Yesterday, the sub-committee heard testimony from a number of former gardaí, including those of commissioner and deputy commissioner rank, as well as a former Minister for Justice. I thank all of those who contributed to our discussion. Today, the sub-committee will hear from the current Commissioner and his immediate predecessor, Mr. Pat Byrne, who I welcome. Mr. Byrne does not remain Commissioner in the way the President of the United States of America retains the title on retirement.
Public Hearings on the Barron Report.
Mr. Pat Byrne
I do not carry the rank. It is just as well.
Or the responsibility. I thank Mr. Byrne for attending on a voluntary basis to provide evidence which is very necessary to enable the sub-committee to carry out its work as requested by the Dáil and Seanad. We appreciate his attendance. As he will be aware from previous appearances — having been very good to us over the years and acceded to our requests to attend — members enjoy absolute privilege while witnesses have only a qualified level of privilege. Members should note that Mr. Byrne was head of the Garda from 1996 to 2003.
Mr. Byrne
I will make a presentation outlining the way in which I became familiar with this case before taking questions as members require. I first became aware of the matter when the family of Seamus Ludlow wrote to my immediate predecessor on 2 May 1996 to seek a meeting. It was the anniversary of Mr. Ludlow's death. I arranged, as deputy Commissioner — it was a few months before my appointment as Commissioner — a meeting at which the Garda was represented by Detective Superintendent Michael Finnegan and Superintendent Michael Staunton. They met the family on 6 and 30 May 1996 and, consequently, Superintendent Finnegan submitted a report on 26 June 1996. The report revealed the existence of a report made by Detective Superintendent John Courtney dated 15 February 1979. As members will know, Mr. Courtney's report contained the four names of the suspects inthe killing of Seamus Ludlow. Superintendent Finnegan went on to state in his report thatMr. Courtney's report contained information which "on its face looks likely to be true" Superintendent Finnegan continued:
It identifies four suspects for the murder and gives an in-depth description of the role played by each. However, for some reason which is not set out in the file it appears that these suspects were never arrested or interviewed about the murder.
As the committee can imagine, that was news to us. We were not aware of it. For the purpose of clarification, these four men were not on the list of names given to the Ludlow family in their submission or letter of information to the Commissioner. These were four new names as far as I know. These were the same four names that were received in January 1979 in Garda Headquarters in C3 department from the RUC as well.
On 11 July, as a consequence of that, I directed that a detective superintendent from the Criminal Investigation Unit study the file, submit recommendations and carry out whatever was required in relation to it. It was quite obvious that this needed to be investigated. Detective Superintendent Ted Murphy was chosen for this task and the committee will be aware from Mr. Justice Barron's report what occurred as a consequence of the investigation of Detective Superintendent Murphy and his team, which included local officers of the Garda Síochána in the Dundalk area. It was to restart the investigation and pursue it as far as they could to a final conclusion.
I want to touch briefly on developments regarding that intelligence. On 20 January 1997 — this is linked into part of Detective Superintendent Ted Murphy's report — the RUC asked for specific information on the names provided by Joe Tiernan to the family. Nothing of investigative value emanated from its inquiries in regard to those names. However, because they had to be eliminated from the inquiry, the focus then had to be on the four names that had been made available to the Garda Síochána in 1979. Those were Hosking, Long, Carroll and Fitzsimons.
There is a note here. Perhaps Mr. Byrne would refer to all these people by number from now on.
Mr. Byrne
I understand. Detective Superintendent Murphy reported that the four suspects had been traced and that the RUC detective inspector, who was obviously investigating it in tandem with the Garda Síochána, was satisfied that 'the suspects can be dealt with in his jurisdiction [that is, Northern Ireland] in accordance with the provisions of the Offences Against the State Act 1861. On 26 June 1997, the RUC sought from the Garda Síochána copies and investigation reports, including photographs, ballistics and any other evidence we had regarding the case. These were provided on 15 September 1997. Suspects Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were arrested on 18 February and suspect No. 3 was arrested on 19 February 1998. There were obviously communications at that stage between Detective Superintendent Murphy and the DPP's office here and, as far as I know, between the two DPP offices in the North and the South regarding developments.
Suspects Nos. 1 and 4 in this investigation made certain admissions regarding the killing of Seamus Ludlow on 2 May 1976 and suspects Nos. 2 and 3 denied any involvement in the killing. On 23 October 1998 the RUC submitted its investigation report to the DPP in Northern Ireland and on 15 October 1999 he decided there would be no prosecution. That was in relation to the continued investigation into these four suspects, bringing it to that conclusion.
On 17 November 1998, Detective Superintendent Ted Murphy submitted a report on the other issues contained in the Ludlow family's complaints. These are all laid out in Mr. Justice Barron's report. I will not go into those unless asked to do so.
Regarding intelligence of 30 January 1979, which is the key issue as far as I am concerned, which was provided by RUC Headquarters to Garda Síochána Headquarters, Detective Superintendent Murphy refers to the documentation touching on this subject. Obviously he went into the background of how this evolved and what occurred and did not occur. He stated in his report: "In short the documentation does not provide any clear indication as to what precise plan of action, if any, was being followed and by whom." He further states:
It is unlikely that Detective Superintendent Courtney was solely responsible for preparing and executing a plan of action without the knowledge of and/or the consent of his supervisors. Unfortunately, records now available do not assist in reaching any definite conclusion.
He concluded his report by stating:
Inquiries completed in the matter confirm that no action was taken in regard to processing the four suspects. It is now a matter of speculation as to where precisely the blame lies. Perhaps each of the offices and officers concerned are responsible for the inaction considering that a report was forwarded to the relevant offices at the time.
On 27 August 2002 Mr. Justice Barron wrote to me as Commissioner seeking my views on the failure to question the suspects in 1979. I personally conducted my own review of files and on 10 January 2003 I sent my 12-page report to Mr. Justice Barron. My report went through in sequence the matters touching on the intelligence received by C3 in Garda Headquarters from RUC Headquarters on 30 January 1979 identifying four suspects in the killing of Seamus Ludlow. A very striking factor in relation to this was the note from the then Commissioner, Mr. Garvey, in 1976, immediately after the murder of Seamus Ludlow when, in returning the file to C3, he wrote: "Keep in touch with the RUC; something useful may be forthcoming in time."
Intelligence from the RUC in relation to the four suspects was made available to all the relevant offices and officers, as the committee will know from the report. Certain actions were taken on this information. However, it appears, for whatever reasons, the investigation petered out, with the last documentary strand dated 26 March 1980. That was a request from the assistant commissioner of C1 for a report from Detective Superintendent Courtney.
The key question, in my view, that was asked of me by Mr. Justice Barron was framed in his letter to me which refers to steps taken as a consequence of intelligence received. In the letter he states that there was nothing on file to suggest that any such steps were taken. He asks whether this suggests no such steps were taken and, if so, where would the default lie. My synopsis would be that we had the information and he was asking what we did with it. Part of my reply as contained in the interim report reflects my view.
The over-arching issue in relation to this, as is contained in my report, is the awareness of people of that information which was first received by the Garda Síochána on 30 January 1979. Obviously those who were not aware of it cannot be faulted. In my report I refer to people in public life both in this State and in Northern Ireland who were aware of the information. I hasten to add, however, that irrespective of who knew what, the primary responsibility rested with the investigative authority at the time this crime was committed in this State, and that was the Garda Síochána.
In essence, in terms of what did or did not happen, the responsibility lay with the Garda Síochána, although it gives me no satisfaction to say that. To suggest otherwise would be ludicrous. At the end of the day, there was a systems failure for various reasons. As I stated in my report, having examined all paperwork and documentary evidence on this matter, I could not identify why what one would have expected to happen did not happen. That concludes my presentation.
I would like to clarify an article in today's The Irish Times which I read three or four times because I felt I had misunderstood it the first time. I will quote from the article which, I believe, gives the wrong impression in terms of what was contained in my report, of a reply, if accurately reported, given to a question raised by the sub-committee. It states:
When asked about former commissioner Pat Byrne's conclusion that any decision not to proceed could only have been made by Mr. Wren in consultation with the Department of Justice, he replied: "Not correct, as far as I'm concerned."
I suspect the question was not phrased that way. However, the manner in which it is reported in the newspaper creates the impression that I reached the conclusion that the only reason the case did not proceed was because Mr. Wren made a decision on his own or in consultation with the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I want to clarify that this was not my opinion. I suspect the question was not asked in that particular manner. I want to put that clarification on the record of the sub-committee.
The Irish Times has a good reputation of clarifying matters in that regard.
I thank Mr. Byrne for attending. His submission to Mr. Justice Barron was fair and honest, as was his submission to the sub-committee this morning.
What was Mr. Byrne's position in the Garda Síochána from 1976 to 1980?
Mr. Byrne
In 1976 I was a detective garda in the special detective unit in Dublin Castle. In 1978 I was a detective sergeant in the special detective unit in Dublin Castle. In 1985 I was promoted to detective inspector and was assigned to security branch, Garda headquarters.
I take it Mr. Byrne was not involved in this case at that time?
Mr. Byrne
That is correct.
I would like to ask Mr. Byrne about the second edition of the Garda code operated from 1965 to 1980 and, in particular, chapter 3, which stated that all crimes and offences brought to the notice of a member would be fully investigated and reported to his or her superiors and so on. Would that have been of paramount importance or would it have been subject to anything else?
