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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 15 Jul 2009

Report on Early Redemption Fees on Home Loans: Discussion with Financial Regulator.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the report on foot of a review by the Financial Regulator concerning early redemption fees on home loans following a request by the committee. I welcome Mr. George Treacy, who was responsible for conducting the review, and Ms Fiona McMahon, deputy head of consumer protection codes at the Financial Regulator.

I draw attention to the fact that while members of the committee have absolute privilege this privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official, by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Mr. George Treacy

I thank the Chairman and the committee for the invitation to discuss the application of fees by lenders on the early redemption of fixed rate mortgages. I am joined by my colleague Ms Fiona McMahon.

There are two main reasons borrowers seek to exit a fixed rate mortgage early. Either they are in a position to pay off the mortgage early or, as is more likely in today's low interest rate environment, they try to avail of fixed or variable rate agreements at a lower rate. Borrowers who have chosen to repay fixed rate mortgages early have found themselves faced with a substantial early redemption fee, in many cases. This has been the source of calls to our helpline and complaints to both lenders and to the Financial Services Ombudsman. It has also generated significant comment by Oireachtas Members and the media. In response, the Financial Regulator undertook an examination of the manner in which such fees were calculated and applied. I will briefly outline the steps the Financial Regulator took in its examination and our findings. I will also mention some further follow-on work we are undertaking. In order to assist the committee in its deliberations I forwarded a copy of our report.

Under the Consumer Credit Act, credit institutions and prescribed credit institutions, sub-prime lenders, must make a submission to the Financial Regulator if they wish to introduce any new customer charges or increase any existing customer charges in respect of services. The Act requires us to assess those according to the criteria of fair competition, impact on customers, commercial justification and passing on costs. These are either rejected, accepted but at lower levels than requested, or approved in full. However, while the term charge includes penalty or surcharge interest, the Act specifically excludes rates of interest and any charge, cost or expense levied by a third party and passed on by an institution to customers. Lenders normally fund a fixed rate mortgage through the wholesale market and as such it is deemed to be a third party cost to the credit provider. Where an institution uses a formula to calculate the costs it will bear as a result of the early redemption of a fixed rate mortgage, it does not fall under the definition of a charge because it is effectively a pass through charge. As such, the formula and resulting charge does not fall to be approved or notified to the Financial Regulator.

The Act clearly contemplates that lenders will charge an early redemption fee where the borrower seeks to repay a fixed rate mortgage early. Section 121 of the Act deals with the redemption of housing loans. It requires that where an early redemption fee is payable a statement to that effect must be included in the information, offer and acceptance documentation related to the fixed rate mortgage. Our statutory consumer protection code also requires that advertising for fixed rate loans must outline the charges that apply where one pays off a loan early.

Borrowers opt for fixed rate mortgages to facilitate budgeting and to protect against future interest rate increases. This is done at the expense of not benefiting from falls in interest rates. In the current environment, interest rates have fallen substantially. Consequently a substantial differential may have arisen between the interest rate the credit provider has locked into when providing funds to consumers and the rates available for the reinvestment of that amount when the loan is repaid early. The breakage or early redemption fee to move out of a fixed mortgage can be considerable. It depends critically on how much time is left on the fixed rate mortgage, what the fixed rate was and the amount owed on the mortgage. As interest rates have fallen, the level of calls from consumers received on our helpline has increased. We received 526 calls about fixed rate mortgage breakage fees in the period January to June 2009.

We commenced our review in April this year seeking information on the early redemption formula applied by lenders, including a worked example. In addition to this, where the institution confirmed to us that the early redemption formula applied by them was limited to recovering the cost, actuarial confirmation was sought of the formula. Lenders were also requested to confirm that where other fees were being applied, approval under section 149 or 149(2)(a) of the Consumer Credit Act had been obtained. Having analysed all of the information we feel that lenders are seeking to recover their costs and in the majority of cases no additional fees, which would need to be approved by the Financial Regulator, are being imposed.

While much of our examination has been desk-based, essentially reviewing and assessing the reports that we received, we recognise the importance of verifying the accuracy of the information received. In this regard we have commenced a programme of on-site inspections. While all of the actuarial reports received confirm that lenders are genuinely seeking to recover the costs of funds, we are following up on a number of issues because all the formulae differ in minor respects. These will be followed up with the firms in the on-site review. One report discussed the impact of using a mix of funding of various durations and another report discussed the use of various breakage fee formulae depending on whether the customer was moving to another mortgage product from that lender or making a repayment and moving elsewhere.

In addition to pursuing a programme of inspections we are also writing to all lenders seeking additional information on matters such as the level of redemptions taken up by customers and including details on the breakdown of the maturity profile of their book and the associated maturity of the funding for that book. We have also sought details on how the early redemption charge is documented in the terms and conditions given to consumers in their credit agreement and this work is ongoing. While recognising the significant costs that arise in the application of early redemption charges to fixed rate mortgages it is important to recognise that they are an important product. They provide certainty to consumers regarding their monthly repayments and it is clear that the current low interest rate environment, while it may persist for some time yet, will not last forever.

Notwithstanding our findings as set out above and in our report, lenders can and do make mistakes. Therefore, we strongly advise any borrowers who believe that they have been charged an excessive early redemption charge should go to their lending institution in the first instance to request a clear explanation of how the cost was calculated. In the event that they are not satisfied with the explanation a formal complaint should be made to the lender and in the event of an unsatisfactory response they should refer the matter to the Financial Services Ombudsman.

Our work in this area will continue and form part of our ongoing and normal inspection process. We have also provided information on our website, www.itsyourmoney.ie, urging consumers to fully inform themselves about the consequences of changing the terms and conditions of their existing mortgages and loans. We have provided information on the pros and cons of fixed rate mortgages as we have received a number of queries from borrowers who are considering fixing their interest rates given that they are at an historic low. We have also introduced a code for handling residential mortgage arrears and have written to lenders warning them that mortgage holders who seek to address issues prior to their become problematic and prior to getting into arrears should be treated fairly. We are open to take any questions.

What is the advice of the Financial Regulator on whether people should fix? Is it true that people on fixed mortgages at high interest rates have no option but to continue to pay or reach a settlement, as there is nothing the Financial Regulator or the Government can do about it?

Mr. Treacy mentioned that a code has been introduced for handling residential mortgage arrears and lenders have been written to and warned that mortgage holders who seek to address issues should be treated fairly. I am aware of several instances involving a sub-prime company called Start Mortgages. It charges outrageous rates and is throwing people out of their homes. I know of one case involving a widow in Galway who is being asked to pay more than €2,000 per month for a mortgage of €200,000 and which now has arrears of €30,000. If one was to take out that mortgage today it would cost €750 or €800 per month. It is ludicrous that a company should be allowed to charge these rates and pursue people through the courts. As a result of threats from me it has stopped in that particular case but it is absolutely disgraceful. The company should be taken to task about the way it is treating people.

Mr. George Treacy

We do not offer advice on whether to fix rates; we offer a range of information. We try to provide the information that people can take into consideration and judge for themselves the pros and cons of fixing at these levels. Just as anyone else, we do not have a crystal ball on where interest rates are going.

Will Mr. Treacy provide us with that information?

Mr. George Treacy

Yes. We produce a number of booklets and I will be happy to provide them. All of the information is reproduced on the website.

With regard to being stuck with high rates we found that three of the lenders charged the lower of the cost to them, or six months' interest; in some cases the saving allowed by that particular provision in a contract could be up to 60% or 70% and it would be worth discussing with the lender. We have no power to dictate the level of interest rates charged. However, if Start Mortgages or any other firm has been in breach of the code we introduced it can be sanctioned by us or the case can be referred to the Financial Services Ombudsman who takes account of our codes when he considers cases.

With regard to the second question, the answer is that some lenders are prepared to accept a six-month penalty payback. How widespread is this? It seems to be fairly reasonable.

Mr. George Treacy

Three of the significant lenders do this.

Will Mr. Treacy name those three?

Mr. George Treacy

I am in a slightly difficult position because the information was gathered under the powers given by the directives and we are not allowed to disclose information that identifies individual firms. I do not think it is an issue for them but they are the rules.

We appreciate that but——

We received replies from most of the mortgage providers and they provide much of this information.

Mr. George Treacy

It is also on their websites.

I welcome Mr. Treacy and Ms McMahon from the Office of the Financial Regulator. I note from the statistical table attached to the report that approximately 80% of the total value of the mortgage and loan book is accounted for by variable loans. To put it in context, in value terms this issue potentially affects the remaining 20% although in many cases very little time is left on the mortgage and it may not be such an issue. I have a number of questions. The first relates to the lack of a standardised approach in the calculation of these early redemption fees. Should there be a greater uniformity and transparency in how these particular fees are calculated, and is that an issue with which the regulator can assist? Would it require legislation through the Oireachtas?

From my experience, people who approached me had no idea when they signed up to the fixed rate mortgage that they would face penalties of the nature of €20,000 or €30,000 in some cases in the event of wanting to opt back to a variable system. That is an important question. Related to this is whether the witness feels the early redemption fees should become notifiable charges to his office under the consumer credit legislation.

The second question relates to the mechanism used by the financial institutions to fund these fixed rate mortgages. The report more or less concluded that following assessment, the lenders only appear to seek recovery of their costs, but how can we be sure of that unless we go into the detail of how exactly they funded those fixed rate mortgages? The witness referred to on-site inspections that will be carried out but the issue appears to be a fundamental element of this report. The report referred to actuarial reports as well but it seems, from page 4, that very few of the respondents gave details of the sources of funding used to provide these fixed rate mortgages.

The essential point we should be seeking to deal with is whether these charges are justifiable. I do not see how we can conclude definitively on that without having a good handle on where the institutions are getting the money to fund these fixed rate mortgages and at what rates. Can they stand over charging people these exorbitant get-out charges?

