious problem also, a problem that would not seem to be lessening.

The reference in the Minister's speech to the fact that last year there were only four armed bank robberies is an indication of how figures can be used to give a false impression. I accept that the Minister's information is correct but we must realise that there were hundreds of armed robberies of cash last year. The fact that the banks after many years have taken greater precautions in conjunction with the Garda has not solved the overall problem from the point of view of security. It is hardly to the advantage of the community that post offices and cash in transit tend now to be more the targets of armed robbery. If anything, the situation is perhaps worse because of the greater degree of vulnerability of these non-banking situations.

There has been a debate here today in some detail about the Garda Síochána from several points of view. I have had a relatively long association in political form with the Garda from the early part of 1970 onwards and I have rarely if ever had to think other than highly of them as a body but in spite of all that has happened in regard to the Garda in the past 12 to 14 years there is no doubt but that they face enormous difficulties. In so far as this House and the Government can help them in those difficulties, every effort should be made to do so.

The effectiveness of any police force is dependent on at least four factors. These are manpower, training, equipment and commitment. I shall consider those elements briefly.

The manpower of the Garda is adequate. The numbers are higher than ever before but I would have some concern in regard to the next two factors because I regard the level of training and of equipment to be neither sufficient nor appropriate for the semi-permanent war against subversives and terrorists in which the Garda unhappily are engaged on our behalf. It should be borne in mind that these subversives and terrorists are organised on para-military lines while the training and equipment of our police force is basically on civilian lines, for civilian duty. The high regard in which the Garda have been held traditionally is due to the good relations that they were able to establish with the ordinary civilian community in all parts of the country during a period of 50 years. While the Garda are in a situation now in which for many of them most of the working week is devoted directly to contact with the ordinary civilian community, they are involved also in a great many varieties of activity intended to counteract subversive and violent activity. By and large from the mid-twenties when the Garda became fully established we have been a peaceful community. At least that was the situation into the seventies. During that time an entirely civilian-orientated and unarmed police force was undoubtedly appropriate. There was something of a hiatus during the war years but as that was a circumstance outside our control, it would be wrong to draw any conclusion from it. From the seventies onwards, and no less today, we are in a different situation from the situation we enjoyed in that half century of internal peace. Because we are no longer in an inherently peaceful situation we must now rethink our attitude to our police force, to think in terms of the kind of police force we need.

Sometimes when people criticise our Garda, they seem to forget that they are the only police force in western Europe operating in a country that has a land frontier with another area or jurisdiction that is in chaos. Inevitably there must be enormous difficulties for the police force of the adjoining jurisdiction. There is no other police force in western Europe who must face that problem. Would we not be wiser to recognise that fact and all that flows from it instead of continuing simply to think in the terms in which we thought appropriately in regard to our police force for more than half a century? We must remember also that much of the subversive violence to which we are now subjected emanates from outside the area over which our Garda have jurisdiction. A high proportion of those convicted of terrorist-type crime in the Republic do not originate in the Republic. That is an added difficulty for our police force.

The suggestion is made from time to time, and one can see in the Minister's speech some thought being given to the possibility, that we should arm the Garda Síochána. That suggestion was made first, I think to me, in 1970 after a garda was shot dead on Arran Quay in Dublin. It was made on subsequent occasions to me and, I am sure, to many other Ministers for Justice. The Garda themselves to the best of my knowledge were never keen on it. In fact they were very much opposed to it in the early seventies and I do not believe they would look on the situation any differently now.

If we were to arm the Garda Síochána we would immediately be in danger of writing off the goodwill that force has built up over two or three generations. At the same time we have got to recognise that the security problem with which our police force has to deal is immensely greater and more difficult than was the case hitherto during most of their existence. I believe we should now give consideration to the possibility of the establishment of a second police force, parallel with the Garda Síochána, a police force organised on para-military lines to counter most effectively the kind of problems with which the country is afflicted today and which our civilian police force, perfectly understandably, have difficulty from time to time in controlling.

I would remind the House that we are one of the few countries in the world which has only one police force. I am told that in some continental countries, like France for instance, there are as many as eight different forces for different purposes, but not necessarily for different regions. The British are somewhat different too. They are more like us except that they have their police force organised on a regional rather than on national lines. We certainly do not recommend that. There is no benefit for us in that because our country is too small a unit, but there is a great deal we could learn from looking at the French or the German system and experience. We should find out why they have done what they did and speculate at least on what would be the situation in France, for example, if they did not have the specialised forces they have.

