Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement between Ireland and Britain: Motion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Lenihan)

I move:

That Dáil Éireann approves the terms of the Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom concerning the Delimitation of Areas of the Continental Shelf between the two countries, signed at Dublin on 7th November, 1988, as laid before the House on 25th November, 1988.

The Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the land territory out under the sea until it plunges to the deep ocean floor. The Continental Shelf doctrine is a relatively new feature of international law. Up to the early nineteen hundreds, coastal states were still only entitled to a territorial sea of three nautical miles.

In the 1920s however, technological advances enabled states to begin exploring and exploiting the seabed of the shallower waters around their coasts for mineral resources, particularly oil. This development of offshore drilling needed regulation and, as a consequence, international lawyers began to give attention to the question of jurisdiction over the seabed. A number of different proposals were formulated, including the suggestion that ownership of the seabed could only be established by exploration and occupation. In the United States, however, different reasoning prevailed in the Truman Proclamation of 28 September 1945, which was the product of growing concern as to the future regulation of offshore drilling. This document was cautious and tentative, but it asserted an intrinsic right to jurisdiction independently of occupation. Having recited the need for regulation of the exploitation of the seabed, it went on to say that the United States regarded the natural resources of the shelf as appertaining to the United States and subject to its jurisdiction and control. It reserved the waters above the shelf as high seas.

Over the next decade the Truman Declaration came to be regarded as the current legal formulation on ownership of the Continental Shelf and its natural resources. This viewpoint was consolidated by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. The question of division of the common Continental Shelf, on which Ireland and Britain are situated, has been the subject of concern to successive Governments for a very long time. The need to establish clearly the areas over which each side exercises jurisdiction became increasingly important as the search for oil and gas accelerated with the advancement of technology in this field.

International law requires that delimitation of overlapping claims must be achieved by peaceful means and suggests various procedures in that regard including negotiation, conciliation or various forms of independent judicial adjudication.

In addition international law provided a primary method for delimitation based on a median or equidistance line. This method proved very satisfactory for many countries where the determining features on each coast were similar and many international agreements between neighbouring states were concluded on that basis. However for other countries, including Ireland, this approach would have produced a result weighted heavily against us because of the nature of the Irish coastline, particularly along the east coast, when compared to the heavily indented west coast of Britain. In the north-west the situation of many small British islands would also have produced a very prejudiced result.

Because of the very varying geographical, geological and geomorphological differences around the world, it was recognised that such a simplistic rule as that of a median line would not always provide a satisfactory outcome and international law has developed in an effort to produce more universally applicable guidelines.

The developments in the law began essentially with the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Hague in 1968 in a judgment relating to delimitation in the North Sea. In its judgment the court rule that the median line rule, which is contained in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and which had been widely applied up to that time, was not a rule of customary international law. It could not, therefore, bind countries which were not parties to the Geneva Convention. Ireland is not a party to that convention.

Subsequent decisions of the court and other judicial tribunals, as well as state practice, have developed that approach. During the negotiation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the difficulty in establishing a universally acceptable rule for delimitation became clear. The median line approach did not find favour at the conference. The discussion of rules which would govern delimitation proved among the most controversial. One group of states maintained strongly that the median line should be the primary method of delimitation although they conceded it could be adjusted to meet particular circumstances. The opposing group, for which Ireland was spokesman in the discussion, argued that equitable principles should apply and that an equitable solution could not be achieved if states for which a median line would not produce an equitable solution had the burden of proof in relation to such a line weighted against them. No agreement on any one alternative method emerged from the negotiations. In the event the median line was not included among the provisions and no particular method is laid down in the 1982 convention. The convention does require, however, that any delimitation effected by agreement, on the basis of international law, must achieve an equitable solution.

State practice shows that, although the convention is not yet in force, it is widely supported and the development contained in it regarding an equitable solution is now generally accepted. It favours Ireland's position which would have been prejudiced by a division based on the median line.

Another practical problem relating to delimitation arises from the numerous small islands and rocks to be found in the seas of the world. This is particularly true in the Pacific where many states themselves consist of groups of islands of varying sizes. There were therefore two schools of thought in relation to islands and their importance when the question of generation of maritime zones was discussed — that is those which wanted every piece of rock which is above water at high tide to have its own continental shelf and economic zone. Other delegations argued that even small islands should not generate such zones.

This brings us to the second important element which emerged from the UN Conference. It is something between the two positions in so far as rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own can have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. This is laid down in Article 121 of the Convention. This development again favours Ireland's position. While Deputies will be aware that the Convention is not yet in force, a greater number of countries are looking to it to guide them on these issues.

In addition to these developments at the UN Conference, the rules and precedents established over recent years by state practice and by international tribunals are extraordinarily varied to meet the different conditions which arise in relation to overlapping claims to continental shelf zones around the world. There is, as a result, a great wealth of material on which lawyers can draw when seeking to achieve an equitable solution. No overriding criterion has been laid down and it is therefore open to negotiators to consider all the different criteria which could be applied in a given situation. The present agreement is a result of the application of different criteria appropriate to the many areas involved.

The negotiations which led to the agreement before the House, which deals solely with the continental shelf, began in the early seventies. It proved a complex matter because of the vastness of the area concerned and the difficult geographical features of the two coastlines. During the early period of the negotiations, but particularly in the last decade, the international law governing delimitation evolved rapidly.

In 1977, when it became apparent that negotiations did not seem likely to produce any acceptable solution it was agreed that the matter should be submitted to international arbitration. Negotiations then began on the terms of an arbitration agreement which would lay down the terms of reference for an arbitration tribunal, its rules of procedure and composition. These negotiations proved difficult and moved very slowly.

In 1986, given this lack of progress, the then Government reconsidered the question and in particular whether recourse to arbitration was the best method to pursue if we were to reach a satisfactory outcome within a reasonable timescale. Following that reassessment, and in agreement with the British as to the best method to pursue, both sides agreed to recommence discussions with a view to reaching a negotiated settlement. It was believed, and in the event it has proved correct, that the recent developments in the international law governing delimitation, which provided new and helpful guidelines, would help the negotiators to achieve the satisfactory outcome which had eluded them on previous occasions. The area to be delimited concerned the continental shelf in the Irish Sea, south and south-west of Ireland, together with the area in the north-west off the Donegal coast.

Deputies will have had an opportunity to study the text of the agreement which was circulated to them immediately after signature. Since that time copies have, of course, been available in the Library.

I now wish to deal with the text of the agreement. As you will have noted it is the intention of the two Governments that the agreement open up further seabed areas for the petroleum industry in each country to undertake activities which, until now, were in dispute between our two countries.

Article 1 of the agreement deals first with the line in the Irish Sea. The line continues southwards and then south-west between the two coasts extending as far south as latitude 46º 34' north/longitude 12º 12' west. It reflects the geographical configuration of the coasts but does not give full weight, as can be seen from the illustration on map A, to some of the features on the British side such as the Scilly Isles, where a clear precedent existed for giving no more than half effect to these small islands.

The line in the north-west, in Article 2, is more than 100 miles longer than the line referred to in Article 1. Deputies will also notice from the illustrative map attached to the agreement that this line does not, as one might expect, run directly westward from Ireland but, in fact, moves inexorably north/west and, having started at a latitude of 55º 28' north, it finishes 634 miles later, a full 2º further at latitude 57º 28' north.

The extent of British designation in that area of the Rockall trough and plateau was considerable although it did not extend as far west as Ireland's even more extensive designated area. An undesignated area lay between the two designations.

The agreed line referred to in Article 2 enters the British designated area at a number of points along the length of the line so that Ireland's gain in that area includes, not only most of the long strip undesignated by either party, but also captures a considerable amount of the British designated area.

