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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 20 Oct 1992

Vol. 423 No. 8

An Bille um an Dóú Leasú Déag ar an mBunreacht, 1992: An Dara Céim. Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 1992: Second Stage.

Tairgim: "Go léifear an Bille an Dara Uair."

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Each Bill proposes to amend subsection 3 of section 3 of Article 40 of the Constitution and their combined effect would be to deal with the various issues that arise from the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General .v. X and some other Supreme Court decisions on Article 40.3.3º in so far as it relates to provision of information.

There is no human right more fundamental or more important than the right to life. There is a long and proud tradition here which regards the right to life as belonging to the unborn as well as to those who have been born. This respect for the sanctity of unborn human life was enshrined in Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution in 1983 by referendum of the people. The provision declares that:

The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate that right.

Prior to 1983 abortion was, of course, prohibited here by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, which makes it an offence to unlawfully use any means with intent to procure a miscarriage. Section 58 is still the relevant provision of our criminal law.

If one were to try to summarise what was the purpose which those who proposed and voted for the amendment of the Constitution in 1983 had in mind, one could perhaps put it most succinctly by saying that the amendment was designed to preserve the prohibition on unlawful abortion contained in the 1861 Act.

In its decision in the X case on 5 March of this year the Supreme Court gave its interpretation of Article 40.3.3º on both the substantive issue of abortion and on the right to travel out of the State to have an abortion.

The effect of the decision on the substantive issue is that termination of pregnancy is permissible in the State where there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother which can only be avoided by such termination and that a risk of suicide may constitute a real and substantial risk. That is the test laid down by the Supreme Court. The court also decided by a three to two majority that, while an injunction will not be given to restrain a woman from travelling abroad to obtain an abortion where there is a real and substantial risk to her life, such an injunction can be given to restrain travel abroad to obtain an abortion where there is no such risk.

The issue of information and counselling did not come before the Supreme Court in the X case but in previous cases that court decided that the dissemination of information on abortion is unlawful having regard to Article 40.3.3º. One effect of the decision in the X case appears to be that it is not unlawful to communicate information to women who would be entitled to a termination of pregnancy under the decision.

The decision has generated a very wide debate and concern about its implications. Initially, much of the debate focused on the implications of the decision for Protocol No. 17 to the draft Maastricht Treaty. The reason that Protocol had been written into the Treaty was that, since EC law takes precedence over any conflicting provision of the Constitution, there were fears that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 40.3.3º, abortion might be imposed on this country under EC law. To meet those fears Protocol No. 17 was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. I will be coming back to Protocol No. 17 later on.

The Government took immediate action to address the issues raised by the decision in the X case. On 10 March 1992 a Cabinet sub-committee was established under my chairmanship of examine the implications of the judgment. The Government subsequently decided, on 10 April 1992, that a referendum should be held on the right to travel and the right to information, covering not only EC citizens and countries but all persons and countries, and that the other issues arising from the Supreme Court's judgment would be considered for legislation and/or referendum depending on the Government's decision on recommendations of the sub-committees.

On 9 June 1992, prior to the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty the party leaders of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats subscribed to a statement to the following effect:

All the Leaders who have signed this statement agree that the right to information, appropriately regulated by law, and to travel will be copperfastened in a further Referendum in the autumn.

Legislative and/or Constitutional changes arising from the Supreme Court decision on Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution will be placed before the Dáil by the Government as soon as is practicable and, in any case, by the autumn.

Before going on to deal with the Bills, individually, I wish at the outset to give a brief outline of the effect of each Bill. I shall be dealing at some length with the complexities of the issues involved later in my contribution.

The first point I want to make about the amendment proposed in the Twelfth Amendment Bill is that it will leave undisturbed the existing affirmative acknowledgement in Article 40.3.3º of the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother. The amendment will be an addition to the existing Article 40.3.3, not a substitution for it. The effect of the amendment is to afford full protection to the lives of pregnant women. Under the amendment, where a pregnant woman is suffering from a physical medical condition such that her life is endangered if the pregnancy continues, the pregnancy may be lawfully terminated, if that is necessary to save her life. The amendment therefore accepts the test set out in the Supreme Court decision in every respect except suicide.

It negatives the decision in respect of suicide but in no other respect.

The proposal in the Thirteenth Amendment Bill would ensure that Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution cannot in future be invoked to prevent a woman travelling abroad, whatever the purpose of her journey.

Likewise, the proposal in the Fourteenth Amendment Bill would ensure that Article 40.3.3º cannot in future be invoked, as it was in a number of recent cases, to prevent the dissemination, in accordance with conditions to be laid down by law, of information about services lawfully available in another state. The particular service which we are talking about here is, of course, abortion.

The substantive issue, which is dealt with in the Twelfth Amendment Bill, is the one that clearly has attracted most controversy and debate. Before dealing in some detail with this amendment I think it is only right to place on the record of this House the Government's appreciation of the willingness of other parties in the House to endeavour to achieve a consensus on how best to approach this matter. Unfortunately, that consensus did not prove possible but I believe that the process of trying to achieve it at the very least threw some light on the many complexities involved. To the extent that there are some who support, in effect, abortion on demand, clearly there never was a prospect of consensus with them.

What is being proposed on this issue is the insertion into Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution of the following additional wording:

It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.

As Deputies will be only too well aware, this wording has been strongly criticised by groups who stand at either end of the debate on this difficult, complex and controversial subject. I hope to persuade the House and the people of our country that the more extreme views expressed on either side of the debate should be rejected and that the amendment now being proposed should be accepted as a moderate and balanced response to the problem presented.

The effect of the Supreme Court's decision was to permit termination of pregnancy where there is real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother which can only be avoided by such termination and that a risk of self-destruction may constitute a real and substantial risk. The amendment reflects this test in every respect except that it excludes a risk of self-destruction. The Government do not regard it as acceptable that such a risk should be available as grounds for termination of pregnancy. There is considerable room for subjective judgement in assessing whether a risk of suicide exists and the availability of such a ground for termination would carry the danger of opening the way to widescale abortion. It is quite clear that the experience in other countries has been that grounds for abortion related to health, physical or mental, lead to abortion on demand.

Otherwise, the test laid down by the Supreme Court is being retained. Under the amendment all treatments necessary to save the life of an expectant mother will be allowed. Her entitlement to have her right to life vindicated will be safeguarded. The constitutional right to life of the unborn with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother conferred by Article 40.3.3º is not being diminished. Intervention affecting the life of the unborn is only justified where it is necessary to save the life of the mother.

The importance which the Government attach to the need to protect the life of the mother is the reason we have not been able to accept the amendment put forward by the Pro-Life campaign. That amendment seeks to confine the possibility of termination of pregnancy to situations where it is the indirect or unsought side-effect of treatment necessary to save the mother's life.

In proposing their formula the Government were conscious of the fact that, apart from terminations arising in cases such as cancer of the uterus, ectopic pregnancy and treatment of breast cancer, there are other life-threatening illnesses, either associated with pregnancy or exacerbated by pregnancy, in which the need to take action involving termination of the pregnancy to save the woman's life may have to be considered.

This is where the Government differs from the pro-life groups. These groups are prepared to say, and have said repeatedly, that there are no medical conditions, without any exception whatsoever, in which what they call a "direct" termination is necessary. They speak as if there was total unanimity among all doctors and all medical specialists on this issue, but that clearly is not the case.

Writing in The Irish Times on 16 October the Chairman of the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists stated that in a survey of their membership carried out last April a substantial minority felt that there were rare cases in which, because of the risk to the mother's life, direct termination of pregnancy was medically indicated.

In The Irish Times of 12 October, an eminent cardiologist was reported as saying the following:

In the practice of cardiology over the past 30 years I have seen women whose lives would undoubtedly have been endangered had their pregnancies been allowed to go full term and I can state that unequivocally.

Speaking on the radio on 12 October the President of the IMO stated that there were differing views among their members on this question.

In the face of comments like these and others, how can anybody reasonably demand of the Government that no account should be taken of the possibility, however remote, that termination of pregnancy may be necessary to save life in the case of the other life-threatening conditions I have mentioned. Neither the Government nor anybody else who supports the proposed amendment has said that these life-threatening conditions occur frequently or are common. They are rare conditions but they cannot be ignored, especially when we are framing a constitutional amendment.

What of suicide?

Pro-life groups make much of the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" termination mainly on the basis that an indirect termination is an unintended effect of other treatment. It seems to me that this distinction could not serve as the basis for a constitutional provision on this subject. It is difficult to see how it can be maintained, for example, that in removing a cancerous womb there is no intention of terminating the life of the foetus when that result is clearly foreseen from the very outset and is inevitable. As a matter of law foreseen consequences of an act are, of course, intended.

If our law was that only so-called "indirect" terminations were permitted, how would that affect new treatment methods for ectopic pregnancy which apparently "directly" remove the foetus from the fallopian tube? Surely it is not being suggested that this treatment should be made unlawful, but would that not be the effect of a provision which would permit only "indirect" terminations?

Another difficulty in replying on the "direct"/"indirect" distinction is that these concepts do not always seem to mean the same thing to different people. I have heard it argued publicly by a Pro-Life spokesperson within the past couple of weeks that the new form of treatment for ectopic pregnancy is, in fact, indirect termination of the life of the foetus. Indeed it can even be argued that it is difficult to see how any operation, the sole purpose of which is to save the life of the mother, could be regarded as a direct killing of the foetus. On that criterion any intervention permitted by the Twelfth Amendment Bill would be indirect.

The Government are satisfied that a distinction between so-called "direct" and "indirect" termination cannot be written into the law without threatening existing medical practice, particularly in the case of ectopic pregnancies. The Government's proposal is clear and straightforward and will not prevent what is necessary from being done in our hospitals to save the lives of mothers as is done at present. To introduce such a distinction into the amendment would be to introduce confusion and uncertainty for doctors, their patients and the courts and this is something which the Government cannot accept. In the Government's view the only acceptable test is whether the action is necessary to save the life of the mother and the question of whether the action needed for that purpose constitutes direct or indirect termination is beside the point and, in any event, is not capable of an unequivocal answer in all situations.

