Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 27 Sep 2006

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

The sub-committee heard yesterday from the families of the victims of many of the incidents referred to in the report. Today we will hear from other witnesses to assist in our consideration of the report. The order in which the sub-committee will take witnesses is set out in the schedule, which is being circulated.

I apologise for being late. I raised an issue yesterday regarding identifying witnesses. If we are not going to name people or ask questions-----

I will not accept this query in public. We will go into private session. If necessary, I will ask all the witnesses to withdraw and we will then discuss the matter.

I have one question. Can those who should not be mentioned be numbered so that when members ask questions, we will all know about whom we are talking? At least then there will be clarity in the replies. I asked a question yesterday and it transpired that the information I was given was incorrect. I am asking that this be done in the interests of clarity.

There is no problem in numbering people or specifying a page or, for example, the second mention in a particular paragraph on a page. However, I ask members not to name individuals.

Can the clerk produce a numbered list of the people members and witnesses are instructed not to name and distribute it to all of us? This will permit clarity in the answers and questions we are putting to people.

We will try to do that. In the meantime, individuals should be referred to as the "person in that paragraph" , "the second person", "the fourth person" and so forth. We are again joined by representatives from Justice for the Forgotten. I welcome Ms Margaret Urwin, secretary of Justice for the Forgotten, Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, SC, counsel for Justice for the Forgotten, and Mr. Kevin O'Loughlan, chairman of Justice for the Forgotten.

We have already received a very comprehensive written submission from Justice for the Forgotten for which we are very grateful. The delegation will be aware of the committee's procedures from previous appearances before it. I remind witnesses of the committee's terms of reference, which are to consider Mr. Justice Barron's report into the bombing of Kay's Tavern in Dundalk for the purpose of making recommendations in respect of legislative or administrative provisions. As a result of the Supreme Court decision in the Abbeylara case, we are prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

I invite members of the delegation to make a few remarks. Does Mr. O'Loughlan wish to make some opening remarks?

Mr. Kevin O’Loughlan

I thank the Chairman. I am chairperson of Justice for the Forgotten, which represents the families of those who died in the Dublin-Monaghan bombings of 1974 and those who died in the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973. We are here today to support the families affected by the atrocities into which the committee is inquiring. The evidence shows that the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 and the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973 are linked to the murders being investigated by the committee. We are here to support the families affected by these murders and give them as much help as possible. I will now ask Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin to present a more detailed submission.

Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, SC

We have appeared before this committee on a number of occasions and it is useful to summarise why we came to be here. In December 1999, the Taoiseach, in consultation with other party leaders, agreed to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The commission of inquiry was established soon afterwards. It was expressly stated in December 1999 that the purpose of what was to become known as the Barron inquiries was to establish whether there was any foundation to the concerns that had been voiced from the early 1990s. The purpose of the Barron inquiries was not to reach final conclusions. Rather, it was to establish fundamentally whether there were valid concerns which required significant public scrutiny.

In the past number of years, what has emerged from the Barron reports collectively is a body of evidence that has been extremely powerful in underlying the existence of very serious issues and that there is evidence of collusion from the early to the mid-1970s. This evidence emerged from the Barron reports and very powerfully through testimony given to this committee yesterday and on other occasions. What is to follow this body of evidence? Is it simply enough that it is collected and collated or is it time to subject it to detailed scrutiny and inquire further into the matter?

If one compares the information possessed by this committee with the information presented by Judge Peter Corry to the Irish and British Governments following his limited inquiries, it is very clear that the body of evidence available to the Irish Government through this process is ten times more detailed and powerful than the evidence collected by Judge Corry, which grounded the decision by both Governments to establish a number of formal inquiries. It is dangerous to compartmentalise the inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and the various other inquiries which have taken place and to assert that the conclusion in the report into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings was X and the conclusion in the report into the Dublin bombings of 1972 was Y. We need to examine them collectively.

Given the publication of the report into the Dundalk bombings and the appendices and sub-reports into various other outrages, a number of questions come to mind. A critical question which goes to the heart of collusion is who knew what was happening in the period between 1974, in particular, and 1976 and 1977. The question arises as to whether what was going on was known at a very low level or whether it was known to the institutions and those in charge of them.