Mr. Byrne
It would have been of paramount importance.
Chapter 26.3, under the heading of correspondence with other police forces, mentions that any matters of a political or subversive nature should be, in the first instance, channelled through the Commissioner.
Mr. Byrne
Yes, but a commissioner's authority would have been delegated to a C3.
Therefore, any matters of that nature would have to be channelled through the Commissioner.
Mr. Byrne
The Commissioner would not deal with such matters on a day to day basis.
A C3 would have been the authorising authority?
Mr. Byrne
Yes.
I refer Mr. Byrne to page 69 of the report where it is stated that he gave to Mr. Justice Barron his opinion — I am aware Mr. Byrne has repeated that opinion today but I would like him to clarify it — that the next step in the investigation would have been to interview the suspects and, notwithstanding the demands on the Garda, that is what should have happened. The fact that it did not happen was a breach of proper protocol within the Garda Síochána. Is that a fair summary of Mr. Byrne's opinion?
Mr. Byrne
It needs expansion in that I could not imagine a situation whereby members of the Garda Síochána would interview suspects who did not wish to be interviewed outside the State. For example, as we all know, the responsibilities and powers of the Garda Síochána only apply within the State. There are a number of ways people can be interviewed, including having a suspect interviewed by another on one's behalf. The key issue is whether any further steps were taken such as, having the suspects interviewed by a different agency such as the Scottish police or RUC or, not interviewing them at all. Also, were there further meetings regarding intelligence, were discussions held with the DPP and was background information sought directly or indirectly in terms of establishing where thesuspects were at a particular time? The word"interview" covers a great deal.
People may have believed that once we received information about four particular people we would automatically head to Belfast to interrogate them. That could not have happened. However, other steps could have been taken even though they may not have come to a successful conclusion. It would be wrong to suggest that the Garda would automatically interview suspects. That would not and did not happen at that particular time.
Mr. Byrne stated earlier that this would not happen in cases where suspects did not agree to or welcome it. Would it happen if such barriers were removed?
Mr. Byrne
It all depends. We are focusing on Northern Ireland and the relationship between it and the South. For example, what would happen if the suspects lived in England? I would have no doubt that arrangements would have been put in place for the local constabulary to interview them. Also, a person might welcome an opportunity to discuss a matter with the Garda Síochána. We are speaking here about different sets of circumstances. The focus must be on what further steps were taken to deal with the matter. I cannot speculate about what would happen if a particular decision were made. As to whether a decision would have been taken to travel North to interview the suspects, I do not believe that would have happened.
Why is that?
Mr. Byrne
First, the Garda Síochána does not have the power to do that. It must gather evidence of the crime and that evidence must be admissible in court. Also, the evidence must first pass the test of the DPP. All these matters would be taken into account. One would discuss the case with the DPP before taking further steps. One would not wish to undertake further investigation of a case and then be told by the DPP one had overstepped the mark in relation to the admissibility of evidence. There are processes to be gone through and it is short-term to think that, automatically, interviews by the Garda should have been conducted immediately
The witness is saying the suspects should have been interviewed. He is quoted in the report as saying that to Mr. Justice Barron. He agrees that the next step in the investigation would have been to interview the suspects.
Mr. Byrne
Yes, but before interviewing the suspects one would have to go through a couple of stages, involving meetings and discussions.
I accept that.
Mr. Byrne
Further, who would interview the suspects? It might not be the Garda Síochána. Perhaps the RUC might interview them.
I accept that. I presume that interview would have involved one of three scenarios, although there may be others in Mr. Byrne's professional experience. One would be that the RUC would carry out the interviews and report back to the Garda. A second scenario would be that the RUC would conduct the interviews in the presence or under the observation of the gardaí investigating the crime. The third scenario would be that the gardaí involved would travel north and conduct the interview themselves. Would those be the three alternatives which would have to be discussed to see which was the most potentially beneficial route to take?
Mr. Byrne
In fact the next step would be to see how that would happen. Looking back at those times, and the relationships and difficulties which existed in terms of North-South relationships, I could not foresee the Garda Síochána carrying out the interview. However, at some stage someone would have had to interview those people. Hindsight is of tremendous benefit when one is dealing with these matters and we are all looking back to 1979. I do not know what was in the minds of people at that time but, irrespective of that, we all know that, when investigating a crime for which there were four suspects, someone must talk to them at some stage or else there is no case.
It is probably clear from what Mr. Byrne said earlier and from what is in the report but, in his opinion and regardless of who was responsible for carrying out the interviews, did the primary responsibility to instigate the process and see that it was completed rest with the Garda?
Mr. Byrne
It gives me no pleasure to say it but I think the Garda Síochána was the investigating authority. The crime was committed in this State, we had intelligence and it was the responsibility of the Garda to take the next step in the investigation, whatever that step should be, with the ultimate objective — while carrying out all the necessary steps that one would need in gathering evidence — of having those people interviewed. I do not know how that would happen. There are a number of scenarios but that would have been the natural progression.
I would like a couple of points clarified. If a garda — in this instance Superintendent Courtney — charged with the investigation, wanted to travel to the North to carry out the interviews, would the correct avenue for him at that time in terms of seeking permission be to channel that request to C3?
Mr. Byrne
We are dealing with a crime where the suspects were identified by RUC Special Branch to C3 in Garda headquarters, a crime whereby the suspects were, through intelligence received from the RUC, identified as belonging to a paramilitary organisation. Accordingly, in terms of policy, the responsibility in terms of paramilitary crime, the gathering of intelligence and the cross-Border activities would be a matter for C3.
So the correct channel for the person in charge to put that request, if he wished to make it, would be C3.
Mr. Byrne
The correct channel for him was to put that request through his superior officers in his branch, up to the rank of assistant commissioner, to put it through C3.
The ultimate determining authority would have been C3.
Mr. Byrne
That would be the channel I would see, through C3, whether they would consult the Commissioner, the Department of Justice and so on.
Is Mr. Byrne familiar with the directive of the assistant commissioner of the Garda in 1953, which is outlined on page 79 of the report? Was he familiar with it in the period under discussion?
Mr. Byrne
The bones of that 1953 circular would perhaps have been contained in the Garda code. Personally, I was never familiar with it. I did not join the Garda until 1965 and it seems a very old circular to which to refer, more than 20 years later. In my reading of the circular, regardless of whether there are reciprocal arrangements, one would think it would apply. It refers to people wishing external police forces to carry out inquiries in this State, which gives rise to two scenarios, namely, crime ordinary, and this unique term, "crime political" or crime special.
So it did not in any way refer to gardaí carrying out interviews. I know there was a reciprocity issue but, leaving that aside, was there any direct statement in it prohibiting gardaí from carrying out investigations in other jurisdictions by interviewing suspects?
Mr. Byrne
I do not know.
With regard to the question of gardaí not going to the North, this involves a policy issue on which we are, if possible, seeking clarification. We have had evidence from people who were in charge of C3 that under no circumstances would any garda go to the North and that the 1953 directive was an absolute blanket prohibition on that, of which everyone was aware, so that such travel would not, therefore, take place. On the other hand, we have evidence from gardaí and perhaps others that officers travelled to the North, interrogated suspects, extradited them in one instance and brought them to justice in this jurisdiction. There is a clear contradiction involved. Was there a direct policy or did different individuals at senior level within the Garda have a view that became policy? Is Mr. Byrne in a position to throw any light on this?
Mr. Byrne
If there was a policy, it should have been written down and we should be able to access it. One asks how it evolved and developed. For a member of the Garda Síochána to enter another jurisdiction and carry out an interrogation or interview a suspect who might, perhaps, be in custody there, would not be in accordance with regulations. However, on the Border, which is very long, I have no doubt that officers on both sides had a very realistic approach to dealing with issues such as burglaries and different types of crime. I have no doubt that this happened, but if it did, in my view it was not in accordance with Garda policy. It may have worked out for the benefit of both communities in terms of crime investigation along the Border but it would be contrary to official Garda policy.
If one had a situation in Newry, for example, with someone arrested there who was wanted for crimes in the Republic and the suspect admitted to the RUC to having committed crimes in the Republic and indicated a wish to talk to the Garda, I could foresee that happening. The suspect might, for example, want to go to Dundalk the following day and deal with the issue, so he or she might want to talk to the Garda in such a situation. That would be voluntary on the part of the person in custody. To suggest that one could do that against the wishes of someone in custody would be very much contrary to Garda policy.
Okay.
Mr. Byrne
The Border is the Border but, in terms of dealing with community issues, anti-social issues and all types of local crime, a relationship builds up between two different police forces and two different stations, North and South. I have no doubt that has happened. One facilitates the other, for the benefit of the community as a whole. This is not, however, strictly in line with Garda policy because gardaí have no powers outside the State. It is not restrictive in that a garda can request to speak to a criminal in custody in England, for example, but that person can refuse to co-operate. It depends on the circumstances. Investigating crimes where a suspect is in another jurisdiction is not clear-cut.
I appreciate that Mr. Byrne may not be able to answer my next question because of his position within the Garda during the period in question. It was subsequent to this that he occupied the highest position within the force and would have had access to such information. Was there close communication in the 1970s with the Department in regard to all operational issues and crimes that had a subversive or cross-Border dimension?
