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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 17 Sep 2009

Vol. 689 No. 2

National Asset Management Agency Bill 2009: Second Stage (Resumed).

The following motion was moved by the Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, on Wednesday, 16 September 2009:
That the Bill be now read a Second Time.
Debate resumed on amendment No. 2:
To delete all words after "That" and substitute the following:
Dáil Éireann declines to give the National Asset Management Agency Bill 2009 a Second Reading because:
1. The Government has published neither the Bacon report that underpins the NAMA proposal nor any proper analysis of this enormous initiative in terms of:
a. The enormous risks for taxpayers of using a dubious and politically influenced valuation methodology to pay €90 billion for assets of highly uncertain long-term value;
b. The growing doubts regarding its impact on bank lending;
c. The growing concerns from creating a secretive, politically directed, state-managed, tax funded work-out process for 1,500 property developers.
2. The Government has not facilitated a review by the Oireachtas of independent analysis of alternative banking solutions which international evidence suggests are likely to be more effective at getting credit flowing, less costly and fairer for the taxpayer and less vulnerable to political manipulation and business lobbying.
—(Deputy Richard Bruton).

Yesterday the Minister for Finance outlined the details of the NAMA legislation. I thank him, his staff and advisers, as well as the Attorney General and his officials, for the huge volume of work they have put into the Bill. I also thank the Cabinet for its input and guidance, as well as those who have offered many constructive suggestions.

As many have commented, this legislation is one of the most important economic Bills to come before the House since independence. Therefore, it is vital that it is debated thoroughly, not only in order that Deputies can have their say but also in order that the taxpaying public can understand with clarity the decisions we propose to take on their behalf.

I want to spend a moment outlining to the Dáil and the people the context in which this is happening and the role the Bill plays in the Government's overall strategy for recovery. As everyone knows, we are going through difficult times. However, we cannot be blinded by the difficulties and we must have courage. We must act. We must take the future into our own hands and not wait until fate decides it for us. Doing nothing is not an option. We must move on. During this critical period for the country I want the people to know that we can take actions to improve our situation and increase our chances of returning to prosperity. We intend to take those actions.

Between now and Christmas the country has the opportunity to take three steps that will lay the foundations for recovery. These steps are the passing of the Lisbon treaty to give us a stronger and more efficient European Union with Ireland influencing and shaping events that affect us; the setting up of the National Asset Management Agency which will help to solve the banking crisis; and the passing of a budget which will continue the process of putting the public finances back on a sustainable footing in the coming years. It is my belief and that of the Government that these three measures will position Ireland to benefit from the recovery we are beginning to see in other countries far sooner than would otherwise be the case. Of course, it is difficult but we must confront the scale of the problems and be confident that together we will pull through for the sake of the country's future prospects. It is also my strong belief that by not passing these three measures we would be condemning ourselves to a period of stagnation, isolation and further deterioration in our economic circumstances. Let us proceed with determination and the courage of our convictions that we will all do what is necessary now to secure our economic future.

On all three issues, the Lisbon treaty, NAMA and the upcoming budget, there is one sole motivation guiding the Government, namely, to return the country to growth as soon as possible for the benefit of us all. These issues cannot be resolved in isolation. In tackling the issues facing the economy, the stabilisation and cleansing of our banking and financial system is not optional. It is a must. To protect jobs we need an economy that is growing. An economy cannot grow without a properly working banking system. After careful consideration of all the options, we believe establishing the National Asset Management Agency is the best solution to the banking crisis that Ireland faces. By establishing the agency the Government is tackling head on the significant threat impaired assets pose to the Irish financial system. The asset management approach has a proven track record internationally and the establishment of NAMA has been supported by institutions such as the IMF and the European Central Bank, as well as by the financial markets. Deputy Bruton stated last night that the ECB had recommended paying the market price for assets. This is not true. It recommended that we avoid paying too great a premium over the market price. As the Minister pointed out yesterday, the Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. John Hurley, and the incoming Governor, Professor Patrick Honohan, have both stated that, having regard to the uncertainty in property price movements, the proposed add-on of 15% to 18% to the estimated current market price does not seem out of proportion with the range of potential upward price movements, especially when a risk sharing element is included. I am absolutely certain that the proposed premium over market price is in the best interests of the economy and, consequently, those of the taxpayer.

Last night the Minister outlined in significant detail how NAMA would operate. I would like to address some of the key points of NAMA's operation, while also setting out the broader context for this initiative. Members of the House should be familiar with the context for this debate but judging by some of the contributions yesterday it is worth reminding ourselves of the events of the past 12 months. As a consequence of international developments and our own domestic factors, the need for extensive Government support and protection for the Irish banking sector became clear. During that period, Governments and central banks across the globe have provided substantial support to the financial sector and the broad economy in their management of this global crisis.

I want to highlight the importance of a functioning banking system to the wider economy and the steps the Government has taken to promote lending. Promoting lending to the small and medium-size enterprise sector is a high priority for the Government and a number of initiatives are already under way to support viable but vulnerable businesses.

Some 8%, that is what it is giving out.

The Government's existing recapitalisation package includes a number of measures to boost lending and underpin economic activity. These measures include a commitment by the two main banks to increase lending capacity to small and medium-sized enterprises this year by 10% over last year's levels, and to provide an additional 30% capacity for lending to first-time buyers this year. The Financial Regulator is monitoring compliance with these lending targets. Furthermore, AIB and Bank of Ireland have each created funds to support projects which have a positive impact on the environment or will provide innovation in clean energy and have committed to seed capital funds, in collaboration with Enterprise Ireland, to support further the creation and development of new enterprises.

These various credit supply initiatives will be underpinned by the new statutory code of conduct for lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. Mortgage lending will be supported by the new statutory code of conduct for mortgage lending, which requires that a lender will not initiate legal proceedings for repossession within six months of arrears appearing — although the two recapitalised banks, AIB and BOI, have agreed to a 12-month wait. I reject the suggestion by Deputy Burton that these banks are lining up repossessions for next year.

There is no evidence to support that——

Look at the girl from Kildare.

——and it is unfair to working families facing financial difficulties to continually suggest that this is the case. Of course, difficulties must be monitored and worked through, but I do not agree with the contention that was made yesterday.

There have been moves in a number of countries to remove the impact of impaired loans or other toxic assets from the balance sheets of banks so that they can more easily secure funding and, hopefully, equity investment. One of the main approaches has been what is sometimes called the "bad bank" model — although in reality it could better be called an asset management model — where a special vehicle is set up to hold damaged assets and seek to recover value.

The option that my Government has agreed on goes further as it also includes performing loans. It is projected that 36% of the assets will be land, 28% development property and 36% associated commercial loans. The estimate is that 40% of these loans are cash-flow producing. The cash flow produced will be sufficient to cover interest payments on the NAMA bonds and operating costs. Therefore, citizens will not have to pay for the running of NAMA on a day-to-day basis.

The asset management agency is the next step in ensuring that we have a banking system that is fit for purpose and can support economic recovery. NAMA will buy the land and development property loans and certain associated loans from the banks at significantly reduced prices. It will then manage these loans over time to achieve the best possible return for the taxpayer. The asset management agency will start with the largest systemic exposures across the institutions and it is expected that by the middle of next year most of the loans will be transferred. NAMA will leave behind smaller but stronger banks that can focus their resources on their core function of lending to Irish business.

It is important to point out yet again that the Government's decision to establish this agency was taken following expert advice from at home and abroad and before we made our decision, we listened in detail to the advice of the NTMA, the Financial Regulator, the Central Bank and our financial and legal advisers.

The Government is convinced that the asset management agency approach is the most appropriate to the Irish situation. Moreover, since the decision to establish NAMA was announced, it has received endorsements from many different quarters, including bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.

All that said, there is an understandably high level of anger and dismay among the public at the way in which some of our financial institutions have operated in recent years. People naturally look at the significant financial supports that the Government has had to put in place to address the difficulties in the banks. The Government shares this sense of dismay and disappointment and is determined that enhanced financial regulation should stamp out bad practices for good in future.

If there is one message I want the House and the citizens of this State to be absolutely clear about it is that NAMA is not designed to be or will not be permitted to operate in practice as a bailout mechanism for anybody who has operated irresponsibly. In relation to those who took out these development related loans, the agency will continue to treat them as borrowers who continue to owe the full amount of their loan. Under the Bill the agency will have a duty to maximise taxpayer returns and the Government expects the agency will use the range of powers available to it under the Bill to meet that objective. To be clear on this point, anyone whose bank loan is purchased by this agency will have to repay NAMA just as he or she would have had to repay the bank originally.

In relation to the banks, the Bill includes a risk-sharing mechanism with the banks that will protect the taxpayer from over-paying for the assets to be transferred to the agency. The Bill provides that if the agency should make a loss in any given year, it will have the option of not paying any interest or coupon payment on the debt concerned. This has the effect of encouraging the financial institution involved to work to ensure that the agency does not finish up in a loss-making position.

The Minister for Finance has dealt in detail with the valuation of the loan assets but I propose to say a few words on this important issue. Every loan will undergo a detailed assessment in accordance with the valuation methodology set out in the Bill and this method of valuation must be approved by the European Commission. The Opposition seems unable to understand, or unwilling to acknowledge, that not all loans will be paid for at a premium to market value. The Minister for Finance has repeatedly explained that some speculative land purchases will now have reverted to agricultural value and the loans on these lands are unlikely to be worth more than agricultural value even over the seven to ten years that we expect NAMA to operate. I assure the House that no premium will be paid on these loans. As I have said, the loans will be individually valued and the question of whether a premium is appropriate will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Our preliminary aggregate estimates outlined by the Minister for Finance yesterday indicate that the asset management agency will pay €54 billion for loans with a book value of €77 billion. This represents a substantial discount and ensures that only a modest recovery in property prices is necessary for the agency to break even over time. The success of the agency is in no way dependent on a return to so-called bubble prices.

I want to tackle head on this notion being peddled by the Opposition that we are mortgaging our children's future. This is a misrepresentation of the facts and is using fear for political gain.

Some of the Taoiseach's own people are saying it.

The support we are providing is backed by assets that need only improve in value by 10% over the next ten years in order for this scheme to break even.

What about the Taoiseach's plans?

Let me be clear about this, taking the subordinated debt into account, NAMA will have to achieve less than a 10% uplift over the current market values on its assets over ten years to break even. Any increase above this would accrue in its entirety to the taxpayer so the suggestion by Deputy Mitchell last evening that NAMA offers no possibility of a gain to the taxpayer is wrong. Finally, I refer to Deputy Burton's request for the publication of a business plan that would set out the cost of the agency's operations. I can confirm that such a plan will be provided before the end of Second Stage of the Bill.

