Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 10 Sep 2008

Current Situation in Georgia and South Ossetia: Discussion.

I welcome Mr. Giorgi Badridze, deputy head of mission, from the embassy of Georgia in London. We are expecting Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov, political counsellor, from the Russian Embassy in Dublin.

Before we commence, I advise witnesses that whereas Members of the Houses enjoy absolute privilege in respect of utterances made in committee, witnesses do not enjoy the same privilege. Accordingly, caution should be exercised, particularly in regard to references of a personal nature.

On Thursday, 7 August, after a series of violent incidents between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, Georgia unilaterally declared a ceasefire. An agreement was made to hold talks to de-escalate the situation. Following what it claimed were further attacks on Georgian villages, Georgia moved forces into South Ossetia and bombarded its capital, Tskhinvali, causing severe damage and civilian casualties.

I pause to welcome our second speaker, Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov, whom I introduced some minutes ago. I thank both delegates for attending this meeting. We very much appreciate the insight they can afford us into these events.

Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov

I apologise for being delayed. I encountered some traffic problems.

We apologise for the traffic problems.

Heavy fighting ensued with South Ossetian militia, and Russian forces, some of whom were already present as peacekeepers, became involved on 8 August. On the following day, Georgian forces were being pushed out of South Ossetia by Russian troops. Georgia at this point offered a ceasefire, which was ignored by Russia. Effective Georgian resistance ended on 10 August, after which Russian forces spread out over large parts of Georgia, destroying military stocks, bases and some civilian infrastructure.

The President of France, which currently holds the European Union Presidency, Mr. Sarkozy, led an international mediation effort involving the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United States Secretary of State, Ms Condoleezza Rice, to devise a six-point plan designed to resolve the crisis. On 12 August, the Russian President, Mr. Medvedev, announced an end to Russian military activities in Georgia, although these continued for some days. The six-point plan was accepted by both Georgia and Russia on 12 August and was endorsed by the EU. However, on 26 August, President Medvedev signed a decree recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was immediately condemned by most western countries including Ireland, when we reiterated our support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This was a deeply regrettable decision by Russia and acutely complicated the task of finding a political solution to the difficulties in the region. This declaration should be revoked and international rules in this regard should be respected.

I welcome recent reports that Russia has agreed to a one-month deadline to withdraw its troops from buffer zones within Georgia around the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and for 200 EU monitors to be deployed in those areas in early October. However, the remarks made yesterday by the Russian Foreign Minister that up to 4,000 troops will remain within each of these regions for the foreseeable future are a matter of concern. We also welcome Georgia's undertaking to return its troops to pre-conflict positions and the announcement that the EU will guarantee a pledge by the authorities in Tbilisi not to use force to reclaim the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

I express in the strongest possible terms this committee's grave concern and disappointment at the use of cluster munitions by both sides to this conflict. Ireland has played a leading role in efforts to have the production, stockpiling and use of these vile, destructive weapons banned. Dublin recently hosted an international conference at which 107 countries signed up to an international treaty to ban the use of cluster munitions. I have written to the Russian ambassador in Dublin and the Georgian ambassador in London expressing this concern and requesting that Russia and Georgia join Ireland and the 106 other countries in signing up to the treaty and ending the use of these weapons once and for all.

I now call on Mr. Giorgi Badridze, deputy head of mission at the Georgian Embassy in London, to make his presentation. I thank both representatives for the documentation they sent us in advance.

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

I thank the members of the committee for inviting me. It is a great honour and a pleasure to speak before them. I also thank them for their interest in the matter and for all the support that Ireland, along with other European countries, has expressed for my country in this difficult time.

I would never have imagined that I would have to prove that my country had the right to freedom. Some people, including people in the West, think that Georgia is just a breakaway Russian province and even feel guilty that the defeat in the cold war dispossessed Russia of what was hers. They suggest that the democratic transition in eastern Europe was a mistake and that further advance of democracy and European values into what they consider Russia's backyard effectively means hostile encirclement of that country. Some of them have even suggested that the world would be a safer place if it were divided into old spheres of influence and that Russia's whimsical destruction of a small neighbour should be appeased.

First, I will touch upon basic facts of Georgian history as they are relevant. It is the ancient country of the golden fleece, known as the kingdoms of Colchis and Iberia to the Greeks since the myth of the Argonauts. We have our unique language, our script and a rich and distinct culture. With more than 3,000 years of statehood, Georgia happens to be one of the oldest Christian civilisations, where the apostle Andrew went on his missionary trip in the first century and where Christianity was proclaimed a state religion in the early fourth century. The Georgian nation preserved its independence for most of this time and never gave up the idea of freedom even when it was conquered by other empires. We have been cut from the rest of Europe for long enough to be forgotten, but not nearly long enough to lose our European identity and values. That is why, after liberation from 70 years of Soviet tyranny, we did not have much difficulty in choosing our vector towards Europe.

We have had setbacks and internal problems. Soviet authorities tried to prevent Georgian independence by provoking conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s and, later, Russia used them as leverage to prevent us from escaping to the West. The war in Abkhazia in the early 1990s, where separatist forces were heavily supported by Russia, resulted in the expulsion of nearly two thirds of the population, mainly Georgians. The OSCE and UN have recognized this as an ethnic cleansing in their official documents. Georgia still controlled a large part of South Ossetia and ethnic Georgians still constituted nearly half of the region's population before the latest Russian war against Georgia.

After 2003 the building of genuine and successful European democracy gained pace in Georgia. Georgia started consolidating its democratic institutions, corruption was curbed, our economy grew at the highest rate among non-oil-producing countries, the World Bank described Georgia as the number one reformer and foreign direct investment nearly doubled every year.

The Georgian Government made the peaceful resolution of conflicts one of its top priorities and worked closely with the international community. To our dismay, Russia perceived all this as a threat, did everything possible to undermine our economic success, introduced a total economic embargo and blockade, hunted down and expelled ethnic Georgians in Russia en masse and increased its grip on Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent conflict resolution.

