I move amendment No. 1:
To delete all words after "That" and substitute the following:
Dáil Éireann approves the actions taken to date by the Government with a view to the eventual closure of the Sellafield plant and in the meantime to ensure the safe operation and the safe storage of nuclear waste now in the plant. In particular, Dáil Éireann notes that the Government has fully and carefully investigated the possibility of legal action to secure closure of the plant and that the Government has been advised that a firm legal case based on sufficient evidence as to injurious effects on Ireland of operations at the Sellafield plant, does not exist at present. Dáil Éireann notes the commitment of the Government to continue its efforts to secure closure of the Sellafield plant.
The Sellafield complex, on the west coast of Cumbria, is the site of British Nuclear Fuels reprocessing plant, where spent nuclear fuel is chemically reprocessed to extract uranium and plutonium. The complex also includes Calder Hall power station as well as the new Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) and a vitrification plant for high level radioactive waste which was commissioned in 1991. UK NIREX is concentrating investigations there for a waste repository for low and intermediate level radioactive waste.
Calder Hall was the world's first industrial-scale nuclear power station, commissioned in 1956 and consists of four major Magnox reactors. These reactors are considered to be unsafe because of a number of problems such as a lack of ability to resist earthquakes, problems with the integrity of pressure circuits, reliability of their shut down system, cooling ability during and after a fire and the lack of secondary containment.
As the House is aware, the Government have been extremely concerned for some years about the Sellafield nuclear processing plant, particularly following an incident in November 1983 which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination of the adjacent beaches, the levels of which were later found by a UK court to have been totally unacceptable at that time.
On 3 December 1986 when the now leader of the Labour Party was Tánaiste and Minister for Energy Dáil Éireann unanimously agreed the following motion:
That Dáil Éireann, concerned about the repeated accidents at, and continuing discharges from, the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant and conscious of the dangerous threat it poses to the life and health of the Irish people and to the whole environment on this island, calls on the British Government to arrange for the immediate closure of this dangerous installation, and urges the European Communities to decide as a matter of priority the establishment of a nuclear inspection force.
Since I became Minister for Energy in 1989 I have continuously and at every opportunity open to me expressed the Government's concern about the Sellafield plant which continues to discharge radioactive wastes in the Irish Sea, although the quantities of such wastes have reduced considerably in recent years. The Government are also concerned about the very large accumulation of highly radioactive waste at Sellafield, together with the transport of radioactive material to and from the plant because this exposes this country to significant risks. The Government's view remains that the only way to resolve the concerns about Sellafield is to close the plant. We have repeatedly conveyed this view to the UK Government.
I have also personally conveyed our serious concerns about Sellafield to the former UK Secretary of State for Energy, Mr. John Wakeham, MP, and to the former Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. Michael Heseltine MP, who is now responsible for Industry and Trade in the UK including energy matters.
I will first deal with the new reprocessing plant which is undoubtedly of great concern to Deputies and various environmental interests. Currently only Magnox fuel is reprocessed at Sellafield. However, BNFL have now completed a massive new reprocessing complex called the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) which will reprocess light water reactor fuel from spent fuel rods from the UK and abroad and recover uranium and plutonium in the process. This plant is due to come into operation this year and is the largest single expansion at Sellafield.
Under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, the EC Commission received notification and data from the UK Government concerning their plan to release radioactive effluents resulting from THORP's operation and set up a group of Commission experts to examine this general data. The Commission's opinion, issued recently, was to the effect that radioactive discharges from the THORP plant is not liable, either in normal operation or in the case of an accident, to result in radioactive contamination significant from the point of view of health, of the water, soil or airspace of another member state.
The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII) have examined the consequences for this country of the operation of THORP. The assessment has been done on the basis of data supplied by British Nuclear Fuels regarding the quantities of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents to be discharged from this plant. The liquid effluent normally discharged to the Irish Sea from THORP will contain predominantly tritium, but also several other radionuclides including caesium, ruthenium and plutonium. The institute estimate that these discharges will give rise to an annual radiation dose of about one microsievert to a heavy consumer of seafood caught off the east coast of Ireland. This will add to the dose of 4.6 microsieverts received by the same consumer in 1990 due to the accumulated effect of discharges up to that time, as determined from the institute's analysis of fish caught in the Irish Sea in that year.
The principal radionuclide in the gaseous discharges from THORP will be Krypton-85. It is estimated that this discharge will, at the maximum output of the plant, give rise to an annual dose to a member of the public here of about 0.1 microsievert. The dose arising from the gaseous discharges from all activities at Sellafield is estimated to be a few times this amount.
The average annual dose received by a member of the Irish public from all sources of radiation is about 4,000 microsieverts. When THORP is in full operation therefore the total radiation dose which will be received by the most exposed member of the Irish public due to all routine discharges from Sellafield will still amount to no more than a fraction of 1 per cent of that received by a person in Ireland from all natural and artificial sources of radioactivity.
