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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 14 Oct 2003

Vol. 1 No. 34

UN Peacekeeping: Presentations.

At the outset I would like to outline the reason for the meeting today. We are dealing with Ireland's role in UN peacekeeping and there will be a joint presentation by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence. I welcome our guests.

Ireland first sent its Defence Forces abroad to serve in a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 1958, 45 years ago. That mission in Syria, Israel and Lebanon is ongoing. Since then, Irish forces have served in nearly 50 UN missions overseas in 30 countries and territories around the world. Irish Defence Forces continue to serve in 13 ongoing UN missions. Our commitment to UN missions has, at times, approached 30% of our Defence Forces' serving personnel.

Our policy of sending our armed forces abroad to help in bringing peace to the conflict-torn regions of the world has not wavered over the years. Despite suffering some terrible losses, perhaps most famously in Katanga Province in the then Congo in 1961, that policy has been sustained, despite the loss of Irish lives in conflicts some far from Ireland and often far from our immediate interests. It demonstrates Ireland's constant and continuing willingness to support, with men and material, the central theme of our foreign policy in which the United Nations is the international body responsible for collective security. The UN Security Council remains the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. That policy continues to have the support of the Irish people.

The world is changing fast, however, and we thought it appropriate and timely that the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs should examine Ireland's role in support of the United Nations mandated peacekeeping missions and also examine the options and directions for future policy in this area. As members are aware, in the conclusions attached to the report following our visit to the UN in New York in November 2002, the joint committee agreed to examine the issue of Ireland's continuing role in peacekeeping and our future UN involvement. It is a subject which touches on many aspects of foreign policy and in which the public has expressed a great deal of interest. Today's presentation is the first part of an exercise within this committee which will lead in due course to the preparation of a report by the committee on Ireland's continuing role in peacekeeping and our future involvement in UN mandated missions.

I will mention briefly some related developments which should also be scrutinised by the committee in the context of this exercise. First, Europe is developing a defence capability through the European security and defence policy which includes the development of crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities outside the Union. As members will be aware, Ireland's participation in such missions is subject to the triple lock decision making process. Ireland's sovereign right to decide on whether and, if so, how to participate in and contribute to such missions is recognised by our European Union partners in the Seville declaration.

Second, Ireland has also committed itself to providing up to 850 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions under the UN stand by arrangement system. The UN increasingly relies on regional organisations, such as the EU and the OAS, to take the lead in peacekeeping missions.

Third, future developments might also include the participation by Ireland in UN mandated peace enforcement operations. Two such missions have already been authorised by the UN Security Council in Afghanistan and Iraq. The committee will examine the latest developments in this area and whether, how and under what circumstances participation might be considered by Ireland.

Fourth, following the humanitarian disasters in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, the UN sought to learn from its failures and to devise procedures to prevent such peacekeeping failures from recurring in the future. I suggest theBrahimi report, which was published following this review, also deserves our attention as it sets out the UN's recent thinking on how futurepeacekeeping missions should be run.

As a first step in considering these issues, we will have a joint presentation from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence. I welcome to the meeting Mr. John Deady and Mr. Julian Clare from the UN section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ciaran Murphy and Mr. Leo Connolly from the Department of Defence and Lieutenant Colonel Seán Kilbride and Colonel McNamara from Defence Forces Headquarters. Before we commence, I remind the meeting that while members are covered by privilege others appearing before the committee are not. I now invite Mr. Murphy to begin the presentation following which I will open the discussion to members.

I am from the Department of Defence and have responsibility for policy in relation to UN operations. Mr. Leo Connolly has responsibility for international security policy, mainly dealing with EU and ESDP issues. Mr. John Deady and Mr. Julian Clare are from the UN section of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Colonel McNamara is the director of operations and Lieutenant Colonel Kilbride is also in the operations directorate.

This presentation refers to peace-enforcement, but it also concerns Iraq in 1991 and Afghanistan in 2001.

I think it merits the clarification.

That should have been included to make it quite clear.

I wish to come back to these points after our guests have spoken.

We have already distributed a paper to the committee setting out the background, the current position and future directions of UN peacekeeping. The paper endeavours to address most of the issues raised by the committee in its correspondence. With the committee's agreement, I propose to touch on some of these issues. Mr. Deady will then deal with some of the background issues to UN peacekeeping and Colonel McNamara will deal with the military aspects.

Ireland has a long and honourable history of providing personnel to support United Nations' missions. Since it became a member in 1955, it made its first contribution to a peace support mission three years later contributing to UNTSO and to UNOGIL in the Lebanon. Ireland's first troop contribution came shortly afterwards in the Congo in 1960. Since then, Defence Forces personnel have served all over the world from Africa to the Middle East to the Far East. Over that period, they have completed more than 50,000 individual tours of duty with UN lead or UN authorised missions. This totals about 25,000 man-years of effort that is very significant on the part of any organisation.

The basis of Ireland's participation is firmly grounded in the United Nations Charter. Ireland is strongly supportive, as a matter of policy, of co-operative arrangements for collective security through the development of international organisations, especially the UN. Successive Governments have continually confirmed Ireland's position in relation to the UN, as the international authority for co-operative arrangements, recognising the primary role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The role of the Defence Forces on peace support operations is set down in the White Paper on Defence. In this regard, the Defence Forces are assigned the role of participation in multinational peace support, crisis management and humanitarian operations in support of the UN. In furtherance of this policy, the Government committed Defence Forces personnel to the support of UN mandates and Ireland has signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations committing 850 troops to the UN Stand by Arrangement System.

Ireland has also committed 850 troops under the EU headline goal to what is commonly referred to as the EU Rapid Reaction Force and we also participate in the Partnership for Peace. In March this year, Ireland signed up to the first two stages of membership for the Standing High Readiness Brigade or SHIRBIG as it is commonly known which is a brigade strength force dedicated to the United Nations for peacekeeping duties. I would like to emphasise that these arrangements are designed to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The focus of Ireland's participation in these arrangements is to develop a capability within the Defence Forces and a capacity to undertake multinational peace support operations with the optimum level of interoperability. The enhanced capability being developed arising from our preparations for the EU Rapid Reaction Force, and from our participation in Partnership for Peace, will serve Ireland's effective involvement in peace support operations irrespective of who happens to be taking the lead in that particular operation. As such it is not a question of choosing between the UN or the EU? The arrangements are mutually reinforcing and complementary

The UN recognises the advantages presented by regional organisations to which it can assign missions. Reliance on regional organisations to take the lead in UN authorised missions is one of the major developments in the changing environment of UN peacekeeping. For example, we saw NATO leading the missions in KFOR and SFOR and the EU leading the mission in FYROM and recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Economic Community of West African States initially led the mission in Liberia, which was recently in the news. In the case of ISAF, recently the Netherlands and Germany provided lead nation status and ISAF has now been taken over by NATO.

Another key development in UN peacekeeping has been the increasing use of chapter seven missions under the Charter. These are commonly referred to as peace making or peace enforcement. While the deployment of UN peacekeepers in peace enforcement roles was always envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter, until the 1990s the UN had only deployed or authorised missions where there was already a peace agreement or truce in place. This development of a chapter seven type mission is one of those which has also led to the UN extending, to a greater extent, the use of regional organisations and what I refer to as "coalitions of the willing" to enforce its mandates.

In addition to the more robust mandates, UN peacekeeping missions are also becoming significantly more complex involving the full range of responses to crisis management. Along with traditional military tasks, other elements now form core parts of any operation, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, the promotion of national reconciliation and respect for human rights, organising and monitoring elections, humanitarian tasks and the re-establishment of policing, judicial and other state functions and, effectively, the re-establishment of civil society as we know it.

Peacekeeping is, therefore, now seen in a much more holistic manner involving the full spectrum of responses required to build peace and to establish a functional civil society based on respect for law and human rights.

I think the "coalition of the willing" is a "coalition of the willing" within the UN Charter.

I think all our comments are within that framework.

Again, that is helpful.