The Russian Government, guided by its Cold War vision of the world, made Georgia its first target in the campaign to rebuild its imperial status. This war had very little to do with either South Ossetia or Abkhazia, and especially little to do with protecting the people there, who are fake Russian citizens. The Russian Government's claim to being a champion of the rights of the indigenous peoples of Caucasus is laughable at best given its record in the northern Caucasus. This was the war that Russia wanted, planned and started.

In seeking to justify its invasion of Georgia, Russia has claimed that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported surprise Georgian assault on Tskhinvali. Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control and after confirmation that a massive Russian land force, which included so-called volunteers, had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel. This was the culmination of months of meticulous planning by Russia. Some 40,000 Russian troops were soon occupying Georgia, as part of a simultaneous land, air and sea assault, unfolding a premeditated strategy that had little to do with Russia's stated claim of protecting its recently created "citizens" in the Tskhinvali region.

I do not wish to use clichés, so I will give more specific information on what has happened since 2004. Georgian peace proposals have been repeatedly rejected by Russia since 2004, when the Georgian Government became more active in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It has been mentioned that Georgia promised not to use force and it is ironic that Georgia was forced to make this promise because the use of force has never been compatible with Georgia's goals regarding these two regions. Georgia's goals were to bring about the peaceful reintegration of the regions and create conditions to allow ethnic Georgians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians live together as they have done for centuries. These goals cannot be achieved by military means. The Georgian Government has actively sought a peaceful resolution to this conflict and has tried to engage the international community, which supported Georgia's peaceful proposals. Unfortunately, Russia's policy is to block the peace process by using its position as a peacekeeping monopoly in the region.

Since 2005 Russia has gained a stranglehold over separatist governments. I have here a list of South Ossetian officials, Government Ministers, military heads and security agency heads. This shows that these were Russian officials and officers directly seconded from ministries, special services and the army to lead what they called the Ossetian Government.

In 2006 Russia built an illegal base near Tskhinvali with a capacity of 2,500 soldiers and substantial fuel storage capabilities for tanks and armoured vehicles. In March this year, the CIS arms and economic embargo on Abkhazia was unilaterally and illegally lifted by Moscow. The international community condemned the decree issued by the Russian Government, represented by President Putin, establishing direct official ties with the separatist governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

The United Nations and the OSCE confirmed that Russia had downed a Georgian unmanned surveillance aerial vehicle inside Georgian airspace in April this year. In May Russia increased its troop presence and introduced paratroopers into Abkhazia. It then illegally moved heavy weaponry and offensive forces into Abkhazia in May and June. These included weapons and armed units which had nothing to do with Russia's peacekeeping mandate. In May, Russia moved its railroad troops into Abkhazia and upgraded the existing railway tracks to enable them to carry tanks and heavy armour, which they did during this war.

A peace plan was proposed by the German Government in July which was, again, rejected by the Russian Government. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Lavrov, said it could not work because it contained a very important element — the right of return for internally displaced Georgian people to their homes — and this was not acceptable. In other words, Russia continued to support the results of the ethnic cleansing.

Early in July, separatist leaders in South Ossetia attempted to assassinate the leader of the unionist pro-Georgian Ossetian Government. This sparked a series of attacks, including roadside bombs, on Georgian police forces and the Georgian sections of the peacekeeping force in the region. In July, Russia undertook large-scale military exercises near South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Several thousand troops and hundreds of tanks were involved and they failed to redeploy after the exercises. The separatists finally rejected the German-mediated plan. The UN organised peace talks in July at which the separatists failed to appear; in late July, the OSCE proposed peace talks, which the separatists rejected.

The developments described, especially in 2008, clearly show that this war had been planned for a long time. I have further detailed description and a time line of events which I forwarded to committee members previously, so I will not read them.

We have circulated these to each member.

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

My main point is that this war was imposed on us. It had several goals. Its immediate goal was regime change in Georgia and the removal of the democratic government of Georgia which was perceived as being too pro-Western. The second goal was to derail Georgia's movement towards the West in general, and in particular its integration with the European Union and NATO, in particular. Another dimension was an attempt to block Europe's access to energy resources in the Caspian and central Asia which was provided by Georgia directly as the only alternative route is through Russia. On a global scale, this was the first step in re-establishing Russia's lost position in the world as a global player through extremely brutal means.

Apart from the destruction and devastation this war brought to Georgia, especially those who have been uprooted and have had their homes methodically burnt and destroyed, we are worried about the people who will be allowed to remain in these areas. These people are ethnic South Ossetian and ethnic Abkhaz. Georgia was offering them, through our peace plan, the highest European-level autonomy that would be guaranteed and guided by the European institutions, as Georgia is an aspirant country for membership of the European Union and NATO. These people have been denied this prospect and will instead have to share the fate of the northern Caucasus republics for some time.

I thank Mr. Badridze. We will have questions after we have had both presentations. We will now hear from Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov, a political counsellor with the Russian Embassy in Dublin.

Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov

I thank the committee. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to be here in the Parliament of Ireland and to present a brief report on the current situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. My report was given to the Parliament two days ago and I think it was circulated among the committee. I will report briefly on some events which took place in South Ossetia, and the most important events from our point of view.

I would like to respond to the report given by Mr. Giorgi Badridze about the history of Russian-Georgian relations. We should never forget that in 1783 Russia and Georgia signed a well known Georgian Traktat. According to this agreement, Russia at that time was the only country in the world which saved Georgia as a state. Without Russian troops sent by Tsar Catherine II, the state of Georgia would not been seen on a map. It was due to the Russian soldiers who gave their lives that the state of Georgia was saved and rescued. The Georgians begged and prayed for this assistance from Russia. That is one small excursion to history.

For the root to the current situation and what happened in South Ossetia one has to look to 1992. All the roots of the current situation according to Moscow lie in that period. In 1992, the first post-Soviet-era President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, tried to implement his plan to abolish the autonomies in the Georgian territory. He ordered Georgian troops to attack South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Due to self-sacrificing actions by the peoples rising in revolt against the aggressor and efforts undertaken by Russia, it became possible to stop the bloodshed, to negotiate a ceasefire and to establish mechanisms to maintain peace and to address all aspects of the settlement.

Peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were created, respectively, in 1992 and 1994, along with the institutional infrastructure to facilitate with Russia's mediation. Those steps were supported by the UN and the OSCE which got involved in the work of the relevant mechanisms and sent their observers to the zones of conflict.

In May 2004, special forces and troops in the Internal Ministry of Georgia were deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, and in August that year Georgian troops shelled Tskhinval and tried to take it. With active mediation of Russia, the then Prime Minister of Georgia, Zurab Zhvania, and the leader of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, signed a ceasefire protocol and, in November 2004, a document on ways to normalise relations in a step by step manner.

After the mysterious death, in February 2005, of Zurab Zhvania, who was a sensible politician, Mikhail Saakashvili categorically rejected all the previously achieved agreements. Mikhail Saakashvili continued to overtly ignore Georgia's commitments and arrangements within the United Nations and OSCE and established puppet administrative institutions for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All the years of Mikhail Saakashvili's rule were marked by his absolute inability to negotiate, continuous provocations and staged incidents in the conflict areas, attacks against Russian peacekeepers, and his disparaging attitude towards the democratically elected leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Since the outbreak of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s as a result of Tbilisi actions Russia has been doing its utmost to contribute to their settlement on the basis of recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia has taken this position despite the fact that the proclamation by Georgia of its independence violated the right of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to self-determination. In accordance with the Law of the USSR "On the procedure for addressing the issues related to the secession of a Union's Republic", autonomous entities that formed part of the Union's Republics were entitled to resolve the issues of their state within the Union and their state's legal status in the case of secession of the Republic. Georgia prevented Abkhazia and South Ossetia from exercising that right.

By the aggressive attack on South Ossetia on the night of 8 August 2008, which resulted in the loss of numerous lives, including among the peacekeepers and other Russian citizens, and by the preparation of a similar action against Abkhazia, Mikhail Saakashvili has put paid to the territorial integrity of Georgia. Using repeatedly brutal military forces against the people whom, according to his words, he would like to see within the state, Mikhail Saakashvili left them no choice but to ensure their security and right to exist through self determination as independent states. It is hardly possible that Mikhail Saakashvili did not realise the consequences of an attempt to resolve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts by force. As early as in February 2006, he said in an interview: "I will never give an order to start a military operation. I do not want people to die since blood in the Caucasus means blood not even for decades but for centuries." Thus, he knew what he was doing.

I wish to comment on the implementation of the plan of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy of 12 August 2008. This plan was reconfirmed during the EU Troika visit to Moscow on 8 August. I reconfirm each side's obligation to respect in full the Medvedev-Sarkozy six point plan of 12 August 2008. Section 1 deals with withdrawal of troops. Under point one, Russia will withdraw all of its peacekeepers from the five observation posts along the line from Poti to Sinaki, inclusive, within a maximum deadline of seven days, taking into account the signature on 8 September 2008 of legally binding documents providing guarantees of non-aggression against Abkhazia.

Under point two, Russia will withdraw in full its peacekeepers from the zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the positions where they were stationed before the start of hostilities. This withdrawal will be carried out within ten days following the deployment of international mechanisms in these zones, including at least 200 observers from the European Union, no later than 1 October 2008, taking into account legally binding documents guaranteeing non-aggression against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Under point three, there will be a complete return of Georgian armed forces to their bases by 1 October 2008.

Section 2 deals with international observation mechanisms. Under point one, UN international observers in Georgia will continue to carry out their mandate in their zone of responsibility in accordance with the number and deployment scheme as at 7 August 2008, without detriment to possible future adjustments decided by the UN Security Council. Under point two, international observers from the OSCE will continue to carry out their mandate in their zone of responsibility in accordance with the number and deployment scheme as at 7 August 2008. Under point three, there will be a speed up of preparations for the deployment of additional observers in the zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia in numbers sufficient to replace the Russian peacekeepers by 1 October 2008, including at least 200 observers from the European Union. I draw the committee's attention to the statement of President Medvedev two days ago in which he said that Russia praises the deployment of the international peacekeepers because for us, at a minimum, the deployment and the presence of the international peacekeepers will be the guarantee that the Georgian regime will be stopped from taking some idiotic actions.

Under point four, as guarantor of the principle of non-aggression, the European Union will actively prepare the deployment of an observer mission in addition to the existing observer mechanisms.

I refer to section three on international discussions. The international discussions stipulated in point six of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan of 12 August 2008 will begin on 15 October 2008 in Geneva. Preliminary discussions will begin this September.

Under point two, these discussions will examine the following issues: in particular, ways to ensure security and stability in the region; settling the issue of refugees and displaced persons on the basis of internationally recognised principles and post-conflict resolution practice; and any other issue put forward with the mutual approval of the parties.

I refer to a comment by the Chairman on cluster munitions. According to the official statement by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, nobody has presented any evidence of the use of cluster munitions by Russian troops. As the general staff stated, the Russian operation in Georgia excluded the use of these cluster munitions. On the other hand, the Georgian side officially admitted to the use of cluster munitions. There are some attempts by the Georgian side to deceive the international community in regard to the real facts.

I do not see any good guys or bad guys in this. I am conscious of the fact the truth is always the first casualty of conflict. I would like to see an international inquiry into the origins of the conflict, its conduct and how both sides are adhering to the six point plan up to which they have signed. I would like to hear the views of both gentlemen in that regard. Are their countries supportive of such an inquiry?

It is very difficult from such a remove and irrespective of what evidence is or is not produced for us to determine who used or who did not use cluster munitions. One would need an external independent inquiry to do so.

We support Georgia's integrity and sovereignty. We would like the displaced persons in Georgia to be assisted and permitted to return to their homes. Approximately €9 million or €10 million has been given by the European Union but it is estimated that approximately €100 million will be required to enable people to return to pre-conflict conditions.

Our Government has given some funding but I ask the Chairman to contact the Minister for Foreign Affairs to ask him to consider allocating funding from our overseas development aid budget to those who have suffered in the Georgian conflict.

On the face of it, it strikes me that Georgia was wrong to take the actions it took initially. The Russian authorities perhaps overreacted and used the opportunity to go further than they should have gone. Mr. Nikeryasov stated, if I am correct, that they would adhere to the six-point plan signed by his President. There are differing reports on how successful is Russia's adherence to that, and he may wish to comment.

