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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 25 Nov 2003

Vol. 1 No. 8

Fight Against Terrorism: Presentation.

At our last meeting we considered correspondence from the Sub-committee on European Scrutiny regarding CFSP (2003) 651, accounts of a common position of 12 September 2003 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. We were advised that the EU Foreign Ministers at their informal meeting in Riva del Garda, Italy began the process of listing the political branch of Hamas on the EU's list of individuals and groups for specific measures to combat terrorism. The list by which member states afford the widest possible assistance to other member states through police and judicial co-operation, is also seen to have a political significance in the fight against terrorism. In the light of the significance of this measure the committee agreed to invite the Department of Foreign Affairs to attend today's meeting to discuss the measure. I welcome Ms Patricia O'Grady from the Department's international terrorism section and Mr. Tony Mannix from the section dealing with the Middle East.

Before we commence, I remind the meeting that while members are covered by privilege, others appearing before the committee are not. I invite Ms O'Grady to begin the presentation, following which I will open the discussion to members.

Ms Patricia O’Grady

I thank the Chairman for the invitation to appear before the committee. For the benefit of the committee I will outline the procedures leading up to the designation of the organisation known as the political wing of Hamas, which took place on 12 September 2003 and is referred to as Common Position 651.

On 12 September 2003 following the completion of a written procedure, the Council designated the political wing of Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The Council did so by adding the political wing to two of the lists that the Council maintains on the proscription of terrorist organisations. The military wing of Hamas had already been proscribed on 27 December 2001.

The following was the procedure leading up to the designation. First, I will deal with the legal basis for designation procedures. UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September 2001 in the wake of 9/11, decided that all UN member states should implement a freezing of funds and other economic resources against persons who commit, facilitate or otherwise engage in acts of terrorism. This resolution adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is binding on all UN member states.

On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted two instruments; the first was Council Regulation 25/80 of 2001 that provides for specific measures directed against certain persons and entities, principally the freezing of assets. This Council regulation, which is implemented under Council decision 646/2003, provides for the preparation and regular updating of an annexe containing a list of persons, groups and entities, external to the Union, which are involved in terrorists acts. This list contains the names of 26 persons and 23 groups and entities.

The second instrument adopted by the Council on 27 December 2001 was Common Position 931 and this provides for the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. This common position, which is given effect by Council Common Position 651, also provides for the preparation and regular updating of an annexe containing a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts. The difference between Council Regulation 25/80 and Common Position 931 is that the common position may contain names that are both external and internal to the Union with the proviso that the internal names are subject to Article 4 of the common position, that is, police and judicial co-operation in addition to the freezing of the assets. The EU has designated 52 persons and 34 groups and entities under Common Position 931.

As to the role of COREPER and Clearing House, which are the bodies concerned with designation, an ad hoc committee, known as Clearing House, was established by COREPER, that is, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of member states, on 7 December 2001 to conduct the preparatory work on the drawing up of names of persons, groups or entities for inclusion in the two EU lists referred to. The work of Clearing House is confidential. Its functions include gathering names and information from relevant sources, checking that the data corresponds to the criteria and the guarantees set out in Common Position 931 and making proposals for examination by COREPER prior to their transmission to the Council for its approval. Clearing House also reviews the names of designated persons and entities on a regular basis to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them on the two EU lists.

I will now outline Clearing House procedures, in other words, the way Clearing House conducts its work. Proposals for inclusion on either or both of the two EU lists may be made at Clearing House by a member state on foot of a decision by a competent authority. A competent authority for the purposes of Clearing House is usually a judicial body. Proposals by third countries on foot of a decision by a competent authority in those countries may be made through the Presidency or through a member state.

Before each Clearing House meeting, a list specifically for consideration at that meeting is circulated by the Presidency and it contains the names of persons, groups and entities which have been submitted to it but on which it has yet to reach a decision as to whether to forward them to COREPER. In dealing with this list, every proposal is considered individually at every meeting and member states may apply reserves against the forwarding of names from the list on any one of the following three bases: a scrutiny reserve, which a member state will invoke where it believes the evidence submitted to Clearing House is insufficient to justify designation; a criteria reserve, where the member state believes the individual or group proposed does not meet the criteria set out in Common Position 931; and a political reserve, where a member state believes that wider political considerations make the inclusion of the individual or group undesirable at this time.

