Vol. 388 No. 9
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he has expressed his concern for the safety of the Irish personnel on United Nations duty in Namibia to SWAPO and the United Nations; and if he will make a statement on the present position regarding the United Nations peace plan for that region.
15.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he will take steps at United Nations level to ensure that the notorious 101st Battalion of the South African Army and all other South-West African units are confined to base immediately in Namibia; and if he will seek explanations as to the reason South Africa was mobilising so many extra troops into the north in the weeks and days before 1 April.
17.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs the plans the Government have to provide support for the independence process in Namibia; if he will respond, in particular, to the requests to send parliamentary observers and to initiate at United Nations level extra support for refugees returning to Namibia and directly provide emergency aid for those refugees returning in winter conditions and possibly without any possessions due to South African import controls.
23.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if his attention has been drawn to the fact that the South African backed Administration in Namibia is currently privatising much of the infrastructure of Namibia in advance of independence; that this Administration is selling into private hands, utilities, post and telecommunications and other resources; that this policy is totally opposed by the Namibian people; and if he will raise the issue with the United Nations.
27.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if his attention has been drawn to the serious inadequacies of the United Nations Resolution No. 435 concerning Namibia, which leaves a hostile South African illegal regime in control of the process of registration, elections and allocation of visas to the international press and observers; and if he will undertake to take up these inadequacies at United Nations level with a view to ensuring that free and fair elections have some chance of taking place.
41.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether sufficient forces are available to UNTAG to ensure that all South African and SWAPO forces are confined to base in Namibia; whether the originally agreed number of 7,500 personnel is the minimum number which could reasonably be expected to enforce the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435; and if he will call on the Security Council to make that number of troops available to UNTAG.
61.
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he will ensure that the United Nations authorities act to prevent the wholesale privatisation of State services and resources in Namibia by South Africa in flagrant breach of the spirit of Resolution 435.
I propose to take Questions Nos. 14, 15, 17, 23, 27, 41, and 61, together.
With the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 632 on 16 February 1989 the final step was taken allowing for the implementation of the UN plan for the transition of Namibia to independence contained in Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. It will be recalled that Resolution 632 was adopted following the agreements reached last year between Angola, Cuba and South Africa which provided for the withdrawal of Cuban Troops from Angola and opened the way for independence in Namibia on the basis of Resolution 435. The date set for implementation to begin was 1 April 1989.
Under Resolution 632 adopted on 16 February last, the Security Council approved the dispatch of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The military component is to comprise 7,500 persons of which, on the proposal of the Secretary-General, 4,650 will be deployed initially, with 2,350 remaining in reserve. The deployment of the contingent within this limit is the responsibility of the Secretary-General. The Government attach importance to the Secretary-General's views on the operational requirements of the force. While the Secretary-General proposed the initial deployment of 4,650, he has stated that he intends to keep the deployment and the size of the military component of UNTAG under review. He has promised to inform the Security Council if the situation in Namibia should require the deployment of additional military personnel.
In accordance with the terms of the agreement between the parties enshrined in the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988, and confirmed to the United Nations Secretary-General by both SWAPO and South Africa, a formal ceasefire was to come into effect as of 0400 GMT on 1 April. Also, by this date South African troops were to have been confined to bases and SWAPO forces to have withdrawn to bases in Angola North of the 16th Parallel. However, on 1 April SWAPO was found to have infiltrated a large number of armed personnel and material into Namibia. In view of the situation which rapidly developed on the ground, the UN Secretary-General, upon the joint recommendation of his special representative and the UNTAG force commander, agreed to a limited and temporary suspension in respect of certain specified South African Army units, or the requirement that all forces be confined to bases. This was agreed to enable additional support to be provided to the Namibian police where necessary. It was further agreed with the South African Administrator-General that the situation would be kept under continuous review and that the movement out of bases would be monitored throughout by UNTAG military observers. I believe it must be left up to the United Nations to determine in the light of the developing situation on the ground when the terms of this temporary derogation from the agreements are rendered inoperative.