What we are proposing here is that a provision be inserted in our fundamental law — the Constitution — that is likely to remain unaltered for the foreseeable future. In that situation we must do all we can to get the provision right and we would be failing in our duty to women and to their entitlement to protection where there is a risk to their life if we refused to take account of the fact that cases may arise, however infrequently, where the woman's life would be endangered by continuation of the pregnancy. If there were to be only one case in one million, or even ten or more million, we would have to take account of it. There is a duty on all of use to ensure that nothing is put into the Constitution which might, even in the remotest possible case, mean that action that was necessary to save a woman's life would not be taken.

What about suicide?

There is no warrant whatsoever for any suggestion that the amendment will open the door to abortion. It is most emphatically not an abortion amendment. Far from making the law concerning abortion more permissive, as some people are wrongly suggesting, the amendment will have exactly the opposite effect: it will prohibit abortion in circumstances where it is now permitted without disturbing existing medical practice and without putting mothers' lives at risk. It is a provision that arises from a woman's entitlement to protection where there is a risk to her life and it enshrines that protection. I would submit that in all conscience we could do no less than we are doing. The Government's proposal ought to satisfy the concerns of all of those who wish the law of the land to protect the life of the unborn in Ireland. It would be a tragedy for the unborn if the amendment were to be defeated in the forthcoming referendum by a combination of those who do not wish the unborn to be protected by the law — i.e. who in greater or lesser degree favour permitting abortion in this country — and certain misguided persons on the Pro-Life side who seem to be blind to the merits of the amendment from their own point of view.

I do not think, either, that there is any basis for suggesting that the test whereby a termination is permissible where there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother is out of line with what our law was even before the X case.

First, the 1861 Act which prohibits abortion does not contain a blanket prohibition. What it prohibits is "unlawful" abortion. The use of the word "unlawful" has from the beginning given rise to the view that the act envisaged that there were circumstances in which the termination of a pregnancy was legally permissible and the general view always seems to have been that termination necessary to save the life of the mother was legally permissible. If therefore a case had come for decision by the courts solely by reference to the 1861 Act, it seems highly probable that a termination of pregnancy in those circumstances would have been allowed.

Secondly, our Constitution provides in Articles 40.3.1º and 2º an explicit guarantee to protect and vindicate the right to life of all persons, including, of course, expectant mothers. It is reasonable to suggest that if a court had to choose between the right to life of the mother and the right to life of the foetus, that explicit constitutional guarantee would impel the court to save the life of the mother. Judge O'Flaherty in the X case intimated that the court would have come to the same decision, even if Article 40.3.3º did not exist.

Thirdly, even considering Article 40.3.3º, it seems to me that the provision, looked at critically, inevitably raises, as the Supreme Court recognised, the question of what happens when there is a conflict between the right to life of the mother and the right to life of the foetus. That is a question which most people, in common with the Supreme Court, will agree should be answered in favour of the mother.

Leaving aside the suicide aspect, the substance of the Supreme Court decision is, in my view, fully in line with preexisting law and I imagine is widely acceptable. That is why the proposed amendment reproduces the substance of the decision.

Why leave out suicide?

The inclusion in the amendment of the phrase "as distinct from the health" has been criticised by some particularly on the basis that it is offensive to women.

And dangerous.

I hope that when I explain the reason for its inclusion it will not be seen in that light.

The phrase reflects the Supreme Court decision in so far as it provides that the risk must be to the life of the mother in the sense that, unless the risk is avoided, she would die. The phrase is taken from the Chief Justice's judgment but it is clear that the other judges also had in mind a risk to life rather than a risk to health. The reality which we cannot ignore is that in other jurisdictions risk of damage to health is the ground which has led to widescale abortion on demand. It is in order to prevent that situation developing here that the phrase is included in the amendment.

Some doctors have expressed concern that the inclusion of the phrase "as distinct from the health" could have the effect of restricting a certain flexibility which under current medical practice doctors are permitted to exercise in the best interests of the patient. It is suggested that in any medical condition there is a spectrum of gravity and it is impossible to identify a precise point at which the risk changes from a risk to health to a risk to life. The concern of the doctors involved seems to be that the wording may result in their being forced to have a greater degree of certainty about the risk to the mother's life before providing treatment which may result in the loss of the foetus — whereas normal medical practice cannot operate on the basis of certainty but only on the basis of probability.

I think that I can provide reassurance on this point. The intention of the amendment is that a risk to health unrelated to a risk to life is not sufficient to warrant termination of the life of the unborn. It is not the intention of the amendment to affect in any way the degree of probability of risk to life that is necessary to warrant treatment resulting in termination. In the X case the Supreme Court laid down the test as being a real and substantial risk to the mother's life arising as a matter of probability. There is nothing in the proposed wording which would change that.

I want to allay fears which have been expressed by some that the use of the word "as distinct from the health" in the amendment might result in pregnant women being denied necessary medical treatment to protect their health. There is no basis for such fears. Under the amendment women will continue to receive all necessary medical treatment to protect their health. Current medical practice in this regard will not be affected. Under current medical practice the question of termination of pregnancy only arises where there is a threat to the mother's life. After all, the amendment does no more than adopt the test laid down in this regard by the Supreme Court in the X case and there has been no suggestion that medical practice regarding necessary treatment to protect women's health has been affected in any way since that decision.

The suggestion that the words "as distinct from the health" should be omitted from the proposed amendment really boils down to this — that it should be possible to terminate the life of an unborn child where there is no risk to the life of the mother. Let there be no doubt about one thing. The amendment as it stands will allow all necessary treatment to be provided for an expectant mother, even if it would result in the loss of the life of her unborn child, in all circumstances where her life is at risk. There is no basis whatsoever for any suggestion that the amendment we are proposing here today will leave a woman without protection in any situation where her life is endangered. The clear intent of the amendment and the clear meaning of the words it uses in that medical intervention will be allowed in all situations where it is necessary to save the mother's life because of a life-threatening physical, medical condition that she is suffering from.

And mental.

Not suicide?

If the Government saw any way that the words "as distinct from the health" could be omitted without giving rise to a real danger that this might eventually lead to abortion on demand, we would leave them out. It can be argued that a reference to "life" on its own should be sufficient — on the basis that "life" means "life" and not "health" and that the reference to "life" in the existing Article 40.3.3º has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the X case as not including health. However, the words "as distinct from the health" formed part of the test enunciated by the Chief Justice in that case. If those words were to be omitted now from a constitutional provision which reproduces the essence of that test, significance might well be read into that omission. In a future "hard" case health unrelated to a life-threatening condition might be found to be a ground for abortion, as happened in Britain in the Bourne case with the results we are all familiar with.

Health unrelated to a threat to life has never been a ground for medical intervention where it is foreseen and therefore intended that the death of the unborn child would result. Unforeseen death of the foetus in the course of a medical intervention to protect the mother's life or her health, where all due care is taken to preserve the life of the foetus, is, of course, an entirely different matter and is not prohibited by law anyway. What the proposed Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution seeks to do is to maintain a just and proper balance between the right to life of the mother and the right to life of the unborn child.

A further criticism which has been made of the amendment is that it does not provide adequate protection for women in a situation where there would be a risk of the life of the mother being shortened rather than of her immediate death. In particular it has been suggested that the proposed amendment would not allow a woman to have her pregnancy terminated if she suffered from a medical condition — for example, a severe heart condition — which did not pose an immediate threat to her life but which would result in her early death if her pregnancy continued to full term. It has been suggested that the use of the word "necessary" implies that there must be an immediate risk to the mother's life.

It is clear that this does not follow. In the X case the Supreme Court held that termination of pregnancy is permissible where there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother which can only be avoided by termination. The formulation "which can only be avoided" seems to be at least as stringent as "necessary". Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also found that the risk to the mother's life need not be immediate. In fact it expressly rejected a submission that termination would be permissible only if it were established that an inevitable or immediate risk to the life of the mother existed. The proposed amendment does not disturb or change that finding in any way and does not require an immediate risk to life.

Immediate necessity for termination of a pregnancy and immediate risk to the mother's life are, I suggest, two different things. The words "necessary to save the life" mean that a pregnancy could be terminated if the doctors were able to form the view that, even after childbirth and recovery of the mother from it, other treatment for whatever she was suffering from would be ineffective to save her life.

On the substantive issue one of the key questions which the Government had to address was whether the implications of the Supreme Court decision in the X case should be dealt with by way of legislation or an amendment to the Constitution. I know that some Members of the House are of the view that to proceed by way of legislation, rather than an amendment to the Constitution, would be better. However, any legislation which would be introduced without an amendment of the Constitution would have to accept in full the findings of the Supreme Court in the X case, including the finding that a risk of suicide would be a ground for abortion. Suicide as a ground could not be removed by legislation alone. Also, without an amendment the possibility could not be excluded that at some future date the grounds for abortion could be widened.

I appreciate that concerns have been expressed that to deal with this matter by way of an amendment to the Constitution carries with it the danger of an emotive and divisive public debate. The fact that a particular issue gives rise to strongly held and often opposing views can hardly be accepted as a reason for not allowing the people to have a final say on that issue. There is a substantial body of opinion among the general public that the position now obtaining under Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution, in so far as a risk of self-destruction can serve as a ground for termination, is at variance with what many people thought it would be when that provision was adopted by referendum in 1983. The Government consider that it is only right that the people should be given a say as to whether they want that position modified now.

Should it transpire that the people decide not to adopt the Twelfth Amendment, the Government have decided to introduce legislation instead to regulate the position obtaining as a result of the X decision. My colleague, the Minister for Health, will be dealing with this aspect in the course of his contribution to this debate.

The extraordinary suggestion has been made in some quarters that, by indicating at this stage their intentions about legislation in the event of the proposed amendment not being adopted, the Government are in some sense issuing a threat to people who may not be satisfied with the proposed amendment from a pro-life perspective to, as it were, "vote for it or else." This suggestion is, of course, nonsense. The plain fact of the matter is that if the position obtaining after the X case is not addressed by way of an amendment to the Constitution, it can only be dealt with by legislation. The Government are proposing an amendment of the Constitution and, after full and careful consideration of what is involved and of all the implications, are proposing the form of amendment which they are satisfied meets the needs to safeguard the lives of pregnant women while at the same time giving the maximum possible protection to the right to life of the unborn child consistent with that. If that amendment is defeated, which incidentally I do not believe will happen, it is the Government's firm and considered view that the only practicable alternative is to legislate on the basis of the X case. That is simply a fact. It is not meant to be a threat to anybody or to put pressure on them to vote in a particular way in the referendum. The reality of the situation is that, if the Government are not prepared to indicate at this stage what form our legislative proposals would take in the event that the constitutional amendment did not pass, we would be open to legitimate criticism. I fail to see how anybody can seriously suggest that we are to be faulted for ensuring that the people will be fully informed about the whole picture when they vote in the referenda on 3 December.