From an operational perspective, the move towards this more proactive involvement by the international community in conflict prevention and peace enforcement leading to peacekeeping and confidence building measures and on to peace building and the re-establishment of society and social and economic development requires a different type of response than we may have been used to in the past. Therefore, it is important that Ireland continues to contribute to such missions so that we maintain and enhance the wide experience of the Defence Forces in these type of operations.

The Defence Forces have risen to the continuing challenges and developments in peacekeeping. Nearly 75% of our eligible serving army personnel have served overseas. Within the officer and NCO groups, that figure rises to more then 90%. Lessons learned from our experience of our own contingents and from international best practice, are integrated into our training programmes. Along with that, the extensive local liaison, where the military engage with local populations in the provision of support and humanitarian assistance, is one of the hallmarks of the Defence Forces' approach to their involvement in peace support missions.

Ireland is currently participating in 19 missions with 365 personnel. If Dáil Éireann approves the deployment of approximately 430 further personnel to Liberia, following detailed reconnaissance and review of the operations scenario, this will bring our overall contribution to about 800 personnel. This will be Ireland's highest participation since our withdrawal from UNIFIL.

The Defence Forces have brought great honour on Ireland through their participation in these operations. Their committed and dedicated service on overseas missions reflects well, not alone on the Defence Forces but on the nation as a whole. It contributes to the excellent reputation that Ireland holds among peacekeepers world wide

However, participation in peacekeeping operations is not without risk. In this respect, we should recall the 84 members of the Defence Forces who have paid the ultimate price in the cause of peace. A key concern for the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces in considering any mission is the safety and security of our personnel. In considering any mission, one must have regard to the degree of risk involved, the existence of realistic objectives for the mission, the requirement for a sufficiently robust mandate and the adequacy of resourcing. For this reason, detailed reconnaissance risk-assessment is undertaken prior to the deployment of a contingent. The results are considered and evaluated prior to a final decision to deploy.

The touchstone for Ireland's participation in overseas missions continues to be the UN. Ireland continues to build on a strong tradition of service to the founding principles of the United Nations, by making practical commitment of personnel on a continuing basis. This represents a major contribution for a nation the size of Ireland. It has been made possible by the willingness of the Irish people, in particular, the Defence Forces personnel and their families, supported by successive governments, to play our part in assisting with conflict resolution by responding generously to calls from the United Nations down the years.

I will now ask Mr. Deady to outline someof the foreign policy issues, before ColonelMcNamara deals with some of the military aspects.

Mr. John Deady

I wish to touch on some of the foreign policy issues that relate to our participation in UN peacekeeping. Our participation in UN peacekeeping operations is in line with the central importance that Ireland has accorded to the United Nations in its foreign policy since we became a member in 1955. The UN Charter confers primary responsibility for international peace and security on the Security Council. We believe that the member states have a duty, in accordance with their different capacities, to make the necessary resources available when the Council decides to establish, or to authorise, a peace support mission. Through its participation in UN peace support missions, Ireland has made a very significant contribution through the years to international peace and security and to human security in general.

This is in line with other major aspects of our foreign policy. I refer in particular to the promotion of human rights and our emphasis on official development assistance. It has become increasingly obvious that without peace building, without better respect for human rights, without strengthened political and civic institutions and without the increased economic and social opportunities that come from development, without, in other words, an integrated approach to peace building, the benefits conferred by individual peacekeeping missions will not be as great as they should be. It is also clear that these elements are the key to preventing conflict.

Therefore, these three elements of our foreign policy, namely the promotion of human rights, the commitment to development co-operation and participation in UN peace support missions are mutually reinforcing.

I wish to make a case for supporting effective multilateralism. We recognise, as many do, that the UN has not been and is not as effective as it might be. The Taoiseach spoke strongly on this matter to the UN General Assembly this year. We have strongly supported reform of the UN so as to make it a more effective instrument of the international community for dealing with global issues, including peace and security.

We have supported the changes introduced by Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, under his own responsibility to streamline the organisation. These include the reforms introduced in peacekeeping as a result of the recommendations of the Brahini Report. We support efforts to introduce reform to the General Assembly, to strengthen it and to enhance the role of the Economic and Social Council. These efforts are ongoing. We support efforts to reform the Security Council, to make it more representative and more in line with the geopolitical realities of today. Efforts to reform the Security Council have not met with enormous success over recent years. Due to recent events, this reform process has become more urgent. The Secretary-General, Mr. Annan, has given an impetus to the issue in his recent statements to the General Assembly in which he announced that he was establishing a high level panel to focus on how threats to peace and security and other global challenges might be met. The panel is to report back before the next session of the General Assembly.

Membership of the EU is also a fundamental part of our foreign policy. First, the EU is firmly committed to multilateralism and to the role of the UN in international peace and security. There have been a number of expressions of such commitment recently. Second, our participation in European Security and Defence Policy and in the PfP process does not in any way diminish our commitment to the UN. We have ensured that participation on our part, in any particular operation, will be a matter of choice for us. Our EU partners expressly acknowledged this at the Seville European Council meeting. The details are contained in the paper that is before the committee.

Within the European Union, we promote and will continue to promote vigorously EU support for multilateralism. In this context, the UN Charter itself envisages and expressly provides for the use of regional arrangements, or agencies, for enforcement action subject to the authority of the Security Council. Therefore, regional arrangements are fully in line with our traditional foreign policy approach.

The African Union and within it, the SADC - the Southern African Development Commission - is working hard on regional security arrangements with the help of the UN to engage in peace support in Africa under the authority of the UN Security Council.

We are all aware that we are operating in a different international environment from that which obtained some years back when international politics was dominated by the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought forth, or revealed, situations that led to conflict and that required action on the part of the international community. Situations arose that called for a more robust approach that called for recourse to so-called peace enforcement. This development was fully covered by the UN Charter. In fact, the charter itself makes no distinction between types of peace support missions. Chapter 6 contains a set of articles that deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. Chapter 7 deals with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Chapter 7 and Article 42 of the UN Charter cover all the peace enforcement actions undertaken since the end of the 1980s.

One further point on this, if the decisions taken by the Security Council and the obligations it imposes are not respected, its authority is undermined. The Security Council must, therefore, take action that is appropriate to enforce its authority if the obligations it imposes are not respected or are ignored and flouted. Its authority will be respected only to the extent that it can enforce its decisions.

As far as my Department is concerned, participation in UN peacekeeping is a key part of our foreign policy. It is a means whereby we can hold up our heads in the international community. Members of our Permanent Defence Forces who have participated in peacekeeping operations have gained enormous respect for Ireland in the UN Organisation and among UN member states around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Deady.

Colonel Gerry McNamara

I will confine my remarks to military and operational matters. The areas I will touch on are Ireland's ability to assist the United Nations with peacekeeping troops and advisers; some mention of personnel issues; a mention of equipment and how the Defence Forces are equipped to meet the roles assigned to them; a brief word on training, and, a very important area, the question of lessons learned from our past experience in peacekeeping operations.

The UNSAS commitment has already been mentioned, involving up to 850 personnel. To meet that commitment and sustain it over a long-term mission, it requires three times that amount. If we have a battalion deployed overseas on peace-support operations, there is a battalion at home training, preparing to participate. There will also be a battalion recently returned from the theatre of operations.

In addition to the UNSAS commitment, Ireland has also offered troops to the European Union and to PFP. In the European Union context, the Defence Forces submit a palette of forces, which are outlined in annex A to the document given to the committee. This palette exceeds the 850 in total, but the principle of limiting the Defence Forces' commitment to that deployment figure of 850 remains. The concept involves a contingent being selected and offered by the Defence Forces from the palette based on the requirements of a particular mission. We call that in military terms, task organisation, or task organising.

It should be clearly understood that in the Defence Forces we are fully aware of the fact that we have one capability to deploy 850 personnel and that it is a matter for Government decision as to where or when that capability might be deployed.

On the question of personnel, the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960, provides for Permanent Defence Forces personnel to serve outside the State on peacekeeping operations. The Defence (Amendment) Act 1993 provides for service overseas in a peace enforcement capacity. This arose at the time of the United Nation's mission to Somalia.