Mr. Nikeryasov mentioned that he would be happy that international peacekeepers or observers would be located within Georgia. I would like to see the Russians go back to their pre-conflict position.

We appreciate that these matters can cause difficulties. We would prefer to see difficulties dealt with by dialogue rather than conflict. It has been acknowledged by both sides that when conflict starts in this region it is difficult to deal with it.

Some Russian spokespersons have tried to equate Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the recognition by the majority of European countries and the United States of Kosovo. I do not see these as similar circumstances. There may be inconsistencies in Russia's efforts to recognise those relative to the areas in the northern Caucasus. That is something of which Mr. Nikeryasov would want to be aware.

I thank Mr. Nikeryasov and Mr. Badridze for coming in here at what is a difficult time for both of them. In a nutshell, we would like to see the situation resolved. Adherence to the six-point plan is imperative. On that score, it is important to acknowledge the role that President Sarkozy, as President of the European Union, has played. It shows the necessity for a strong rather than a fragmented Europe when it comes to such foreign policy issues.

I thank the two representatives for coming in and giving us their views. Obviously, there is a wide gap between the positions of Russia and Georgia. We in Ireland have our own experience of conflict for 800 years. At the end of the day, it was resolved in a peaceful way by people sitting around the table and seeing how they could agree. That is what we would like to see: a peaceful solution to the problems.

I share the concern of my colleagues at the violence we witnessed in August. I refer, first, to the response of Georgia and the use of cluster weapons and, second, to the violence and the use of more force than was necessary by Russia in trying to influence the conflict.

On the question of the cluster weapons, is the Russian representative stating that Russia did not use cluster weapons? Have Georgia and Russia considered signing up to the international agreement to abolish the use of cluster weapons altogether, which originated in Dublin and to which 107 countries have signed up? Obviously, none of us ever wants to see war. We certainly do not want to see violence in which innocent civilians are injured. Cluster weapons are one of the most lethal forms of weapon for use in war and, obviously, civilians are the main casualties. Has either county looked at the possibility of signing up to that international agreement, something which we all would welcome?

Like Deputy Timmins, I recognise and appreciate the contributions of President Sarkozy, the US Secretary of State, Ms Condoleezza Rice, and the European Union. It is to be hoped we will be able to see a settlement that will ensure Georgia's continued independence and that will resolve the outstanding issues on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

I welcome the plenipotentiaries and thank them for coming. I endorse what my colleagues have said. I would describe this as a comedy of errors, a long history of underlying tensions and mistrust. As Deputy O'Hanlon stated, our country has been the victim of partition for centuries. It has cost us a lot of pain, huge loss of life, economic loss and deprivation, particularly in those parts of the country affected by the conflict down through the years. It took a great deal of effort and singular determination on the part of independent-minded people both domestically and internationally to bring about progress and a resolution.

We see this situation as one that can be resolved if there is goodwill on all sides and if everyone comes to the table to resolve the situation. However, there must be mutual respect for the integrity and sovereignty of both parties and their countries. Nobody wants to see any country divided or partitioned. The European Union, like Ireland, has had a long history of working in partnership with the Russian Federation. We see the Russian Federation as an important global player which has the potential to ensure the success of common goals not alone in its region but across the world through its engagement with, in particular, the European Union and other global players. Acting on behalf of sovereign states of the European Union, President Sarkozy and his team have done an excellent job in trying to find a structured, progressive conclusion to the current conflict.

Georgia is a country with a great and rich history and it has huge potential going forward. We believe that that region, working in parallel with Russia and the European Union, can make a huge contribution to the well-being and sustainability of human life, political progress and economic wherewithal going forward.

I am confident that the European Union stands ready to be a fair and even-handed independent broker in ensuring that, working together, the Russian Federation and the State of Georgia find common ground and, ultimately, a resolution which will ensure the people of both countries can live in peace and harmony thus ensuring their economic wherewithal and future can be sustained for centuries to come.

Like other speakers, I thank our speakers today for the civility of their presentation in very difficult circumstances. I wish to ask a number of questions, if I may. I do not disagree with anything said by other members of the committee. The objective must be to bring this conflict to a permanent end and to find political structures that are acceptable and which will work.

I wish to ask for the information of members of the committee some hard and obvious questions about the conflict. It appears to me there is an agenda, from my understanding of the region, that goes beyond South Ossetia and Abhkazia. I will be happy to hear a response in this regard from both sides. It appears to me that Russia has a difficulty in fully accepting Georgia as an independent state, a state entitled to make economic decisions in the interests of its own people and as a state entitled to align itself politically on the international plain in a manner that it perceives to be to its benefit and in its interests. I was particularly interested in the reference by our second speaker in his script to the suggestion from some European countries and the United States that Georgia might be part of NATO. There was also a reference to Georgia being part of the European Union. Will Mr. Nikeryasov explain Russia's position with regard to Georgia's aspirations to join the European Union? As an independent State and a member state of the European Union, Ireland would accept Georgia's entitlement to seek to join the European Union and would not see Georgia joining the European Union as doing so in the context of posing a threat to Russia. We do not see the European Union, for example, as a military alliance which intends to put Russia under pressure. The European Union is a sophisticated body representing many states within Europe that have increasingly close economic relations and relations in other areas.

Some of us perceive the events that took place as a flexing of muscles by Russia to indicate — not just to Georgia, but to the Ukraine — that it has a difficulty if those countries seek to bring about closer relations with the European Union or become part of NATO. Will both sides comment on that?

I know there are different opinions with regard to who initiated the conflict that took place. My colleague, Deputy Timmins called for an inquiry into the exact events that took place — perhaps an international inquiry from neutral individuals — and that might be of value historically. Perhaps it might be of value politically also, in so far as the events in August and how they originated are likely to continue to be a matter of political charge.