Mr. Byrne
I cannot answer that because I was not in the Special Branch at that time. My review of this case involved an examination of the information that flowed back and forth between the Garda and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, including telex messages and so on. All such information was copied to the Department, including investigation files. That is on record. The Minister must be made aware through his officials of issues that affect public policy. In terms of the Minister's democratic responsibility to account for actions of the Garda Síochána, he or she must be kept aware of various issues while, at the same time, not interfering with any operational issue. A strong relationship existed in my time between different offices, for the right reasons.
Mr. Byrne was in the Special Branch or the detective branch throughout the 1970s and I am aware that he served with certain persons from New Ross. He may, therefore, be in a position to answer my next question. In his conclusions, Mr. Justice Barron maintains there was a policy — written or unwritten, most likely the latter — within the Department not to pursue suspects in Northern Ireland by going there and interrogating them because of the reciprocity issue or the quid pro quo aspect, as he put it. What is Mr. Byrne’s comment on this?
Mr. Byrne
I do not know, one can only be guided by what happened over that period. We must bear in mind — and it is in the public arena — the difficulty we had following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in terms of identifying ways for police officers from both sides of the Border to carry out inquiries in regard to crimes that took place in their respective jurisdictions where the suspect was resident in the other. That these issues were debated at length gives an indication of the difficulties prior to that.
I have a question in regard to missing exhibits. I understand bullets went missing, photographs of fingerprints have disappeared and there is nothing on the files in certain instances. This is a constant theme in the three reports we have examined and it is particularly pronounced in regard to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, with missing files and a failure to follow up evidence. Can Mr. Byrne give any explanation for this? It is difficult not to conclude that there were some inhibitions on these investigations from a policy overview perspective or some inertia in the force which meant these issues, including some very significant evidence, were not pursued, as highlighted in all these reports. Can Mr. Byrne enlighten us in this regard?
Mr. Byrne
I cannot because I do not know.
I welcome Mr. Byrne and thank him for his co-operation. He has used the word "hindsight" today. A number of witnesses made the same point that it is easy to be well informed after the event. Are we not dealing with, at best, a major mismanagement on the part of the Garda and RUC of this case or, at worst — as I and many others believe — a sinister cover-up by certain persons who did not want this case resolved?
We are concerned not with what many of us believe but with putting questions in regard to policies and what happened in this case.
The question of hindsight arose yesterday. My question is relevant in terms of a policy of professional policing because it is a question of trying to ensure that the public has trust in the police on both sides of the Border. This is a major issue in this inquiry. I asked a general question on policy in terms of the importance of trust between the citizen and the police force.
Mr. Byrne
The question of trust between the citizen and the police force is of paramount importance. In this particular case, however, I am of the view that the system failed. In my report, I point the finger at the organisation I had the privilege of leading for seven years. I do not know where the system failure happened. In my report, I can identify no person responsible for the fact that certain actions were not taken, even though particular offices were made aware of the status quo at the time. A number of persons are deceased and we cannot get answers on some points.
It would be wrong for me to go beyond that in terms of deciding whether there was a conspiracy not to pursue this matter. I do not believe there was any such conspiracy. 1976 was an extreme year in terms of murders in Northern Ireland, events along the Border and the pressures on everybody in regard to their actions and responsibilities. As I said, however, this is no consolation to the Ludlow family. I could not get to the bottom of why the next step was not taken in this matter. I am a great believer that we should say we are wrong if I believe that is the case, rather than waiting for others to say it. Without pointing the finger at anybody, we, as an organisation, failed in terms of following through the next step in this investigation. There is no issue of conspiracy or anything like that. It was a human failure that there was no follow-up.
It was an overall management failure.
Mr. Byrne
Yes.
I appreciate that Mr. Byrne accepts some responsibility. There are others, however, who do not. That gets up my nose but it is another day's work.
Page 71 of the report includes Mr. Byrne's assertion:
The only explanation I can give, looking back on the seventies and eighties, is that with pressure of work and the demands on the organisation, it was lost sight of and not pursued.
Mr. Byrne seems to contend that, because it was so hectic and the period was so volatile, these types of issues occurred within the system and people should accept responsibility for them. From a citizen's point of view, however, I am not comfortable with that explanation. In terms of policy, it is important that citizens be reassured that, in any situation in the justice system, they will not be forgotten or left behind. What is Mr. Byrne's view on this?
Mr. Byrne
I cannot foresee this happening again.
I disagree. A regular complaint members receive in the broader justice arena is that victims, particularly if they are from disadvantaged communities, are forgotten. There is a perception that a wealthy person is looked after whereas a forestry worker or a person from the inner city, for example, may be forgotten. This is a complaint members regularly encounter.
Mr. Byrne
The Deputy is speaking generally but I am focussed on this investigation. I say to him that a situation where four suspects are named in regard to a murder but no further steps are taken will never happen again. That is my point.
I refer to the 1980s when Mr. Byrne was a senior police officer. What was the relationship at that time between the RUC Special Branch and the Garda Síochána, particularly in the period 1984 to 1986?
Mr. Byrne
I was not a very senior officer at that time.
From the point of view of being an active policeman.
Mr. Byrne
The co-operation was extremely good.
From his point of view as a police officer, was Mr. Byrne satisfied with the relationship?
Mr. Byrne
Yes, but I was at a lower level of the organisation.
That is frontline stuff.
Mr. Byrne
One could call it frontline stuff. It would be wrong for me to offer the committee an overall assessment of that particular time; I could give it for later years when I was assistant commissioner and deputy commissioner but it would be wrong for me to pass judgment on that particular time. From my experience of my relationship with them — because I had many dealings with them — I found them extremely co-operative.
Were senior police officers at that time aware of the allegations of collusion between the British security forces and loyalist paramilitaries? Was this a policing issue at the time or did it emerge later?
Mr. Byrne
This matter was raised regularly in the media and by different commentators but this is also the case today about all different types of issues. Allegations can be made against anyone in public life but unless there is substantial——
Mr. Byrne did not feel uncomfortable about it from a policing point of view.
Mr. Byrne
No, I just got on with my job and worked professionally as best I could.
What is Mr. Byrne's view of when it was later proved that there was collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries? Does this not damage the integrity of police officers around the world?
That is not what the committee is considering.
I was referring to Mr. Byrne's broader view but I will return to the specific question. Senator Jim Walsh raised the issue of the filing system. It is obvious that there were major cock-ups regarding the Garda Síochána filing system. Has Mr. Byrne confidence in the system and did the system change for the good when he became Garda Commissioner?
Mr. Byrne
I have every confidence in the system as it exists at present and as it was prior to my time as Commissioner. It is the case that files will be missing on occasions because there are tens of thousands of files. Since its foundation, the Garda Síochána has investigated thousands of crimes every year and this is certainly the case in the past 30 years because of the issues raised by developments in Northern Ireland. I have every confidence in the system.
The sub-committee heard yesterday from a detective sergeant who worked in the archives. He stated that there was easy access to the archives and to boxes of files. It seems that the physical resources were not available to maintain a leading-edge type of filing system. It seems that access was easy and that the files were bound with cord, so it would have been easy to misplace and mislay material. The detective sergeant was not making a complaint about the system but it did not seem to be perfect.
Mr. Byrne
In those years?
Detective Sergeant Gary Kavanagh was referring to the years 1997 to 1998. Is Mr. Byrne familiar with the physical area where files are kept and has a risk analysis been undertaken?
Mr. Byrne
To which branch was he referring?
He was referring to C3.
Mr. Byrne
I went through many files in C3 in the 1980s and I found such files were very well maintained and contained all types of information. Any paper system is liable to human error in terms of maintenance of the system. I found the system very well maintained. It is the case that human error occurs especially regarding exhibits which can go missing or be misplaced. In the overall scheme of things I found the system very good but it is not the system that would be used today, which is much improved.
People have legitimate suspicions about the reasons for the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and the Ludlow case and it is not satisfactory to refer to inefficiencies. Serious questions are being asked by taxpayers, politicians, families and the general public.
Mr. Byrne
This is heading for the conspiracy theory. I do not believe in going that route unless there are some facts to back it up.
I am not satisfied with that explanation.
Mr. Byrne
It is easy to say there is a conspiracy.
The conspiracy theory is not an issue on which Mr. Byrne needs to comment.
In a week when the Russians are talking about cameras in rocks — there was also the recent "Stormontgate" affair — I think conspiracy theories should be considered and examined. Many of us believe there were people with a sinister agenda. This is a legitimate question to ask a former Garda Commissioner.
Those matters will be discussed in private session.
From his perspective as a former Garda Commissioner, is it Mr. Byrne's view that responsibility for the mishandling of the investigation of the horrific murder of Seamus Ludlow lies with senior officers of the Garda Síochána?
Mr. Byrne
My report to Mr. Justice Barron gives my view that certain steps should have been taken as a consequence of receiving this intelligence. Those steps were not taken, for whatever reason, and, therefore, the responsibility must lie with the people who had the intelligence and who were the investigative authorities, this being the Garda Síochána. In my view, the Garda Síochána must accept responsibility for the lack of progress at that time.