The history of our contribution to peacekeeping has meant that there has been no difficulty in raising sufficient troops to take part in overseas missions. There are from time to time shortages in specialist technical areas, like medical personnel, engineers, communications and information service personnel, ordnance corps, chefs and fitters. However, we are not unique in this. Most other military forces have the same difficulties with skilled technical personnel.

On the question of equipment, the Defence Forces have engaged in a major programme of purchase of new equipment. We have a long-term equipment plan that was compiled in 1999 and formed part of the Defence Forces' submission on the White Paper. The plan entailed a detailed expenditure programme over a four-year period and an aspirational programme over the following six years. We are coming to the end of the first four years. We are in the process of issuing the plan beginning in the year 2004 to 2007, with an aspirational element appended to that.

Irish troops are very well equipped for any task that the Government might ask us to perform. In terms of training, our troops are organised along conventional lines, much more so in recent years, with the objective of being capable of conducting operations both at home and abroad. On training for overseas service, training plans reflect the Defence Forces' international commitments to the UN, the EU and the PfP. In this respect, priority in the training plans for recent years and for the future have been: a standby battalion for peace support operations; the preparation of a company group within each brigade with a rapid response capability, in line with our commitment to the European Union; and the development of an EU capability to take autonomous action in crisis-management operations. This training consists of both individual and collective training up to battalion level. The training, while conventional, is orientated towards peace-support operation scenarios and is evaluated thoroughly.

On the lessons learned by the Defence Forces, we are continuously engaged in review of practices based on experience. All returning units and individuals are debriefed and recommendations for change considered for incorporation into existing procedures and training. In addition, the training and exercise programme is constantly reviewed in light of international experience and doctrine to ensure that best practice prevails.

On the pre-deployment phase of operations, our early warning of impending deployment enables preparation of mission-specific assessments and briefings. This would encompass the social, political, security, cultural and economic aspects of the target country and its surrounding states. The Defence Forces' intelligence section has produced excellent booklets that are issued to troops on the Lebanon, the Balkans, Somalia and so on.

The pre-deployment reconnaissance of the area of operations is absolutely vital and is undertaken by an expert group from the Defence Forces. This has happened most recently in KFOR, in INTERFET in East Timor, in UNMEE in Eritrea, in ISAF in Kabul and there is a planned reconnaissance in Liberia, beginning tomorrow.

Where a unit is international in its organization - for instance we have a company group serving in KFOR at present under Finnish operational control - it takes very detailed pre-planning to get all the necessary steps in place for those units to dovetail on the ground. Pre-deployment training has to be mission-orientated, including driving, medical factors, stress factors, cultural and social norms. There is also unit organisation and armaments to suit the task and personnel selections to include particular skills that are required in the mission. The specialist equipment required is also a consideration. On the medical aspects of deployment, the lead-in time for troop commitment must allow for total completion of medical processing prior to deployment. There are also the status of forces agreements and rules of engagement that are applicable to the force.

During deployment we put emphasis on civil/military relations in the area of operation. Our experience has proven that anything we do in this area is of great benefit to the troops in the field. Military information, which is now beginning to be referred to as military intelligence by the UN, is a vital aspect of any operation, and units deployed must have the resources necessary to gather such information.

Rules of engagement must be continually reviewed throughout the life of the operation so that they reflect the existing circumstances on the ground. We also wish to establish relations with Irish diplomatic missions in any particular area as we feel it is mutually beneficial both to the Department of Foreign Affairs and ourselves.

On the withdrawal aspect, since the Lebanon, where we were engaged for more than 23 years, one feature we are now looking at is the planning of a clear exit strategy when we commit ourselves to any mission. When we are involved in a multinational environment with, say, the Finns in the multinational brigade in Kosovo, we must be clearly able to signify our intent to withdraw well in advance.

I thank our visitors, both civilian and military, for attending today and giving us a preliminary brief on the situation. It is acknowledged by everybody in all parties, and by the population at large, that the Army has done an enormous amount in this country over the years of which we can be proud, and we can certainly be proud of its service overseas also. There is unanimity in wanting to compliment the Army for participating in UN-ratified missions overseas.

I would be in a better position to contribute if the excellent brief that has been circulated had come to my desk in advance. I have only had time to sketch through the initial pages but what has been written is very interesting. I get the feeling in recent months that the ground of our participation in missions abroad, whether in Europe, the margins of Europe or further afield, seems to be moving. Sometimes I get the feeling that it is as if practice is attempting to precede policy and is only just being held back. Those of us attending the meeting would regard ourselves as reasonably well informed, but I would say the public has a vague view of what national policy now is in terms of our participation in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations.

We intervene under a UN mandate in normal circumstances, and there is a general feel for what is involved in the Petersburg Tasks. There is very little public acknowledgement now of what might happen in the UN standby arrangement systems - the UNSAS - which is probably a new concept for most people. Then there is the European Union Rapid Reaction Force. It looks as if the military arrangement, with the consent of the Government through the Department of Defence, is that 850 light infantry mounted personnel will be on standby as a rapid reaction force. As the Colonel mentioned, this 850 is drawn from a palette of expertise across the different Army companies, so the cohort from which the 850 would be drawn would be larger than 850 and would have a range of specialities. In any particular mission, 850 could be put on the field.

It is the same 850, whether involved in Petersburg Tasks, the UN standby force or the Rapid Reaction Force. There is nothing unusual about that but as the terms are thrown around, particularly the acronyms, people get confused. They have a notion that there are a number of different forces at play under different command structures that could be available for intervention. There is nothing too unusual about that either because in the European context forces operate under different headings. For example, in the Congo the framework nation is France but the forces were drawn from around Europe. There seems to be a notion that there are national military forces, EU military forces in the process of formation in this Rapid Reaction Force to which Europe will contribute, and then NATO. However, they are the same forces and just wear different hats at different times.

It is like the situation where the media would report the Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs issuing statements when he had that particular hat on, and then he would go down to the Central Bank as a director and issue different sets of advice wearing a different hat. From the lay perspective, it is getting more difficult to understand what it happening in Europe.

There is a huge concern in the former Warsaw Pact countries that were part of the Soviet bloc to join NATO, and most of them have joined NATO since the treaty in Prague. Thus, NATO is operating right up to the borders of the present state of Russia. Then the Iraq war split NATO in all directions. The British NATO forces have now become British forces operating in Iraq, but it is the same people, commanders, structures and military people who are involved. At home they are NATO forces under a British flag. It is getting increasingly difficult to understand what is happening but there is certainly a very strong feeling that the policy ground is being moved forward and that the population at large is not being taken into the confidence of the policymakers, to put it diplomatically.

I would like to discuss these issues here at some stage because there is a changing policy front and I am not quite sure where it is going. We also have many bilateral arrangements in Europe. I read an article recently that stated that the Belgian and Dutch governments are amalgamating their naval forces and putting them under one command. There are joint submarine operations in the Mediterranean between the Italians, Spanish, Portuguese and, I think, the French. Again, under the European umbrella we have these bilateral arrangements between nations that advance forces.

My primary concern is that we do not do anything in advance of policy, that the policy is clearly laid down, mandated by the UN Charter, the Nice treaty and Irish law, and that this is as far as we are go and are not in any way straining the tape which contains practice within policy. I would like an indication of where the witnesses think policy is going. They might indicate, for example, what diplomatic relationships we have with NATO in Brussels at present. At what level are we represented diplomatically at NATO headquarters? Are we represented militarily at NATO headquarters? Do our people there have full diplomatic status? Are the military people present there as observers, and to what degree are they involved in policy discussion?

I ask for some indication of how the witnesses see the European Rapid Reaction Force operating. Looking at what is happening in Europe, it seems that it will all come together if the regional forces that are willing to intervene in regional conflicts, in accordance with UN policy, do so under a European Union mandate and as the European Rapid Reaction Force.