From looking at 1974, we know that detailed information as to the identity of loyalists was communicated from RUC Special Branch to the Garda Síochána. As early as 1974, the identity of those involved in atrocities was known. As the various reports have emerged, we have seen that names given to the Garda Síochána in 1974 subsequently reappeared in connection with events in Silverbridge, the Miami Showband and other atrocities. The identity of individual perpetrators was known as early as 1974. We know that their identity was not a local matter but was known at divisional headquarters in Portadown and at RUC headquarters. We know from the Holroyd notebooks that the identity of these people was known to military intelligence. We know the structures within military intelligence that all that fed into military headquarters in Lisburn. We know from the Wallace documents that these individuals were being listed and collated and that associations were being identified. If one takes the individuals as being unrelated to the security forces and takes them purely as subversives, the identity of this network or organisation of subversives in Armagh was well known by 1974.

Due to the fact that there has been no means of questioning anybody about it, what has not emerged through the Barron inquiries is what intelligence was gathered in connection with these people from 1974 onwards. We know that from June 1974 onwards, both the Garda Síochána and the RUC knew that this group was capable of horrendous acts. It was capable of planting no-warning bombs in Dublin and Monaghan and planning events involving mass murder with no question of warnings. We know that from the summer of 1974, the security forces in Northern Ireland knew that a powerful and dangerous group operated in their midst and yet we have no evidence or indication that anything was done to curtail, restrict or limit the free range of movement or the freedom to act of these individuals. While it is often said there is no evidence to convict, we continuously saw throughout the 1970s and 1980s the security forces adopt practices designed to curtail, limit and obstruct groups and organisations in carrying out actions. The question for the security forces is not simply related to having evidence to convict, but of how resources were applied and what was done to obstruct and defeat those who sought to carry out unlawful acts. That network of intelligence was in place by the summer of 1974 and we begin to see what emerged in 1975 and 1976. If we take on one side the atrocities that have been the subject of these reports and witnesses before this committee, one counts the number of serious criminal investigations that they gave rise to and the context in which they were carried out, one will find that senior police officers were involved in the Miami Showband investigation. One will find that senior police officers across a number of divisions were involved in the investigation concerning the Reaveys and the O'Dowds. One will find that atrocities attracted huge public focus, not only because of the atrocities themselves but of the counter atrocities they gave rise to.

If one reflects on the time and looks back at the newspapers, Dáil reports and British parliament reports, one continuously finds major expressions of political concern about what was happening in Armagh. In that context, we are expected to believe the detail about individuals and that their membership of the UDR and RUC reserve remained unknown to the powers that be. In some way, all of this never crossed the desk of senior commanders, whether it was civilian intelligence, RUC intelligence or military intelligence. All of this was supposedly immune from CID investigation or forensic officers. The experience of some inquiries made reveals that there were two very different cultures within the RUC. One was that of CID, criminal investigation, formal investigative officers who in many incidents were collecting information. The other was that of RUC special branch which either controlled that information or controlled the course and direction of inquiries.

When one takes all of the inquiries that were ongoing and the political concerns expressed, one has to come to the conclusion that people at a very high level knew what was going on, yet we find the most minimal accountability. If one tries to trace who was arrested, lifted or detained, one finds people on minor changes and discovers subsequently that they were given character references when they appeared in court on these charges, that the prosecutors and prosecuting officers indicated that these people were believed to have no known associations, when all the other contemporaneous evidence was pointing in the other direction. Records of previous convictions were not referred to. Ultimately, it is not brought to an end by police or security action.

Matters changed in the late 1970s when this group centred around Glenanne began to disintegrate or fragment. The only period in which it really came into focus was in 1979 when a particular RUC officer began to speak out about his involvement. What do we find? We discover that centrally involved in a number of these events were policemen who were members of a special patrol group, a special unit set up to tackle the very thing in which they were involved. It was a specialist unit with its own command structure, its own assistant chief constable as head and linked straight to RUC headquarters. There is a huge question mark when one finds that a special anti-terrorist unit — that was the nature of the special patrol group — and its members were involved and associated with people whom we now know were terrorists and involved in a range of atrocities which directly led to other atrocities such as the Kingsmill massacre. It was brought home to me in one long meeting we had with John Weir in Paris a number of years ago when we asked where it was going to stop. When was the tit-for-tat retaliation and the madness going to stop? He said it had stopped one evening when, as a further retaliation, they sat down to plan an attack on a primary school. At some stage someone said "No". At some stage the spiral stopped.