Mr. George Treacy

On the standardisation and transparency issues, the formulae are different but when one considers them, they are all trying to do the same thing. Some use the Euribor rate, and some would use the rate derived if the funding is backed by a securitised bond. There may be a blended rate because funding came from different maturities.

There is an issue about whether we should standardise the process, and that is an option we could consider. Considering the cost of funding, I am not sure it would produce a very different result, and our findings suggest it would not. If we are talking about trying to reduce the charge or cap it in some way, that is a different matter entirely which would have implications for the fixed rate mortgage market. That is a matter which would need to be considered by the Oireachtas, as it has clearly contemplated the placing of an early redemption charge in section 121.

That brings me to the issue of borrowers not knowing about the process. That section requires a warning to be displayed in all documentation, including the loan agreement, the loan offer and the advertising. The problem is that we have reached an historically low level of interest rates, and as that is a critical factor in the arithmetic, the breakage costs are pretty high for large value loans. It is likely that this will not persist and we may be back in three or four years wondering why there is not a fixed rate market. That is a question of policy and it may have to be considered by the Oireachtas.

There is one question unanswered but to go back to the issue of transparency, surely at the time of taking out a loan and signing up to a fixed rate mortgage, it should be possible to present a table to the customers of what the charges would be if there are X years left on the mortgage when seeking to exit the fixed rate mortgage? If the variable rate at the time is 2%, 3% or 4%, the institutions could present in tabular form what the penalty would be. That could be a simple form of transparency attached to the agreement and people could sign off on it.

If there are ten years left on a mortgage and a person wishes to get out of it when the variable rate is 3%, the fee could be displayed. This would be instead of having legal mumbo-jumbo in the text of the agreement. That would cover the institution legally but to any lay person it is not of any great relevance.

Mr. George Treacy

Given the experience we have had, that would be very useful and we will consider the issue.

There was a final question on the funding source which the banks use and how the regulator can conclude that the breakage costs incurred by the bank are the same as the early redemption fee being charged to the customer. How does the regulator conclude this without knowing the funding source and the rate being paid by the bank for that funding?

Mr. George Treacy

We recognised in the report that we would try to gain a deeper understanding of the funding arrangements. However, we also recognise that each loan is not funded individually, so there is an issue with the treasury and lending departments. They tend to fund the larger amounts in single tranches which will not necessarily match the maturity of each of the individual loans. We have tried to take a practical understanding and approach. In the three inspections we have had to date, one was a securitised product so the institution was taking a rate from Euribor related to the securitised product.

Ms Fiona McMahon

In the other cases they were taking perhaps three separate pools of funding and providing the customer with the average cost across those three pools for the funding sourced at the time the customer's mortgage was taken out. We could see the balances traced to the rate which applied at the time.

In those cases, did the breakage cost to the bank equate to the redemption fee charged to the customer?

Ms Fiona McMahon

We found some errors in some of the institutions we visited but in general we found they were able to prove the balances to us.

Were all those errors in favour of the bank?

Ms Fiona McMahon

No.

I welcome the two witnesses before us this afternoon. Is the review of these lenders periodic or was it done specifically because this committee asked for that kind of review to be done? How often would inspections be carried out or does it only happen where there is cause for concern about further issues to be investigated? Why is there not a more hands-on approach and why do staff from the regulator not visit banks on a more regular basis?

How many inspectors are in the regulator's office and what samples are taken from the institutions? It has been stated that there were only three on-site inspections so far so is the regulator happy enough about the assurance given through the heads of lending and actuaries that the formulae being applied are true? What about the 526 calls taken through the helpline? What further investigations, if appropriate, are to be taken and are cases referred to the Ombudsman? Is there an overlap?

The notes provided have indicated that some individual cases with regard to formulae are being followed up. What concerns exist in that regard and in respect of some institutions reviewing their policy? Do the delegates envisage a standardising of the formulae used to calculate breakage fees?

Mr. George Treacy

The review was undertaken because many issues came together at the same time. There was much media and political commentary and a significant increase in queries to us regarding breakage fees for customers with fixed rate mortgages. At the same time, we received a request from the Department of Finance for information on this matter. Therefore, we concluded it was appropriate to undertake a project that would involve information gathering, analysis and verification.

Have there been periodic investigations of fixed rate mortgages or is this the first?

Mr. George Treacy

This is the first investigation into early redemption formulae. We considered this issue some three years ago as part of a broader review in the context of section 149 of the Consumer Credit Act, and there was considerable interaction with the banks at that time. Under that legislation, financial institutions must notify us of charges to customers. However, we did not undertake any on-site inspections at the time. It was simply a consultation exercise.

In regard to inspections generally, it is important to distinguish between the consumer side and the prudential side. We set out a programme at the beginning of the year to allow for a set of random inspections, themed inspections and mystery shopping exercises. We try to divide up our working year to ensure our resources are deployed as efficiently as possible. However, issues will arise and we must be prepared to change our plans. That is what we did in this case, dealing with the issue as a specific project that had to be undertaken immediately. I do have not the data on the number of inspections. They will be set out in our annual report which will be published shortly.

In regard to staff numbers, staff are broken up into sections, with inspection staff on the banking side, and others on the intermediary side and insurance side. We also have a special investigations unit to gather evidence in regard to potential sanctioning cases. I do not have the information on numbers in each section but I can provide that to the committee if it is required.

We are currently completing follow-up work on the three on-site inspections we have undertaken. We intend to undertake three further inspections, which have been chosen as a representative sample of the reporting banks. If we find that the issues that have arisen warrant further investigation, that will be undertaken. Likewise, if any issues of concern arise from the reports into the inspections already undertaken, further investigations will be undertaken. It is essentially a matter of resources. The institutions we inspect will be those controlling the vast majority of the market.

What is the penalty where an institution is found to have given inaccurate information to the regulator?

Mr. George Treacy

We can take a sanctioning case against an institution in those circumstances. We view it as a very serious matter if we find we have been seriously misled.

What specific penalties are deployed?

Mr. George Treacy

The penalties are those available under the sanctioning regime. For an institution, the penalty is up to €5 million, while for an individual who has participated in a breach, it is up to €500,000. Those are the maximum penalties. We can also move for a disqualification if we find there has been a deliberate attempt to mislead in regard to a specific request we have made. That is viewed very seriously.

Were the 526 telephone calls to the helpline merely noted or were callers referred to the Financial Services Ombudsman?

Mr. George Treacy

If a caller has a particular complaint against a specific institution, we try to provide a seamless service in terms of transferring that complaint to the Financial Services Ombudsman. We have an agreement in place to do that. If a caller has information that might assist us in targeting firms for inspection or raises an issue we consider worthy of investigation, we will consider initiating action. We view the complaints helpline as a valuable tool to ascertain focus for our work.

I thank the delegates for attending the meeting. Did every mortgage provider contacted reply to the regulator's inquiry?

Mr. George Treacy

Two that were in the process of winding up did not do so. We are satisfied the institutions in question no longer have a book of business.

Can Mr. Treacy identify those providers?

Ms Fiona McMahon

We cannot name the individual institutions. However, members will be able to see from publicly available information that the companies in question do not currently have a book of business.

They have no business at all relating to mortgages?

Ms Fiona McMahon

That is correct.

Mr. Treacy mentioned that three institutions have been inspected to date. Is that correct?

Mr. George Treacy

Yes.

What form did those inspections take in terms of the numbers and categories of staff involved? Did the regulator's office use its own actuarial evaluations? Was the review in the form of an audit? Mr. Treacy mentioned that one report discussed the impact of using a mix of funding of different durations in regard to redemption fees and funding breakage costs. There is a perception, whether justified or not, that banks are effectively borrowing short to lend long, that they have been getting the benefit of reductions in interest rates over a sustained period but are not passing those reductions on to customers in the form of reduced breakage fees for fixed rate mortgages.

The examination carried out to date by the regulator seems to have involved returns from the banks themselves, backed up by actuarial valuations provided by those same institutions, on the basis of which the regulator has conducted what would be termed a desktop review. When staff go out on site, what is the level of verification carried out? How many personnel are involved? Do they include accountants, legal professionals and actuaries? In the course of the review, did the regulator's office identify any two separate institutions with virtually identical fixed rate loan offerings where one is charging a much higher breakage fee than the other? If so, has there been any inquiry into the reason for this? As Deputy Michael McGrath stated, there are young couples who were not fully aware of the implications of entering into a fixed rate mortgage. Such persons have suffered severely in the past year. Surely it is the role of the Financial Regulator to address such issues?

Mr. Treacy referred to resources. I would have assumed that this issue required heavy verification work rather than a situation where we have returns coming in from 23 to 26 financial institutions, with only three having been examined thus far and an expressed intention to examine only a further three. That is six out of 25, which is a very small sample. I ask Mr. Treacy to address these points.

Mr. George Treacy

With regard to the numbers, as the Deputy said, we decided to have an information-gathering process to allow us to obtain a greater understanding of the situation.

It was reported in the media that the information-gathering exercise showed there were no great difficulties with fixed-rate mortgages and redemption fees. Clearly there is a major problem among the public, which is why verification is critical from the point of view of the financial regulator.

Mr. George Treacy

We staged it, first, as an information-gathering exercise; second, for the purpose of analysis; and third, to verify. We clearly recognise the need to verify the information.

I would not regard six out of 25 institutions as a comprehensive verification.

The Deputy can ask further questions when Mr. Treacy has finished speaking.

Mr. George Treacy

If we feel that any of the information we are getting requires further verification we will consider this. We have not ruled it out; we said that would be the minimum number we would undertake. In choosing these we sought to ensure we picked large as well as sub-prime lenders, as they are termed. We will return to this if we feel it is necessary.