The question has also been raised whether legislation should be introduced which would supplement the amendment, if passed. It seems to me that the test proposed in the amendment is a straightforward one based on whether or not termination of pregnancy is necessary to save the life of the mother and should not give rise to difficulty in practice. The Government are not at this stage persuaded of the need for such supplementary legislation. We will, of course, listen carefully to any views expressed on this matter during the course of the debate.

Deputies will be aware that Protocol No.17 to the Maastricht Treaty saves the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3º from the effect of EC law which, under the Constitution, takes precedence over any other conflicting provisions of the Constitution. The Protocol was designed to ensure that abortion would not become legalised in the State by virtue of EC law. The Protocol relates to Article 40.3.3º as it stood on 7 February 1992 when the Treaty was signed. On the face of things Article 40.3.3º as interpreted by the Supreme Court should retain the protection of the Protocol when the Treaty comes into effect and this would mean that abortion could not in any event be legalised beyond the extent permitted by the Supreme Court. The Solemn Declaration on the Protocol to the Treaty, adopted by the member states on 1 May 1992, provides that in the event of a constitutional amendment of Article 40.3.3º the Contracting Parties to the Treaty will, following the entry into force of the Treaty, be favourably disposed to amending the Protocol so as to extend its application to any such constitutional amendment. If the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution is passed the question of invoking the procedure set out in the Solemn Declaration with a view to securing an amendment of the Protocol will be taken up.

To sum up, the Government have taken a balanced and considered approach to the very difficult problems associated with the substantive issue. We recognise the genuineness and the depth of people's feelings and concerns about this whole subject—whether from a pro-life, pro-choice or other point of view. Our objective is to do what is right in the public interest. We have been motivated by deep concern for the right to life of the unborn. We are also fully committed to the protection of the right to life of the unborn. We are not prepared to take any chances where the life of the mother is at stake and we want to ensure the maximum possible protection of the right to life of the unborn consistent with that.

I turn now to the Thirteenth Amendment Bill regarding travel. The background to the proposal in this Bill must be seen in the context not only of the Supreme Court's decision in the X case but also in the context of EC law.

In that case, three of the Supreme Court judges decided that the constitutional right to life of the unborn took precedence over the constitutional right to travel of the mother so that an injunction can be granted by virtue of Article 40.3.3º against women going abroad for an unlawful abortion (i.e. one in which there is not a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother, as enunciated by the Supreme Court).

With regard to the EC aspects, the Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty provides that nothing in the Treaty or in the European Community Treaties shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution. Assuming that the Maastricht Treaty comes into force, the Protocol will then form part of the European Community Treaties and it will be for the European Court of Justice to decide what the Protocol means.

The Irish Courts will be bound by that court's interpretation of the Protocol. The main purpose of the Protocol was to ensure that abortion would not become legalised in the State by virtue of EC law —freedom of travel to other EC states for an abortion was not envisaged as being affected. However, the argument has been made that the Maastricht Protocol, if passed, would copperfasten the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in relation to travel and would nullify rights of free movement conferred by the EC and Maastricht Treaties.

Whether this is correct depends, of course, on the proper interpretation of the phrase in the Protocol "the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3º ". It can be contended that the issue of an injunction in Ireland against a woman within the jurisdiction to protect an unborn life within the jurisdiction is an application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3. On the other hand it can also be argued that the phrase must be intended to refer to effects in Ireland only and cannot restrict movement or actions outside Ireland. That has been the contention of the EC Council's Legal Service.

Freedom of movement of persons is one of the freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaties. It is part of the Community's legal order that people are free to move to any place in the Community, either to work or to establish themselves, or to provide or receive services. This freedom, as is clear in particular from provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, is a fundamental principle of the Community and will be of growing value in the years to come. Because of the fundamental importance of freedom of movement in the EC, it is likely that if in future the European Court had to deal with the issue, it would decide that the Protocol did not envisage Article 40.3.3º having extra-territorial effect and that injunctions against leaving the country for another EC member state could not be issued consistently with EC law.

However, to avoid any uncertainty about the matter, the Solemn Declaration on which the Government got agreement among EC partners affirms in effect that the Protocol as it stands protects the right to travel between EC states and under generally recognised rules of interpretation of international treaties—I am referring in particular to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—the Declaration would have to be taken into account in interpreting the Protocol.

The Government's proposed constitutional amendment on travel is designed in any event to put exercise of the right to travel beyond doubt and to make it clear that it cannot be restricted by reason of Article 40.3.3º. This is in line with the commitment in the statements of 9 June 1992 of party leaders, which I have already mentioned. It will also ensure freedom to travel to all States, not just to other member states of the EC. It is fair to say that there is wide support for the Government's proposal on this matter.

I come now to the third Bill, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill on freedom to provide and receive information. This issue did not, as I have said earlier, come before the Supreme Court in the X case. However, the Supreme Court decided in cases in 1988 (the Well Woman Centre case) and 1989 (the Grogan case) that the dissemination of information on abortion is unlawful having regard to Article 40.3.3º. Following the X case that prohibition extends only to information on abortion not covered by the decision (i.e. abortions in cases where there is not a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother). In the Well Woman Centre case, which is at present before the European Court of Human Rights on allegations of breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, the State has conceded that point.

The information issue was raised before the EC Court of Justice in the Grogan case. The effect of the decision of the Court of Justice is that, while lawful abortion in a state constitutes a service within the meaning of the EC Treaty, it is not contrary to Community law for a member state in which abortion is forbidden to prohibit the distribution of information about abortion services available in another member state where there is no economic link between the provider of the abortion service and the distributor of the information (in the particular case the distributor was a students' association). The court did not specifically decide, but could be taken as implying, that if there was such a link the distribution of the information would be permissible under Community law. That aspect, including the conditions which might be placed on the provision of information, has not come before the court in any case.

Recently, on 7 August 1992, the High Court granted a permanent injunction in the Grogan case restraining the students from distributing information on abortion clinics abroad. The judge in the case identified a profound distinction between the distribution of the documentation and information in which the students were engaged—distribution to the community at large and university students in particular—and communication of such information to a clearly defined and extremely restricted type of person indentified by the Supreme Court in the X case.

As in the case of travel, the question of the freedom to give and obtain, in the State, information about abortion facilities in another EC state has been raised in the context of the Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty. The argument has been made that the Protocol would nullify rights to information conferred by EC law. The Solemn Declaration on which the Government got agreement among EC Partners deals with the matter. It affirms that the Protocol protects freedom to obtain or make available in Ireland information relating to services lawfully available in member states. The Declaration also provides that the information may be subject to Irish legislation that is in conformity with Community law. As I have already said, under generally recognised rules of interpretation of international treaties, the Declaration would have to be taken into account in interpreting the Protocol.

On the basis of what we know from the Grogan case, as dealt with by the Court of Justice, there is no absolute right to information under EC law — the right indeed may be subject to appropriate conditions laid down in national laws. The fact is that member states have a reasonable margin of discretion to decide what should or should not be permissible in their national laws on abortion information and some EC states have controls on public advertising of abortion services.

As I have mentioned, the question of the right to information is before the European Court on Human Rights at present in a case involving the Well Woman Centre. The court is due to issue its decision on 29 October but there are no grounds for believing that that will interfere in any way with the amendment on information.

The proposed amendment would enshrine in the Constitution the right to receive and impart information subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law. This, again, is in line with the commitments given in the party leaders' statement. The amendment would not permit directive counselling but would permit non-directive counselling. Directive counselling, as I understand it, is systematic guidence and advice and involves abortion referral. Non-directive counselling, on the other hand, consists of the provision of information and does not involve abortion referral. Non-directive counselling would clearly be covered by the right to obtain or make available information which is provided for in the amendment.

In conjunction with publication of the Constitutional Amendment Bill on information the Government have agreed the publication of the Minister for Health's proposals for legislative controls on the supply of information. Those proposals can only be published in draft form at this stage because they are dependent on the amendment of the Constitution being carried in the referendum that is proposed. The Government's view is that the House and the people should be aware of what the Government's approach would be on supply of information. My colleague the Minister for Health will be speaking further on this matter in the course of the debate.

I want to refer to one final point. The decision of the Government has been to put the issues to the people as separate amendments in separate referenda on the same day rather than in one amendment which would deal with the issues together. It is the view of the Government that the advantage of separate referenda is a greater degree of choice in that the people will be enabled to exercise their choice separately in respect of each issue. Voters will be able to vote for or against each issue and each amendment will be decided in its own right and on its own merit. There appears to have been a general welcome for that approach among the public and I am sure that Deputies will agree that it is the most democratic way of dealing with these important issues.

I commend the Bills to the House.

The Chair appreciates the understanding and co-operation of the House in the matter of the extra few minutes allowed the Minister. If necessary, adjustment can be made later.

Perhaps we will all be allowed the same latitude.

No, the time limit is 45 minutes.

It is only right at the start of this debate we recall the circumstances which have given rise to the constitutional referenda proposals now before the House.

At the very end of January 1992 a report was made to the Garda that a 14 year old girl had been the victim of sexual abuse and statutory rape and was pregnant. The girl's parents reached the conclusion that the pregnancy resulting from rape should be terminated. On 27 January 1992 she told her parents and she and her parents learnt from the local doctor that she was pregnant. It was accepted by the court that this tragic young girl, referred to as X, had confided in her mother that when she learnt she was pregnant she had wanted to kill herself by throwing herself downstairs. On 31 January 1992 she again said much the same to a member of the Garda Síochána. During the return journey from England she told her mother that she had wanted to throw herself under a train when she was in London and that she would be rather dead than the way she was. In the presence of another member of the Garda, when her father commented that the situation was worse than a death in the family she stated, "Not if it was me".