This debate is only beginning. I do not recall who made this point, but there is no doubt that the whole world security situation has changed very rapidly in recent years. If one takes 9/11 as one's starting point, it has changed very rapidly and continues to do so. Everybody is reacting to that, and Ireland cannot stay out of that either. The time has come for the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs respectively to be more forthright in policy terms on where things are moving. It is well beyond time that we had a debate in here to see where they are going. People may agree or disagree but the first principle is that the information is made available to the public so that if there is a plan to bring us into a different security and defence arrangement it needs to be mapped out to a greater extent than it is now. This is not the ideal forum in which to hold this discussion. I would be better prepared to have the debate if relevant documents were made available to part of the meeting.

I do not intend any discourtesy to our visitors. I compliment the role of the Defence Forces. I have always held that there is one Irish Army that has served us very well and I do not hold with those who claim to be another army. The Army has served us very well at home and abroad, as have our diplomats and staff in the Department of Defence. I am not in any way challenging our visitors. For the purpose of this committee and this House it is time that the new strategic debate was kicked off and I am using this occasion to say a few preliminary words on this.

That is why we are preparing the report. At the outset I mentioned the rate of change and the Deputy has very well elaborated the issues that we face and we hope to include those in the report. We also hope to invite the Ministers to meet us and discuss these issues along the lines the Deputy has mentioned.

We have not discussed the terms of reference of such a report.

We have set out some terms of reference and we can come back to those. This is just a first step in that direction.

I wish to put my name down as I wish to speak.

I join the welcome to our visitors, both military and administrative. It is very good to see them here in such harmony and presenting this case to us. In a general sense we know much of what they said, particularly those of us who come from areas where there are Army bases. Does the Defence (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1960 govern everything? There has been no change in the Act. Is it correct that there are 850 troops at the Army's disposal to deploy wherever the need arises and as the Oireachtas approves? How often have all of those troops been deployed? For example, they are ready to go to Liberia when the Dáil gives the go-ahead for that so the numbers deployed must have been considerably lower. Can the witnesses give me a rough indication of how often the full complement of personnel is deployed?

In their presentation, the witnesses referred to there being one-third deployed in the theatre of peacekeeping, one-third being absorbed back and one-third getting ready to go out. I appreciate these are general terms. In general does the Army always try to manage it this way? The presentation sets out very succinctly where everyone is across the globe, like a map of trouble, indicating where conflicts have arisen or are about to arise. Even one look at that shows how disparate are the engagements and how widely dispersed are our forces. It would be worth disseminating this information further.

Colonel Murphy spoke about learning the lessons from the operational reviews and the UN has established within its Department of Peacekeeping Operations a "lessons learned" section. It is rare to find very plain language in military or civil service contexts. That is not intended as a criticism. "Lessons learned" is a very good title for a section dealing with peacekeeping. I hope that the lesson learned will be one on which the witnesses could follow up.

Deputy Michael D. Higgins mentioned, and will speak on, the coalition of the willing. For many of us here that has another connotation, in the context of Iraq, and not a particularly warm one. I would be glad to hear an explanation of that. The witnesses correctly made it clear that the Treaty of the European Union acknowledges the principles of the UN Charter because people are often confused as to where we are going and how. The Seville Declaration encompassed within the Nice treaty also made that clear. To follow Deputy Noonan's point about whether the confines are to be pushed outwards, issues on which our committee is preparing a necessary report, the witnesses present a list of criteria to be observed when forces are sent on a mission. Is that a wish list or has it gone somewhere, is it being addressed? One of them is that the UN should deploy into post-conflict situations rather than trying to create them, which makes sense, as do the other matters on the list. Are these points being implemented or are they a refined wish list and does the UN approve of them?

I am very pleased and honoured to be a member of this committee to receive this submission. I am not sure we always give ourselves sufficient credit for Ireland's contribution, in terms of the number of Irish people in difficult postings in so many areas throughout the world. I believe the very fine work of Defence Forces personnel, working with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the administration within the Department of Defence, is not being fully elucidated to the general public. Perhaps the Defence Forces are being somewhat demure in that regard, notwithstanding the excellent work being carried out.

The early days of overseas missions now seem a long time ago. Perhaps the initial approach could be described as somewhat naive, in terms of the "goodies" going to assist in keeping the "baddies" at bay. It involved a very clear-cut mission then, but, as Deputy Noonan said, the mission edges are now becoming more blurred. Many of us have particular memories of those times, including some sad and tragic events which affected many army towns, when the proper respects were duly paid.

Unfortunately, I have to leave at this stage to attend another meeting in these Houses, but I intend to follow up on the response to the matters to which I have referred.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to comment on the document which I have seen for the first time this afternoon. I join with my colleagues in paying tribute to our Defence Forces. I recall meeting our Defence Forces personnel in Nicaragua and I am aware of their work in the Lebanon, Somalia and many other places. The respect in which we hold them is mirrored by that of others. In the Nicaraguan situation, I particularly noted their diplomatic skills in enabling different groups to pass relatively near each other without engaging in conflict. That required intelligence skills of a very subtle nature, at which they excelled. On the other hand, the circumstances under which our Defence Forces personnel were placed in the Lebanon involved taking risks which the political process failed to resolve. One might say that some of those who were associated with the greatest risks for Irish peacekeepers have now advanced in Cabinet terms in conflict areas of the world.

I wish to raise a few questions. In a sense, I find the discussion quite extraordinary. If, as the opening paragraph of the document states, we are to discuss Ireland's role in peacekeeping in changed circumstances under the United Nations charter, that is where we should begin. From there, one can move on to discuss fundamental principles of foreign policy, some of which were addressed or hinted at by Mr. Deady, including a reference to human rights. In that regard, I wish to refer to a situation in which I believe the cart has, in effect, been put before the horse. There is a paper currently in circulation on Somalia which draws a distinction between protection of human rights and humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian intervention has been abused before and since the foundation of the United Nations. It is a concept that has been discredited in some circumstances, being sometimes ambiguous and sometimes necessary. The protection of human rights has implications for concepts of sovereignty that are at the very basis of one's acceptance of the United Nations charter and membership obligations. Why did we not begin there? One cannot neglect such a basic issue in relation to international advocacy and implementation of human rights. That leads on to crucial distinctions between peace-building, peace-making, conflict prevention and so on. Having been involved in foreign affairs matters for more than 20 years, I am becoming rather tired of the approach whereby fundamental principles of foreign policy are evaded by one government or another regarding the issues as simply a matter of technical provision. They are not issues of technical provision.

On page 2 of the document before us, on the 1960 Act, there is reference to a resolution on which there is a fundamental difference between the present Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself. My memory of the Act is that our triple-lock mechanism relates to issues that are initiated by the United Nations. Whether I am right or wrong, I wish to have the opportunity in this committee to discuss the distinction between actions initiated and actions mandated. It is not at all helpful to proceed from that point to discuss coalitions of the willing. Senator O'Rourke has quite rightly stated that the most infamous coalition of the willing is a group of people who are being bribed to come together by a mixture of aid, trade and other such considerations as an alternative to a United Nations force.

I am in favour of greater resources within a properly mandated and accountable position for the Defence Forces. However, I do not approve of the Department substituting its considerations in the White Paper for what should be discussed in foreign policy. This is a matter for this committee to debate. We are not constituted as a committee on public accounts to hear a delegation on what is required in relation to military defence. Even if that were our brief, I would still raise a few questions. For example, on page six of the document, at which I have only had a preliminary look, I have a question mark on the suggestion in paragraph 3 that the newly acquired equipment under annex 3 is interoperable - I rather like that phrase. It suggests that while one is doing what is required for political reasons, one can switch from task A to task B, C and D. In all of the listed places where I remember an Irish peacekeeping involvement, such interoperability was singularly absent. That is a matter that should be debated.

In the context of a debate on Irish peacekeeping, I would have expected some recognition of a person who is all too rarely mentioned in Ireland, although he was, possibly, our most distinguished civil servant working for the United Nations. I refer to the late Erskine Childers. In 1991, he and Brian Urquhart wrote three volumes on reform of the United Nations under the title, "Towards a More Effective United Nations". Another book, under the auspices of the Ford foundation, on how the various UN committees might be reformed, got little recognition from subsequent governments.