There has been detailed discussion and commentary in the media on potential alternatives to the asset management approach and the establishment of this agency. Deputy Bruton's alternatives are premised on significant levels of default on Irish bank debt. This would have a severe detrimental effect on the remaining banks and, most importantly, the State's ability to fund itself. The Government does not believe the best interests of the State are served by allowing a culture of default or potential default to develop. This would undermine financial stability and result in the need for further action to rescue the banking system. The suggestion by Deputy Bruton that we can divide most or all of our banks into a good and bad bank system without disrupting the flow of finance to the economy is totally unrealistic in our view and not founded in any practical plan. If, as suggested, all or most of our banks were to be put into a bank resolution scheme we would be left for a significant period with zombie banks and very little lending into the Irish economy.

What have we got now?

(Interruptions).

Is the Taoiseach implying that Anglo is a systemic bank?

An Taoiseach, without interruption, please.

It is telling that Deputy Bruton's examples of how the Fine Gael scheme will work are Washington Mutual, Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley, none of which is providing any significant new lending in their respective economies at present.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

Having explained that we are not trying to provide a bailout for developers, I must state also that neither is the Government motivated by protecting the providers of risk capital. Shareholders in these banks have already lost much of the value in their investment as shares have fallen over 90% from their peak. If State capital is needed after the transfer of loans to NAMA, it will be in the form of equity capital thereby increasing the Government's shareholding further.

What about nationalisation?

Certain bondholders have also lost out as a large amount of subordinated debt has been bought back by the banks in recent months at a significant discount — with the result that bondholders took substantial losses relative to the face value of the bonds.

This was organised in such a way that no event of default arose — the bondholders were given a choice. The buy backs by the three largest banks have resulted in losses of almost €4 billion from face value for those bondholders and resulted in accounting gains for the financial institutions. That has increased their core capital putting them in a better position to absorb the discount which will arise when the loans are transferred to the asset management agency.

An important point I should make is that the bulk of bonds in issue by Irish banks are not subordinated debt but are debt of a far more fundamental character. They are often purchased by pension funds or insurers who are not natural high-risk takers. Another suggestion is that the Government could nationalise the banks and the financial system's problems would possibly disappear. This is patently untrue. Impaired assets still would have to be dealt with and the shareholders in AIB and Bank of Ireland would have to be compensated to the tune, perhaps, of more than €5 billion.

Deputy Burton stated yesterday that her party is not in favour of blanket nationalisation and I welcome that clarification. The Government favoured nationalisation where that was the best solution available at the time, as in the case of Anglo Irish Bank. Furthermore, we have repeatedly said that if the State needs to put further capital into the other banks, it will be done by way of equity, thereby increasing the State's holding.

The measures undertaken by EU Governments have been designed and implemented within a common EU framework. I have already referred to the undoubted benefits that membership of the eurozone has brought in tackling the current crisis, in particular the support to Irish financial institutions from the European Central Bank, ECB. The Government has also benefited from the template for impaired asset schemes drawn up by the EU Commission which will help to ensure that the NAMA provisions will be fully consistent with relevant state aid provisions of the treaty.

The Government is determined to ensure that the regulatory framework for financial services in Ireland meets the Government's objectives for the maintenance of the stability of the financial system, for effective and efficient supervision of the financial sector and for safeguarding the interests of consumers. Meeting this objective necessitates a new approach, involving new standards in banking regulation, new standards of corporate governance, and the integration of Central Bank responsibilities with the regulatory and supervisory functions.

The Government has agreed significant and comprehensive changes to the institutional structures for financial regulation which are consistent with the emerging international agenda for reform in the financial services sector. The key element of the new structure is the establishment of an independent central banking commission. The central banking commission will be chaired by the Governor and will be a single integrated structure combining the existing role of the Central Bank board with responsibility for the prudential supervision of financial institutions, which is currently the role of the Financial Regulator. The Government is determined that these structural changes will be supported with new resources, skill sets and expertise, that will underpin the restoration of confidence in our regulatory arrangements.

It is a bit late in the day.

It is a priority for the Government to ensure that the membership of the new structure is highly authoritative, expert and experienced in all of the key areas required for it to effectively discharge its responsibilities. As Members are aware, the Government has already announced the appointment of Professor Patrick Honohan as governor. A director of financial supervision will be appointed in the coming weeks. This person will be a high calibre individual with a high level of expertise and market knowledge and extensive experience. The Government considers this is essential for the rebuilding of confidence in the reputation of the Irish financial regulatory system.

These reform measures will include strengthening corporate governance in the banking sector through, for example, a prohibition on chief executives moving directly into the role of chairman, and limiting cross directorships. Every analysis of the financial crisis has pointed to the vital importance of trust and confidence in financial services and the profound impact of the decline of these essential ingredients. The reform of the institutional structures for financial regulation announced by the Government will underpin confidence in our financial system as well as helping to enhance the flow of credit in the economy.

The new structures will provide improved levels of enforcement, more responsible and transparent lending policies and ensure a financial sector that acts in the interest of the customer rather than with an eye to short-term gain.

Most of the Opposition Deputies have concentrated on the risk to the taxpayers that NAMA will not recover sufficient funds to pay back the bonds issued. They have ignored the very real risk to the taxpayer that the economy is paralysed by banks which are unable to lend. I believe that the passing of the National Asset Management Agency Bill is absolutely vital if our economy is to recover in the coming years and if we are to defeat the scourge of unemployment that is blighting so many lives in the country today. Passing the legislation will cleanse the balance sheets of the Irish banks and so enable them to increase the provision of credit which is their core role in the economy. Along with the other initiatives that this Government has taken over the past year with regard to restoring competitiveness and bringing order to the public finances, it will bring us a long way towards positioning ourselves to take the earliest possible advantage of the global economic recovery when it takes hold.

I commend this legislation to the House.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

Deputies

Ah, go on.

This is a defining moment for our country. The decisions taken over the next few weeks will impact not just on this generation but on those to come. The stakes could not be higher. The Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, may well feel like a liberated man, but the taxpayer is now going to be trapped by the actions of the Government.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

In a few weeks the people will vote on the Lisbon treaty. This party believes passionately in the interests of our country and for that reason we have set aside any narrow political considerations in campaigning actively for a "Yes" vote. Let me be clear. With the same passion and sense of conviction we believe that the NAMA proposal is not in the national interest and that is why we are voting against it. This is not just a flawed item of legislation. It is the economics of the madhouse, supported by the fiction of long-term economic value.

The Government keeps telling us that this is not a bail out for the bankers. In fact the Taoiseach gets quite annoyed when he hears talk of bail outs. Perhaps the Government, then, should explain why the share price of AIB is up 25% this morning and the share price of Bank of Ireland is up 16%. Is that not a very clear sign indeed that this is a great deal for the banks at the expense of the taxpayer?

Since the beginning of this year there has been a massive transfer of wealth from the taxpayer to the financial markets. The State has guaranteed the banks and pumped €7 billion into the system. The result is that since April senior bank bonds have increased in value by about20%, subordinated bonds have increased by 50% and shares that were worth ten cent are now valued at €3.20 with targets being set at €5 or thereabouts. The Government wants us to believe that it makes sense for this State to fork out billions of euro to overpay for toxic assets. The Minister claims that all NAMA needs is a 10% bounce in property prices for it to break even. However, this only holds true if the toxic assets of the banks have been correctly valued and if we are at the lowest point of the property market. The Minister says the advice cannot be changed, but its interpretation certainly can.

If property prices seem to have bottomed out, as the Taoiseach seems to assume, where are all the buyers? Where are the cash-rich pension funds, swooping to pick up the bargains that lie around? They are nowhere to be seen. The Taoiseach bases his assumptions on a modest recovery, but he simply does not know what the future holds, in that regard. A recent article in The Irish Times by Professor Morgan Kelly for whom I have great expect, clearly illustrates why buyers are holding on to their cash. As the professor was one of the few commentators to predict the current collapse in the property market, people would be very foolish to ignore his warnings. According to Professor Kelly, when the bubble burst on Irish agricultural land in the 1970s, real prices fell by a massive 75% and stayed at that level for 18 years. Based on that experience, and on what happened to the Japanese property market in the 1980s, Professor Kelly gives a clear warning that NAMA could generate multi-billion losses for the taxpayer. I respect his opinion.

The Minister seems to believe that because rents are still high in Ireland, property prices are set to increase. He should go out on the street and ask people. Can I suggest to the Minister that it could also mean that rents have further to fall? We know that Irish rents are still very expensive by European standards. We also know that more than 30% of commercial property in this city is empty, while interest rates and unemployment are set to increase. So which is more likely, a rise in property prices or a fall in rents?

The Minister told the House that NAMA would apply a 30% discount, on average, to the loans that it is purchasing from the banks. He did not tell us, however, what the discount is for each individual bank, which is fundamental. Can the Minister tell us the discounts being applied to Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland? Do they have discounts lower than 30%? If so, what is the discount that is being applied? I ask the Minister to indicate to the House how much further recapitalisation will be required at Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, following his statement on NAMA yesterday. I hope that detailed responses will be given on both issues. What further money will the taxpayer need to fork out here?

Despite the many uncertainties and this being the biggest gamble of the century, the Government has still decided that the only way to solve the banking crisis is to place almost all of the risk on the shoulders of the people. They might not see it yet because these are paper transactions and it is being sucked away out of the system without it being visible to them. In contrast, the Minister intends to allow the investors and speculators who funded the property bubble to scuttle away from their responsibilities. This is why share prices have zoomed following the Minister's statement. All this comes from a party that continues to lecture the rest of us on patriotism.

The sad thing is that senior members of the Government believe what they are saying on NAMA. They are so cut off from the real world that they have ended up swallowing this fiction. When the Taoiseach looks in the mirror in the morning, he probably sees a man who thinks he is doing what is right. The rest of us see a Taoiseach whose policies helped destroy our economy in a Government which refuses to apologise and which keeps making the same mistakes. The Taoiseach said it is a gamble or do nothing. He had the privilege of sitting in the Department of Finance for four years when nothing was done, despite the fact that almost 1,000 people work in the regulator's office and the Central Bank. Advice was available to him not only from at home but also from abroad about the dangers that lay ahead and yet nothing was done. He now tells us that it is a gamble of €54 billion or do nothing.

If we have learnt anything in the past 12 years, it is that the Fianna Fáil Party cannot be trusted to make the right decisions because its members listen to the wrong people. Fianna Fáil is no longer the party of the ordinary people; it is the party of the establishment. It is easy to be brave when taking away €10 million for cervical cancer vaccination or medical cards from pensioners. However, when it comes to standing up against the elite and the vested interests it has caved in completely. This money is being sucked out of the system without the public seeing it. It is not as if NAMA were to tax child benefit or whatever else. The people will be on the streets when its impact hits home.