Deputies should also be aware that in 1977, and before the recent developments in the law which now govern delimitation, the then Irish Government counter-designated a small area across the British designation line in the north-west already designated by Britain. In other words both Britain and Ireland had designated the same small sector of seabed. This is the only area where a double designation occurred.

The de-designation which will be required of Ireland as a result of the agreement will relate to most of that double-designated area. The extent of the area to be designated is not only considerably less than that required to be de-designated by the British, but also it only relates to a double-designated area, while the British de-designation requires a pulling back from areas which they alone had designated in the past. No similar de-designation occurs in the Irish case.

I would like now to direct the attention of the House to the rock known as Rockall. Deputies will note that no mention of it is made in this agreement and from a quick glance at the map attached to the agreement showing the proposed dividing line across the Rockall plateau, it is clear that the rock played no part in determining the direction of the line. In effect, the line would not follow any different direction if the rock did not exist.

Before I pass to comment on the remainder of the Agreement, I would also like to clarify the Government's position on the Rockall rock because misunderstanding of this rock and its role has, I believe, distorted the view taken of the facts and of the law in relation to the equitable division of the Rockall trough and plateau. In fact the matter has gone so far that delimination of the continental shelf as a whole has often been referred to in common parlance, but quite incorrectly, as the "Rockall Case". I would like to dispel some of the myths about the rock and set down the correct facts. Rockall is a conical rock, only about 83 feet in diameter, rising at most to a height of 70 feet. To land on it by boat is very difficult and has rarely been achieved. In addition, the rock is well over 200 miles from either mainland, and it must also be recalled that it is in fact nearer to the Outer Hebrides than the Donegal Coast. In other words it is a totally isolated piece of granite in the vast Atlantic Ocean.

Furthermore, as I have just explained the rock is not of any significance and cannot be a factor in the division of any maritime zone between Britain and Ireland. It has nothing to do with this delimitation case.

When the agreement is approved by both sides and enters into force, the totally separate question of the Rockall rock will be considered further by the Government. Successive Governments have rejected purported British sovereignty over the rock, and the present Government continue to reject this British claim and have further rejected, in common with other countries, British claims to a 200 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone measured from the rock. Having said this, of course I again stress that fishing zones of any kind are separate from, and do not form any part of, this agreement.

The water column above the continental shelf and the exclusive fishery zone are not dealt with. These maritime zones are governed by different rules of international law as compared with the continental shelf. Different issues may have to be taken into consideration if the waters above the shelf and the fisheries zone are to be divided. Consequently this agreement deals solely with the continental shelf are neither the water column above it nor the exclusive fishery zone is affected by it.

In this debate I hope that Deputies will address only the terms of the agreement before the House in the knowledge that what is properly called the Rockall Rock question and the other matters I just referred to can be taken up at a later date.

Returning to the subject of today's motion and the text of the agreement, I should mention also the possibility that mineral deposits which straddle the boundary line may be found. A special provision is therefore included in Article 3 whereby the parties to the agreement are requested to negotiate an acceptable method for the joint exploitation of such minerals. There are numerous precedents for such agreements relating to the various minerals which are subject to joint exploitation because of their nature. Should either party be fortunate in discovering such a deposit then discussions will take place to ascertain all the relevant details in relation to the fields in question so that a satisfactory method for exploitation, which does not prejudice either side, can be negotiated.

As I explained earlier, the continental shelf is the prolongation of the land mass under the sea. This prolongation of a continental landmass is also a form of boundary zone between two fundamentally different types of material that make up the earth's crust — the lighter thicker continental crust and the oceanic crust of heavier material. The mineral resources of the oceanic crust are on the deep ocean floor and, therefore, in what is known as the international seabed area. Exploitation of these resources is governed by a new internationally-established régime, laid down in the 1982 UN Convention of The Law of The Sea. On the other hand, coastal state jurisdiction — which is what we are talking about — extends to the exclusive exploration and exploitation of the continental crust material, or continental shelf. In determining the extent of the jurisdiction of the coastal state it is therefore imperative to identify scientifically where the outer edge of that continental material lies. To acquire the relevant data extensive marine scientific research work will be required.

Rules to help coastal states to establish the outer limit of their continental shelf are contained in the UN Convention. That Convention also provides for an international boundary commission which would make recommendations to the coastal state and ultimately ensure international recognition of the limits of the shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of sound scientific data.

Ireland has not yet acquired the appropriate data to establish definitively or specifically the outer limit of the Irish continental shelf where this meets the international area. For this reason, therefore, Article 4 of the agreement provides that the delimitation of the shelf between Ireland and Britain is without prejudice to the location of the outer limit of the continental shelf of either party at a later date.

The agreement provides, as is usual for international agreements, for a procedure to bring it into force. Under the terms of Article 5, it will be for both Governments to exchange notifications to the effect that all internal procedures have been completed and that the agreement may then enter into force. This will be done when the appropriate British legislation has been enacted and following the approval of the agreement by this House. At that stage, designation orders will be made by the Governemnt and laid before both Houses in accordance with section 14 of the Continental Shelf Act, 1968.

I would also like to take this opportunity to reiterate, as I have done previously, that this agreement does not deal with Northern Ireland or the maritime zones off its coast. In other words, Northern Ireland and its status are not affected by this agreement.

Deputies will appreciate that any consideration of the maritime zones of Northern Ireland cannot be dealt with separately from the question of Northern Ireland as a whole. Any delimitation in that area, which would have to be in accordance with the rules of international law, would be further complicated by the political factors which exist.

It is the Government's intention not to isolate that issue from the overall resolution of the Northern Ireland question.

Finally, I must reiterate to Deputies that this agreement does not deal with the waters above the continental shelf or the exclusive fishery zone and neither deals with, nor is affected by, Rockall. Further, Northern Ireland and its status are similarly unaffected by the agreement. The agreement concerns the overall division of the continental shelf, including the Irish Sea and stretching to the western approaches and, in the North-west, the Rockall trough and plateau without any reference to the Rock. The Rock and its status are unaffected and are issues to be considered separately at the appropriate time.

The agreement, which provides an equitable solution — and this is important — removes altogether the need to summit this complex matter to any form of independent judicial adjudication.

As I hope I have made clear during this statement, the Government are satisfied that the terms of this agreement are of considerable benefit to Ireland. Therefore I urge the House to approve the motion.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Before calling Deputy Barry I might remind the House that the time constraints stipulate 20 minutes for each speaker.

Mr. Barry

The Minister ended his remarks today by saying:

The agreement, which provides an equitable solution, removes altogether the need to submit this complex matter to any form of independent judicial adjudication.

We all applaud the fact that this agreement has been reached without the need to have recourse to that adjudication. However, that does not mean we will rubber stamp the agreement, allowing the motion be passed in this House. Indeed an article entitled "Continental Shelf Agreement to be Debated" by Mr. Charles Lysaght in The Irish Times this morning adds further fuel to my concern in that regard. I have been concerned at the kind of pressure being exercised by the Government side to have this motion taken very quickly. For example, the Government Whip said to our Whip a fortnight ago that this motion had to be taken within a short space of time to coincide with its passage through the British Parliament. It struck me that that was an extraordinary amount of haste to attach to something that had hung around for 20 years. I telephoned the British House of Commons to ascertain the reason for this haste. I discovered that the House of Commons did not sit at all the week before last, which was the week the Fianna Fáil Whip said this had to be taken. Indeed I established also that the House of Commons did not sit last week either.