The events since 1 April are naturally disturbing and it is the Government's fervent hope that the agreement reached between South Africa, Angola and Cuba at Mount Etjo on 9 April on the return of SWAPO forces to Angola and their confinement to bases there will ease tensions in the immediate term and allow the implementation of Resolution 435 to remain on course. In a statement on 6 April the Twelve, in expressing concern at the fighting on the border with Angola, stressed the fundamental importance attaching to the scrupulous respect by all parties of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the agreements entered into. I believe we must now await further developments before we can judge whether the UN plan is still on course. In this regard, we, together with our partners in the Twelve, have reiterated our unqualified support for the United Nations Secretary-General, his special representative and for UNTAG.
As Deputies will be aware, Ireland is contributing to the UNTAG operation through the provision of 20 Defence Force personnel as military observers as well as 35 Garda officers, who will form part of the civilian police contingent headed by former assistant Garda commissioner, Mr. Stephen Fanning. The direction of operations on the ground and the security of UNTAG personnel is of course a matter for the UN Secretary-General, his special representative and the UNTAG force commander. The Government will naturally monitor developments in the implementation of the UN plan continuously.
The Government are not aware of any request for parliamentary observers. The Government would of course lend their full support to any proposals of this nature.
The United Nations appeal for funding support for their programme or repatriation of refugees to Namibia has already met with a very generous response from the international community. That included a pledge of 1.75m ECU from the EC to which Ireland as a member state is a contributor. Provision has been made by the EC for a community plan of 10m ECU in favour of Namibia. The UN have undertaken to make a technical assessment of any further relief needs and to bring the results to the attention of the international community. In the circumstances, there is no need at present for any initiative at United Nations level in respect of extra support for refugees returning to Namibia. My Department will, however, continue to keep the situation under review.
Regarding the terms of Resolution 435, I am aware of certain concerns which have been expressed. Among these concerns are those expressed by Deputies regarding voting arrangements, visas for observers, infrastructure, utilities and state services in Namibia. Resolution 435 is, like all Security Council Resolutions, binding on all members of the United Nations. It sought to establish the board framework of a settlement. Since 1978, efforts have continued to develop this framework in an attempt to bring the parties to a negotiated solution. Following the agreements reached in late 1988, the Security Council was able to take the necessary action to initiate the plan for the independence of Namibia established in Resolution 435. While South Africa has undeniably a central role to play in the implementation of the UN plan for independence, the overall authority of the United Nations was restated in Resolution 435. This makes it clear that the transition process in Namibia is being carried out under the responsibility of the Security Council and under the direction of the Secretary-General, assisted by the special representative and the force commander in Namibia. Resolution 435 reaffirmed the mandate of the UN special representative to "ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations". The Government have every confidence in the United Nations' ability to implement their mandate.
I observe that the Taoiseach has included in his reply the answer to Priority Question No. 14 in the name of Deputy Geraldine Kennedy. I will call on the Deputy if she so desires now.
First, I would like to thank the Taoiseach for a very comprehensive reply to these questions. There is one particular matter that I would like to raise. Given the temporary derogation of aspects of the peace plan for Namibia which the Taoiseach has outlined, and the fact that Irish personnel are serving in Namibia in circumstances that were not envisaged when they went there, I should like to ask the Taoiseach if he has any undue concern for the safety of Irish personnel there.
There is always concern when our personnel are serving under such circumstances. Such situations are often tense and confused and it is difficult to ensure that the role of the UN personnel is always fully understood and respected by others. However, we have to be guided by the UN authorities, by the Secretary-General and his special representative, in matters of this kind. At present, apart from the general position that I have outlined, we have no particular reason for concern. I say that with great caution and prudence because, unfortunately, history teaches us that in Lebanon and elsewhere the unexpected can tragically occur.