With regard to what we did on-site, we examined individual files of customers who had sought early redemption of their loans.

Were they randomly picked?

Mr. George Treacy

Yes. As the Deputy will appreciate, we do not have a——

To clarify, those files were not provided by the banks but were randomly picked?

Mr. George Treacy

Yes, we picked them randomly.

With regard to the funding issues, we had discussions with the lending arms of the institutions and the treasury personnel to gain an understanding of how that was done. Perhaps Ms McMahon could be more specific in this regard. She has already addressed the issue in the case of how the bank traced through the loan to the actual blended rate.

Ms Fiona McMahon

We sat down with the treasury people in the institutions and investigated how they have funded, what the cost of the funding was at the point in time at which the customer took out a fixed rate mortgage, and the rates that applied for either re-investment or replacing of——

I am aware of that, and I would not like the witnesses to go over old ground. I have a simple question: is there a similar situation to what happened with Anglo Irish Bank whereby, effectively, the Financial Regulator took so-called independent information provided by Anglo Irish Bank? The same has happened here with regard to the banks coming up with independent actuarial reports. Is the Financial Regulator going into the banks?

Ms Fiona McMahon

Yes. We are going in and taking samples. We are picking a certain month——

I know, but what information is the Financial Regulator taking? Is it actuarial evaluations? Is the regulator looking at that level, or accepting the reports provided by the financial institutions? What level of verification work is the Financial Regulator conducting?

Ms Fiona McMahon

We are drilling down into client files. We take samples of client files from a selected number of months in individual institutions. We are going through the quotations given to customers, what charges were applied and what quotations were taken up; we are also investigating whether they were calculated correctly and asking the institutions to show us how they come up with the cost of funds at the times of origination and redemption.

Is it cross-referencing the bank's stated rate of borrowing on the day with the actual rate on the wholesale market on that date?

Ms Fiona McMahon

Yes; we are checking that through our own internal markets department.

So it is doing the actuarial work independently of the banks?

Ms Fiona McMahon

We are not taking an actuary on site but we are carrying out internal checking of the rates provided to us by the institutions while on site.

The key components here are the rates at which the banks said they borrowed, the rates at which they actually borrowed and the rates they charged to customers. Has the Financial Regulator considered, over the period before the loan is redeemed, whether the banks re-financed the funding as provided to mortgage holders from day one? Can it state that the banks themselves have not been borrowing short and re-financing the funding for those mortgages without giving the benefit to the mortgage holders? Has it considered it on that level? That is the kernel of the issue.

Ms Fiona McMahon

That is part of the work we are currently doing. We have written to all the institutions and asked them to provide us with a maturity profile of their mortgage books and a maturity profile breakdown of the funding for those books so we can check whether what the Deputy is saying is actually taking place. To return to a question the Deputy asked earlier, we have also asked all the institutions to populate a standard example so we can see whether——

There is consistency.

Ms Fiona McMahon

Yes, or different institutions are producing different numbers to the same——

Is the Financial Regulator going back to all 25 institutions?

Ms Fiona McMahon

Yes; we have asked all institutions to respond.

Will there be one example or is the Financial Regulator asking them to provide a range of examples?

Ms Fiona McMahon

There is one standard example for every institution.

Based on that, would the regulator consider extending it? The key point is that the public are entitled to certainty on the issue. At the moment, average mortgage holders with fixed-rate mortgages — particularly young couples and people who have bought houses — feel they are suffering a burden of interest over and above what they should be suffering. I am talking about the period since the mortgage was taken out. One of the reasons the banks got into trouble was that they were borrowing short to lend long across a range of areas, and then when they went to borrow short when the markets started to tumble, they were not able to.

How long before the Financial Regulator will have the results of this verification work? With the six institutions, what is the mix? What percentage of the overall residential mortgage book will it cover, and what is the breakdown among the normal mortgage providers and the subprime providers?

Mr. George Treacy

That is something on which we can get back to the Deputy. As I said already, we tried to choose the particular firms to be sampled to obtain a sample from each category. I will clarify that what we are trying to do here is to verify whether a charge which, in many cases, can be substantial — I do not think anybody is——

It can be €20,000 or €40,000 in many cases, which is crazy money.

Mr. George Treacy

Yes. The biggest number I have seen was about €44,000, in a case which was recently publicised.

What size of mortgage was that applied to?

Mr. George Treacy

I think it was around €400,000.

So it was 10% of the value of the mortgage?

Mr. George Treacy

It was pretty substantial.

How many years had gone by on the mortgage at that stage?

Mr. George Treacy

I do not know.

Those are crazy figures.

Mr. George Treacy

It is also arithmetic, I am afraid, although it brings in its wake much trouble, heartache and worry for the consumer. If it was a loan of €100,000 it would be one quarter; if it was ten times as big the figure would, unfortunately, be ten times the size. There are very large mortgages out there and some of the fixed rates are very long. That is what the figures will throw up. The question of whether the breakage fee should be capped and whether institutions should be allowed to charge a breakage fee is different. Once a breakage fee applies, it is critically dependent on the arithmetic. The duration left on the loan is important — sometimes up to ten years. The amount of the loan is also relevant; if we are talking about a loan of €400,000 or €500,000 it will be a large figure. If the loan was taken out at a time when rates were 5.5% or 6% — they have fallen about 3% since — the figure will be high. I am afraid no amount of investigation on our part will reduce that figure.

When does Mr. Treacy expect to conclude the inspection and have it ready?

Mr. George Treacy

We hope to have the other three inspections done in fairly short order. However, if we feel there is further follow-up work to be done we will undertake it.

Will it be a public document?

Mr. George Treacy

We have not intended——

I call on Deputy Barrett.

I would appreciate if that question could be answered.

We agreed two questions initially. We have had about ten, so Deputy O'Donnell should allow Deputy Barrett to ask a question.

When will the report be published?

Mr. George Treacy

There was no intention to issue a second——

Deputy Barrett is asking a question. Deputy O'Donnell must allow him to do so.

I join others in thanking the delegation for its attendance. Regarding the investigation into institutions, have brokers been investigated? The vast majority of people who took out loans in the recent past got them through a broker. While the file in the institution might clearly state certain facts, the only dealings the client had were with the broker. It is totally different. Has that issue been examined?

It is clear that the committee should ask for an amendment to the Consumer Credit Act regarding the requirements for persons taking out a fixed interest rate mortgage. As stated in the report, the current provisions state it is required that where an early redemption fee is payable, a statement to that effect must be included in the information offer and acceptance letter. A statement is very broad in scope.

The fees being charged in the event of a breakage should be specified. One does not know when a breakage will occur but if there is a fixed fee for services or whatever, they should be specified. The more information we give to the person concerned the better, rather than just providing a statement of requirement. An amendment to the Act requiring this would be of help and benefit to the delegation and the individuals involved.

I formally propose that the committee write to the Minister requesting a change to the Act as a result of the report presented to us and the information available. We should specify clearly what is required of an institution, namely, a statement of the amount of the fee and how an institution would calculate the breakage fee to be charged. It should be specified, rather than being an ordinary statement.

Another area of concern regarding fixed rate mortgages is that many of them were accompanied by endowment mortgages. There will be trouble in the future because the basic sum of an endowment mortgage, if it was on a with-profit basis, was calculated with the assumption of a reversionary bonus being added. In the old days, one was more or less certain that such a reversionary bonus would not reduce because it was always fairly conservative. However, given the times we are living in it is not the case and in the next five or ten years people who have endowment mortgages will come up short with the actual capital because the sum that will be available at the end of the term will not match that of the original loan. It is another area I respectfully suggest the delegation examine.

If endowment mortgages are to be issued, it should be on a non-profit basis and be a fixed amount, so there is certainty about the capital sum available when the period expires. People could be €20,000 or €30,000 short and do not realise it. Many endowment mortgages and policies were based on a reversionary bonus plus a terminal bonuses. Terminal bonuses are being cancelled so people will not receive the benefit of them at the end of the period in question. It is a significant problem area that should be investigated.

Some warning should be issued through the Financial Regulator's office to individuals who may have endowment mortgages that they should check their current value, the anticipated value and how it is likely to fare, because now is the time for them to try and correct the situation by upping payments to an endowment policy. I would appreciate if the delegation's office could take that on board, because alongside the issue we are discussing, there could be the possibility of the capital sum not being available at the expiry of the term of the mortgage.

Mr. George Treacy

Regarding the question of brokers, as our focus was on how the banks calculated their charges and the justification for the calculation and application of the early redemption charge, we did not focus on brokers in this exercise. However, the practices of some, but not all, mortgage brokers have been a matter of concern for the Financial Regulator for some time. We have taken a number of actions against mortgage brokers over the years regarding the falsification of income, P60s and so on. We co-operate with the Revenue Commissioners and the Garda in these matters. It is going on all the time in the background. We are aware of concerns about it and have our own concerns. Some years ago we took the opportunity to call lenders together, raise our concerns and suggest that a much closer examination of documentation received in loan applications was necessary.

Regarding the amendment of the legislation and the passing through of information, section 121 requires a statement, together with a statement on how the fee is to be calculated. It is not possible to say what the fee will be at any given time, but following on from the suggestion made earlier, it may be possible to develop a table setting out the scenario that might apply. The question of the legislation is a matter for the members.

I understood endowment mortgages are not a significant feature of the mortgage market in recent years, but there is a significant legacy there. We have advised that a range of actions be taken regarding endowment mortgages and that borrowers with such products should be given the opportunity to top up their policy if necessary and be alerted to the terminal values of such products. I am referring to a number of years ago——

They may not be commonly sold today, but those who have them are the ones who will suffer.

Mr. George Treacy

That is correct.