Now we note from the Minister's remarks today that the British require to pass legislation through the House of Commons. It is possible that that legislation has been prepared already but seems unlikely given the complexity of the issues involved. Since the agreement was reached some time in the last three weeks only it seems equally unlikely that legislation would be ready. Furthermore, given the pace at which legislation goes through the House of Commons — remembering that the first sign of smoke vis-à-vis the fair employment legislation in the North of Ireland was seen in September 1986 and which will not be passed by the British Parliament until September 1989 — it is even more unlikely.

I am glad, given doubts now being cast on this agreement by people a lot better qualified to study it than am I, that we did not accede to the Chief Whip's request to rush it through this House in unseemly haste within a week of its signature.

That is all the more important because of the very scant information made available about this agreement. For example, the Minister said in the course of his remarks:

Deputies will have had an opportunity to study the text of the agreement which was circulated to them immediately after signature.

The text of the agreement is comprised of one and a half pages and two totally inadequate maps with lines showing the line of the present agreement and four or five pages of figures pertaining to the longitudinal and latitudinal marks. Deputies have not had an opportunity of studying the text of the agreement circulated. The agreement consists of one and a half pages on an extremely complex issue. The least the Government might have supplied — primarily to this House, but not merely this House — was a map showing what had been the British claim originally, what had been the Irish claim originally and where the existing agreement now lies between those two.

Having said that, I should say there was a briefing arranged yesterday afternoon in the Department of Foreign Affairs of which I am not sure how many Deputies were informed. I was informed when in Cork on Friday afternoon by our Whip's office that that briefing would take place on Monday afternoon. That type of arrangement may be satisfactory to party spokespersons living in Dublin but is not for others who do not reside in Dublin. Some effort should have been made before then to brief party spokespersons on this matter. Having said that I should thank the Minister and his Department for having sent me this morning the notes of the briefing given.

An explanation of the agreement between the Governments of Ireland and the UK has not been made available. This agreement sets out to create opportunities particularly with regard to off-shore petroleum and related industries. The Minister is extremely enthusiastic in his support for this agreement and has maintained that Ireland has made real gains with regard to the Continental Shelf, but he has not spelled out in detail what we got. A lot of doubt has been cast on our so-called gains because the areas in which we got this huge increase are the areas that are of least value in oil exploration. The British have gained in the Celtic Sea which is the most valuable in the area of oil and gas exploration.

At one point in the article which I quoted from The Irish Times of today the author in explaining how the line was drawn between the islands and the mainlands of both islands said:

If the Agreed Line gives full effect to these islands as measuring points, the British have achieved the best result they could possibly have anticipated in an arbitration.

In other words, they have been saved the price of arbitration and have still got the best possible deal. This agreement would not make one jump up and down with joy at some major national gain. When replying, the Minister should take the opportunity to say what precisely is the gain to us as he seems to be suggesting that we have made a huge gain whereas the British have lost out. The article I have referred to indicates a different scenario.

An agreement such as this has many implications and raises questions about a number of issues such as the dumping of nuclear waste and the provision of adequate sea and air rescue services. Before approving this agreement the Dáil must be satisfied that on balance it is of positive benefit to this country.

It has been suggested that by negotiating the agreement bilaterally we have reached a satisfactory settlement. This raises the question of gains and losses, as a compromise of some sort is inevitable in a negotiating process. It appears that most of our gains are in the area of the north west of this country. There is a very significant extent of water available to us up there but this is a far less favourable location for oil and gas exploration because of the difficulty with weather and because the technology is not available to explore in that area. At the moment, however, the price of oil would not encourage anybody to explore. The Celtic Sea which is thought to have reserves of oil and natural gas is the area where the British have gained.

The only map I have seen relating to this is in The Irish Times of today and it shows the three lines I spoke about originally, the original Irish claim, the original British claim and the area that is now being agreed. This map shows that the area the British have gained is possibly far more valuable to them than the huge area we have gained in the north west. We need an explanation from the Minister about this before we can push this through the Dáil. If the area in the north west showed signs of having gas, oil and other minerals, the cost of bringing them ashore from this depth of water and over those distances in the very unfriendly north west sea, would be prohibitive, and it is not foreseeable that we would reap the rewards during the lifetime of anybody in this House. If, however, the price of oil rises in the next ten or 15 years and if OPEC manage to control output and push the price up, the Celtic Sea becomes a far more attractive proposition.

The agreement does not deal with the complex problems of who owns Rockall. The Minister has said quite a lot about that and I will come back to it in a moment. While we have not conceded our claim on Rockall, the fact that we have agreed to waive exploration rights to the seabed around it may indicate a less than convincing belief in our claim. I do not know if it is tactically wise to concede any territorial right before the issue of ownership is settled, and that may be what the Minister has done in this agreement.

I note from the map that in drawing the line in the Celtic Sea between Wales and Ireland, islands called The Smalls are used. These are rocks, the same as Rockall, and they are incapable of sustaining any form of life. Yet, this is the starting line. These rocks are 12 miles out from the Pembrokeshire coast and the Welsh coast. If the distance between the Welsh and the Irish cost is 60 miles, then the meeting line would be at 30 miles down the centre of the sea but if we start at these rocks which are 12 miles from the west coast the agreed line is pushed over so that it is 24 miles from the Irish coast and 36 miles from the Welsh coast giving the British a further 12 miles in the Celtic Sea, which is a considerable amount of the Continental Shelf available to the British for exploration. I will want a satisfactory explanation from the Minister about that when he replies and before I will be satisfied to allow this through the House.

If these islands are now being used so as to decide where to place the line between the two claiming countries, then how does this affect our position on Rockall which is precisely the same as the islands known as The Smalls? From my understanding, the law of the sea says that when one draws a line between countries claiming rights over seabed, uninhabited rocks incapable of supporing life cannot be used as a starting point. The starting point must be inhabited islands.

The Minister in his speech referred to the Scilly Islands as being half measures. I take that to mean that the distance between them and the mainland is halved and that is the starting point. Will the Minister explain that?

In relation to Rockall I am not sure if it is wise for the Minister to concede a territorial right before the issue of the ownership of the island is settled. We must also consider the claim of Denmark to the area of the seabed which is included in this agreement. The map shows the overlapping claims of Denmark, Britain and Ireland in the area which has now been designated. The Danish claims are based on what is called a micro continent under the sea. They maintain that a bilateral agreement between Ireland and Britain is not binding on a third party. In their view all of the parties including Iceland, Ireland, Britain and Denmark must negotiate in order to reach an acceptable agreement. In that regard this agreement probably raises more issues than it has solved. If the Danish and Icelandic claims come down through both the British and Irish areas, how will we disentangle all that mess, if we ever concede that the Danes and the Icelanders have the right to negotiate on the Rockall trough and the Rockall seabed?

Also in relation to Rockall, it is my understanding that for some years now there has been a tendency for some species of fish that had been very plentiful off the Donegal coast to move up towards Rockall and Donegal fishermen have been hunting those fish up to Rockall and around the rock. On a number of occasions in the past two or three years they have been warned off fishing in those areas by British warships. What is their position now? They have to pass through those waters to get to Rockall. Have the British the right to hunt those fishermen away? Under this agreement, will both countries have the right to fish around those rocks, and can we be sure that the British will not insist, as they have been doing for some years, that the fishing rights around Rockall are part of their exclusive zone? That is something which the Minister could clear up in his reply.

As I said, this agreement raises questions on a number of issues. For instance, what negotiations and discussions have been held on the environment? Did the Government use the negotiations to talk about the emissions from Sellafield? Is there any undertaking from the British that, by getting this item off the agenda to be discussed between the two countries, we would be clearer about the position of emissions from Sellafield into the Irish Sea? What are the implications for our fishing industry? I am thinking particularly of the Donegal fishermen who are being chased from fishing around Rockall.