Once it is clear from a Clearing House meeting that there is likely to be a consensus among member states to add or remove persons or entities from the two EU lists, the Presidency will ask COREPER to consider the proposals. If COREPER agrees, it will consider and pass to the Council a draft Council decision and a draft common position, both of which are short texts merely updating the annexes to the original Council decision, whether that is 25/80 of 2001 or Common Position 931 of 2001. Decisions to include additional names on the two EU lists are taken by the Council acting unanimously.

To ensure that funds are not moved out of the EU during the time between the decision to designate the person or entity and the entry into force of the revised EU list, a decision is not held over until the next Council meeting. Instead, the Council under written procedure usually considers it. In the case of the decision to designate Hamas, COREPER considered the matter on 11 September and the draft common position and Council regulation were circulated to member states later that day for decision under written procedure. All member states indicated their approval to the designation by close of business on Friday, 12 September, and the acts were therefore adopted that day and their provisions applied immediately.

Can the written procedures take place fairly quickly?

Ms O’Grady

Yes. They are for urgent cases.

Does Mr. Mannix intend to contribute at this stage?

Mr. Tony Mannix

I thought I would wait to hear the questions the committee might like to put.

I thank Ms O'Grady for giving the committee so much information on what I must say, as a long-standing member of this committee, is a fairly secretive process and, it appears, a fairly unaccountable one.

I raised the issue of the inclusion of the political wing of Hamas and I am now even more worried than I was then because, and this is no reflection on anybody in terms of resources or whatever, this item could have floated through the committee. I am at a disadvantage now in that I do not have in writing before me the exegesis of this but I want to take up some of the issues.

Returning to the criteria, it appears to me that on the specific case we are dealing with, which is the political wing of Hamas, the political resolve alone would have been sufficient to put a stop to what was a singularly unhelpful action. The next point is that there is a difference between operating unanimously and operating nem. con. When I questioned this I was informed by the Minister's office - I could be wrong about that because I do not have my notes in front of me - that Ireland did not have anything against the proposal. It was not that it was part of the unanimously in favour decision but that it went with the decision. That could be a colloquial expression. A question that should be put on our agenda for the next day because some of the material is very serious is the basis on which information is provided to Clearing House. Who provides the information for people who effectively make internal representations to COREPER?

As a spokesperson on foreign affairs, I do not recall ever hearing anything about this entity called Clearing House. I will go much further and say that I am familiar with Resolution 1373 post September 2001. I could say a good deal on that but we are all agreed that Resolution 1373 is the major anti-terrorism resolution which had widespread support but which has been degraded and abused by being dragged into the Iraq area. We will leave that issue aside because we can discuss it in detail another day. To have used Resolution 1373 in the Iraq context it would have been necessary to established a direct connection between the Iraq situation and the war on terrorism. I am not being provocative about this issue. I am simply saying that Resolution 1373 enjoyed a unique level of support across the world spectrum and among different viewpoints.

As Resolution 1373 is interpreted into the European process, there has been no description to this committee of how COREPER would, for example, operate with Clearing House, discuss lists of proscribed organisations and individuals, establish criteria and a process for the inclusion, exclusion and revision of members and so forth. That raises an immediate question. On what basis of information would that be done? I tabled a question in the Dáil to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the basis of information we had for our decisions in respect of other matters and I got an enigmatic reply to the effect that we did not have a separate source of information but the public are entitled to know how this process is working.

When I heard about that I was horrified and wondered what those of us interested in the Middle East and in the political process were doing on a foreign affairs committee or what Parliament was doing discussing foreign affairs. I thought: what am I doing on a foreign affairs committee or what are we doing in parliament discussing foreign affairs, those of us interested in the Middle East and in the political process, if we discover at an informal meeting, which has no constitutional or legal basis, the political wing of Hamas is being added to lists, on the basis of information that has not been presented to any parliament? My reaction as I heard all this was that I was horrified.

