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JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN SCRUTINY díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 18 Dec 2007

Proposed Airport Charges Directive: Discussion.

We will deal first with COM (2006) 820, a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and Council on airport charges. On behalf of the members of the joint committee, I welcome the following: from the Department of Transport, Mr. Liam Daly, principal officer in the airports division and his colleague, Ms Mary McCullagh, assistant principal officer in the airports division; from the Commission for Aviation Regulation, Mr. Cathal Guiomard, Commissioner for Aviation Regulation, Mr. John Spicer, head of economic affairs and Mr. Kieran Baker, head of corporate services; from Aer Arann, Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh, chairman, and Mr. Cathal O'Connell, head of strategy and planning; from Aer Lingus, Mr. Niall Walsh, deputy chief executive and Mr. Laurence Gourley, manager legal affairs; and from Ryanair, Mr. Jim Callaghan, head of regulatory affairs and company secretary.

I draw attention to the fact that members of this committee have absolute privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it. Members are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official, by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

The first part of the meeting will be taken up with ten minute presentations by each of the groups present. Given the number of presentations to be heard, I ask each organisation not to exceed ten minutes. Once the presentations have been heard, a question and answer session with members will follow. I am sure many questions will arise in this very important debate.

I am delighted to call Mr. Daly, principal officer at the airports division of the Department of Transport.

Mr. Liam Daly

The European Commission launched an aviation package in January this year. The package included both an action plan for airport capacity, efficiency and safety in Europe and a proposal for a directive on airport charges. The Commission saw these measures as contributing to the further development and competitiveness of the European internal aviation market by promoting regulatory convergence.

In the case of the draft directive on airport charges, the Commission's rationale for the proposal included the need to ensure greater transparency and consultation between airports and airport users in the setting of charges.

Under the Aviation Regulation Act 2001, as amended, the Commission for Aviation Regulation, CAR, is the independent regulator overseeing airport charges at Dublin airport. Charges at other airports are not regulated because they do not have significant market power.

The legislation provides for CAR to review Dublin Airport's charges at regular intervals on the basis of its statutory mandate. It also provides for consultation with airline users and other interested parties as part of the process of setting airport charges. CAR sets a price cap to apply for a number of years and the Dublin Airport Authority then establishes a schedule of detailed annual charges that comply with this price cap.

The aviation working group of the Council started its consideration of the Commission's proposal in July this year. The draft directive as proposed by the Commission envisaged mandatory consultation between airports and airlines with detailed transparency requirements and referral to an independent regulatory body to resolve any disputes. Serious reservations were expressed by some member states, including Ireland, about aspects of the Commission's proposals, such as the relatively low minimum threshold for airports subject to the directive. Airports with over 1 million passengers were to be regulated under the initial proposal. In addition, dissatisfaction was expressed over the unduly burdensome provisions relating to financial information to be disclosed by airports as proposed in Article 5. It was also felt that the role of the independent regulatory authority needed to be set out with greater clarity. Significant changes were made to the directive in the working group.

A key concern for Ireland was the potential application of the directive to airports, such as Cork and Shannon, that do not have significant market power. We also wished to avoid circumstances in which there could be a form of double regulation at Dublin airport if the existing price cap arrangement were to be retained. In other words, a price cap would apply but the airport would also be subject to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions in the directive. Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom shared many common concerns.

Changes negotiated mean that airports with over 5 million passengers annually and the largest airport in each member state will be regulated. This is a considerable improvement on a minimum threshold of 1 million passengers. There will also be flexibility for member states operating price cap regulation systems to continue to do so without the risk of an additional layer of regulation.

Following on from the working group's consideration of the Commission proposal, the November Transport Council agreed a "general approach" to the text of the directive in advance of liaison with the European Parliament under the co-decision procedure. The draft directive is provisionally on the agenda for the European Parliament's plenary hearing on 14 January 2008. It is envisaged that the European Parliament will at that stage vote on first stage amendments as proposed by the Parliament's transport committee. The Slovenian Presidency will then assume the task of progressing the co-decision arrangements with Parliament.

The draft text of the directive agreed at Council is significantly different from the original proposal. The main provisions, as agreed by the Transport Council, are that the directive applies to any airport with an annual passenger throughput in excess of 5 million and to the largest airport in each country; and member states are allowed to apply additional regulatory measures over and above those provided for in the directive, including economic oversight of charges, provided such measures are compatible with the directive and Community law.

The directive provides for a process of mandatory consultation between airport operators and airlines on airport charges allied to a requirement that before changes are made to the airport charges system or to the level of charges, the airport authority must consult the airlines. In the event that the changes are not agreed, the airport authority must justify its decision. It is then open to either party to "seek the intervention of the independent supervisory authority", as outlined in Article 4(3). Charges will not take effect until the regulatory authority makes a decision unless the regulatory authority makes a preliminary decision otherwise. This is dealt with in Article 4(4). Airport managing bodies and airport users are required to exchange specified information as part of the consultation process. Member states can decide not to apply the dispute settlement provisions where there is a system of "economic oversight" of charges by an independent supervisory body.

There are some other provisions. Member states are to ensure that airport charges do not discriminate between airport users - modulation of charges is allowed for issues of public and general interest, including environmental issues. Member states must ensure that airport managing bodies consult airport users before plans for new infrastructure are finalised. Member states must also ensure that airport managing bodies can offer tailored services, including services at terminals, and can charge a differential price for such services. Where such services are offered, member states are to ensure that airport users have access to these services and, where there are capacity constraints, access is to be determined on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria. Member states must nominate a national independent supervisory body for the purpose of enforcing the directive, as outlined in Article 10.

Assuming the directive is adopted during 2008, this will necessitate a review of the legislation governing the Commission for Aviation Regulation, in particular, with a view to deciding on how best to transpose the directive and to determine if primary legislation is required. As airports, other than Dublin Airport, can be expected to come within the threshold for application of the directive as passenger traffic grows in the future, this will have to be factored into consideration of how best to transpose the directive. It would also be necessary to consider how best to integrate the consultation provisions in Article 4 with the current procedures for settling the price determination at Dublin Airport.

I call Mr. Cathal Guiomard, Commissioner for Aviation Regulation. He is very welcome.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

I thank the joint committee for the opportunity to take part in these discussions. I remind members of the various roles of the aviation regulator's office, as many of these arise under other EU regulations. I will outline how the Commission for Aviation Regulation carries out price regulation at Dublin Airport and what, if any, changes may arise as a result of this new proposal.

In January 2007 a draft of the directive was first published, setting out its provisions and during the course of the year we have been working with the Department of Transport on the negotiation of the exact details of the text and appreciate the chance to engage with it.

The Commission for Aviation Regulation was established in 2001, taking over some roles previously carried out by the then Minister for Public Enterprise. Allowing for functions given to us since then, our roles are as follows: we license travel agents and tour operators; we license Irish airlines under EU rules; we license a class of firms at airports called ground handlers under EU rules; we have a role in enforcing certain rights of air passengers also under EU regulations; we decide the landing slots regime on the runway at Dublin Airport; we set maximum charges that can be levied by the Irish Aviation Authority, these are air traffic control charges at Shannon, Cork and Dublin airports; and finally the bulk of our work is related to the setting periodically of maximum aeronautical charges at Dublin Airport.

Initially when we were established under the Aviation Regulation Act 2001 we regulated Dublin, Shannon and Cork airports, then in 2004, the State Airports Act 2004, provided for the separation of the former Aer Rianta into three separate companies which narrowed the remit of the commission to Dublin Airport. Our statutory objectives in setting that price cap, which is now restricted to Dublin Airport, are in general terms as follows: we must have regard to the efficient and economic development of Dublin Airport, and the ability of the Dublin Airport Authority to operate in a financially viable manner, and protect the interests of users and potential users of the airport. We operate a price cap regime which aims at being a form of incentive regulation. In other words by setting a maximum charge per passenger for a number of years, which is typically five years in advance, the airport operator has an incentive to look for ways to reduce its costs per passenger below that price cap since the airport keeps any such economies it finds during that five year period. The cap then gets reset at the end of the five year period, including taking account of any economies the airport operator has found during the price cap period that is coming to an end. The price cap we set is made up of a number of building blocks, which are the sum of the following items: a return on the capital stock, a profit that is allowed to the company plus a depreciation charge against the capital stock plus an estimate of what it will cost the company to operate the airport over the coming years. In what is called the single till arrangement, which is operated at most, though not all airports, one subtracts from that a forecast of the company's earnings outside aeronautical charges, that is to say commercial revenues over the coming years. This total is divided by the forecast of passenger numbers to give a per passenger price cap.

The early drafts of the directive were somewhat wider than the text as it reads now. Originally the plan was to include all airports with more than 1 million passengers which would have meant that even though national legislation had taken Cork and Shannon airports out of price regulation, they would have re-entered immediately and probably Knock Airport not very long afterwards. We felt this was an overly wide remit for the directive. Second, the character of regulation would have changed because the directive provided for a dispute settlement regime and we had a concern that this might have involved the regulator's office in frequent or even continuous adjudication on disputes at many of the airports in Ireland on many of their charges and could have proven to be a very involved and costly process. A third concern with the draft directive was that it required a great deal of information exchange between airports and airlines, which seemed more than was strictly required to achieve its objectives. However, revisions to the text have largely addressed these concerns and we now have a text which will permit the commission to carry on in Dublin doing its work in a way which is generally rather similar to what we do already. In transposing the rules into Irish Law, consideration must be given as to how best to give effect to them in the case of Cork and Shannon airports.

The thresholds for the airports to be regulated has been moved up from 1 million to 5 million passengers and that reduces the number of airports covered initially although over time it is likely to cause Cork and Shannon airports to re-enter into the regulatory regime. The text now provides that rather than have a regulatory office adjudicating very frequently on disputes that might be large or small, the office has scope to establish a procedure to decide how it will consider such matters to determine the conditions in which disputes can be brought to it and the criteria for resolving them. This ought to give rise to a management of the flow of work which will be superior to what might have arisen originally. The text of the draft allows that for airports such as Dublin, which have an economic oversight regime already, this can substitute for the dispute resolution regime, if the member state so decides. We also know that the draft of the directive allows for some differentiation of services and prices into the future, which may be an idea that might be taken up at the relevant airports in the future.

