Written Answers - Terrorist Attacks.
Marian Harkin
Ceist:
17
Ms Harkin
asked the
Minister for Health and Children
if his Department has contingency plans with the major hospital and the emergency services if a bioterrorist attack should occur and Ireland becomes inadvertently involved; if his attention has been drawn to the availability of any smallpox vaccines here at present; and the persons who will be considered a priority for receiving the vaccine should the event arise.
[6709/03]
The ERHA and each health board have a major emergency plan which is based on a framework approved by Government in 1984 for a co-ordinated response to major emergencies. These plans are updated on a regular basis and both the authority and the boards have a significant response capacity in place for dealing with the effects of biological agents.
In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA I established an expert committee under the chairmanship of Professor William Hall, director of the virus reference laboratory, to develop a contingency plan which would be implemented in the unlikely event of a biological attack here. In preparing the plan it was necessary for the committee to identify the level of risk of such an attack. It considered that the secondary consequences of an attack in another country was the most likely threat.
A detailed protocol in relation to category A agents, including smallpox, botulism, plague and tularaemia, entitled Biological Threats – A Health Response for Ireland was issued in May 2002 to all health board chief executive officers and directors of public health for circulation to all relevant personnel. The chief executive officers were requested to circulate the document to appropriate medical personnel and to ensure that each board's emergency plan was reviewed and updated to take account of the protocol. It is available on my Department's website: www.doh.ie/pdfdocs/biothreat.pdf.
The national disease surveillance centre issued a document entitled Biological Threat Agents. It was aimed at informing all medical staff, particularly GPs, in order to assist in the diagnosis of anthrax, plague, botulism and smallpox. This document was agreed by the expert committee and was circulated in May 2002.
It was agreed by the expert committee that a sub-group, representative of health boards, consultants in emergency medicine and infectious diseases, public health doctors as well as the NDSC, was required to examine operational issues arising from the document Biological Threats – A Health Response for Ireland. This sub-group was established in October 2002. It was requested to examine several key issues including the designation of hospitals for treatment of smallpox cases and development of protocols in relation to transport of patients and samples. It submitted a number of reports to the expert committee for consideration.
Based on the recommendations of the expert committee, I approved the purchase of specific antibiotics and vaccines which would be required in the event of a biological attack with specific class A agents. The following quantities were secured: 2.4 million doses of ciprofloxacin, oral, and 16,000 doses of ciprofloxacin i/v, for the treatment of anthrax; and 600,000 doses of smallpox vaccine for use in the event of a confirmed case of the disease. This vaccine can be diluted by a factor of five or six.
These products will compliment the existing stocks of medical products for the treatment of these diseases. There is a considerable quantity of antibiotics and other therapeutic substances already available in hospitals which could be used against a range of biological agents in the event of an attack.
A high level containment facility has recently been constructed at the virus reference laboratory. The facility is designed to a BL3+ standard to allow for containment of a range of infectious agents including smallpox and to ensure increased safety.
Ireland's strategy on the control of smallpox, based on the recommendations of the expert committee, complies with the advice of the World Health Organisation. The WHO does not recommend mass vaccination. The key to smallpox control is early detection, isolation of cases and vaccination of contacts. In the unlikely event of a case of smallpox occurring here the expert committee will provide advice in relation to the management of the situation, including the issues of vaccine use and dilution based on the specific circumstances prevailing at the time.
