In some of what I have to say in this debate, I intend to be critical of the process and some aspects of the outcome of last week's announcement of a set of proposals for a comprehensive agreement. I intend to praise where I can and criticise where I must. I will do so because it is my duty as the leader of a party in opposition to do so. I will do so in the interests of proper democratic accountability and, above all, in the interests of standing by the Good Friday Agreement and its potential, a potential that is to some extent still not realised. I am conscious of the fact that whenever any aspect of the peace process is criticised, however legitimately, whenever any question is asked, however relevant, the person who asks the question runs the risk of being described as unhelpful or even obstructive. I listened to the Taoiseach on Sunday last, for instance, suggesting that some people were not playing the game. Playing the game, it seems, is to be defined as supporting everything that is announced as uncritically as possible, never raising doubts or fears, never seeking to go behind the often obfuscatory language in which many of these agreements are couched.
I am aware that many unfounded and unfair accusations have been levelled against a Member of this House, Deputy Kenny, because he asked an entirely legitimate and proper question about whether an agreement had been reached in regard to the killers of Detective Garda Jerry McCabe. Suggestions have been made that I too was not acting in the national interest by seeking the publication of side agreements relating to this and other matters. Such accusations, whether made against Deputy Kenny, me or other Members of the House, amount to no more than attempted political blackmail. They are an attempt, in effect, to prevent the Opposition doing the job it is required to do in a democracy. Despite such attempted political blackmail, whether it comes from the Government or the leadership of Sinn Féin, we will continue to do our job. This is our country too.
Today is the 11th anniversary of the Downing Street Declaration, a document which has come to be regarded as the first formal step in what is known as the peace process. In that declaration, in clear and direct language, the British and Irish Governments agreed that the central idea behind the peace declaration is that the problems of Northern Ireland, however deep and intractable, however difficult to reconcile, have to be resolved exclusively by political and democratic means. The British Government went on in that document to declare that it had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland", and to agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement and between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given. For its part, the Government declared: "The democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."
Those three principles, the commitment to exclusively political and democratic means, the right to self-determination and above all the principle of consent have underpinned the peace process ever since. The referenda which adopted the Good Friday Agreement were an expression of self-determination concurrently undertaken by the people on both parts of this island and that agreement effectively enshrined the principle of consent in our Constitution.
What has bedevilled the peace process, from the moment the Downing Street declaration was signed until right now, has been the failure to arrive at a point where every political party is seen to operate on the basis of exclusively political and democratic means. The consequence of that failure has been the collapse of institutions that were set up on an inclusive basis, and an increasingly polarised society, especially within Northern Ireland. None of the difficulties of recent years would have arisen if that first principle had been accepted.
To say that is not to deny that much has been achieved, in terms of stability at least, in the 11 years since the Downing Street declaration was signed. Perhaps as many as 1,000 people are alive today, who might be dead were it not for the peace process. Families no longer suffer the fear of a knock on the door in the dead of night, or the anguish when a loved one disappears without trace. The economy of Northern Ireland has undergone a revival, and it is now a friendly and welcoming place to visit. Indeed, it can be argued that the stability and relative peace enjoyed by the whole island has been no small contributor to the progress made within our own economy.
It remains true, however, that reconciliation has not happened. Violence has been removed from the conflict, as my predecessor former Deputy Dick Spring remarked, but the conflict in some ways remains as bitter as ever. Too many communities are divided, not only by physical barriers but by those of hate and intolerance. Too little trust exists in the politics of Northern Ireland and the root cause of that is the use of violence and the pursuit of undemocratic means.
The only one of the major parties that has been unable to accept the first principle of the Downing Street Declaration has been Sinn Féin. I do not say that in any way to score a point. It is a simple fact that for Sinn Féin, the road to exclusively political and democratic means has been long and difficult. I have praised the leadership of that party before for its role in undertaking that journey, and for the courage and discipline required. However, when one traces the difficulties of recent years, they all go back to that one source, the difficulty of establishing an adherence to exclusively political and democratic means.
One of the ironies of that situation, of course, is that the longer the journey that Sinn Féin undertakes, the more it becomes the centre of attention for both Governments. Similarly, the more polarised society in Northern Ireland becomes, the more people cast their votes for parties at the extremes of the political spectrum. The consequence is that we have now arrived at a point where the development of a framework for a comprehensive agreement essentially has become an exercise in seeking to address and reconcile the concerns of two parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, even if that is at the expense of all others.