That is why we need to concentrate on continuously advising people as the Financial Regulator has done in the past. It is why I ask the regulator to recommence its early warning system. That is in everybody's interest because the sum of money is considerable.

Mr. George Treacy

Yes. I will note that.

Are the financial institutions telling a consistent story? Is there any historical or anecdotal data on the fees they charged in the past when the situation was different? The regulator may not have examined that in the same detail. What was happening when the variable rate was higher than the fixed or when they borrowed cheap? Was it just a case of horse trading? Are they being consistent or have they concocted a formula which one cannot deny on paper? Did they always work according to that system? People would not run to change their mortgages unless they wanted to get out for other reasons. Does the historical argument stand up?

Mr. George Treacy

Historically they charged this as a fixed fee based on three, six or 12 months' interest, depending how much longer the loan had to run. A flat fee, however, does not reflect the cost. At the time it caused concern that people were being charged a penalty fee for repaying a mortgage when there was no cost to the bank. It was the reverse of the present situation.

Following our investigation at the time and our pointing out that if an institution charges a flat fee under the section 149 provisions it must notify that to us and get approval, banks moved to a position where they charged for the cost and applied these formulae. My understanding is that the formula the institutions provided us with, on foot of our request, is the formula they have applied since then. We did not examine this.

They use different rates but their results tend to be similar. Our actuary reviewing the formulae says that they effectively calculate the difference in a similar way. They vary but not materially.

When does the regulator expect this report to be concluded and will it be made public?

Mr. George Treacy

We have no intention of publishing a report on the matter. We undertook in our response to the committee, however, that if there was any matter or finding which was materially incorrect or misleading we would contact the committee about that.

Will the regulator present the follow-up verification work to the Minister for Finance?

Mr. George Treacy

We will certainly share that with him.

Is the code for handling people who fall into arrears with residential mortgages voluntary?

Mr. George Treacy

No, that is a statutory code that was introduced this year. We intend to conduct on-site reviews of the banks' books to verify compliance. The Ombudsman can take it into account in reaching his decisions because it is a statutory code. We can apply a sanction if we identify a breach of the code.

What is the sanction?

Mr. George Treacy

It is the same sanctioning procedure. The legislation provides for the maximum limit. The severity of the breach, how people respond to the issues and whether it was sanctioned, all go into the mix.

I thank Mr. Treacy and Ms McMahon for coming here and giving us an up-to-date account of what is happening, especially for the information they have provided in their report. I would appreciate if they could inform us when the report is complete if they need to make any changes because of the remaining work they are doing.

Sitting suspended at 3.10 p.m. and resumed at 3.20 p.m.

The purpose of this session is to discuss the review carried out by Mazars consultants of lending to small and medium businesses which was published by the Minister for Finance last week. As members will be aware, this was an independent review of credit availability funded by the banks but managed jointly by the banks, Government and business representatives. I welcome Mr. John Thompson from the Department of Finance, Ms Dera McLoughlin and Mr. Joe Carr from Mazars, and Mr. Pat Farrell from the Irish Banking Federation.

Members are reminded of the parliamentary practice that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside of the Houses or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I draw their attention also to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. I invite Mr. Thompson to make a presentation.

Mr. John Thompson

Members have been given a brief document summarising the main points. I will briefly put that in context and draw attention to some of its features.

The supply of credit to business is economically vital. There was a good deal of concern on the part of Government that many conflicting statements were being made and there was a desire to get a proper baseline, establish the facts and so on. That is what we set out to do.

Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland agreed to take part in and fund the review as part of the recapitalisation deal announced in February. Some volunteer banks, Ulster Bank and National Irish Bank, joined in also. Bank of Scotland, unfortunately, was unable to take part but those three volunteers also made a financial contribution, which is worth recording.

We had a broadly representative steering committee and we benefited greatly from its input. The context, as members will see in the document provided, is that on the Central Bank figures business lending had been rising fairly rapidly for several years and the figure shown would be the total, including the larger corporate borrowers and so on. As members will see, that comes to a stop. It peaks in June 2008 but declines by approximately 2% overall. That is the context.

Overall lending has fallen a good deal but that fall is heavily concentrated in construction, real estate and a number of such sectors. We excluded those from this review because they would distort the picture. We believe we know what is happening in that regard but we were anxious to determine what is happening in the rest of the economy.

On the main features of the review, one of the features is our survey of SMEs. Many surveys have been done but this one is of a particularly high quality. It used a very large database, had a carefully constructed sample, asked factual questions and did telephone interviews with a great deal of care taken to ensure the right people answered the questions fully. That has been a particular feature of this report.

The overall outcome is quite complex. We can see that the stock of lending was steady over the period. That does not mean there was no lending going on. There is a constant turnover but the stock is staying the same. The demand for credit in quantity of money has gone down, although the number of people applying has gone down much less. That would suggest people are being a little cautious about what they are looking for, which is understandable.

The number of requests for credit, and this is on the banks' records, is 119,000, which is fairly large. One of the controversial features is that the banks' view of the number of applications they are refusing and the customers' view are quite different. That largely seems to centre around customers' perception of a fairly informal approach. The banks tend to be somewhat more formal in their approach than their customers and that makes up part of the gap in that respect.

As members will note from the report, the rates of refusal of credit are very varied in terms of a number of factors, namely, by the size of company, the sector the company is in and the bank that is lending. Members will also note the details in that respect in various parts of the report. From the sample of the files examined by the consultants, they found that, in general, the refusal seemed reasonable in the context of normal business criteria. That is an important point.

The type of credit people sought tended to be very much concentrated on working capital and similar types of finance. Some people are still seeking money for expansion and investment but, understandably, working capital has become the main credit sought.

Credit policy is another point on which there is a fairly considerable difference of opinion between the banks and their customers. At a formal level credit policies have not changed, but banks had a system of exceptions to policy and that has been very much tightened up. Members will note on page 40 of the report the customers' view is that on many occasions credit has been refused because in their view bank policy has changed. There is a difference of opinion on that aspect.

In regard to business conditions, the banks' loan books have deteriorated and many small and medium-sized enterprises report falls in turnover and in employment. We examined credit insurance in particular because, as the members may be aware, a problem arose earlier in the year about credit insurance. Forfás did considerable work on it. We were concerned that a difficulty in obtaining credit insurance might be a feature in preventing bank lending. It transpired that was true in only a small minority of cases. Surprisingly, given the fairly well documented difficulties in obtaining credit insurance, the alternatives the banks offered, the products one could use instead of credit insurance, were not much in demand and there was very little sign of much increase in demand for them. That was surprising.

In terms of recommendations, we believe that this issue is an important economic variable and we will need to tract it over the next year or two in a way we did not previously. We will work with the various stakeholders to put something together on that. We want something that is not a huge burden. We are not collecting statistics for the sake of doing so. We are conscious that there can be considerable costs in collecting data. We will try to come up with a good and practical method based on recommendations in the report. We will work that out with the stakeholders, including the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. The report runs through international experience where governments have taken various actions to support business, business lending and so on. We will examine those in the future.

On the issue of the Government response to credit problems, I will mention briefly the guarantee scheme introduced last September, which has been crucial in protecting banks from loss of deposits. The recapitalisation of the banks has given them a good deal of leeway in allowing them to be in a position where they can lend. When the quality of a bank's loan book comes under pressure as economic circumstances change, it has to put aside more capital. That is an important consideration for the banks. As part of the recapitalisation of the banks, there are a number of specific commitments for the two recapitalised banks. The details for Anglo Irish Bank have not been finalised yet, but for Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland, they are quite specific commitments and those are reported on quarterly to the Minister for Finance and those reports are checked by the regulator. With regard to the future, the aim of the National Asset Management Agency is to strengthen the banks' balance sheets and to create a situation where they are in a position to lend as needed.

I thank Mr. Thompson for his contribution. Do Mr. Farrell and Ms McLoughlin wish to contribute?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

No, I will respond to questions as they arise.

Mr. Pat Farrell

We welcome the report because there had been a good deal of anecdotal information as regards the environment for lending to SMEs. When we last came before the committee, we clearly said that we were lending to business. The report supports that because in a period in which the economy has declined by about 10%, the level of lending to SMEs has been constant at €34.5 billion. That is a significant amount of money. It is also a dynamic figure. It is not one that is static, in that within that figure, loans are constantly being renegotiated and re-financed. There have been applications within that figure. However, that figure also reveals is that while the sector remains very supportive of businesses that have a sustainable operation, there are also situations where the risk climate has significantly changed. The number of loans that are on watch has risen significantly and the trading conditions in a range of firms in the SME sector have considerably deteriorated. We contend that not alone is the banking sector lending to SMEs but it has taken on a far higher degree of risk in terms of the risk-sharing arrangement with the sector than would have been the case hitherto.

I wish refer to what I consider to be three or four key findings of the report. While the report highlights that the pricing and security conditions attaching to applications for credit appear to be reasonable, which is an important finding in the context of normal commercial and business lending criteria, there had been some commentary to the effect that this was different. The report also makes the point that they do not differ significantly from those offered to existing customers — this is in the case of new applications.

The report also makes the point that in the case of declined applications, in general, for the sample of credit files examined, which was an extensive exercise, the decision to decline seemed reasonable in the context of normal commercial and business criteria, given the information on the file in regard to the application. The other important point is that the value of new applications for credit decreased by an average of 42%. However, even though they decreased by that amount, one would expect a similar reduction in the value of lending but I draw the attention of members to the fact that the overall level of funding remained at €35.5 billion. The absence of that reduction underlines my point that this is a dynamic environment where credit facilities, at the request of small businesses which are experiencing very difficult trading conditions in many cases, are being renegotiated, restructured and extended at the request of the customer. That is to facilitate longer repayment periods, put loans on interest only for a period or negotiate them on to a longer-term structure.