Following her return from England she was taken by her parents to an experienced clinical psychologist. He found that she was emotionally withdrawn, in a state of shock and had lost touch with her feelings. He took that as indicating that she was coping with the appalling crisis she faced by denial of her emotions. He stated that she did not seem depressed but that she coldly expressed a desire to end matters by taking her own life. The psychologist was of the opinion that she was capable of committing suicide, not just because of depression but because she could calculatingly reach the conclusion that death was the best solution.

It is regrettable that the Minister did not refer in detail to the facts of this case in his speech. In the High Court Judge Costello accepted that there was a risk that this tragic young teenager might take her own life. He held, however, that it was much less and in a different order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn would be terminated if the injunction were not granted.

The outcome of the case give rise to substantial public controversy. A Supreme Court appeal was brought and was successful. In dealing with the circumstances in which a pregnancy can be terminated by way of abortion, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that a pregnancy may be terminated if it was established as a matter of probability that its continuance involved a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother. The court concluded that there was no doubt that such a risk existed from the uncontested evidence heard by the trial judge in the High Court. The court did not differentiate between a physical condition which poses such risk and a mental condition. The Chief Justice stated:

In my view it is common sense that a threat to self-destruction such as is outlined in the evidence in his case, which the psychologist clearly believes to be a very real threat, cannot be monitored in that sense and that it is almost impossible to prevent self-destruction in a young girl in the situation in which this defendant is, if she were to decide to carry out her threat of suicide.

Mr. Justice Egan stated:

The risk must be to her life but it is irrelevant, in my view, that it should be a risk of self-destruction rather than a risk to life for any other reason.

Mr. Justice O'Flaherty agreed with this conclusion, as did the late Mr. Justice Niall McCarthy. The latter stated:

I am wholly satisfied that a real and substantial risk that the girl might take her own life was established; it follows that she should not be prevented from having a medical termination of pregnancy.

The only judge who dissented from this conclusion was Mr. Justice Hederman. This decision of the Supreme Court resolved a controversy that had raged on and off within the State since 1982 as to the exact meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 40.3.3º. It confirmed that this Article, rather than totally prohibiting abortion, as its original proponents contended, contemplated abortion lawfully taking place within this State.

The result of the X case was not merely to allow this young girl to again travel to England to have her pregnancy terminated but also to entitle her to have an abortion in this State if she sought one in the tragic circumstances in which she found herself. While it was not necessary for the court to decide the issue of the girl's right to travel, having regard to her entitlement to terminate her pregnancy within the State, the judges of the court nevertheless addressed that issue due to its essential public importance. By a majority they concluded that a woman's right to travel outside the State could be impeded by way of court injunctions in circumstances where she intended to have a pregnancy terminated and where there was no real and substantial risk to her life.

It is, I believe, no exaggeration to state that the result of the Supreme Court case with regard to the circumstances of this tragic 14 year old girl and her family was greeted with a universal sigh of national relief. It was, I believe, a general view that a pregnant young teenager who is the victim of rape and her family should not be put through such a legal trauma. There was a belief that the young girl and her family should have been left to make decisions that they believed right in the interests of the girl's welfare and that the State should not have interfered.

For many of those — and I include myself in this — who opposed the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in the referendum campaign in 1983 the case in a very stark way highlighted the possible different interpretations that could be put on the words contained in it and the manner in which its constitutional provision could impact on the lives of ordinary people trapped in personal tragedy. It was always my view that this provision was a constitutional time bomb waiting to go off. What is surprising is that it took almost 10 years to explode.

Before turning to the specific constitutional proposals before the House there are some general comments I want to make with regard to the difficult issues with which we are confronted. Neither the Fine Gael Party nor the overwhelming majority of people on this island want to see general abortion available in Ireland—what some people refer to as "abortion on demand". In saying that, I reiterate what was said in the House on behalf of the Fine Gael Party to both myself and many of my colleagues during the difficult and emotional debate that took place on the Eighth Amendment Bill in 1983. It was then and is again important that this be put on the record because in 1983 anyone either inside or outside the House who for good and considered reasons was opposed to the holding of that referendum and who disagreed with the wording which was eventually inserted in the Constitution found themselves labelled abortionist and anti-life. In 1983 for totally cynical political reasons the Fianna Fáil Party sought to so label and besmirch Members of this House and others for their own cynical electoral gain. From the speech given by the Minister for Justice today, it is apparent that Fianna Fáil intend to again travel along that road during the course of the coming weeks.

There was a hope following the coming to office of the present Taoiseach that no similar games would be played by Fianna Fáil with such sensitive and difficult issues. There was a glimmer of hope that we were entering a new political era and that difficult social issues would be honestly and openly addressed. The Government's behaviour during the past two weeks, however, clearly illustrates that this is not so. If there is a single lesson that should have been learned by politicians inside this House and, indeed, by lobby groups outside it, it is that this whole area is far too complex to simply be dealt with by the insertion of an extra sentence or two into our Constitution.

Hear, hear.

To highlight this, it is worth briefly recalling the claims made by the proponents of the 1983 amendment, one of the most vociferous of which in this House was the present Minister for Justice, Deputy Flynn, together with other members of the current Government, including the Minister for the Marine, Deputy Woods and the Minister for Tourism, Transport and Communications, Deputy Geoghegan-Quinn.

Warnings then sounded as to the ambiguity contained in the wording of the Eighth Amendment and their diversity of possible interpretations were ignored. The fact that these warnings were sounded by the then Fine Gael Taoiseach, Dr. G. FitzGerald, the then Attorney General, Mr. Peter Sutherland, the then Minister for Justice, Deputy Noonan (Limerick East) and by many other members of the Fine Gael Party both in Government and on the backbenches simply resulted in allegations that such people were in some way soft on abortion.

For the Fianna Fáil Deputies I have referred to and the lobby groups who operated outside this House, such as PLAC and SPUC, nothing was ambiguous. In 1983 everything was clear in absolutist terms. Specualtion that the wording might not say what its advocates propounded was labelled dishonest. Those who queried its wording and the dangers of its application were the objects of hate-mail.

It is worth recalling what that advocates of the Eighth Amendment said they intended and contended with certainty would be achieved. First, and foremost, they claimed it would outlaw abortion in all circumstances. In this they were totally wrong and, now, of course, it is the Supreme Court and not themselves who are to blame. They stated it would not affect the right of pregnant women to travel abroad; in this they were wrong also. They contended that such a constitutional provision would provide a sort of atmosphere that would result in a reduction in the numbers of Irish women going abroad to terminate pregnancies; in this they were also wrong. In 1983, approximately 3,000 Irish women, according to official figures, had abortions in England; in 1991 over 4,000 Irish women had abortions in England.

The primary result of the 1983 amendment was to ensure that more people in Ireland were informed about the availability of abortion outside Ireland than would previously have considered abortion as an option. It also has now provided for an implicit constitutional right to abortion, which right is now to be made explicit, in the terms of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill.

Assertions made by Members of this House in 1983 who are now in Government with regard to the effect of the 1983 amendment are of relevance in the context of the debate we are to have in particular on the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill. They are relevant because we have seen in recent days that the proponents of the wording contained in the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill are unwilling to listen to those who are expressing concern as to its contents and worries about its impact.

At the weekend, the Minister for Justice, was praised for his outstanding rhetoric at the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party meeting on Wednesday last which reportedly satisfied his political colleagues that the course the Government are charting is correct and that the constitutional amendments proposed by them are both legally and politically sound.

I have, in recent weeks, had an eerie feeling that Members of this House and many of the lobby groups outside this House, are locked in a 1983 time warp. The reports I have heard of the Fianna Fáil meeting of Wednesday last have confirmed to me that we are truly back to the future. From the Minister's speech this evening it is clear that the Fianna Fáil party, at least, have learned no lessons. I would caution those members of Fianna Fáil who are relying on the Minister's presentation of Wednesday last, and his presentation today, to be wary of convincing ministerial rhetoric and assertions.

To his Fianna Fáil colleagues and those who will vote on this issue on 3 December next, and those who will vote in this House, I say judge the reliability of what the Minister is now saying against the accuracy of what he said in 1983. If they do, they will see substantial reason for concern. On 23 February 1983, the present Minister, Deputy Flynn stated, according to the Dáil Official Report, Volume 340, Column 979:

I believe the amendment of the Constitution is not just desirable but essential, because the Constitution does not contain any specific protection for the unborn child... it [the amendment] will reinforce the existing law as we know it and it will guarantee that any future decision regarding abortion or the legalising of abortion, or any related matter, will have to be done by further referendum...

Further on the same debate, exclaiming "what a magnificent document the Constitution is" the Deputy continued:

The insertion of this amendment in the Constitution will mean simply that abortion cannot and will not be made legal either through legislation or judicial decision.

Never a man to drop a hyperbole when he spies one on the distant horizon, returning to the same theme on the 2 March 1983, the present Minister stated at Column 1584, Volume 340 of the Dáil Official Report:

"It [the amendment] will act as a magnificent deterrent... to passing down a decision that they [the Supreme Court] will know, by referendum result, does not reflect the minds and the wishes of the majority of our people. It will not be possible then to read abortion into the Constitution...

Never has someone been proved so starkly wrong.

As for those who expressed concerns about the exact meaning of Article 40.3.3º and its possible application the present Minister dismissively stated:

As far as I am concerned, confusion is one of the main strategies, the main aim of the abortion lobby... they are seeking to impress and impose their aspirations and attitudes on the majority who do not share their permissive latitude in the matter of abortion and any shilly-shallying now or any devise to thwart or confuse or worse to abandon the enabling legislation, as far as I am concerned would be regarded as a victory for the abortionists.

I have no doubt that the then members of the Fianna Fáil party in 1983 greatly admired the rhetoric of Deputy Flynn in this House as it was admired in the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party rooms last week. Presumably, they equally appreciated the politics of the matter and the ease with which the label "abortionists" could be attached to those who then disagreed with Fianna Fáil. No doubt there are some within the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party rooms who see the current referendum as yet another opportunity to so label those who disagreed with them. It is remarkable that in the light of the present Minister's track record on this issue, that assertions made by him as to the correctness of the Government's approach can be taken so seriously and that reservations expressed by others can be so easily dismissed.