That summarises the main elements of the directive, the changes that have occurred during the negotiations this year and how we see things evolving into the future.

I call Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh, chairman of Aer Arann to make his presentation.

Mr. Pádraigh Ó Ceidigh

I very much appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this discussion. Mr. Cathal O'Connell will make the presentation on behalf of Aer Arann.

Mr. Cathal O’Connell

Aer Arann welcomes the opportunity to comment on the proposed directive. As a regional airline, operating turbo prop aircraft, which typically have lower capacity than most other carriers, cost management is critical for us. It is essential that an environment in which airport charges can be set and justified is delivered.

We have some reservation regarding the proposals and I will go through the various areas and highlight our concerns with the proposal.

Any assessment of airport charges based on airport income factors must take account of the overall business of the airport, the single till approach. It is important that income which is derived by the airports and is driven by the passenger throughput must be taken into account in establishing a benchmark against which airport income can be matched with the airport charging structure. It is important that is the context for the establishment of charging structures. With regard to the scope of the proposal, the figure of 5 million passengers has been mentioned. As a regional carrier, our view is that many of the airports we serve do not and will not come into the remit of the proposal. However, the directive is made in the context of trying to establish a fair and equitable charging structure applicable to airports. By virtue of their competitive position, it is possible that certain airports with traffic volumes below the threshold should be considered as to whether their airport charging structures should be reviewed. It is relatively subjective to set the number of passenger figures at a certain level and the competitive environment in which the airport operates is an environment that must be taken into account in determining inclusion.

With regard to consultation and transparency, the initial drafts indicated a significant workload on the part of the airports and airlines in establishing and reviewing the airport charging structure. Under its previous draft, with the €1 million threshold, 11 of our 13 UK airports came under the threshold, giving a relatively small airline such as us a significant administrative overhead because of the consultation process.

Within that process we want to understand the detail that needs to be shared between the airports and airlines. We have financial and traffic projections and the latter are relevant to airports. In sharing traffic projections we must be confident that they are treated with the utmost confidence. Similarly, airports must be confident of the same in sharing financial data with airlines. Airports that are publicly quoted companies may have difficulty sharing the level of detail of financial matters that is suggested in the articles.

Aer Arann welcomes the service level agreement proposed in the directive. While security charges are outside the remit of this proposal, we suggest the provision of services, including the security clearance process at airports, should be incorporated into any service level agreement. As a regional airline, Aer Arann has significant difficulties with the differentiation of charges.

We agree with the principle that airlines should be permitted to pay only for the services they require and that, if they so desire, they should be allowed to avail of a lower level of service from an airport and pay a lower rate than airlines that require a higher level of service. Despite the directive's hope of applying non-discriminatory criteria in deciding who can avail of lower cost facilities, however, the practicality of capacity constraints means that some airlines will be prevented from availing of the lower cost facility. We find it difficult to accept, for example, that should an airport do a deal with an airline to use a redundant building as a terminal at a lower cost, a second airline would be permitted to avail of those services. It depends on the type of agreement between the airline and the airport and the physical capacity of the lower cost facility.

Our primary concern is that, although we may wish to avail of a lower level of services than other carriers, we may not be facilitated in the lower cost facility and be forced to avail of more expensive facilities, over and above our requirements, while a competitor, by virtue of their size and influence, avails of lower cost facilities.

We favour the position where airlines can select the services they wish to pay for and that the provision of a lower cost base is not contingent on available space at a low cost facility. Airport operators must tailor their services for lower cost operators and allow airlines to select facilities above this basic level on an à la carte basis. In the case where there is one terminal with lower cost and a lower charging structure and another with a higher charging structure, if we cannot access the former we cross-subsidise the lower charge facility by paying the higher charge facility.

Aer Arann supports the methodology of using security charges solely to pay security costs. Given the nature of security, however, there is an onus on the State to provide funding for security services at airports and this should not be the exclusive remit of the airlines to fund. There is a need for an overview role in the implementation of the directive. We do not wish to see a regulatory authority that drives additional cost onto the airlines.

I welcome Mr. Walsh and Mr. Gourley of Aer Lingus.

Mr. Laurence Gourley

Aer Lingus welcomes the opportunity to meet this committee to give its views on the proposed directive on airport charges. It is an important legislative initiative with potentially far-reaching repercussions for airports, airlines and the travelling public. Airports in Europe for the most part constitute monopolies and generally market forces are insufficient to control monopolistic behaviour. The directive has the potential to improve competitiveness and, by forcing airports to control capital costs, distortions in competition will be eliminated. Eventually consumer interests will be protected.

Airport charges constitute one of the main overheads for airlines. Airport charges in 2006 accounted for 20% of Aer Lingus's costs, second after staff related costs. These are ultimately paid by passengers through higher ticket prices. It is estimated that a 5% reduction in European airport charges would save airlines €750 million annually, enabling airlines to pass this on through reduced ticket prices.

Aer Lingus supports the proposed directive in so far as it contributes to fair competition between EU airports by the introduction of a common and transparent charging framework. The regulatory regime in Ireland, whereby the Commission for Aviation Regulation was established in 2001, demonstrates that effective regulation is necessary to ensure airport charges are set on a reasonable basis and that airports take account of the interests of users.

The scope of the directive should be as wide as possible so that all airports with market power are subject to economic regulation. Airport size is not the relevant criterion because reasonably small airports can exert market power in their pricing policy by discriminating between operators.

Therefore, the Commission's original qualifying threshold of 1 million passengers per year is reasonable. If the European Parliament's proposed amendment, that the scope be increased to apply to airports of 5 million, is successful this will exclude eight to ten member states entirely because of the size of airports in those member states. If the threshold is increased as suggested, the proposed directive should provide, at a minimum, that the independent national authority would have the power in certain cases to request that any airport in its jurisdiction be required to follow the provisions of the directive. In those cases, the authority would have the power to set and enforce cost efficiency targets in respect of those airports.

Regarding the national authorities envisaged in the directive, they must have enforcement powers to ensure cost efficient performance by airports. This approach was adopted in Ireland by the establishment of the Commission for Aviation Regulation. Arbitration bodies without enforcement powers such as exist in other member states have proved to be ineffective. These are more suited to resolving disputes between parties with equal powers but that is not the relationship between airlines and airports where airlines do not have the ability to choose the airport from which they operate. Aer Lingus consequently supports the objective of the directive to set up strong national regulatory bodies that can equalise the interests of the various groups and eliminate distortion of competition.

We do not agree with the suggestion of the European Parliament that regional authorities, to whom powers can be delegated by the national authority, should be created. This would undermine the responsibility and authority of the national body and potentially lead to inconsistencies between regions in a member state.

Transparency should be in place with regard to costs, revenues and the methods of calculation and allocation among users at an airport. It should be achieved in the process by which decisions are made and in the capital expenditure plans of the airport. Detailed information on the relevant components for setting airport charges should be provided annually, as suggested in the proposed directive. Transparency is critical for effective regulation and the current Commission proposal sets out the minimum level of information necessary to ensure transparency. This should not be diluted along the lines suggested by the European Parliament. We strongly believe the single till is the correct approach to regulation. This single till principle should be included in the directive as it ensures the total cost of the service provided at an airport is covered by all revenues, both aeronautical and non-aeronautical, that an airport receives from its users. If the single till is not made compulsory, it is essential that the treatment of commercial revenues should never be left to the discretion of airports and should instead be determined by the independent regulatory authority. In Ireland this is being done by the Commission for Aviation Regulation, CAR, which has consistently adopted the single till approach, and by airports which operate in a competitive environment, such as secondary airports which compete for subsidies and low-cost carriers.

We also support the proposal that new infrastructure projects can only be finalised following detailed consultation with airport users. Effective consultation between the airport and airlines is essential to ensure that developments meet the requirements of users and can only take place if sufficiently detailed information is provided by the airport to users, coupled with the effect that this would have on airport charges. In the absence of adequate information, users cannot assess the cost-effectiveness of a particular capital project.

In Ireland, CAR in its determinations has consistently accepted the need for such effective consultation and has in the past disqualified significant capital expenditure on the basis that consultation has been insufficient. It is important that the national regulatory authority has the power to review capital projects as airlines may not have the resources or the expertise to assess the cost-effectiveness of a given project.

We also believe in regard to capital expenditure that the directive should restrict pre-financing of capital projects. Pre-financing generally violates the principle that a service must be received prior to charges being paid. In other words, users should only pay for a development once it is operational. Various financing mechanisms are already available in the market for the purpose of new infrastructure and this issue has recently been the subject of detailed discussions with regard to the debate concerning developments at Dublin Airport and mechanisms such as trigger pricing have been proposed by the commission here to avoid pre-financing.

We support the provisions of the directive for obligatory negotiations at airports in regard to service level agreements. As we have experienced significant deficiencies at many airports, this provision should be strengthened by specifying a timeframe for negotiations and a role for the national authority if such negotiations are unsuccessful. Provisions should also be made for compensation mechanisms in the event that service level agreements are not complied with by airports.

With regard to the issue of differentiation of charges, we do not believe there is any need for specific provision in the directive. General provisions of European competition law provide that any differentiation must be based on transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. This will apply regardless of the provisions of the directive. Consequently, any new and specific provisions in the directive could give rise to confusion and decreased legal certainty. Individual situations differ too much for one rule to fit all circumstances. Difficulties may also arise in regard to the allocation of limited capacity between users. We are concerned that the inclusion of this provision might encourage differentiation in situations where this is not objectively justified and where carriers are not free to choose between different facilities or pricing options.

This directive, if properly implemented, has an important role to play in improving cost-effectiveness. We would therefore request that the committee use its influence to ensure it is adopted in a manner that will enable those objectives to be achieved.

Thank you. I call Mr. Callaghan, head of regulatory affairs and company secretary at Ryanair.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

I welcome the opportunity to present Ryanair's comments on the Commission's proposals. However, I would question the timing of this hearing given that the Council's work on this initiative is already very advanced. The Council has included a number of amendments that Ryanair would argue have actually made the Commission's proposal worse.

Before getting into specific comments on this proposal, I first express Ryanair's concern regarding the ongoing trend by the European Commission of re-regulating the airline industry. Following the initial success of liberalising air transport in Europe, which led to the birth of efficient low-cost airlines like Ryanair and EasyJet, the Commission, largely under pressure from flag carrier airlines and their national governments, have sought to re-regulate the industry to protect these inefficient airlines, which are unable to compete with the more efficient low-cost airlines. The current proposal on airport charges is a case in point.

