If the circumstances were different, I would almost say that it was a happy coincidence that these two issues have come up this evening, but in fact it is an unhappy coincidence. The two incidents to which I refer give rise to serious concern not only because of the incidents themselves but because of what they tell us about the need for a rigorous approach to plant design and to the setting up of adequate moitoring procedures to deal with cases like this.
The functions of the Environmental Protection Agency as set out in Part III of the Act include the running of an environmental monitoring programme, the monitoring of the activities of public authorities and also environmental audits, all relevant to the concerns inspired by these two cases. Part IV of the Act deals with integrated pollution control. They are vital functions underlined by the concerns we have just been talking about in relation to the pollution of the Foyle and indeed the incident in Listowel. We have gone to the trouble of legislating to put an Environmental Protection Agency in place to look after these things, but unfortunately the agency does not yet exist.
There are anxious questions about the Lough Foyle incident. It happened on a Tuesday. The company involved first said that they thought the spillage initially was small. It was not until Friday, some three days later, that they found that one and a half tons of Chlorobutedane had been spilt, which made it a major incident. It raises very serious questions about the internal controls and information within the company about what is going on in its plant. Although it is not strictly in our jurisdiction, it certainly raises questions about how the Environmental Protection Agency can carry out its functions.
In the Listowel incident the failure of a water tank allowed a large quantity of water to invade pipelines and tanks holding hydrochloric acid. That mixture is a very dangerous one, but perhaps the most disturbing aspect of that incident is that it was in many ways a repeat of an incident that had happened two years earlier when another tank burst and some difficulties arose as a result. I am not blaming the company as the company followed the recommendations made in order to make the whole installation safe; but it appears in the light of this most recent incident that those recommendations were not adequate to deal with the problem because the water burst over two concrete dams and other works designed to prevent water getting into the hydrochloric acid. That raises very serious questions about plant construction and design. Although it is not my function now to say it, it raises questions about what the Minister of State described during the debate on the Environmental Protection Agency Bill as the BATNEEC procedure — the best available technology not entailing excessive cost. That appears to have failed in this case.
I hope the Minister of State avoids the temptation given into by the Minister for the Environment to make the childish allegation that I was saying that these two incidents happened because the Environmental Protection Agency has not yet been set up. That was not my point. My point is that these two incidents again show how vital it is that we have an agency with teeth to fulfil the kind of functions that are allocated to the agency, particularly in Parts III and IV of the Act, and to impress on the Government the urgency of getting this agency up and running so that we can be sure that proper measures are taken, first, to avoid the kind of incident we have had and to monitor what is going on in plants where potential hazardous substances are present.