Following the X case there was substantial public discussion about the issues of travel and information, but little if any detailed discussion with regard to the actual application of the main decision of the Supreme Court; that is, the decision that under the Constitution abortions can take place here where there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother. Government comment was confined to a statement that a Cabinet sub-committee was examining the issue and that it would come forward with proposals for legislation and/or a further constitutional amendment.

In the light of the strictures by the Supreme Court on the Oireachtas for its failure to enact legislation, following the 1983 referendum, it was widely expected that at the very least detailed legislative proposals would be forthcoming and that there would be a considered and comprehensive public debate. There was a diversity of views about the need for a further constitutional amendment, but if one was proposed it was expected that recognition would have been given to the fact that something more than a simple constitutional prescription was required. Unlike 1983, no Opposition Party was waiting in the long grass to ambush the Government for reasons of political expediency. Unlike Fianna Fáil in 1983, the Fine Gael party did not and have not aligned themselves with any of the lobby groups who address these issues from a narrow and blinkered perspective.

It was a cause of astonishment to Fine Gael that the sole Government proposal with regard to this aspect of the problem is that there now be included in the Constitution an additional Article which is contained in the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill which states:

It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.

Astonishingly, the Government propose to publish no legislation to provide for the detailed implementation of Article 40.3.3º and this additional provision, despite advice from the Attorney General that it is required. In this, they are not only ignoring what was said by members of the Supreme Court but also ignoring the advice of their own Attorney General.

The new Article proposed if incorporated into our Constitution, will have the following effect: (1) It will make express provision in the Constitution for abortion and the termination of pregnancies; (2) it will allow an abortion to take place where there is a real and substantial risk to the life of a young girl or woman, but not where there is a real and substantial risk to her health; (3) the risk to life will have to derive from an illness or disorder and not from any other source and (4) if a pregnancy poses a risk that the mother may commit suicide an abortion will be prohibited in this State.

The document published by the Government as the Attorney General's advice on the day when this proposed wording was made public asserts that:

The amendment accepts the test set out in the Supreme Court decision in every respect except suicide. It therefore sets out to negative the decision in respect of suicide but in no other respect. The effect is that where a pregnant woman is suffering from a physical medical condition such as that her life is endangered, the pregnancy may lawfully be terminated if that is necessary to save her life.

Similar assertions were made today by the Minister for Justice. I intend to deal with the issue of suicide at a later stage.

I first wish to deal with the statement that the amendment "accepts the test set out in the Supreme Court decision in every respect except suicide". The four members of the Supreme Court also were of the view that a pregnancy which posed a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother could be terminated, each expressed this view in a somewhat different way. The only majority judgement of a member of the court to contain an expressed distinction between life and health is the judgement of the Chief Justice which stated:

If it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life as distinct from the health of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, that such termination is permissible having regard to the true interpretation of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice O'Flaherty stated:

The law in this State is that surgical intervention which has the effect of terminating pregnancy bona fide undertaken to save the life of the mother, where she is in danger of death, is permissible under the Constitution and the law. The danger has to represent a substantial risk to her life, although this does not necessarily have to be an imminent danger of instant death.

Mr. Justice Egan stated:

A pregnancy may be terminated if its continuance as a matter of probability involves a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother.

The late Mr. Justice McCarthy stated:

When there is a real and substantial risk attached to her survival, that is, the mother's, not merely at the time of application but in contemplation at least throughout the pregnancy, then it may not be practicable to vindicate the right to life of the unborn.

For many women the constitutional line and distinction expressly drawn between life and health is grossly offensive. However, it is not only offensive but also dangerous and ill-advised. It is a grave error to believe that this distinction can be easily drawn. In discussions which the members of the Fine Gael Party have had with the medical profession it has been consistently stated to us that the timing of certain treatments could be affected by such distinction and that as a result women's lives could be placed at risk. This could particularly apply, for example, with regard to the treatment available to women who suffer from breast cancer or cancer of the cervix. Similar difficulties could arise with regard to the treatment of cardiac disease. Decisions about the treatments which should be given and the timing of such treatments for such illnesses should be left to the medical profession in consultation with their patients, that is, in consultation with the women who are affected by such illnesses. Neither women nor doctors should feel at risk of treatments being withheld for fear of court action being taken by some individual or group.

We have already seen in the days since the publication of this wording a substantial conflict between Ministers as to its meaning and intent. Apparently the Minister for Justice sought to put this confusion to rest at the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party meeting last Wednesday, in further comment since then and again today in the House. However, I have already learned from the experience of 1983 that what is relevant here is not what politicians believe the wording to mean but what the wording expressly states and the manner in which the courts interpret it. This distinction has rung alarm bells throughout the medical profession and is of substantial concern to many women throughout the State. It is in the context of this distinction that the Fine Gael Party are concerned that the Government proposal is substantially flawed.

It is not correct for the Attorney General to argue that this formulation is one accepted by the court; nor is it correct for the Minister to so argue. It is a formulation solely contained in the judgement of the Chief Justice and in so far as that judgement differs between life and health it is not a distinction that the court had to address as a real issue in the case which came before it. It was uncontroverted in the X case that the girl's threat of suicide posed a risk to her life and not to her health. It is extraordinary that the Government should on the strength of what is a single judicial obiter dicta try to incorporate such a rigid distinction in our Constitution without detailed consideration of its implications. It is even more extraordinary that the Minister in his speech today and in comments made by him during the past few days should imply that he could read the minds of the judges in the Supreme Court who made no such express distinction in the judgments they delivered.

It is a peculiarly male approach to an issue of huge complexity. Of course, there are only 13 women Members of this House but the docile acceptance of this proposal by the Fianna Fáil women Deputies is extraordinary. I suspect that if the Government introduced legislation into this House which sought to include a provision in our Constitution which expressly allowed medical treatment in circumstances where a man's life was at risk but not his health it would be confronted by a parliamentary riot.

The Deputy can say that again.

I emphasise this is a distinction never properly teased out in the High Court hearing or in the Supreme Court judgments. Neither has it been properly teased out by the Government. It is a distinction which should not be contained in this constitutional provision.

Listening to recent comments by Ministers, I cannot help but speculate as to whether this distinction is there for political as opposed to sound legal and health reasons. I suspect its inclusion is something of a political trojan horse and my suspicions have been heightened by the Minister's comments this afternoon. It is there so that it can be suggested by way of an action replay of the type of discredited approach we saw from Fianna Fáil in 1983 that those Opposition parties who wish to have it removed are in some way "soft" on abortion. Statements by Ministers that the exclusion of this phrase "as distinct from the health of the mother" could allow for easy abortion or abortion on demand should be taken with a grain of salt. The observations of Mr. Justice O'Flaherty in the X case in this context are worth noting, where he stated that under the existing constitutional provision, unamended: "Abortion on demand, is not something that can be legalised in this jurisdiction". There should be no provision in our Constitution which raises any doubt as to the right of a woman to obtain treatment where circumstances arise that there is a probable risk to her life. There is currently confusion and differences among members of the medical profession as to how they will apply this provision if it becomes part of our constitutional law. As is frequently said: "when doctors differ, patients die". In this instance, it can be said: "when doctors differ, women will die".

And have died.

I wish to refer to the issue of suicide. Part of the rationale for the government's wording is to exclude suicide or a threat of suicide as allowing for the termination of a pregnancy. There is real and substantial concern that if a threat of suicide continued to be a general basis for the termination of pregnancy we would have in this country general abortion or abortion on demand. This is based on the supposition that it is impossible to properly administer a law or a constitutional provision which allows for terminations in such circumstances and is based on the assumption that it would not merely be open to abuse but would be grossly abused. The Fine Gael Party would have substantial concerns if the law as it applies with regard to suicide was to remain unchanged following the decision in the X case.

In dealing with the issue of suicide, however, the Government have simply made a policy decision that no threat or risk of suicide should ever allow for the termination of a pregnancy and have assumed that if any exceptions to this were to become part of our law, no legislation could be enacted to ensure protection against abuse. However, in a bizarre twist to this approach we are told we are to see legislation that the Government might introduce if the referendum on this Article is unsuccessful.

There are countries where mental ill health and threats of suicide can result in pregnancies being terminated which have legislation which, in practice, works to prevent abuse and widescale abortion. There are other countries which have such legislation and where there is, in effect, abortion on demand, something I believe no one in this House wants to see. Some of this legislation and its application in practice is reviewed in a recent paper published by Professor Anthony Clare and Dr. J. Tyrrell. Such legislation can be drafted competently and can work or can be drafted incompetently and be unworkable. The bona fides of the Government in their approach to this area will be clearly seen when their promised legislation is published. However, it is extraordinary that the Government are able to draft legislation to detail how the law will apply if their referendum wording is unsuccessful but are unable and unwilling to prepare legislation on how it will apply if the referendum is successful.

There are legitimate fears that threats of suicide as a ground for abortion could give rise to widespread abortion of a nature that would be anathema to the overwhelming majority of people in this country. Fine Gael share these fears. However, the Government have an obligation not to lose sight of the very real problem illustrated by the X case. In that case evidence was given that the tragic young victim of rape was suicidal and no contrary evidence was called on behalf of the State. Presumably the State called no such evidence because the Attorney General accepted the truth of what the psychologist told the court. If the Attorney General did not, it is extraordinary that the psychologist's evidence was not seriously challenged.

At this stage in the debate we are entitled to ask the Government what consultations, if any, they engaged in with professional psychiatrists and psychologists who have experience in dealing with young girls and women who are the victims of sexual abuse, sexual assault and rape and who as a result have become pregnant. As the Government are sponsoring this legislation, it is their duty and responsibility to further explain their approach to such tragic cases.

No mention has been made by the Government of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 2 of that convention it is stated "Everyone's right to life should be protected by law". I ask the Minister to tell the House whether the Government consider the Article they now propose be included in the Constitution protects a woman's right to life under this convention. Has this issue been examined in any detail by the Government? No mention of this convention was made by the Minister in his speech. I suspect it is not an issue that has been addressed in any great detail by the Government in their considerations in bringing forward this proposal.