However, the current situation for us with regard to Georgia's position since its independence is that there have been difficulties with regard to both the regions now under Russia's control. Could we hear more about the population of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia? As I understand, approximately 50% of the population in both areas is Russian and 50% Georgian, but I am open to correction on that. Bearing in mind the history in this situation, if that is the case, it seems the type of special arrangement to which Mr. Badridze referred has much to offer in that the special nature of those regions needs to be recognised within a political structure that gives them a degree of self-administration while at the same time recognising that they are part of the State of Georgia. I suggest the declaration of recognition of their independence by Russia has made this conflict more complex and the difficulty more complex to address than it need have been.

Ireland can make only a small contribution to the resolution of the problems we have been discussing, but as part of the European Union, we are part of a larger grouping of countries, one that is in a position to make what I hope is a constructive contribution. I also welcome the steps President Sarkozy has taken. He deserves substantial praise for his initiatives and the hard work he has done to try to bring about a resolution to the current situation.

I understand there has been a proposal from the European Union — I am not clear whether this has been accepted — that 200 peacekeeping monitors representing the European Union involve themselves in ensuring that the arrangements finally agreed and implemented are observed. Can we have a comment on that? Will Mr. Nikeryasov comment on whether the Georgians who, as a consequence of this conflict, have now fled from South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be allowed to return to their homes, which hopefully for some of them are still standing, and will be under protection when they return home so that they are not subject to violence, threats or intimidation?

I have no disagreement with my colleagues of any party in their observations. I am especially interested in Deputy Shatter's questions and how Mr. Nikeryasov will respond to them. Our recent experiences with our difficulties in Northern Ireland would have us firmly on the side of resolving conflict through negotiation and putting arrangements in place which would allow conflicting elements of a population to live in peace and harmony and run their affairs.

While I am not sure of the sequence of events which was the proximate cause of the conflict, it is a great pity that Mr. Nikeryasov's President and parliament recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as this will make matters more difficult to resolve. They are both recognised internationally as integral parts of a sovereign Georgia and to recognise them unilaterally against universal international opinion is a great pity. Even Russia's closest allies and people who have been traditionally supportive of its position have not supported Russia on this issue.

I do not mean to take away from the difficulties in Georgia and the Caucasus. I am concerned about the manner in which Russia has appeared to try to assert itself in recent times. It is as if the collapse of the Soviet empire has left a psychological imprint on modern Russia and that it is asserting itself now when it is economically and militarily much stronger than it was 16 or 17 years ago. This policy is a mistake both in Russia's own interests and in our interests. We are not members of NATO and our foreign policy position is one of neutrality. However, Ireland is a member of the European Union and speaking as a member of that Union, Russia is our largest neighbour. We would like to resolve matters with it through negotiation and by integrating Russia more fully in business and in the process of global capital which is now emerging.

The big Aughinish Alumina plant is in my constituency and it was acquired two years ago by the private sector in Russia. Many of my constituents work in that plant in the Shannon estuary and it is part of the globalisation of the aluminium industry. The aluminium is exported to Russia's refineries. There is constant coming and going of Russian people in my constituency. Previously, at Shannon Airport, the Russian airline was welcome when it could not land anywhere else. There has been a long tradition in my part of the country of good relations with Russian business. For reasons of pride, position and face, Russia seems to be putting some of its economic progress at risk.

I am no authority on recent economic progress in Russia but it is largely dependent on the recently reversed price rises in oil, gas and other commodities. Russia's total economy is about 7% of the joint United States and European Union economies which, when one leaves aside places such as Ireland and Austria, are effectively the NATO countries. A total of 7% is a very small player in that situation. Russia therefore needs to trade. There is no alternative world model that Russia could export to other countries as it used to have in Soviet times. There is only one model now. The choice is between the authoritarian capitalism practised in China and Russia and the liberal capitalism practised in Western democracies and the emerging states. There are not big choices. I thought Russia was making progress in recent years towards a greater recognition of human rights and that it was progressively becoming more democratic in its politics and procedures. Everyone recognises it is coming from a particular position. It is not possible to make one giant leap forward and solve everything together. It is not a question of alternative models anymore.

Russia has a population of 143 million, which is dramatically reduced on 25 years ago. While I do not know what the country's demographic projections are, the last figures I saw indicated the population would continue to decline and then probably pick up again in the mid-2020s. Compared with its giant neighbours in the south east, that is a very small population for such an enormous landmass.

Russia does not need to be aggressive towards the West. Russians might wonder why Georgia and Ukraine want to join NATO. It seems the reason is they are afraid of Russia. It was for the same reason that Poland had a special sitting of parliament to pass motions in favour of Georgia. These countries are afraid of Russia. They are afraid that Mr. Putin will reassert a kind of Brezhnev doctrine covering the satellite states in the former republics of the Soviet Union and that Georgia was some kind of pilot test for a further aggressive Russian policy. It does not need to be that way.

While Russia has done very well economically in recent times, its stock market is approximately 80% commodity driven. The country does not have much equity in manufacturing or service industries. If the great boom in commodity prices is about to go into reverse, it will not be as economically strong in the short term.

I am not sure whether this is true — perhaps Mr. Nikeryasov could advise — but somebody told me that the price of oil would need to remain at approximately $110 per barrel for Russia to balance its budget and only beyond that price would it have a solid fund to invest abroad. While we are very pleased that the country has been economically very successful, particularly in the past seven to eight years, it is so heavily based on commodities that it is still not a modern industrial nation as we understand the term in western Europe and it could have emerging problems. Obviously, it can use oil and gas as instruments of foreign policy. I understand it is doing so with Armenia where good behaviour results in lower prices, while adverse behaviour results in higher prices. That model would not endear itself to western Europe. Obviously, Russia can cause considerable grief to western European economies in the short term, but in the long term we will just find other ways.

While I have departed from the Georgian-Russian conflict, it seems we have a vested interest in having Russia as a good neighbour. It has a very significant economy — bigger than India's. There is much talk about India in world economic terms, but Russia has a stronger economy. We would like to have Russia as a great big co-operative trading nation to the east with good relations involving whatever legal arrangements the European Union can put in place with it on a bipartisan basis. However, it must stop threatening its former neighbours or satellite countries — if they do not object to that term. It certainly must stop using energy as an instrument of foreign policy. Energy is a commodity to be traded: Russia sets its price and we buy it. This country is at the end of a long gas pipeline. It is a question of price and trade not of threatening people.