The other aspect that is highlighted in the report is that the capital adequacy framework with which we now live has changed the environment in terms of the way banks must apply the credit rating systems. That, undoubtedly, has had an impact, but it is something in which banks are takers rather than appliers. We acknowledge that and we also acknowledge that has probably been the cause of some of the communications gap between the banks and small and medium enterprises. We have resolved to work in that and in a number of other areas with the sector to try to close that communications gap. We have developed a business brief guide, which we have put on our website, www.ibf.ie. It explains the credit rating process for customers.

From our point of view, we believe this report is just a road map. It gives us a clear direction ahead but we also believe and want to emphasise that banks can only be part, albeit a critical part, of helping businesses to sustain themselves in this very difficult environment. There are a number of stakeholders involved, not least other authorities, enterprise agencies, etc. We are prepared to make that journey forward and engage constructively through the clearing house group that has been established by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the Department of Finance and other representatives, but it is a journey we have to make not on our own but with all of the other actors involved because it is not just about access to credit. There is a whole host of complex issues involved. There has been a severe increase in the level of debtor days. Some businesses are sustaining period upon period of trading losses, which indicates that the underlying business might not be viable in the longer term.

On the rate of decline of credit, some commentators said recently they were surprised that there were any decline rates but that is not facing reality because every business that applies for credit will not be automatically approved for credit. Some applications will not stack up under normal credit criteria, and the report reinforces that.

We welcome the publication of the report. We will continue to engage with all stakeholders and work on the recommendations highlighted in the report. There is undoubtedly more work that can be done to improve the environment.

I thank Mr. Farrell.

I welcome the delegation and would like to put a few questions to it. I have read the report which is comprehensive. However, the limitations appear to be considerable, when one considers the assumptions made at the end of the report. Perhaps Mr. Thompson might clarify a few points for us.

The keep issue is the lack of credit to existing businesses, small businesses in particular. A questionnaire was used by TMS-MRBI, but where in it was one asked about the relationship with the bank in terms of the availability of facilities and whether credit facilities had been reduced or changed? I cannot find that question and it a critical query. We find the biggest problem for small business is that credit facilities are being cut and overdraft facilities reduced. In the main, the report seems to deal with new lines of credit. It refers to a limitation in that one can distinguish between new and existing customers owing to the way banks maintain their records. I am worried about those involved in small businesses set up in the last year or two because it takes about five years for someone to get a foothold and become established in business. According to the survey, it appears that 72% of businesses are in place for more than ten years and that 86% have been with the same bank for five years or more. Where has the small business group set up in the last two or three years been captured in the report? That group is under enormous pressure. Where in the questionnaire is the issue of facilities for existing customers who are coming under pressure from the banks dealt with? Where are new businesses dealt with in the report? The report deals with the historical position; it only covers the period up until February this year. Mr. Farrell said €34.5 billion was the static level of investment in that period. What is the current level of investment? Has anything changed since the date mentioned in terms of the level of funding provided? Permanent TSB does not appear to have been involved in the study. Was it asked to be involved and, if so, did it decline?

I note that in the report there is no distinction made between medium and micro and small businesses. That is due, once again, to the fact that the banks did not distinguish between them. The group coming under most pressure comprises small micro businesses, but they have been dealt with as part of an overall group. I would like Mr. Thompson to deal with these points. The thrust of my argument concerns existing businesses and the working capital available to them. I note that approximately 85% of the total number of applications cannot be separately identified in most banks. The report states one was required to consider both as availing of one credit facility option.

The availability of overdraft facilities is the key problem. Small businesses may have an overdraft of €10,000 or €15,000. However, the banks are reducing an overdraft of €15,000 to €10,000. In addition, overdrafts of €10,000 are being pulled back.

The findings are based on the information available, but I would like Mr. Thompson to elaborate on where the report deals with small business people and facilities for existing customers on which the banks have not pulled back. A key factor is that businesses cannot continue owing to a lack of credit.

Mr. John Thompson

The report is historical because obviously one must go back in time and it takes time to do this. Therefore, one will always be slightly behind. The Central Bank is tracking the level of business lending as a whole. As I understand it, the picture in the last few months has been up and down a little. However, we are talking about the total level of business lending being around the €50 billion mark, leaving aside the construction sector. The changes in the last few months have been small. Most recently they have been up, but there is no great change either way.

As regards recently established businesses, they form part of the sample. People were asked how long they had been in business. The number is identified, but they are not picked out for special treatment. That was not an issue that came up. The steering group was broadly representative and included the three main business organisations — Chambers Ireland, the SFA and ISME. That was not an issue they particularly brought to our attention; therefore, we did not specifically identify recently established businesses. There is a question in the questionnaire that asks how long a person has been in business; therefore, it would be possible to extract figures for those who have been in business for a very short time.

There is a figure in the report for the level of credit advanced. I hope the Deputy will not ask me on what page it is included because I cannot remember, but it shows how many overdraft facilities have still not been availed of. That figure is high — it is close to 50% — and in the period did not change a lot. Because we hear such stories, we would have expected the amount to be way down, but that does not show up in the figures.

With overdraft facilities there is a capacity to reach a limit, but one will have fluctuations between various businesses.

Mr. John Thompson

Very much so and that comes out strongly in the report. Interestingly, one can look at the views of both customers and banks of declines — the polite word for refusals.

My specific point is that the report does not appear to deal with that issue; it was the vehicle used to gain information on the demand side. However, the way banks presented the information did not enable sufficient data to be gathered to enable a considered opinion to be made. The questionnaire does not appear to include specific questions such as: "What is your current relationship with your bank?" and "Have your existing facilities with the bank been altered in any way?" The questions asked are very much about new business. In most cases the critical issue for businesses concerns their existing facilities. The problem is the dramatic impact they are having on the availability of working capital. Businesses are not being paid and are using their overdrafts to survive, yet the banks are pulling back on these facilities. As a result, effectively they are going out of business. That is the point I am trying to make. Can Mr. Thompson tell me where in the report is that issue addressed?

Mr. John Thompson

Am I right in saying it has not specifically been looked at?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

It has not been specifically looked at in the questionnaire. In the questionnaire one is asked: "Have you sought to increase your overdraft?"

In a lot of cases, however, they are just trying to hang on to their existing facilities, on which the banks are pulling back.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes.

That is more than anecdotal.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

As the Deputy points out, there are certain restrictions in bank systems and we were not always able to split all the details between new and existing businesses. To deal with that issue, we sampled a significant number of credit files across all participating banks, of which there were five, and looked at the terms and conditions. A credit file sets out the relationship between a customer and the bank. We looked at the extent to which they were changing, if they were, and the nature of that change. It is not possible to examine 35 billion files. However, we sampled the number and what we found suggests that the terms and conditions are largely not being changed by the banks except at renewal date, which is normal in the relationship between banks and their customers. Based on the sample we took, we did not find any significant change to terms and conditions or pricing.

Was that sample based on the TNS-MRBI data?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

No. There were two sides to the study. There was a demand side, in respect of which we were obliged to seek support from TNS as a result of the restrictions on information, and a supply side, which really involved interrogating the banks' systems. The supply side, which is the part I am referring the Deputy to in the context of the sampling of files, was conducted by us. We selected samples across all product types and all types of business and sectors.

What about sole traders?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes, and we even considered the agricultural sector. We examined and profiled, in so far as is possible, new and old business and looked at quite a diverse range of credit files. A credit file provides the most comprehensive information one can obtain in respect of a particular customer.

Did Mazars consider customers who were in difficulty in the context of credit facilities?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

The way one identifies a customer who is in difficulty is by his or her credit grade. Broadly speaking, there are three types of credit grade — namely, performing, on watch and impaired — and we selected a sample of customers from each type.

Was the position relating to the European Investment Bank funding to which the banks have access, the level of drawdown in respect of such funding, etc., examined?

Mr. John Thompson

The funding to which the Deputy refers was agreed after the date of the report in almost every case. To clarify, such funding does not relate to the provision of working capital, which is what most people are seeking. It is aimed at investment, expansion and so forth. Our latest information indicates that, while the process is somewhat slow, the banks have begun approving loans and people are beginning to draw down the moneys involved. We do not yet have full information in respect of this matter but the process has commenced.

To place this matter in context, there is a total of €350 million available and, as the Deputy is aware, the figure for total credit is €34.5 billion. The money available from the European Investment Bank therefore represents only 1% of the total.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

On the distinction between micro, small and medium, we could not do that on the bank systems because they do not distinguish. However, we did distinguish between them on the demand survey and all of the information relating thereto takes account of the distinction.

It was stated that the level of on-watch and impaired loans rose from €14.7 billion to €23.8 billion in eight months.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

It was nine months.

The position in this regard will become significantly worse. Do our guests have a view on how this matter should be dealt with, particularly in light of whether the Government guarantee scheme will have an effect on the banks in the context of their putting in place overdraft and loan facilities? What will be the position of NAMA in all of this? The report clearly indicates that the figure relating to the loans has deteriorated by eight basis points. That is a significant deterioration and the position is obviously getting worse. Does Mazars have an opinion on how people might remain in business? The banking crisis is leading to job losses. In the macroeconomic context, we must promote the activities of entrepreneurs. We must foster an entrepreneurial culture because this will be one of the key components in ensuring that the economy emerges from the recession.

Mr. John Thompson

I am not in a position to comment on policy in respect of this issue. However, the Departments of Finance and Enterprise, Trade and Employment are giving active consideration to this matter. I cannot indicate what will emerge from that process or what policy decisions will be taken as a result of it. The Deputy may rest assured that we are definitely monitoring the position. The picture that is emerging and other information to which we have access is giving grounds for concern. An increase such as that to which the Deputy refers, which occurred over a relatively short period——

Is quite significant.