An additional major concern to Ireland is of course the risk of an unplanned release of radioactivity due to a serious accident at Sellafield. The institute have considered the possible consequences of the types of accident which one could reasonably visualise as happening to THORP, and which would result in discharges into the Irish Sea, or to the atmosphere, depending on the nature of the accident.
From an accident giving rise to atmospheric discharges, the estimated highest dose to an adult living at the nearest point in Ireland to Sellafield, and eating only locally produced food, would be approximately 70 microsieverts. The dose to a heavy consumer of seafood from an accident resulting in liquid discharges to the Irish Sea would be approximately 120 microsieverts. These doses could be reduced if short term restrictions were placed on the consumption of certain foodstuffs. For comparison, the dose received by an Irish adult due to the Chernobyl accident was estimated as being in the range 120-150 microsieverts.
The institute's net conclusion is that, while all discharges of radioactivity from Sellafield are undesirable and therefore any increase in them is even more so, the additional radiation doses to a member of the Irish public from the THORP plant, either in normal operation or in certain foreseeable accident scenarios, will not be such as to cause a significantly increased risk to health.
Nonetheless I and the Government would wish to see all discharges of radioactivity into the marine and aerial environment progressively reduced and ultimately eliminated. I would also emphasise that the occurrence of an accident in THORP, or elsewhere at Sellafield, with consequences more serious than those considered above, cannot be ruled out, and remains a serious and legitimate concern for this country.
The institute will be continuing the intensive programme of monitoring of the contamination levels in the Irish Sea which it has been conducting for a considerable number of years to determine the effects of radioactive discharges on the Irish marine environment. The effects are quantified in some detail through their analyses of fish and shellfish collected at the principal fishing ports and of seaweeds, sediments and seawater from selected locations around the Irish coastline. The present situation is that significant reductions in radioactive effluents from Sellafield occurred during the early eighties and since then there has been a further slow decline in contamination levels. Radiation doses to typical consumers of fish are now as low as 0.1 per cent of the International Commission for Radiological Protection annual dose limits for members of the public from controllable sources of radiation.
While the principal objective of our monitoring programme is to obtain an estimate of the radiation exposure of the Irish public, it also enables us to detect unrecorded discharges, examine trends and generally relate the quantities reported as having been discharged with the institute's monitoring results.
I am confident that the institute's monitoring programme will enable the institute to detect and quantify the effects of liquid discharges from THORP following the commissioning of the plant. Any large increase in atmospheric radioactivity will be detected by the national network of continuous monitoring stations which the institute operates as part of the national radiological emergency plan.
It remains, apart from the liquid and aerial discharges from THORP, a matter of major concern to the Government that the risks and dangers associated with Sellafield will be increased also because of the spent fuel stockpile accumulated from abroad mainly from Germany and Japan awaiting reprocessing, the resultant by-production of greater quantities of wastes and the attendant problems of hazardous cargoes to and from the Irish Sea.
On 12 June this year, following the British general election, I again wrote to Mr. Heseltine, now the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, including Energy, and to the Minister for Energy, Mr. Tim Eggar, expressing my concerns on these matters. Indeed, I had previously expressed my concern to Mr. Eggar when I met him at an Energy Council meeting and informed him that I would be formally lodging the Government's view in regard to these matters with the new Minister, as I have done. My Department will be pursuing this matter in the context of our regular meetings with the UK authorities through the Irish/UK Contact Group.
I will now turn to the proposed waste repository at Sellafield. The UK Government say they are satisfied that safe disposal in a deep facility can be developed in the UK for low and intermediate-level wastes. They believe that on-site storage is an unacceptable long term option because in general it carries a higher risk to workers in the nuclear industry and the public and because decisions should not be left to future generations. The UK's Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive, called NIREX, was set up with the responsibility to provide and manage a new facility for the disposal of such waste. Investigations were undertaken by NIREX into various disposal options and sites. In March 1989, the UK Government announced that they had accepted NIREX's recommendation that a site should be built in the form of a mine underground. Detailed geological studies, including the sinking of boreholes, were carried out in the vicinity of Sellafield and in Dounreay in Scotland. Both sites of course cause a problem to us.
In July 1991 when UK NIREX announced that it planned to concentrate its future investigations at Sellafield, I immediately arranged for officials of my Department to meet on that day to discuss the matter with their British counterparts in London. On 14 August 1991, I wrote to the then Secretary of State for Energy reiterating the strong opposition of the Irish Government to the continued operation of Sellafield and expressed our deep dissatisfaction in relation to the repository.
I am aware of recent articles in the press regarding reports that Sellafield may not be a suitable location for an underground repository. The basis for such claims apparently arises from three reports entitled: UK NIREX Ltd's "The Geology and Hydrogeology of Sellafield March 1992 Interpretation", (Volumes 1 and 2); UK Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's "Response to UK NIREX Ltd's revised design for Sellafield Repository" and "A Review of the Geology and Hydrogeology of Sellafield" by Environmental Resources Ltd. for Cumbria County Council.
