Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 4 Feb 2003

Vol. 560 No. 3

Written Answers. - Electronic Voting.

Eamon Ryan

Ceist:

123 Mr. Eamon Ryan asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government if the programme source code to the Nedap-Powervote electronic voting system software used for recording votes is available to the public; and if not, if there are plans to publish the said source code. [2464/03]

Dan Boyle

Ceist:

124 Mr. Boyle asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government the general and specific safeguards in place to ensure that the results of electronic vote counts are accurate tallies of the votes cast. [2460/03]

Paul Nicholas Gogarty

Ceist:

135 Mr. Gogarty asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government if procedures are in place to check, prior to the commencement of polling, the electronic voting machines to be used in an election for the presence of audio, video or photographic recording devices which might be used to breach the secrecy of the ballot. [2462/03]

Dan Boyle

Ceist:

137 Mr. Boyle asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government the general and specific safeguards in place to ensure that the programme algorithm, used to perform the count in an election where electronic voting is in use, exactly represents the rules which would govern the counting of votes if the said election were performed using paper ballots. [2461/03]

Breeda Moynihan-Cronin

Ceist:

145 Ms B. Moynihan-Cronin asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government his plans for the wider use of electronic voting; his proposals to ensure the integrity of the system, having regard to the concerns expressed in the Zerflow report; the total cost of installing electronic voting systems for use in the 2004 local and European elections; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [2380/03]

Eamon Ryan

Ceist:

149 Mr. Eamon Ryan asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government if the programme source code to the Nedap-Powervote electronic voting system software used for counting votes is available to the public; and if not, if there are plans to publish the said source code. [2465/03]

Paul Nicholas Gogarty

Ceist:

152 Mr. Gogarty asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government the general and specific safeguards in place to ensure that the recording and counting processes cannot be tampered with where electronic voting systems are in use. [2463/03]

Ciarán Cuffe

Ceist:

397 Mr. Cuffe asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government his plans to modify the voting machines which will be used in future elections in order that they will produce paper backup ballots and to count these paper backup ballots as a means of verifying the results of electronic counts. [2475/03]

Ciarán Cuffe

Ceist:

398 Mr. Cuffe asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government his views on whether it is appropriate that the recording and counting of votes, where electronic voting is in use, is done in a manner which provides no concrete evidence either to the public or to defeated candidates, that the result of the count is a true and accurate reflection of the votes cast by the electorate. [2476/03]

I propose to take Questions Nos. 123, 124, 135, 137, 145, 149, 152, 397 and 398 together.

Security and integrity have been paramount in the design, testing and implementation of the electronic voting and counting system. Original tender submissions were assessed and the successful solution selected on the basis of, inter alia, functionality and product quality including hardware and software security and application of the count rules as in the case of a paper ballot. Detailed functional specifications, likewise, made extensive reference to security aspects of the system. The testing programme has been thorough and involved independent examination of the voting machine and voting machine software by a number of recognised international test institutes and private companies. The voting machine hardware and software has been tested by PTB, the National Institute for Science and Technology in Germany. Separate reports have been prepared by two test institutes in the Netherlands: TNO subjected the voting machine to a range of environmental tests and KEMA Quality BV tested the machine for compliance with international safety standards.

An Irish company, PMI Software Limited carried out an architectural and code review of the system software. My Department also engaged the Electoral Reform Society in the UK, which has extensive experience of STV election counts, to test the software against its database of over 300 elections. The count software was, in addition, tested for functionality and accuracy both by my Department and a number of Dáil returning officers. Finally, in relation to vote counting, the system can produce, after the votes are mixed, vote tables to enable progress of the count to be monitored and also to trace a vote at any stage of the count. If necessary, following a High Court order in an election petition case, the system can also produce a ballot paper, with preferences, to allow a manual count to be carried out. At the general election and referendum pilots in 2002, the software was used under licence from the supplier and at present, the source code is not available to the public. The software is currently being modified for use at the European and local elections in June 2004 and when this work has been completed and tested, I will give careful consideration to the making of the source code available.
The Zerflow report, which was the subject of recent media reporting, was commissioned by my Department as an addition to the principal reports to which I have referred. The company was requested to carry out a security assessment of the procedures to be applied in the use of voting machines in polling stations to ensure that procedures proposed by the Department were adequate. The issues raised by the Zerflow report, which dealt mainly with possible threats to the external physical features of the voting machine, were assessed by my Department and by Nedap-Powervote – the machine manufacturers. The assessment by both was that the main scenario identified was implausible and that the likelihood of its occurrence without detection was extremely remote.
I should emphasise that the version of the voting machine used in this country has more security features than the versions used in the Netherlands and Germany where the issues raised by Zerflow have not been identified in any risk assessments. In addition, the integrity of the Irish voting process is protected on polling day by a set of protocols operated by polling staff and the Garda under the supervision of the returning officer. My Department will continue to keep these arrangements under review and will update advice provided to returning officers, as necessary, including advice in relation to the presence of audio, video or photographic recording devices which are not permitted in polling buildings. I also intend that further expert consideration will be given to external security issues in prospect of the use of electronic voting machines in 2004.
In addition to the design and testing undertaken, the actual use of electronic voting and counting at real polls has provided a crucial assessment of the security and integrity of the system. Following its use in three constituencies at the May 2002 general election and at the Nice referendum last October, the reaction of election staff and the public was overwhelmingly positive. In October 2002, the Government approved the use of the system throughout the country at the European and local elections in 2004 and work on this project is ongoing. The estimated cost of the voting system equipment for a countrywide rollout is €36 million plus VAT. Most of this expenditure will be recouped in the form of reduced election expenditure over the life of the voting machines. While all aspects of the system will be kept under ongoing review, I am satisfied that our electronic voting and counting system meets the key criteria of any electoral system in terms of ease of use, maintaining the secrecy of the ballot, accurately recording and counting votes and security.
Barr
Roinn