One comes back to our main concern which started with the Dublin-Monaghan bombings as to whether there was collusion. We end up with the benefit of four Barron reports that put the Dublin-Monaghan bombings evidentially at the start of a trail of evidence that identifies a period in which we believe there was significant state collusion which was not limited to what might be referred to as foot soldiers, bad apples, or the occasional wayward RUC officer or UDR member.

That brings us back to the question of where we go from here. We made a number of complaints to the European Court of Human Rights arising from what we believe was the failure of the United Kingdom to co-operate with various inquiries. Both complaints were ruled inadmissible under the rules of the court, particularly the time limit provisions, which require that complaints be lodged within a period of six months of the grounds of complaint being evident; it is not always six months from the event or atrocity being complained of. We complained about the lack of co-operation with inquests, the Oireachtas committee and the Barron inquiry. The context in which the court ruled against the admissibility of the complaints was, in part, that one could not complain about the British Government not co-operating with an inquest if it took 30 years for the State or the relatives to ask for that inquest to be resumed. One cannot expect a formal level of co-operation from a government if the inquiries established are non-statutory and without legal powers, in the nature of the Barron inquiry. It was very much a case of the European Court telling us not to look to the convention if both the victims' families and the Government had failed to bring these matters to a head much earlier.

That effectively brings us to what should be done at this stage. We have constantly campaigned for a public inquiry on the basis that the evidence needs to be gathered, sifted and tested publicly. We have admitted all along, however, that there are limitations and difficulties. We find it ironic that a public inquiry has been established to inquire into the murders of two RUC officers who served during this period when the police force and others in structures whom we believe were involved in collusion do not seem to be amenable to a formal inquiry. Having been constantly told that one cannot compel co-operation, it would be interesting to know whether the inquiry under Judge Smithwick into the murder of Breen and Buchanan is being recognised by the British Government and whether it is obtaining co-operation from the PSNI.

I am aware of the controversy surrounding the formal and statutory inquiries in the North following the Cory report but it is important to find out the extent to which those inquiries are receiving co-operation from the security authorities. For us, the evidence of collusion is now so compelling and powerful that there is an obligation on the Oireachtas to take up the issue and state the matter must be fully inquired into in order that the full nature and extent of what occurred in those years can be established.

Ms Margaret Urwin

I intend to highlight points from the written report we submitted which we consider particularly important. Our report was divided into sections dealing with direct collusion, indirect collusion and the Garda investigations. I concur with Mr. Ó Dúlacháin that on the completion of the fourth Barron report we can confidently make links between four attacks in the South in the two year period from May 1974 to March 1976: the Dublin-Monaghan bombings of May 1974, the shooting of Mr. John Francis Greene in January 1975, the Dundalk bombing of December 1975 and the Castleblaney bombing of March 1976. In three cases bombs were placed without warnings. These cross-Border attacks claimed the lives of 38 people.

We have a body of evidence from the first and fourth Barron reports, the evidence of John Weir and the Wallace letters of 1975, as well as the memo and loyalist inventory of Wallace and the notebooks of Fred Holroyd. These are very important documents because they are contemporaneous sources, not something dreamed up at a later date. These records were written down during the period. The research carried out by the Pat Finucane Centre, as well as the papers obtained by the centre were particularly useful. We also obtained papers from and conducted research in the National Archives of the United Kingdom. This body of evidence points to the Glennane gang as the perpetrator of these atrocities. As Mr. Ó Dúlacháin stated, the gang comprised members of the British security forces, the RUC, the UDR and British Intelligence, together with loyalist paramilitaries. They operated from a safe base in County Armagh, the farmhouse of a member of the RUC reserve. The gang now can also be definitively linked to attacks north of the Border, including the attack on Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge on the same night as the bombing in Dundalk, the Miami Showband murders, the murders of the Reavey and O'Dowd families and many more.

The committee heard such compelling evidence from all of the witnesses present yesterday that members could be left in no doubt that collusion was rife during this period. The ballistic evidence, as charted by Mr. Justice Barron in the fourth report, is very compelling, as it links the weapons used in many of the attacks and further links them directly to members of the security forces.