What are the implications for the provision of rescue services? Have we or the British undertaken any increased obligations in this area? For instance, part of what we have accepted as the British area, water up the north-west coast, is nearer to the air-sea rescue services in Donegal than to the Shetlands and it is part of the policy of this party to station a helicopter for air-sea rescue on the west coast. Will we be co-ordinating our air-sea rescue services? Maybe this agreement would be a suitable vehicle for doing that. Was there any discussion about that?

What are the implications for fishing protection vessels? Was nuclear waste discussed? Was the question of submarines in the Irish Sea raised and resolved in the negotiations? Over the last number of years this question has not been resolved by the two Governments. When in Government I raised this question in the IMO, which was a very unsatisfactory place to have it raised. They did not come up with a solution but they indicated their goodwill towards the Government and expressed their concern that the Irish Sea was being used as the "Patrick Street" of the world.

The importance of the channel between Scotland, Iceland and Greenland to the two Super Powers, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, is enormous. Ships are visible but modern methods of war are moving more towards nuclear submarines. There are more submarines in the Irish Sea than in any other area because the NATO submarines travel to their base in Scotland and the Warsaw Pact countries' submarines maintain surveillance on them.

There have been accidents involving submarines in the Irish Sea. Trawlers were sunk and men were killed. We all remember when French sailors were killed. In the last ten years submarines have caused a great deal of damage; the British Government admitted that one of their submarines sank a trawler, but other ships have been sunk and it was thought that submarines were responsible.

Submarines are designed to travel below water and if possible to avoid surveillance. We should not underestimate the importance of large submarine fleets to NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. Something must be done to address this problem before more lives are lost in the Irish Sea. This could be a useful opportunity for the Government to discuss the possibility of banning all submarine traffic in the Irish Sea. If the present level is maintained, more trawlers will be sunk and more lives will be lost.

Are there any implications in this agreement for the technical side, such as weather forecasting? There are many wider ranging implications involved and I am not satisfied that this House should rubber stamp this agreement and let it through. There are many problems which might be solved through arbitration but I am not convinced the Irish Government have got, on balance, more than they would through arbitration.

Mr. D. O'Malley

I have listened carefully to the Minister's speech. He makes it very clear that this agreement relates only to the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and does not apply to any of the other factors involved, territoriality or an exclusive economic or fishing zone. In that context it is probably satisfactory enough that an agreement has been reached in regard to these matters.

My initial worry on the day this document was published was the position in regard to Rockall. Having heard what has transpired in regard to Rockall and the fact that for this particular purpose its location is irrelevant, even though it certainly is not irrelevant for other purposes, I accept that the north-western division as set out in this agreement seems to be satisfactory. One of the things I am afraid of is that this agreement will be accepted as a headline for all other fields, like fishing, territorial claims and so on, and will be seen in popular parlance on both sides of the Irish Sea to be the end of Ireland's claim to Rockall, and there is a very grave danger of that. If Rockall were an inhabited island and it was Irish territory, obviously the line drawn would be very different — it would run half way between Rockall and the Hebrides or more accurately, half way between Rockall and the Scottish mainland.

I noticed in his speech that the Minister, for some reason, does not give the respective distances between Rockall and the two mainlands. He simply says it is over 200 nautical miles from both but that some islands on the Outer Hebrides are closer to it than the Donegal coast. We are well aware of that. What we have always suggested is that our mainland is closer to Rockall and gives us rights.

The map in relation to this agreement is very unsatisfactory. The maps attached to the agreement are hopeless from several points of view. The map relating to the Irish Sea and the Celtic Sea is far too vague and imprecise. It would have been helpful for the purpose of this debate if we had had a map showing the Continental Shelf west of Scotland and, for example, the location of the Rockall trough, which is east of Rockall, between Rockall and Scotland. I would have thought if I were a Dane, that that would have considerable bearing on the British claim west of Scotland. If that map were prepared and showed the continuity of the Rockall plateau to the south, it would show a much greater connection with the Irish part of the Continental Shelf than with the British part. Either way I am glad the British and the Irish have agreed on this point because I think the Danish claim is perhaps a little far-fetched and the Icelandic one, with the greatest of respect to them, is even more far-fetched.

The part I find unsatisfactory in regard to division in the Irish Sea is that line A, as it is described in article 1º on map A, begins as far south as 53º 39' north. I do not know why it begins that far south because looking at the map, which as I say is hopeless, that is just a relatively short distance north of Howth. Why not go 25 miles further north to somewhere off Dundalk, because the difficulties with Northern Ireland waters start only there? When you go north of Anglesea, why does that line not move quickly to the east, or are the British allowed to draw a base line between the north westerly point of Anglesea Island and the south westerly point of the Isle of Man? If they are not, the line we agreed to should move to the east north of point 1 on the line on map A. Some explanation of that is called for because there is no dispute about the ownership of the Irish shoreline for a distance of about 25 miles to the north of what is shown as point 1 on that map. Only when you get off Carlingford the problem arises with regard to Northern Ireland, and I wonder why this part of it was left undefined, particularly as it is shallow water and, we hope, may be of some benefit to us.

The other difficulty arises further south in St. George's Channel and in the north-eastern part of the Celtic Sea. Mr. Lysaght draws attention to that in the article which has been referred to by Deputy Barry, where he feels that in the part that can be described as Irish block 50 there is an overlap, as it were, in the two original claims and to the north-east of Irish block 50 the bulk of the disputed area seems to have gone to Britain, and he is fearful that that is one of the most valuable parts. Certainly, judging by Irish block 49 it is, because the Irish block 49 has proved to be one of the more interesting, perhaps the most interesting blocks from an oil point of view on the Irish side of the line. It is not terribly clear, and the maps are hopeless. The Irish Times attempted to provide a map in connection with Mr. Lysaght's article and it is a great deal better than the map produced with this agreement. An enlarged map of these areas should be made available. If this agreed line in that area south east of Carnsore Point is agreed as a result of taking the Smalls of Pembrokeshire into account it should follow that the Tuskar Rock, for example, off Rosslare should be taken into account. Was this done? We are talking here about possibly three, four or fives miles of seabed that would be in dispute, but it could prove extremely valuable seabed.

For that reason it is disappointing to have had a speech from the Minister for Foreign Affairs which is full of generalities and references to international law in general global terms, UN conventions and all the rest, while the really important part is the nitty-gritty about a few miles of seabed in that area. This is not something remote and speculative 600 miles north west of Donegal where there might or might not be something. This is an area where both on our side of the lines and on the British side there have been finds of oil and it is really only a question of time it is hoped, until there are commercial finds on one side or the other. The fact that the line is three miles to the east or west of where it might be could be of huge consequence to this country and of some consequence to Britain. It is very important that we know exactly were we stand in relation to that. This should have been spelled out in much more detail.

Follow that line down to the south-west towards point 94 as marked on map A where presumably the French have an interest. Presumably point 94 is not the limit of the continental shelf at that point. I am not certain because, unfortunately, we are not given that information. The French will have to agree with us as to where the division comes in the more extended part of that line. Have the French been shown this agreement? Has it been discussed with them in any way? Do they feel in any sense bound by it? It is not entirely satisfactory in the way it has been put across.

One of the most significant parts of this agreement is the part which has not been dealt with at all, that is the question of Northern Ireland waters. The significance of that may not have been fully grasped here but it was grasped by Mr. John Taylor, the Unionist MEP, who, I notice, some weeks ago, devoted a fairly long speech to the fact that the Northern Ireland waters were agreed, as it were in practical terms to be waters in dispute and therefore were ignored in the same way as the Rock of Rockall was agreed by the parties to this agreement to be in dispute and ignored for various purposes and the line drawn as if it did not exist. It is useful that the British have agreed this sort of arrangement without insisting on the waters around Northern Ireland being delineated as belonging to A or B. Perhaps point 1 in the line on map A starts as far south as it does to avoid that difficulty, but we should be told the position in relation to it.