On the matter of delegated powers and functions, Mr. Byrne stated that the Garda Commissioner is responsible for everything but that he delegates responsibility to certain officers. Does this ethos pervade the system? For example, if the Commissioner decides that a task is to be accomplished throughout the system, would a chief superintendent say to an officer of lower rank that the Commissioner had asked him to ensure that a task be completed? Could this have happened in C3, whereby the head of that unit might have stated that, in general, nobody would be allowed to travel to the North to carry out interviews? Would it be possible that six months later somebody could request permission to interview the people involved and be informed that the head of C3 had indicated that no one could travel to the North?
Mr. Byrne
There would need to be some policy for dealing with such an issue, whether or not it is written down, in terms of making that extra step outside the jurisdiction. The Commissioner can give a direction at any stage on action to be taken, once it is within the law, and this action will be carried out. General policy matters are developed and teased out with the Commissioner and his senior officers and, at times and if it is something that is outside the jurisdiction, officials from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in terms of Government policy. The policy will finally involve whether to take an action. The Commissioner does not have the power to decide to send a garda outside the State to make an arrest or interrogate a person. In terms of the Ludlow case, as to what should be the next step outside the jurisdiction, this is a matter for senior officers to discuss and debate as to the best option and to tick-tack or consult other relevant agencies, either within the State and/or outside the State.
The question is how to move forward with information. The investigating officers in a particular branch must discuss this up the line. If there is a problem about going anywhere, the investigating branch must discuss this laterally and go to a higher authority if necessary. I would have expected that in the context of what Mr. Courtney did. What confuses me is that when the final query came to Mr. Courtney in 1980, his reply was not to say that having discussed the matter at a certain level, he had been directed not to go any further. If it had been, we would at least know what had happened. We do not know what happened and why the matter was not brought up the line to one branch and then to the other branch. I cannot and would not, therefore, point the finger at any individual in this matter. However, I can say the management of the Garda failed to take the necessary step, whether it was to pick up the telephone and ask what could be done or something else.
It must be obvious to everyone that it ran into the sand. A shutter came down and there is nothing to indicate what happened afterwards, which is what is so annoying, confusing and disappointing from an organisational perspective. It should be borne in mind that the Garda was investigating thousands of serious crimes, if one includes aggravated burglary and the like. In 1976, new legislation was being introduced and there was a major problem in the State in the face of serious threats from paramilitary gangs around the country. The focus was on a variety of issues which is why I say in my report this matter may have been lost sight of. While it is not to say it was a satisfactory state of affairs, people may have moved on to other things and lost sight of the fact that we had a case with four suspects. As a result, the next step was not taken.
As the Commissioner has been waiting outside for over half an hour, I ask Deputies Costello and Peter Power to be very brief.
I thank Mr. Byrne for attending and for all the work he has done in examining this case. His seems to have been the first thorough examination which has taken place within the Garda. There is an alternative theory as to why the matter did not proceed further than it did which is that many of the files are missing. Mr. Courtney attended to tell the sub-committee he wrote reams of correspondence, none of which is to be found. A trip to Glasgow was arranged and we do not know why it was cancelled. If all the files were in place, we might have some chance of getting closer to the answers.
Mr. Byrne quotes Commissioner Garvey at the end of the 1976 inquiry as saying, "Keep in touch with the RUC. Something may be forthcoming in time". Were structures in place which would have allowed such contact to take place or was the relationship with the RUC on a completely ad hoc footing? When were structures put in place?
Mr. Byrne
There was always close co-operation between the RUC and the Garda at a very senior level and in the passing of information and intelligence which affected each force's jurisdiction. It is for that reason Mr. Garvey wrote what he did. As there was a constant flow of information between Garda and RUC headquarters, the then Commissioner would, presumably, have anticipated that if something came to the notice of the RUC which might help the investigation, it would be communicated. It would have been suspected the people responsible for the crime would have come from Northern Ireland. If intelligence was to emanate from anyone, it would come from Northern Ireland through the RUC. He was quite right to advise the maintaining of contact as something might have been forthcoming. It was forthcoming three years later when the four suspects were nominated.
Mr. Byrne said that most of the responsibility for this matter must be attributed to the Garda. A former Minister for Justice mentioned yesterday that the RUC had the information for 18 months before passing it on to the Garda and that there was legislation in place to allow the RUC to proceed with an investigation itself and to bring a case to court in its jurisdiction. In that case, was there not a failure by the RUC also? Was it the political circumstances of the time which led to the failure of the RUC to proceed with the case based on legislation which was in place? Why lay all the blame firmly at the foot of the Garda?
Mr. Byrne
I have a very simple approach. Irrespective of the reasons the RUC held back on the intelligence, the Garda received it in January 1979. While legislation dating from 1861 whereby people can be tried in Northern Ireland for a crime of murder committed outside that jurisdiction is a factor, the crime in question was committed in this jurisdiction. If a case was to be pursued in the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, one would have expected the Garda to initiate the request with the RUC, meet with its representatives and discuss with the directors of public prosecution in both jurisdictions the right way to gather evidence and to decide who should bring a prosecution. The intelligence had been received and Mr. Courtney had met in the North with RUC officers and reported back on his discussion and the location of the suspects. It might be thought that I would pursue a particular line, but it would be unfair to suggest that in the circumstances the RUC should have taken a lead role in pursuing a crime committed in the South of Ireland when no steps appear to have been taken by the Garda on foot of the intelligence received. While I would prefer to be able to say otherwise, the honest thing to do is say that where the blame falls, it falls.
When he was asked by Mr. Justice Barron about the note from Detective Superintendent Courtney on the proposal to go to Glasgow to interview who we call "suspect No. 1", Mr. Byrne said he found it implausible that the selection process, by which he meant the interview which was taking place, would in any way inhibit a decision as to whether and/or when the visit to Glasgow should proceed. That implies Mr. Byrne saw no difficulty with a visit to Glasgow taking place to interview "suspect No. 1".
Mr. Byrne
One could take that interpretation, but I think it is obvious that I was commenting on the fact that Mr. Courtney replied, when asked as investigating officer what further steps had been taken on the intelligence, that there was a proposal to go to Glasgow. He also indicated, however, that his immediate superior, Detective Superintendent Murphy, was not in a position to go because he was on an interview board. I find that very implausible. It must be asked which should come first, the interview board which could be put off for two or three weeks or the pursuit of the investigation. That was my point.
Let us suppose the interview board was not important. Is Mr. Byrne saying there ought to have been no difficulty in Detective Superintendent Murphy going to Glasgow to conduct the interview, that it should not have been an issue?
Mr. Byrne
It depends on circumstances. If a number of steps were taken beforehand——
If we assume those steps were taken, should there have been no difficulty? Is Mr. Byrne saying that if no interview panel was being formed, there should have been no difficulty with him going to Glasgow and conducting the interview?
Mr. Byrne
If a decision was made to do so.
If Mr. Byrne was told that it was simply not possible for gardaí to leave this jurisdiction and go to Glasgow to carry out an interview, what would be his response?
It appears suspect No. 1 was a willing interviewee.
If Mr. Byrne had been told it was not possible for Detective Superintendent Murphy to leave and go to Glasgow, what would he have said?
Mr. Byrne
We are dealing with one suspect in Scotland. If, in discussions with the RUC and the Scottish police, it had transpired that they thought this was the way to go about gathering further information and evidence in regard to the case and a decision had been made at a senior level to go, it would then have been a question of transport. For example, if there is a suspect in London who is wanted for fraud here and we discuss the matter with the police there, it can invite us over and its officers will interview the suspect and we can sit outside the room. The key issue here is whether a decision was made not to go. If a decision was made, it would have been a question of going.
That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. Byrne
The suspect may sit mute looking at one or he or she may wish to talk. The agencies in the other jurisdiction may carry out the inquiries on one's behalf.
Surely if all of the processes were gone through, it would have been possible to hold the interview when the decision was made to do so.
Mr. Byrne
Yes.
Would it have been subject to C3 approval?
Mr. Byrne
If the intelligence was extra-jurisdictional and related to suspects who were part of a paramilitary organisation in the North, I would have expected the senior officer at assistant commissioner level on the investigation side to consult C3 before that step was taken. I do not know whether that did or did not happen.
Was that the correct procedure?
Mr. Byrne
That was the procedure. One would not hit off on one's own.
I thank Mr. Byrne for facilitating us. He has been very helpful.
Sitting suspended at 12.13 p.m. and resumed at 12.14 p.m.
I welcome the Garda Commissioner, Mr. Noel Conroy, and thank him for coming. He has always facilitated the committee whenever it has asked him to attend. I also welcome Assistant Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan.
I must repeat that committee members have absolute privilege in regard to what is said. Witnesses do not have the same privilege in regard to what they might say; they have qualified privilege. I invite Commissioner Conroy to address the committee.
Commissioner Noel Conroy
As Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, I express my deepest sympathy to the family of Seamus Ludlow who was tragically murdered on 2 May 1976. Following the setting up of the commission of inquiry into the murder of Seamus Ludlow, the Commissioner put in place a liaison mechanism to fully co-operate with the commission of inquiry. My colleague, Assistant Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan, was a member so appointed. All material files considered relevant and available in Garda records were assembled and placed at the disposal of the commission. As the inquiry progressed through its work, further material was requested and made fully available. The liaison mechanism was established to facilitate the commission in contacting many individuals with whom it wished to interact, including all relevant members of the Garda Síochána, both serving and retired. I am satisfied that the commission was provided with the fullest co-operation by the Garda Síochána and can assure the committee of the continued co-operation of the Garda Síochána in its work.