I should like to thank the Taoiseach for his comprehensive reply. Did I gather from it that he is by and large satisfied with the way the UN handled this matter and that he does not anticipate taking initiative to express the range of concerns included in the questions tabled by Members? I respectfully suggest that rather than clapping the UN on the back we should be asking them very specific questions as to why on 1 April the UN were there in such tiny numbers and allowed the situation get out of control. What do they propose to do to retrieve that situation? Will the Taoiseach consider taking on board the view of many Members of the House, including those who were in the general area and were considerably critical of the UN at the time, that if the UN are to establish control there they should increase resources and the full strength of the reserve force should be drawn up? Will the Taoiseach undertake to discuss with us our concern about this matter with a view to the Government taking a more aggressive stand with the UN rather than accepting the lines handed down from them?
I do not think the Deputy is being quite fair. The UN have assumed an enormous responsibility there. They made their best estimate of the strength of the observer force required, put the figure at 4,650 and retained 2,000-odd in reserve. This is a totally unpredictable situation and all they could do was make the best estimate of what would be required. I suggest that had it not been for the SWAPO intrusion there might not have been any problems and the numbers might have been quite adequate. I am certainly prepared to arrange for the Deputies who are interested to get as much information as possible about the situation. We can arrange briefings, perhaps, through the Department of Foreign Affairs.
We are a contributor and the role of a contributor is a tenuous one. Our sole duty is to supply the personnel when requested. We do not have any official control over the operation as a whole; that must be left to the UN and the Secretary-General. If all the contributor countries tried to control the operation there would be chaos.
Over the years we have worked out a fairly satisfactory way of handling these situations by being good and responsible contributors. At the same time, if the need arises we make our concerns known to the UN but, apart from that, we must leave it to the good judgment of the UN authorities to handle this very tricky and sensitive operation which has to be centrally directed by the UN. In the course of my reply I said that we would monitor the developments in the implementation of the UN plan. We will do that continously and if any other action appears desirable we will certainly undertake such action.
By and large, this is a UN operation and it must be conducted by the UN who have the responsibility. The important thing from everybody's point of view would be for all parties, South Africa, Angola, Cuba and SWAPO, to adhere to the settlement. If that occurred we would not have the sort of problems that are concerning the Deputy.
A number of Deputies are offering and I will facilitate them. I should like Deputies to be brief in their questions.
I will assist the Chair. I should like to ask the Taoiseach to reconsider his usage, in answering the question, of the phrase, the SWAPO intrusion. I would advise caution in regard to the use of that. One section of the press is using that term and in my view it is being used out of context. I should like to ask the Taoiseach the precise reply he is giving to Question No. 23 which was included in the list of questions he has answered. That question referred to the selling off of the resources of the people of Namibia in advance of its independence. What practical steps is the Taoiseach taking to object at the denial of visas to the international community and the international organisations who have been invited to look at the registration process for the elections by the South African authorities? I am referring to the international lawyers group, the respectable international organisations and members of parliament who are being denied visas to travel to Namibia to observe the crucial registration process. Is this not a matter for objection by the Irish?
I asked for brevity.
My questions can be answered very briefly.
I do not think they can.
Are we objecting to the refusal by South Africa to grant visas to those who want to look at the registration process?
I have no particular knowledge of that matter.
They are being denied, and everybody knows that.
I will look into the matter. I dealt with the question of selling off the resources.
I listened with interest to the Taoiseach's reply and I am sorry to say that I do not agree with a lot of what he said. Will the Taoiseach not agree that as our personnel are involved in this peacekeeping exercise in Namibia we have a perfect right to object to the United Nations if we consider what they are doing is not sufficient or well thought out? Looking from the outside in, it appears to me that the plan was illthought out, badly prepared and tardily put in place. The UN cannot complain of lack of experience in South-West Africa because they have been involved in Namibia for ten or 12 years. They have had peacekeeping experience all over the world. I say with great regret that this was the worst performance the UN put on in a role like this. We should protest about it and I say that with great regret.
I am sorry the Deputy says that so strongly. I will refrain from saying it is easy to be critical from a distance because we can all see from our television sets and from reading reports that it is a very difficult and confused situation.
It is very difficult but the UN are not without experience in such matters.