It is very important that a sizeable body of men should be given not the primary task but the sole task of watching, keeping constant surveillance and getting information on those people who may engage in acts of extreme violence within our jurisdiction. That can only be done by people who are designated to it in a full-time capacity.

There was discussion earlier about an additional task force and so on. I do not particularly want to enter into the rights and wrongs of that. Its abolition has certainly led to some difficulties. There may be some other advantages in some other ways. I am not very clear about that but what I am suggesting is something like a national full-time task force, and that should be an integral part of the Garda Síochána. I do not think it should be so separate that there would be a possibility of conflict arising between the two bodies and both should therefore report to the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána so that the line of communication between them, which would be vital, would be fully maintained. I would envisage, and hope, with the scale of the problem we have now, that somewhere between 750 and 1,000 men throughout the country would be needed for this purpose and I would envisage that most, if not all, would be recruited out of the existing Garda Síochána Force.

There has been a tradition to use the Army, as the phrase goes in the Act, in aid of the civil power and the Army not just recently but over a long number of years, have rendered great service in aid of the civil power in support of the Garda Síochána in circumstances that do not appeal to them, for which they are not primarily trained and in respect of which they have an instinctive dislike because the soldier is not anxious to be concerned primarily with internal violent dissidents. I think that is recognised not only here but in other countries and that is why you have elsewhere specialised forms of police for specialised tasks.

I would strongly urge the Minister to accept — I am sure he must be thinking about it — that the security situation arising out of terrorist, subversive activity is a specialised one. It is not now being carried out by a few isolated patriots here and there throughout the country who fire a few shots in honour of our Fenian dead or whatever. These acts are being done by a group of ruthless, vicious professional anarchists and they can be controlled only by people who are as tough, as fit and as dedicated as they are. No ordinary civilian police force can be in that situation. It has too much to do. It has too broad a spectrum to cover. It has to retain within its ranks men who have gone beyond the kind of physical fitness, extreme physical fitness, that is often needed for this kind of work, men who no longer, through no fault of their own, would be able to endure the sort of hardship that has often to be endured in doing that sort of work. I believe if thought is given to the suggestion — it is not something I would expect anyone to adopt overnight; it has to be fully thought out — it may not at first sight appeal to the Garda Síochána but, on reflection, it will be found to be in the interests of the country and the force and in the interest of the community. We have very severe difficulties in terms of security for very unusual reasons, reasons that are not repeated on the other island. The Garda have served us very well within the limits which their civilian constitution and their proper attitudes to the community constraint upon them but we are not now dealing with a few isolated criminals or would-be patriots. We are dealing with men who operate on a professional and organised basis, who want to create chaos and bring the democratic rule we have to an end, men who will wave that flag over there beside the Ceann Comhairle only in the most hypocritical and false way because in their heart of hearts those men with whom we are now concerned, who seek to damage our country, hate everything for which that flag stands.

Mr. Kenny

The suggestion made by Deputy O'Malley is certainly worthy of consideration and this debate this afternoon is an aspect of Dáil reform which should be continued.

The reason there is a special Dáil debate on security is obvious. In one sense security means protection and to protect means to safeguard from something. As has been asked with regard to the Criminal Justice Bill, one may ask a question with regard to the level and the range of crime committed. Crime is committed in the name of politics and in the name of religion. There may be cases where crime is committed for reason of retribution or for sheer vandalism. Crime may be committed because of mental imbalance, poverty, fear, or from a craving necessity, as in the case of heroin and drug addicts. The definition has been drawn clearly between petty crime and criminal activities of a much more serious nature.

The definition of the role of the Garda, as outlined by Deputy O'Malley, on a civilian basis as against the people they attempt to apprehend who are trained in a military fashion needs serious consideration. The reason for having the Garda Síochána is to allow the people of this island to continue living their lives in peace and safety, within the freedom of the Constitution and the laws of the country.

Anxiety with regard to security is not confined to this country. In a recent periodical of the European Communities information was given regarding a poll taken in each of the member states and the rise in the crime of terrorism caused much fear and resulted in comments from 71 per cent of those interviewed. That was spread right across the Community. The fear caused by this crime was much more considerable than the anxiety caused by poverty, by the deterioration in international relations, by the increase in unemployment as a consequence of the new technological age and by the breakdown in supplies of oil and natural gas. Fear is of epidemic proportions across the Continent and our little island has not been untouched.

As the Minister for Defence pointed out, the only people who can bring about the freedom and prosperity to which all aspire are the people themselves. No guerrilla organisation in the world has been defeated by police forces or by armies. The problem can only be solved in the minds and hearts of the people. Until our people respond to the situation on the ground we will never come to the point where the Garda Síochána and our Defence Forces can defeat these ruthless anarchists.