The investigation into the death of Seamus Ludlow employed the usual structures for a murder inquiry at the time. An incident room was set up to co-ordinate daily inquiries. Tasks were assigned and recorded. Routine questioning of all persons living and working near the murder scene was carried out. Appeals were made for witnesses to come forward and efforts made to employ intelligence information where available.
At the conclusion of the original investigation in 1976 the Garda had not identified any suspects against whom a prosecution could be brought. On 30 January 1979 a letter was received from the RUC Chief Constable's office to the late Chief Superintendent Michael Fitzgerald of security and intelligence branch, also known as C3, Garda Headquarters. It was entitled Murder of Seamus Ludlow at Ravensdale, County Louth, on 2 May 1976. The information contained therein nominated four suspects for the murder of Seamus Ludlow. This information was passed, on 5 February 1979, to the chief superintendent in Drogheda. On 15 February of that same year a meeting took place at RUC Headquarters, Belfast between Detective Superintendent John Courtney and members of the RUC. Inspector Courtney, as he was by then, provided a report on the meeting that had taken place with his colleagues in the RUC. Thereafter the trail went dead. Unfortunately, we are in a situation today where we have not resolved that crime. From a Garda point of view, I regret this very much in so far as, as I see it, it was a failure on the part of the Garda Síochána not to have had the crime thoroughly investigated and brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
I thank Commissioner Conroy. Will he take questions from the committee?
Commissioner Conroy
Yes, I will.
Deputies Costello and Hoctor will commence.
I welcome and thank the Commissioner, Mr. Conroy, and the assistant commissioner, Mr. Callinan. We appreciate their coming on a voluntary basis and being prepared to make a statement and answer questions.
My first question relates to Commissioner Conroy's remark that he had assembled all files when requested. Will he elaborate on that remark and say what files were sought and found to be full and complete and so on?
Commissioner Conroy
From my reading of the situation — Assistant Commissioner Callinan was the officer concerned with collecting the files — it is clear a file from Dundalk Garda station in relation to the investigation could not be found. However, the five copies forwarded to the various branches in headquarters were located where they were supposed to be.
They are the files on the original investigation.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes. The files relating to the 1976 investigation were found. Also, files were recovered following an examination at the Garda Technical Bureau which at the time housed members of the murder squad. I am aware two bullets have not been accounted for, although one has been found. Members will note from Mr. Justice Barron's report that there was correspondence at the time between the Garda Síochána and the RUC on the bullets retrieved at the scene and from the body of the late Seamus Ludlow in an effort to identify the weapon used in the crime. A similar type weapon to the one we believe was used in the murder of Seamus Ludlow had been found by the RUC. It appears from my reading of the file that the weapon found by the RUC was not the one used in the murder in our jurisdiction. Parts of files are missing.
There may be a misunderstanding, as a result of the passing of time, in relation to some of the people interviewed by Mr. Justice Barron. Mention was made of a fingerprint allegedly found on a chip bag found at the scene. However, the original investigation file makes no reference to a chip bag being found at the scene. However, it is mentioned in the original statement of Detective Sergeant Maurice Boyle. Memories can fade over time. It is clear from my reading of the situation that fingerprints were developed from chip bags found in a car stolen on the date of the murder in Dundalk and later located in Keady, County Armagh, although the file makes no reference to fingerprints being found at the scene. I would go so far as to say very limited forensic evidence that could be developed, other than the bullets, was found at the scene of the crime.
I would like to recap on what the Commissioner had to say about the gun examined by the technical bureau. What was the problem in that regard?
Commissioner Conroy
Following the arrest in the North of the four named suspects in the document we received from the RUC, a Smith & Wesson revolver was found. It was a .38 calibre weapon. The bullets used to murder the late Seamus Ludlow were from a .38 calibre weapon. The forensic experts always try to match bullets used in a a crime with weapons found. When a bullet is discharged from a weapon, it leaves certain marks which experts can identify. Such checks were carried out but the forensic experts were unable to make an identification and it was their opinion that the weapon found was not the one used in the murder of Seamus Ludlow.
That weapon had been used in the murder of Mr. Spratt.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes.
Therefore, the file contained no reference to fingerprints or chip bags found at the scene and no identification was made of the murder weapon?
Commissioner Conroy
That is my reading of the situation. I read the statement made by Detective Sergeant Maurice Boyle. I accept that in the report he made to Mr. Justice Barron he spoke of a chip bag found at the scene. However, his original statement, made at the time of the murder, would indicate he was mistaken. I have not spoken to him but I suggest that if we presented him with his original statement, he would accept it does not match with what he said in the report he made much later.
Detective Sergeant Boyle is alleged to have made another statement later on, a matter to which we will come later.
Detective Inspector Gary Kavanagh who attended the hearings yesterday has stated he undertook a trawl of documentation in the technical bureau when he discovered that the murder investigation unit documentation had been transferred there. He did not, however, undertake a trawl of the forensic section of the bureau. In other words, he was looking for correspondence, files and documentation. Who undertook the trawl of the photographic and forensic evidence and so on?
Commissioner Conroy
I will ask my colleague, Assistant Commissioner Martin Callinan, to respond to that question because he is the officer who carried out the trawl. I believe Detective Inspector Gary Kavanagh was referring to the inquiry conducted by Detective Chief Superintendent Ted Murphy who would have availed of any information that would have assisted him in trying to solve the crime prior to his meeting with the PSNI or RUC as it was then known.
My question relates to the statement by Detective Inspector Gary Kavanagh that he did not undertake a trawl of the forensic section as it was not part of his brief. Who undertook that trawl and was anything found?
Assistant Commissioner Martin Callinan
My brief, as the Commissioner outlined, was to gather all available files in possession of the Garda Síochána and produce them to Mr. Justice Barron for the purposes of his investigation. That required me to go to a number of centres, including Dundalk and Drogheda, in respect of which there was an interchange in housing the divisional office facility in the Louth-Meath division. During the 1980s and 1990s we visited Drogheda, Dundalk and Drogheda again. Therefore, there was a certain amount of movement of files between those offices during the period. I would have visited those locations, as well as the crime and security section of Garda Headquarters, known more colloquially as C3. I would also have visited the crime policy and administration section, known at the time as crime branch, and would have carried out inquiries in the technical bureau where, as was rightly said, the special investigation unit was housed at the time.
Where was it located? Was it located at headquarters or in a separate building?
Assistant Commissioner Callinan
The Garda Technical Bureau is located in the modern building at the back of the complex at Garda Headquarters. It houses all of the specialist units, including ballistics, fingerprints, photographs, mapping and handwriting, as well as the Forensic Science Laboratory. The area was visited by me, or inquiries were carried out on my behalf, in an effort to assemble all the papers for Mr. Justice Barron. I would have had inquiries conducted, some by me and others through me, in the photographic, fingerprints and ballistics sections.
Assistant Commissioner Callinan is saying there was a thorough trawl of all the documentation. Detective Sergeant Gary Kavanagh said he could find no documents relating to the murder of Seamus Ludlow when he checked the archives. I refer to documents relating to the murder investigation unit. We, therefore, have a problem regarding files and documents. We have heard evidence from former Chief Superintendent Courtney that he wrote many letters, yet we can scarcely find any of them. Moreover, files which should be at certain locations seem to be missing. Will the Garda Commissioner elaborate on this?
Commissioner Conroy
If someone wrote numerous files, I would expect to see copies turning up at some location. The superintendent and chief superintendent in Dundalk at the time made five copies of files which travelled to Garda Headquarters where they were found. As I said, there were communications from the RUC to Garda Headquarters which filtered down to the chief superintendent with responsibility for the Dundalk area and were made available to the officer in charge of the division. There followed communications from the former chief superintendent, John Courtney, with regard to the information he had captured as a result of his visit to the RUC. It is peculiar that this information is there. I have no reason to doubt what Mr. Courtney is saying but I find it rather strange that if all this paper was moving about, we have not captured it in some of the sections checked. After all, at the time the investigation commenced, Mr. Courtney was, I understand, a detective inspector in what was then known as the murder squad. He was promoted to the rank of superintendent and sent to Drogheda where he was based while the investigation was alive. Essentially, he returned to the position of detective superintendent in the murder squad which was under C1, not C3, of which an assistant commissioner was in charge. I would, therefore, have expected that if all that paper was moving around, some of it would have been captured in some of the files and at some of the locations checked by Assistant Commissioner Martin Callinan. It is not there.
There are now good mechanisms in place to ensure everything is filed. The system is computerised.
Former Chief Superintendent Courtney said he replied in handwriting to all letters received.
He has stated he did not write in triplicate or duplicate, but simply wrote to everyone in handwriting. He has said he did this assiduously. Those are documents which would have a considerable bearing on decisions made and which would have relevance for us. Records, missing or otherwise, are crucial.
I will move on to 1979 and the crux of the issue, why and how the investigation suddenly came to a dead end. Mr. Courtney has said a direction was given to him verbally by Detective Sergeant Boyle——
The reference to chip bags was made by Sergeant Maurice Boyle; we are now talking about Sergeant Dan Boyle.