I have no strong desire to oppose this agreement in principle. I certainly support it. It is a very good thing that matters of this kind that have been in dispute for a long time are finally agreed on a voluntary basis and do not have to go to arbitration. However, not all the questions are answered and the House will have to bear in mind that if and when this agreement is approved here this afternoon we will never again get an opportunity to look at it. It is never again going to be changed. The British may take a year to two before they ratify it. We are doing it with extraordinary rapidity in the very same month in which it was signed. The British may have time to have second thoughts about it but we are not going to have time. For that reason what is said in the reply is of some importance on these points. I wonder if, even before the end of this debate, we can get proper maps to a reasonable scale to enable the precise position to be ascertained. The most useful piece I have seen is the map in Mr. Lysaght's article as opposed to anything that has been given out by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Looking at that map one sees the quite extensive areas that are in dispute and now divided up in a fairly arbitrary fashion. It is interesting, for example, that at one point the proposed Irish and British lines clearly crossed one another and at another point they did not even meet. That point needs to be taken into account. It is noticeable that in the southern part of that division, nearly all the disputed area has gone to Britain, whereas in the more northern part of it which is very much narrower and where, under present knowledge at least, the existence of hydro-carbons is not proven, it has gone slightly more towards Ireland. Of the disputed area there is no doubt, looking at the map, that Britain seems to have got the more extensive part of it, which is the point that Mr. Lysaght makes.

I do not see there is any point in arguing in something of a vacuum. It would be appropriate that we be given a more precise map and a full explanation of how that particular arrangement was come to. We are also entitled to be told what the Government propose to do in regard to the claims of Denmark, via the Faroes and Iceland, to areas in Rockall. The line shown on map 4B is so far south of anything that either the Faroes or Iceland might possibly legitimately claim that we should claim that line as being a line that stands against all claims, because Iceland is about 800 miles to the north west of that line and, taken from any normal view, could not conceivably have a claim to it. If they have a claim to it we have a claim to extensive areas off the French coast which I certainly think the French would not countenance, and perhaps off the Spanish coast also which, equally, the Spaniards would not countenance. We are closer to the French and Spanish coasts than Iceland is to these areas that they are laying claim to.

Mr. Quinn

The House has at this stage heard quite a lot in relation to this matter. It might be useful to restate what exactly is being proposed here. After 11 years, perhaps even longer, we now have, subject to our ratification, a draft agreement on an issue that has occupied an enormous amount of time and legal expertise and which makes reference to at least three other legal precedents in the form of the delineation and the definition of boundaries. Having regard to that brief summary of part of the process that has taken place today, we should be wary about attempting to redraw in two hours what has taken 11 years to emerge. I am not normally that modest, as you might on occasion grant; but a lot has been done in this area. On the question of the line, I take the point that Deputy O'Malley made in contrasting the map prepared in conjunction with Mr. Lysaght's article in today's The Irish Times with the map we were circulated with; it does show a degree of equalisation when one looks at the disputed area.

The agreement itself is quite concise. It confines itself exclusively to the Irish rights of exploration of the seabed and the surface below it on the Continental Shelf, therefore enabling the Government of the day, specifically the Department of Energy, to set the terms and the conditions attaching to any oil exploration in these areas. There is very good reason to presume that there are more Kinsale-type fields and, while exploration has somewhat subsided in these waters because of the current price of oil, it is not unreasonable to presume that between now and the end of the century the price will fluctuate and the profitability of such deposits will be exploited with new and more environmentally sound methods of extraction.

On behalf of the Labour Party I welcome the fact that this 11 year old dispute has been resolved, that a line has been agreed upon. It is clearly a compromise. Such lines are, of necessity, a compromise. The zig-zag form that it has taken has been specifically designed to facilitate the allocation of prospecting blocks in the various sea areas to enable different prospecting consortia to obtain licences so that they can proceed with their own work.

The whole question of Rockall that has been part and parcel of the debate on territoriality and whether we have a claim to it, should be put in the context of what this agreement between the British and Irish Governments means. I will come later to the question of the Icelandic and Danish claims. It was always presumed by those people who urged the Irish Government to either counterclaim Rockall or to have refuted internationally the British claim to Rockall that the motivation for claiming Rockall was substantially and exclusively the mineral rights Rockall will generate in its vicinity. This agreement effectively makes Rockall irrelevant for the purposes of that particular motivation. We have, as the record shows and as the Minister repeated, simply refuted and refused to recognise the validity of the British Government's claim to the sovereignty of Rockall. If such a claim were to be upheld by some international court, and this is now most unlikely having regard to the development of international legal thinking in this area, if at the very worst it was to be upheld and it was to be determined that Rockall was legally part of the territory of the United Kingdom, the rights that would be conferred upon Britain as a consequence of that would be a 12-mile territorial zone around the area of Rockall. Since the line that we have determined falls 12 miles below that position anyway that makes the outcome of the claim for Rockall legally an irrelevancy in terms of Ireland's interests in extracting mineral resources from the continental seabed and below. That is as I read it. Perhaps the Minister might confirm that I am correct in my reading of it.

If we argue that the motivation of Britain in claiming Rockall, and nearly killing some of their naval servicemen in trying to get on to it, was presumably to stake a claim for some stage in the future to the riches and the oil resources around Rockall, the definition of this boundary now which puts Rockall to the north of the median line is in fact one that makes that whole exercise by the British irrelevant.

In relation to the points that Deputy O'Malley made concerning the decision to ignore the area between Northern Ireland and Britain and, indeed, from Dundalk back down to the coast, that is a point that might be usefully addressed by the Minister, particularly in relation to the Irish seabed, going up to the point where the territorial boundaries clearly change. The map starts south of that and it is possible, having regard to the intentions of some of the mineral prospecting companies, that there are mineral resources in the middle of the Irish Sea. It would be useful for that reason if that was defined between Britain and Ireland. I should like to ask the Minister to clarify the Government's thinking in relation to that.

The Government have effected a significant advance in not allowing the territory around Northern Ireland become a factor. I read that as a tacit admission by the British that this area is disputed. Therefore, were I John Taylor I would be rightly concerned. This conclusion is a reasonable one. Deputy Barry used the occasion of this debate to raise other matters related to the joint administration of seas around Ireland and it should be said that the initiative for the settlement of this apparent endless dispute was taken by the previous Administration. It reflects very much on the positive relations that existed between Iveagh House and their counterparts in Britain and between the Governments of the day. Deputy Barry should take some credit for that. Had that relationship between London and Dublin continued perhaps we would have seen a successful resolution of many of the other problems that still haunt us in regard to the administration of our seas. The Government should take note of the fact that this is not a cause for celebration; they are harvesting the results of work initiated by the previous Administration. It would be unwise of them to draw the conclusion that they have done a good day's work and that they do not need to do anything further. Following the conclusion of this agreement the Government should pursue the other areas of conflict that have arisen in relation to the administration of the seas around these islands.

The legal points have been addressed by other Members. I take it that what we are debating is an agreement which we can accept or reject but that, even if we were in a position to suggest an alternative boundary, we are not in a position to request the Government to renegotiate with the other side. Therefore, I am not proposing that we should do that. I am prepared to accept, on the basis of the effort that has been put into these negotiations, that the line prepared for us is as good as we could hope to achieve. I say that notwithstanding the expertise of Mr. Lysaght who for a long time was intimately involved in the negotiations. I am sure he would be the first to recognise that he has not been involved in the final process or been part of the final agreement. His article in today's issue of The Irish Times alludes to the fact that he is giving an interpretation which is not based on all the available information.