That was an appropriate starting point, unless one had written off the United Nations. In terms of reform of the United Nations, I accept the fact that it does not have a standing army. On problems and dilemmas in the charter, I have already referred to the different implications of humanitarian intervention and the protection of human rights, in terms of sovereignty that is protected in the act of signature of the United Nations. I would have liked a reference, even if it was only casual, to United for Peace Initiative that was discarded along the way. It is thought real men do not talk like that.

One looks then at one's capacity for peacekeeping and then at the question of transferred responsibility to different regional organisations. I find this paper valuable and I thank the people who provided it but what I do not find valuable is the way this is being started and discussed. It is unfair to people who represent our Defence Forces and the Department of Defence. After all, they are very happy, and they continually stress this, to do what the policy requires but we are discussing the techniques before the policy and I find that unhelpful.

These were decisions of the committee.

I do not recall the committee deciding to do——

We did.

I do not recall the committee deciding that we would do it in this way.

We did. We had a list made out and we are following the list.

I do not recall that.

It is only the beginning of a wide——

The Chairman should not upset himself about it because we will get back to the beginning of it.

I am not upset.

The Chairman might let me finish.

I would be happy to do so.

I will assist the Chairman in structuring a proper debate on this. The Chairman will have more difficulty getting some of his own people to come to say in what they believe.

I am interested in regional allocation of responsibility. By way of being helpful, I suggest we look at each of these in turn in terms of the diplomatic background to it, how it operates and what the consequences were, whether in relation to Kosovo or the 1991 war in Baghdad. It is interesting that we have such a thorough document that is, in a way, to the credit to the authors and those from whom we have heard. They are not talking about sliding into a post-war situation in Iraq because that will come.

I refer to whatever commitments are made should a new UN resolution be passed. We should discuss this at this committee. I have been told there is a third draft of a resolution floating around the Security Council for adoption. What is our position if that resolution is passed? Are we then free to have an act of deployment? Are we free to have an act of delegated authority to one's Aunt Florence if one does not want to call it the "coalition of the willing"? How then could one not be worried if one hears the phrase, "not all forces in which Ireland participated were led by Ireland"? That is to ignore the legal issue on the international legality of the war in the first place which cannot be dodged. I am sure that whatever we do, we will do it for the poor, suffering, impoverished and broken Iraqi people. I am in favour of helping them but I am not in favour of fudging the law.

I have no difficulty with what the representative of the Army suggested on building up the complement. I emphasise that. If one is going to have people doing the good work all these people acknowledge, including myself, one must be able to replace them and run it effectively. I am willing to go down that road but we have not gone far enough in terms of discussing where we are.

I mentioned interoperability. I notice there is a reference on page eight of the submission to the Secretary General's response to a request by the Council and to his report of June 1992, Agenda for Peace. It states: "The UN General Assembly adopted a major resolution in the matter ("An Agenda for Peace") in 1993 which mandated the Secretary General to strengthen the preventative diplomacy and early-warning capacity of the UN Secretariat." Where lies that now in anyone's thinking? We are living with pre-emptive military strikes that are being mirrored in the case of Israel against Syria as they were in the case of the United States against Iraq.

Some of us, for example, believe that, while we are making a plea to go back to fundamentals in discussing foreign policy, the language does not mean much now. I thank the Lord we, in this country, have people speaking on defence matters with more credibility than the person who speaks for them on the neighbouring island and who has presided over such fabrications with such disastrous results and the loss of life of other people's children.

For all these reasons, I will confine myself to saying that I want, no more than Deputy Noonan and others want, to begin at the beginning by looking at the principles and the changes in the United Nations. We will then get to these other points and we will be even more grateful for what we have heard.

Like the other speakers, I welcome the deputation from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Army. We should not be afraid of the debate but, like others speakers, I found it quite disconcerting to be presented with such a detailed document today without having had an opportunity to look at the contents, which are quite detailed. As Deputy Higgins said, it is important that the policy is always put before operational matters.

My first point relates to policy cohesion on our foreign policy across the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. To what extent is there an overlap? Mr. Deady mentioned that he sees - I agree with him - Irish participation in peacekeeping as very complementary and a natural addendum to our role in the wider world in terms of our commitment to human rights, disarmament and human development. Has anybody in either of the Departments contemplated the fact that if we reach the overseas development aid target of 0.7% of GNP by 2007, it will be a budget of about €1 billion which will constitute a bigger budget than both Marine and Defence at present? Is there some deal of policy cohesion and advance planning as to perhaps a greater role for our Army personnel in our development activities, particularly in Africa? I know in the context of peacekeeping in the past in the Lebanon, Kosovo and elsewhere, our soldiers are widely and highly regarded as fantastic humanitarian workers. I see it as a natural extension of a possible role in the future for our Army personnel to have a greater involvement in our overseas development programmes. That is one aspect that I would like to include for debate in the future.

On the wider foreign policy issues to which Deputy Higgins referred, it is useful to have a discussion on foreign policy issues outside the emotional, volatile atmosphere of a war, for example, or, indeed, a referendum. The only time we seemed to develop any ideas on or discuss foreign policy was in the context of the Nice referendum when debate was heated and combative and there was much noise and little sense. Similarly, in the run up to the last invasion of Iraq by the United States of America outside a UN Security Council mandate, it was clear that Irish people were very conflicted. We were torn between our traditional alliance with the United States in other areas of policy and our friendship and ties of kinship with the United States and, indeed, the United Kingdom but it was clear the Irish people did not favour acting outside a UN mandate in terms of participation in a war. It is helpful for us to have this opportunity. As Deputy Noonan suggested, if we are to have a deeper engagement in security matters in the wider world, as we become more wealthy, more self-confident and as our engagement with the European Union and the enlarged states deepens, we need to discuss to what extent our army will participate in such activities and under what circumstances. Having this group from the Oireachtas looking across at a deputation from the Army and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence asking whether there is some policy change that we do not know about, is a good start to the conversation. At least weare starting in a convivial way rather than in a combative manner and outside of an electoral process.

My third question concerns Iraq. If a new draft resolution on Iraq is to be circulated - I believe that it has been circulated - is there a possibility that Ireland, as a traditional supporter of peacekeeping resources to the UN, will be expected to provide troops to contribute to the stabilisation of Iraq? That is a policy question but is one on which I am sure the military people present would have a view.

I am delighted to see the witnesses present today; in particular, I welcome the representatives of the Defence Forces, Colonel McNamara and Lieutenant-Colonel Kilbride. I am also pleased they have an opportunity to express their views. I wish to place on record my appreciation, on behalf of everyone, for the work by the Defence Forces abroad and to acknowledge the sacrifices made by our troops on peacekeeping missions over a very long time. My own experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998 with the OSCE, when I helped to monitor the elections there, was that the work of our own Army personnel was very much recognised and also in Kosovo.

I agree with Deputy O'Donnell that the work that is being undertaken on a voluntary basis by Defence Forces personnel should be greatly encouraged by the Army and supported in every way possible. This work includes the re-building of schools and hospitals in Kosovo.

I wish to ask the officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence some questions about Bosnia-Herzegovina, an area that I feel has been ignored by the international community. My experience there for a short period was that it was an area that no one really had much interest in. The international spotlight has gone from that country; they are nobody's children at this stage. Is there much interest or development in that regard?

On Kosovo, I was involved in the establishment of the Kosovo refugee aid organisation in my locality in the west of Ireland that raised a few million euro for aid. That organisation is still active. I hope that I get an opportunity to speak with the Defence Forces' personnel again about further involvement between that organisation and the Irish peacekeeping forces on the provision of humanitarian assistance.

To have had 50,000 tours of duty is absolutely tremendous and is a massive involvement. From a practical point of view, what role do the witnesses see for the FCA, or the other forces in assisting the Permanent Defence Forces in support abroad? I am aware that many of those personnel would be interested in serving overseas on peacekeeping missions, perhaps for shorter tours of duty. On more mundane issues, such as monetary involvement, what exactly is the cost of the operations abroad? At one stage, we were regularly in a balance of payments deficit with the UN. Has that changed in any way? For a small country we have had a massive involvement across the world. The list detailing our involvement overseas is very impressive.