Yes. Mr. Courtney has said a direction was given to him verbally by Detective Sergeant Dan Boyle that a decision had been taken to discontinue the investigation, that it had been made by the Garda Commissioner of the day, or the deputy commissioner in charge of C3. What is Commissioner Conroy's view on the matter with regard to the role of C3 in such decision-making?
Commissioner Conroy
I cannot exactly say because I was not involved at that level in that branch at the time, but C3, the crime and security branch, has a major role with regard to personnel leaving the jurisdiction to carry out inquiries on behalf of the Garda Síochána since all communications from other police services throughout the world are contained in the crime and security branch. In other words, it can be in daily contact with police services in some 184 countries. Branch members would interface with management in another police service.
Here is how I see it and always did in my time and role as an investigator. If, for example, I was investigating a crime of murder, I would have made contact with the police service concerned but only to establish as much information as I could. I would have put that information on paper, sought permission to form an interview channel, or whatever was required in an attempt to bring the investigation to a successful conclusion. As an investigator, I would have often done this. C3 members would have gone through the channels at a very high level and then announced permission had been granted. A particular officer would have been assigned to carry out the inquiries in the other jurisdiction and permission to travel would have been given to deal with that office. That is the basic way in which it was all put together in my time. If there was urgency, for example, where someone had been detained in another jurisdiction for a serious crime and the Garda had an interest in the case, I could have envisaged telephone contact being made, but in the case of an investigation which did not involve someone being detained, one would have expected to see a paper trail, with permission being given to travel. If a request came into the Garda from the United Kingdom police force, for example, there might be telephone contact between the latter and the Garda investigators. Ultimately, however, the Garda investigators would advise their British colleagues that they must get their authorities to write to the Garda authorities.
That was then. The new procedures are far more streamlined but are similar in essence except that all requests are now channelled through Interpol. In other words, we can decide the number of police officers from other jurisdictions who come into the State to seek our assistance in conducting investigations. Equally, we are in a position now to control the number of gardaí going out of the country to carry out inquiries into crimes committed in this jurisdiction. Even in the past, however, I recall going several times to the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in the course of inquiries into serious crimes.
Was this procedure always preceded by a paper trail?
Commissioner Conroy
In my case, yes.
How far back would Commissioner Conroy go in this respect?
Commissioner Conroy
I would go back to the 1970s.
Commissioner Conroy was not in any way involved in this particular investigation?
Commissioner Conroy
No. My investigations then were restricted to the Dublin area.
It was the norm that there should be a paper trail?
Commissioner Conroy
There should be.
The question is whether a paper trail was ever in place. If so, did it disappear? That is a difficulty.
In regard to co-operation between the RUC and the Garda Síochána, one of the requests made at the end of the 1976 investigation by the then Commissioner Garvey was that gardaí should remain in contact with the RUC in the event that something might transpire. Is Commissioner Conroy aware whether any structures were in place to facilitate this?
Commissioner Conroy
Border chief superintendents and superintendents were encouraged to ensure they had the best possible information in regard to persons who might well cause difficulties to the citizens of this State. Equally, I am sure it was in the interests of the RUC to talk to our people along the Border to ensure they had as much information as possible on any terrorists from our jurisdiction who might commit unlawful acts in Northern Ireland. Such contact was always encouraged, even at district level, in Border areas. I cannot, however, say what structures were in place in regard to headquarters.
Were there regular meetings?
Commissioner Conroy
Meetings definitely took place.
It seems strange the RUC had the information for 18 months before passing it to the Garda Síochána.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes, I noticed that.
This suggests there was little or no co-operation.
Commissioner Conroy
I noted Mr. Courtney's observation that the RUC's concern in this matter may have been the preservation of somebody's life. I must be honest and say I find it rather strange that the information was not passed on. I do not, however, have a clear answer on this other than what I have read.
In regard to this information, it seems an obvious question one would have expected the Garda to have asked and one would expect there to be some record of the answer.
Commissioner Conroy
When one gets information from a source, one does not beat that source down but tries to elicit as much information as possible. From a police perspective, we are always willing to take on board any information that will help us to carry out our duties more effectively and efficiently in solving any crime.
It seems some people know all about the 1953 directive while others know nothing. Is Commissioner Conroy aware of it and what status it had within the Garda Síochána?
Commissioner Conroy
I must be honest; I did not know about the 1953 directive. We are governed by the Garda Síochána code. The code I worked to when I joined was that issued in 1965. This code is updated on a regular basis to take account of circulars that address various issues as they progress. Some, for example, deal with case law in the courts. These directives are intermittently captured in an updated code. A code was sent out in 1965, updated in 1984 and again in the 1990s, and the latest update is currently being completed. This is our code of instructions in terms of how we should conduct ourselves.
Does this mean the 1965 code superseded the 1953 directive?
Commissioner Conroy
It took on board the 1953 circular. Even in recent times, other directives have gone out in regard to certain issues. For instance, if we were in the same situation today, making inquiries into a murder in this jurisdiction, the assistant commissioner in charge of the regions would oversee the conduct of the investigation. If, for example, inquiries were to be conducted outside the jurisdiction, he or she would give authority to certain officers to do so. Those arrangements would be made through the crime and security branch using Interpol. That is the system now in place. The assistant commissioner in charge of the regions is responsible for authorising such movement. Again, there is a paper trail and at least ten days' notice must be given to the crime and security branch to arrange for an investigator to go to another jurisdiction.
What does the 1965 code, which is presumably what gardaí operated under in 1976, say in regard to subversive offences ?
Commissioner Conroy
My experience is that specialised people generally carry out investigations of subversive crimes. That expertise would be utilised by the investigators. For example, if a crime such as that we are discussing today took place in Dublin, we would involve the Special Branch investigators because of the terrorist element. They would know best the backgrounds of those involved in that type of activity and we would utilise that expertise. However, that does not mean the investigation would have been taken from the district officer who was responsible for conducting and bringing it to a conclusion.
The Commissioner stated he had personally travelled abroad in the course of investigations. Were these ordinary criminal investigations?
Commissioner Conroy
Yes. They were investigations into crimes of murder.
Not subversive crimes.
Commissioner Conroy
No.
I am not certain if the directive, the 1965 Garda code or any other makes a distinction between ordinary and subversive crimes. The Garda code is a secret document; it is not publicly available.
Commissioner Conroy
The Garda code does not contain secret documents. It was the case then and is still the case in every jurisdiction that when one is dealing with subversives, great care is taken in dealing with them because they are trying to subvert the authority of the State. It is only natural that great care would be taken in both the collection of intelligence and its handling by the persons working to obtain intelligence on the individuals concerned in order that they would not find out what intelligence a service had about them. Those involved in terrorism are working equally as hard as members of the Garda Síochána. They are trying to find out what we are doing against them and what intelligence we have about them. It is only natural that the Garda Síochána needs to be guarded and very careful in its handling of such issues. I am trying to explain that not every garda will be aware of what is known by special branch about those involved in terrorism.
Is the Garda code a published document?
Commissioner Conroy
It is personal issue to every member.
Whether a member is dealing with subversive crime.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes.
In the Commissioner's experience, is it common practice for officers to go abroad in the investigation of serious criminal offences? How are any necessary interviews conducted?
Commissioner Conroy
I will deal, first, with the situation of police officers coming to this jurisdiction. There is a clear policy for dealing with officers entering this jurisdiction which states interviews will be conducted by members of the Garda Síochána in accordance with the laws of the State.
By members of the Garda Síochána only.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes.
Are there any circumstances in which others are permitted to conduct interviews?
Commissioner Conroy
No. It would be a breach of discipline.
Has this always been the case?
Commissioner Conroy
To my knowledge, it has always been the case. The directive clearly sets out that gardaí conduct interviews. There have been occasions when police personnel came here without our consent. It was pointed out to the police force concerned in correspondence that it did not have permission to enter the jurisdiction and that any action taken could be termed unlawful.
When members of the Garda Síochána travel to another jurisdiction, they give the investigators every piece of information in the possession of the service to help solve the crime. We will do our best to assist officers in the other jurisdiction and inform them of what evidence will be acceptable to the courts. I am aware that there are occasions when the other jurisdiction may request that the Garda not carry out an interview. This can occur particularly where the person concerned is not in custody but it is a different kettle of fish if he or she is in custody, in so far as legislation applies in the United Kingdom where interviews are monitored and recorded. In instances where the Garda is involved with a UK police service, the Garda will not be involved in the interview process; rather members of the force will be present to give the UK police service all the information in the Garda's possession in order that it can conduct the interviews in a professional manner. There are occasions when an individual who is held in another jurisdiction may ask to speak to a member of our organisation. We will send somebody where this is warranted. I recall one case where I interviewed an individual in the United Kingdom on a train but the UK authorities were aware of the situation. The person concerned had not been detained and was later extradited to Ireland where statements were taken. I did not want to do this but they insisted. My duty was to solve the crime and play my part in bringing the person concerned to justice.
In the context of the Ludlow murder investigation in 1979, there would have been nothing unusual in an investigating officer seeking to go outside the jurisdiction to conduct or have conducted an interview with suspects.