The difficulties associated with the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill should not have to be solely addressed in a guillotined debate in the sole context of a constitutional proposal, the contents of which have only been in the public domain for 14 days. It is the view of the Fine Gael Party that prior to a referendum being held on the substantive issue, detailed legislation addressing the difficulties involved should have been brought before this House for discussion by the Government. There is no reason such legislation could not have been brought before this House. Why is it that the Government have taken the view there is a need for such approach prior to a referendum in relation to divorce but no need for such an approach prior to this referendum? If the Minister for Health is able to produce a draft of proposed legislation with regard to the issue of information, the Government should have been able to produce a draft of legislation addressing issues they now, apparently, intend to ignore in regard to this substantive problem. There are, of course, other areas of genuine concern which are being ignored.

An area of genuine concern to the medical profession and to women totally ignored by Government relates to a woman pregnant with a foetus that is anencephalic — without a brain. There are about 40 such pregnancies annually and they are easily detectable during the early weeks of pregnancy. A foetus so born cannot and does not survive. There is a universal view in the medical profession that it should be possible within the law to terminate such pregnancies, that it is an unacceptable cruelty to require a pregnant woman to carry such a pregnancy to full term. This is yet another area of difficulty that is being ignored in the context of the Government's proposal and has, I assume, never been considered by them. Because of the difficulties involved in this area it cannot be properly addressed in two or three sentences in our Constitution.

In regard to the right to travel and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill, it appears that all sides in this debate agree that the right of a woman to travel abroad should not be impeded by constitutional constraints deriving from the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.

In the X case a majority of the court expressed the view that where there was no real and substantial risk to the life of the mother and if she intended to go abroad to terminate her pregnancy, the courts could grant an injunction to prevent such termination. The effect of the Government's proposal is understood to mean that no injunctions can be obtained in the future to prevent a pregnant woman travelling abroad whether or not she intends to obtain an abortion.

The vision that the X case threw up, of pregnant women being effectively imprisoned in Ireland during the course of their pregnancy even alarmed extremist groups such as that fronted by Mr. William Binchy. The alarm, I suspect, was more due to it being seen as a public relations own goal rather than out of any concern for women's rights to freedom of travel. Of course, it is the freedom of women to travel which until the X case allowed us to evade addressing many of the difficult and substantial issues concerning abortion and allowed certain groups to maintain the facade that this country is an abortion-free zone. The irrelevance of the Eighth Amendment in preventing abortion can be seen from the statistical figures referred to earlier which show that while in 1983, 3,000 Irish women per year approximately had abortions in England, by 1991 the figure was in excess of 4,000 — an increase of 25 per cent.

The proposed Thirteenth Amendment, of course, also allows for a young girl or woman who is truly suicidal and who is regarded as such by her Irish psychiatrist or psychologist and who is denied an abortion in Ireland to go to England to obtain an abortion.

The Health (Family Planning) Act of 1979 was stated at the time to be an Irish solution to an Irish problem. The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 1992 together with the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, is in effect, an English solution to an Irish problem. For many it will highlight the hypocritical and politically schizophrenic approach we take to difficult social issues.

In many Supreme Court judgments, including the judgement delivered in the X case, members of that court have emphasised that the Preamble to the Constitution records that the Constitution seeks to promote the common good "with due observance of prudence, justice and charity". The practical interaction between the Twelfth and Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment Bills now for the first time elevates hypocrisy to the level of a constitutional principle worthy of promotion together with the principles of prudence, justice and charity.

The provisions of this Bill are welcome. However, it is unsatisfactory that the legislation that the Bill envisages has not yet been published by the Government. I welcome the fact that the Minister for Health is to tell the House the draft proposals. If he has draft proposals, they should have been published well in advance of this debate so that reasonable consideration could be given to their implications by Members of this House.

In regard to information and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, prior to the judgement in the X case, the principal impact of the Eighth Amendment was a series of court cases brought by SPUC against student groups and other agencies who were providing non-directive counselling to pregnant women which included information about pregnancy termination. This whole area — as did the travel area — became further complicated as a result of the Irish Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent solemn declaration entered into in respect of that Treaty.

In the court cases that ensued it was held that information could not be given to Irish women with regard to the obtaining of abortions outside Ireland and the Bill is intended to allow the making available of such information.

There are many people of the view that the restraint on information has had a negative effect, that if Irish women seeking abortion abroad first felt free to obtain counselling at home, some at least might, after all the options had been explained to them, decide not to proceed to obtain an abortion.

It is also extraordinary that the Government are intent on pushing the referendum Bill through all Stages in this House prior to the judgement of the European Court in the Open Door Counselling Limited and the Dublin Well Woman Centre Limited cases, which is scheduled to be delivered on 29 October next. It is totally illogical to finalise this referendum Bill while the contents of this judgement remain unknown.

For far too long we have dealt with this whole area from a narrow and negative perspective. For far too long in debates such as this both inside and outside this House, men and talked about women in an offensive and unacceptable way, what Frances FitzGerald, the chairperson of the Council for the Status of Women has graphically referred to as "a disembodied debate about women's bodies". For far too long we have played constitutional and political games with women's lives and the lives of the unborn. Far too often in debates such as this, we lose sight of the fact that women do not conceive alone, that for every difficult and unwanted pregnancy a man shares the responsibility. It has never been acknowledged in this House that without men there would be no abortions.

The overwhelming majority of people on this island are opposed to abortion but there is also now, I believe, a recognition that simplistic constitutional solutions or formulae do not and cannot provide the answer. There is a need to take positive action, in so far as that is possible, to eliminate those circumstances that result in abortion in the first place. The judges of the Supreme Court in the X case recognised this.

Mr. Justice O'Flaherty referring to the responsibility of the executive branch of Government, spoke of the positive thrust of Article 40.3.3º saying: "The State should provide every practical assistance to pregnant women who find themselves unwillingly in that situation to help them make a decision which is in accordance with the Constitution."

The late Mr. Justice McCarthy referring to the Eighth Amendment, stated:

Since the Amendment contemplates lawful abortion, how may the State still, as far as practicable, vindicate the right to life of the unborn? Legislation may be both negative and positive: negative in prohibiting absolutely or at a given time, or without meeting stringent tests; positive by requiring positive action. The State may fulfil its role by providing necessary agencies to help, to counsel, to encourage, to comfort, to plan for the pregnant woman, the pregnant girl or her family. It is not for the courts to programme society; that is partly, at least, the role of the Legislature. The courts are not equipped to regulate these procedures.

The State has, of course, never enacted legislation to provide a comprehensive positive action programme such as the Article envisages. That has largely been left to voluntary agencies, some of which over the years have been persecuted and vilified by extreme groups. Tragically, the Government are ignoring this aspect of the Supreme Court judgement and by refusing to provide the comprehensive legislation required, are abdicating their constitutional duty to take positive action. If the Government were truly pro-life and if they truly wished to reduce the numbers of Irish women who are currently having abortions, there would be a positive action programme being presented to this House. Positive action is required; if not the numbers of Irish women having abortions will continue to increase.

We need determined action to reduce the level of sexual crime, better family planning services with health boards accepting their full responsibilities, comprehensive sex education and education for life in our schools and the strengthening of services offering care, support, counselling and information into all aspects of pregnancy. Such action would inevitably reduce the current demand for abortion very considerably. No such action, sadly, is envisaged by this Government.

The Government intend to push the three referenda Bills through this House with obscene haste. It is the view of the Fine Gael Party that a more considered and detailed approach is required. It is a mystery to everyone in the country outside the ranks of Fianna Fáil why the Taoiseach has irrevocably fixed 3 December next as the date by which the referenda must be held.

The Government should postpone the passage of this legislation through the Oireachtas and the holding of the proposed referenda until all of the legislation necessary is published and until Members of this House have an opportunity to consider it in detailed debate. The Government, at least the Fianna Fáil wing of Government, should stop playing political games with a difficult and serious issue that deserves better and more detailed consideration. The people of this country deserve better than they now have on offer.

I move amendment No. 3:

To delete "now" and add at the end of the motion the words "on 15 January, 1993 or on such earlier date as may be determined by the Dáil, after the Dáil had first discussed, up to and including Committee Stage, legislation designed to elaborate on the practical implementation of the provisions of this Bill".

I hope the Government will take seriously this motion, that they will slow down in bringing this legislation to a completion and allow for more reasoned, detailed and considered discussion.

I hope, too, that in the context of that discussion the dismissive attitude adopted in 1983 by members of Fianna Fáil to other parties and Members of this House who expressed concern at the constitutional proposal that we eventually included in our Constitution, will be given more consideration than was apparent from the approach taken by the Minister for Justice to this issue in the House this evening. We shall be moving also, at the appropriate time, similar amendments to the other two Bills.

At the outset I would refer the House to the Amendment on behalf of the Labour Party which states:

That this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, because of the dangers it poses to the life and other fundamental rights of Irish women, and because this House regards the subject matter of the Bill as being appropriate to regulation by way of legislation rather than Constitutional change.

As I speak in this debate I want to make it abundantly clear, despite what has been said about me on many occasions, both in my constituency and elsewhere since 1983, that I speak as a pro-life leader of the oldest pro-life party in this State. It is from that perspective, and that perspective alone, that I and the Labour Party reject the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution Bill — the so-called "substantive issue" amendment — in its entirely as it is presented to us by the Minister for Justice. We regard this Bill as a brutal, divisive, and ultimately counter-productive attack on the most basic rights of Irish citizens.

Irish women.

It is not acceptable to us, and it never will be, that our Constitution should set out to treat half of our citizens differently, just because those citizens happen to be women.

From the day it was founded eighty years ago, the Labour Party has stood for life. We have stood for the right to life, to shelter, to health and to welfare — and we have stood for them as fundamental rights. Whether they were written into the Irish Constitution or not, it has been a fundamental tenet of my party that every Irish citizen has an equal right to all of these things. And we have campaigned for them abroad, just as we have at home. Our record, and our consistency, in all of these issues cannot be challenged by anyone.

We have stood for the principle of a republic throughout all those years too. A republic for us involves a society built on tolerance, on freedom of expression and freedom to follow different beliefs. This Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, as it is drafted, is a brutal assault on the republic. None of that makes us particularly special, or marks us out as different. Most Irish people believe in the rights I have mentioned. Most Irish people believe in republican principles — real republican principles, not the perversions of republicanism practised by terrorists. Most Irish political parties, too, support republican principles. Indeed, one party leader in this House once made a famous declaration of his determination to stand by the republic. We will all watch with interest to see whether or not he stands by, or stands idly by instead, when this attack on republican principles is voted upon this week.