The line that has been agreed must be accepted as the best available compromise. I hope the removal of any doubt, particularly in the area of the Celtic Sea and in the south west, will encourage those companies who are contemplating prospecting in the Irish Sea, to proceed without delay. Notwithstanding the enormous liberalisation and enticements offered by the former Minister for Energy, Deputy Burke, who also removed many of the constraints and safeguards in the original terms, notwithstanding that bargain basement offer to oil prospectors to drill in the Irish Sea where there was no dispute with regard to ownership or sovereignty, few companies have taken up the offer. I am not sure that the confirmation of this line will mean a rush of new prospectors. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs, who worked closely with the Department of Energy in defining the line, may be in a position to indicate if companies have expressed an interest in areas which were subject to some doubt as to ownership. If the Minister of State has that information available I hope he will give it in the course of his reply. The Labour Party will be supporting the ratification of the agreement and are anxious to express their appreciation of the satisfactory outcome of the negotiations. The alternative would have been to contest the issue before an international tribunal which would have been costly. The outcome is satisfactory particularly having regard to the fact that the agreement may be challenged by the Icelandic or Danish Governments. However, that can only be in respect of areas that are more likely to concern the British authorities than ourselves. The clear definition of the line in the Celtic Sea and the south eastern and western coasts will not be subject to a dispute with any third party and I welcome that. I hope the agreement will provide the basis for confidence for oil exploration.

Mr. Sherlock

The main value of this agreement is that it represents an agreement between Britain and Ireland on hitherto disputed jurisdiction over certain areas of the seabed surrounding this country. The agreement may encourage further exploration of these waters for oil and gas fields, as the exploration companies were naturally reluctant to get involved in possibly expensive exploration work in disputed territories. If it does that will be a welcome development, although it has to be said that the oil exploration companies have shown no great sense of urgency in trying to bring ashore the oil that has already been found in Irish territorial waters over which there is no dispute.

The agreement is, of course, only a partial one. It ducks a number of issues, such as the territorial waters around Northern Ireland, and has avoided the Rockall issue. The agreement is strongly disputed by Denmark and Iceland, who claim part of the seas now divided between ourselves and Britain and it is likely that it will be challenged in the international court or some other international forum.

It has been suggested that by ignoring the question of Rockall, this agreement is in fact strengthening British claims to jurisdiction over it. The importance of Rockall is not the rock itself, but the jurisdiction over the surrounding waters and the fishing rights that internationally recognised sovereignty would bring with it. This question will have to be sorted out by negotiation and compromise at some stage, and it is important that this should be done as soon as possible.

Similarly, there will have to be negotiations with the Danish and Icelandic Governments at some stage over the claims on the waters covered by this agreement. The Danes are claiming sovereignty over a substantial area of both the British and Irish sectors covered by the agreement. The Danish claim, in fact, covers a far greater proportion of the Irish sector than the British area, and we would stand to lose a lot more if it was successful. I would ask the Minister to say in replying to the debate, if any protest or representations have been received from the Danish Government on the agreement. As with Rockall, the dispute with Denmark over these waters will have to be resolved at some stage. It is better that it should be resolved by negotiation, discussion and agreement rather than by litigation in the international court which could go on for years and which could prove enormously costly to the Irish taxpayer.

While there obviously has to be a certain amount of give and take in agreements like this, there is some evidence to suggest that there has been too much give on the part of the Irish side and the British have been allowed to take too much. Certainly, in the area of the Celtic Sea to the south west of the country, which is generally considered to be the most promising in terms of possible oil and gas resources, the British seem to have done exceptionally well.

As I said earlier, if this agreement increases the potential for oil and gas exploration, then it will be a good thing. However, one can only be totally sceptical about the intentions of the exploration companies given their record in Irish waters so far. Successive Governments have capitulated totally to the demands of the international oil companies and have made concession on top of concession; yet the oil remains under the sea. The Coalition Government improved the terms for the oil companies on three occasions during their term of office and last September the Fianna Fáil Administration gave them even more generous terms; yet not a drop of oil has been brought ashore.

Successive Governments have been hopelessly outmanoeuvred by the oil companies, and the public have been subjected to a concerted campaign of disinformation by certain of the oil barons who have used their interests in newspapers to wage a campaign for a virtual surrender to their demands. The entire approach adopted by successive Fianna Fáil and Coalition Governments has been inept and has been far too dependent on the "goodwill" of the international oil companies. We believe that the Government should have adopted an approach similar to that of the Norwegians who, when it was established that there was oil in their waters, involved themselves very directly in exploration, and hired the necessary technical expertise from abroad.

The interests of the Irish people and the interests of the huge international oil companies are not the same. The oil and gas resources in the Celtic Sea are, we know, likely to be in small reservoirs. Major oil companies are normally only interested in developing large fields, but these deposits, which are small by international standards are quite substantial in terms of the annual energy needs of this country. We have enough evidence of oil and natural gases off our southern coast to say that investment in State exploration would be repaid by having complete control and use of the discovered resources. This, rather than further concessions to international oil companies, should be the direction of our oil and gas exploration policy.

The apparently never-ending concessions to the oil companies, more typical of a third world country than a member state of the EC, do not indicate any determination on the part of the Irish Government to ensure that the oil is brought ashore and used in the best interests of the Irish people.

The agreement also focuses attention on our ability, or more accurately our lack of ability, to explore our own Continental Shelf area. Under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which Ireland has signed the definition of the national continental shelf must include a definition of the outer edge of the continental margin. This is necessary to define a boundary between the national territory and the central oceanic area in which the United Nations claim sea-bed rights.

This is not a procedure which can be carried out by diplomatic negotiation. It will require a considerable amount of work of a practical nature at sea in distant parts of the Atlantic. Failure to carry out this work and to make a claim for the relevant sea-bed territory may result in the loss to the nation of huge areas of sea bed with the possibility of mineral deposits.

There is currently no indication of the Government's interest in this important area. The only research vessel we have —Lough Beltra— is not capable of carrying out this work. A recent research cruise by a German vessel with Irish cooperation, which got an amount of publicity, was a minor but only a minor contribution to this important process.

The Marine Research Institute which was announced with great noise by the present Government has not been heard of since. It might have been expected when created to take an interest in these matters.

There is no Civil Service or semi-State body currently capable of carrying out this work at sea. Expertise exists in some areas but facilities such as a ship, equipment and personnel are absent. Such a gap must be filled quickly. The Danish Province of the Faroe Islands and the State of Iceland have made claims on much of this territory. Without physical information they may well obtain it to the detriment of our economic situation in spite of the fact that our claim would appear to be better. If our claim is not documented with first hand information it will not be sustainable.

The argument that technology is not available currently to work minerals in such waters is not sustainable. When the need is demonstrated the technology will become available. All of the principles involved have been applied in other areas of underwater work. Another argument used is that the supply of minerals on land will be sufficient for many years. This is probably true. However it is not an argument. Since the area in question is seven times the size of Ireland it will take many years to carry out even a preliminary examination.

Mr. Kelly

While I am very glad that this long running problem with the British has reached some finality not in every respect but so far at least as the areas covered by this agreement are concerned, I think the whole episode shows up a lack in our own administrative arrangements. I had, for about two years, something to do with this matter when I was Parliamentary Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for the legal section, as well as a few others, and subsequently during the brief time that I was Attorney General. I can remember very well that this was a period in which maritime matters were at the top of the Government's agenda and were frequently on the headlines. It was the era when the Fianna Fáil Party — if it is not disobliging to strike a partisan note by saying so — then seated on those benches were willing virtually to die for the 50-mile exclusive fisheries zone, and when Senator Eoin Ryan, their leader in the Seanad, said that if we did not get an exclusive 50-mile zone we should reconsider our whole situation in the European Communities — they were that dedicated to it. Where, I would like to ask, is it now? It had however, despite its absurdity, the effect of souping up the general temperature surrounding maritime problems and put them very much up on the table in this House for several long months, or perhaps even a year or two. I am beginning to forget just the length of time during which this endured.