I do not mind taking whatever action is necessary to protect the safety of our personnel. That is a solemn obligation on us.
And to observe the transition to independence.
On the other hand, I would like to try to be as supportive as possible of the Secretary-General, his officers and the force. It is a question of trying to be constructive. Initial reports certainly seemed to indicate that the operation was not very successfully organised, but whether that was anybody's fault or was endemic in the turbulent situation that developed is another matter.
They were not there.
They had years of notice.
I should like to join with my colleagues in thanking the Taoiseach for a comprehensive reply. I should like to put a question to the Taoiseach with regard to the voting arrangements, having been in the region with Deputy Flaherty on Independence Day——
——the registration arrangements.
Would the Taoiseach ensure, through the auspices of the United Nations, that fair elections take place in Namibia on 1 November next? Could he ensure, again through the auspices of the United Nations, that on this issue the United Nations would be particularly conscious that there is a major illiteracy problem obtaining in that country, with up to 70 per cent of the Namibian people being unable to read or write and who should be entitled to impartial assistance on the part of ours or United Nations observers when going to the polls? Would he ensure that the United Nations would be conscious also of the lack of clarity with regard to registration of voters there, of the urgent need for computerised registration of the electorate, bearing in mind the need to give a vote to those who are 18 years of age or over, not merely to those over 21, as would appear to be the wish of the South Africans? There is a large problem with regard to these forthcoming elections. Therefore would the Taoiseach ensure, through the United Nations, that the whole electoral process is a fair one, in particular the run-up to the November elections?
Yes, we will do what we can in that regard.
Arising out of the Taoiseach's reply to my question in relation to the adequacy of numbers and reliance on United Nation forces — it being difficult to ascertain what might have happened on the ground — is the Taoiseach aware that there was widespread concern expressed that, when the final decisions were being taken in relation to numbers, they would be inadequate? Furthermore, is he aware that the reason the numbers were decided on were monetary rather than any decision in principle on the basis of what would be the best size of peace-keeping force? Furthermore, is the Taoiseach aware that there being only 700 United Nations personnel there on 1 April, when the problem broke out, the United Nations should not have called up the 101st battalion, which is known to be notorious as a heavy brigade, a battalion which engages in violence and exploitation, a strong arm battalion, when there were other battalions available to them and that their failure to do so only aggravated the problem? Would he agree that it is an indication of the total lack of preparedness and commitment, resulting from which the UN peacekeeping efforts have been seriously undermined? Would he agree that in order to get it back on the rails, the kinds of concerns we are expressing should be made known to the United Nations? Perhaps the best way of having this moved forward would be that Members who have particular concerns be allowed meet officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs in order to ascertain how we can channel such concerns most constructively?
The history of the matter is that the Security Council approved the dispatching of the force on 16 February last. The force was originally planned to number 7,500. The Secretary General of the United Nations announced on 24 January 1989 that the initial deployment would consist of 4,650 only, 2,850 being held in reserve, as I have said. The permanent members of the Security Council had argued that the December 1988 arrangements on Namibia, between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, made the deployment of a large force unnecessary. Therefore, there were divided views at the Security Council. South Africa had given repeated assurances that they would respect the transitional arrangements.
Then the General Assembly approved the budget for UNTAG on 1 March last and, as has been repeatedly stated by the Secretary General, at least six to eight weeks would be the absolute minimum period necessary to permit UNTAG to be fully operational; that is reasonable. The Government here considered that due weight should be given to the Secretary General's views on the operational requirements of the peacekeeping forces, as the deployment of the contingent is the responsibility of the Secretary General who has promised to keep the size under review and will inform the Security Council if the situation in Namibia requires the deployment of additional military personnel. I do not suggest that we should not say anything or make our concerns known to the United Nations. On the other hand, specific responsibility for the size, deployment and operational requirements of the peace-keeping forces are all firmly placed on the Secretary General. It is his decision.
We are merely asking to have our concerns made known because we are concerned.
That is reasonable.