Mr. John Thompson

——in the number of loans that are at least on watch — the number that are impaired is still quite small — is a cause for concern.

The increase could be of the order of 12 basis points in a year.

Mr. John Thompson

We are monitoring the position closely.

I welcome our guests. Section 5 of the report deals with the issue of bank lending and on page 47 there is a table which lists total bank lending — by lending product category — to SMEs and gives a total of €34.5 billion. The figures appear to have been fairly consistent during the nine-month period to which consideration was given. The table shows the starting position, the position at the end of each month and then the closing position. If the total loan book was €34.4 billion in June 2008, how much new activity is taking place? How much of that money was repaid during the following nine months and, in value terms, how many new loans were issued? The table does not illustrate the full picture in the context of throughput and actual activity. During the period in question, how much money was advanced to SMEs in the form of new loans?

On the availability and drawdown of working capital, there is a good graph on page 57 which appears to fly in the face of the anecdotal evidence of which we, as public representatives, have been made aware. The information provided on this graph appears to contradict what has been stated by business interests with which we have been in contact. The graph shows that the level of approved overdraft limits actually increased and that the drawdown level did not change to any significant degree during the nine-month period. Was there any change with regard to the number of businesses to which such overdraft facilities were made available? Is there an underlying story which is not readily revealed by examining the graph, which appears to indicate a stable picture with regard to the level of overdraft facilities available and the drawdown by businesses of the moneys relating thereto? There must be a reason why the information provided in the graph does not correlate with what ISME and the business people who have contacted us are saying.

Why is there such a discrepancy between the information that emerged from the survey of SMEs and the data provided by the banks in respect of the level of loan approvals? According to the survey, the level of approval is 14%, while the data made available by the banks indicates that it is 24%.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

On new activity, there is a graph at the top of page 50 which shows the value of new applications for credit. The total for the period is approximately €9 billion. There are a number of things which could have been included in new applications. For example, there could be applications from existing and new customers, applications from people to restructure or elongate the facility extended to them or combinations of other things such as top-ups, etc. In light of the information that is available within systems, it is difficult to distinguish these into their constituent parts. We were obliged, therefore, to focus a great deal of our work on new applications from new or existing customers. The value of formal applications, as represented on the graph to which I refer, is approximately €9 billion. If one applies the average level of approval or rejection to this, as the case may be, the figure is approximately 14%. That is the level of new business over the period.

Therefore, approximately 86% of that €9 billion was approved——

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Approximately.

——and of that, how much was drawn down?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

To be honest, in the majority of cases one cannot correlate in the bank systems an application to a draw-down. I could not conclude on that.

To tease this out, if we take the figure at June 2008, the total loan book to small and medium enterprises was €34.4 billion. As of the end of February 2009, how much of that figure had been repaid? That will tell us how much of the closing figure is accounted for by new activity within the nine months.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

I tried that. The application systems are entirely separate from the draw-down and the credit systems. One cannot do that analysis as it stands.

The key issue we are trying to deal with here is the level of new activity. We have the total loan book at the end of June and the total loan book at the end of February. They are broadly similar. That does not tell us much.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

What it indicates is that the books are broadly similar yet the level of applications has decreased. One would normally expect customers to be repaying their facilities. It gives a certain level of insight into the position, if that makes sense.

We have no idea how much of the €34.4 billion in June 2008 would have been repaid at the end of Ms McLoughlin's report.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

No. What I have looked at is the average life of the book and what we can draw as a conclusion is that it would appear there is quite a level of restructuring, renegotiation, elongation of facilities and roll-up of interest in a certain number of cases but I cannot put a number on it.

What Ms McLoughlin is saying is that the level of new activity may be more limited than we were led to believe. If the closing book figure is €34.37 billion, much of that is accounted for by, say, loans and——

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Some of it is accounted for by extending facilities, new facilities to existing customers and new facilities to new customers.

We do not have a measure of the——

(Interruptions).

Ms Dera McLoughlin

No. We cannot roll down, not in the case of all banks, to present a full picture for the market.

Based on what Ms McLoughlin has seen, is she prepared to give her view of the level of activity throughput in terms of new loans added to the €34.4 billion at the end of June? How much was added to that new loan sanction and drawn down to SMEs? It is a key question.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

New loans applied for are in the region of €9 billion and if one applies the approval rate to that of 14%, that gives the approximate figure. We cannot establish any more detailed facts than that.

Does Ms McLoughlin accept the approval rate of 14% is more accurate than the survey figure of 24%?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

In terms of the reasons for the difference, a bank records a formal application. There would be a good deal of activity which proceeds a formal application including an inquiry, an informal application, a call to the person's branch manager, a drop-in to the branch and so on. They are not recorded in bank systems and therefore are not treated as formal applications. That 14% represents declines on formal applications.

If we examine the demand side, which is what the customer perceives to be the case, in many cases they perceive an application for credit to be a conversation with a bank, a branch manager, an informal discussion and so on. There was quite a difference in perception between the two sides of what constitutes an application.

The other factor that might contribute slightly is that we looked at five banks in the study whereas if any kind of survey is done, such as the one we did, other banks will emerge as well. The five banks plus others, therefore, are represented on the demand side.

Why did TSB Bank not take part in the survey?

Mr. John Thompson

We set out to cover as many of the biggest business lenders covering the major part of the market as possible. Several small business lenders were not covered for practical reasons but in covering Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Ulster Bank, National Irish Bank and Anglo Irish Bank we covered a very high percentage of business lending.

Was it asked to take part in the survey?

Mr. John Thompson

To the best of my knowledge it was not asked, no. It is not regarded as a major business lender.

It is a reasonable lender to small business throughout the country.

Mr. John Thompson

I do not know its market share. I understand it is fairly small.

My final question is on the graph on the overdraft approval. Are there any significant shifts beneath that graph in terms of the number of businesses which had limits reduced or withdrawn? Is that netted off against other businesses that had new limits provided or extended? There must be some way of correlating that with what ISME is saying and our experiences of businesses contacting us.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

That is an average figure, as the Deputy can appreciate, reflecting the overall position of the sector as distinct from either groups of customers or specific institutions. That is the first point.

Is it the total rather than the average?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

It is the total but on an average basis.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

It shows what people have been drawing down versus what they have been approved to have drawn down, and it differs to the extent of 51%. The banks approved approximately €3.6 billion over and above what is drawn down over the period. It is clear there is an increased demand for new or extended overdrafts. There would be some conversion of overdrafts to loans. They would be the main patterns on overdrafts one would see.

Is that picture consistent with the feedback Ms McLoughlin got from the survey of the SMEs?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes. If the Deputy looks at the survey, the facilities were largely for working capital purposes and, traditionally, an overdraft would be used for working capital purposes. Increased overdrafts, new overdrafts and short-term loans would be the primary request on the demand side. Through the sampling of files, that pattern would be consistent as well. Working capital would be the primary reason for additional lending in many cases whereas there would be some indication to suggest that expansion type activities would——

The stable picture presented in this graph, however, was mirrored by Ms McLoughlin's survey and her contact with the SMEs. They did not present a different——

Ms Dera McLoughlin

No. There is a significant level of demand for overdrafts.

The sanctioning and the availability of overdrafts is consistent as well. It is stable.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes. One cannot see any difference in the pattern on either side. There is no difference apparent but there is still a high demand. An important point to make is that loans represent approximately 85% of the overall books and while overdrafts are very important, it would not be as significant in value terms as loans.

To help the discussion, the managing director of Anglo Irish Bank was before this committee about two weeks ago and it asked him, in regard to his bank, or should I say our bank, some of the questions the members have been asking already. He said the amount of new lending by Anglo Irish Bank was tiny. If I recall correctly he was covering the period from 1 January to 31 March and put the figure as under €40 million of lending. I also asked him about the level of capitalisation of interest because that goes into the pot and can appear as additional lending. The figures he quoted for the capitalisation of interest, and in the case of that bank we are dealing mainly with construction and related activity, was approximately 25 times the figure for new lending, which was significant. It was certainly very large and in the many hundreds of millions of euro.

Does Ms McLoughlin have a table by the banks in her survey of the amounts involved in lending that are, as the previous Deputies asked, the new lending? That is, lending to new projects of existing customers or new lending to new customers. That is what we mean. It would be helpful if we had that for each of the banks because as a result of the local and the European elections many of us have had opportunities to meet business people throughout the country and hear what they are saying. They are pretty realistic that the economy is difficult and that banking conditions are difficult. People consistently say that in many cases they are finding it close to impossible. I know the survey suggests that everything is fine but that is not the feeling of people on the high streets of our cities and towns. They seem to believe that things are really difficult. Is Anglo Irish Bank typical? That bank has a very tiny amount of new lending to either new customers or new projects. What is the delegation's definition of new and additional lending? If somebody's existing overdraft is renewed, is that new business? In my book that is existing lending, particularly in cases where people have had a long relationship with the bank. Many people have said to me that it seems that because they have been good customers with a reasonable business, the banks are squeezing them harder because one of the primary objectives of the banks is to get more money back in to restore their profitability and recover the losses they made. Has the delegation seen any evidence of this phenomenon in the course of its examination?

That is my first question and I have three more.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

We are saying very clearly that we recognise that conditions for small and medium-sized business have deteriorated significantly. A total of 74% of the businesses studied had a decrease in turnover in the past 12 months; 45% of those, more than 20%, more than half, have let employees go. From a trading perspective this was apparent and very clear. It is also saying that 24% of customers are not being approved for credit and this would suggest that it is a difficult environment. On the question of Anglo Irish Bank, I will make two points. First, construction activities have been excluded from all the analysis in order to normalise matters. Second, because it would be commercially sensitive information I cannot give the individual positions of each bank. However, from an SME lending perspective, Anglo Irish Bank would not be the main or very significant player in that market so the Anglo Irish Bank position may or may not be representative. From an overall market position which is what we are presenting, it might not be the benchmark.