Other damaging legislative initiatives include the widely criticised EU261 measure on passenger compensation, which applies only to airlines and not to competing forms of transport, such as ferries and trains. It forces airlines like Ryanair to pay ludicrous amounts of compensation, often up to ten times the level of the fare actually paid by the passenger. More worrying is the proposal to include aviation in the emissions trading scheme when aviation accounts for less than 2% of greenhouse gasses and has made huge efforts in recent years to reduce fuel burn and, therefore, emissions. The industry has estimated that the Commission's proposals will cost approximately €4 billion per annum in an industry where most airlines are already loss-making or marginally profitable. The true intent of green parliamentarians appears to be to prevent people from travelling by air at all, despite the minimal impact of aviation on the environment and the huge benefits it brings in terms of economic growth and regional development. Taken together, these damaging and unnecessary regulations are seriously undermining the competitiveness of the EU air transport industry, a hugely important industry which impacts on many other sectors and on the well-being of EU citizens.

The main problem with this directive is that it is largely unnecessary, and in the limited number of cases where legislation is necessary to prevent monopoly airports from abusing their dominance, it is completely ineffectual. During the initial phase of consultation with the industry, the low fares airlines, which use mostly regional and secondary airports, pointed out to the Commission that the airports market is very competitive, with airports actively seeking to grow their traffic by offering better, more efficient services and lower prices to airlines. There are certain large hub airports, where capacity is scarce and there is little or no competition from secondary airports like Charleroi, Hahn or Skavsta, which can and do impose above-market prices and offer substandard services. In these cases, there may be a need to intervene with some form of regulation but in many cases these airports are already subject to some form of national regulation.

It was also pointed out that in many of these cases national regulation had been unsuccessful in forcing monopoly airports to meet the reasonable requirements of users and that the Commission should instead encourage competition from secondary airports and competing terminals within airports, given that regulation had already been shown to have failed. A case in point is Dublin Airport, which has consistently failed to provide the kind of low-cost efficient facilities that Ryanair requires to continue to grow in Dublin. This is despite having been regulated for the past six years by CAR. Ryanair is now the biggest user of Dublin Airport yet the DAA has repeatedly failed to either build a low-cost second terminal or to allow Ryanair build and pay for such a facility. This is because the regulatory system in Ireland, which is the same as that now being investigated by the Competition Commission in the UK, actually incentivised the monopoly to waste money on facilities as it provides a guaranteed rate of return on any capital expenditure. Why would the DAA spend just €200 million on a low-cost terminal when it can get a guaranteed return from the regulator on more than €800 million which it intends to spend on T2?

Yet, despite the fact this system has been widely criticised in the UK, CAR continues to allow DAA to ignore the requirements of users and to build ridiculously expensive facilities, the costs of which are then passed on to airlines and their customers. Despite the fact CAR has found that the second terminal being built by DAA is at least 50% too large, CAR is nevertheless allowing DAA to recover the vast majority of these costs. This is clearly wrong and demonstrates the utter failure of regulation. Had the Government followed through on its promise to allow for a competing terminal at Dublin Airport, costs would be decreasing instead of about to double, as confirmed by our failed regulator.

The proposed airport charging directive will do nothing to address this. It is full of notions of transparency, objectivity and non-discrimination, although even these have been watered down in the Council version, but it does not address the fact that a monopoly will always seek to charge monopoly prices. If this means building unnecessarily expensive facilities to achieve this, it will do so. Dublin Airport is proof of this fact.

The only way to address this is either to have a competing airport that will force the main airport to improve services and lower its prices, which is happening in most cities that have secondary airports except those which are owned by the same company, such as, for example, BAA's common ownership of the London airports, or, alternatively, monopoly airports must be forced to allow competing terminals that will give airport users a choice. The Government had committed to the latter in its programme for Government but reneged on this promise and has allowed the Dublin Airport Authority monopoly to build the second terminal despite its history of providing inefficient, gold-plated facilities. One only needs to consider the mess in Cork, where the airport is left with a terminal for 3 million passengers per annum that cost €200 million, whereas similar facilities are being provided at other airports around Europe for a fraction of that price.

What does the proposed directive do for airlines and passengers? The answer is absolutely nothing. Originally it was to apply to all airports with traffic of more than 1 million passengers per annum, which would have meant that approximately 160 airports would have been subject to it, the vast majority of which do not require such regulation. Although this now has been increased to 5 million passengers per annum, most of these airports are highly competitive and do not require any regulation of their prices. Regional airports like Cork and Shannon will eventually be caught by this legislation and will be forced to adapt their commercial practices to this legislation. This will call into serious question the future development of these airports. There only are approximately 20 to 25 airports in Europe that actually require some form of regulation to prevent them from abusing their monopoly power.

Who has been pushing for the wider scope of this legislation? Interestingly it is the flag carrier airlines and the main airports. In the case of flag carriers, they see this as an opportunity to put manners on the very competitive low-cost airports to undermine the low-fares airlines using them. In the case of main airports, widening the scope of the legislation to include small airports has necessitated its watering down to the point where the legislation is almost irrelevant. Moreover, it also will undermine the competitiveness of secondary airports, thereby sparing the main airports from this growing competitive force.

In conclusion, this is another piece of unnecessary and damaging legislation to come out of the European Commission. It does not address the problem of anti-competitive behaviour at monopoly airports like Dublin and imposes an unnecessary legislative burden on a huge number of airports that clearly do not require regulation.

This is just one of the several legislative initiatives coming out of the Directorate General for Energy and Transport in Brussels that appear to be designed to undermine the competitiveness of air transport in order to protect the ineffectual high-fares flag carrier airlines. Such damaging legislation, together with the failure of national regulation of monopoly airports like Dublin Airport, are having a negative impact on the competitiveness of air transport and will lead to fewer passengers travelling, which means less tourism and fewer jobs. This is particularly serious for an island nation such as Ireland, which depends heavily on air transport for its tourism industry and economic growth.

I call on the joint committee to oppose strongly the continuous stream of legislative nonsense coming out of the Commission. The joint committee should be promoting liberalisation and competition instead of protectionist and damaging legislation. The airport charges directive is a prime example of this kind of bad legislation and the joint committee should oppose its passage, assuming it is not too late to so do.

I thank Mr. Callaghan. The joint committee has heard detailed submissions from everyone. I have a question for Mr. Daly regarding consultation with the Department. Moreover, he should clarify the reason that Luxembourg felt obliged to vote against the Council's general approach endorsing the proposed directive. I refer to consultation with airports, the likely impact on passengers using them and the additional stacked-up costs. The bottom line is whether passengers eventually will pay for all these services.

Mr. Liam Daly

My understanding is that Luxembourg's concerns arose from the small size of its sole airport and the charges and services there are affected by its obligation to compete with a number of other nearby airports. As far as they were concerned, it was unnecessary to bring Luxembourg within the scope of the directive. It must be stated that contrary to what has been said, the Council agreed that not only would the threshold be set at 5 million passengers, but that the largest airport within each member state also would be caught within the scope of the directive. The issue for Luxembourg was that they felt it was an unnecessary burden as far as they were concerned.

I did not pick up the second question directly and perhaps the Chairman will clarify it.

In respect of the proposed regulation, was there much consultation with the airports, given that the original ceiling was 1 million passengers before the change and is now 5 million?

Mr. Liam Daly

Obviously, consultation took place before discussions started on the directive in the working group. A number of member states, including Ireland, argued that the threshold was too low. One must remember that the imposition of such requirements on airports imposes a significant regulatory burden on them. Were one to place such a requirement on an airport, one should be sure there was a good reason for so doing. The argument that took place within the Council working group was that it was not clear that airports of that size had significant market power and for that reason it was difficult to see how one could justify airports of that size being brought within the directive's scope.

I have a final question on the stacked-up costs, as 20% of operational costs are related to the charges levied on the aviation industry. I refer to profitability and the impact of such costs. Would it not be somewhat discriminatory if such charges were to apply to one but not to all airports? In the operation of any business, one would imagine that the same charge would apply in Cork as in Dublin.

Mr. Liam Daly

In their own way, airports are in a competitive market. They are not necessarily able to charge what they would like because if they fail to pitch their charges to the market and to airlines' needs, the latter will not use them. Many airports today simply cannot afford to charge excessively because they are dealing with a highly demanding and competitive industry.

I wish to ask three relatively short questions of Mr. Daly. First, who will benefit from this directive and how? Second, what consultations had the Department of Transport with the airports? Were they consulted on an individual basis? Third, I ask the same question in respect of airlines.

I was not entirely clear on the point made by Mr. Daly in respect of modulation. Is it within or between airports? I refer to his point that member states are to ensure that airport charges do not discriminate between airport users and that modulation of charges is allowed for issues of public and general interest, including environmental issues, as in Article 3. Mr. Daly should clarify this aspect.

Mr. Liam Daly

Obviously, this is a Commission initiative and not an initiative of the Department of Transport. Its view of the directive is that, essentially, it is addressed towards balancing the bargaining power possessed by airports and airlines. The European Commission perceives this to be an effort to get the right balance in this regard. Its perception is that in certain airports in Europe today the balance is not proper and that a number of airlines are unable to get the kind of transparency regarding costs and the justification on capital expenditure they require.

On the other hand, I also understand that the European Commission takes the view that in some other airports and other situations, airlines have excessive bargaining power. This is the Commission's perspective. It would see this as a balancing regulation to set the situation and correct imbalances that are there at the moment. The question of who would benefit was put to the Commission in some of the initial consultations before it was debated in the Council working group. The main beneficiaries in terms of users would be the airlines. They are the main beneficiaries in that sense but they would also see some remedying of imbalances and bargaining power arising from their proposals.

Deputy Dooley asked me about our consultation with users, both airports and airlines. Before we went into the working group, the Department held consultations with our airports and a number of the airlines. Obviously, we took into account the views that were expressed to us in respect of that in participating in the working group.

On that point, did the Department consult with Cork and Shannon or did it just consult with the Dublin Airport Authority?

Mr. Liam Daly

We might have approached it in a way whereby within the existing structure of the DAA, if I recall correctly, we would have asked that the DAA co-ordinate the response of the DAA on behalf of the three State airports. That would have been the way we would have approached it, if I recall correctly.