The Garda Síochána are not entirely perfect. They, too, are subject to the rigours of the law and recent activities have made this clear to all. The recruitment system for the Garda has been streamlined in recent years. I am sure great pains are taken to ensure that those recruited are of the highest character and that they fulfil all the necessary requirements to do their job properly. However, it would appear from some discussions that within the Garda force there is a tiny minority whose ambiguity in relation to the security of the State leaves something to be desired. This attitude is not prevalent to a great extent within the Garda Síochána but it appears it exists to a small degree within the force. That small minority has given the force in general a bad name at a time when morale and confidence should be at a high level. It is only when one does away with something one realises its value. If one were to dispense with the Garda Síochána one would soon realise their intrinsic value. I believe the Garda are capable of doing much more than they are doing at the moment but if the situation warrants it they can rise to the occasion.

Reference has been made to the training of gardaí on civilian lines and to the necessity for setting up different systems within the force. It is probably fair to say that the training of gardaí takes too short a time for the kind of activities in which they must engage on completion of their training. In the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill I said it takes four years to become a hairdresser or a carpenter and seven years to become a doctor, priest or engineer but a person can become a TD in three weeks and a Senator by making a telephone call. Perhaps that leaves much to be desired also.

The kind of activities in which gardaí are engaged on completion of training are alien to some of them. In one sense it is probably unfair to land a young recruit from rural Ireland into the heart of Dublin where the kind of people he will face in terms of hostility and in trying to keep the peace of the area are alien to him. The effectiveness of detection by the Garda Síochána must be mentioned. Throughout the country gardaí know the people who come and go in an area, what strangers are in the area and the activities that take place. However their effectiveness in preventing criminal activities or in seeking and apprehending criminals has, in the past, led to jokes being made about them and to a certain amount of ridicule being heaped upon them. The force must look at its own attitude to sort this out and it must look to the State and the people to provide the necessary facilities to allow the Garda to do their job properly.

The question might be asked should a special traffic corps be set up specifically for the job of dealing with traffic offences. Is it fair to ask the ordinary garda to do all this kind of work in addition to his job of ensuring that the peace of the land is kept? For instance, would it not be better if a special traffic corps were set up to deal exclusively with traffic offences and to do the ordinary work associated with that matter?

Reference has been made to the television programme where people refused to answer questions. This calls into question the inherent effect of the politics of fear which is rampant in parts of our country at the moment. If a person were to state on the national television channel that he was prepared to inform, if one wants to use that word, or to give evidence, if one wants to use that phrase, or to tell about people and their activities in a certain district, that person will have to live with the fear of reprisal, the midnight knock and the other activities that go along with that. That leads to a sense of non-commitment by the public because of the fear of reprisal if they give information to the Garda Síochána or the security forces. It calls into question the historical attitude to the police force on the part of the Irish people. They did not give all the information that was necessary with regard to the RIC, for very valid reasons. The Garda force have much work to do with regard to public relations, in restoring confidence to the highest possible level, so that people can go to the Garda in absolute confidence with information in relation to activities in their areas.

Questions have been raised about the Army. The proportion of five to one would give something like 2,000 troops in the field. How many of our Army personnel are tied up every day transporting cash in transit from one end of the country to the other? In many cases there are other means available for carrying out these operations. How many operational troops are on duty in Army barracks every day of the week? How many cadets are in training and how many Army personnel lose contact with their fellow officers and men when in such training? I am not advocating the abolition of educational qualifications to any great degree, but there is a sense of alienation on the part of the cadets when, after an absence of a couple of years, in the cadet school, they return to find themselves dealing with different people with different attitudes.

The Army, as the last line of defence, are not getting the opportunity to do physical training courses on the hills and mountains, using the kind of terrain dealt with in anti-subversive activities. They are not sufficiently experienced in traversing this type of terrain and dealing with a highly trained guerrilla organisation which has been dealing not alone with the British Army but has had training abroad for the last ten or 12 years and whose members are in the peak of physical condition.