I wish to say something about the Green Party, the junior member in Government. If its Ministers, Deputies Gormley and Ryan, vote in favour of NAMA, they are sending out a message that in this Republic the people of influence and money continue to rule. The Green Party spent the last week telling anyone who would listen that it had effected major changes in the draft legislation. It did so with great enthusiasm and exuberance. The Minister, Deputy Ryan, claimed that the Government had agreed on "equal sharing of the risk between NAMA and the banks", in other words, 50:50. Yesterday, we saw what those fine words mean in practice. The value of the subordinated bonds which will be offered to the banks, under NAMA's risk-sharing mechanism, amounts to 5% of the total price. Somewhere along the way, a zero went missing. If anyone finds it, send it to the Green Party promptly.

The Green Party also told us last week, with barely concealed excitement, that there was going to be a social dividend. What it meant, of course, is the State will vastly overpay for land which it may then make available to local communities. If the Green Party wants to make community pitches available, why can the Government not buy it at market value now instead of paying over the price for land that could be transferred to communities?

Deputies

Hear, hear.

As they are doing in America.

The truth is that the changes that have been made to the draft legislation are cosmetic. Why else would Fianna Fáil have let the Green Party take any credit? They were designed to get the Green Party through a shaky weekend in Athlone. I remind the Minister, Deputy Gormley, that NAMA is not about 140 Green Party members who turn up at a conference; it is about the 4.2 million people who live in this country.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

NAMA is not just a defining moment for our nation, it is also a defining moment for the Green Party. If its members decide to vote for this legislation they are sending out a message that they too are part of the elite, the establishment and the powerful. Are the interests of bank investors and developers really more important than the interests of ordinary people from whom Green Party members have become removed? We are constantly being told by the Government that there is no alternative to NAMA. The same line is repeated in certain quarters of the media and by the hired guns. This is absolutely untrue. What is true is that the Government has refused to consider any alternative.

Let us not forget the origins of NAMA. I would like the Minister to clarify a point on which I am unclear. If this was the biggest financial crisis to have hit the country one would have thought that the Government would either have called in the parties to advise them of the scale of the problem we had——

The Deputy was told that time and again.

I would like the Government to go away and consider our suggestions. The Minister for Finance appointed one single person to draft a report on this — a stockbroker turned property developer. On the basis of that 11-page report, which I have not seen and in respect of which I have no knowledge what other input from the Department of Finance, the Central Bank, the regulator or other economic commentators were added, the Minister has proceeded down the road of introducing this NAMA legislation. It was done on the evidence and report of a single consultant who I have heard made references to coastal erosion in Longford in a draft of a report published a number of years ago.

That was section 32.

On the basis of this report the people were informed we were proceeding with NAMA. If it was not all so tragic it would be farcical. I would like the Minister to produce the evidence of how that 11-page report was treated, the consultations that were held on it, the discussions and the interpretation that has resulted in proposing the introduction of NAMA. In order to understand the basic thinking behind the NAMA structure, we need only go back to what the Taoiseach said in a radio interview some time ago: "The Government has to write whatever cheques are necessary in the interest of maintaining financial stability". In all my years in this House I have never heard such an irresponsible statement. No wonder the share prices and bond prices of the banks have rocketed in recent months. The financial markets are not stupid. They know when Government interferes here, there is money to be made and that is what they are doing. They know an easy mark when they see it. Instead of defending the interests of the Irish people, the Taoiseach has waved the financial flag of surrender. Stockbrokers this morning must feel as though they are getting all their bonuses at once. I can almost hear the clink of champagne glasses as the markets toast the long and healthy life of a Government that has caved in to their demands.

Whatever way one looks at it, NAMA is an appalling solution to an economic collapse overseen and orchestrated by the two parties in Government. The IMF has confirmed that Ireland is suffering from the worst economic crisis of any of the industrialised nations. Countries that used to look upon us with envy now look upon us with pity. As I have pointed out before, German, French and British newspaper headlines proclaim the end of their recession. They have moved on. In Ireland, however, the headlines are about job losses, worsening Government finances and increasing social misery; and now we face the nightmare scenario of rising interest rates while we are stuck at the bottom of the economic cycle.

It is exactly 12 months since the bank guarantee, which this party supported in the interest of having a vibrant and competitive banking sector, was put in place by the Government. Over these 12 months the Government has increased the tax burden considerably but failed to stop the rise in public spending, as was pointed out so clearly by Colm McCarthy on many occasions. In the same time unemployment has increased massively without any real jobs package from the Government. The Government has talked about credit flowing but nothing has happened, despite the State's injection of €7 billion into the banks. We have had 12 months of delay, failure and uncertainty.

After all this, we are asked to trust NAMA. Why should we, given the Government's record? Only a few weeks ago, the Minister told us the loan-to-value ratio of the transferred loans was 75%; in other words, there was a 25% equity cushion. Yesterday we learned that the true figure is 88%. What other figures is the Minister getting wrong? Are we supposed to trust the bankers? I will give an example. I am not a banker and have little involvement with the banks. God knows, my account is overdrawn most of the time. However, I went to meet with representatives of the banks last year with Deputy Bruton and some of our economic people. We had some straightforward discussion with them. I sat in the headquarters of Anglo Irish Bank in St. Stephen's Green for two hours and was given a superb presentation by the former chief executive, whose salary was of the order of €3 million. That person said to me that every single loan was individually assessed. Where did I hear that yesterday? From the Minister for Finance, who said every loan was subject to individual evaluation. I sat in that office and was told there was nothing wrong with Anglo Irish Bank, that there were no speculative runs or overhangs, that there were no transfers of money between that bank and Irish Nationwide, and that there were not people in that bank who had been allocated €30 million in bank shares to get over the overhang problem. Before we left, I asked whether there was anything else we should know about this bank, and I was told there was nothing wrong with it; it was the strongest bank in the world.

Are we supposed to trust bankers? John Kenneth Galbraith said that these were the guardians of the nation's financial pessimism. Boards of banks do not know what is going on because when they meet for their two-hour meeting once a month or every two months, most of them do not have the information to ask the relevant questions. We are now faced with a small group from the National Treasury Management Agency, transferred into NAMA, being placed in charge of the largest property portfolio in the world. I realise the Minister must set out a whole series of questions about these loans, but if he does not put in people of real competence in this field, we will be going down a dangerous road. That is my experience with bankers at the highest level in this country. If they decide to tell the major Opposition party a whole series of untruths — because there is another word I cannot use here — that speaks for itself in terms of the trust we are expected to have.

The points that have been made by Deputy Bruton for many years are as relevant now as they were then. I acknowledge the respect and international standing of people such as Dermot Desmond, who I know sent his proposals for dealing with this issue to the Department of Finance more than six months ago. These were in many ways parallel to what Fine Gael has proposed——

The Minister decides the price of the haircut. That is all he has done.

——with our national recovery bank. We would not set up a quango. If the Taoiseach says people who are opposed to NAMA are either unwilling or unable to understand what is going on, I refer him to the likes of Dermot Desmond or Professor Morgan Kelly or anybody else who has put forward an objective view on how this might be achieved.

Fine Gael is opposed to NAMA on principle because it is fundamentally unfair. Basic fairness would dictate that those who took the risks and were paid to do so should not now be bailed out by the taxpayer. If one was responsible for the boom in the banks, one must be accountable for their bust. It does not matter whether one is a shareholder, a bondholder or a developer. We are also opposed to NAMA because international experience shows it will not work for the taxpayer. The Government likes to quote the IMF when it suits its purposes. However, an IMF study in 2008 concluded that "government–owned asset management companies appear largely ineffective in resolving distressed assets, largely due to political and legal constraints". Proof positive of this comes from France in the 1990s, where a NAMA-type asset management company purchased €28 billion of distressed assets from Crédit Lyonnais, resulting in an €18 billion loss for the State. Is it any wonder the French have opted for a different model in 2008? Their model is similar to Fine Gael's proposed alternative to NAMA.

The proposal is based on two core principles: we need to get credit flowing quickly by establishing a national recovery bank; and we need to restructure the existing banks to place the risk with the shareholders and bondholders rather than with the people. It is unclear from yesterday's announcement whether the existing banks will be in a position to resume normal lending if NAMA is established. What is the position of Anglo Irish Bank, which is a property-based bank? If these assets are to be acquired at a discount, how is it expected to trade its way out of the difficulty in which it finds itself? I would like to hear an answer to that question. Given that it will be many months before the loans are acquired by NAMA, the likelihood is that the banks will continue to hoard their cash, whatever the Government says.

The national recovery bank proposed by Fine Gael is designed to inject cash rapidly and effectively into the economy. I bet the Minister that every single Deputy can give him umpteen examples of small businesses all over the country who are not getting overdrafts or credit and, as a consequence, are unable to continue in business. By this time next year, how many more thousands of people will be out of work because businesses will have closed down due to the lack of available credit?

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The national recovery bank proposed by Fine Gael could be set up in a matter of weeks, as has happened with the French Financing Corporation, SFEF, which was announced in October 2008 and was up and running by November 2008. To finance itself, the SFEF issued €5 billion of bonds on 1 November. One month later, it issued a further €6 billion of bonds, and according to SFEF, the second issue was over-subscribed by 50%. In other words, investors were so keen to invest in the French recovery bank that they could not all be accommodated.

There is no recovery bank. It does not exist in France.

It is there in front of the Minister if he wishes to look at it.

There is not money for all the banks in France.

The Minister has been led by the nose by the banks and developers. He has gone down one road and he does not want to discuss alternatives. He says he is open for business. The evidence is there in front of him.

It is a friendly bank.

More magic banks.

There is no shortage of ideas.

The second part of our proposal is to give the banks some time to strengthen their own balance sheets. Although the details are not the same, our proposal is broadly parallel to that put forward by Dermot Desmond in the newspapers yesterday.

If individual banks make progress we could, under the Fine Gael proposal, inject capital into them to aid a return to financial health. If they have not made adequate progress, particularly in renegotiating the terms of their loans with the bondholders, we would nationalise an individual bank and separate it into a good and a bad bank. We will place all of the equity capital and subordinated — or high-risk — bonds into the bad bank, along with the worst developer loans. The good bank, free of the worst of the debt, could trade normally and would be re-floated in the market when it made financial sense. If individual good banks make progress, under the Fine Gael proposal, we could inject capital into them to aid a return to financial health. If they have not made adequate progress, particularly in renegotiating the terms of their loans with the bondholders, we would, under the plan, nationalise individual banks and separate them into a good bank and a bad bank. We would place all the equity capital and subordinated high risk bonds into the bad bank along with the worst developer loans. The good bank, free of the worst of the debt, could trade normally. It could be refloated in the market when it would make financial sense to do so.

The Government claims that these proposals are untried and would somehow deny Ireland access to the capital markets. As Deputy Bruton pointed out and as referred to by the Taoiseach, investment in markets did not close as a consequence of what happened in the case of the US Government in terms of Washington Mutual or in the case of Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley in England.

My message today is that the time for spinning is over. NAMA is secretive, politically driven and a politically directed workout for banks, developers and speculators. It will do nothing to get credit flowing to business when we want to do so now. It is the highest cost and the highest risk solution for the Irish taxpayer and, above all, it is deeply unfair.