In the Wallace letters of 1975 many of the suspects are named. He directly states many were involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The same names crop up again in the incidents at Dundalk, Castleblaney and Silverbridge, as well as in the case of the Miami Showband. In the Wallace letter of August 1975 he gives his source for this information as one of Craig's people. Craig Smelley was the head of MI6 in Northern Ireland. In his letter of September 1975 to a former colleague, Tony Stoughten, he names this group as the Protestant Task Force or the Protestant Action Force and states he was told that most of the loyalist sectarian killings which took place in Tyrone and Armagh in 1975, including the Irish showband murders, were carried out by the Protestant Task Force, PTF. He states there are also rumours that the group is linked to the special duties team at Lisburn. Lisburn was the location of the British Army headquarters and the special duties team was a special team of British soldiers involved in undercover work. His memorandum of 28 June 1974 to the GSO of Intelligence with an attached list of 66 loyalist paramilitaries is very important in that it includes the name of the RUC reserve who owned the farm at Glenanne and he had written RUC beside it. According to Mr. Justice Barron, this gentleman joined the RUC reserve in September 1974 but the list suggests he may well have been a member before that date. The important point to be made is that it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that this man's involvement with loyalist paramilitaries was known to the authorities in Northern Ireland as early as June 1974.

Another very important aspect is the information given to the Pat Finucane Centre and the families of the victims at Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge, when they met the investigating officer who had investigated the atrocity. He told them that one RUC officer and two UDR members had been involved, as well as UVF members. He further told them that "permutations" of this group had also been involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk, the murder of the Reavey brothers and Sean Farmer and Colm McCartney at Altnamacken, County Armagh when returning from a GAA match in August 1975. The modus operandi was the same as that used in the shooting of the Miami Showband, a VCP. Then the people were murdered. That must be followed up because it involved a senior RUC officer, probably PSNI eventually, and he retired as a superintendent. He was not, therefore, just a constable in the RUC.

In regard to the allegation that four members of the RUC in Portadown were members of the UVF, Mr. Justice Barron mentioned in his report that he received this information from the Department of Foreign Affairs. He goes on to say that it is no longer available in any of the files of the Garda Síochána or the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and, further, that the information did not provide any names. We find this most unusual. During our research, we located papers in the national archives of the UK dealing with this very matter. This information was passed by the Irish ambassador to the Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office on 20 August 1975. He was worried because the source of this information was considered to be very delicate and, for that reason, he decided against passing it direct to the Chief Constable of the RUC. He said that the knowledge of this was being restricted to the Ministers for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Foreign Affairs and that, therefore, there should definitely be a file in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. It also seems that the names would have been provided. The British ambassador wanted further details but Mr. Seán Donlon, who was the senior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs, said that both Ministers had decided they could not pass on any more details at present, in case they would compromise the source. If these names were available to the sub-committee, it would be very helpful to it in its deliberations.

With regard to the Castleblaney bombing, it was stated yesterday that John Weir had said that this was carried out by the same RUC officer who was mentioned yesterday and the UDR corporal. John Weir told us in a telephone conversation that he believes it was carried out solely by these two men, one UDR and one RUC, just as they had carried out the bombing of the McArdle's Bar in Crossmaglen on 29 November 1974 — that is one that has not come up — where one man was killed; he died almost a year later. He said one would have driven the bomb car and the other the getaway car. He had also heard that they were stopped on the way out of Castleblaney at a checkpoint where the Keady and Newtonhamilton roads meet and that the UDR officer had his gun under his seat. He said that if they had been stopped by the Garda, instead of being waved on, he would have shot them.

Justice for the Forgotten believes that the intended target in Castleblayney may well have been the Derry to Dublin Ulsterbus, which was due to arrive and park at the exact spot where the bomb exploded at 8.15 p.m. The bus was delayed slightly because of the Garda checkpoint and arrived approximately two minutes after the bomb exploded. Apparently, the bus was very punctual and one could set one's clock by it. Sadly, one man, Patrick Moane, died. If, however, the bus had arrived on time, there could have been absolute carnage and a huge death toll. This belief is supported by the fact that the bomb car was parked with the boot facing out onto the street. As on previous occasions, this car was stolen in the Shankill Road area and, once again and as stated at previous hearings of the sub-committee, the owner reported the theft to Tenant Street RUC station. This example shows that this continued to be the modus operandi for obtaining cars to be used in bomb explosions, particularly in the Republic.