It is fair to say that when the Army moves into an area every man on the ground knows exactly what he has to do. The line of communication and the line of authority are very clear. The commandant knows where his sergeants are and the sergeants know where their men are. This has not happened in the case of the Garda. In the Ballinamore incident the gardaí were arriving in civilian clothes with no armbands and in civilian cars. This led to tension and confusion. Something will have to be done to prevent a recurrence of this. The Garda task force should have distinctive uniforms, otherwise they cause confusion among their own forces and the Army. This could lead to the disastrous consequences that we all know. To whom are the task force answerable? Is it to the chief superintendent, as was originally intended, or to the superintendent of the district? When the Army move into an area of superior command, they have to make reports and follow the line of authority in that district. That line of authority does not apply in the case of the Garda, but that may well be for very valid reasons. There have been leaks of information at the wrong time and it is probably fair to say that information should be given only to a certain small number of people. However, that brings difficulties with regard to the line of authority and where it should end.

Too few actually understood the type of terrain with which the Garda and the Army were faced in the Ballinamore district. I do not know how many Deputies have crossed a fully grown forest, or indeed one which has been only a few years planted. It is practically impossible to make any headway in such an area. Gardaí who might have served in country districts for many years and might not be up to the required standard of physical fitness because of never having been called upon to push themselves to the physical limits would be out in the cold in trying to contend with people used to such areas. It is for that reason that the Garda recruits, when they were used, were very helpful. Their level of physical activitity was second to none and they were able to make significant headway, as compared with older members of the force who might have more experience in terms of implementation of the law but who could not be up to the required level of physical fitness. One questions why the Ranger unit of the Army, who are highly trained, were not used, or do not appear to have been used on this occasion.

The Minister said that the only problems were technical, but that is not really true. Many of the ordnance survey maps being used by the Garda and Army forces were drafted at the turn of the century and physical characteristics and the geography of the terrain have changed since then. There have been allegations that the gardaí were not able to read maps. That is an unfair charge. If one is dealing with a six inch map the thickness of a biro line is 40 feet. One can go to the wrong side of the woods, as happened with regard to the Garda task force. The most detailed maps probably belong to the British Army in terms of the Border area between the 26 and the Six Counties. They show every little detail. Their soldiers are supposed to be highly trained and yet there are incidents where British soldiers and, indeed, members of the SAS, cross into the 26 counties, even with these incredibly detailed maps and with their high level of training. That, however, is not the responsibility of the Department of Justice. The maps of areas with these difficult terrains must be updated so that the Garda and the Army have accurate maps which they can read, showing changes which have occurred in the last number of years. Three cars were involved in the Claremorris incident, one of which had not arrived on the scene when the people had fled across the fields. For the Commissioner to give his interview prior to having received all the reports certainly put pressure on the members of the task force to send in a report which they now believe will result in disciplinary action, whether they were correct or not.

The fact is that two task force members, three members of the old Special Branch and one garda in plain clothes were at that particular house before the second car arrived with five members. Somebody is responsible for that, as someone was responsible for the other incident where disciplinary action has not been taken. I know that investigations and discussions are going on at this very day about that matter. While it is inexcusable and indefensible, I trust that a lesson will be learned by the Minister for Justice, his Department and the Garda Commissioner and that this will not happen again, given the equipment and the level of facilities available.

The only really successful detective in the last half century has been Rip Kirby, who appears never to fail on a mission. If the Minister were to take advice from Rip's faithful servant, Desmond, or take the moral of the story in each case and translate it into effective action, backed by the confidence of the people and the Garda, we might make headway. It is a very difficult area for the Minister for Justice. He walks a delicate and politically very sensitive line. I trust that, for the continued peace of the community, reciprocal action demanded on the part of the community will result in the security forces being informed of various activities in absolute confidence, without fear of reprisal after the midnight hour. The Garda, backed up by the facilities of the State, will thus be enabled to carry out their duties as we all want them to do.

Mr. Morley

I welcome the opportunity of making a brief contribution to this debate. Much has been said already. I find I can agree with most of what speakers have said, including my last colleague from across the floor of the House. I particularly welcome this opportunity because the immediate part of my constituency, Claremorris, features by chance in some recent activities vis-à-vis Ballinamore and other places over Christmas.

At the outset I should say that the people of Claremorris, its environs and indeed all of Mayo, constitute as law-abiding a community as I believe would be found anywhere and that I have nothing but abhorrence for criminal activities and lawbreaking in any form, particularly the type of criminal activity involved in the type of incident with which my town was unfortunately associated. That incident poses serious questions in regard to security. To say the least of it, the security arrangements and procedures which the Government have a duty to provide for the protection of the State and its citizens were shown in a very bad light. It is my contention that the primary responsibility for this must rest with the Minister and the officer or officers of the law charged with such responsibility. In anything I may say I do not want to be construed as being mischievous or destructively critical of the Garda or Defence Forces generally. Neither do I want anything I say to be construed as anything but total condemnation of all criminal activity under whatever banner such activities are perpetrated. But, because of the onus of responsibility that rests with the Minister and the Commissioner of the Garda in particular, subsequent to the events. I was saddened to read that the Commissioner was contemplating taking disciplinary action against the security personnel who had been directly involved at local level. This smacks to me of a witch hunt or making scapegoats in the force, which exercise can only further demoralise the security forces. Rather than have that happen, the Minister and the Commissioner should have been content to learn the obvious lessons from that unfortunate experience, taking the necessary corrective action to ensure that such does not recur. It must now be obvious that it was a mistake to deploy the task force in such a manner as to render it practically ineffective.

