Written Answers. - Freedom of Information.
Trevor Sargent
Ceist:
25
Mr. Sargent
asked the
Minister for Defence
his views on the fact that following changes in February 1985 of the Defence Force Regulation A15, 18.1F subsection 2, that the manner in which a person (details supplied) was treated in 1969 could not occur today; and if he will allow all relevant documents pertaining to this person including files (details supplied) to be released forthwith.
[13742/02]
Ruairí Quinn
Ceist:
31
Mr. Quinn
asked the
Minister for Defence
if he will consider re-opening the case of a person (details supplied) who was compulsorily retired from the Defence Forces in 1969; if, having regard to the lapse of time and the belief of this person and their family that this person was a victim of a miscarriage of justice, he will consider allowing access to the files relating to the case; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
[13816/02]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 25 and 31 together.
The position is that, on the advice of the Government, the individual concerned was retired, by the President, with effect from a date in June 1969. The retirement was effected pursuant to section 47(2) of the Defence Act, 1954 and paragraph 18(1)(f) of Defence Force Regulations A.15, which provide that an officer may be retired "in the interests of the service". The amended text of DFR A15 paragraph 18(2) as amended in 1985 states: "An officer shall not be recommended for retirement for misconduct or inefficiency or in the interests of the service unless or until the reasons for the proposed retirement have been communicated to him and he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may think proper in relation to the proposed retirement".
Although the formal amendment was made some considerable time after this individual's retirement, in the event the manner in which his retirement was dealt with was in fact consistent with the later 1985 amendment in that the reasons were made clear to him and he was given every reasonable opportunity to respond. His continued assertions that the reasons for his retirement were never made clear to him are difficult to comprehend given the facts of the case. Specifically, prior to his retirement, the person concerned would have been made fully aware, in some considerable detail, of the circumstances giving rise to his retirement in June 1969. He was afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to the issues raised and failed to do so. He was interviewed by officers of the intelligence section of the Army on three separate occasions in April 1969 in relation to a number of serious matters which had come to their attention.
At the third of these interviews on 30 April 1969, the person in question volunteered to submit a statement in relation to the matters raised, but did not subsequently do so. Given the serious nature of the situation presented to the military authorities, they were of the opinion that to retain him in service would be contrary to the interests of the Defence Forces and of the State.
The Deputy Judge Advocate General was requested to advise on the matter and he himself conducted a personal interview at his office with the officer concerned on 28 May 1969. The Deputy Judge Advocate General informed the officer that he had been asked to advise the General Staff in relation to the case and that he wished to give the officer concerned an opportunity to submit any statement he wished to make in relation to the very serious issues which had been raised in the April interviews. The officer advised the Deputy Judge Advocate General that, following the April interviews, he had consulted a solicitor who undertook to correspond with the military authorities on his behalf. The DJAG informed him that no such correspondence had been received.
The Deputy Judge Advocate General took the officer through the issues raised in the April interviews, explained the gravity of the situation, advised him to consider the situation, and arranged a further meeting for the following day, at which the officer was to submit a statement. The officer raised the question as to whether he could consult his solicitor and the DJAG made it clear to the officer that there was no objection to such a course of action. When the officer returned the following day, 29 May 1969, he then advised the DJAG that he would not in fact be making any statement.
As I have already stated, given the very serious nature of the situation presented to the military authorities and in the absence of any response from the individual in question to the matters put before him, they were of the opinion that it would be contrary to the interests of the Defence Forces and the State to retain him in service.
A decision to retire an officer "in the interests of the service" is only taken for the most compelling reasons. Given that the Government decision and advice to the President concerned military security, I can say that I am satisfied that the matter was handled in an entirely appropriate and proper manner in accordance with the relevant Defence Force regulations extant at the time. I am also satisfied that the individual's case was dealt with in a manner which was consistent with natural justice and in fact which met the criteria which were later incorporated in Defence Force regulations by the amendment in question. The decision to recommend his retirement was taken only after very detailed and due consideration.
With regard to the question of access to files, the person in question applied to the military authorities in May 1998 under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, for access to copies of all documents in relation to his retirement from the Permanent Defence Force and in relation to his period of service in the Permanent Defence Force.
The military authorities issued their decision on the application on 12 June 1998. They advised him that the records sought did not come within the scope of relevant provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, except in so far as the request related to "personal information", as provided for in the Act. In this regard, he was advised that he could have access to all personal information contained in his file for the period in question.
In accordance with the provisions of the FOI Act, the individual, through his legal representatives, exercised his right to appeal the decision to the designated FOI internal appeals officer in the Defence Forces. The appeal was considered by the relevant officer, who upheld the initial decision. This decision was issued in writing to the applicant's legal representatives on 20 July 1998. Copies of the records which were deemed by the military decision makers to come within the scope of the FOI Act were forwarded to his then legal representatives in July 1998. When conveying his decision in relation to the internal review of the decision, the internal appeals officer advised the applicant of his statutory right of further appeal to the Information Commissioner, who is an independent officer with statutory powers to review decisions made by public bodies in relation to FOI applications. I understand that in July 1998, such an appeal was lodged in this case with the Office of the Information Commissioner. Such appeals are a matter for the Office of the Information Commissioner. However, I understand that the case was suspended in July 1998 at the request of the applicant's then legal representatives and was subsequently discontinued by the Information Commissioner's office in 1999, due to the subsequent non-pursuance of the matter by the individual concerned and his legal representatives at that time.
I understand that on 17 July 2001 the individual made a further Freedom of Information request to the military authorities in relation to the records regarding his period of cadet training. These records were released in full by the military authorities. The applicant submitted an internal appeal in relation to the decision in relation to this application and was advised by the internal appeals officer that all records in relation to his period of service as a cadet had been released. I understand the applicant has now submitted an appeal on this decision to the Information Commissioner.