The process of engagement that led to the peace process was, throughout most of its history, an inclusive one. Indeed the notion of inclusion could be described as the central strategy of the process, the idea that everyone should be seen as part of the solution rather than part of the problem. It is unfortunate and potentially dangerous that latterly, the process has become more and more exclusive. One may instance, as referred to by Deputy Kenny, that it was only on Monday of this week that the Government found it possible to brief my party on the outcome of last week's events, and I gather that other parties were only briefed yesterday. It is far more to the point, however, that increasingly, a number of political parties whose history and contribution should place them at the heart of this process are becoming more and more marginalised.
There would not have been a peace process in Northern Ireland, indeed democracy itself would have struggled to survive, without the immense contributions of the SDLP and latterly the Ulster Unionist Party. These parties remain true to the objective of reconciliation, and have established track records to prove that. Similarly, some of the other parties in the process, including the Alliance Party, which have made many thoughtful contributions to the negotiating process, the PUP, the Women's Coalition and others have played significant roles. They have rejected any attempt at triumphalism, often sacrificing their own expedient interests, and seeking to engage all the time in the interests of bridging the divide within and between communities. All these parties, it seems, are now to be expected to swallow whatever will bridge the gap between Sinn Féin and the DUP.
The single greatest manifestation of this new exclusion is to be found in annex B of the proposals, and especially in paragraph 9, which proposes a fundamental change in the way Ministers are to be selected for the new executive. When the executive was originally established under the Good Friday Agreement, and as a consequence of the operation of the d'Hondt system, Ministers were appointed in direct proportion to the mandate their parties received, and on no other basis. That process enabled Sinn Féin, for instance, to abstain on the election of Mr. David Trimble and Mr. Séamus Mallon as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, while still occupying ministerial posts in the executive as of right. The DUP actually voted against the establishment of that executive, but went on also to occupy two ministerial posts as of right.
Now the rules are proposed to be changed. The new "comprehensive agreement" significantly alters provisions for electing the First and Deputy First Ministers and the nomination of ministers to the executive that will penalise those parties which wish to register legitimate dissent at the entire process or at the nominations of certain individuals to particular posts. Previously, the only vote required was for the joint election of the First and Deputy First Ministers. The DUP demanded this be changed and that the First and Deputy First Ministers and the entire executive be elected together by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Their motivation was simply to save themselves the embarrassment of having to approve the nomination of Dr. Ian Paisley and Mr. Martin McGuinness in the one vote.
The net result is that should the SDLP or the Ulster Unionist Party abstain on the election of Dr. Ian Paisley and or Mr. Martin McGuinness as First and Deputy First Ministers in protest at the way the process has been managed, they would now lose their automatic right to have ministers nominated to the executive. This procedural alteration means that parties which wish to object formally to any individual holding a particular post may do so only if they are prepared to forfeit their right to participate in the executive.
This transforms the situation as it was, merely because the DUP wishes to claim to its constituency that it has substantially altered the agreement and Sinn Féin and the Irish Government have acquiesced. As Mr. Mark Durkan put it in a piece in The Irish Times yesterday:
You can be a bigot and hold ministerial office. You can have a criminal conviction and hold Ministerial office. But if you dare not to vote for Sinn Féin and DUP as First Ministers, you are automatically excluded from office. How democratic is that?
I would ask this. Would the two Governments have accepted such proposals had the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP sought them, to ensure that Sinn Féin either voted for the First and Deputy First Ministers or lost their two ministries, or to force the DUP to endorse the entire executive rather adopt their "half-in, half-out" approach? They certainly would not. They would have told the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party that they were advocating exclusion. Sinn Féin and the DUP would have been raving to anyone who would listen about how the two main parties were denying them their right to join the executive.
The Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP in particular, which put inclusion at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement, will be the first to be excluded should they wish to register their dissent at the antics of the DUP and Sinn Féin. The Irish Government has allowed that to happen. It will be said that strand one is principally a matter for the British Government and that there was nothing the Irish Government could do to prevent this happening. Everyone who has been involved in the peace process at intergovernmental level over the years knows that this is no more than an excuse. The truth is that both governments have acquiesced in the false proposition that there are only two protagonists who matter. The proposed agreement and the democratic structures of Northern Ireland are the poorer for that.