Our spokesman outlined the successes that that task force had had since its inception. Whether it has been disbanded or because of the manner of their deployment, there is no doubt but that public perception is that their effectiveness in combating crimes of this sort has been seriously watered down. The type of operation required in Ballinamore and Claremorris demands the services of a highly trained specialist corps to deal with the situation with which they were confronted. Diverting Garda personnel — who for the most part deal with crimes of a relatively minor nature — does not constitute the answer to this type of situation, gardaí or detectives whose role normally is to deal with crimes such as burglary, housebreaking and so on. They are not conditioned to dealing with armed subversives, much less raw recruits such as those who were drafted into Ballinamore. It is totally infair to involve people with such lack of training in those circumstances where their own safety is so obviously at risk. Here I should like to join on offering condolences to the families of the late Garda Sheehan and Private Kelly who so tragically lost their lives. It is also unfair to the force to involve such people because it gives the impression that the force is expected to be capable of dealing with the circumstances confronting them.

Another obvious deficiency is the inferior equipment with which the security forces have to make do. This covers a whole range of equipment, arms, transport, communications and so on. The Minister's predecessor, Deputy G. Collins, had plans to rectify that situation. Although much has been done I fear that many of those plans have fallen the victim of Government book-keeping. Even now I hope steps will be taken to rectify that deficiency so that whatever additional funds are necessary will be made available, ensuring that our security forces are properly equipped. I am quite certain that the public do not begrudge funds devoted to this purpose because security is of paramount importance. I am aware that security costs the country much needed money, money that could well be used for other purposes were it not so tragically required for the purpose of security in the conditions obtaining. Indeed the £200 million approximately spent annually on Border security — were conditions different — could usefully be employed-in creating much needed employment, on our health system, educational system and so on. But, despite the shortage of funds in these areas, I am quite certain the public are prepared to support the Government in making available the equipment and anything else the security forces require in order to carry out their duties effectively. The public rightly expect value for money. They are entitled to an assurance that, that money having been spent, they will be provided with a system of security, which in its structures and deployment, backed up by the necessary equipment, will be second to none and capable of doint the job effectively.

I might mention one other matter to the Minister, that is what is known as the rural policing pilot scheme. I mention this because the Claremorris, Co. Mayo and Thomastown, County Kilkenny, areas were the two originally selected for this pilot scheme. I understand now that this is being extended to other areas, but I sincerely believe that it constitutes a retrograde step. Various speakers mentioned the necessity of people having confidence in the Garda, in communicating with them confidentially. I agree that that should be so. But when the Garda are withdrawn from a vast area or territory which, because of its dispersed population, can be said to be a rural, farming area, that constitutes a course damaging to the relationship which existed traditionally between the Garda and people. At present the Garda attend one hour a week only at closed Garda stations and there are days when some of these stations are not open at all. There was a system of communication initiated in regard to such closed stations intended to enable the public to communicate with the Garda in, say, Claremorris or Ballin-robe — I am being specific about my own area — but in two of those cases the system initiated did not operate at all. When a member of the public in these areas wants to meet a garda or has reason to require his services he is not immediately available to him. That is not conducive to good policing. Perhaps it is more economical to use the new system but the question arises as to whether the saving justifies the loss in other directions.

There is also much time spent in ferrying gardaí from one place to another and individuals in fairly sizeable communities have no direct contact with them. People do not know them as they did in times gone by. Sometimes a garda is there for a very short time and the rest of the time he is patrolling the area in a squad car. That does not make for good policing and is a retrograde step. I agree with much of what the Minister said in his opening speech. I know the Garda and the Defence Forces are doing their best in a very difficult situation but I wonder, as Deputy O'Malley said, if we could have the national task force, or at least one similar to that in operation until the Minister took office, reconstituted because only a specialist, specially trained force like that is capable of dealing with the subversive and criminal activities which, unfortunately, are all too common at present.