The shooting of John Francis Greene was dealt with in the first Barron report. Regarding the linkages of weapons, Mr. Justice Barron talks about a .38 Star pistol which was used to murder John Francis Greene. This weapon originally belonged to a UDR member from Loughgall who had connections with the UVF in the Shankill Road dating back as far 1966, when the modern UVF came into being. This weapon had been used in two earlier incidents, both in March 1973. It was then fitted with a new barrel and used in the murder of Greene in January 1975. It was again used to murder Mrs. Dorothy Traynor in Portadown in April 1975 and was found, along with an arsenal of weapons and ammunition, at a place called Ballynewry, near Portadown, in August 1979 at the home of a UDR member. The car belonging to one of the prime suspects for the murder of Dorothy Traynor was found at the scene of the Miami Showband murders.

I will move on quickly to indirect collusion and definitions thereof. We feel that Mr. Justice Barron sets a very high bar in his definition of collusion. At its hearings into the second Barron report on 26 January 2005, Cormac Ó Dúlacháin told the sub-committee:

It is very clear in a legal sense and in international law that providing cover constitutes an act of collusion. If one provides protection, obscures people from prosecution or fails to disclose information, one is acting as a participant in the overall event.

In his report on the murder of Pat Finucane, Judge Peter Cory stated that collusion includes the pretence of ignorance or unawareness of something one ought morally or officially or legally to oppose and to fail to take action against a known wrongdoing or misbehaviour. Judge Peter Smithwick, in his opening statement at the public tribunal of inquiry set up to inquire into an allegation of collusion into the murders of RUC officers Breen and Buchanan, said that the issue of collusion would be examined in the broadest sense of the word. He said that while it generally means the commission of an act, he was of the view that it should also be considered in terms of an omission or a failure to act.

We have provided several examples of indirect collusion, but I will just mention two. The issue of the Dundalk bomb car, and its theft and ownership, is a crucial element that has arisen from this Barron report. When Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan appeared before the sub-committee in connection with hearings on the Ludlow report, he stated that the purpose of the visit of Superintendent Courtney and himself to Belfast on 15 February 1979 arose because he had received information regarding the bombing in Dundalk, specifically on the make and colour of the car used, the identity of a person and the location at which that person resided in Belfast. Arrangements were made and they travelled to Belfast and met with Mr. Bill Mooney, a senior CID officer, in the city. Superintendent Corrigan said that when they met him he seemed anxious about their visit, undertaking to help them in everything. He said that a member of the RUC was able to confirm the information that he had but during the course of their visit, Mooney told them that there would be no more investigation and that no co-operation would be forthcoming. He then left the police station. Detective Sergeant Corrigan made reference to the fact that the RUC Special Branch took precedence over CID and dictated what should and should not be done.

I understand Mr. Corrigan will be appearing today and he should be asked to clarify if he believes that they were refused co-operation on the instructions of RUC Special Branch. Deeply worrying questions arise from this incident. It is further compounded by the fact that Mr. Justice Barron has not been able to procure a copy of the statement given to the RUC by the owner of the bomb car. He reported that the statement is missing from both the Garda witness statement file and from the Garda investigation report. Although he sought a copy of this statement from the PSNI through the Garda Síochána, no copy of the statement has been forthcoming. We suggest this is most unusual and unacceptable because in all the previous cases involving car procurement for bomb attacks, statements of the car owners have been made available to the Garda. The Garda must also be asked whether a statement was made available and, if so, has it misplaced it.

The location and manner of the procurement of bomb cars are critical facts. In a number of bombings the cars used have been hijacked from the same Belfast street in the same manner with a direction that the owner report the theft at a specified time to the same police station. We are unable to make this comparison about Dundalk because the relevant information has not been disclosed.

In the case of the Miami Showband murders where we already have absolute evidence of direct collusion, with three serving members of the UDR having been convicted and two other serving members having blown themselves up at the scene, there is further indirect evidence in that a white Ford Escort, registration number 4933 LZ, was found at the scene of the attack. This car belonged to a gentleman from Portadown. During the first trial, that is the trial of Crozier and McDowell, this man was called to give evidence and he gave evidence that his car had been stolen while he was asleep. It seemed to be accepted by the prosecution that he was an innocent man whose car had been taken from outside his house.