Could I express my deep concern in respect of Mr. Daly's response? The State Airports Act 2004 sets out a schedule for the three airports going forward as independent entities. We have seen considerable difficulties arising in respect of the Shannon-Heathrow debacle. What subsequently came out at the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Transport was that information was not passed on and it appeared that the DAA was in charge of information or had certain information which was not communicated to the Minister or the Government.

Given that Shannon and Cork have a schedule going forward and are going to be independent, I am deeply concerned if the Department only sought the information from the DAA on its behalf. I do not believe the airport authorities at Cork and Shannon believe that Dublin represents them anymore, albeit that they may still be within the same legal framework. The resignation of the chairman of the Shannon Airport Authority from his executive role with the DAA would underpin that statement. Therefore, I hope the Department would now seek the understanding or, at least, the comments of Shannon and Cork in respect of this particular directive if it has not already done so.

Mr. Liam Daly

In respect of the consultation that would have taken place, we would have assumed that the views of the three State airports would have been taken into account in the responses we would have received. One of the views we had in respect of our general approach to the directive was that we thought it was inappropriate for our smaller airports such as Cork and Shannon to be brought within its scope because we believed they did not have sufficient market power. We would have said that the only airport that was really appropriate for inclusion within the scope of the directive was Dublin Airport.

I am concerned about the €5 million threshold because it is clear to me that perhaps within the not too distant future, Shannon will reach that threshold. In my opinion, the threshold is too low.

Several people are offering to speak. I will take contributions from Deputy Mulcahy, followed by Senator Kelly, Deputy English and Senator Paddy Burke.

I apologise for being a little late, however, I heard most of the presentations and read all the documentation. I congratulate the Chairman for setting up this meeting. It is one of the first times that a series of industry groups and regulatory bodies have come in to discuss a topic like this. It is a pity that we are coming to it a little late. Due to the general election, we are a little bit behind in all our scrutiny. It is a very good example of how we should proceed.

The Chairman may be aware that very recently, a delegation from the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs went to Brussels on a study visit. While we were there, two things were promoted. The first matter was the Lisbon Agenda and the concept of making Europe one of the most competitive knowledge-based economies in the world. The second matter is the question of subsidiarity and the emphasis on subsidiarity as an underlying principle of all European legislation going forward.

The principle of subsidiarity has existed for a number of years. It will have much more force in the new Lisbon treaty. We can take it that the principle of subsidiarity exists at this time and I believe this directive should be viewed under it. In other words, if something can be done by a national government, it should be done by a national government and Brussels should not interfere unnecessarily.

Have the airlines ever had the experience of being discriminated against in any airport with regard to airport charges? Have they ever encountered a situation where Alitalia was charged a certain amount to land while they were charged a different amount to land? If they have, could they give details?

There is one very important element of this if it is required, namely, the principle of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination is a cornerstone of any competitive environment. Under this obvious principle, no one should be discriminated against with regard to landing in any airport, regardless of who they are. If discrimination has taken place, I would support this directive in so far as it seeks to underline that principle of non-discrimination which is essential for competition.

There is much to be said for underlining the concept of competition here. By and large, we have found the more regulation one has, the less competition one will have and the more expensive things will be. I agree with the Ryanair submission on this fundamental point. We do not want to go back to a highly regulated airline industry. I am not saying there should be a race to the bottom. As a regular flyer with Aer Lingus, I am sometimes dismayed at its race to the bottom. I wonder whether there will be a middle of the road airline left in Ireland for those of us who do not want to fly with low cost airlines. That is an aside.

Will we have clarification on the question?

I am almost finished. Generally, regulation is bad for competition. Mr. Daly said that airports cannot afford to charge excessively. However, they can do so when a monopoly exists. There is a monopoly in Dublin. For all we know, the DAA could charge anything it wanted. One could not advertise Cork as a suburb of Dublin. One could not organise Shannon as a suburb of Dublin in respect of flying to Dublin.

We need competition between airports. We do not need more regulation. The idea of regulators stepping in, capping and discussing here, there and everywhere is the wrong way to go. My question for the airlines is whether there has been discrimination on pricing throughout Europe. My next question is for the Chairman or our adviser. How does it sit with the Lisbon Agenda and increasing competition across Europe? Will it help or hinder competition in the airline sector?

I hope the Deputy's questions will be answered at this hearing.

Has there been discrimination in airport charges?

Would it be quicker to put all of the questions at this point?

We will deal first with Deputy Mulcahy's questions. Does anyone wish to answer the questions on competition and discrimination?

Mr. Jim Callaghan

I welcome Deputy Mulcahy's excellent questions, which go to the core of the issue and should have been asked before the proposal was put on the table. Certain European airports have serious market power, that is, they are complete monopolies. If left unregulated or without competitive intervention, not only can there be serious discrimination in charging, normally involving national carriers with sweetheart deals in terms of property rental, etc., but there is also a serious risk of monopolies charging as much as they can, as is the case in some instances. For example, Ryanair is discriminated against by Dublin Airport, where it uses inferior facilities such as Pier A and pays full whack for a temporary facility.

The Commission has a distorted notion of non-discrimination, that everyone flying to an airport should pay the same price. It does not understand the commercial aspect of an airline that uses facilities more efficiently or that an airline using lesser facilities should pay less. The Council's version of the draft has watered this notion down further so that airports do not even need discriminatory or differentiated pricing when airlines use different or lesser quality facilities.

In the case of Dublin Airport, which has been regulated for six years and where Ryanair is still paying the same high price for using lesser facilities, regulation has failed. Were there a competing low cost terminal, airlines would have a choice. Aer Arann could use a low cost facility or stay in the existing terminal, which is over-specified. Regulation has not addressed this issue at Dublin Airport, which is a concrete example of Ryanair being discriminated against.

I thank Mr. Callaghan. Does anyone else wish to speak?

Mr. Niall Walsh

A number of issues have been raised, such as the global European situation. A number of countries - as I was not prepared for this question, I will not be specific because I may be inaccurate - differentiate their landing charges, whether they are domestic or international landings.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

France.

Mr. Niall Walsh

That has been confirmed. Differentiating was illegal according to the Commission and Ireland needed to reverse its charging structure to comply with the non-discrimination measure, as did Portugal. However, France is continuing with its structure. Regarding discrimination--

Do carriers have the same--

Mr. Niall Walsh

They would avail of the same service.

Has Aer Lingus witnessed discrimination whereby a local carrier was charged less than a foreign carrier for a European flight?

Mr. Niall Walsh

No, but one would not necessarily know what the local carrier was being charged. In certain respects, there is a lack of transparency in the deals done between airports, regional authorities and airlines.

Concerning discriminatory pricing, my colleague on my left is showing selective judgment regarding Dublin Airport, stating that Ryanair has been discriminated against in terms of inferior facilities at Pier A. However, it is not seeking to pay more to use Pier D, which is of a higher standard. Ryanair is looking for something on the one hand but unwilling to pay for it on the other. Aer Lingus might call it discriminatory, but not in a legal term.

The situation at Shannon Airport, where an incumbent airline paid €14 to €18 per passenger for many years and opened new routes on which the charge was €3, €1 or whatever, is discriminatory. We believe in fair pricing to be paid by everyone. A consequence of discrimination is there for all to see.

Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh

Deputy Mulcahy asked a good question that goes to the heart of a number of issues. We support a couple of the directive's fundamental aspects, including transparency, which is a bottom line for us. Another aspect is the requirement for 1 million passengers. As my colleagues from Aer Lingus suggested, the Governments or regulators could tell airlines to pull in 1 million passengers if that is required in a particular instance.

I can answer the question about whether we have witnessed discrimination in a number of ways. As there has not been transparency, it is difficult to state whether there is discrimination. Recently, Shannon Airport wanted more passengers and rightly so, as referred to by Deputy Dooley. The airport went to Ryanair and did a deal with it to get more passengers. We do not know the details of the deal, what Ryanair pays or what marketing support it gets. Conversely, there may be nothing to it. The directive would address the transparency issue.

I support Mr. Daly in that airports compete with one another because airlines, on which they are dependent, can move. In the past two years, approximately six airlines have withdrawn from Shannon Airport with little public knowledge. Aer Lingus pulled out of the Shannon-Heathrow route for a number of reasons, one of which was that it was paying Shannon Airport approximately €4 million per year to fly to Heathrow. However, we do not know what another airline flying to three London airports was paying. This has a rebound effect on small airlines like Aer Arann.

Monopoly airports have been discussed at this table, but there is a situation involving airlines that monopolise airports. Other airlines leave for that reason. There are two sides to the coin, but only one has been discussed.

I welcome this important debate because concern about the issue is reaching its prime. We picked the right matter with which to welcome the visitors. In conjunction with Deputy Dooley, I am concerned by the question of consultation with the two other airports. Like a number of committee members, I was not satisfied with the answer.

I have three questions to put to the visitors. I welcome Mr. Ó Ceidigh's comments on consultation and transparency and I hope openness will come about through the directive. However, what are our guests' opinions on the directive's administrative costs given the volume of information required? Some changes may be made to the directive as it progresses. Having worked in the travel and tourism industry for a number of years, the overheads in Ireland could be considerable. Perhaps it is a chance to make changes because the information required of airlines and airports will be sizable, leading to increased administrative costs. How confident are the witnesses that confidentiality on the figures given by the airlines will be maintained? I have heard some stories that would not fill me with confidence.

The second issue was about Article 8 and the differentiation of charges. I can see some problems because the airlines are not dealing in a normal market scenario. My question is directed at the Department officials here today. What happens when two airlines are looking to provide the same type of service into the same airport, but in a situation where one airline was there before the other, or where there is a capacity issue or a better marketing plan? I am not too clear about Article 8 and the differentiation of charges and how it will work. I can see problems with different airports, and airlines claiming they are not being favoured for various external reasons. How will that be managed? It could be a potential form of discrimination against airlines for reasons that are not even in their own control.

The modulation of charges between airports is very loose, which may be a good thing but I would like clarification on it. I would like to see examples of how it can be administered, and to what degree modulation is allowed before it questions the directive in the first place.