I want to be positive about this. I came across this information originally when I saw it flying through, so to speak, at a time where every ounce of goodwill was necessary to try to get the roadmap up and running. I saw this as being singularly destructive. The most serious damage to politics all over Europe currently is tainted intelligence. It is up to the representatives to tell us of those people who facilitated any of these inclusions and the basis of the intelligence. Otherwise, one can draw any conclusion one likes. One might say this is about getting Resolution 1373 implemented, but it is disastrous in its levels of unaccountability.

I ask the two officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs if we can have what has been presented verbally to us in writing at some stage? There is no urgency about it; we do not need it today.

Can we have it for the next meeting?

Yes, for the next meeting. Can it be elaborated on, particularly the legal basis for this within the treaties of Rome; when we voted for this process and in which treaty? I have no problem about the struggle against terrorism, if I knew what people meant by the word "terrorism". I take terrorism to mean the use of force designed or intended to cause harm or worse to civilians.

Is the Senator against it?

I am, it is appalling to be engaged in it. The problem with the definition I gave is that it stretches fairly widely and some great powers would have a problem with it. When there is conflict in the Middle East and two Israeli soldiers are shot, I regret and deplore that. Such action does not make any contribution to a resolution of the conflict, but that is not terrorism. A military response to an occupying force in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank is morally wrong because the circumstances do not justify it; it is also politically useless, but it is not terrorism.

I am extraordinarily uneasy about this designation of that political wing. Hamas is what is keeping a large part of the population of the occupied territories alive. Hamas's funds are being used in large quantities to feed, clothe and provide medical and education services for people who have been deprived of those services as a result of a systemic policy by the Israeli Government. Hamas would not be as popular among the Palestinian people if it were not left to be the only source of support. When the European Union takes a decision to freeze the funds of that political wing, it is freezing funds that are, among other things, used for those humanitarian purposes.

The parliaments of member states of the European Union are entitled to know the processes by which such a decision is taken. I accept, with enormous reservations, that some of what is classified as intelligence material must be kept secret. Ms O'Grady said that a competent authority, usually a judicial body, supplied the information Clearing House used in its procedures. What body in Ireland would supply such information to Clearing House? Some people still talk of one political party as being essentially another wing of a paramilitary organisation. Apart from that, what would be the competent authority in Ireland that would supply such information? Would such information be given because people had been convicted in court or would the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform give it? That Department is most assuredly not a judicial body; in my opinion it is a most unjudicial one.

We have to stop this discussion here because we need detailed background information about everything to do with this, including the basis for its confidentiality. I have no problem with the definition of confidentiality, which is adequately covered in the Freedom of Information Act. However, that does not mean that everything that COREPER does needs to be confidential. What needs to be confidential is what "needs to be confidential" and we all agree on that, but that does not mean that everything needs to be confidential. We need to know the basis for confidentiality in this regard. My request is that we postpone the discussion, obtain a detailed written report and then resume the discussion.

I agree with Senator Ryan when he said that we need further information. I would like the written text of the information the officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs delivered today because it is interesting and unprecedented. COREPER is the accumulation of the permanent ambassadors to the EU. From my experience on occasions, they are given undue powers that should properly be used and availed of by Ministers. However, from time to time COREPER is given responsibility for making and arriving at decisions following discussions with colleagues around the chers collèques with very little political accountability arising from them. This is one such area. It is an area that is highly politicised and should have had the maximum input from the political representatives of the EU member states who were relevant to this decision.