It was, of course, the fishery problem which was foremost then, but a long-term problem, of perhaps greater importance, was the one which the House is dealing with now, it struck me then, and I wrote to the then Taoiseach, Mr. Liam Cosgrave, to that effect. Afterwards I made representations in this House to the incoming Fianna Fáil Government and subsequently said the same thing again during the time of their successors that the legal resources of this State are dispersed among several Departments having necessarily to deal with maritime matters. There are resources of that kind in the Attorney General's Office — which comes under the umbrella of the Taoiseach's Department — in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and I presume the Department of Defence have a legal adviser of their own. I do not wish them to betray warlike secrets but I suppose somewhere in Parkgate Street there is a legal expert. I am not sure whether the Department of Fisheries employ a legal officer but certainly they must frequently have to deal with legal problems both in regard to infractions of our fishery zones and in regard to their rights of pursuit and such things.

The State's resources being necessarily very small it seemed to me then, and still seems to me, a pity that they could not be concentrated under one head. I do not care whose empire is enlarged thereby, let it be the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Attorney General's Office but I think the expertise, fine though it is, is very thinly spread. It should be concentrated in such a way that we do have a team of people who are familiar with the problems arising on and under the sea, military, fiscal, mineral, territorial and fishery problems. It does not need to be an enormous team that grows with every Estimate. A small team doing nothing else except remorselessly and relentlessly studying the law relating to maritime matters would be better able to serve the State than the very overtaxed, excellent teams we have which are now scattered among several Departments.

By saying all of this I do not wish in any way to disparage the work which has been done because I can testify to the extremely high standard of the work done in this regard. Perhaps the best official Government paper I ever read, although I know one should not make these comparisons, was one which was in the middle of an almost one foot thick file which was put on my desk when I was with this section in the Department of Foreign Affairs bearing on this very problem.

In those days in the mid-seventies we had the problem that the British were designating all around them. They were designating areas from which under this agreement they have now been forced to recede, perhaps I should not say forced, but negotiated into receding from. My own view at that time was that there was no way of getting action from them because they appeared to be dragging their feet on the arbitration front. As soon as we designated a few areas across their line the effect was instant and electric, they were at the negotiating table for arbitration within weeks. I would not like to say that it was because I was discharged from my responsibility for that area shortly afterwards that the thing went into low gear. It certainly went into low gear for about 12 years and not much action resulted.

I used to inquire, sometimes privately and sometimes in the House, about what was happening to the arbitration to settle the dividing line of the Continental Shelf between our country and theirs and apparently there was always some good reason but this added up to a lot of good years being let go by. I am very pleased that it has at last ended in an agreement but I feel had we been forced to go to arbitration it would have been an extremely costly business. We would have been forced to retain the services of foreign experts who might have had more academic expertise than any native international lawyer but because they were foreign they would not have had the feel for the Irish exigencies that our own native officials would have had. That is why I again say, in no sense to belittle the efforts of the officials who have taken part in this process, quite the contrary, that we ought to have a special legal department under whatever main Department concerned only with maritime legal problems.

Had we been forced into arbitration I cannot imagine what it would have involved the State in, in terms of cost. I can remember that during the short time I was Attorney General spending a disproportionate amount of that small period at meetings with the adviser, since unhappily deceased, who was of Irish blood but not of Irish citizenship and who was one of the most distinguished international lawyers in the world and who came over to Dublin on a number of occasions to discuss with us the best line we should adopt in trying to press on with arbitration. That was only the very beginning of what might have been an immensely expensive process and the House, whatever reservations may be expressed about the terms of the agreement, should be grateful that the agreement has spared the State that expense.

There are two things, arising more out of what the Minister has said than from the agreement itself, that I would like to refer to very briefly. First, I would like to add my voice to that of the Minister in trying to dispel this fetish we have about Rockall. Rockall is a tiny needle of rock which not even a gull could live on, let alone a human being. It is not only not capable of supporting inhabitants but it is also not capable of supporting an offshore economy. One cannot treat it in the way in which people still treat the Blasket Islands, one cannot keep anything on it. It is very hard to land on it. The possession of Rockall is of no significance to anyone. What we are worried about is any sort of claim, be it on the fishery front or on the Continental Shelf front, which might assume that that tiny uninhabitable and unexploitable pinpoint of rock, not as many feet across as this House is or barely, generates any kind of rights to territorial waters or rights in regard to fisheries, to the Continental Shelf or to mineral exploitation. We certainly would have to dispute that not because of any Irish claim to actually owning this useless piece of rock but because we never could concede that this geological accident should in equity make any difference to the disposal for fishery, mineral and other purposes of the seas around it and the seabed underlying it.

Having said that much, I only have to offer the House my warm support in regard to what the Minister said in his opening speech about Rockall. The last thing I want to refer to, and I am not sure if any other speaker mentioned this, bears on something which the Minister also mentioned and that is the question of the right to the waters around Northern Ireland, around the coasts of Counties Derry, Antrim and Down. I think it is a good principle — I do not know if other lawyers would agree — that if you have two points going into court, one of them a good point and the other a bad point, that one should not bring both in, that one should leave the bad one outside because the bum point is going to discredit the good one. I see two other professional lawyers here and it may be that their technique is different and they are willing to try anything but I do not think it is a good idea to provoke impatience in a judge or in people who are in the position of a judge or in a public we are trying to impress by wasting bad points on them when one has a couple of really good points.

I was a bit disturbed to find the Minister talking about settling once and for all the question in regard to the seas around the three maritime counties of Northern Ireland in the context of an all-Ireland settlement. The Minister is much given to globalities and totalities. He likes to take the global view, a phrase which adapts itself very well to the motion of the hands which comes naturally to him. The totality of global relationships is his element but while I would support him in trying to get the best possible totalities and globalities we can, I do not think we ought to drag this ancient red herring of the waters around these three northern counties into the picture. I hope I will not be accused of doing down the national interest by saying this but I am trying to advance the national interest by advising us not to bring a bad point into the public view.

This whole hare, herring or chestnut, whichever image one prefers, arose about 20 years ago when a resident magistrate in Northern Ireland got the idea that the Irish Free State or the area of Southern Ireland which turned into the Irish Free State had at all times and still has jurisdiction over the territorial waters, over a belt of sea, around the three maritime counties of Northern Ireland. The reason for that argument, which is a perfectly good debating point, on the face of it seems quite stateable. It was that Northern Ireland for constitutional purposes is defined by a system of exclusion, it is the whole of Ireland less a certain number of parliamentary counties and boroughs — less Counties Derry, Antrim, Down, Tyrone, Fermanagh and Armagh and the county boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry. No county or county borough generates a territorial sea. Ergo this was the magistrate's argument. The territorial seas were left behind by and were not caught by the legislation which created Northern Ireland and therefore perforce had to be regarded as still part of the rest of the island and under the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State.

I do admit that there is here a casus omissus and that if it had occurred to the draftsmen back in 1920 they would somehow have put this point beyond dispute, but so much water has gone under the bridge and so much legislation in particular has been enacted which is not consistent with that position and so many things have officially been done, including, let me mention, a statement by the then Taoiseach, the late Deputy Seán Lemass, in 1964, which is quite inconsistent with any claim on the part of this State to exercise jurisdiction over the territorial waters around Northern Ireland that for us to be raising this point at this stage will only cause impatience in people who are all too given to impatience anyway and will subtract from the force of the points which this State has all too good reason to make in the context of an all-Ireland settlement. I ask the Minister — and I hope that in saying all of this I have not done any damage, overlooked some important point or misunderstood him — if I am right in what I say that this is the basis on which this idea rests, to consider whether his total overall global case would not be better served by leaving this herring out of it.