Mr. Liam Daly

The first question was about Article 5, which deals with transparency. I am not sure whether members have the Council's agreed text in front of them, but we arranged for it to be circulated to the secretariat. Amendments were made to that article which would simplify much of the data that would need to be provided by an airport as part of the transparency provisions. As a result, the directive is improved--

Did you indicate that it is about mandatory consultation?

Mr. Liam Daly

Article 5 deals with the information that would be provided by the airport managing body to airline users. It sets out, in revised form, a more simplified version of the kind of information that would be provided to airline users. Within the Council working group, strong views were expressed by a majority of member states that the earlier draft was far too onerous regarding transparency.

What would be the view of the airlines?

Mr. Cathal O’Connell

As a representative of the smallest carrier here, we feel that getting involved in negotiations and discussions with each of the airports will significantly drive costs within our organisation. We are not equipped to have people attending meetings with all the airports in our network that come within the scope of this directive, especially when dealing with the level of 1 million, as that brings in 11 of our 13 UK airports. If each of those takes a day or two of travel, that is a pretty significant resource requirement for an airline of our size. We certainly feel from that perspective that there is a little industry of meetings with a significant cost of administration attached to it. Such a cost would be imposed on us, as a carrier.

With regard to confidentiality, we feel we need to trust the parties with whom we are dealing. However, once the information is in a psuedo-public domain, there is always a risk that the information might get out. We need to believe the parties with whom we are dealing will treat the information with the confidentiality it requires. From the perspective of the airports providing information to the airlines, it is a different issue completely. There is a significant onus upon the airlines to respect that confidentiality, or alternatively for that information to be tailored down.

Mr. Niall Walsh

With regard to participation in regulatory meetings, we in Aer Lingus tend to concentrate on Ireland and use IATA as our representative at other airports outside the jurisdiction of Ireland. There may be specific instances where we would be involved because we believe the home carriers' interests may not be in the interests of Aer Lingus. Home carriers tend to have a great deal of weight and a big say in regulatory processes.

We believe we must give information to the likes of the Dublin Airport Authority and the Cork Airport Authority about planning capital investments. This information is held confidentially because on many occasions during the consultation process on the second terminal in Dublin Airport, Ryanair demanded access to those traffic forecasts, and therefore would have had access to Aer Lingus. If we had thought there was any doubt that the DAA would disclose that information, we would not have given it.

Another point was raised on price differentiation between terminals and services. Aer Lingus has no problem with paying for an air bridge if it is using an air bridge. However, a serious issue will develop with the second terminal. I must remind members that T2 is not being built for Aer Lingus, which did not ask for it. There was a consultation process on how extra capacity would be brought into Dublin Airport. As a result of that consultation, it was agreed by the parties that T2 should be developed. It may not have been a separate unit as desired by Ryanair, but we were asked would we move out of T1 into T2 if it was built, and we said we would. We support T2 on the basis that there is no price differentiation between the two terminals. The fact that it is a separate unit is a matter of cost reduction, because if they had extended the current terminal, it would have meant that there would be a higher cost and infrastructure between T1 and T2 would have to be removed. The circumstances in which it is said that T2 will be newer and better are all well and good, but we are being asked to go in there. We will not go in there and pay higher costs.

My second question on non-discrimination was broader than that. I was particularly thinking of the Aer Arann point of view. An airline might try to get into an airport where there is some kind of legacy or there is some way it is looking for a certain type of service, but smaller airlines can suffer from this. The bargaining position will not be at a level the airline might want or a capacity issue might force it to pay a higher cost for a service. I am not too sure how that will be dealt with, which is probably a question for the Department. My last question was about the modulation of charges and was for the Department as well.

Mr. Liam Daly

I must draw members' attention to the text of Article 8 as it currently stands and how the tailoring of services would be dealt with, where perhaps there were competing interests for certain terminal facilities. Procedures would have to be followed if a number of airlines wanted to use terminal facilities. The principles of how this would be addressed are set out in Article 8.2 which reads:

Member States shall ensure that any airport user wishing to use the tailored services or dedicated terminal or part of a terminal, shall have access to these services and terminal or part of terminal.

In the case that more users wish to have access to the tailored services and/or a dedicated terminal or part of terminal than it is possible due to capacity constraints, access shall be determined on the basis of relevant, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.

The proposal also states these criteria may be set by the airport managing body and that member states may require these criteria to be endorsed by the independent supervisory body.

The amendment on modulation was proposed by a member state. The original version stated member states should ensure airport charges would not discriminate among airport users. The amendment would add that this would not prevent the modulation of charges for issues of public and general interest, including environmental issues, and that the criteria used for such modulation should be relevant, objective and transparent.

The additional phrasing was requested by France which held the view that the original article was too narrowly drafted. It considered greater flexibility should be given if one wanted to make variations in airport charges for environmental or other general reasons. This was eventually accepted by the working group.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

Touching on the points raised by Senator Kelly, the main issue is not administrative costs, but the impact on competitiveness. This is where the major cost is incurred. We do not want to see the administrative cost of the Commission for Aviation Regulation, CAR, currently €4 million per year, being replicated elsewhere.

The difficulty with this type of regulation is that a monopoly such as the DAA and BAA in London will shower users and regulators with large amounts of information. Information is not the issue, but relevant information. It is easy to be transparent, as all one has to do is provide figures which mean virtually nothing. Unfortunately, the Council's draft has removed a great deal of specific information on passengers, staff and profitability. What we are left with is complete nonsense. It is surprising that the CAR supports this removal of information. Perhaps it explains why we encounter such difficulty in obtaining information from the DAA. Confidentiality is a red herring, as the airport uses it to refuse to provide relevant information for airlines. It happens in London as well as Dublin.

The key issue involves the points made by my colleagues such as Ryanair receives beneficial deals at airports. We must distinguish between airports which have monopoly power such as Dublin Airport. Under European competition law, the concept of non-discrimination applies only to undertakings with a dominant position. The reason for this is to prevent the customer from not having a choice. If one wants to fly to Dublin, one must fly to Dublin Airport. Therefore, it is subject to strict criteria in terms of transparency, non-discrimination and objectivity.

The vast majority of airports throughout Europe are not in a dominant position. Airlines now have choice. If an airline wants to fly to Brussels, it can fly to the main airport or the alternative. Therefore, it is ridiculous for this legislation to focus on airports with more than 5 million passengers and impose concepts which do not apply.

A company in any walk of life does not have to treat Tesco the same as a corner store. This is communism. The Commission is trying to impose the same conditions on large companies as well as small companies. This is not the type of economy in which we operate. Why are airports treated differently from the likes of a bread supplier? Tesco does not pay the same price for a loaf of bread as a corner convenience store. This is a market economy. With this and other legislation, the Commission is attempting to impose a form of communism on the market, which is wrong. As Mr. Daly stated, the Commission is schizophrenic. Is it attempting to address monopoly airports or Ryanair obtaining better deals at small airports? Unfortunately, the focus of the legislation is on the latter. Why does Ryanair pay less at airports such as Shannon or Pau in the South of France? It is because we have larger volumes which we guarantee, we use fewer facilities and are entitled to a lower price.

It is nonsense to have a society where the European Commission tells companies what they must charge, that they cannot treat anybody differently and that it is too bad for an airport with a full low-cost terminal. The first mover who fills a low-cost terminal is entitled to pay a lower charge. We have whinging about it being terrible that Ryanair pays less. That is what a liberalised market is supposed to do. The Commission is attempting to impose a nonsensical regulation to break this down.

The Lisbon agenda is the core of this issue. The Commission states we must have the most competitive economy in the world. However, at the same time it proposes nonsensical legislation, of which this is only one example.

Mr. Cathal O’Connell

On the differentiation in charges and the proposed Article 8, no matter what processes are gone through with regard to tailored services, if we have excess demand over supply of these tailored services, somebody needs to lose. The airline which loses is the one which ends up paying more to use the non-tailored terminal for the provision of services over and above what it requires. This is a major failing, as if we cannot secure access to a lower cost terminal because it is designed for larger jets, we will end up footing a bill with much higher costs per passenger than carriers which can deliver a better deal to the airport in higher volumes or larger aircraft.

From a regional airline perspective, tailored services and the impetus to include them within the directive must be focused on larger low-cost carriers. This cannot happen at the expense of regional carriers. We provide an essential service and have as much right to access tailored services which facilitate our operation as other carriers. As a domestic carrier, we do not need immigration services. We do not need to be taxiing at Dublin Airport for 35 minutes before take-off if we are only flying 45 minutes to Galway. We require certain services by virtue of our scale but when we approach an airport operator to ask for facilities which are specifically tailored for our type of operation, the reaction is that we are too small to warrant the investment in the level of service we seek. We believe there is a significant risk that regional operators will be disadvantaged by the provision of tailored services due to the target market at which they are aimed.

It is extraordinary there is no service for regional carriers elsewhere in Europe that would pertain to the situation faced by Aer Arann in terms of lower charges for internal services. Does the Department envisage any plans in that regard?

Mr. Liam Daly

As I said, this is the Commission's draft. Article 8, which provides that member states shall take the necessary measures to allow the airport managing body to vary quality and scope of particular airport services, is an optional provision. It would be up to the managing body to decide whether to provide tailored services and it would have to observe certain key principles if it did so. It is important to recognise that as the basis on which it would happen.

I am concerned this directive will eventually cost passengers more money. Not only has nobody argued otherwise today, but my concerns have been confirmed. I would like to know who is driving this directive. It would be preferable to bring in directives which help smaller airlines to deal with airports rather than this directive which will allow airports to charge everybody more. If we want to improve competition and reduce prices, we should assist airlines which need our help.

Mr. Brady stated that the intention of the directive is to control airport charges and that it is important to control airlines in reaching deals. I am not convinced of the importance of controlling the airlines because they are the ones which charge the customer at the end of the process and the customer has benefited thus far. If it ever arose that the customer did not benefit, the EU should step in with regulation, but that has not been an issue. Consumers have gained when companies like Ryanair used their power to reach deals. I believe we are going to stop that, although I ask somebody to tell me if I am wrong. I do not see how this directive will benefit the consumer. Airlines include the charges in the price of the tickets they sell to passengers but airports get to hide in the middle. In many cases, people have no choice in the airport they use.

The document supplied by Ryanair noted that the company was refused consultation on numerous occasions. I hope that is not the case but, if it is, I would like to know the reason. Although people in many areas may not like the way Ryanair goes about its business, it brings benefits to passengers and we have a duty to achieve value for taxpayers.