This Bill is being foisted on the people of Ireland by a Government that either has not thought it out, or is unable to understand, or is unwilling to admit, what the Bill actually means. I have to say at this stage that it is typical of what we have come to expect from the present Taoiseach, who appears to believe in the idea that Government can operate with its eyes tightly shut, stumbling from crisis to crisis, without ever any clear philosophy or considered policy. It seems clear from all of the Taoiseach's utterances on this subject that he regards this issue as nothing more than a political sore tooth, and the quicker it is dealt with the better. It does not matter if the management of the problem actually makes it worse in the long-term — sure that will be someone else's problem. The problem created by this Bill will be much more than a problem for politicians. It will be a problem for the rights of women. That is a fact that appears to have been completely ignored and passed over by the Taoiseach.

This is a Bill which will incorporate into our Constitution, alone among the written Constitutions of the western world, the principle of legal abortion, but it is so badly drafted that in practice, the wording of the Bill will potentially put many more women at risk than are at risk at the present moment.

The most criticised aspect of the drafting of this Bill has been the use of the distinction between the life and the health of the mother. Ministers have responded to all the criticisms of the drafting by saying "that is not our distinction, they are the words of the Chief Justice in the X case". That is one of the many myths that the Government are trying to perpetrate about this issue, and it is as well that it be disposed of at the outset.

The Chief Justice in the X case was dealing with a very particular set of circumstances, involving as we know the sort of tragedy that can devastate any Irish family, no matter how close or loving. He was in essence adjudicating between two "tests" that had been put forward in the particular circumstances of that case.

The first test, advocated by counsel on behalf of the family, was (and I quote from "The Attorney General v. X and Others"):

...If it was established as a matter of probability that the continuation of the life of the unborn child constituted a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother then the conflict thus arising should be resolved by preferring the life of the mother.

The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued in that case that the "true test" should be:

...If it was established in any case that the continuation of the life of the unborn constituted a risk of immediate or inevitable death to the mother the termination of the pregnancy would be justified and lawful.

It could hardly be clearer, in my view, that the Chief Justice in adjudicating between those two tests was deciding between the issue of "real and substantial risk" on the one hand, and "immediate or inevitable death" on the other. The Supreme Court was not asked in the particular case to adjudicate between health and life. If they had been, the arguments would have been entirely different. The conclusions might more readily support the position the Government have arrived at, or they might not. We are not in a position to know. What we do know is that it is absurd and irresponsible to use the remarks of the Chief Justice, taken completely out of their context, as justification for these dangerous words.

That is not the only irresponsibility of which the Government stand accused. In a statement I issued last weekend, I pointed out that Ireland has many pressing and grave economic and social problems. They all demand the attention of policy makers and people alike. It is completely wrong that they should be allowed to be pushed to one side of the political agenda in order to facilitiate this debate, which will increasingly divide homes and communities over the weeks and months ahead. And for what? To insert into our Constitution a form of words which is gratuitously offensive to every woman in Ireland, and to every man who believes in equal citizenship.

Throughout the debate, the only thing we can be certain of is that we will be bombarded from all sides by people who are absolutely certain of the correctness of their position. One of the most dispiriting aspects of all of these issues is the capacity for participants to adopt absolute and fundamental positions about issues where absolutism is simply impossible.

We will be lectured by doctors who assure us that doctors know best, though we are unlikely to hear from women who have suffered because of mistakes made by the medical profession. We will be lectured by male lawyers and professors of law who will also know best — even though they could have no appreciation of the hurt their views can inflict. We will be lectured by politicians who will argue they and they alone have the interests of the nation at heart, as if the nation consisted of only those who agree with them.

Throughout all of these lectures, the people most affected by them are the people least likely to be consulted. They will, in general, be women and girls, many of them in distress or pain, many of them suffering from physical or mental conditions of which we are being asked to take no account. On polling day, many will cast their votes more in hope that this is the end of the matter rather than in any genuine expectation that they have solved a spiritual, emotional, and physical crisis.

If this Government were serious about addressing that emotional and physical crisis, they would think again. But they are not serious. This Government are not only willing to play politics with the lives, health, feelings, emotions and beliefs of Irish women — they seem determined to do so. And they are determined to do so in a particularly callous, brutal and unfeeling way. I have not seen in any of the interviews with Ministers that have been broadcast or recorded over the past couple of weeks so much as a shred of sympathy for the agonising dilemma in which so many women find themselves.

Let me make it perfectly clear where I stand. I do not want an abortion regime in Ireland. I do not intend to campaign for the introduction of such a regime. But it is unacceptable to me, and I suspect to the great majority of people in this country, that no matter what distress or danger a pregnancy causes, no matter what caused that pregnancy in the first place, no matter what the outcome of that pregnancy is going to be, that we should by our laws and Constitution expect every woman in every circumstance to carry that pregnancy to full term.

Let us make no mistake about it. That is what this amendment, and the accompanying refusal of the Government to legislate unless the amendment is defeated, really means. We are going to put into our constitution, if this Government have their way, a provision that will require doctors, and nobody else, to determine what might be a constitutional abortion and what might not. That is more than an absurdity. It is an obscenity.

For the remainder of this speech, I intend to put on the record of the Dáil the detailed views of the Labour Party in relation to the three amendments proposed by the Government.

The Government's proposed amendment in relation to travel in the Thirteenth Amendment Bill is a new subsection (presumably 40.3.3ºi) to read as follows:

Subsection 3º of this Section shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state.

The wording proposed by the Government presumes that there is a right of travel but is this correct? Such a general right is not referred to in the Constitution anywhere. We will be putting an amendment on Committee Stage of this Bill to insert a positive right to travel in Article 40.3.2º

The amendment must also protect the right to receive a service lawfully available elsewhere, as well as simply the right to travel, and we will be putting down amendments to that effect also.

The courts have held that the unborn is implicitly protected by other provisions of the Constitution, apart from Article 40.3.3º. I refer to statements in McGee v. Attorney General and Norris v. Ireland). So these other provisions could be relied on in a travel injunction case, since the amendment relates only to limiting the scope of Article 40.3.3º.

The wording proposed by the Government in the Fourteenth Amendment Bill is:

Subsection 3º of this section shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.

Again, this wording is negative rather than affirmative. It does not create a right to give and receive information. Neither does it prohibit the Oireachtas from banning information. It is unreasonable to expect people to vote on this without an idea of the conditions to be laid down by law. In addition, it is essential to protect the right to counselling and to assistance as well, and we will be putting down amendments to try to achieve that.

It is perhaps another indication of the haste with which this legislation has been brought before the House that we were informed this afternoon by the Minister for Justice that his colleague at some time during this debate will give some draft ideas on the legislation that will be introduced. That is not good enough. This issue is far too serious and urgent for the House to wait upon draft legislation to be put before us by the Minister for Health. If the Government had been organised in what they were doing, that legislation, even in draft form, would have been before the House prior to the commencement of this debate.

The words "another state" in that Bill should be "another jurisdiction" since, for example, abortion is generally unlawful in parts of the state of the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) but is generally lawful in the jurisdiction of England and Wales.

Even a cursory examination of these two Bills, which we support in principle, reveal bad and sloppy draftsmanship which must, in our view, be corrected on Committee Stage if the amendments contained in them are to serve the long-term purpose for which they are intended. But the mistakes in these Bills pale into insignificance baside the truly draconian meanings and interpretations which potentially can arise from the Twelfth Amendment Bill, the substantive issue, with which I now propose to deal.

As I have already said, the proposed changes to Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution represent an intensely sensitive issue, which involves the lives, health, feelings, emotions, and beliefs of every Irish woman and girl. These changes must be examined carefully in that light. So far, the confusion spread by the Government's different interpretations of what the proposed text means has only served to illustrate now little consideration has been given by Ministers to so sensitive an issue. It was absolutely appalling to witness the different interpretations given in the hours immediately after the wording was presented. It showed yet again the lack of discussion and proper preparation by the Government before publishing the wording.

It is worth making the point at this stage, in case there is any misunderstanding about it, that this Bill was not required by the joint declaration signed by the four party leaders prior to the Maastricht referendum. It was the Labour Party which drafted the relevant passages of that declaration dealing with these issues. We were careful to make a clear distinction at the time between, on the one hand, the agreed determination of the four party leaders to copperfasten rights of travel and information, and on the other, the right of the Government to bring forward proposals for legislative and/or constitutional change when the Cabinet sub-committee had finished its work.

All the evidence suggests that the Cabinet sub-committee did no serious work whatever on this issue. It seems instead to have functioned as nothing more than a vehicle for the rivalry between the two political parties in Government, with the smaller party allowing themselves to be rail-roaded into decisions they clearly did not support.

Indeed, according to my information, at least one of the members of the sub-committee, the night before the Government meeting which finally decided the issue, was discussing a quite different form of words with a delegation he met. If that is an indicator of how little concern was being shown by the sub-committee to getting it right, it is no surprise that the Government have ended up in the present mess.

This confusion also serves to make the point that it is almost impossible to legislate for a complex set of circumstances by seeking to insert one sentence into the Constitution. The ultimate outcome of the so-called "Pro-life Amendment" foisted upon us in 1983 is further proof, if proof is needed.

As a result of all this cheap internal politics, the Government are proposing to add words to the existing provision of the Constitution, so that, in toto, Article 40.3.3º would read as follows:

The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother which gives rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.

According to statements made by the Government this wording accepts the test set out in the Supreme Court decision in the X case, in respect of everything except the threat of suicide. Of course this is a distortion of what happened in the Supreme Court. The net, basic, effect of the Supreme Court decision in the X case was that an abortion is permissible in this jurisdiction in certain circumstances defined by the court.

The bottom line effect of the amendment, whatever Government Ministers may argue is this: if this amendment is accepted, the Constitution will provide for the carrying out of legal abortions in certain circumstances. The principle of legal abortion is, therefore, being proposed for insertion into our Constitution. However, the situation is not nearly as simple as appears from this description of the effect in principle. The circumstances in which abortions may be carried out are far from clear — and it is entirely possible that the amendment, as it is drafted, may in fact render illegal certain operations which may be lawful now.