The Taoiseach asked last night whether NAMA is a gamble and he replied that the only gamble was if nothing was done. For four years prior to becoming Taoiseach, he sat in Merrion Street and knew the projections that were being made, yet nothing was done by him, as Minister for Finance, or by the Government, of which he is now leader, to stop this. With all the evidence and information that was flowing into Merrion Street and if patriotism and standing by their country was foremost in those people's minds, then surely action could and should have been taken long before now. However, I suppose it goes back to the Taoiseach's belief of loyalty to the party first and loyalty to the country second.

How can the Taoiseach ask his party and the Irish people to make sacrifices in the forthcoming budget if he is not prepared to insist that the banks and their investors assume their fair share of risk? I recognise that we are faced with the political reality of the NAMA legislation as being the option under debate. I ask the Minister again to open his mind to alternatives that exist which will not strangle the Irish taxpayer, that will allow for fairness and real risk sharing and will create a situation, through a national recovery bank, where credit can flow to business now.

Every Deputy in the House can point out what has happened in the case of business people in their constituencies. I know of a case last week where a man received €45,000 for a job he completed. He put that money into his current account to pay his workers their wages but the cheques bounced. When he went to his bank to ask what had happened he was told that the bank has offset that money against his overdraft. There are many such cases of banks hoarding money. If they believe a levy will be applied against them in a number of years time, they will want to increase their capital base and that will restrict lending. How much of the moneys to be transferred by the Irish taxpayers to the banking system will be spent by banks in clearing the debts they have borrowed from other lending institutions abroad? We need to know that figure because this is fundamental to what will be available to lend as credit to business around the country.

If we all espoused the sentiment that we stand by our country, that we want to see a competitive and vibrant banking system, the restoration of our public finances to good health and for people to be able to get liquidity and credit so that business can flourish, there are other ways of doing it than through NAMA. I reject the Bill that the Taoiseach has put before us because it is unfair and it does not allow for credit to flow. It is a bailout for banks, speculators and developers and it exposes the throat of the Irish taxpayer to a banking system that has failed, as the Taoiseach pointed out yesterday, while being supervised, or not supervised as the case might be, by an incompetent Government.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The Taoiseach in his speech this morning said that there are three steps to economic recovery. He is wrong; there are four. He always keeps forgetting about and omitting the fourth. It is jobs, getting people back to work and addressing, through labour market measures, the needs of the people who have lost their jobs and who will lose jobs in the economy.

The Labour Party agrees that we need to get the Lisbon treaty passed on 2 October and that is the reason we are campaigning in favour of it. We will engage constructively on the debate that we will inevitably have about the public finances and what to do about them, although I suspect we may disagree about some of the measures that will have to be taken. We will be advocating a fairer way.

On the issue of what is needed to get the banks functioning again and lending to business, the Labour Party disagrees with the proposal that the Government has put forward on that issue. NAMA is the wrong fix for a crisis that should never have happened. It is a scheme to nationalise losses and privatise profits. It exposes the State and the taxpayer to unnecessary and excessive costs and risks. It will undermine the competitiveness of the Irish economy for years to come.

I need hardly remind the House of the importance of this Bill. The decision we are being asked to make on NAMA is enormous in respect of the quantum of resources. It will be enduring in terms of the impact it will have on the economy and the public finances and it will be irreversible in respect of any future Government. A decision, it appears, has been made by the Government to commit €54,000 million, that is 54 followed by nine zeros, deliberately overpaying for bad property loans. If the Minister's figures are right, that overpayment amounts to €7 billion, but only if the figures are right. No matter what the odds, it is a €54 billion bet. Are the figures right? There are aspects of these figures, presented by the Minister for Finance yesterday, that make me deeply uneasy. In his speech yesterday the Minister said the following about his view of where property prices are, and where they are likely to go. He said:

The fall in property prices has pushed up property yields. Yields are now above their long-term average, and this suggests that values are bottoming out.

The Taoiseach repeated that today when he said that "NAMA will have to achieve less than a 10% uplift over current market values on its assets over ten years to break even."

I was struck yesterday when I heard the Minister for Finance say that the assessment is that the market value of the loans is €47 billion. I asked myself from where did we get this market value and from where do we get the assumption that values will lift by 10% to 15%, which will give NAMA the return. We find in the green document that the Minister supplied us with that all of this is based on assumptions that are made about yields and about rents. I will tell the House a few facts about rents and where the Minister for Finance is wrong. There is a law on the Statute Book which provides that commercial rents cannot be reviewed downwards. I know the Taoiseach will say that the Government has changed that, but it has only changed it for future leases. Many retailers throughout this country who committed themselves to long leases in new shopping centres at the height of the property boom cannot get a downward revision on those rents because there is a law that provides that rents cannot be reviewed downward. That is the reason commercial rents are high.

Residential rents are still high because it is only in recent years that the Taoiseach's Government, at the behest of the Labour Party and also of Fine Gael, introduced legislation to regulate the private residential tenancies sector. Many of the tenancies are not registered with the new Private Residential Tenancies Board. At best the board has examined only a tiny minority of tenancies in terms of whether their rents are market value. I keep meeting people who are still paying the rent for their apartment or their home that they were paying three years ago at the height of the boom when those rents were driven up by high property prices and even the rents that have dropped have not dropped in line with the drop in property prices. The State is contributing to the high levels of rents we have. In the residential sector the State is paying through rent allowances a high rental subsidy for in region of 60,000 tenants and in addition to that, the State is a tenant.The State, for example, is paying approximately €60 million for office property rental, much of which will not be used because the decentralisation proposals are not going ahead. The Minister for Finance's entire house of cards, in terms of the market value of the properties — the €47 billion — and his assumptions about the 10% to 15% increase, is based on a rental sector, regime and yields that are not normal. All of the tables he produced comparing rental yields in Dublin to Rome and Oslo is not comparing like with like. It worries me that we have now got an approach to NAMA that is based on such a flimsy basis.

Then we have risk sharing. Last week was risk-sharing week. We were told a big victory had been won by the Green Party. What did we get in the Minister's statement? We were told that risk sharing would be 5% — as small as it could possibly be. The so-called risking sharing is no more than a puff of green smoke, a derisory concession to an ineffectual party whose only value now is the numbers that are required to keep Fianna Fáil in Government but who have sold both themselves and the public short.

The decision to establish NAMA is being made in the cold light of day. This is not like the night of the blanket guarantee, when the Government could at least claim that its profound errors were made in the face of fast-moving events. This decision is being made after the Government has had every opportunity to seek advice, and to seriously consider all of its options.

This is a moment when the Government could have achieved a unity of national purpose; when we could have come together to address the banking crisis in a manner that would gain support from across the political divide in a manner that would put the taxpayer first, but that opportunity too has been spurned. Instead, what we got from the Minister for Finance yesterday was an exercise in partisan bluff.

We have a decision that lines up perfectly with a long series of decisions during the property bubble and the housing crisis. It is another decision to put the interests of property developers and banks first, at the expense of the taxpayer. Every single decision — every U-turn, every twist in the tail — has put the banks first. The status quo has been protected, the taxpayer has been left to pick up the tab. After all that has happened, rather than moving to prevent another crisis of this kind, NAMA will preserve the very interests and structures that brought it about in the first place.

The markets are delighted.

We can all agree on a number of points in this debate. First, that there is a banking crisis, and that it needs to be addressed urgently. A modern economy needs a functioning banking system, and the large retail banks are part of the nervous system of the Irish economy. We need these banks in particular to be capable of normal lending — to families and businesses across the country. It is a simple point, but one of which we cannot lose sight. Business needs credit.

Everybody knows that a severe credit crunch is affecting small business in particular. According to the most recent statistics published by the Central Bank, the credit crunch got worse in the second quarter of this year. Lending to the non-property, non-financial sectors declined over the quarter by €3.3 billion, or 6.2%, with the largest falls in absolute terms being recorded by the manufacturing and wholesale-retail trade. The annual rate of change in credit to those sectors fell to minus 7.7%. Credit extended to those sectors has declined on a quarterly basis for three successive quarters, with the pace of decline increasing significantly during the second quarter of this year. These figures match the experience of the people to whom I speak around the country, despite the protestations of the banks and the Minister.

To deal with this credit crisis, we need to clean up the balance sheets of the banks, so as to restore confidence in them, and to ensure that they can resume normal lending. This process must focus in particular on the two large retail banks. Those two banks are deeply embedded in the Irish economy. They have been built up over decades and have a deep reach into the communities in which they function. They cannot be quickly replaced. They simply must be in a position to lend if the economy is to function.

The second reality that must be faced is that there are constraints on Government action, particularly in the form of the blanket guarantee. The Labour Party did not agree to that guarantee and we did not vote for it. However, it is in place, and it acts as a severe limitation on the options available to Government. From the minute the guarantee was put in place, the Irish taxpayer was always going to be lumbered with the bad loans in the banks, to a greater or lesser degree. The question with which we are now faced is how to deal with them. The balance sheets of the banks must be cleared up, so that lending can resume, or the economy will contract further. We will see more and more firms, and more and more jobs, that would otherwise be viable, go under from a want of credit.

Equally, as the world economy begins to recover, the absence of liquidity will restrict Ireland's capacity to share in that recovery. This must be done at the least cost to the taxpayer, but the Government has issued a blanket guarantee, meaning that the taxpayer is exposed. The question is how to limit the risk to taxpayers, while restoring the flow of credit to the economy. Essentially, there are two options available. The first is NAMA, the second is temporary nationalisation. Let us be clear. Neither of these is a good option — the crisis is too deep for that. Either approach will be costly, but one is manifestly better for the State than the other. Temporary nationalisation limits the risk to the taxpayer while NAMA increases that risk. NAMA is based on a deliberate policy of overpaying for the bad loans. Temporary nationalisation removes the risks involved in having to value the loans.

Fianna Fáil has been trying to persuade people that it does not matter how one deals with the banking crisis. In its version, the losses are the losses. That is simply not true. With the temporary nationalisation approach, there is no policy of deliberate overpayment, and the State stands to gain when the bank is sold again. With the NAMA approach, the taxpayer assumes an unacceptable risk. The Government knows all of this. The issue has been debated in great detail in the media, old and new. The overwhelming majority of independent economists, of all political viewpoints and none, is that temporary nationalisation is a better option. Yet the Government is choosing to push ahead with NAMA. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Government is deliberately choosing to place the interests of banks above the interests of the taxpayer.

What we also see, right through this legislation is a determination to preserve the status quo– to protect the toxic triangle of developers, bankers and bad government that got us into this mess in the first place. We saw it in the case of Anglo Irish Bank, where the determination to avoid nationalisation led to the blanket guarantee and a subsequent nationalisation on the worst possible terms for the taxpayer. We see it in the determination that at all costs further nationalisation should be avoided, which is what is driving the determination to over-pay for bad loans. We see it in the refusal to shake up the boards of the banks and we see it in the extraordinary powers that the Government is assigning to itself in how NAMA will function.