But Anglo Irish Bank is included in the survey——

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes, it is.

——and the comments about that bank are kind of positive in that the appendix to the survey states that it has a range of support products to the SME sector, including a specific SME package launched within the past 12 months. To be honest, based on what Mr. O'Connor was saying, is this realistic?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

They have launched a package but I cannot comment on the take-up of the package.

Today's exercise is for public information and to send messages out to people who are in business about what is realistically possible in terms of their relationship with their banks in this very difficult time. Many business people are very realistic. I will put the related question more specifically. I have been approached, as has every Deputy in Dáil Éireann, by people involved in the car business and car loan financing business. It is obvious that car sales have collapsed. I am aware there was wild lending for car loan financing, particularly to very young people, to buy very expensive cars. What I am being told now by dealers, including dealers in my constituency whom I know, and who are being honest with me, is that people with secure public service jobs are coming to them wishing to change or trade up in a car but such people are finding it almost impossible to access that type of finance. This is the kind of problem that businesses are citing as making it almost impossible for them to continue in business. Allowing for them ornamenting the situation to me, they would have classified such customers as reasonably good credit risks.

There are favourable comments about first-time buyers and the volumes of lending being made available but people are saying that the requirements on the paperwork and verification sides are so onerous that in some cases people who might otherwise be reasonable prospects, particularly where house prices are perceived to be falling quite dramatically, find they are confronted with a very negative response. We are back in the chain of deals where person A's house purchase relies on his or her selling the house. I do not think there are many people in the house market yet but there are many people interested. Has the delegation any sense of how the banks are responding on a discrete basis to those kinds of applications from those kinds of businesses? I am talking about people who could be judged to represent a reasonable credit risk. It is a given that the criteria for establishing the reasonable nature of a credit risk have got tougher and I think people in business accept that.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

To answer the first question, our study did not examine personal credit, including mortgages or car loans.

I know but I am referring to the business implications. If a mortgage broker, a builder or an estate agent is selling, its capacity to do so depends on potential clients being able to gain access to finance because otherwise there is no deal.

Mr. Joe Carr

I will answer that. It is important to note the report deals with averages. There are some businesses and sectors in much greater difficulty than others. The figures on the demand for goods and services certainly do not paint a very rosy picture. They show a significant proportion of businesses are facing a significant reduction. We did not analyse why this is the case but one reason is obviously the lack of consumer demand in certain areas, particularly for durable goods. It is quite clear from the review of the SMEs that the demand for their goods and services has dropped and is dropping. In certain sub-sectors, this phenomenon is very significant and serious.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

The problem is more pronounced in certain sectors.

From an economic perspective, sales of new and second-hand cars have decreased dramatically. One interest of this committee is in seeing a revival of economic activity. Should the problems faced by customers who represent a good risk, be it in respect of buying a house or new or second-hand car, not be subject to scrutiny, perhaps by the Department of Finance?

Loans to operators at the lower end in the manufacturing sector have decreased dramatically. Is this because of supermarkets putting pressure on Irish suppliers? Does the reference to manufacturing include packaging, and so on?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Yes. I assume the Deputy is referring to page 48.

I am completely confused. It is either page 38 or page 48.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

There is a reference on page 48 to lending to individual sectors. Manufacturing is relatively static. There are some that have fallen.

I am looking for a reference that shows quite a decline.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

It could be on page 39, which sets out the rates of decline. That is another option.

Yes. I was referring to page 39, which deals with all manufacturing other than processing of food. There has been a huge decline. One could argue that there has been a reduction in the level of general demand in the economy. I assume the figure for manufacturing includes packaging and breaking down from bulk for distribution in Ireland. Is there any particular reason for this dramatic fall?

Mr. Joe Carr

We did not look into the factors underpinning this aspect of the survey. The Deputy is right to point out that various sectors in Ireland are experiencing severe difficulty. There is no standard rate of decline across all sectors. Some sectors are experiencing more difficulty than others. The report makes it clear that certain sizes of company are finding it more difficult than others. It was beyond the scope of our work to look into the reasons for the drop in demand.

People are aware that there have been falls in sectors like construction and property development. It is surprising that there has been such a fall in this sort of manufacturing. We are looking to generate and retain jobs in this area. The big main banks often refer to the business support fund. What is the delegation's perception of how that is operating? Perhaps I should address that question to Mr. Farrell. It has been suggested that each of the two big banks is providing €250 million to small companies. People seem very unclear about how to access those moneys.

Mr. John Thompson

A number of factors need to be considered in that context. As part of the recapitalisation agreement, the two largest banks agreed to make specific amounts of money available for lending to small and medium sized enterprises and first-time buyers. They have to report on their levels of such activity. Their figures are checked by the regulator. We are seeing that. I would like to comment on one thing that has emerged from this. I get the impression, judging by some of the things bankers have been saying, that they are a little surprised by the communication gap between the banks and their customers on a number of issues. They seem to be thinking about addressing that. It is important.

I have been told by people that when they go into their local bank, with which they have a long relationship, they are basically told that everything is dealt with at head office level in Dublin, rather than at regional level. Is that not the reason so many people are reluctant to ask for loans? They believe there is very little point in doing so. Are people getting an overly negative impression of the banks? Is the situation a little better than they think it is? Should they pursue loan applications?

Mr. John Thompson

As the Deputy can see in the report, the banks had systems of exceptions to policy. As far as I know, some of those systems operated at local level. They have been tightened up, however. Perhaps people are finding that their local banks are going by the book more than they did. At the meetings that were recently arranged throughout the country by the Minister of State, Deputy Kelleher, bankers suggested to business people that if they do not succeed at first, they should try again by taking it to a higher level. If the first bank manager to whom one speaks will not give one what one is looking for, one should ask for the matter to be taken to a higher level. The banks cannot promise people they will get the answers they are looking for, but they can examine these matters again. That suggests to me that what Deputy Burton is saying might be correct. Perhaps people at the front line are being too cautious or giving an overly negative impression. It seems to me that the banks are concerned about that. They are anxious to ensure that people have a realistic view of banks, the business of which is lending money.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

When we spoke to representatives of small and medium sized enterprises, it was clear that there is a perception gap between the impact of going into the bank for a loan and being refused and the reality of that. There is clearly a fear of being rejected when one applies for credit, or a concern about the process involved. It is clear that the perception gap I have mentioned — between the banks' view and the customers' view — is apparent on both sides.

Can Ms McLoughlin or Mr. Farrell speculate on why that gap might exist? For many businesses, it is not just a perception — it is a reality. When they make an approach, they are told they are wasting their time. When a business person who has banked in a certain institution for many years is told by a senior official in that bank that he or she is wasting his or her time, it is not unreasonable for the business person to be disappointed. Are the witnesses saying that business people who are told they are wasting their time should really think about writing letters to officials further up the chain? Under the terms of the bank guarantee scheme, loans should be made available to businesses involved in the environmental upgrading of houses, and so on. I do not get the feeling that people on the ground are easily able to access such funds. Perhaps Mr. Farrell might tell us about that. Over a long period, the Labour Party campaigned in the Dáil for the banks to take European Investment Bank loans. It would be helpful if the delegation could give the committee some examples of companies that have come through this process. That might give other people some confidence about approaching the banks.

Mr. Pat Farrell

I will make a couple of general observations. Borrower sentiment plays a large part in the current situation. Mortgage finance has been mentioned. Some 2,500 mortgages were drawn down by first-time buyers in the first quarter of this year. First-time buyers are maintaining or increasing their share of the market, which is much smaller than it has been in the past. Over the past 12 months, the extent to which first-time buyers have been approved for mortgage credit has consistently exceeded the extent to which mortgages have been drawn down. The number of people being approved for mortgages is approximately 10% or 15% larger than the number of people drawing down mortgages. I suggest that people are getting mortgage approval before standing back, relentlessly surveying the market and looking for value. While I do not have a TNS-MRBI survey to back that up, I think it is a pretty reasonable insight. The people in question are probably saying that house prices may drop further if they wait a little longer. We are continuing to see consistent drops in house prices.

The same sentiment plays a part in the car business too. There was a period when people seemed to change their car every two or three years. That is now seen as a form of discretionary expenditure. Car manufacturers are putting new cars on the market with warranties of three, four or five years. People are deciding to hold on to their cars, rather than changing them every two or three years. They are informed, in part, by the spectre of the transformation of the whole employment situation. As people are less certain about their future earnings streams, they are not as keen to decide to add more debt to their current debt profile, particularly for items of a discretionary nature. They are choosing to defer such expenditure for periods of one, two or three years. I suggest that all the factors I have mentioned are playing a part in driving borrower behaviour. I am not saying there are no other reasons. The factors in question are having a strong impact on the reduction in demand for credit. It depends on whether one wants to look at it from the perspective of demand or the perspective of production.

How common is it for younger first-time buyers who comprise the majority to seek insurance from a parent, whereby the parent would partly guarantee the loan for the adult child? The transaction cost is very expensive.

It struck me when I read the report that its findings bore little relation to the evidence on the ground. Ulster Bank, Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Limited and National Irish Bank seem to have aborted the idea of engaging in further significant lending in the economy. Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland are not even interested in lending to their best customers. That is the evidence on the ground. Will the delegation comment on this? The major contributor to unemployment is the attitude of the five main banking groups towards lending. They are just not interested; they are only interested in receiving money. The total figure for outstanding credit in the banking system which at the beginning of 2003 was approximately €160 billion increased by €220 billion in the four years to the beginning of 2007. Surely, therefore, the banks have a responsibility to continue to lend. Is it simply a question that they do not have the money?