Commissioner Conroy
There would have been no difficulties in requesting permission to go outside the State to assist another police service such as the RUC at the time in conducting investigations on behalf of the Garda Síochána. There is no way that our authorities, either then or now, would give permission to a member of the Garda Síochána to go to another jurisdiction and ask the police service to interview individuals suspected of having committed a crime. That would never happen. If Garda Headquarters was taken apart, I doubt if a document would ever be found which would state this.
To go and assist.
Commissioner Conroy
Yes.
That would be normal. Is C3 the body which would grant the request?
Commissioner Conroy
C3 is a conduit in ensuring everything is prepared and officers are ready to travel.
I have a final question. Will the Commissioner comment on the appalling failure on the part of the Garda to observe proper procedures in contacting the family of Seamus Ludlow regarding the inquest?
Commissioner Conroy
I am very disappointed at the way in which that episode transpired. It is very regrettable. The family of the late Seamus Ludlow was informed on the morning of the inquest. To make matters worse — from what I have read in the documents — the Garda did not seek the consent of the coroner to have the inquest adjourned. That is the least I would have expected to be done in order that the family would be able to attend and hear the evidence.
Currently, the role of the Garda in inquests of this nature is quite broad. Gardaí notify the families of victims and also have a significant role in assembling a jury. Does the Commissioner envisage any changes in this area?
Commissioner Conroy
A working group is considering the Coroners Act 1962 and has made recommendations to officials in the Department. While I cannot speak for what legislators may do, I expect new legislation to be brought forward in the near future and significant changes to be made.
As we must recommend improvements in the inquest process, perhaps the Commissioner will transmit any views the Garda has separately.
Commissioner Conroy
Members may be assured we will give them any assistance we can.
On an administrative matter, there is a division in the Dáil.
I asked that we be paired until 1 p.m. as I thought we would be finished our meeting by now.
Would members like to continue or do they wish to vote in the House?
I would like to vote.
We will return immediately after the division and conclude before lunch.
Sitting suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 1.20 p.m.
I welcome Commissioner Conroy and Assistant Commissioner Callinan. Is it considered by the Garda Síochána that the case of the murder of Seamus Ludlow is closed.
Commissioner Conroy
No, I do not agree with that.
We are glad to hear it.
Commissioner Conroy
I would go so far as to say that if the individuals concerned turned up in this jurisdiction tomorrow morning, we would take action. I am not sure whether that would result in people being brought to justice but let me be quite clear that if we had information tomorrow that some of them were in our jurisdiction, we would take action.
That is very welcome news. We are happy to hear the case is not closed. We welcome that the Garda Síochána has expressed its regret at what happened. Would the Commissioner be prepared to go further and apologise on behalf of the Garda Síochána for its failure to act as expected? The family of Seamus Ludlow recently expressed to this sub-committee that even at this stage it would welcome an apology from the Garda.
Commissioner Conroy
I have no difficulty apologising to the family on two fronts: regarding the overall investigation, in so far as we did not bring it to a successful conclusion; and in respect of our handling of the inquest. I apologise to the family in that regard. As I said earlier, I regret that the Garda Síochána did not bring this investigation to a satisfactory conclusion. I have no doubt that management within the organisation feels the same.
The sub-committee thanks the Commissioner for his apology and recalls his wish, expressed during its hearings on the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, to co-operate and to make all files available to it. May we take it that that co-operation will continue in this case?
Commissioner Conroy
The sub-committee can be assured that that co-operation will continue. The Garda Síochána will co-operate in any inquiries, as is its function. We are employed by the State to assist and support it and that is what we will do.
Has the Commissioner formed an opinion as to why, given the information available to the Garda Síochána in 1979, the interviews were not pursued at the time?
Commissioner Conroy
I would be only expressing an opinion bearing in mind that I was not au fait with the difficulties that may have prevailed at the time in relation to the Garda Síochána’s relationship with the RUC. I am not sure what problems existed or if problems emanated from the Governments of the day. I have read nothing to suggest that was the case. I have read the same documentation as everybody else in terms of the Garda Síochána wishing to visit the North and the RUC wishing to visit the South. I am not sure if there were barriers in that regard. I have read nothing to support either case. That is the position as I am aware of it. Quite clearly, the paper trail went dead and various matters were not pursued. I cannot say why that was so.
I thank the Commissioner.
I accept that the Commissioner had no direct involvement in the case at the time. However, from a procedural point of view, the only reason a detective superintendent would contact C3 would be to facilitate travel to another jurisdiction. Would C3 have the authority to refuse permission to travel and to decide that a particular investigation is not to be pursued?
As a rider to the Deputy's remarks, would C3 not have had a responsibility, in its own right, to follow up this particular case?
Commissioner Conroy
As I understand it, from the documentation I read, the murder squad, as it was then known, was working under assistant commissioner C1. As I stated earlier, I would have expected that officers under the command of that section would have corresponded with C3 whose job it was to facilitate them. I could foresee a situation where, for reasons of which I am not aware, C3 may have refused permission to travel to Northern Ireland to conduct an investigation, namely, because reciprocal arrangements would have had to be put in place in the South. That is as far as I can go on that matter. I have not read anything in the documentation which suggests that was the case. I cannot, unfortunately, enlighten the sub-committee any further.
I would like to take the matter one step further. Given the political circumstances of the time and based on the information given to the sub-committee by the two deputy commissioners in charge at the time that there was daily contact on the matter with the Department of Justice, is it conceivable that the Department, because the Northern Ireland and British authorities were then seeking overflight permission and so on, instructed C3 not to carry the matter any further? Is that possible?
Commissioner Conroy
Anything is possible. We do not have definite information on what happened. I would have expected that the officers involved at the time, unless fading memory is involved, would be in a position to give us a clear indication of what did or did not happen. Anything which I might say would not be as strong as what they could say in relation to what happened at the time.
Would it be possible now that the Department could instruct C3 not to pursue an investigation?
Commissioner Conroy
No. I became a member of C3 in the late 1990s at which time the RUC was requested to conduct an investigation into a murder. The individual concerned committed a crime in Galway and then fled to Belfast where he was caught in possession of certain items. He was then arrested by the RUC and we contacted the DPP's office and put in train all the procedures to allow our officers from Galway to travel to Belfast where the investigation was conducted. Witnesses from Galway also travelled to Belfast to give evidence and the matter was finalised there. We have dealt with many similar situations in the South in relation to crimes committed in the North. One case involved individuals who had escaped to the Border following the shooting of a member of the security forces. The suspects were later arrested in the South and dealt with in the courts in this jurisdiction. There have been many such investigations since the 1990s, both terrorist and crime related.
Commissioner Conroy told Deputy Hoctor that the case remains active. Given the current relationship between the two Administrations and police forces, is it not within the Commissioner's power to ask the PSNI to rearrest the suspects and to do with them what he intimated could be done if they appeared in our jurisdiction?
Commissioner Conroy
I understand from where the Deputy is coming on this. However, he will appreciate that Detective Chief Superintendent Ted Murphy travelled to Northern Ireland during his inquiries in relation to re-investigation. The superintendent in the North put in place arrangements to have all four individuals arrested and brought one of them back to Northern Ireland from England. They were subsequently interviewed for 48 hours. Their time was extended for a further 48 hours and they collected what evidence they could and sent the file to the DPP in Northern Ireland. The DPP examined the case and, as far as I can recall, even sent it to an outside counsel in Northern Ireland. It was the opinion of those very experienced law officers that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the preferring of criminal charges against any of the individuals concerned.
It would be very difficult for us to go back to the PSNI because it may not even have the powers to address the matter. That force may have exhausted all its powers, as the Garda would have in similar circumstances. The Garda arrested someone down here for a similar crime up there and once we had exhausted our powers of detention, it was the end of the line as far as arrest was concerned. I imagine the same applies in the PSNI's jurisdiction in that it would have exhausted its powers in assisting us in an investigation. Unfortunately, it did not get the evidence which would convince law officers up there to make a decision on the preferring of criminal charges.
Can we clarify the matter by contacting the PSNI to determine whether there is an avenue whereby it can reopen the case?
Commissioner Conroy
I have no difficulty with doing that if it is what the sub-committee requires.
I thank the Commissioner.
I gather from the Commissioner's remarks that on a number of occasions he has travelled outside the jurisdiction, to Northern Ireland and elsewhere, to investigate crimes. Were any of those crimes regarded as political or subversive?
Commissioner Conroy
They were ordinary crimes in which people's lives were taken but there was no question of terrorist involvement.
None of the cases involved terrorists.
Commissioner Conroy
No.
I understood the Commissioner to say that the 1953 directive from the assistant commissioner, of which he was unaware, and others was incorporated into the code in 1965. Did the 1965 code contain anything specific to prohibit gardaí from travelling outside the jurisdiction to interview suspects or assist another police force to do so?
Commissioner Conroy
No.
The Commissioner indicated that other police forces would not be allowed to enter our jurisdiction to interrogate suspects in a crime committed outside it. The sub-committee has received a communication from Mr. Patrick Livingstone who claims he was interrogated at Dundalk Garda station by three RUC personnel in 1975 without a garda present. Subsequently, a case was successfully prosecuted against Mr. Livingstone in Northern Ireland based on evidence gathered at that interview at which two gardaí attended as observers. Does the Commissioner have information on that or could he acquire such information to assist the sub-committee? It seems to be at variance with the police policy of the time.
Commissioner Conroy
It certainly does. Is there a date on which this happened?