I now turn to the two most serious issues arising from the proposed agreement. Many people on this island would have been baffled last week to be told that one party was prepared to put peace at risk over the demand for a photograph of decommissioning and that the other party was prepared to put peace at risk by refusing it. The more one reflects on the matter, the more it has to be said that there is a great deal more justification in demanding verification than there is in refusing it. For that reason, I find it all the more surprising that the Taoiseach was so ready to resile from that aspect of the proposed agreement, apparently at the behest of Sinn Féin, until it was clearly pointed out to him that he had undermined the fabric of his own negotiated document. The IRA has made it clear that it regards the process of putting arms beyond use as part of its contribution to a comprehensive agreement which will see the transition to a totally peaceful society. However, it refuses a demand that this contribution be photographed and thereby reduced to "an act of humiliation".
The analogy seems to be with the forced disbanding and disarming of a defeated army, following an act of surrender. In the European and wider international context, it is nothing of the sort. Sovereign and undefeated states regularly bind themselves, as part of their contribution to peaceful international relations, to international agreements on arms proliferation, arms control and arms disposal. Confidence building and compliance processes requiring notification, inventory listing, information exchange, inspection and peer verification are embedded in such agreements. To give just one example, I refer briefly to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which applies to NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. That treaty deals extensively with decommissioning, inspection and verification issues. The treaty states that:
Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty.
If the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not consider themselves humiliated by agreeing to such procedures, then what is so special about the position of the IRA?
Perhaps the most serious issue to have arisen since the publication of the proposed comprehensive agreement is that of criminality. Since the publication of the documents, there has been considerable confusion around this issue. It is fair to say that had the documents been signed last week, the Government would have fought very hard to conceal the clear division within the Cabinet on the handling of this issue. That division has served a useful public purpose, because it has thrown light on an issue that needs to be confronted. We all want peace in Northern Ireland. We want to be sure that paragraph 13 of the Joint Declaration of April 2003 is accepted and will apply. For the sake of avoiding confusion, let me quote that paragraph:
Paramilitarism and sectarian violence, therefore, must be brought to an end, from whichever part of the community they come. We need to see an immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary activity, including military attacks, training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons, other preparations for terrorist campaigns, punishment beatings and attacks and involvement in riots. Moreover, the practice of exiling must come to an end and the exiled must feel free to return in safety. Similarly, sectarian attacks and intimidation directed at vulnerable communities must cease.
Most interested citizens believe that terms like "full and permanent cessation of paramilitary activity" mean precisely what they say. There are now attempts by senior Sinn Féin spokespersons to qualify this by adding terms like "an end to all activity that would endanger the agreement".
There are several aspects of ongoing paramilitary activity, North and South, that may not directly impact on the Agreement, but that nonetheless endanger our democracy. The most corrosive of these activities, to which we in this House cannot turn a blind eye, are the forms of behaviour used to assert and maintain control in certain communities, not just in Nationalist areas of Northern Ireland, but in some of the communities in this jurisdiction, especially where disadvantage is concentrated. There is only one way to be satisfied that the blithe assurances offered by Sinn Féin spokespeople on this whole issue of illegality can be taken seriously. Sinn Féin has always strenuously opposed the work of the Independent Monitoring Commission, just as it opposed its establishment. Perhaps this is not surprising, since the first IMC report found that there was a link between IRA and Sinn Féin leadership, that the IRA continued to be active and that the leadership controlled the level of that activity. However, let me quote from last week's statement from the Sinn Féin president:
I believe that Sinn Féin can say yes to the political package, as now presented. There has been a singular focus, particularly by the DUP, on silent IRA arms. Resolving this issue of arms is a matter for the IICD and the armed groups. Sinn Féin has used whatever influence we have to see guns taken out of Irish politics. Martin McGuinness and I have been to the IRA. I am not prepared to go into the detail of these discussions. That organisation will take its own council and make its position clear in its own time.
The political package as now presented, referred to by Gerry Adams, includes a timetable. That timetable in turn proposes an interim report by the IMC in December and a full report in February next year. If Sinn Féin, in accepting the political package, is also indicating clearly that it is accepting the role of the IMC in monitoring and reporting on all illegal activity associated with paramilitarism, then that would help to generate some confidence in this area. In the absence of such agreement, it is difficult in the light of my own experience and in the experience of many Members of this House, to take assurances of good behaviour too seriously.
There are a great many additional aspects of the present situation to which I would like to refer if the time was available to me. There are major issues to be addressed, such as policing and the Taoiseach's own speech admits as much. Despite the legitimate criticisms I have felt obliged to express, I continue to hope for a successful outcome to the negotiations. I urge the Government in its fresh efforts to seek to be as inclusive as possible. I hope a truly comprehensive agreement, still based on the three principles of complete adherence to exclusively political and democratic means, self-determination by all the people of Ireland and above all the principle of consent, will not be long in coming.