We should probably not be surprised that we are being asked to bail out the banks and the property developers in this way. NAMA is simply another step in a long line of decisions that favoured property developers over many years. A recent study of the housing sector by the Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice provides a picture of how housing policy has developed under this Government. It notes, for example, that between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the price of housing in Ireland broadly tracked the cost of building a house. After the mid-1990s, however, there was a surge in the price of housing, which bore no relation to the cost of the relevant inputs. By 2007, house prices had risen by four times as much as building costs. The average price of a new house in Ireland increased by 344% between the mid-1990s to the peak of the bubble, rising from €73,000 to €323,000. In Dublin there was a 408% increase over the same period. Average second-hand house prices increased by 441%, and by 499% in Dublin. Needless to say, wages were not increasing by the same amounts. In fact, if new house prices had tracked the increase in earnings, that price of €323,000 in 2007 would only have been €124,000.

When an economy starts to boom, one can expect house prices to rise, but one might also expect the Government to do something about it. As long ago as 1999, the Labour Party was addressing housing policy in a comprehensive manner. In February 1999, the Labour Party established a commission, under Professor P. J. Drudy of Trinity College, to advise the party on a wide range of housing issues, including the crisis in affordability that was facing young couples. That report explicitly identified a number of factors that were leading to escalating house prices, including the lax lending policies of the banks, the impact of speculation on the housing market, and the effect of property based tax reliefs.

The report made a series of recommendations covering a wide range of housing policies but with a particular focus on affordability. Again and again during the past decade the Labour Party raised the question of spiralling house prices and it was ignored. In 2003, the Labour Party made a submission to the All-Party Committee on the Constitution making clear that, in its view, there was no constitutional impediment to the implementation of the Kenny proposals to control the price of building land. This was followed with a Bill to give effect to the Kenny formula which was again rejected by the Government.

For its part, the Government twisted and turned in every way possible to avoid confronting this issue. While it commissioned reports and promised action, that action either did not materialise or was, in some cases, reversed before it could have any impact. More and more housing was treated as an instrument of speculation and accumulation rather than as a basic human need. If one ever needed a more telling statistic in terms of how Fianna Fáil has deserted its roots in the past ten years, it is to be found in the figures on social housing. In the 1930s and 1940s, social housing accounted for 60% to 70% of all housing output. As late as 1985, the public sector was responsible for 27% of output. However, in the boom years of 1995 to 2006 this fell to 6%. Again and again we called for action but nothing was done. At the same time, Fianna Fáil blatantly flaunted its connections to property developers and speculators. Those lavish Fianna Fáil election campaigns, which took political spending in Ireland to new heights, had to be financed somehow. Frankly, Fianna Fáil did not care how any of this looked. Well, it looks pretty shabby now.

Meanwhile, all of this was having a damaging effect on our economy. As the construction bubble gained momentum more and more labour and resources were sucked in and became dependant on the construction sector. By early 2007, more than 20% of all male employment was in construction. As a result the competitiveness of the exporting economy was undermined. After 2000, Irish export performance began to flag. The export boom that Fianna Fáil inherited in 1997 petered out as the current account of the balance of payments turned negative.

It is natural for any people who have gained new wealth to want to spend it. It is entirely normal to expect consumption and housing output to grow in the wake of an export boom. However, the purpose of economic policy is not growth for its own sake but to provide more employment and higher standards of living. The people who were supposed to be in charge, the people whose duty it was to protect the economy were, at best, asleep at the wheel. Fianna Fáil was in charge. It was supposed to ask the right questions to ensure the banking system was properly regulated, to prevent the build up of risk in the banking system and it failed in that duty.

If one wants an example of how the system was asleep one need only look to Irish Nationwide Building Society. I know the main focus of attention today is on the large institutions but one has to ask how a small building society like Irish Nationwide Building Society acquired a commercial loan book of €8 billion. How was that allowed to happen? The pity of it is that action of any kind and at any stage would have at least lessened the impact of the banking crisis as it is being felt today. In a bubble of this kind the worst excesses often happen just before the crash. This commitment to the bubble economy has also been evident throughout the handling of the banking crisis. Through every U-turn and policy switch there has been a common theme: protect the banks and the bankers and avoid nationalisation.

We now know that on the night of the blanket guarantee, namely, 30 September 2008, the Department of Finance had prepared a Bill to nationalise Anglo Irish Bank and that the Government instead put in place a guarantee for the whole banking system, including Anglo Irish Bank which represents €28 billion of the toxic debt we must now take over. Anglo Irish Bank was kept alive for a further three months during which time significant bonuses were paid and it was January before the inevitable happened.

The structure of the guarantee was in itself inexplicable as it covered parts of the banks' capital. It has never been properly explained why dated subordinated debt was covered by the guarantee. Bonds that are supposed to be available to absorb losses in certain circumstances were guaranteed by Government. Why? No adequate explanation has ever been given and no concerted action has been taken to reform the banks. There have been some changes in senior management and at board level but change has been little and slow. Last week, The Irish Times published a profile of the boards of the six covered institutions. There have been significant changes at board level in Anglo Irish Bank and in Irish Nationwide Building Society but let us look at the boards of the other banks. Leaving aside the two public interest directors, nine of the ten people on the board of AIB, ten of 12 people on the board of Bank of Ireland, eight of the 11 people on the board of EBS and six of the eight people on the board of Irish Life & Permanent have been in place since before 2008. With all due respect to the individuals concerned, these boards have failed and the Government has done little or nothing to remove them. Firm action in this respect would have cost little and would have contributed to restoring confidence in the Irish economy and in Irish sovereign debt.

Even now, with all that we know, it is clear that lessons have not been learned. The NAMA Bill before the House is intended to protect the toxic triangle not break it up. Worse than that it will create an unhealthy alignment of interests for future Governments to contend with. From now on, whether implicitly or explicitly, every Government policy will be NAMA-proofed. Every measure proposed will be assessed on the criterion of what it will do to property prices and what impact it will have on NAMA. The State will have an enormous vested interest in restarting the property boom and in getting property prices back up as high as possible. In that sense, NAMA will have to be a self-fulfilling prophecy and everything possible will be done to ensure it succeeds. Anyone who doubts that this is so need only look at the governance structures within NAMA as proposed in this Bill.

The Bill vests in the Minister for Finance extraordinary powers and discretion in respect of decisions on how NAMA will operate. Section 9 states: "except where otherwise provided by this Act, NAMA is independent in the performance of its functions". However, there are many instances which are "otherwise provided for", thus it is not independent but must act at the direction of the Minister. It is important these are identified. Section 65, in respect of the Long Title, makes it clear that NAMA's function is to acquire "certain assets from certain persons to be designated by the Minister". It is also to "perform such other functions related to the management or realisation of bank assets that it has acquired, as are directed by the Minister". Under section 11, the Minster may confer on NAMA, by order, such additional functions as he or she thinks fit. The designation of "eligible bank assets" to be purchased by NAMA is a power vested in the Minister for Finance by section 67. Section 13 requires NAMA in the performance of its functions to "have regard to any guidelines issued by the Minister". Section 14 sets out the Minister's powers of direction including, "the Minister may give a direction in writing to NAMA concerning the achievement of the purpose of this Act".

There is one area where this ministerial discretion is particularly worrying, namely, the determination of acquisition values. Again, it is important to list the specifics. Under section 76, the Minister may make regulations to require NAMA to take into account the report of an expert concerning factors or matters relevant to the determination of the value of any property in question. Under section 77(1), the Minister decides the "adjustment factors" to be taken into account in determining the "long-term economic value" of bank assets. Under section 109, the Minister can appoint an expert reviewer and, under section 116, the valuation panel which in turn reviews the total portfolio acquisition value and then proceeds under section 121 to communicate its position not to NAMA but to the Minister.

What is NAMA doing?

Can the Minister continue indefinitely to call on the valuation panel to reconsider unless and until it comes up with an answer that suits him or her?

In setting up NAMA, the Government has sought to vest it with some of the authority of the NTMA. The Governor of the Central Bank is also mentioned in dispatches. It is clear from reading the Bill that NAMA will have very little real contact with the NTMA other than as a tenant. The Bill also provides the Minister with extensive powers in dealing with the restructuring of banks after the loans have been transferred. Under section 203, the Regulatory Authority may, but only with the approval of the Minister, give a direction to a participating institution in order to achieve the purposes of the Bill. One has to ask where the Oireachtas would stand in such a situation and why these powers are being handed over to the Minister. This continues a trend, established in the legislation underpinning the bank guarantee of extending extraordinary discretionary powers to a Minister and in this case to a Minister from a party which created the problems in the first instance.

There are other legal problems with the Bill, as identified by the Labour Party in its recently published critique. Some of these have been the subject of communication between my colleague, Deputy Joan Burton, and the Minister for Finance. There are also important features in regard to the manner in which NAMA will operate that are not mentioned in the Bill. For example, it is proposed that NAMA will assume ownership of the loans but that they will be managed by the banks that initiated them. Has the Minister considered the potential for conflicts of interest in this arrangement? How can a person who is an employee of a bank and whose career is based in that institution be expected to navigate any conflicts that might arise? Will the banks that originated loans be allowed to buy back those loans at market prices in several years time?

There continues to be many uncertainties about how NAMA will operate in practice. The Second Stage speech delivered by the Minister was replete with such uncertainties. The figures which gain most prominence in the media are inevitably the broad aggregates. These figures are described in the Minister's booklet as "top down, illustrative estimates of aggregate loan purchase prices ... for illustrative purposes only". Numbers that are absolutely vital to the entire enterprise are either heavily qualified or not included in the booklet. The much spoken of equity in the loans can be imputed only from an "approximate average LTV". Is it there or is it not? We do not know and will not know until NAMA goes through the loans one by one.

More important, we do not know the discount that ultimately will be applied. The figure of 30% is an industry-wide estimate. If it turns out to be inaccurate, the cost to the taxpayer will be high. It is important to remember that the discount that will apply at the end of the process will be different across the different banks. If it turns out that the figure of 30% is accurate overall but is much higher in Anglo Irish Bank than in the other banks, then the true picture is different from the one the Government is trying to paint. It is fair for the Government to point out that it will not know the final figures until NAMA has done its work. However, a year after the banking guarantee, it is striking that the estimates are still so shaky. The cost of Government borrowing has been profoundly affected by the uncertainties surrounding the banks. The slow pace at which this information has been released has contributed to that uncertainty.

I wish to comment on the section in the Minister's speech in which he purported to cost the Labour Party proposal. It was pretty pathetic stuff, unworthy of him and an inappropriate use of Civil Service resources. To clarify, the Labour Party does not propose blanket nationalisation. What we have suggested is a temporary nationalisation of Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland. The Minister claims we have proposed a straight 50% write-down of bad loans. We made no such proposal. The Minister claims that, under nationalisation, we would have to borrow at market rates of 4% to recapitalise the banks. There is no evidence to support this claim. The Minister claims international markets would not lend to nationalised banks. There is no evidence to support that claim and no serious commentator accepts it. Many State-owned banks internationally have no difficulty in borrowing on world markets.