I think it was 1975 but the sub-committee has correspondence on the matter.
Commissioner Conroy
If I can get the documentation, I will check and revert to the sub-committee in writing.
I am told the interview took place in December 1975.
The Commissioner said at the outset that he had carried out a thorough trawl of all the files on this matter in preparation for today's meeting. Mr. Justice Barron concluded that while any decision to stop the Ludlow case in its tracks would have been made by C3, it would have been known to the Department of Justice and also would have been the subject of a level of consultation. Has the Commissioner come across any correspondence or paper trail on such decisions in any of the files he examined to suggest that the Department of Justice had a role in a decision on an investigation with an extraterritorial dimension?
Commissioner Conroy
I have not come across any documentation to suggest that. While we are in daily contact with officials in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, I cannot imagine circumstances now or in any period during my time at crime and security branch in which some official in the Department would say we could not take a certain action in the furtherance of an investigation. I have never heard tell of it and would be very surprised if it happened. However, I do not know what things were like in the 1970s because I did not deal with terrorist organisations that may have been causing problems along the Border at the time. Those who were involved should be able to enlighten us all but fading memories may mean they cannot. Certainly, I cannot assist the sub-committee on the matter.
In the context of issues of overflights or hot pursuit, what channels existed to communicate political considerations to the Garda if, as has been said, there was a reluctance to reciprocate due to the possibility of the RUC coming down here? Were decisions to discontinue investigations on those grounds made by the Garda off its own bat or were channels of communication available whereby a political perception of events could be expressed to the upper echelons of the force or C3 which might result in a decision to cease dealing with a case in the manner required to get a result?
Commissioner Conroy
I would be very surprised if a Member of Government or an official would get involved in the investigation of a particular crime. It would be a very difficult issue. The overflight problem, for example, was still very much alive in the 1990s, with complaints coming in about flights over this jurisdiction. A governmental group had meetings on the matter on a regular basis, quite a number of which I attended. I put a certain practice into place which, hopefully, reduced the number of overflights coming into this country. Individuals in the other jurisdiction were communicating with people who had no authority to allow them to fly along the Border and cause problems. We found a mechanism to prevent that by requiring those individuals to acquire special code numbers which could only be obtained from one agency in the State. When the system came into being, they had problems because when they contacted the aviation authorities about their activities, they had to supply the code. If they did not have it, they could not do it.
The agency refused it.
Commissioner Conroy
Exactly.
It was a solution.
In regard to C3 and its authority and responsibility in the matter, in the third last paragraph on page 75 of the Barron report it is stated:
As we have seen, C3 was the first branch of An Garda Síochána to learn of the information regarding [the suspects] ... via the letter from the RUC Chief Constable's office on 30 January 1979 ... A copy of Supt Courtney's report of 15 February 1979 was sent to C3 from the Divisional Office, Drogheda ...
We have heard from witnesses about the conflict of evidence in regard to whether a request to interview people was made, how it was made and so on. We accept the good faith of all of the witnesses regarding that. Mr. Justice Barron asks:
If a request to travel was never made, senior staff at C3 would nonetheless have had a duty to inquire of C4 as to why no such request was forthcoming. If only for intelligence-gathering purposes, C3 should have been interested in finding out whether these men were still considered prime suspects for the Ludlow murder.
What does Commissioner Conroy make of those comments in the report on C3's responsibility to continue the investigation?
Commissioner Conroy
The only comment I can make on that is to refer again to the suggestion that some documents may have been lost. However, I find that rather strange because there were so many sections involved. On the other hand there is a certain responsibility on C3, in terms of pursuit in regard to people visiting Northern Ireland, to ensure that inquiries are conducted. That is different today. The assistant commissioner of C1 should have been pushing the door. The investigators attached to C1 would have been telling their assistant commissioner that if the case was to be resolved they would have to go to Northern Ireland and get the assistance of the RUC. He would have got in touch with C3 and then it would have been up to C3 to make sure all the doors were opened. C1 should have been pushing and pushing very hard. That is the conclusion to which I have come. However, I have seen no evidence of that.
Arising out of a question from Deputy Costello regarding the documents, Assistant Commissioner Callinan has carried out an extensive trawl of the documentation relating to this and other Barron reports. Is the Commissioner satisfied that if a formal or statutory inquiry were established and an order for discovery made to discover all of the files, that no other documents would be unearthed? In other words, and in the interests of clarity, have all the documents been made available?.
Commissioner Conroy
I can never be sure that something would not be found. I appeared before this committee in connection with the Dublin-Monaghan bombings. Searches continued and two documents were found that were declared missing during that inquiry. I should add, and we said at the time, that we felt that the documents that were missing were not of major interest and that has been confirmed. We discovered two of the missing documents and, to be honest, every effort is being made by Assistant Commissioner Martin Callinan to find everything involved. He called for searches to be made by staff in each of the branches and I have no doubt that each of them carried out their work diligently in the best interests of whatever inquiries were looking for documents.
We accept that.
It was suggested by counsel for Justice for the Forgotten that the more formal an inquiry, the greater the chance that more documents will appear. If the inquiry is under a commission of investigation, legislation or tribunal of inquiry, documents seem to emerge. What is the Commissioner's response to that comment?
Commissioner Conroy
We made every document available to Mr. Justice Barron. Any requests he made for other documents were met and the documents were made available to him. There was no question of the Garda holding back documents.
I accept that.
Commissioner Conroy
We searched during the inquiry into the Dublin-Monaghan bombings. Mr. Justice Barron reported that documents were missing. The searches continued. We stated here that documents were missing and, during the course of the searches, two of the missing documents were found. Every effort was made at the time to find those documents but we did not find them. That is not to say that we will not continue to look for documents that are missing. We will. If there is anything we can do to help, we will do so.
If Assistant Commissioner Callinan wishes to speak, he may do so.
Assistant Commissioner Callinan
I am obliged. I add that in respect of the Barron inquiry and the present inquiry being conducted by Mr. Patrick McEntee, SC, the Garda supplied over and beyond the number of files required for the purposes of the inquiries. That is an indication that the Garda Síochána is very forthcoming both in terms of the thoroughness of the searches it has conducted and continues to conduct. As can be appreciated, incrementally with all of these investigations there will be other files that might begin to manifest themselves through the commission's work and the Garda will always co-operate fully and get those files, even though in our view they may have nothing to do with the terms of reference of those commissions. That has been the case. The Commissioner has clearly indicated to me how I should conduct my business and I will continue to get whatever documents are available, outside, over and above the terms of reference of any these commissions. We do not accept that we were in any way minimalist in terms of the documents we produced. Anything we have will be produced.
Supplementary to Deputy Costello's question about interaction with the Department, all the evidence we have heard in the past few days has clearly indicated that there was a very close liaison between the Garda, at different levels, and the Department. Given that the Commissioner meets the Minister regularly, presumably the same would have happened at that time. Knowing the personalities of the Ministers involved, one would not come away from a meeting without being clear in one's mind as to what were their wishes from a political perspective. Mr. Gerry Collins said clearly that it was the policy of the Government from 1977 on, and prior to that it was the policy of the coalition Government, to avoid any situation in which the RUC would come to the South to interrogate people. Reciprocity was, therefore, an issue. To what extent would such meetings and issues arising from them be factored into the policy operations of the Garda Síochána?
Or the codes.
I would say they are unwritten. Given the nature of the relationship and that promotions are obviously decided at political level——
Commissioner Conroy
In my dealings with officials and the Minister, investigation techniques are not matters that would be discussed. Of course, they set certain goals and standards in terms of work rates and so on. Concern would also be raised from time to time in respect of various types of crime that might be committed but such matters would be raised on the basis of ensuring that I as Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and the organisation was focused on the prevention of crime and the active pursuit of those responsible for committing crime in terms of bringing them to justice. Many other matters, such as community policing and traffic, are topical issues at the moment. I have had a number of meetings on traffic enforcement and how better the Garda Síochána can do its job. It would be normal for such matters to be discussed between the Garda Síochána and the Minister or his officials.
I shall be more specific. Former Ministers have told us that clear Government policy in a particular situation would be not to aggravate and inflame the situation in the South. The RUC becoming involved in assisting the Garda Síochána and so on would, therefore, as far as they were concerned, be off limits. Would that be part of the Garda operational agenda at this stage?
Commissioner Conroy
As far as the Garda Síochána is concerned, if officials, be they from the RUC, from Northern Ireland, the city of London or Manchester, are authorised to come into this State the rules in relation to procedures on investigations apply, namely, the investigation is conducted by the Garda Síochána at the behest of those requiring it to be carried out. Those rules have never been altered during my term in office. The Garda Síochána would take cognisance of what is required to be covered and provided that falls in with what the legislation authorises us to do, we will do it. That is what happened.
That brings us to the end of our hearings for today. I thank Commissioner Conroy and Assistant Commissioner Callinan for assisting us. We will use the information they have given us as we continue our hearings.
The sub-committee will now go into private session and, following its adjournment, will resume at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 8 February 2006, when we will meet the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Deputy McDowell, and the Secretary General of his Department, Mr. Seán Aylward. We will also meet Mr. Ed Moloney, a journalist, in the afternoon session.
The sub-committee went into private session at 1.53 p.m. and adjourned at 2.15 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 8 February 2006.