On hearing these claims, I sought and received copies of the different documents from the UK authorities and I have asked the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and the Geological Survey Office to examine them as a matter of urgency. It would be premature to make any definitive statement on the recent media claims until the reports which are voluminous and very technical have been thoroughly examined by the experts in both institutions.
In any case, I understand that a decision by NIREX regarding a possible planning application in relation to the proposal has now been deferred pending the safety aspects analyses. Any proposals for a repository will be the subject of an independent public inquiry and NIREX will have to comply with the strict safety standards laid down and enforced by the authorising and regulatory bodies. My Department will continue to monitor all further developments in relation to the site investigation, planning and design of any such proposed repository.
Within the international fora Irish uneasiness about nuclear safety and our insistence on new control measures, notably at EC level, have been raised at every opportunity. I raised the matter at the EC Energy Council in 1990 and 1991, when I said that my concerns were exacerbated by the absence of any move in the direction of independent verification and inspection of nuclear installations which I, and of course the present leader of the Labour Party when he was Minister for Energy, have been advocating under Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty. The Government believe that the European Community in particular has a vital role to play in the problems of safety and trans-boundary effects of UK nuclear installations.
In addition, I have put our view on two separate occasions to the European Parliament. Other Government Ministers and officials of my Department have pressed home the message on every possible occasion. In response to Irish and other pressures so far, the Commission re-introduced in 1990, after a 20 year gap, inspection of radiation monitoring facilities under Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty. While this does not go as far as we would wish or had been asking for, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction so far as Ireland's policy in this area is concerned.
There have been recent calls for legal action on the question of Sellafield. The Government have always been and continue to be committed to legal action against Sellafield if a sufficient case for it can be shown to exist, but it cannot initiate such action without a firm legal case based on sufficient evidence. Any such legal action would have to be based on scientific evidence as to the injurious effects of operations at the Sellafield plant on Ireland. To find convincing evidence to establish a direct cause and effect link between the operation of the Sellafield plant and damage or injuries to people in Ireland may be very difficult. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that activities at the Sellafield plant are in breach of the relevant Euratom directives and regulations. If there was, legal action could and would be considered by this Government. In addition to the Euratom Treaty, options for legal action which have been considered include possible action pursuant to the EC Treaty, Directive 76/464/EC, on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged from land based sources into the aquatic environment of the Community, the Law of the Sea, the Paris Convention, the London Dumping Convention and action in the UK courts and in the International Court of Justice. These have all, however, been confronted by the same obstacle — the lack of sufficient evidence.
Although Greenpeace provided copies of two separate legal options to my Department, neither of them on examination by the Attorney General's Office provided any hope that immediate legal action can be taken. It is important to point out that the Greenpeace presentation related solely to legal procedural possibilities and they failed to put forward any possible case which could be supported by concrete facts or evidence. The Greenpeace presentation was examined in detail by the Attorney General and the legal advice made available to me is that recourse to the International Court of Justice would be unlikely because the court would lack jurisdiction without the consent of both parties and because of difficulties in determining issues arising prior to such consent. Even if consent and jurisdiction obstacles were overcome there would have to be non-compliance by the UK with some international law or convention if it was to have any hope of succeeding in the court.
I had previously informed the House that I had arranged with Greenpeace for their legal adviser to meet with the Attorney General and officials of my Department to go over the whole question of the legal case that they said Ireland could take. That meeting took place on 17 April 1991 and I have already informed the House about that. The outcome of that discussion was that their case was not supported by facts or evidence.
As I said, the Greenpeace presentation has been examined in detail and the legal advice available to me is that recourse to the international courts would be unlikely to succeed. The UK Government would not be obliged to consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and that court would have no jurisdiction without the consent of both parties. Secondly, the UK would be most unlikely to accord jurisdiction to the International Court over Sellafield by giving such consent. It is clear from discussions I had with them that they would not do so. Even if the International Court had such jurisdiction there would have to be non-compliance by the UK with some international law or some legal norm if the Government of Ireland were to succeed in the court and there is no available legal or evidential basis for establishing this at present. There is no legal or factual basis on which it can be established at present that the UK are not complying with any relevant international convention.
I am aware that Greenpeace held a press conference on 9 October 1991 even though they had the opportunity of this full discussion in April. At the October press conference they again presented legal procedural options and these were identical to those presented to my Department in April. The Government are determined to pursue all means available against Sellafield, including legal means, but it is vital that the legal case is sufficiently strong to succeed. The Government are open to information and evidence from any source for a sustainable case regarding closure of Sellafield. They are not however prepared to proceed to legal action without such a sustainable case or purely for the embarrassment factor involved. One could not ask one sovereign state to take a case against another sovereign state purely to cause the other some embarrassment. Ireland would lose its integrity if it were to take such actions in the international arena.
I am not the only person who has occupied this responsible post as Minister for Energy. Members of the other parties in this House have been in this position in recent years since the Sellafield threat and concern arose. A lot of what was said in the 1986 debate could be said here. The Members of the other parties in Government could not succeed in establishing any grounds upon which they would have advised the Government at that time to take a case.