The Minister claims our party's proposal is based on an ideological preference for public ownership of the banks. As we have repeatedly pointed out, our proposal is to sell the banks back to the private sector as quickly as possible. In other words, we propose to nationalise where necessary and resell when possible. The reality is that Fianna Fáil is ideologically opposed to public ownership.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

It is going to extraordinary lengths to avoid public ownership in what it claims is the national interest. The argument for temporary nationalisation is well established and clear. It avoids the risks involved in the valuation of loans and affords taxpayers the prospect of sharing in the benefits of a revived banking system. The Minister knows this. There have been many attempts to persuade us that NAMA is TOSIT — the only show in town. The disciples of TOSIT, who must presumably be TOSERS, are everywhere and most seem to have a season ticket with Fianna Fáil.

The reality is that there are other shows in town and viable alternatives to what the Government is proposing. That proposal will cost the Irish public too much into the future. It is built on very shaky assumptions in regard to market value and the way in which that value may increase in the future. It is based on estimates that have not been fully explained and which are expressed only in the most general of terms. The Labour Party is not convinced it is a gamble worth taking. My party has advocated a better way, namely, the temporary nationalisation of the two largest banks and the cleaning up of their balance sheets so that they can resume lending to business and getting the economy moving again. This strategy will be neither easy nor cost-free, but it involves less risk for taxpayers and will more effectively facilitate a functioning banking system.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

The harsh reality is that our country is in a financial crisis. As a small open economy, the international recession has hit us harder than most. The mess in which we find ourselves has arisen in no small part from the greed and stupidity of a minority of those involved in banking, land speculation and building developments. The property frenzy, largely driven by this minority, only halted when fear overtook greed and stupidity. We are now left to deal with the consequences.

It is no overstatement to say that our efforts today are aimed at saving the livelihoods and futures of Irish workers who had no part in that frenzy of greed and stupidity. We seek to secure the future prosperity and independence of this State and the Irish people, who remain stricken by fear. Any remedy we choose to resolve this crisis will be extremely expensive and unfair to workers. I and my colleagues in the Green Party have worked in government to find the solutions which will get us out of this financial mess as quickly as possible. We have devoted huge amounts of time in the past six months to finding the most effective options.

To say the very least, the Green Party has never been a friend of bankers or builders. We are unique among all the parties in this House in that we have never taken a red cent from either. The Green Party would never co-operate with an effort to bail out bankers or builders. Quite the opposite. We see this initiative for what it is, namely, a stimulus for an economy that is mired in crisis, an effort to get money flowing back to business, and an initiative to save existing jobs and to create new jobs. We need an effective and functioning banking system as part of a strategy to build economic recovery and to take advantage of the nascent and much anticipated international upswing. We must ensure there is a flow of credit to fund businesses and to sustain jobs. Our banks must be able to secure the funds to lend to business. That is why we have worked in government on the creation of the National Asset Management Agency.

Throughout these months of Government deliberations, we in the Green Party have stressed that the solution we choose must be the least expensive and the least unfair for the taxpayer. I would not be standing here today if I were not convinced that we are on our way to finding that least expensive and least unfair option. The National Asset Management Agency is the least worst option. Moreover, we have worked hard to refine and adapt it to bring significant spin-off benefits to taxpayers and to ensure there can be no repeat of the property bubble which led us inexorably to this economic crisis.

Our focus must be on resolving this crisis. In that regard, it is logical to consider the viability of the alternatives to the NAMA proposal that have been put forward. We have been offered a good bank option from Fine Gael, while the Labour Party offers nationalisation followed by another version of NAMA which it calls an asset recovery trust. Despite both parties' efforts to delude the public, each of these would-be alternatives is both expensive and unfair. More importantly, I am simply not convinced they would be as effective as the National Asset Management Agency in resolving our current dire difficulties.

The Labour Party and some of its supporting commentators would have us believe that a 100% bank nationalisation is the way to go. We looked closely at that prospect without any ideological baggage. The simple reality is that full bank nationalisation would leave taxpayers responsible immediately for 100% of capital and funding costs for the banks. It would instantly cost tens of billions of euro, which is money we do not have. For example, in the case of Anglo Irish Bank, which had to be nationalised earlier this year, we found that we had to inject €4 billion in taxpayers' money to make good serious loan losses. There is no other option when a bank is nationalised because banks must maintain minimum capitalisation levels.

Ireland borrows most of its money abroad. If banks were fully nationalised, the country's credit rating would be downgraded and borrowing would be significantly more expensive for the taxpayer. Central to the Fine Gael Party's original plans for a good bank was an apparent threat to default on significant levels of bank debt. This far-reaching step would have had disastrous effects, causing long-term damage to Ireland's reputation and, ultimately, costing much more taxpayers' money to fix.

The bonds issued by banks are largely part of the banks' own funding and are owned by pension funds, insurance companies and other providers of long-term funds. I will not waste time on this issue but it is sufficient to note that two former Fine Gael Party leaders, Dr. Garret FitzGerald and Mr. Alan Dukes, felt obliged to publicly express serious misgivings about the solution being advanced by the party to which they had given a large part of their lives and considerable talents. All of us in this Chamber who have devoted time and effort to our parties will be aware of the personal dilemma involved for these two men. I salute their integrity and honesty.

Over the weekend, I had the opportunity to meet another former Fine Gael Deputy and stalwart of the party who wished me well and asked me to do my best for the country.

I, too, wish the Minister well. Who was the individual in question? There are no anonymous individuals in our party.

I will not name him because I have a great deal of respect for him. However, he also made the interesting comment that if Fine Gael and the Labour Party were to form a coalition and enter Government in a few weeks' time, they would introduce NAMA.

The Minister told me he had more in common with Fine Gael than Fianna Fáil.

I share the anger of people who see bankers' greed and stupidity and ask reasonably why we should not allow them to fail and face the same consequences every other citizen faces if he or she messes up his or her finances. Until recently, we had to listen to lectures from incompetent and amoral bankers telling ordinary workers that they did not have a right to modest pay increases and that they, the bankers, knew best about everything. It is more than tempting to borrow from the bankers' own rhetoric and allow the almighty market to take its course by letting the chips fall where they will. The sad reality, however, is that to allow this to happen would hurt the ordinary citizen far too much. Life savings would be lost, businesses would be crippled, our international reputation would be damaged irreparably and unemployment would spiral. We must fix the banking system but in so doing we must also reform it. We must install a new regulatory regime and rebuild trust.

I have always stated that the Green Party's key objective is to protect the taxpayer. This objective was central to our approach to finding a solution to the current crisis and in the ongoing work of elaborating the details of NAMA's working and the accompanying measures. Under the NAMA proposal, the taxpayer is protected from risk in three ways: through ownership of stakes in the banks; through holding back a portion of the premium being paid over current market values; and through a levy which can be imposed on the banks if NAMA winds up with a deficit.

The State, which owns 25% of Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks, will end up, through NAMA, owning larger stakes in the banks. Thus, the taxpayer will share in any upside that may arise. We have avoided the disadvantages of total nationalisation which I have already cited.

We are paying 15% over market value for the loans to reflect the fact that there is no real "current market value" for property or property loans. This premium reflects the levels to which valuations can reasonably be expected to recover over the medium term. The premium amounts to €7 billion. We are sharing the risk on this premium with the banks. Of the €7 billion, the banks will only receive €4 billion up front and the balance of €3 billion at the end of the process, and only if NAMA makes a profit. If, on the winding up of NAMA, there is a deficit, the Government may impose a levy on the covered banks to recoup these losses. Even in such extreme circumstances, the taxpayers' interests are covered.

The Green Party did not cause the economic problems we are now encountering.

NAMA will cause the next crisis.

We have the policies and solutions to fix these problems and have insisted on them being introduced in tandem with NAMA. My party has a proud record of standing up to vested interests when others turned a blind eye.

That is fighting talk.

We did not take money from banks or developers. When other parties were shouting for tax cuts and stamp duty amnesties, we warned of unfettered greed in the banking system, builder-led development and putting profit before people. Our banking and property problems cannot be fixed unless we address our planning problems.

In this country greed ruled over need when it came to planning. The profits of developers and landowners were placed by councils the length and breadth of the country above the needs of ordinary citizens. It is no coincidence that our commuter towns are now suffering most from the economic downturn. These are towns where house upon house was built and field upon field re-zoned but hardly any facilities built, where unemployment rates have increased most quickly and house prices have collapsed by the largest amount and where citizens have paid an enormous price for the decisions of councillors who re-zoned at the behest of greedy developers and landowners.

We have heard much from the Opposition which has used every opportunity to claim NAMA is a bailout. That is not the case and if, for one minute, I thought it was a bailout for any developer, I would not touch it with a barge pole. My party can stand proudly on its record on our dealings with developers and bankers and the policy decisions in which we have been involved. Five years ago, almost to the day, the Labour Party and Fine Gael launched their much vaunted Mullingar accord. Mullingar was chosen for the signing because of the power sharing agreement between the two parties reached on Westmeath County Council. Did this agreement bring with it a new type of politics to County Westmeath? Did people come before the profits of banks and land speculators? Not one bit of it. The power sharing agreement between the parties brought with it some of the most irresponsible planning this country has ever seen.

Why does the Minister not do something about it?

It resulted in enough land being zoned in Athlone to last for 60 years of boom building — until 2069 to be precise. Did the Mullingar accord bring a fair deal to the people of Westmeath or the families who moved to the county, paying huge prices for their new homes? The scale of the problem is now becoming apparent.

Will the Minister tell us about the 50%?

Athlone is the tip of an overzoning iceberg which has contributed massively to the housing and development bubble. Figures collated by my Department show that in the 45 towns and cities designated as developing areas, sufficient land has been zoned to accommodate houses for an additional 1.7 million people. That is a staggering amount of overzoning.

Will the Minister do something about it?

Yes, I am doing something about it.

Two and a half years later.

How much will be paid for the glass bottle site?

To put it another way, it would mean that at the rate of boom house building, this land would not be used up until 2032. In individual towns, matters are even worse. In many towns and cities councillors have zoned so much land that they will be long dead before it is used up. Waterford has enough zoned land to last it until 2072 at boom time building rates. In Dundalk the house building party could continue until 2073. Deputy Lynch will be interested to learn that in Cork, building at boom rates could continue until 2053, while in Tralee the zoned land stockpile will last until 2043.

They are waiting for the Minister in Dublin South East.

The Green Party will clean up the mess this type of reckless re-zoning behaviour has brought with it and break the cosy councillor-developer cartel once and for all.

Through the most radical planning legislation ever, we will rid our council chambers of the wink and elbow language of developers and their puppet councillors.