Mr. Liam Daly

In regard to consultation, it is the Commission's proposal.

Mr. Liam Daly

It is the Commission's view of the world that a balance needs to be found.

Mr. Daly has reiterated that statement several times.

This is being advocated by the Department.

It is our proposal.

Mr. Liam Daly

We have accepted the proposal but it was originally tabled by the EU Commission. As always within a Council working group, various member states have different positions and some were more strongly in favour of the original Commission proposals than others. They would argue that what has now emerged in regard to Article 4 is a better balance between airports and airlines. We now have an article that allows airports to do what they need in terms of information provision while at the same time giving an opportunity for airlines to have their views heard. I think that is fair.

I get the impression that the Department is not fully supportive of this directive and is merely trying to facilitate it. I am not convinced that the Department believes in the necessity of the proposal. I am aware it is an EU directive but we have to make a decision on it.

Article 6 requires airport management bodies to consult airport users before planning new infrastructure. How strong will that requirement be given that "consult" does not mean "listen to"? There have been many examples of consultation without listening.

With regard to tailored services, many airlines are stuck with existing facilities because of a lack of low-cost facilities. I have serious concerns about that because the directive does not seem to make airports develop low-cost facilities as a matter of urgency.

In regard to increasing passenger numbers to 5 million, does Mr. Daly fear that the figure will revert to 1 million in one or two year's time? Has the cargo figure of 200,000 tonnes remained the same?

In regard to the Commission's work and the duty of setting a price that allows airport bodies to operate in a financially viable manner, is the Department permitted to set a charge that would result in an airport authority losing money? If an authority made bad decisions or spent money unwisely, can a charge be set that does not give it the return it needs? I do not believe that will be possible. It is quite possible that airports will overspend if they are sure the regulator will cover them. Once again, the passenger will lose out as a result of bad decisions.

A number of contributors said that the overall business of an airport should be taken into consideration. I get the impression that does not happen and wonder why. The authorities running airports can make a lot of money from car parking charges and retail outlets. They seem to make masses of money. That is where the business is going. I do not claim to be an expert but it seems many airports take a smaller charge from users to gain more money from retail footfall. That makes sense. It is good business. Surely they should, in some cases, be made pass on those profits in other ways, perhaps by way of a reduced charge. If a passenger decides to spend more money on shopping or car parking, that is his or her choice, but there is no choice in airport charges.

There is a comment that it is naive to think people will share this information easily. How can Mr. Guiomard ensure people will share the information and that we can believe the information we get is true and up to date? If I were setting up an airline I could predict any figure I want. It says airlines must give their predictions, but it would be easy to make them up. My concern is that none of this proves to me that the passenger will not lose out.

Would Mr. Guiomard like to respond on the value for money and the cargo issues?

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

Deputy English asked whether an airport could lose money under price regulation. The answer is "Yes". Normally we set a price cap five years in advance. If the airport incurred costs higher than that price cap it would lose money during those five years.

It could lose by incurring costs.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

Even though it is a safe prediction that at the end of the five years we would be asked to retrospectively return the money that had been lost, our position and record on various decisions to date show that we do not want to make retrospective changes. For companies to have the incentive to make economies in advance, they must know there is no retrospection, whether due to savings or losses by them. Depending on how a company's costs evolve compared with the price cap set, it is possible for regulated firms to lose money.

On whether the information shared is genuine, the best test of that is the extent to which the record over time shows whether the information provided is close or otherwise to reality. It is difficult for anybody to assess a forecast in advance. However, by comparing previous forecasts with history, one can judge whether numbers are provided in good faith or not.

I understand there is an incentive with current, day-to-day operating costs, but there is no incentive to ensure the fixed asset was at the right cost in the beginning.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

Our treatment of those two costs is the same. A company will be given an allowance for day-to-day costs and an allowance for investment. If the outturn in either case turns out to be more than the allowance, the company has no presumption that the difference will be returned to it.

Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh

Deputy English asked whether it will cost the passenger more. In Ireland we have approximately 5 million people and three very successful airlines. We have three of the best airlines in the world in their sectors, namely, Aer Lingus, Ryanair and Aer Arann. We are different airlines and provide for different markets. There is a certain attempt at overlap in some parts, but so be it.

An airport gets its money from two sources, namely, the airline and the passenger. The airline pays the airport for whatever services it uses and for Dublin Airport that is regulated by the Commission for Aviation Regulation. It gets money from passengers through car park charges and rental of retail units. Those are the primary sources of income. When an airline negotiates lower charges - and fair play to it - the airport must get more money from the passenger. It is the only way they can survive. Shannon Airport car parking charges more than doubled in the past two years and the cost of retail rental increased by a similar proportion, because the money must come from somewhere. It is not true that the passenger pays less money. While they may pay less to the airline, they pay the airport that is "subsidising" the airline.

In that case they have a choice.

Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh

Absolutely, they have a choice.

In the case of Shannon Airport, the last thing some people want is the war in Iraq to stop. Last year approximately 1 million American troops passed through Shannon Airport and this helped to pay the airport's running costs. Where places such as Shannon Airport will get their income in the future will be an issue. The question of whether passengers are better or worse off balances out. They have a choice whether they want to park their cars for more money.

The question is whether we have efficient, low-cost airports. That is what we need. Will this legislation give us that? I am not convinced by the formula used for calculating the charges. Does one set out with the understanding that the airport must make a profit or does one go with a capital cost for a new extension to the airports? What is that capital cost based on? Is it based on low costs, as Mr. Callaghan of Ryanair suggested, or high costs? As Mr. Callaghan said, we do not have competing terminals. Maybe that is the answer to all our questions. Otherwise we are safeguarding the airport authority; we will guarantee it will have a profit and survive.

We have all seen how airlines have gone out of business all over the world, but we have not seen any airports go out of business. Will this directive mean we will have lower charges at the airports? Will the regulator be able to bring charges down and on what basis? As Mr. Ó Ceidigh said, there are other activities at airports such as car parking. I was surprised by the high price of car parking at Shannon Airport earlier this year and the same is true of Knock Airport. However, we have not addressed lower cost terminals. Mr. Callaghan said lower cost terminals are a way forward, but we have not seen that in this legislation. Where does the regulator begin with pricing? What figures does he take into account? If he sets a high figure with the airports it may mean we have an inefficient airport authority and this leads to inefficiencies.

That is a good question on costs.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

I thank Senator Burke for his questions. As I guess he knows, the airports' complaint is that we set charges low and when the committee talks to them they will repeat a complaint they make to us, that they charge much less than airports they consider to be comparable.

The Senator asked about our assessment of investment and whether that should be included in the regulatory price calculation. If the investment has the support of users, and the costs of that investment seem reasonable for what is being provided, we would be minded to include it in the asset base against which the regulated prices are charged. If the investment does not have the support of users, we are forced to get professional advice on whether the size and cost of the investment are reasonable, as we did when we considered terminal 2 during the summer. Depending on whether the size and cost of the investment is reasonable, and depending on the answer we get from our own advisers, we will make a decision on whether to include the investment in the regulated charge. Historically, over the past six or seven years, this has meant we have decided not to include some proposed investments but to include others in the regulatory price cap. There is some discretion in how we respond to proposals and it would be an exaggeration to say any investments proposed are automatically rolled into the calculation or that we offer any guaranteed position to the regulated firm.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

My response will tie into the questions from both Senator Burke and Deputy English. If one looks at airports such as Zavantem Airport in Brussels, which one could say is similar to Dublin Airport and has a competing secondary airport next to it, one will see that prices are going down as the airport tries to attract traffic. In Dublin we have a regulator who, for the past six years, has not robustly regulated the monopoly and has not forced the Dublin Airport Authority to consult on what facilities the airlines need. As a result, we will have a doubling of airport charges in Dublin Airport.

The regulator talked about bringing in professional advice but this creates a difficulty. How is a regulator or a professional adviser supposed to determine these issues? We have professional advice that what the DAA is proposing and, indeed, is building, is at least 50% too large for what is needed and Ryanair has been saying that for the past 18 months. We have challenged it in the planning process and are now bringing High Court proceedings, yet the regulator is allowing the vast majority of what the DAA is proposing to spend, which amounts not to €200 million but over €600 million or, by our calculation, approximately €800 million into the regulated asset base.

This is the problem. If we had the competing terminal which the Government promised at Dublin Airport, I assure members prices would go down and not up. Until the Government makes a decision to implant competition within the airport, because a secondary airport in Dublin is not feasible given the prohibitive land costs, and take the dead hand of monopoly from the airport, the problems will persist. The problems in Cork and Shannon, where they have had to increase parking charges, are caused by the fact that they have been left with the legacy of the Dublin office of the DAA. Cork Airport has a massively expensive terminal which it will never be able to pay for because of the DAA and the fact that the regulator failed to properly regulate it at the time by telling it not to build the terminal because it would never be able to recover the costs.

We have regulation but prices are going to double at Dublin Airport and remain high at Cork and Shannon Airports until we have competition. Regulation is not working and it will not work if the regulator is influenced by the Government to ensure the DAA is profitable. He has been given directions from the Minister for Transport that, when terminal 2 is built, he must allow the authority to recover its costs. How will we ever have prices coming down at Irish airports when there is this kind of regulation?

I have a second question to Mr. Daly on the question of Belfast competing with Dublin and the fact that they are in different jurisdictions. Does this legislation address the situation where one airport might undercut the other, owing to different economic conditions such as different wages and a different tax base?

Mr. Liam Daly

The directive does not deal with that point but from the point of view of user airlines any incentive to make an airport more efficient as a result of competitive forces has to be a good thing. Since there are three State airports and a number of regional airports, as well as the Northern Ireland airports, there are pressures on them to control their costs. They know if they do not do so the danger is that certain airlines will not use their services.

Is due diligence carried out to ascertain the exact costs? There are a lot of hidden costs such as security, as Mr. Ó Ceidigh said. What percentage of the overall costs are now taken up by security and what are the costs per passenger?

Mr. Liam Daly

I do not have that particular figure at my disposal for State airports. I am sure the DAA can provide that information.

The Dublin Airport Authority is before the committee on 22 January.