Mr. John Thompson

I will start at the beginning. I cannot comment on individual banks, as the Deputy will understand. The report shows circumstances vary enormously and everyone reading it should not be overly concerned about the averages. The range is very wide and it is often the case that it is more important than the average. Page 39 shows the decline rate according to customers. The average figure is 24%; the range is from approximately 48% to 6%, depending on the sector involved. Therefore, the range is considerable.

On the basis of the customer survey – the banks' figures do not support it – the rate of refusal of credit for micro-enterprises is far higher than for the larger SMEs. However, there is a wide range across sectors. Some sectors in which the refusal rates are high are the very ones in respect of which we hear anecdotal evidence about people being in serious difficulty. There is no doubt about this, but the overall picture indicates the amount of credit is the same. However, this does not mean it is static because there is a dynamic situation. We discussed at some length the flow of new lines of credit. It is difficult to work this out, but it must be acknowledged there is a flow.

Under the recapitalisation agreement, as mentioned, the two largest banks have commitments to make extra funding available for SMEs and first-time buyers. They are obliged to make credit available but not to lend a specific amount. There is no doubt but that there is lending to SMEs by the two large banks. This has been reported on and the figures are being checked by the Financial Regulator.

Certainly, there are people suffering, about which there is no question. It is clear from the survey of SMEs that a large majority are experiencing a decline in turnover and a sizeable number are reducing the number of staff. The quality of the loan book is reducing and the number of loans on watch is rising sharply. We are seeing higher risks and certain sectors being hard hit by declining demand. We are seeing a very varied picture. Clearly, if a business in a hard hit sector is in difficulty and its bank regards it as a much higher risk than ever before, the average does not matter to that business because it is its own circumstances that matter. This is something about which we will have to be careful in the future.

Certain sectors were mentioned, but there are various others. The average is one matter, but the range is another. There is no doubt that certain sectors are suffering severely and the report does not hide this fact, but makes it abundantly clear. At the same time — as I do not wish to be too negative — I must state there are other sectors that are regarded as not very risky. A couple of sectors are experiencing very low decline rates in respect of credit. I explained that "decline" is the bank's polite word for "refusal", but that is the term we have used. There is no question that people are having very tough experiences, but this is part of the reality.

Mr. Pat Farrell

Deputy Burton asked me a question about people wishing to retrofit their houses to achieve energy efficiency. One of the areas in the mortgage market that is still buoyant in terms of volume is that of top-up loans on an existing mortgage. This is a very cheap form of finance because it is benchmarked against the ECB rate and is, therefore, the cheapest form of finance available. Many are topping up an existing mortgage to carry out energy-efficiency works on their house. This is the most straightforward way to do so for anybody who wants to access finance. It is efficient and quick and happens to work very well because one must be a houseowner in the first instance. Such persons have probably been in the house for a long period, thus implying their mortgage loan is mature, and it should be a relatively straightforward process for them to gain access to the additional finance. It is also a good investment and to be commended.

Page 39 of the report shows the decline rates are lowest in the areas where we identified the sectors as being very close to the real economy, the productive economy. I refer to manufacturing and the transport and distribution of goods. The sector is focusing its resources on those parts of the real economy closest to adding real value and actually creating and maximising employment. The areas showing the highest decline rates involve construction-related activities, in respect of which the risks have increased substantially. That pattern is evident when one looks at the decline rates across sectors.

On the points made about the banks only taking in money, they are required to take in money because they cannot lend it if they do not do so. They have been required by Government policy to reduce their leverage and adjust their loan to deposit ratios. They have a number of dials on the dashboard that they have to watch. They must maintain levels of credit capacity to the economy, particularly the productive real economy. At the same time they are required to bring their ratios back into line with those set out in the recapitalisation and guarantee schemes.

This is a fine report, but it is a pity it cannot give the breakdown between the opening balance of €34 billion, the repayments during the period, the credit advanced during the period to new and existing businesses, the credit withdrawn from existing businesses and the closing balance. We have incomplete records. The methodology was fine. I find it difficult to understand how the information was not freely available from the banks. We could have had a much more informed and meaningful discussion. The report which is nearly 100 pages long could have listed on one page the opening balance, repayments, credit advanced and credit withdrawn. Why is that not the case?

Mr. Pat Farrell

In a sense, it is not for me to stand over——

He who pays the piper calls the tune. The banks paid for the report.

Mr. Pat Farrell

The reality is that it was commissioned by the Government. Two of the banks paid for it as required under the terms of the recapitalisation scheme. The methodology and approach to the collection of the data were undertaken by Mazars. The report is important as it directly meets head on——

Can I just make the point——

Mr. Pat Farrell

Let me finish my point. The report meets head on several uncontested and unsubstantiated claims that have been in the ether for some time. There is up to €34.5 billion in credit in the economy. Some commentators asserted that lending had, in fact, ground to a standstill and that there was no credit in the economy. This is an unsustainable assertion. If it were true, the country would have ground to an absolute halt with the unemployment rate in stratospheric terms.

The unemployment rate is getting there.

Mr. Pat Farrell

The second point is that the approach taken by the banks in declining credit and the decline rate seem to be reasonable and fair under normal credit criteria. The report has been very valuable in dealing with these issues.

All sides agree we must create a lending environment in which there will be maximum confidence among SMEs to approach their lending institutions and enter dialogue about the requirements for credit facilities. For whatever reason, there is an impression that one cannot approach a bank for credit. I accept we have more work to do in improving our communications. That came out in the report and we will commit to tackling it.

It is also important people are persistent in approaching their lending institutions. Thousands of decisions on credit applications are made every day. I am sure some are wrong and should be revisited. I am also sure decisions to give credit can be wrong too. It is not all one-way traffic.

The report makes some valuable recommendations to which we are committed. We will work constructively with the small business groups, the Department, Enterprise Ireland and other involved parties. The report is a benchmark and gives some indicators as to what we need to do to improve our system.

We have no idea of how much the credit advance is rolled up in interest on existing loans. We know on the ground that small businesses cannot access finance from the banks, but we cannot get the details of this. While this is a worthwhile report, the devil is in the detail and we do not have the detail that enables us to state how much new credit has been advanced. We do not know how much has been repaid in the pulling back of existing facilities, for example. Mr. Farrell has said the banks are cleaning up their balance sheets by getting money in. I hope there will be a follow-on from the report where this information will be forthcoming from the banks.

Mr. John Thompson

We are anxious to put together a practical way of monitoring the situation. As I stated, this is economically vital and we are trying to get inputs from all the stakeholders. The Deputy's point on the withdrawal of credit is important. However, it is not a simple matter because so many facilities can be extended. The roll-up of interest, for example, was a particular feature of developers' and builders' facilities but not for others. Credit facilities are complicated. People can extend their credit or roll it over making it difficult to decide at what point does it become new credit.

The Government guaranteed recapitalisation——

Excuse me, Deputy, but we are going around in circles. We all understand the problems with this issue.

The banks should provide the information.

I hope in the future there will be a vehicle for getting better information on this issue.

The taxpayer is providing the guarantee.

Excuse me, Deputy, but I wish to call Deputy Terence Flanagan.

Mr. Pat Farrell

Let me respond to Deputy O'Donnell's comments because I do not want to leave them sitting there. The report incontrovertibly shows there is €3.5 billion in credit facilities which have not been drawn down. As Mr. Thompson said, certain requirements were set out for the recapitalised banks which are being monitored and met. The report states credit facilities are being renegotiated, restructured and extended to facilitate longer repayment periods or interest-only repayments. Banks are taking on more risk in that regard.

How many files were examined in those cases of refused credit?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

Approximately 1,000 files were sampled. It depended on the size of the bank and was proportionate. There was no pattern in refusals in the sample we examined. In the majority of cases it was due to inadequate repayment capacity or already highly leveraged businesses that may not have been able to sustain the level of additional borrowing. In some cases it would have been customers who might have applied to several banks when their primary banking facility was with another bank.

Did this raise further questions?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

We did have further questions. In such cases we would have discussed these with the lending managers. We also reviewed minutes of credit committee meetings to understand the rationale behind the decisions to refuse credit. In nearly all the cases we sampled it appears to be reasonable from a commercial perspective.

I note that in June 2008, 14.7% of the market was contained in the watch list or impaired categories for credit grades and that by February this year it had increased to 22.3%. What does that mean for the normal business owner if their loans are moved into this category?

Ms Dera McLoughlin

On page 59 of the report we set out the movement of categories of loans. A performing loan is one not in arrears and there is no issue with credit facilities. The watch list category would be for those which did not breach the Basel 2 rules specifying a period of 90 days.

Will such businesses have greater difficulty with credit or be squeezed more by the banks? If there are on the watch list and are under review, they will not be harrassed but will receive a great deal of extra attention.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

If one is on the watch list, it is a requirement under the Basle agreement that there be a level of engagement.

Looking at the new business loans that were reviewed, it seems that much more personal security was given by the business owners than that which was given previously.

Ms Dera McLoughlin

We could not separate the files from a data perspective, so we looked at the issue in credit files. We could see that there is a prevalence of personal guarantees and security which appear to be asked for in many cases. I cannot compare the previous period, so I cannot state if there is a significant increase or not, but it would appear to be prevalent.

On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank Mr. Thompson, Ms McLouglin, Mr. Carr and Mr. Farrell for attending this afternoon to discuss the report, which is a great reference point for the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the Department of Finance and the banks in formulating future policy. It also looks at much of the anecdotal evidence we have heard about over the years and puts it into perspective. That is vitally important because it gives us factual information. There are certain limitations on everything, and that is why the delegations have not been able to get detailed information on payback and so on. Hopefully, that limitation can be overcome in the future, but that might be in other people's hands.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.55 p.m. until 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 22 July 2009.
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