Almost every single word in the Government's proposed amendment is loaded with potential meaning. No one can predict at this stage whether or not this issue will become the subject of litigation in the future, or what the result of litigation will be. What is clear is that statements of "Government intent" are a meaningless basis for predicting the outcome of any future test by the Supreme Court. The words will be judged on what they mean, and not on what the present Government would like them to mean.

The principal dangers in the form of words proposed by the Government lie in the following words: "necessary", "save", "as distinct from the health", "disorder", "not being at risk of self-destruction". The potential meaning and consequence of each of these words, both individually and taken all together, could place many women at risk.

The word "necessary" in this context implies restrictiveness. The essential meaning of the word is to imply that terminations would only take place where they are absolutely unavoidable. While many would agree with this in principle, in practice it could lead to situations where necessary terminations are delayed until a medical emergency has occurred.

This is compounded by the use of the term "save the life". It is easier to understand the potential meaning of this term if it is contrasted with an alternative — for example, "protect the life". One protects someone's life from the probability of a medical emergency happening in the future. One saves someone's life from the consequences of that emergency. For instance: a woman with cardiac disease becomes pregnant. Her doctor is satisfied that at some stage during the stress of a pregnancy, her life may be at serious risk from a heart attack. In a regime devoted to protecting her life, immediate or early termination of the pregnancy would be an option. In a regime aimed at saving her life, termination could also be an option — but perhaps not until the heart attack was imminent or had already happened.

The phrase "As distinct from the health", has attracted so much comment and apart altogether from the innate offensiveness of this term, which implies that the health of women is not an area of concern, and is redolent of a controversy in this State forty five years ago, the use of this term is very dangerous for women.

To take a similar example, this time involving a woman suffering from high blood pressure, if it was the medical opinion in her case that she was unlikely to die as a result of a pregnancy, but was at serious risk of a debilitating stroke, it might not be possible to recommend a termination — since it would be her health, and not her life, in the literal sense, that would be at risk.

One could go further. The use of the term "as distinct from the health" could also rule out operations that would be perfectly legal now, if they were necessary to save the health, as distinct from the life, of a woman. In other words, in any situation where it is "merely" the health of the woman that is at risk, both "direct" and "indirect" abortion could be illegal.

To take an example. Suppose a newly pregnant woman is involved in a serious car accident, which involves extensive damage to her spine and lower back, internal bleeding, and so on. While her condition can be stabilised and maintained, extensive and immediate surgery is necessary to ensure that she will walk again. There may be the risk that the foetus in her womb will be inadvertently killed or damaged in the course of the surgery. This would be what the "pro-life" movement call an indirect abortion. It is only necessary to save the health, that is, the ability to walk, of the mother. It is entirely doubtful that it could be regarded as legal under the proposals put by the Government before this House.

Taken together, these phrases "necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother" also mean that there will be a number of grey areas, where it is impossible to be certain that mothers at risk to their health will be fully protected.

For example, if chemotherapy is withheld from a pregnant woman in the early stages of cancer, that will not, in the immediate sense, literally threaten her life, but it will aid the progression of the disease, and will almost certainly shorten her life. Since the proposal is to allow women's lives to be "saved" rather than protected or prolonged, it is entirely arguable that this provision will rule out terminations in "life-shortening" situations, and allow them only in immediate "life-threatening" situations.

The use of the word "disorder" is referred to in the explanatory document circulated by the Government as being necessary to include ectopic pregnancies. It appears that the Government intention is to rule out all forms of psychological and psychiatric disorders. In reality, some such disorders do have "life-threatening" and/or "life-shortening" physical manifestations — anorexia nervosa, for instance, can be a very dangerous physical condition, even though its origin is psychological. Acute or chronic depression can also have dangerous physical consequences for its victims.

Finally, the Government have ruled out the possibility of a termination based on the "risk of self-destruction". This appears to be a blanket ban — no matter how imminent or certain the risk is. It denies a termination to the woman or girl who threatens suicide, but it also denies it to the girl who is in a suicidally depressed state and has already slashed her wrists twice.

This ignores the fact that any decision-making process involving the provision of terminations on the grounds of threatened suicide would involve psychiatrists, psychologists, and possibly social workers, and would have to take account of a wide range of factors.

In this connection, I have to say that I regard it as both wrong and unacceptable that the profession of psychiatry appears to be treated in this debate as if the opinions of that profession were in some way less valid than those of physicians or obstetricians.

There has been a great deal of sneering at the notion of a woman or a girl being a genuine or potential suicide risk, as if it were some kind of excuse. There has been too much rumour-mongering, and too much innuendo, about the circumstances behind the X case, as if we should not be expected to accept the facts already accepted by a judge of the High Court and the entire Supreme Court.

Only last night, on the "Questions and Answers" programme on RTE, an eminent doctor needlessly and mindlessly repeated the myth that these circumstances were "manufactured". The truth is that there is a substantial body of literature in this whole area. That literature shows quite clearly that suicide is an occasional outcome of refused abortion. The literature also shows that suicide among pregnant women and girls has fallen in those jurisdictions which permit abortion on psychiatric grounds.

A great deal of the literature is of course subjective, but it is also instructive, and perhaps, it is especially relevant to us. One eminent study, for example, concluded that "the awareness of deviance from the norms of the social group may make a suicide attempt or threat more likely".

To put it another way, if a girl is young, or single, or the victim of a sexual assault or incest, and becomes pregnant, she is going to be far more vulnerable to psychological or psychiatric damage. That damage can be compounded far more by her religious or cultural beliefs, or the beliefs of those whose support and approval she needs, than it would be by, for example, her financial circumstances. A girl in this situation, even if she is surrounded by love and affection, can find herself totally alone.

Even though the circumstances of her pregnancy might involve no willing participation on her part, she can come to believe that she has betrayed not only her loved ones, but all the values they have tried to instil. It is when that girl is entirely alone, isolated from support and marginalised from those she cares about, that she is most at risk. Are we seriously going to say that she does not matter? If we make our law as inflexible as we are proposing, that is precisely what we are doing.

I have a daughter, and there is no law in the land that would prevent me from reaching out to my daughter, or I hope to any child in trouble, to help in any way I could to put that trouble right. I am not unique — far from it. Many Members have children, and all of us represent children as much as we represent their parents. All of us believe, and want to believe, that if any of our own children need us, we will be there for them.

What that means is that we must recognise, no matter how painful it might be, that there are times when the only way we can relieve pain and suffering, and remove risk to children, is to rely on the advice of psychiatrists and other professions who can see too clearly the danger they are in.

Under the Government's Bill, terminations of pregnancy will never be allowed in the case of victims of rape or incest — unless of course those victims are also suffering from some highly dangerous physical illness, which threatens to kill them in the short-term.

The reality — and it is a reality that we must face as parents as well as legislators — is that there are some circumstances where rape and incest can result in life-threatening psychiatric conditions. It may be unpalatable, but unless we want to place young girls, already victims of monstrous injustice, at further risk, we will delete this provision.

The Government are proposing that no legislation will accompany this constitutional change, even though we now know that all the legal advice available to the Government is to the effect that legislation is also necessary.

A failure to legislate would place doctors in the position of being the sole arbiters of what was or was not a constitutional protection.

They would have no immunity or idemnity in making these decisions. They would have no guarantee that they would not be prosecuted for procuring an unlawful miscarriage if anyone disagreed with their decisions. They would have no guarantee that they would not be sued if they refused to arrange a termination and the result was the death of a mother.

This is an impossible situation. In addition, legislation is also necessary to set out the services to which women would be entitled if the amendment were carried. In short, passage of this amendment cannot absolve the Government from the responsibility to legislate, so clearly spelled out in Mr. Justice McCarthy's judgement in the X case. We should remind ourselves of what he said:

In the context of the eight years that have passed since the Amendment was adopted... the failure by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable. What are pregnant women to do? What are the parents of a pregnant girl under age to do? What are the medical profession to do? They have no guidelines save what may be gleaned from the judgments in this case.

In future, they will have even fewer guidelines, if these dangerous words are inserted into the Constitution. Mr. Justice McCarthy also went on to say in his judgment that:

Legislation may be both negative and positive: negative, in prohibiting aboslutely or at a given time, or without meeting stringent tests; positive by requiring positive action. The State may fulfil its role by providing necessary agencies to help, to counsel, to encourage, to comfort, to plan for the pregnant woman, the pregnant girl or her family.

Are we to prove yet again, by passing this Bill, that this House is very good at prohibiting, and hopeless at providing? Are we to prove yet again the this House is prepared to ignore its responsibility to encourage, to comfort, and to plan, in favour of taking the easy way out?

The drafting of the provisions in relation to travel and information is inadequate, and does not cover the "copper-fastening" promised by the four Party Leaders in their joint declaration. In regard to the substantive issue, the words proposed by the Government have a number of consequences that are not envisaged within their declared intentions. While the words do enshrine the principle of legal abortion in the Constitution, one of the practical results could be to rule out operations that are legal at present.

In summary, the Government's proposals on the substantive issue could prohibit termination of "life-shortening" pregnancies; "health-threatening" pregnancies and pregnancies which are likely, or certain, to cause the mother to commit suicide.

No account is taken in the words to the right of women to have their health and welfare fully protected; the words make those rights secondary to the rights of the foetus.

The complexity of the issue, the failure of the constitutional amendment to address those complexities, and the difficulty of drafting a constitutional amendment that would address them adequately, make it infinitely preferable that this whole issue be addressed through legislation. Indeed, it is almost certain that there is no form of words that will not lead to further confusion and litigation in the future.

Our Constitution is based on the underlying principles of prudence, justice and charity. It was prudence, justice and charity that informed the Supreme Court judgement in the X case. In prudence, justice and charity, I say that it is impossible to recommend support for this dangerous, divisive and potentially cruel amendment. I hope that, in the course of this debate, over whatever number of days and nights it takes place, the Government will change their mind, that they will see the error of their ways and realise that the Fianna Fáil Party do not alone contain all the wisdom in relation to this issue.

Debate adjourned.
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