Mr. Deasy

It is interesting that within a matter of days of this Agreement between the Irish and British Governments being announced the Danish Government lodged a counter claim to the effect — and apparently the Danish Government look after matters relating to foreign affairs for the Faroe Islands which are associated with Denmark — that the Agreement which was arrived at between Ireland and Britain was null and void because they had an interest in quite a bit of the Continental Shelf which was supposedly divided up by the Agreement. I believe it is extremely important that we are clear as to whether this third claim to this apparently disputed territory is in any way valid. I have not heard any denial from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or for that matter from the British, as to the correctness or otherwise of this claim by the Danes on behalf of the Faroese.

There may also be a fourth factor which has not yet been publicised — that is, the claim by Iceland to the regions which have been divided between Ireland and Britain. I have tabled a question on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs — to which I am awaiting an answer — which asks whether it would be logical to have a conference not just between Britain and Ireland but between the four countries, Ireland, Britain, Denmark and Iceland, in order to divide the Rockall trough area rather than take out a little bit and divide it: even when one takes a little bit out and divides it one can have a dispute with the third party. If one looks closely at an atlas one can see that the three main participants involved, Ireland, Britain and the Faroe Islands, are virtually equidistant from what we call Rockall. This issue, is being bypassed in this discussion because we are told it is not part of the Agreement but I do not believe we can bypass it. It is part of the overall question and I do not believe one can resolve any part of that question, be it what was decided bilaterally three or four weeks ago or whatever, unless one takes the North Atlantic and Rockall area into consideration. Rockall is described on maps not just as Rockall but as the Rockall Rise. It is not referred to as the Rock of Rockall; it is referred to as the Rockall Rise because obviously it is awash in very wild weather so it could hardly be designated as being habitable or capable of being occupied for any significant length of time.

This question involves four countries and not just two countries. It is not good enough to say "We will deal with this little area for the time being and we will deal with the overall issue in years to come".

The Rockall issue has been going on for 32 or 33 years. The first time it was claimed by the British was in 1955 and 1956 and it is a sad of affairs if we have not made an attempt with Britain to find a solution to the problem after 32 or 33 years. We should be making some concrete moves at this stage to try to reach an overall agreement with regard to who owns what in the North Atlantic area. The Minister's statement is helpful to us in some ways. He said that the line of jurisdiction of the Scilly Isles only goes 100 miles out, or half way, because they are not part of the British mainland and are only islands. That would seem to invalidate the British claim that because the Hebrides are slightly closer to Rockall than the Donegal coast they have a superior claim to it. The very point they make in regard to the Scilly Isles defeats their case in regard to the Hebrides and certainly defeats the case the Danes are making in regard to the Faroe Isles.

All of these matters should be examined extremely closely. The precedent which is being created by the Scilly Isles undermines the case which has been made by both the British and the Danes. The sooner an around-the-table conference between the four countries involved in the North Atlantic area is held the better. As I have said I have put down a question in relation to this matter and I should like to think that we would be the people responsible for initiating discussions on this matter.

Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs (Mr. Calleary)

First, I should like to thank all the Deputies who contributed to the debate. I welcome the general support this Agreement has received. I am particularly glad that the House appreciates the importance of the Agreement.

Deputy Quinn mentioned that the present negotiations were initiated by the previous Government. I think the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to that in his speech and I should like to acknowledge that fact here. However, that is not to say, as Deputy Quinn seemed to imply, that this Government have not continued the very good work in relation to the negotiations. The fact that the Agreement is before us today is proof that this Government have carried on very successfully the negotiations which were started — as Deputy Quinn said and which I acknowledge — by the previous Government. Many matters were raised by Deputies and within my time span I hope to try to reply to the questions which were raised.

It can be seen from the very full debate here today that the agreement deals with a long-standing disagreement, which is a very complex matter. That long standing disagreement was mentioned in particular by Deputy Quinn and Deputy Kelly who referred to the length of time it has taken to bring this Agreement before the House. While the agreement is no more than half a dozen pages long, no one should doubt its significance. It may appear to be no more than a collection of geographical co-ordinates and maps but its importance for the State should never be under-estimated. The Agreement which concerns the delimitation of the common Continental Shelf on which Ireland and Britain are situated delineates the respective areas of jurisdiction for each country in the Irish Sea — South, South-West and off the Donegal coast in the North-West. The agreement is based on the international law concerning delimitation on which a wealth of material exists and from which the negotiators could draw. The agreement clarifies and expands the areas within which exploration and exploitation may now take place hopefully it will encourage the petroleum industry to take advantage of this situation. I will try to deal with the questions which many Deputies raised about the maps. The maps have been described as inadequate, but let me point out that they merely illustrate and that the real lines are designated by the co-ordinates. Generally, it is not usual to disclose our different negotiating positions in negotiations.

Deputy O'Malley asked where the line began in the Irish Sea and why it began at that point. The reason is that it starts below a point where complicating factors, for instance where the Isle of Man's possible claim began. The Deputy also referred to the outer edge at point 94 and why it did not extend beyond this point. From my information, the reason it did not extend any further is that that is the outer edge of the Continental Shelf and after that point we come to deeper water. As I have said earlier, the determining factors are the co-ordinates, rather than maps which are really only for illustration purposes.

Deputies O'Malley and Barry raised the question of pollution and dumping at sea. As they will be aware, all coastal states have the exclusive right to permit, regulate and control dumping on to its Continental Shelf. However no dumping may take place without the coastal state's express prior approval. Deputies can rest assured that no permission detrimental to this country will be given. It is Government policy not to permit the dumping of any hazardous materials on to our Continental Shelf.

Deputy Barry, in particular, spoke about the question of war ships and submarines, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Under international law the waters above the Continental Shelf are high seas for navigational purposes. Consequently such waters are open to the ships, including submarines, of all states for the purposes of freedom of navigation. I am sure the House will be pleased to know that as a result of an Irish initiative, the assembly of the International Maritime Organisation unanimously passed a resolution on 19 November 1987 recommending that in international waters, submerged submarines should as far as possible keep out of the way of fishing vessels and of fishing gear connected to them.

Deputy O'Malley referred to the newspaper article that stated that Ireland conceded in some significant areas in the Celtic Sea, particularly Block 50. The House will agree with the point made by Deputy Quinn that where there are negotiations there has to be give and take. However, the Government are satisfied that on the basis of information available the State has not lost out or ceded any areas which are particularly promising. While the Block mentioned has some prospectivity, it is not among the most promising areas for future exploration and exploitation.

All Deputies refer to the Continental Shelf off Northern Ireland. May I again restate what the Minister said, that this agreement does not deal with the waters or the Continental Shelf off Northern Ireland. The de facto position is that there are conflicting claims to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and its offshore areas and the Government are firmly of the view that these matters are best dealt with in the overall framework of a political solution.

Deputy O'Malley spoke about the Rockall trough. As Deputies are aware this is a deep valley between the Irish mainland and the Rockall plateau. Despite its depth it does not form a break in the continuity or natural prolongation of Ireland's Continental Shelf which stretches through the trough and across the plateau. The Government are satisfied that any argument challenging this fact could not succeed.

Deputies Barry and Kelly referred to fishing. May I again reiterate that the agreement only refers to the Continental Shelf, that is the seabed extending as a natural prolongation of the land territory out under the sea, which can extend further from the coast than the fixed 200 nautical miles exclusive fisheries zone. It will make further undisputed areas available for oil and gas exploration.