On the situation in Iraq, it seems that a new arrangement, or agreement, may emerge from the United Nations. On the list of overseas missions furnished by the witnesses, I note there was an involvement in Iraq in 1997. It appears that Irish troops would be very much respected if called on to serve in a peacekeeping role in the Middle East.

Once again, I wish to place on record our recognition of the great personal contribution made by the Defence Forces on peacekeeping missions. The number of casualties, at 84, is a high price to pay but an indication of the commitment that has been made by our people who are true patriots. We should recognise their personal sacrifices and those of their families. On behalf of many people in my county, I wish to say how much we appreciate and admire the work of the Defence Forces abroad, and long may they continue with their efforts.

Ms Patricia McKenna, MEP

I welcome the witnesses. In common with those present, I also recognise the role of our peacekeeping forces internationally for many years. However, I have grave reservations about the image of our peacekeeping forces in the future. We were seen as being very effective at peacekeeping because we were viewed as being neutral and were not aligned with any particular country. However, If Irish troops are asked to get involved in operations in Iraq at some stage, they will not be seen as neutral, considering how the Irish government aligned itself with the US during the most recent conflict in that country. Much damage has been done to the credibility of what was traditionally the neutrality of our armed forces on peacekeeping missions.

One question I should like to put to the delegation echoes what Deputy Michael D. Higgins said about Ireland's foreign policy, especially after the most recent conflict in Iraq. I am confused as to what Irish foreign policy is. What does it adhere to? I have a certain interpretation of our own Constitution and what we are committed to. Quite frankly, looking at the behaviour of the Irish Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence, I am very confused as to what our foreign policy position is. This is why I feel it would be useful to have a debate to establish firmly what our foreign policy is. What is our foreign policy on established principles within our own Constitution? Are those being abandoned and, if so, for what reason? Certain conditions in our own Constitution and in Irish law have been ignored.

On the EU, Senator O'Rourke spoke about how the EU acknowledged the principle of the UN Charter. Of course it does, but there is no requirement for a UN mandate on the operation of the Rapid Reaction Force.

A number of people spoke about the Seville Declaration. There were two Seville declarations and I remember being in that city at the time they were adopted. If those declarations are examined, one will see that our Government signed one and the Heads of State of the other member states signed the other. There is quite a difference between them. At the time, there was great concern about signing. Many member states had serious reservations about the idea and refused to sign a declaration that would have committed any kind of operations by the Rapid Reaction Force to a UN mandate. There is no requirement for a UN mandate. Admittedly, we have a triple lock, or whatever it is, in relation to Ireland. I suppose that all depends on the position of the Government of the day and who is in the House for a vote.

I have two questions for the Defence Forces. Figures have been mentioned concerning how many people we are committing to the Rapid Reaction Force. Annex A seems to suggest that the number is more than 1,500. Perhaps I am misreading the figures. I am particularly interested in our involvement in the military structures in Brussels. It is possible that there might be an operation involving the Rapid Reaction Force that has no UN mandate. In recent times, it seems we have quite a number of established military personnel based in Brussels. Looking at the list of appointments under the Partnership for Peace, it appears there are 13 in Brussels, which is a big number compared to other places, such as the UN Permanent Mission in New York. Who are these people, and to whom are they answerable? What happens if the EU decides to take military action or to get involved in a military conflict, where Ireland may not be getting involved? What is the role of these people from Ireland who are involved in this military structure in Brussels? To whom are they answerable? Do they report back on a regular? Is there any mechanism to control these people? I am aware that the permanent administrative representatives in Brussels attend meetings and take decisions on behalf of governments without any proper consultation with the national parliaments. In the area of defence, will something similar happen? Is there a clear structure in place to ensure that any decision, participation or involvement by our Irish representatives in these military structures in Brussels are completely transparent and that they are accountable to the national parliament?

I will just take some of the operational questions first, or at least the operational policy issues. Then Mr. Deady will pick-up on some of the UN foreign policy issues.

On the issue of security ground moving, and practice preceding policy, the reality today is that the security ground is moving, but if the UN Security Council could have reached agreement on the use of Chapter Seven-type missions during the cold war it probably would have done so. It is really with the end of the cold war that there has been more movement in this direction and more agreement within the Security Council towards the use of the Chapter Seven-type mandate, which is referred to as peace enforcement, rather than more traditional peacekeeping as we have known it, where one had to have a peace agreement, or a truce, or something in place to allow for the deployment of peacekeepers. I am sure Mr. Deady will elaborate on that issue at a later stage, and on how the Security Council has moved in that direction. From our point of view, we can only address the issue on a post-Security Council Resolution basis.

On the use of military force as an instrument of furthering foreign policy, the policy is decided initially and then the military come in afterwards as an instrument of furthering the implementation of that policy. The question of our involvement with the UN, raised by Deputy Michael D. Higgins, is not something, from the Department of Defence point of view, that we could comment on. We take as our founding basis that we are members of the UN, that the UN Security Council consists of the people who provide the mandate to missions. When there is a mandate and it is substantive, when looked at from the background of our own domestic legislation, which requires that the mission be authorised by the UN, we move with that, and we consider it as a mission that is eligible for participation by the Defence Forces. I am not sure if that addresses to some extent——

Yes, the distinction is between initiated and mandated. It is a matter for debate.

To take the example of FYROM, which was the first EU mission, the provision under the UN mandate was that the Security Council strongly supported the establishment of an international force to undertake the protection of UN monitors in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. In the case of Ireland, the view taken legally was that the words, "strongly supported", was not establishing the mission. Therefore, since the Security Council had not established or authorised the mission, Ireland could not participate. The triple lock, and domestic legislation, is quite strong on what it means in respect of a mission being established or authorised by the UN. We cannot participate on the basis of "strongly supported". The UN must give a more definitive mandate than that in order for us to participate.

On Deputy Noonan's queries on the representation on NATO, I will ask Mr. Leo Connolly to deal with them at a later stage.

On the EU Rapid Reaction Force, our view is that it is complimentary and reinforces and helps us build the capacity that enables us to deploy more speedily on the ground. One of the problems for the UN is that it does not have any standing military forces. It does not have an army it can call on at short notice and deploy wherever it needs to be deployed. Probably one of the problems with the member states has been that they have not been sufficiently speedy in responding to situations, so that a crisis turned into a catastrophe before we started to see UN peacekeeping troops being deployed on the ground. The development of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, and the UN standby arrangements, allows for a much speedier deployment of personnel on the ground, so that the UN can get in before the crisis gets out of hand.

From a military point of view, in order to be able to deploy on the ground one needs to be able to work with the other people on the ground. One needs to have command structures and communication systems that can actually talk to each other. One needs to have equipment which is interchangeable and which can work together. Therefore, these developments, from the point of view of the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence, are mutually reinforcing and complementary. It is not in some way, or rather I would not see it, as practice preceding policy. The policy is already set. It says we should be able to effectively deploy our military personnel in support of UN mandates, but if we are going to do that we need to work within those structures to develop the competency to deploy quickly and effectively. That is what we are endeavouring to do through our membership of the Rapid Reaction Force and participation in PfP, and through SHIRBRIG and UNSAS.

Senator O'Rourke asked about the provisions of the Defence Acts. The legal basis for our participation is the 1954 Act, as amended by the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960. The Defence (Amendment) Act 1960 made provision for a contingent of the Defence Forces to serve overseas on a particular international United Nations force. At the time of the 1960 Act it defined that force as "a force which had a policing nature." That was amended in 1993 to simply state, "an international force established by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations" and removed——

Yes, established.

That is correct, and that is the issue that we have been discussing. Not mandated, not approved, but established.

I am not a legal person. I can only proceed on what the legal advice available to me is. The legal advice on various missions in which we have participated is that "established" and "authorised" are taken as having the same meaning.

By a number of Attorneys General and the Government?

Yes, by a number of Attorneys General.