Apart from the accountability issue, to which Deputy Michael Higgins referred, the danger in regard to the implementation of that resolution, which came about as a result of a wide consensus that something had to be done in terms of combating international terrorism following the events of 11 September 2001, is that it has drifted into a wider EU policy and American and United Kingdom policy on Iraq. I heard Tony Blair say recently that he views Iraq as yet another front on the war against terrorism, not something with which the Irish Government necessarily agrees or has voted on. As I recall, the initial invasion of Iraq was based on a proposition that that country was in defiance of UN resolutions on weapons of mass destruction, which under pressure turned rapidly into the notion that it was about regime change, but now it seems it was a front against terrorism. These are all issues that are causing great conflict among the body politic in the European Union, in particular, in countries like Ireland that do not agree with this.

On the security approach being adopted now, as evidenced by the proscribing of the political wing of Hamas by the European Union with very little discussion or democratic debate in the European Union about it, the danger is that we are drifting into a security approach to the issue of the Middle East rather than a much needed political track. There is danger in that for everybody because it is turning into a deepening crisis between the culture of Islam and the West. Ireland does not want to be associated with any such chasm or ideological divide. Ireland should use its position at EU level and through the UN to call for a wider political track to be opened. The EU can be a bridge between the Unites States and the Islamic world, as it is a bridge from the United States in other matters.

This is a particular example of how EU policy can be determined without any input from the Irish Government and with little accountability to the Irish Parliament. I agree with the issues raised by Senator Ryan and Deputy Higgins. The Minister should come to the House about this. I mean no disrespect to the officials but these are deeply political issues which are of great concern and are much discussed here. I look forward to the Minister coming before the committee and articulating Ireland's position on the absence of a political track in this war against terrorism. It appears that everything has been ceded to the overwhelming security approach adopted by the United Kingdom and the United States. The EU is not exercising sufficient clout or cultural input into the dialogue that needs to take place.

We have been given a forecast of Ireland's Presidency of the EU and the issues that will be to the fore on the international agenda during that term. One would imagine that a key aspect of that would be EU-US relations on the Middle East. The Minister should give the committee a foresight of the approach Ireland will take during its Presidency on the absence of a political track in the war against terrorism.

My question is similar to that of Senator Ryan. Is there an official definition of terrorism? The media and world statesmen use the word as if everybody knows what it means. If the EU or the UN has a definition, does it include state terrorism? If the unilateral action of a gunman, for example, provokes a reaction from a superpower, mini power or any government resulting in the deaths of, perhaps, 20 innocent citizens, can that be regarded as terrorism? We need to decide what terrorism means. Yesterday's terrorist could be today's political leader. As Nelson Mandela was regarded as a terrorist, I find it hard to accept that definition. We are talking in circles until somebody, at some level, decides what terrorism is and whether it applies to states.

As I said earlier, we were advised that EU Foreign Ministers, at their informal meeting in Riva del Garda in Italy, made the political decision that began the process of listing the political branch of Hamas on the EU's list of individuals and groups. It began at the political level and the rest was the procedures that took place afterwards.

Ms O’Grady

I will be happy to circulate a note setting out the facts I gave the committee. I will include in that the point raised by Senator Ryan about the judicial authority. Judicial authority in this case means a court of law but we will define it more closely for the Senator in the note.

On the definition of terrorism, paragraph 3 of Common Position 931, which is the basis on which we are talking today, has a detailed definition. It is rather long but I have no difficulty outlining it.

Does it have universal acceptance? The media, George Bush and others talk of terrorism as if there was universal acceptance of the term. I doubt that there is.

Ms O’Grady

The Deputy is right that there is no universal definition of terrorism.

What is the common position adopted by the EU?

Ms O’Grady

The Common Position of the EU has defined it as follows:

For the purposes of this Common Position, "terrorist act" shall mean one of the following intentional acts, which, given its nature or its context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, as defined as an offence under national law, where committed with the aim of:

(i) seriously intimidating a population, or

(ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or

(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation:

(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;

(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;

(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;

(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;

(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;

(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;

(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life;

(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;

(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed under (a) to (h);

(j) directing a terrorist group;

(k) participating in activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group.

For the purposes of this paragraph, "terrorist group" shall mean a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist acts. "Structured group" means a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of a terrorist act and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.