However, the RUC special branch was well aware that this gentleman was no innocent whose car had simply been stolen at random. We know this from one of the notebooks of Captain Fred Holroyd, a military intelligence officer for Portadown, who linked this man with suspect T and another suspect for the attack on Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge. He linked him with the chief suspect or at least the one who was identified in Dublin in Parnell Street as the driver of the Parnell Street car. He linked him with two other suspects, one for the Monaghan bombing and suspect C for the Dundalk bombing.

Captain Holroyd linked this man with three brothers in training. He said this man was training with these three brothers who were all members of the UVF in Portadown. He also linked him with one of the UDR members who was killed by his own bomb at the scene of the Miami Showband murders. Captain Holroyd also states in his notebook that this man was one of two prime suspects for the murder of Ms Dorothy Traynor in Portadown on 1 April 1975. He further states that he had received a photograph and a file on this man from Drew Coid who was the special branch sergeant in Portadown and that he was ordering complete surveillance on him.

Mr. Justice Barron in his conclusions seems almost Jesuitical in his arguments on collusion. He accepts that collusion occurs between members of the British security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. He also accepts that collusion was occurring around the time of the Dundalk bombing and that the inquiry would be shutting its eyes to reality if it accepted that such collaboration was limited to the cases in which collusion has been proved. Nevertheless, he goes on to state that he cannot prove that Dundalk itself involved collusion. This is despite the fact that he accepts that Dundalk and Silverbridge were co-ordinated attacks and we have absolute proof that collusion occurred in the case of Silverbridge.

Mr. John Weir in an e-mail to Justice for the Forgotten earlier this month said that Dundalk would have been planned at a high level to take place on the same evening as Silverbridge. He said that the RUC officer at the farm, the UDR corporal and a loyalist paramilitary would have been aware of the attack. He also claimed that the explosives used in all the bombings were supplied by a UDR captain who was working for British intelligence. In a further recent e-mail he stated to us that the explosives for Dundalk probably came through Glenanne. It must be accepted that the co-ordinated attacks on Dundalk and Silverbridge involved a conspiracy. We do not need proof that senior members of the British security forces planned or planted the bomb in Dundalk in order to state confidently that collusion occurred. If security force members are proved to have carried out one attack, then they are equally culpable for the second attack.

It is important to remember that all the Barron inquiries have been frustrated by the absence of any real co-operation from the UK security forces. There has been no independent examination or assessment of the information that intelligence agencies had in the 1970s or have now. The information supplied is but a fragment of a much larger picture.

I was going to deal with recrystallised ammonium nitrrate but I will not because of the time constraints, at any rate the committee members have the detail of it.

I will move on to final aspect, which is the Garda investigation. Mr. Justice Barron highlights the fact that almost the exact same wording is used by the Garda officer in writing up the report on the Dundalk investigation as that used by the officer in writing up the report on the Monaghan bombing 18 months earlier. This is a cause of grave concern as it is strongly suggestive of merely going through the motions. The exact wording is to be found on page 50 of this Barron report, the fourth one. The first sentence reads: "It will be appreciated that investigations were greatly hampered by reason of the fact that no direct enquiries could be made in the area where the crime originated." The impression being given here once again is that there was little formal co-operation or dealings between the Northern security forces and the Garda in December 1975 to January 1976. This is a total misrepresentation of the facts.

The committee will be aware, as was mentioned, that a meeting had taken place at the highest level in September 1974 in Baldonnel of Mr. Patrick Cooney, the then Minister for Justice, Mr. Merlyn Rees, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the then Garda Commissioner, the then Chief Constable of the RUC and many other senior officials from both Governments to formalise structures between the two Governments and police forces on cross-Border security co-operation. This meeting led to the establishment of four technical panels, which was mentioned by Mr. Justice Barron in his first report. Significantly in regard to what the committee is now examining, at that meeting both Assistant Commissioner Garvey and Chief Constable Jamie Flanagan agreed that the exchange of information between the special branch in Newry and Dundalk could not be better.