Perhaps Mr. Nikeryasov has some reflections on where Russian foreign policy is now pitched. We could do business with Russia, and both sides could show respect for each other, if its foreign policy were less aggressive. It is a great pity that the recent events in Georgia took place. It is a backward step for Russia. Georgia is very small. Democracies always have a tendency to back the small guy. Georgia is getting all the international sympathy. Russia looks like a bully, frankly. That is a problem for Russia. Negotiation is the only way to proceed. The European Union is not about to go away. It covers a big area and has a strong economy. It is allied to the United States, in many respects. Russia is very big and powerful as well. It has a much weaker economy, however. Russia and the EU need to do business with each other, without any conflict. I am aware that I may sound like the Skibbereen Eagle did when it said it was keeping an eye on the Tsar of Russia. Ireland has a voice as a member of the European Union.

I thank all members of the committee. I invite Mr. Badridze and Mr. Nikeryasov to respond briefly to the questions asked.

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

I thank the members of the committee for their comments and questions. I will address all the issues one by one. I will be as brief as possible.

I can inform Mr. Nikeryasov, who spoke about history, that I happen to have a master's degree in history. In particular, I have studied in detail the Treaty of Georgievsk, which was agreed by the Kingdom of Georgia and the Russia Empire in 1783. The treaty secured the independence of Georgia. Russia offered protection to Georgia in exchange for Georgian participation in Russian wars against theoretical and hypothetical enemies in the south. In 1795, Persia, which was unhappy with the treaty, demanded that it be abolished and threatened to invade. Georgia asked for the treaty to be implemented — for Russian troops to be deployed — but that did not happen. As a result, eastern Georgia, including its capital, Tbilisi, was razed to the ground. Russia did not send troops to Georgia until 1801, and then only to abolish Georgian statehood entirely. Georgia had been dominated by many empires throughout its history, but the Russian Empire was the first of them to abolish all Georgian state institutions, including the Georgian monarchy in 1801.

After a brief period of independence as the Georgian Democratic Republic, Georgia became part of the Russian Empire for the second time in 1921 when it was invaded by the Bolshevik army. I do not suggest that the entire history of Georgian-Russian relations has been bad for Georgia. We have enriched each other as part of each other's culture. Our respective intelligentsias are extremely closely connected. For me, it is a big personal pain to talk about what happened between Georgia and Russia in recent times. I would never have imagined it to be possible. The reality is that it happened. I will not respond to some of the other comments made by Mr. Nikeryasov because it would take me too long.

I wish to speak about what happened on 7 August, as it has become such an important point. Russia invaded Georgia under a certain pretext. No such pretext had been given by Georgia. On 7 August, after several days of being shelled from positions near Tskhinvali, Georgian police and peacekeepers received direct orders from President Saakashvili not to return fire unilaterally. We held our ceasefire for eight hours while our diplomats tried to work with Russian diplomats. The Russian special envoy, Mr. Popov, failed or was unable or unwilling to organise direct talks with the separatists, who would not stop their activities. The head of the Russian peacekeeping force, General Kulakhmetov, officially declared that he was unable to control the separatist forces, who were increasing their shelling at a time when Georgian forces were holding a ceasefire for eight hours. It was only when confirmed information was received that 150 armoured vehicles and trucks, carrying Russian army personnel and volunteers, were coming through the Roki Tunnel from Russia, that Georgian forces were ordered to enter Tskhinvali and nearby villages.

Mr. Nikeryasov might have some reflections on where Russian foreign policy is now pitched. If the aggression could be removed, we could do business with respect for each other. What happened in Georgia is a great pity and a reverse step for Russia. Regrettably, Georgian forces used multiple rocket launch systems against the areas from where the artillery fire was coming. We regret that because we realise the Grad, the so-called "Hail" multiple rocket system, is an indiscriminate weapon. However, it was only directed at the areas from where the artillery fire was coming. Russia used the Hurricane multiple rocket launch system which is approximately four times more deadly, more indiscriminate and has a much wider area of coverage. There was carpet bombardment of Tskhinvali which Russia was supposedly saving from Georgian attack.

On the first day of hostilities Russian propaganda declared that 2,000 civilians had been killed by Georgian forces. After the operation finished, Russian sources talked of 133 casualties. Human Rights Watch entered the area on 11 August and indicated that only 44 people had been confirmed dead in Tskhinvali, not all of whom were civilians or killed in the Georgian bombardment. While the Georgian counter-attack on Tskhinvali must have caused damage and resulted in casualties, for every Georgian bomb 100 Russian bombs were used against the town. Russia cannot claim it was protecting anyone in Tskhinvali.

Let us not fool ourselves: there is no recognition; there is annexation. I will provide the committee with a list outlining South Ossetia's so-called government which is made up of Russian officials and officers directly seconded from Russian ministries and special services. I attach their biographies for full precision. These are Russian born and trained officials who were simply sent to administer the Russian controlled part of the region. Only a few days after the Russian invasion the Minister for Regional Development, Mr. Kozak, was reporting to President Medvedev about what he had done to set up a new government for South Ossetia. It is being put together by Russia.

The reason the six-point agreement needed to be reconfirmed was it had never been implemented in the first place. It was first declared by President Medvedev on 12 August that the military goals had been reached and that Russian troops were withdrawing as the military phase of the campaign was over. On the same day he supported the six-point agreement brokered by Mr. Sarkozy. On 14 August he signed the same document after President Saakashvili had signed it. The Russians had pledged several times that they were withdrawing but, in fact, they were entrenching deeper and extending the geography of occupation. Almost one month was spent ethnically cleansing the areas controlled by Russian forces and looting the military infrastructure. Munitions were taken by hundreds of trucks with civilian office furniture, household goods and many other items. We did not expect the Russian army to be that desperate for basic items.

International peacekeepers are extremely welcome. We have been trying to achieve a peacekeeping presence for many years but Russia blocked the internationalisation of the conflict resolution process in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I do not want to go into the details of what Russian peacekeepers did not do to protect the Georgian population.