Is Fianna Fáil in favour of it?

While councillors will retain their zoning powers, these powers will have to be used responsibly. Councillors will have to abide by national and regional guidelines and will no longer be able to engage in zoning free-for-alls.

The planning context for the post-NAMA period will be set by this legislation which aims to achieve much more focused land use strategies, with the provision of land zoned for residential and other development closely tied to national and regional policies and grounded in an evidence base of population projections and other needs. A robust planning structure can ensure that some of the mistakes of the past are not repeated in that it should be no longer possible to provide vast tracts of zoned land without reference to population demand and the provision of essential services. More focused land use strategies will also result in a more efficient use of taxpayers' money by allowing the State to target investment in essential infrastructure and services more accurately. When our new planning legislation is enacted each local authority will have to review its development plans and, in many areas, deal with irresponsible rezonings of the past.

The introduction of NAMA is also an opportunity to ensure that a so-called social dividend becomes an integral part of all future planning and development. This has long been shamefully neglected. The Green Party will ensure that our communities get the services they need and deserve. It is essential that there is a social dividend to NAMA and that there is a first-refusal mechanism on NAMA assets for social projects, from schools to hospitals and community facilities.

This morning, Mr. Tom Parlon and members of the Construction Industry Federation was on "Morning Ireland" complaining about this and claiming that NAMA would be "hog-tied" by such a provision. I disagree profoundly and fundamentally with him and his members. I have one message for Mr. Parlon and his people: "Please, keep your noses out of NAMA". It is for the Government and Members of this House, of all parties, to decide on how NAMA and related planning reforms will work.

Profit without social dividend is what created this property bubble. Developers lived high on the hog from charging astronomical prices for sites for schools and other social infrastructure, from building serried ranks of houses without regard to the needs of those to whom they sold them.

We will also ensure a windfall tax on the future rezoning of land. In our deliberations over NAMA, we in the Green Party argued that a windfall tax on property developers would have to be an essential and indispensable component of the package. It is the least the public deserve for footing the considerable NAMA bills.

People have suffered too much from the culture of speculation which has infected our property and building sectors. The remedy for this suffering from inflated prices and deficient facilities has been posited for more than four decades, but blithely ignored. Now, at last, a key recommendation of the Kenny report can be put in place.

I listened to what Deputy Gilmore said about 1999 and his own submission on the Kenny report. His party has been in Government since the Kenny report was published——

Not for 12 years.

——and did nothing about it. We are in Government and we are actually going to do something about it.

What about that Planning Bill? Are we ever going to see that? The Minister has announced it three times.

Our legislation will reform the planning system to make sure it works better and more efficiently — not in the interests of a few, but in the wider interests of society and a sustainable economy.

I will extend planning permissions for renewable energy projects. I will speed up the planning appeals system through reducing the quorum on An Bord Pleanála from three to two for small cases. I will overhaul the foreshore licensing system to modernise it for the renewable energy revolution that is beginning here in Ireland. Our development plans will have to have the climate change agenda at their core, from sustainable transport to adaptation. Those who willfully flout our planning laws will no longer get away with it under my plans. I will reform the retention system and impose punitive penalties and restrictions on its use.

Before Christmas, and I hope the Labour Party will support it.

Which Christmas?

The only leaf the Green party is interested in is a new one.

No Minister who has been in Government for two years has used the word "will" more often.

We want to see this country turning over a new leaf, where a person can no longer get land re-zoned because he or she are pals with a councillor. We want a new leaf where good ideas, responsible business, and public good are rewarded.

That is why the Minister's party has no councillors left.

This week, a climate change expert, Professor John Sweeney, called for a range of policies to prevent a property bubble recurring and to ensure a sustainable future and economy for all of us. That is exactly what we plan to deliver.

Much of the talk yesterday centred on the risks and costs for the taxpayer and, yes, there are risks and costs associated with every one of the options mooted to get us out of our current crisis. Let us be clear, however, the risks and costs associated with NAMA arise if it does not make a profit. Another risk is that it works and promotes another property bubble. In formulating our policy, we have considered all of those costs and risks, and have sought at all times to minimise and eliminate any risk to the taxpayer.

The almost 250% increase in house prices between 1996 and 2006 was unsustainable and should never be repeated. However, is it beyond the bounds of possibility that we could have a 10% increase in property in the next ten-year period, particularly when we get credit flowing again in the economy and given that inflation alone could be running at 2% annually? That has to be a distinct possibility. We have seen property prices drop to much more sustainable levels, and rightly so. The measures we will introduce for good planning and re-zoning will ensure we never again return to those days of hyper-inflated property prices.

There is a real circularity to the argument on NAMA: NAMA will work if we get credit flowing in the economy; if we get credit flowing in the economy, NAMA will work. I have never owned a share in any bank or company in my life; I simply do not believe in it. I believe, as a Green Party member for over a quarter of a century, that regardless of the solution being put forward — whether it be NAMA, the magic bank, nationalisation, default or whatever — the aim is to resurrect a system which is in and of itself unsustainable. We in the Green Party know this, but we also know that we are hooked into this unsustainable system and that the transition out of it, which is absolutely necessary, will take some time. In the meantime, the livelihoods of many people are dependent on the functioning of this flawed system. That is why it is necessary in the short to medium term to make changes in order that the financial and economic systems are more ecologically sustainable.

As a result of those changes that culture of greed and stupidity will be changed. It will be a better regulated system, which will result in more benefits for ordinary people and a better quality of life for all. That is why I will be pushing for further amendments to the NAMA legislation. NAMA is undoubtedly the biggest decision this Dáil has ever taken, but it is also a turning point in Irish politics. The circumstances that have given rise to this crisis will never be repeated. I am aware of the great responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the Green Party. After this crisis, the greatest opportunity we have had yet to transform our country will emerge. The new planning legislation and the new programme for Government will be transformational in nature. They will be accepted by the Green Party membership only if that is so.

I want to begin by urging the Fianna Fáil-Green Party Government to do its duty to the people and make a commitment, here and now, that if this legislation is passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas it will support a petition to the President under Article 27 of the Constitution to put the NAMA Bill before the people in a referendum. The Constitution provides that the President may refuse to sign a Bill passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas if it "contains a proposal of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained". If ever there was such a Bill then this is definitely it.

Here is the real challenge to Fianna Fáil backbenchers and the Green Party. If the Government will not put this Bill to the people and if Fianna Fáil backbenchers and the Greens are as exercised as they claim to be about the Bill, they should go to the country — either in a referendum on NAMA or by pulling the plug on this disgraceful, discredited and bankrupt Government, thus allowing the people to vote in a general election.

The people are watching this debate and are watching how those they elect serve them, or if they serve them at all. There is no doubt whatsoever about who Fianna Fáil and the Greens are serving with this rotten Bill. It is a bailout for the greediest and the most corrupt in Irish society — the bankers and the speculators whose boundless avarice has devastated the economy. Throughout the Celtic tiger years, Fianna Fáil-led Governments pampered this elite group. They allowed them to benefit from massive tax breaks at unknown cost to this State. They allowed them to determine the State's housing policy, which was to let the market drive everything and, boy, did that market drive. It drove property prices to unreal and unsustainable levels. It drove a frenzy of greed for profitable property, inducing many who could not afford to do so, to borrow to buy in the grossly inflated market. It drove debt to levels previously unknown in this country. It was fuelled by cheap loans supplied by a banking system corrupted by the culture of greed that saw massive salaries, bonuses and perks lavished at all senior levels in the financial institutions.

Finally, the locomotive was driven into a wall and we are now left to deal with the train wreck that is the Irish economy today. Who are the biggest losers in all of this? Not the bankers and the property speculators who did the crime because they will never do the time. Not the politicians who facilitated them because no-one in Fianna Fáil, the Progressive Democrats Party and now the Green Party ever admits responsibility for anything and they are never made to pay the price for their disastrous policies and disastrous management. The real losers in all this are more than 400,000 unemployed people in this State, the families saddled with massive mortgages, many of whom are being evicted from their homes, people who never had the chance of a decent home during the Celtic tiger years and the weaker sections of the community which are about to be punished most by the savage budget cuts in preparation.

All this need not have happened. Many of us, including Sinn Féin, urged a different direction. Trade unionists, people in the community and voluntary sector, other parties of the left and economists with a social conscience urged policies based on the principle of equality and driven by need, not greed. More than a decade ago, in our pre-budget submission in November 1998, Sinn Féin pointed out that the banks enjoyed a return on their equity that was double the European average, making them among the most profitable banks in the industrialised world. We said that, ultimately, the banks should be nationalised in order that the Irish people would be the true beneficiaries. We also proposed an increase in corporation tax for Irish retail banks with resulting tax funds earmarked for community and local development projects in the most disadvantaged areas throughout the State.

Instead of this, we saw bank profits continuing to soar, a belated, limited and short-lived bank levy, successive banking scandals, which ripped off customers and the taxpayer, and collusion between banks and property speculators as they inflated the property bubble. Now the same corporate criminals are to be bailed out by the Government using the people's money. That is what NAMA is in a nutshell. It is supposed to address the crisis caused by a corrupt system but NAMA may well turn out to be the source of the next decade's tribunals. Higher taxes are coming, something the establishment parties have railed against for years, but they will not pay for better public services. They will disappear into the NAMA black hole created by a Government refusing to take the obvious step of nationalisation to address the banking problem.

The basic concept of NAMA is flawed and this legislation to introduce it is flawed through and through. The focus point for most commentators has been the price NAMA will pay for toxic loans it transfers from the banks onto the taxpayers' balance sheet. This is the argument around what discount NAMA should apply to the €77 billion worth of bad loans on the banks' balance sheets. I hope we will get answers to the questions we pose in these contributions. Will the Minister advise the House how much of that €77 billion was used in the purchase of sites and land banks and employed in development works? In other words, how much of the €77 billion is accrued unpaid interest?

The legislation states NAMA will not pay current market value for these loans — the amount that would be repaid to the banks if the properties the loans are on were sold immediately. Instead it will come up with estimates based on "long-term economic value". The moves by ACC Bank against the developer, Liam Carroll, have done the Irish taxpayer a huge service. After being dragged to the courts, he had to admit that if forced to repay his loans he would only be able to repay one quarter of their worth. That is based on the fire sale of his properties at their current market value. Whatever price is paid for the bad loans, risk will transfer from shareholders and creditors to the taxpayer. This transfer of risk creates a real danger of moral hazard in the future, that is, the banks engaging in risky lending behaviour because there are no consequences.

NAMA is incapable of meeting the twin objectives of achieving the best value for the taxpayer and exposing the taxpayer to the least risk possible. The debt to which NAMA will expose the taxpayer is €54 billion — one third of our GDP — and that is before the Government recapitalises, and make no mistake about it, these financial institutions will need to be recapitalised. The detail of this was not placed before the House yesterday. The taxpayer's exposure far exceeds the bank-related debt taken on by Sweden in its bad loan management in the 1990s, which equated to 8% of its GDP. This will have implications for our sovereign credit rating, which has already been downgraded by several ratings agencies, and will incur increased debt servicing costs, potentially in the region of billions of euro annually.