Senator O'Rourke also asked how often we reach the 850 personnel figure. Most of the time for the 23 years we were in Lebanon we were at the 850 figure. We had a battalion in Lebanon and we also continued to service our arrangements in UNTSO, and a number of other missions. We were always at that 800, 850 level from the first time we served, in 1978, in UNIFIL, more than 24 years ago.

On whether we operate this one-third, one-third, one-third split as a matter of standard practice, I will ask Colonel McNamara to deal with that. I used the phrase, "coalition of the willing." I will probably never use it again. I did not mean it in its current colloquial sense. It was a term used in more recent times where the UN called on member states to act together in a particular manner, especially in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the UN mandate called on the member states to act in support of the UN mandate, or to act to defend civilians and others. In that situation a number of countries would put together a force to act under the authorisation of the United Nations. We have referred to those colloquially in the past as, "coalitions of the willing". Our view is that this relates to forces which come together under UN mandate in an operation authorised or established by the United Nations, in contrast to how the term may have been used more recently.

On Senator O'Rourkes question - I know she is not present but she raised the issue - about the deployment and post-conflict situations: she was looking at annex G, which is a summary of the Brahimi report. Perhaps Mr. Deady will comment on that. On Deputy Higginss comments, I believe we have already spoken about the issue of the UN Charter and established and authorised operations. Our approach to any of these missions, in any event, is that we start on the basis of, "should we go?" In other words, is this an operation that falls within our foreign policy? Is it a mission that is supported and authorised by an appropriate UN mandate? It then moves on to the operational question of whether we can participate in the mission, before finally moving on to the question, "will we participate in the mission?" The operational issues do not come before the policy decision. At least the policy decision in principle is made in the first instance on the basis that yes, this is in the interests of our foreign policy, in support of human rights and so on.

On the issue of the agenda for peace, perhaps the Department of Foreign Affairs will deal with that. On Deputy O'Donnell's comments on military personnel working on overseas development, traditionally a number of people have worked in this area. They have been deployed on various missions, including Honduras, in response to a humanitarian crisis there. Certainly, it is not precluded by the Defence Acts or by our policies. On the question of any draft resolution on Iraq, the Department of Foreign Affairs may want to deal with that, if it is aware that there is one, or not, as the case may be. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Cowen, I believe, has recently given his views on what the approach should be in the event of any resolution.

The White Paper on Defence made provision for the involvement of Reserve Defence Forces in international peacekeeping. It is stated in our paper that the Reserve Defence Forces have a good deal of technical support personnel. It is difficult for the permanent Defence Forces to retain this expertise. The policy decision is therefore already made that the reserve Defence Forces can participate in overseas missions. At present, as I understand it, there is an implementation plan for the development of the Defence Forces and it has been approved in principle by the Minister. The plan will be implemented over a period of about six years. Obviously, there are issues on the security of employment, return to employment post deployment etc; so there are quite a number of complex employment issues that need to be addressed over that period. On a point of principle, however, there is no impediment to the participation of the RDF in overseas peace support operations.

On the position on UN arrears, our current situation at the end of August this year was that €8.7 million approximately was outstanding, with the United Nations. To put that in context, if one takes UNIFIL troop costs alone over the period we were there, there was €176 million in payments. These amounts of money can rack up relatively quickly. The breakdown of that money is accounted for by an amount of just over €5 million due from UNIFIL. Much of that may not be recovered. We are currently in discussion with them in relation to it. As the committee may recall, during the 1990s the UN was rather short of funds. There were part payments, progress payments and various other payments made over the period, because the UN was relying on contributions which were not forthcoming.

Sorry to be so pressing, but this is very important, too.

They have never caught up on that, fully. It is being pursued. That accounts for €5 million out of the €8 million. The other €3 million comprises payments which we expect to get and some smaller amounts in relation to UNFICYP and smaller missions. It is also expected we will get some of those.

Ms McKenna, MEP, wanted some explanation about the military structure in Brussels - about annex A. Mr. Connolly will take up that issue. Was there anything else in particular? I know Ms McKenna also raised the issue of UN mandates. Does she believe one is not required for the Rapid Reaction Force?

Ms McKenna

That is correct.

Within domestic law one is required.

Ms McKenna

Yes.

Therefore, we could not be a part of a European Rapid Reaction Force if it was deployed without a UN mandate.

Ms McKenna

The other question was not just about annex A, but about the staff involved in the military structures in Brussels who are attached to anything that may happen with the Rapid Reaction Force that may not have a UN mandate - or we may not be involved in.

May I pass that to Mr. Connolly?

I am the principal officer dealing with ESDP and our involvement in partnership for peace, PfP within the Department of the Defence. I should like to address a couple of the issues raised. Deputy Noonan raised the issue of public perception being very complicated, bilateral agreements with members of the EU etc. Deputy Higgins raised the matter of 'inter-operability' being the keyword. There was also the question of the UN mandate and our people abroad within EU military structures.

ESDP has developed over the past four or five years at a phenomenal rate. It is based, fundamentally, on national sovereignty and voluntary participation in the ESDP. Unanimity of decision-making underpins whatever happens in the context of a possible crisis management operation. That means all 15 - or 25, as the case may be - nations must agree to undertake a particular operation. Within that there is a facility for what is called constructive abstention, where a nation may abstain and the mission may go ahead. It can retain a veto on the mission, however. That is basically where everything flows from, in the ESDP.

The EU is trying to put together what is called the Helsinki headline goal, which effectively means having the facility to put 60,000 troops in the field within 60 days, and maintain them for a year. That is a huge undertaking. The idea is to have this available for the Petersburg Tasks. As it has been said, the EU recognises the fundamental position of the UN with regard to international security. It is going forward with this, on that basis. As late as 24 September a further declaration between the EU and the UN was signed with regard to enhancing co-operation. It is against that background, therefore, that things are happening.

To return to the involvement of the Defence Forces and Irelands possible engagement in missions, quite a number of things need to be put in place. National sovereignty underpins whatever happens. The triple lock is there and it operates. A classic example of this was the recent FYROM mission, which has been mentioned. Again, we had a situation where the UN strongly supported an issue, but did not authorise our mandate. In that situation domestic legislation clicked into place and we did not - and could not - participate.

I will mention briefly PfP, which we joined in December 1999. It was on the basis of a presentation document, which detailed our aims with regard to Partnership for Peace. We regard Partnership for Peace as a tool to develop the inter-operability that is required to place our troops in a multi-national environment and be able to work efficiently and effectively there. We do not want to send out troops into a multinational situation where they will hit various difficulties when they arrive on the ground. These may range from very simple things, like what current operates a particular piece of equipment or problems with refuelling nozzles all the way through to doctrine and standing operating procedures. It is a huge area. People refer to it flippantly but it is a very serious issue. That is one of the things we take on board before sending our troops anywhere because we have an obligation to them when putting them in a situation to at least look after them and equip them to the best standards we can.

The de facto standard on many of these type of issues is the NATO standard. We look at PfP and PARP and engage on the basis that we want to build up and build in inter-operability, from command and control all the way across the spectrum. That does not mean we slavishly follow whatever is in vogue in NATO or slavishly buy a particular piece of equipment. Inter-operability is not that specific. That gives a flavour of our involvement in PfP.

There was a question on military staff in Brussels. We have military staff with our PfP delegation. We also have two military staff in a liaison office to NATO, and they perform standard liaison duties. We have six staff in the permanent representation to Brussels, and they perform a similar function in the development of ESDP. The EU military staff is a body of what we call detached national experts. Personnel are seconded to the military staff, which works for the European Council. Our officers serving with the EU military staff are effectively on secondment and are employed by the EU military staff and European Council. They work for them on whatever tasks are assigned to them. That puts it in a nutshell.

Mr. Deady

I will cover some of the other issues. Senator O'Rourke asked if the Brahimi report was being implemented, and the answer is "Yes." To take the recommendations in turn, it called for a credible force projection and sufficiently robust rules of engagement, amongst other things. This derived from several instances where mandates had not been sufficiently robust and UN forces were not able to cope with the situation on the ground.