Mr. G. Mitchell

I want to make a few brief comments and I do not want to go over any ground which has been covered. I want to make a general point about the hopelessness which many of our citizens feel when they have to make contact with a Garda station. We make very pious contributions in this House about the Garda Síochána. In general they deserve them but there are exceptions to that rule. For too long the exceptions have been getting away with it, covered by the rest of the gardaí who are doing a good job. On the very rare occasions when citizens have to make contact with a Garda station it is not always a very pleasing experience. In many cases they are treated with indifference and callousness and this is something which I have brought to the attention of the Minister and the Commissioner from time to time. It is not satisfactory because the 11,000 or so members of the Garda Síochána are being paid an average salary of about £13,000 per annum, and citizens have the right to expect that they will get consistent and good service for their money. Of course they get that from the majority of gardaí but there are exceptions who, unfortunately, seem to be able to operate without having to answer for the lack of high standards which the rest of their colleagues maintain.

I hope, on Committee Stage of the Criminal Justice Bill, that the Minister will include a section incorporating the creation of an independent complaints tribunal, which is long overdue. It is in the interests of the majority of the gardaí who are doing a good job and who want to see their high standards maintained. I do not believe it is necessary to refer minor incidents to them and that is one of the problems of the present procedure. Some incidents could be dealt with in a minor industrial relations type manner but where there are strong offences against the community they should be examined independently.

I welcome all attacks on organised, petty and terrorist crime and there is a great need to do something about the level of crime at present. Much of it emanates from the troubles in Northern Ireland and many of the criminals operating today learned their trade from people who call themselves republicans and who have the audacity to go before the public under the shield of a political party and lecture about drug pushing and other evils in the community. These are the people who showed how simple it was to rob banks and who are now putting themselves in the role of social workers, and we need to constantly remind the public that it is from these people that many of our problems come. Many people would not be involved in crime today if they had not been shown the way by these so called republicans.

I hope Deputy Woods will not take my next remark personally — I do not mean it to be — but I think it would be very helpful if the Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism were able to operate outside the political arena. It is very difficult for that committee to operate effectively if the chairman is also Opposition spokesman for Justice. Although the chairman has very good experience in that area, it can hamper the independent working of the committee. I know the position must go to a Fianna Fáil Deputy but being Opposition spokesman for Justice and chairman of that committee does not help the committee in their work although I believe that that committee could be very effective in contributing to solving crime.

I wish to express concern at the way in which the Garda representative bodies have taken it on themselves regularly to comment publicly on operational matters. There is constant criticism, quite rightly, of political interference in the Garda Síochána, and the Minister for Justice has said he is not getting involved in operational matters. I do not believe that the Garda representative bodies should either be involved in operational matters or comment publicly on them. There was a headline in The Irish Times last week — I have not got the date — which referred to the Garda. However, on reading further it transpired that they were referring to the Garda representative body of sergeants and inspectors. They have a very important function to play in looking after their members rights and needs and nobody will deny them that but their position should not extend to supplanting the Garda Commissioner, who should have our support in dealing with the very difficult problems he faces. It has got to the stage where guidelines should be laid down as to precisely what serving members of the Garda Síochána can say publicly on operational matters. I hope the Minister will raise this matter with the Garda representative bodies.

The commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police Force recently issued an independent performance report on that police force which made many worthwhile suggestions and identified many problems which they can now try to solve. I hope the Minister will take a leaf from that commissioner's book and consider having a similar performance report made on our Garda Síochána.

I do not want to be condemnatory or critical because I am not being critical of the majority, but of a minority, but there are problems in the Garda Síochána and it is time we faced them. It is time to stop putting them on a shelf and putting the Garda beyond criticism. When they are wrong they should be criticised and we should give the majority the support they need and show our goodwill. There are very serious problems facing the community and we should not be bland about them or blind to them. As I said, I hope the Minister arranges for an independent performance report to be carried out on the activities of the Garda to see precisely how their role in the community might be more effectively updated. I hope the Minister will take cognisance of that suggestion because I think it would be a worthwhile exercise.

Mr. Flynn

I would like to put it on the record that the question of security, which has affected the people of my county to some degree in the recent past, obliges me to state the attitude of the vast majority of the people of County Mayo in their absolute support for the Garda, our police force, who are doing a job, paid for by the taxpayers, and doing it to the best of their ability. I use the words "the vast majority" because this does not apply to the population as a whole.

If I had time I would like to deal with the role of the Garda in dealing with the community as a community, their role so far as subversives are concerned and their role as far as the Border and Border duties are concerned. At some time I would like to elaborate on those areas because all is not black and white in the minds of the public. There are grey areas which will have to be accepted and elaborated on at another time.