I asked a question about the supply of information to Clearing House.

Ms O’Grady

Proposals are made to Clearing House. They are made by a member state or, through the Presidency, by a third state. The proposals contain information on the group, person or entity that is proposed for designation. Member states respond to those proposals by either agreeing with the proposals or raising a criteria reserve on the proposals.

When consent is sought from Ireland, has it access to the full range of information upon which the proposal is based?

Ms O’Grady

Yes, Ireland would have that information.

Is this information confidential at any stage?

Ms O’Grady

At all times that information is confidential to Clearing House.

The only evaluation of the quality of the information, therefore, is by the COREPER representative and the advice he or she will give ultimately to the Minister. Is that the case?

Ms O’Grady

Member states are allowed 15 days but are not confined to 15 days to examine any information that is proffered to them. This allows the governments of member states to form a view on the information proposed and then it reverts to the next meeting of Clearing House.

Is this COREPER II, which is at ambassadorial level?

Ms O’Grady

That is right.

That does not change it.

No, I am not saying that. We would be much more familiar with the official side of COREPER.

Yes. I am just making the point that information is a highly contested area at present. That is the politics of it.

Since the interval, Chairman, I had to attend to something else and I regret I was not present to hear Ms O'Grady's initial presentation. I am somewhat at a loss in discussing the matter without having heard the presentation because I notice that members are attaching great significance to it. I would like to add my voice to call for another occasion to discuss this matter in greater detail. Have you already agreed to that, Chairman?

Members will get a written copy of the presentation after which we can consider it.

A number of issues arise immediately. First, there is the issue of scrutiny of EU decisions. I remember being at Council meetings when I was the Minister for Industry and Commerce. The Danish Minister always had difficulty because not only did they debate the policy position in their parliament prior to Council meetings, but they actually gave him specific instructions on how far he could go. On occasions, when he was faced with a situation where he actually agreed with compromises, he still had to refer back to Copenhagen before such decisions could be endorsed. That is a bit extreme but our situation is extreme in the opposite direction whereby we go through these debates after the event when we cannot change a comma of what has been decided. We are merely rubber-stamping, by way of scrutiny, decisions into which we have no policy input. The big problem the public has with the EU at present is that they feel there is no democratic input to many of the decisions. The reason for that is that there is post facto scrutiny with very little policy input into particular items, even though there is a policy input into primary colour policy. At that level the Dáil is good but it is very bad in dealing with specific items.

Deputy Tony Dempsey asked whether there was an international definition of terrorism, but there is not. Different jurisdictions have definitions of terrorism, which are quite adequate for them. International bodies also have reasonable definitions of terrorism that go a long way towards meeting the need for such a definition. The other test is a pragmatic one, which is that if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and swims like a duck, then it is a duck. What happened in Istanbul in recent weeks, in Bali last year and on 9/11, was terrorism. What happened in Omagh was terrorism, as was what happened in Adare the day the IRA shot Jerry McCabe. We can debate the matter around the edges but, at times, it is as clear as crystal what terrorism is and we can recognise the main events. Following from that, the EU has an absolute responsibility to protect its citizens from terrorism. If, taking all circumstances into account, it is believed that a particular organisation is organising terrorism that threatens citizens of the EU, then I fully support the taking of action in doing what we have done several times in Ireland - stating that particular organisations are terrorist organisations. As a result of that conclusion they are proscribed and certain actions will be taken against them.

In the Irish context, there were great debates during the 1980s and 1990s about whether people who were charged with actions they claimed were political in other jurisdictions could be extradited. As a result of extradition cases in the Irish courts, a huge jurisprudence has developed on what terrorist acts are. It goes across Chief Justices and Supreme Court and High Court judges of different political pedigrees, if that is not an offensive way to refer to judges. It ranges from Cearbhall Ó Dhálaigh to Tom O'Higgins and on to Tom Finlay. They have spelt out in very great detail a developed piece of jurisprudence, from one to the other, which is organic and has been well developed over the years. Under this jurisprudence, certain acts cannot be deemed to be political because they are outside the pale of the kind of political act that a normal civilised political system would acknowledge to be political and as a consequence they are terrorist acts. We have a very well developed jurisprudence on this matter. Today, however, I do not want to talk about the problems of the Middle East or the US intervention in Iraq. I have expressed my views on those matters previously and I do not want to do so now. On the narrow issue of the responsibility of EU member states to protect their citizens if, taking all things into account, they feel certain organisations should be proscribed, I am with them and will not criticise them on that issue. I would welcome a longer debate here.