To reply to the question on the demography of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, before the war in the early 1990s Georgians were the largest ethnic community in Abkhazia, constituting nearly half of the region's population. The rest, 17%, were ethnic Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Estonians. Nearly all Georgians — some 300,000 people — Jews, Greeks and Estonians were expelled from Abkhazia after the war in which Russia directly supported the separatists. A tiny minority was left there to which Russia refers when it says the people of Abkhazia made a choice of not being part of Georgia. We are talking about a few remaining people led by these people.

As for South Ossetia, Georgians comprised nearly half of the local population before this conflict. They have all been expelled and their houses have been destroyed, meaning there is nowhere to return. We have open statements from the local separatist leadership stating it will never allow Georgians to return.

Those who were allowed to remain in the region will be deprived of a European prospect that we were offering them, that is, a European standard autonomy guaranteed and guided by Europe. They will be sharing the fate of other northern Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and others, where the human rights situation has not improved. Just last week, two leading opponents of the Kremlin regime there were murdered. This is not the first time the Kremlin has killed its opponents. Until recently it was done through covert operations such as poisoning or contract killing. This time the leader of the Ingush opposition, a prominent journalist, was assassinated publicly.

The last thing Georgia wanted in its relations with Russia was confrontation. When we decided to build a European democracy in Georgia, we never thought that this would be perceived as a threat to Russia. Why Russia is allergic to democracy in its neighbourhood is a mystery to us. We thought it would be much better for Russia's people, economy and security to be encircled by democracies and not autocracies, failed unstable states or tyrannies. We still hope to one day establish good co-operation with Russia.

Separatism is not just Georgia's problem. In the early 1990s when we were warning Russia against supporting separatists in Abkhazia, it did not listen and believed it would not be affected by it. What happened in Chechnya was a direct result of Russia's participation in Abkhazia. What is happening today will affect Russia itself. Georgia is deeply interested in normal and good relations with Russia because we are connected by history and culture. We are always ready to accommodate Russia's legitimate security interests in our region but this will not happen at the expense of our choice of freedom.

We are being punished for our choice of freedom and the European path. The most important action the committee can take is to ensure Georgia is allowed to continue on this path. This will only be a foundation for better relations with Russia. Russia must rethink the path it is pursuing. Russia is essentially a European country. It has everything to be a leading partner for European union. It seems the Russian Government has chosen another way.

Mr. Andrey Nikeryasov

I thank the Irish people who sent letters supporting Russian policy in the Caucuses and I take this opportunity to thank the Irish NGOs who provided aid to the suffering people in South Ossetia. On behalf of the Russian Embassy I would like to draw attention to the Irish media, which in comparison to the media in neighbouring European countries, is giving a more balanced picture of the current situation in the Caucasus.

Let me comment on Russian policy in our neighbouring countries, such as Georgia, Ukraine and other countries. Our President stated that Russia will defend its national interests. Of course, our national interest is in aligning with former Soviet republics. Russia pays attention to the situation in these states. It is subjective; we have had historic ties over many centuries with these people and many Russians live in these countries. We have a strategic national interest. The leaders of these former Soviet countries must understand this relationship. In this case I ask why the leaders of Georgia in Tbilisi did not ask themselves about the consequences of their attack on South Ossetia.

Nobody could assume how Russia would react. I think the majority of politicians in the European Union and the United States never would have assumed what action Russia would take. I think some of them thought that Russia would not react. How could Russia not react to such a situation near its borders when its national interests were attacked aggressively? Russia had to respond. Why did President Saakashvili not consider the consequences of the orders he gave his troops? Did the Russian Government create obstacles for the former Soviet states to co-operate with the European Union? Is there official evidence that Russia put obstacles in place that would hinder Tbilisi or Kiev from joining the European Union? No. Instead, I can provide evidence that individual EU member states do not want further enlargement of the European Union. It was not Moscow but individual NATO and European Union member states which objected to Georgia's proposals to join those organisations. We never put such obstacles in place and nobody can produce evidence that we did. However, Tbilisi forgot about the consequences of its actions and what would be our reaction to the attack on South Ossetia. We were certainly right to do as we did. Some politicians in the United States and some European capitals cannot accept the fact that Russia woke up. Russia will never be as it was five, ten or 15 years ago. The situation has changed and Russia is a different country from what it was before.

Regarding our relations with the European Union, there is no doubt that we are ready to co-operate in all fields with all European countries. For example, Ireland is not a large country but it is the seventh on the list of foreign investors in Russia, behind such heavyweights as the United States, Britain and Germany. We welcome this. I am aware of seven factories in different parts of Russia constructed by Irish companies. In St. Petersburg, an Irish company, Treasury Holdings, has made a huge investment in the construction of a golf resort. We are ready to continue this dialogue and co-operation in the economic sphere.

It is correct that some 70% or 80% of our budget is made up of oil and gas exports. We would certainly like to restructure the flows of money and we have invested heavily in technology and so on in an effort to achieve that. We shall be glad to co-operate in this sphere with the European Union. However, our oil and gas companies are an example of the unequal basis of co-operation between the European Union and Russia. For example, 25% of shares in Russian gas and oil companies belong to European companies. Meanwhile, however, European markets are still closed for our companies. We do not understand this. This is the case not only with gas and oil but also in other spheres. The European Union market remains closed for us; it is not as open as we are.

We can wait one, two or three years for this to change but we cannot wait forever. We are looking for other partners who will be more open to us than the European Union. That is why there must be dialogue between both sides. As our Prime Minister, Mr. Putin, has said, we do not want to change our pipelines from Europe to Asia. It is something we can do, but nobody wants this. What we want is respectful and equal dialogue. We have a long list of economic issues, in respect of which we do not feel we are on an equal footing with the European Union. It includes bank, insurance and high technology services. This country is not very open to us, which we witness in certain spheres, in which my country has become a store for second-hand products from the European Union. That is not because of our policy but EU policy. We are open but do not want to become a store for second-hand products, yet sometimes we do not receive a reply from the European Union. We were very pleased with the fact that, following the recent summit, the European Union did not impose sanctions because they would not have been constructive. Members should not forget the Russian influence on global security and its role in settling the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran and other parts of the world.