This legislation contains numerous problems. These include a reliance on the banks acting in good faith to give all the information on the loans to NAMA. The Minister for Finance will have sole power to appoint NAMA board members. NAMA will be empowered to "work with developers" to finish projects, potentially lending them taxpayers' money to do so. NAMA will also have compulsory purchase order powers to help developers complete projects if there are so-called "ransom strips" or contested land in the way. Power will be given to the Minister for Finance to overturn "independent" valuations of loans made by NAMA.

Then there are the operational concerns. Deputy Conor Lenihan is not interested in what I have to say but I hope the Taoiseach might listen to some of it. NAMA will not have the expertise to reclaim debts, as it is not used to working in this sphere, and the staff the agency recruits may still be loyal to their former bank employers. There is the prospect of developers' loans being nursed for decades while ordinary loan holders are forced to pay back their debts or face repossession. NAMA will be another huge Government cost at a time other organisations of significant public importance are being amalgamated or abolished. As for the notion that a levy will be introduced on the banks if NAMA makes a shortfall, we do not know how a "shortfall" will be defined, much less what the levy will be.

The Government has put forward NAMA as an alternative to nationalisation but almost all commentators are agreed that even after NAMA, nationalisation might still be the outcome. That is because even after the loans are taken off the books of the banks, there is nothing to guarantee against more loans becoming impaired as interest rates increase. Further liquidity problems may arise and, therefore, the State will go down the route of equity capital shares that may be so large that banks will be nationalised by proxy. The Government claims that cleaning out the banks via NAMA will bring about a return to normal bank practice and lending. We are told NAMA is needed for the economy to return to normal and anybody anti-NAMA is either politically and economically naive, anti-patriotic, or both.

However, this rests on the assumption that private bankers are committed to restoring our economy through providing credit and will place this above the interests of bank shareholders. Will banks lend when they manage to get their hands on cash via the NAMA-issued transfer bonds? A code of conduct for banks covered under the State guarantee scheme on lending to small and medium enterprises was published by the Financial Regulator last February and it took effect in March but SMEs in every constituency say the banks continue to deny loans and credit. That is the reality. This so-called leverage introduced in March has not had the effect it should six months after its introduction. It is not certain what "normal" is when it comes to bank lending practices but it is certain that banks do not fulfil the role of public investment. Historically, banks have lent too much and too easily in booms and have lent too little and too cautiously in recessions.

My colleague, Sinn Féin finance spokesperson, Deputy Arthur Morgan, has rightly asked where is the NAMA for ordinary people. When homes and small businesses are being repossessed the length and breadth of the State and people are facing negative equity and economic hardship, the Government can stand over bailing out banks and developers alone. The guide to NAMA by the Department of Finance exposes the fundamentally flawed thinking behind it. Frequently asked question No. 2 is: "How can you justify this further bail-out of the banks for assets and not prevent banks from increasing mortgage rates?" The answer given states:

It is true that the banks in most instances will not be paid the current market value but will be paid a price which is in accordance with the long-term economic value of each asset. With regard to mortgage rates, the interest rates reflect commercial market realities as banks must pay more to access funds in wholesale retail markets. The Government has no role to play in the commercial day-to-day operation of banks here and believes that it is important that the banking sector has a market presence and operates within market discipline and constraints.

Surely if banks were operating in normal market conditions with discipline and constraints they would not be under a blanket state guarantee and in the middle of shifting all their bad loans off their books onto the taxpayers' heads at a bargain price for themselves.

One of the most incredible aspects of NAMA is that it is outsourcing the property management aspect to private development firms. Had it been used as a property management company, the State could have used land seized on defaulted loans for vital infrastructure, social housing provision or tourism development. We now have the crazy situation where people throughout the country are sitting in homes and business premises in negative equity and worse, and are being evicted as their property is repossessed. The property managed by NAMA should be available to local authorities to house people currently in need and those who will find themselves evicted as a result of banks moving against them, and they are moving against them with no care or thought for the human suffering involved. However, the NAMA-owned property, paid for by taxpayers, is to be managed by private development companies. Tenders have already been put out to attract such companies. This revelation is highly suspicious and will lead many to believe that the taxpayer is again being deceived and robbed by the Government, banks and developers.

Sinn Féin believes the only way to deal with the current crisis is to nationalise the two main banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland, with the potential of turning these two banks into a State bank. This will offer far greater security for the taxpayer. Bad loans can be dealt with in the context of nationalisation and the State can make informed decisions about whether these loans should be foreclosed or managed. We may need to set up a bad bank to deal with the toxic loans within the nationalised system. The Government can then decide on a process of recapitalization and restructuring, and deliver the management control that will ensure resumed lending. That is the critical need, namely, resumed lending to allow for a rejuvenation of the housing sector, affordable mortgage access for ordinary people, restructuring of existing mortgage arrangements and the opportunity for people in small and medium enterprises and retail outlets to have the chance to have working capital to get through these difficulties. They are being choked off by people in banking institutions who have no other allegiance than to the profit line of their shareholders and management.

The current upheaval in banking will undoubtedly have an impact on the staffing numbers at the banks. This is a very important point that needs to be taken on board. While a clear-out of those at the highest levels of the banks whose reckless mismanagement brought about the current banking crisis is required, Sinn Féin recognizes that the vast majority of bank employees played no role in the corruption and bad management that pervaded the sector. The Government should work with the IBOA and other trade unions representing these workers to ensure the retention of the maximum possible number of jobs in banking and to ensure that employees who lose their jobs receive proper redundancy packages and the opportunity to retrain.

The restructured banking sector envisaged by Sinn Féin goes far beyond just restoring so-called normality to the system. There was nothing normal about a sector that systematically overcharged customers, was complicit in tax evasion and routinely withdrew access to financial services from working class and rural areas because of the profit pursuit. I have raised these issues many times, not only on the floor of this House — I was first elected here in 1997 — but over the course of my five years as a member of the Committee on Finance and the Public Service where we encouraged and were part of the decision taken to go into a thorough examination of bad banking practice. It would have kept the Government very busy.

Nationalisation is preferable to repeated recapitalisation, which is excessively costly for the taxpayer, yet leaves the Government with no real say over how those banks are run. It also deals with any potential losses that could be incurred by the taxpayer, having left the banks in private hands and bought the bad loans off their balance sheets. If recapitalisation of a State bank or the nationalised banks is required this could be funded through national bonds which, unlike bank bonds, would be guaranteed. The EBS, Irish Nationwide and Irish Life & Permanent must be examined to see if they can function with recapitalisation and the State taking a stake alone or if they need to have their business wound up and-or transferred to the other two banks.

The issue of ordinary bank shareholders is a sensitive matter. While many of these shareholders benefited during the boom period for the banks, many reinvested dividends in order to secure their future and have lost much of their pensions. We have genuine sympathy for their conditions. However, the interests of the taxpayer and public shareholders cannot be held hostage to the interests of private shareholders. The most appropriate way to protect vulnerable shareholders and pensioners is to ensure — I hope the Government will note this in its preparations for the budget in December — that no cuts take place to State pensions or other social protections and that the State pension for all those currently in receipt of same is increased. In doing so one protects equally those who have lost life savings through risky investments and those who never had the money to make investments or build up a private pension in the first place. It would be an exercise in equality.

Sinn Féin opposed the Financial Measures (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2009 which sought to grant the Minister for Finance the power to extend the guarantee beyond 2010. While other states ran guarantees for longer while securing their banking systems, none had the extensive guarantee with the lack of appropriate conditions that we have. A blanket guarantee is not the way forward for the banking system.

We believe that the Committee of Public Accounts should be tasked with carrying out a full investigation of malpractice in the Irish banking system over the last decade. Its findings should inform better regulation of the banking sector. Malpractice and even criminality by the banks led to this crisis — those are the accurate words to employ — yet there have been no arrests, fines, admissions or findings of guilt. All those responsible must be investigated and prosecuted where the evidence warrants. In one case since Christmas members of my community were brought before the courts and terms of imprisonment were handed down, not for defaulting but for being unable to service relatively small loans from financial institutions in our constituency. That is mirrored in many other areas. There are two very different laws at work, one for the poor and those who cannot afford to cope with the situation now presenting and those who were at the helm of what went wrong and whose actions and decisions influenced the current situation and were absolutely corrupt.

The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform must disclose to the Dáil if investigations are currently being undertaken by the Garda or the Criminal Assets Bureau and the public must be kept informed of criminal proceedings being taken against those guilty of corporate malpractice. Those at the highest level of the banks over the last number of years and suspected of culpability in mismanagement and fraud must be removed from their positions and new management installed in the nationalised banks.

Other measures we would commend include whistleblowers' legislation to cover workers in the financial services and banking sectors. The regulation of the banking sector should be intensified and made independent. The role of credit unions should be enhanced through reforming legislation that allows them to expand their work as community-based not-for-profit services that support social and economic development. I suggest that the Government should legislate for the right to a bank account, as has been done in the Netherlands, France and other states, to enable people without a bank account to open an account at a financial institution of their choice. Several of my constituents have not been accommodated in this manner and therefore have no means of opening a bank account. Deputies will appreciate what that entails for them. It is absolutely outrageous. I ask the Government to introduce legislation post haste that mirrors the approach taken in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. We also suggest that the Government should enable An Post to provide basic banking services, including a basic bank account. I refer to simple, low-cost, no-frills current accounts that are designed for the many people in our communities who are financially excluded. The Money Advice and Budgeting Service should be given more support as it deals with the increase in personal debt and assists those who are trying to address personal financial crises.

I accept that emergency action on banking is required. There is no difference of opinion in that regard across this Chamber. Emergency action should be taken to rescue the people's economy, rather than to rescue the bankers and developers who have devastated it. The provision of fresh capital is just part of the solution. It is more important to provide new leadership at the banks. Such leadership should put the public interest first and work to strict criteria and guidelines. We need a banking system that serves the people and in which the people can have confidence. NAMA has nothing to do with improving Irish society. The ultimate point of it is to socialise debt and privatise profit. Therefore, this Bill should be rejected. Even at this late stage, on the second day of the Second Stage debate on this facilitating legislation, Sinn Féin urges the Government to go back to the drawing board and reconsider its proposal. It should recognise that Opposition voices, like large swathes of public, informed, professional and expert opinion, are cautioning it not to take the course on which it is set. It is important for the Government to listen, to examine the alternatives and to accept, in light of that exposure, that there is a better way. This Bill should be rejected. On the basis of its failings to date, the Government should also be rejected. If the Government is not prepared to support the petition to the President for a referendum on this Bill, if it is to pass, it should do the honourable thing and stand down. The people should be allowed to decide who should be at the helm of the Government of this State.

Debate adjourned.
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