I agree totally with Deputy Noonan that the horrific acts he described are acts of terrorism. I have no difficulty with the duck analogy. I do have a difficulty in talking about what people call state-sponsored terrorism. If the lives of a couple of hundred innocent civilians are put at risk in order that a madman who has shot somebody can be captured in a particular place, is that state terrorism? We need to address what that is.

Let us be clear. None of us disagrees with Deputy Noonan's duck analogy at all but we have to be careful. It is not today nor yesterday that Deputy Noonan and I had debates about legal definitions when he was acting in a different role. The real difficulty is how does one write down a legally enforceable definition of terrorism. For instance, if somebody uses military force to try to get rid of the appalling junta in Burma, according to what has just been read out, they are terrorists by definition because they are using military force to attempt to change a government. I am not very keen on using military force to attack a regime, however obnoxious it may be, but I will not accept that is the same as bombing a restaurant in Bali.

One aspect to bear in mind is that this is the definition that is being adopted in this context. We can look separately at the definitions. As Deputy Noonan said, during the 1980s there was a lot of development and thinking on the whole question. In fact, if one looks at the extradition law, one will find that a person could not be extradited for various charges and the definitions were enlarged as we went on.

Deputy O'Donnell raised a crucial issue that is the implication of all of this along the continuum from security to political approaches to solving a problem such as the Middle East. Mr. Mannix may be able to address this issue. There is no doubt that this occurred at a sensitive moment for the Middle East. All such moments there are tragic but the point is that it is not divorced from a political context. When it is formally on the agenda we can discuss why the Saudi royal family is not on the list, for example, while the political wing of Hamas is. I am interested in restoring the political context. In fairness to Ms O'Grady, she mentioned three criteria that are adjudged and she is right. These include a member state offering an opinion on the wider political context but I am baffled how anyone can think this is of help.

I fully understand that the Deputy wants a wider discussion of that issue.

When I asked the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources about it he replied that we did not promote this but that we also did not have anything against it.

Mr. Mannix

I will try to deal with some of the political dimensions that have been raised rather than with the procedural side, with which I do not deal. As has been correctly pointed out, all of this is quite politicised. A decision of this nature must come at the end of a political process, which is what happened. As the Chairman pointed out, Ministers at Riva del Garda discussed this matter on 6 September and there was a broad consensus to move in this direction. It has already been discussed by Ministers, and features in the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 16 June. At that stage, the Council stated that it was urgently examining the case for wider action against Hamas fundraising. This question has quite a long history and has been considered at a political level. It has been considered by various political-type working groups of the European Union. It has not been considered just as a technical or security question. It has also been considered in its broad political context.

A question was raised about terrorism and state terrorism. Everyone knows that there is no universal definition of terrorism. As members can imagine, it has been difficult to obtain any kind of agreement on such a sensitive question. As far as successive Irish Governments are concerned, we have always condemned both terrorism and the excessive or disproportionate use of force by states. We think that neither one nor the other is in any way helpful towards advancing the cause of peace.

Deputy O'Donnell made the point that one cannot simply follow a security track and that there must also be a political track. Her comments were echoed by a number of speakers. We agree with that because our experience shows that simply following a security track is absolutely futile. This is why Ireland, as a member of the European Union, has been a strong supporter of the concept of the road map in approaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is beyond doubt that this conflict fuels the type of terrorism to which I refer. It is essential that progress should be made along a political track as well as a security track. A package of political measures must be put together. Everyone knows what these are because they are set out in the road map. Without progress on the political track, it is impossible to achieve anything lasting on the security track. That is also one of the reasons the decision on listing the political wing of Hamas was deliberately not taken earlier. There was a point at which significant attempts were being made to reach a ceasefire. These attempts ultimately succeeded. The decision against Hamas was not taken at that stage; it was taken later.