If one looks at recent forces that have been sent, particularly in Sierra Leone and now Liberia, one will see that they are being equipped with a robust mandate and sufficient numbers and components to ensure that they can deal with situations that can arise on the ground. The one in Sierra Leone has been particularly successful and we hope the one in Liberia will be also.

The UN should deploy into post-conflict situations rather than trying to create them. The principle here is that for a UN force there should be a peace to keep, as Secretary General Annan puts it. In other words, there must be action first to bring about a ceasefire, agreement or whatever, and the UN force should go in to support that. That is what is happening in the case of Liberia, for instance, where there is a peace agreement that will never be implemented without strong international support in the form of a peacekeeping mission and humanitarian assistance.

There are various other recommendations in the Brahimi report. I will not go through all of them and will just mention one or two. Some have been mentioned already. Mr. Murphy dealt with the capacity for quick deployment. UN peacekeepers should have the authority to intervene in the case of witnessing violence against civilians. This is an important aspect also because it does not enhance the impression of the effectiveness of the UN if civilians suffer violence and there is a UN force nearby, unable to protect them. This is now being addressed through greater force capacity and more robust mandates.

The report talks about peace-building strategies and implementing programmes to be developed. The deployment of peacekeeping missions is now accompanied by peace-building strategies in all situations. There is attention to the re-building of institutions, proper policing, respect for human rights, post-conflict justice and all the things which go towards healing a conflict and putting things back on an even keel. That is enough to demonstrate that the Brahimi recommendations are being implemented.

Related to that is the Agenda for Peace report raised by Deputy M. Higgins. This report was followed by a resolution of the General Assembly in 1993 that, inter alia, mandated the Secretary General to establish within the secretariat a preventive diplomacy and early warning capacity. That has certainly been working and is continually reporting to the Security Council and other relevant organs of the UN on tensions arising or situations that could lead to violence. Speaking from experience as a member of our Security Council delegation, they are very effective and provide timely information. They do what they can to get information out there and bring it to the Security Council and warn about situations that could lead to violence. It does not always prevent violence - it cannot - but that capacity is there.

I shall make a couple of remarks on humanitarian intervention. There is a certain dichotomy in the UN Charter between the principle of sovereignty, whereby states are sovereign within their own borders, and the problem of peace and security. We have learnt in recent years that civil wars do not stop at borders, and we have had a terrible example in Rwanda, an extremely small country with a fairly small population. We had a situation there involving gross violations of human rights internally, which ultimately led to a regional war in southern Africa. That was definitely a lesson for the world.

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo drew in neighbouring states as part of the same process. We have seen in the very troubled corner of west Africa comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea that trouble, violence and bad governance in one country spills over the border and leads to a problem in the neighbouring country, resulting in a whole series of interlocking problems.

If a situation within one country is identified as a threat to international peace and security then there is a case for the international community to take action.

A distinction is made between humanitarian intervention and protection of human rights in the paper I referred to on Somalia, but Mr. Deady and I are ad idem on this.

Mr. Deady

On the question of the authority conferred by the Security Council for action, the UN Charter is the international treaty we must rely on. Article 42 which is the critical Article, does not make any distinctions. It says the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." It goes on to say: "Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations." It does not make any particular distinction between one kind of force or another. It has been the view of successive Attorneys General that under our legislation an authority conferred by the UN Security Council is sufficient to warrant our participation in an action authorised by the Security Council.

As regards possible participation in Iraq, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently informed the Dáil, if a resolution were adopted authorising the deployment to Iraq of a multinational force it is always possible that Ireland would be one of the countries invited to participate. However, if a UN resolution satisfies the requirements of our national legislation, that does not necessarily mean we should participate. That is a matter of policy that I would prefer to leave to the Government. I cannot comment meaningfully on the nature of or conditions for possible participation other than to point to the need for its authorisation by the Security Council.

I saw the Katanga funerals when I lived in Newbridge, County Kildare. In 1961 I was in fifth year in school and from the school grounds we watched the funeral of the Lieutenant who was killed in Katanga. This afternoon has been most enlightening. I would prefer to hear the Army, or the Department of Defence, or the Department of Foreign Affairs on a news programme telling the people what is going on, rather than a political voice. It would be better that the people on the ground or those behind the scenes explain this to people. I am shocked to learn that 84 people have died on UN duty. I would have guessed the number was about 25. These people laid down their lives for human rights on behalf of our country and in other countries. It would inspire young people to see these men and women going into dangerous situations, as everybody here has inspired me this afternoon. This should be shown on mainstream news programmes rather than on a documentary that no one watches.

It is significant that the US Government is diminishing the United Nations. It has to be reformed but there should be a public debate about the future of the United Nations and we should be able to say what will be our role. That would create greater interest in what is going on. The Defence Forces have been hiding their light under a bushel for too long. I mean that in the most complimentary sense. The Minister speaks for the Army on television.

They have to sing for a journalist.

I do not know anything about that. I was privileged to listen to the witnesses here this afternoon. I will never forget the Katanga funeral because it was the first time that our soldiers were killed abroad and the whole country was in mourning. Today I learned that 84 people were killed and I want to pay tribute to them.

Colonel McNamara

I would like to assure Deputy Noonan that no confusion exists within the military. We have one set of forces and it is a matter for Government to decide where and when that force is committed. Inter-operability has been mentioned several times. This is not a textbook definition; it is the ability of personnel, weapons, systems and doctrines to be able to operate together. In light of what is happening now we are certain that if we are going to deploy troops to Liberia we will be inspected in advance of our deployment by members of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In the European context there are countries which will refuse to deploy with countries which they feel do not have the ability to operate up to a particular standard with them.

Senator O'Rourke asked about the battalions split three ways, one deployed, one in training and one resting, which is simply a sensible way of dealing with the training implications. Training always develops as a result of the debriefing of units and individuals overseas. That is not to say that the battalion that is at home training is training all the time, it does that part of the time, but it performs other duties too. The battalion that has just returned from deployment has a period to readjust, to have some leave from overseas missions and then returns to routine operations.

Deputy O'Donnell mentioned the Army's role in development. I refer her to the palette of offers in the document which we presented to the committee and in particular to the truck company and the Civil Military Co-operation team which has a military context but the truck company is available if directed to carry relief in a humanitarian crisis. It could be considered that the nuclear biological platoon is there for decontamination in the event of a country being the object of such an attack. The civil military co-operation is a new term for us. In the United Nations context we knew it as Civil Military Affairs. I reiterate that we in the Permanent Defence Forces would love to have FCA reserve Defence Forces personnel deploying with us, subject to their being properly trained.

Ms. McKenna referred to her confusion about the 1,450 made up by our palette of offers. The total is in excess of 1,400 but the maximum amount that can be deployed at any one time is 850. There have been occasions when that has been exceeded. It happened in Lebanon in 2001 when the Israelis withdrew from South Lebanon and the United Nations asked us to put additional forces into the field and the then Minister authorised a build up to about 900.

On behalf of the committee I thank the representatives from both Departments and from the Defence Forces for appearing here today and for their informative and useful presentation. This is the beginning of a process and it has been very valuable. It should be clear to the delegation before us today that we are very proud of those who serve on the UN missions and of the work being done.

One may ask where we should begin. I believe it has been a very valuable beginning. It should be clear to the delegation that we are enormously proud of those who serve on the UN missions - and of the work being done in Irelands participation with the UN. We want to emphasise it and support it in every way we can.

These are, of course, changing times and there are new challenges to be faced. We need to know where we are going, for the future. That is one of the purposes of this meeting. The document provided was very valuable and comprehensive. I would like to thank the delegation for it. Although some may have liked to have had it sooner, nonetheless, it is a tremendous piece of work and is very helpful and useful to us. The contributions and responses to questions were also very helpful. I trust we can meet the delegates again as we develop the report which we plan to produce. In the meantime, on behalf of the committee, thank you for appearing before us today.

The joint committee adjourned at 5.05 p.m. until 2.05 p.m. on Tuesday, 4 November 2003.
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