The operation in Claremorris was greatly misunderstood. While it might be said in some corners in a gleeful way that the Garda were embarrased by what took place there, let me tell the House that had any other result come from that, we, the Legislature, would have been greatly embarrassed because that would have set in train an alternative we would find repeated in many other areas and which we might not be able to control. It is one thing to take human life but I would like to put it on record that the gardaí involved in that operation had no knowledge of the extent of the culpability of the people in that house. We might have ended up with a very tragic situation had there been a shoot-out with a loss of life on all sides — security and civilian. We would look very foolish if we had set a pattern of activity in train in Claremorris which might have proved counter-productive and which would rebound on our heads in many other situations.

We would all like to know under what rules and regulations the Garda operate so far as the use of fire power is concerned. The gardaí who operated in Claremorris are well-known in the community and they have done very good work on a whole range of activities. They are very brave men but I do not believe the Garda have a licence to shoot to kill. Had there been another result to that operation in Claremorris it is the Legislature who would have been embarrassed.

The general public support the Garda in their activities and are prepared to provide the finance to help them deal with any matter which comes their way, but there is need for a very clear and unambiguous statement from the Minister as to what rules and regulations govern the Garda as to the use of fire power, and the type of fire power available to them.

Minister for Justice (Mr. Noonan

, Limerick East): I would like to thank every Deputy who contributed today. In the light of recent events it was important that Deputies on all sides should have an opportunity to put their views on the record. I found most of the views very constructive and I will take note of them.

Deputy Morley and Deputy Woods were very critical of me and Garda management but that, if not understandable, is not surprising. I can appreciate Deputy Morley's situation. I knew he would come here today and make that type of speech. Deputy Woods did not surprise me either. I have had many varying experiences as Minister over the last 13 months — some in the area of legislation, others in the security area and some to do with Garda, crime, prisons or matters arising out of the courts. I have had a variety of experiences in a very short period but the one constant was that, no matter what happened, Deputy Woods was ready to swing his machete in my direction or, if I was not around, he could not resist the temptation to swing it at the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Garda Commissioner. Therefore, I am not surprised he contined to fulfil that role which he initiated when he was appointed Opposition spokesman for Justice.

Despite the fact that he has received replies to a variety of Dáil questions and that at the first available opportunity he got his replies at 3.30 p.m. to his written questions today, he still continues to misrepresent the situation. He weaves a tapestry of truth and fantasy into a type of mythology which reached a high point today. The Special Task Force, Dublin based, has not been changed. Deputy Woods knows that; yet he stated today that it was. This force deal with kidnapping and hijacking in Dublin and around the country——

Dr. Woods

I said reduced, not changed.

Mr. Noonan

(Limerick East):—— and that has not been changed. The divisional task force have not been disbanded, despite Deputy Woods' propaganda; they have been integrated with Special Branch gardaí in the divisions. In my opinion the Commissioner had very good reasons for doing that.

I do not think—and this arises directly from what Deputy Flynn said — it is proper that armed plain clothes people should not be responsible to a direct chain of command and should only be responsible to a chief superintendent in a division whom, by the nature of things, they would rarely be in a position to meet. In situations such as this, it is important that we have special forces. The same number of people are dealing with this problem as previously. They are still in plain clothes; they are still armed, as they were; but they are not integrated with other people in plain clothes who are also armed. They are doing the job the special forces should be doing in the Garda Síochána.

Deputy Woods also talked about check points. I have seen some publicity in the papers about his attitude to check points. He suggested that if it were an ordinary check point for car tax you would put up a sign saying, "Car Tax Check Point". If it were a terrorist check point you would put up a notice saying "Terrorist Check Point".

Dr. Woods

As a matter of interest, I never said that.

Mr. Noonan

(Limerick East): If it were for drunken driving you would put up a notice saying, “Drunken Driving Check Point”. I can understand why the Deputy says things like that. If he ever occupies the seat as Minister for Justice and fulfils his policy of getting involved in operational matters within the Garda, God between us and all harm, and God help the country.

He also talked about Rooskey and said a divisional task force would have been there. That check point was operated by the garda in that town for many years and it was never supported by armed men. It was never supported by a divisional task force. It was a routine check point. The check point in Mayo at which events were initiated the night before the Claremorris situation arose is a routine check point. It has nothing to do with subversives. It would not be armed in the normal course of events. There was an implication that a certain much sought after subversive went through a check point in Wexford. That is not correct either, and the Deputy should know that. A suspicious car was followed by a Garda car out of the town. It was not a check point situation.