When considering Hamas, one must look at the nature of the organisation. Hamas is many things: a national liberation movement; a social welfare organisation of great significance, and a political party. Just because a movement or organisation happens to be one or all of these, does not mean that it is no longer bound by the normal rules of international law and proper conduct. Hamas has a long history of engaging in acts of terror. These were not merely sporadic acts of terror carried out by individual members; they go beyond that. There is a pattern that suggests a deliberate strategy of employing terror.

Senator Ryan was obliged to leave to attend for a vote in the Seanad. I would have liked to inform him that he is correct in distinguishing between the legitimate resistance of a national liberation movement to occupying forces - this is a long-established point of international law - and attacks carried out against civilians. It has been equally long-established under international law that such attacks are totally illegitimate and cannot be countenanced.

The third element that came under consideration was an increasing feeling that drawing a distinction between the political and military wings of Hamas was growing more artificial and more difficult to sustain. On 21 August, there was a horrific bombing in Jerusalem that killed 20 people. The Israelis retaliated the next day and Islamic Jihad and Hamas called off the ceasefire. A couple of weeks later the decision was taken, at a political level, that action would have to be taken against Hamas. It should be borne in mind that if Hamas were to decide to return to give up terror attacks and renew the ceasefire, it would be open to the European Union to delist it. That is the position that Ireland has taken. As part of that position, we have also stated that targeted assassinations, particularly of leaders of Hamas, must end. One cannot expect a ceasefire to hold unless these targeted assassinations come to an end.

I agree entirely that it is futile to simply target terrorism with military and security means. Ireland is a co-sponsor of a UN resolution, originally of Iranian origin, on the dialogue among civilisations. We strongly agree that one must understand the causes of this terrorist phenomenon, the origins of fundamentalism and the circumstances in which such fundamentalism can turn to extremism and violence. We take great interest in this matter and the European Union is also working on it. I assure members that Ireland will do its best to promote it during our Presidency. I hope I have managed to answer some of the questions posed.

I ask that Mr. Mannix supply copies of the presentation after the meeting. It will be some time before the Official Report of proceedings is completed.

Mr. Mannix referred to a resolution, of which Ireland is a co-sponsor, on the clash of civilisations.

Mr. Mannix

It relates to the dialogue among civilisations.

Will that be voted upon soon or has it been passed?

Mr. Mannix

It has been passed. There is an action programme to support it.

I agree that this is an important matter. Will it feature during the Irish Presidency?

Mr. Mannix

It will feature but I am not sure if it will do so as a specific topic. It is being pursued in various areas and we hope that they are going to come together. This matter will probably be dealt with at the next meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council. The Commission and the Council's secretariat have prepared papers. Various items of work have been completed and we will have to see how they start to come together. We will certainly place it in every area where it arises. However, because these topics are only really being explored and various ideas that have been brought forward are being examined, it is somewhat early to say that it will be taken as a single topic and pushed in that way. We will have to see, when the time comes, what will be the best way to advance.

Was there not supposed to be a meeting in Madrid as part of the dialogue between civilisations or on Islam and the west or Islam and Europe?

Mr. Mannix

I am not aware of such ameeting.

That is a welcome development.

Mr. Mannix

There was an important meeting in Madrid in respect of Iraq, but that is a separate topic.

I request that members of the committee be circulated with information on the resolution on the dialogue between civilisations.

Mr. Mannix

We will be glad to circulate the resolution.

I thank Mr. Mannix.

I thank Ms O'Grady and Mr. Mannix for appearing before the committee and for the information they provided. As they have seen, members are greatly interested in this subject and we will be giving further consideration to it. We look forward to further co-operation from our guests.

Barr
Roinn