Mr. Liam Daly

The committee can take the matter up with the authority on that date. For the purposes of transparency, the directive envisages that, for airports within its scope, more information will be provided. In regard to Dublin Airport, which is regulated at the moment, anybody who examines the Commission for Aviation Regulation will see a huge amount of information as to how it does its job and the role it plays, as well as in-depth analysis on how the investment and operating costs are assessed.

This is a very interesting debate. Why did the Department of Transport agree to the directive? I do not see any great benefit, from the State's point of view, of allowing another control to be put in place. Will it replace Mr. Spicer at the commission or will the regulatory authority take over the responsibility?

On the regulation of Dublin Airport Authority, from last Wednesday to Friday I parked in the short-term car park and it cost €113. The Aer Lingus flight to Venice cost €40 plus taxes of €45. One person came back from a trip abroad and the four wheels of his car had gone but the Dublin Airport Authority states it is not liable for the man's four wheels, even though he paid up to €70 for the security of keeping his car at Dublin Airport. My car was, fortunately, still there when I returned. The DAA is not even insured for the purposes of keeping a car secure for a few days a person is away. Bewley's in Dublin has provided a bit of competition. They offered one night's accommodation plus three days' parking for €101. The Dublin Airport Authority, which has been running the show for the past 50 or so years, could not look ahead and build short-term car parking close to the airport. It completely ignored the problem and it is a walking disaster.

We will bring that matter up during the meeting on 30 April.

I am asking the regulator what he is doing about it. He is supposed to be regulating costs in Dublin Airport. He allows the cost of parking, short-term and long-term, to go up and the airport taxes to go up. Given my experience in Dublin Airport last Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, I believe he is doing a very bad job. If that is regulation, then to hell with regulation because it is not working as far as the consumer is concerned.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

The legislation we have been given requires us to set a cap on aeronautical charges at the airport. These are the charges the airlines pay for using the airport - the landing, the take-off, the parking, the passenger and the cargo charges. There is another stream of income which the airport has from retailing and from car parking and so on which is not directly regulated. It affects aeronautical charges in so far as the profits made in this commercial area, entirely or partly, subsidise the running costs of the airport. Therefore, the aeronautical charges currently are lower than they would otherwise be, because the profits from car parking are taken into account in the calculation. There is no direct restriction on the car parking charges specifically. There are no powers for the regulator to do that. This indirectly affects aeronautical charges but we do not have a direct power to set them. Our focus is on setting the aeronautical charges.

I believe the remit of the Commission for Aviation Regulation should be extended to other charges, if it has any say, because they are the ones that are causing the major problems. They are paid well to do a job and if there is a need to amend the 2001 legislation a request should be made to do so to allow the Commission for Aviation Regulation control the other charges.

Will amending legislation be required?

Mr. Liam Daly

We will have to look at that in due course. The directive still has to go through another stage which is to have the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament. When that concludes we will be in a position to determine whether we need to amend primary legislation or whether we need a statutory instrument.

What is the timeframe for implementation of the directive?

Mr. Liam Daly

The Council, as a result of the directive it has cleared, has allowed for an extra lead time than originally envisaged. In the latest draft, Article 12 states that, member states shall bring into force the laws and regulations and so on, not later than 36 months from the date of its publication in the Official Journal. Assuming it goes through over the next months or in the next year, implementation would be 36 months from that date.

It is optional.

Mr. Liam Daly

No.

That is the earliest date.

Mr. Liam Daly

That is right. Obviously one could bring it in earlier if a member state--

The text is always agreed at Council level.

That would appear to be the case.

Therefore, the only input we could have would be via the European Parliament. Is the co-decision procedure still happening?

Mr. Liam Daly

The European Parliament has to take a view on the directive. It has not formally reported as yet. My understanding is that early in the new year it will take its view.

It is regrettable that the new role of the committee is that it has the powers of scrutiny.

The Department of Transport will have some flexibility in how the proposal will be transposed into Irish law. The choice would be whether to transpose it by statutory instrument or primary legislation directly. There will be a fair amount of flexibility left to the Minister as to what approach to take. What is the view of the Minister on a matter that is of considerable consequence or has he expressed a view as to whether he would do it unilaterally by statutory instrument or leave it to the Dáil and Seanad, which would have the opportunity of examining, amending and passing it in a manner which would be deemed suitable to this country?

I am sorry for my late arrival, I was at another meeting and could not get away. I have just heard the last point made by Mr. Callaghan from Ryanair about the capacity which he deemed to be 50% greater than is required. Surely, in terms of an expanding population, expanding trade, and an island economy this type of transport will continue and it would be better to budget for the use of greater airport capacity rather than find ourselves with a situation which persists in Heathrow and many of the other countries at present.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

Deputy Costello's point was a good one and one that the DAA has been using to justify the size of this facility. The DAA is now formally capped as to how much passenger traffic can transit through the existing footprint of the airport - the eastern campus. Fingal County Council, in its local area plan, has stated that once the passenger capacity has reached 30 million per year the development has to move to the western campus. The issue with the size of the facility in the eastern campus, that is, the old current terminal and what the DAA is building, is that we have estimated the combined capacity of those would be roughly of the order of 50 million passengers. The problem is they can only use 30 million of those. It is literally building almost twice as much capacity as it can use under the planning conditions. It is designed as a horseshoe and it will not be allowed to use any more than 33 million. It still has about 17 million excess capacity. The Commission for Aviation Regulation has confirmed this.The so-called experts brought in have confirmed it and yet we will still end up paying for a facility that is massively over-sized. At the same time the DAA is talking about spending a further €450 million on the existing terminal to extend and refurbish it and yet, because such a huge terminal is being built next door, it is talking about reducing the capacity of the existing terminal from 25 million current capacity down to 15 million. The reason it has to spend the €450 million is that Aer Lingus refuse to pay any more for using the brand new terminal. The DAA is faced with a situation where it is forced to spend, completely unnecessarily, €450 million on the current terminal so that the CAR can confirm that the cost of the current terminal is the same as the cost for second terminal and, therefore, Ryanair and everybody else using the existing terminal have to pay the same charges. It is bizarre. This is what regulation has bought us.

If it is so obvious that €450 million is being spent needlessly, surely Aer Lingus would see that.

Aer Lingus can speak for itself. In anticipation of the growth in traffic numbers over the next ten yearsis it not likely that building will be fully utilised and from a business point of viewit will be a building for the future? The concept may be too large now but in 20 years’ time--

Mr. Jim Callaghan

The point is that Fingal County Council has done its detailed planning analysis of the existing footprint which is a horseshoe. One has to bring all the traffic in one side. It says it is impossible at any point in the future to be able to deal with more than 33 million passengers per year. Anything that is built on the eastern campus which facilitates more than 33 million passengers per year is a complete and utter waste of money.

We are going slightly off the directive.

There is a price involved.

That is true. There are stacked up costs.

The directive has provisions relevant to this if it was in operation at the time.

Does the Deputy want Mr. Daly to clarify that?

Mr. Liam Daly

On the question of how the directive will be transposed, as of now the legal position has yet to be established because we have not finalised the directive. It is in transition, to that extent. There is still further work to be done following the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament.

Willlegislation be required to implement its provisions or will that be left to the Minister’s discretion?

Mr. Liam Daly

That is governed by legal advice. Certain directives can be implemented by statutory instrument.

It is not really governed by legal advice. The Minister has a great deal of discretion in that regard. It comes under the communities Bill we passed last year which allows the Minister considerable discretion. Is the Minister disposed to allow the passing of a measure, even if he or she is entitled under the legislation to pass it by statutory instrument? The exercise of such discretion would be based on the opinion of the Minister and his Department, as distinct from the measure concerned being passed to Parliament for examination, amendment and perhaps further consideration in a committee such as this one when the final version of it would be available and, thus, for such consideration of it to be treated in a proper democratic fashion.

Mr. Liam Daly

I thought it was purely the legal issues with which we were dealing. I misunderstood that.

What is the Minister's thinking on it?

Mr. Liam Daly

We have not as yet discussed with him the form of transposition. We will probably have to await the finalisation of the directive before we would be in a position to discuss that with him.

It is possible to invite the Minister to come to the committee if we want to develop a negotiating position on this going forward.

Mr. Niall Walsh

Regarding the statement that was made previously about the capital investment in T1 being expanded because Aer Lingus will not be moving into T2, that is the first I have heard of that statement. As far as I am aware, no expenditure in T1 is as a result of Aer Lingus not moving into T2.

I wish to briefly refer to a point Mr. Callaghan made. I am very much in favour of competition between airports. I disagree with the point Mr. Callaghan made about a small regional airport. If a large airline such as Ryanair requests the imposition of a small charge because it will bring a million passengers through an airport, an another airline may like to open a route with the airport, the airport authority will advise it that it has a preferential deal with Ryanair and therefore it will not impose the same preferential charge for that airline. That is more or less what he intimated.

Mr. Callaghan also cited the example of Tesco. It is a severe problem in Britain. The DTI in Britain mooted the possible break-up of Tesco because of the scale of its effect in the marketplace. Tesco can approach a baker and offer to pay one penny for every loaf of bread purchased, while a small shop would have to pay a baker £1 sterling. That is bad for competition. Tesco is nearing the point where it has a dominant position in the marketplace.

I am in favour of competition between airports but I am also in favour of airports, even small regional ones, charging all carriers who fly into them the same price. Some airlines, I will not mention any names, will use their strength to try to elbow out smaller airlines from also using certain airports. There is a question of abuse of dominant position. I will not go into the specifics of Ryanair and the Aer Lingus situation. There would be much more competition in the aviation sector, than there is currently, if Aer Lingus and Ryanair had no shareholder connection. Let us be open about competition in all aspects.

Mr. Pádraig Ó Ceidigh

I support 100% what the Deputy has said. He has shot from the hip.

Why are directives that would assist the position of smaller airlines not coming forward? Why are we having to deal with directives that will penalise everybody across the board rather than specific directives that might help the smaller airlines? There are arguments to be made on both sides, but why has this directive come forward? Where are the directives that are needed? I accept that this is a matter for another day.

This relates to competition.

Mr. Laurence Gourley

This regulation will not cure all our problems and anybody who thinks it will is being unrealistic. We are faced with there not being adequate competition between airports. Regulation is always second best to competition but it is better having regulation rather than not having it and having no competition. This is what this directive seeks to do, to address the position where many airports still have total pricing power by trying to impose regulation on them. We can argue whether the Commission for Aviation Regulation has been successful in our market in controlling costs at Dublin Airport. Different views can be taken on that, but this position is better than having no regulation in place. There is neither competition nor regulation in many European airports. It would be better if competition were introduced, but it will be a long time before we will be able to say there is fair competition between airports throughout the EU. This directive, in its undiluted form, can go some way to remedying some of the deficiencies in terms of lack of competition.