We never used any critical words about Georgian people. I have been in Tbilisi and like the country. "Tbilisi" translates from the Georgian language as "warm city" and I remember the beautiful mountain of Mtatsminda at its heart. Its people are very good and we like them but we do not understand the leadership of the country.

On the subject of the recognition of independence, as our President said, we want it to be a closed chapter. We recognise the independence of both countries and shall not change our position. We appeal to the European Union and the entire international community for an understanding of the new political reality. We will not surrender nor change our decision.

I also have a question about President Saakashvili. Why did his patrons in the United States and some European countries not stop him? Why did they not think about the consequences? Everybody knows Russia rejected the agreement regarding Kosovo. Some countries rejected the position taken by Russia but we think Serbia has more right to preserve its integrity than Georgia, on historical and economic grounds. Nobody in the European Union or Washington thought about the consequences. Everybody knows about Abkhazia and South Ossetia but why recognise Kosovo? It was because at the time nobody imagined that Russia would react in another way, as we did in South Ossetia.

I thank Mr. Nikeryasov.

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

I failed to answer two questions about cluster bombs and I do not want to be disrespectful to members. The Georgian army has used cluster munitions, but not bombs, in a narrow valley in an unpopulated area adjacent to the Roki tunnel. Therefore, in theory there was no chance of harming civilians or infrastructure. I have presented to the committee pictures and documents detailing the weapons used by Russia, including large cluster bombs used in Gori, Shindisi and Variani. These attacks resulted in the loss of civilian lives.

Will Mr. Badridze give those documents to us in order that we can circulate them to everyone?

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

Deputy Shatter asked about nationalities in the region and mentioned Russians. There are no Russians in the region. The people in question were only recently thrown passports by Russia — even where there was no Russian diaspora, a pretext was created. The countries that really have Russian communities should be worried.

If there is any further information Mr. Badridze thinks we should have, he can send it to us.

Mr. Giorgi Badridze

Kosovo was mentioned but the difference in that situation is that in that case recognition was preceded by ethnic cleansing. The Russian invasion was followed by ethnic cleansing and the difference is dramatic.

I know that nobody wishes to hear from all of the committee members again but it is appropriate to speak, having raised questions earlier. I found the response of Mr. Nikeryasov extraordinarily depressing. He suggests there is no wish to have an insight into what is necessary to solve this problem but he did not answer questions I asked about the possibility of people who have the left the region returning. I greatly regret the manner in which he spoke of Russian national interests and the reawakening of Russia, as they reflect the concerns expressed by Deputy Noonan. This approach smacks of a mixture of xenophobia and paranoia and I hope that when people wake up, they will reflect further on what the reawakening of Russia has produced.

One thing we have learned in Ireland is that timeframes are necessary for the resolution of conflicts. Perhaps with the passage of time and a greater insight, there might be a long-term solution. However, I found what was said on the Georgian side today more constructive and enlightening than the insights on the conflict from the Russian side. It is not our job to act as a referee; it is our job to form judgments within the committee as Members of the Irish Parliament. Having heard the presentations and using what I know of the background to the conflict, I would be less than honest if I simply left the room without expressing a view. I hope there will be further constructive engagement with the European Union and that will it produce a greater insight and a solution to these difficulties. I heard what Mr. Nikeryasov said about the European Union and Russian national interests and remain concerned that what occurred in this conflict did not relate solely to Georgia. I suspect it was about a Russian reawakening that resulted in the need for it to flex its muscles and ensure states along the border that have achieved independence were taught they could not exercise it without permission from Moscow. That would be an extraordinarily retrograde step in international politics and I hope this is not the political scene we will face in the coming years.

My colleague, Deputy Noonan, eloquently expressed real concerns and I am afraid that much of what Mr. Nikeryasov said confirmed, rather than allayed, these concerns. However, I would be glad to be proved wrong in the years to come.

I thank both of our guests for attending. We have had an interesting discussion that we could continue further, particularly when one allows for the wider issues mentioned by Deputy Noonan. We are conscious of the importance of the regional aspects of this matter and anxious to ensure there will be dialogue. We hope Russia can be a great friend of the European Union and that it can develop its relationship with the rest of the countries of Europe. We would be looking for this within the European Union, needless to say.

It is great to see both of the representatives here today and we thank them for coming. We appreciate it is not easy for them to explain these things to the extent to which they have. We are all aware in this country that an end to conflict can only be achieved by meaningful dialogue. We are very much aware of this, as members have stressed to the representatives. We could revisit all the conflicts of the past, but we must focus on where we are going. One thing the representatives managed to bring out very clearly is that we are living in a new world and a new Europe. There are new opportunities and possibilities and we must all rise to take advantage of these. It will not be easy and will require much work to tease out the issues.

In the meantime, however, we must urgently return to the ceasefire signed on 15 and 16 August, with the Russian troops returning to the positions they held on 7 August. International monitors should be deployed in Georgia to oversee the withdrawal and the return of displaced people and to help maintain the ceasefire until a peacekeeping mission can be created. There is no quick fix in this conflict, and all parties must recognise this, including the US and the EU. The French President, Mr. Sarkozy, has done, as we have heard again and again, great work with the six-point plan. He moved in very quickly, before things were allowed to develop, to try to bring about a peace plan. If peace and security are to be restored and nurtured in the region generally, we must welcome the active support of the UN in the conflict and stress the need for urgency in dispatching observers and monitors — these are now scheduled to be there for 1 October, which would be very helpful — and in the formation of the peacekeeping mission. It is to be hoped the mission will be available not too long after that.

From what we have heard here today and in recent days we can be cautiously optimistic that work on a resolution to the conflict will get under way. We can see from what has been said how complex the issues are and how difficult it will be. We emphasise the fact that we have goodwill towards both sides and we want to see a solution which is fair and equitable and good for both sides. We will do everything we can to promote that. The representatives have heard the views of all members. We will keep ourselves informed of the issues and of developments. I thank the representatives for coming here today.

The joint committee went into private session at 4.28 p.m. and adjourned at 4.30 p.m. sine die.
Barr
Roinn