There was a direct misrepresentation also about cutbacks. Deputy Woods was a Minister. He understands how estimates are drawn up in the Departments. He knows quite well that in the Justice Estimate in 1983 there was a slight overestimation in percentage terms. Every garda in the country was paid his full rate but, at the end of the year, some millions of pounds were left over in the Estimate. He also knows from my speech on the Adjournment before Christmas that that money was used and put at the disposal of the Garda for £1 million worth of Garda cars and for the acquisition of necessary radio equipment to the tune of almost £3 million. The Deputy was informed about all that, and yet he continues to misrepresent the position.

I should like to deal briefly with the more constructive contributions than that of Deputy Woods made by some Deputies. Deputy O'Malley's contribution was very interesting. He said that on the Continent there are at least two police forces in many countries and many police forces in some countries and that these are not provided by regions but by the nature of the work they necessarily have to perform. I have some knowledge of some of the continental police. Many of the reasons why there are a number of police forces on the Continent are historic rather than operational.

There must be a degree of specialisation in the police force, whether it is a second force responsible to the Commissioner or a parallel force responsible to the Commissioner. It is too early to deal with that suggestion now. I take the point that in the situation in which we now find ourselves, with the threat from subversives North and South, there must be a degree of specialisation in dealing with problems of terrorism and subversion. I assure the House that equipment, training and everything else will not be lacking. The Government will provide the resources necessary for the fight against terrorism.

It is important — and I do not say this in any defensive way — to put the matter in context. Garda recruit Sheehan was not the first garda to die. We have had a long list of tragedies over the past number of years. In 1970 Garda Richard Fallon died. In 1972, 1975 and 1976 we had deaths and in the tragic year of 1980 we had three casualties in the Garda Síochána. Again in 1982 and before Christmas at the end of 1983 we had more tragedies.

We can also go down through the list of armed robberies and point out that anything happening in this area has been happening for years. In 1980, in Leopardstown, £109,000; 10 April 1980, Allied Irish Banks, New Ross, £67,000; scattered around the country £102,000, £79,000, £115,000, £103,000. In 1981, £100,000, £60,000, £54,000, £50,000, £60,000. In 1982, £52,000, £53,000, £1,177,000, £200,000, £70,000, £104,000, £98,000. In 1983, £50,000, £63,000, £500,000, £59,000, £192,000. I do not read these out to bore the House with statistics. If anybody tries to show me a pattern of the diminishing armed robberies under any security arrangements, I will reply that the statistics do not bear that out.

This is a tragedy. The chaos which has existed for many years in Northern Ireland has an enormous influence on what is happening here. It is now trite to say that there is a spill over of crime from Northern Ireland. We are facing problems at the hands of the Provisional IRA, the INLA and the people who have learned their skills by imitation and example. Money is being spent on security which could be better spent. Yet we must protect the peace and freedom of the ordinary citizens. We must protect the democratic rights of the State against any attack. I assure the House that we will resist the INLA and the Provisional IRA.

I have not come forward today with positive recommendations about what we should do now, because I am not in the business of providing instant solutions or reacting to the latest security problems. I know this situation has been with us for many years. There have been some good years and some bad years, one quiet month and another very bad month. Remember the burning of the British Embassy. When was that? Who was Minister? What were the circumstances? I am not saying that anybody could have done anything more than was done at the time about it. Who remembers the shooting of Senator Billy Fox? When was that, and what were the circumstances? Remember the killing of Lord Louis Mountbatten. Remember the bombs in Dublin.

Remember the major bank robberies all over the country. Remember all the Garda shootings I have listed over the years since 1970.

Can anyone seriously say the difficulties we face now as a community started some time in December 1983 because a Garda operation which was successful in its objective of freeing the kidnapped person was not successful in arresting the perpetrators of the kidnapping? I know that every time something dramatic happens which concerns people, upsets them, or makes them fear, I have a responsibility to evaluate the response and I will evaluate the response. I will not produce instant solutions to problems which have been around for a long time. I will not be put into a position in which I will have to pull some stunt out of the hat because of the pressure of a particular event.

The events at Ballinamore and Claremorris and the other events around the country have to be evaluated carefully by the Army, the Garda, the Department and the Minister for Justice and the Government and they will be evaluated and the necessary policy changes will be made as a result of that evaluation.

I should like to thank very much all the Deputies who contributed to this debate, who were so well informed and who informed me about different aspects and suggested so many things. I will take the views of those Deputies into account when I am making this evaluation over the next couple of weeks.