Does Mr. Gourley believe this directive will create competition?

Mr. Laurence Gourley

Where competition does not exist it will impose regulation. That is what it seeks to do.

In one of the submissions it was suggested that if there was a 5% reduction in charges, it would result in a reduction of charges to the value of €750 million in European airports.

Mr Laurence Gourley

That is correct.

Every 1% reduction would equate therefore to a reduction in the charges to the value of €150 million. Will this directive result in the adding of many more percentages to the airport charges?

Mr Laurence Gourley

I am not qualified to put a value on it, but it ties in with Deputy English's question as to how this directive can benefit consumers. With regard to regulation, at least there is now a consultation process with the Dublin Airport Authority in terms of the capital infrastructure being built there. Airlines will not always agree with what airports have done, but prior to the regulation there was no consultation with airlines. The authority proceeded to build what it wanted, it did not meet the needs of interested parties and it did not do so in a cost effective manner. By controlling capital costs we can control airport charges, which ultimately will be passed on to consumers in lower ticket prices. If regulation is introduced in the way it should be done, while it will never replicate the benefits of competition, it will be better than having neither regulation nor competition.

Does that mean the regulator would be involved in forward planning at airports which cater for more than 5 million passengers?

Mr Laurence Gourley

Absolutely.

Over a five-year or longer period.

This question is addressed to Mr. Guiomard. What is the position regarding Senator Burke's point about the involvement of the regulator in the five-year plan and the five-year envelope? It must be quite difficult to envisage the costs that would be stacked up over five years going forward. The organisation must be heavily loaded to ensure allowance is made for hidden charges, etc.

Mr. Cathal Guiomard

In about a year's time we will plan to begin the exercise we are due to do in 2009, namely, to set charges for the following five years at Dublin Airport. We would allow ourselves the greater part of a year to obtain the views of the airport, the airline industry, professional advice, if necessary, and to draw all those strands together, allow people to express their views on those various ingredients and then make a decision towards the end of the year. The exercise we will do in 2009 will try to take account of costs over the subsequent five years, very much including the airport's investment plans over that period and the industry's view of them and whether it considers them appropriate.

Does Mr. Daly wish to express a view?

Mr. Liam Daly

I was just merely going to comment on the reason the Department supports the directive. The overall view we took was that the directive was not too far removed from what we have today in terms of the regulation of airport charges, that it protected the current position whereby the Commission for Aviation Regulation would regulate airport charges at Dublin Airport. It allowed for an extension of that regulation to other airports in the State when they reach the threshold of 5 million passengers, but given the realities in terms of the Council and the working group, there was very much a majority in favour of adopting a directive like this one.

Does that mean that in a year's time perhaps the 5 million could be reduced to 4 million once it is established?

Mr. Liam Daly

As of now, I would say that is unlikely.

Before we wrap up does anyone else wish to comment on the last question?

Mr. Jim Callaghan

Unfortunately, Deputy Mulcahy has just left the room because I wish to come back to the issue of the purpose of this regulation. Is it to regulate those few airports in Europe that need to be regulated, that is, which have a dominant position, or is it to try to control the commercial practices of airlines that are in a very competitive market? Is it the desire of the European Commission to try to regulate the way Ryanair does business with its small airports? I point out, and most people can agree with this, that nobody else flies to most of the airports we fly to and we therefore have bargaining power there. Is the Commission trying to regulate Ryanair through this legislation or is it trying to regulate the likes of the Dublin Airport Authority?

I wish to comment on what Mr. Callaghan said. Shannon Airport is critical to the Clare region. While there is generally a welcome for Ryanair's presence, there is also considerable concern that the airline's presence has a capacity to act a bit like the cuckoo. Once it is in the nest, it throws everybody else out. I am not suggesting that is Ryanair's modus operandi, although some might do so. I do not think it is but it would not be helpful for Shannon or for many other airlines or airports that might need a variety of services. I am not suggesting it would not be appropriate where Ryanair identified a military base somewhere in eastern Europe with no commercial aviation activity.

There is a bit of history to this, too. Ryanair operated a flight between Frankfurt-Hahn and Shannon but when it got a better deal from Kerry Airport, it upped and left. While I am concerned about what Aer Lingus might do in the future, I am also concerned that Ryanair would get to a dominant position and would use its bargaining position to charge the airport for every passenger it might bring in. The threat would be that if it did not, the airline would go elsewhere.

In the absence of real, direct aviation competition there is a requirement to have regulation but it must be effective. It cannot burden Ryanair's business model or plan to a point where it makes it ineffective for the airline to operate commercially. There must be a barrier or threshold beyond which the motivation of Ryanair's desire to continue to grow its stock price does not get, because to do so would damage a region. I am not suggesting that Ryanair is doing that but it is important to have a set area within which everybody knows the ground rules. The regulation could support and assist Ryanair in other locations, particularly where the airport is the dominant player.

I hope Mr. Daly is saying that the motivation behind this is to get a balance between the airport and the dominant airline. It is clear that airports are using their dominant position but airlines are also doing so. That is the nature of commercial activity. I do not think Mr. Daly would want a regulation that would hamstring the commercial activities of any airline. There is little doubt that the efforts of the three airlines represented at this meeting have done phenomenally well for this country. They must be encouraged and grown. That is why I hope this regulation will not prevent them from continuing that growth cycle in their respective businesses, or that the cycle will not damage the entire sector. That is obviously where we need to get to.

Given that the main players have heard various views today, not only from our side but from their respective companies, they might be asked to submit a brief summary of their concerns and fears, following which we could have a further discussion among ourselves.

There are two more witnesses coming in on 22 January and it is intended to produce a report on this once the hearings have been completed. That is a good recommendation to have an overview from today's meeting so that the committee could advise the Government of the salient points and concerns. As the Deputy said, many different views have been expressed at this meeting. It is unfortunate this debate did not take place months ago.

We could seek some specific points in light of where we are now in terms of the inclusion of this directive rather than getting into the full background. We can then have a discussion with the Department and the Minister if necessary to see if it is possible to incorporate a balance of the views of competing interests. The airports obviously would have a role to play in that.

I certainly will second that proposal. Does Mr. Callaghan want to reply to Deputy Dooley's point?

Mr. Jim Callaghan

Does the committee want me to summarise my various rantings over the past couple of hours?

Perhaps he can cut to the chase.

Mr. Jim Callaghan

Cutting to the chase, does this committee feel comfortable with such legislation? I had never been aware but always suspected that the purpose of the legislation, as presented to the industry, was to deal with a specific problem, that is, that certain monopoly airports in Europe are able to abuse their position. It now seems to have morphed into some kind of balancing exercise, as Mr. Daly said, to protect small airports from the likes of Ryanair who may be able to use their dominant position in the market to negotiate better rates. Is this committee comfortable with that kind of process in Europe whereby the Commission can come up with a proposal which, it is claimed, is one thing and then throughout the process of negotiation and pressure from various interest groups, it somehow morphs into a form of competition legislation to prevent abuse of dominance at the airports and by airlines? Why do we have competition rules if we are going to introduce this kind of nonsensical legislation?

My point at the beginning was that this is not the only legislation coming out of Europe that completely undermines the competitiveness of the industry. Why do we have compensation by airlines and not ferries which cancel their services all the time or trains that are habitually late? Why is it always the airlines that are forced to increase costs and reduce competitiveness? That is the main point. The key for this committee, which should have a broader view on these issues, is that for some reason the airline industry has been targeted in the European Commission for this sort of nonsensical legislation. Having successfully liberalised the industry, we are now barraged with this kind of nonsensical legislation. If the Commission is serious about the Lisbon Agenda, the competitiveness of the airline industry flows into a number of other sectors. Every sector of business is impacted by the aviation sector but the Commission seems to have lost sight of that. We are considered as some kind of cash cow whereby passengers should be paid €250 if they only paid €10 for their fare. This is only one example of the kind of damaging legislation that continues to come out of the European Commission.

With respect, competitiveness cannot be seen in isolation. Under the Lisbon Agenda, competitiveness is not seen purely through the eyes of the aviation sector. Aviation is an integral part of ensuring the competitiveness of a region, country, state or whatever. There must be balance and while it is a company's duty to try to drive competitiveness from its viewpoint, it should not be done in a way that is overarching or overriding or would leave the company open to having the capacity to use a dominant position. I do not suggest that is the case with Ryanair. I certainly agree with the notion that an airline should not be in a position to dominate in a way that would be anti-competitive to a region. However, I would not want a set of protocols in a directive that would hamstring an airline that was genuine about creating activity within a region.

This has been a very beneficial meeting with many different views. Another meeting on this issue will be held on 22 January 2008. If Deputy Dooley outlined his concerns in a one-page document, it would be important in the formulation of the report, which will be laid before both Houses. I thank Mr. Daly, Ms McCullagh, Mr. Guiomard, Mr. Spicer and Mr. Baker for attending. Senator Leyden did not intend personal criticism of Mr. Guiomard.

Perhaps there should be competition in airport car parks.

That was Senator Leyden's recent experience. I also thank Mr. Ó Ceidigh, Mr. O'Connell, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Gourley and Mr. Callaghan for attending. It is unfortunate that we did not discuss this issue a year ago but it is still important because the Minister has discretion of up to three years in this regard. The scrutiny on which the committee has embarked will benefit the consumer. The major concern is that 1% of airport charges in Europe is worth €150 million. Even if that increases to 2%, airlines and airports will make a profit. The bottom line is business is void of sentiment and it is about making a profit. Efficient operations are needed to ensure the profitability of any company. Airlines and airport authorities have adopted a partnership approach and it makes common sense that agreements benefit both parties. That is the objective but, at the end of the day, we are trying to make Ireland a more attractive destination and the carriers are doing an excellent job creating that image. If more people visit Ireland, it will benefit every industry. I thank everyone for the wonderful job they are doing in that regard. We will forward our detailed report to the witnesses when it is compiled over the next two months.

The joint committee adjourned at 2 p.m. sine die.
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