Mr. Cooney told the sub-committee on 28 January 2004 that the Irish Government felt it necessary to put in place formal structures to demonstrate there was a will to co-operate in the fight against terrorism. The reality was that the Irish Government was yielding to sustained pressure from the British since the beginning of 1974 to do this. Mr. Cooney went on to say that following that meeting, as the years went on, they were refined and provided for consultation at all levels right up to Commissioner and the head of the RUC. The panels were set up and suffice to say they were co-chaired by senior officers from both forces. The two officers from the Garda who co-chaired these technical panels were Assistant Commissioner Edmund Garvey and the then chief superintendent Laurence Wren who later became Commissioner.

One of those on the RUC side, Detective Chief Constable Bailey reported in April 1975 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office that he was very satisfied with the work of the panels and reported he had a direct line with his opposite number in Dublin, namely, Assistant Commissioner Garvey. He said that progress had been particularly encouraging regarding intelligence. By July 1975, the Garda was in a position to use various police data banks in the North because this was stated by Mr. Cooney to Lord Harris at a meeting on 2 July 1975.

In September 1975, a meeting was held to discuss arrangements to help the Garda to improve radio communications by mounting X-ray radios in Garda vehicles and at static locations. Previously, the Garda had accepted the loan of a number of X-ray sets provided by the British army. The installation of direct telephone links between the Garda and the RUC was discussed and secure speech equipment known as Goliath had been set up, providing improved communication along the Border.

We have received and read the submission. Time is passing and we would appreciate it if Ms Urwin could summarise.

Ms Urwin

I will try to wrap up. I am almost finished. We were surprised that some information was not included in the Barron report. It was inexplicably excluded. Justice for the Forgotten sourced two important photographs from the archives of The Irish Times, one of which was taken at the scene of the bombing in Dundalk and another taken at the scene in Castleblaney. The Dundalk picture was taken on the night of the bombing and the Castleblaney picture was probably taken the day after the explosion. Both photographs depict members of the Garda Síochána examining fragments of the bomb mechanisms.

We invited Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wilde to provide us with technical opinions on the photographs in his capacity as an ordnance and photographic expert. The two important points about the photographs are that police officers were handling significant evidence without wearing gloves; and the presence of parts of a TPU, a timing and power unit for the bomb, which were not passed on as forensic evidence to either Dr. Donovan or Mr. Hall. According to Mr. Justice Barron, the remains of the TPU at Dundalk were found by Inspector McCabe and handed over to Detective Garda Thomas Foley of the Garda Technical Bureau, who examined them for fingerprints with negative results. However, if they had been handled, the fingerprints would have been obliterated.

I will not speak further about that but I will briefly mention the Dublin Airport bombing. Mr. Justice Barron does not make any link between the bombing and an earlier incident at Dublin Airport in which the son of a leading UVF member was detained. Two young loyalists were arrested at Dublin Airport on 10 September 1975 and charged with loitering with intent to commit a felony. They were held and questioned in the Bridewell Garda station and brought to court.

A source gave us the information that he was living on St. Lawrence Road in Clontarf at the time. He was on the run from the North and using an alias. He was arrested in what he described as a sweep of the general area in the aftermath of the murder of Garda Michael Reynolds in St. Anne's Park in Raheny on 11 September 1975. He was in the Bridewell station for questioning at the same time as the two loyalists and was asked for his opinion on what they might have been doing at the airport. He told gardaí that he believed they were probably going to blow up the airport and may have been on a scouting mission. He further claims that a couple of days after the Dublin Airport bombing, he was walking along the Clontarf Road when two detectives pulled up in a car beside him and one told him that he had been right.

The UDA claimed responsibility for the bombing but Mr. Justice Barron stated that there was intelligence information suggesting that members of the UVF might have been involved. One of the two loyalists is included in the list of lost lives. He was murdered by the IRA in June 1988. He was shown to have been a member of the UVF and had been given four life sentences on the evidence of supergrass, Joe Bennett, but had been released on appeal. We are not in a position to say whether there was a link between the two events, but the question is whether gardaí made a link and did they seek to have the loyalists questioned in the aftermath.

I will not deal with the Barronrath Bridge issue, but I will mention the case for a public tribunal of inquiry. Previously, we have found the sub-committee to be impervious to calls for public inquiries to be established in the cases examined by Mr. Justice Barron. Despite the recommendation that the UK Government set up a public inquiry in its jurisdiction into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, we know with absolute certainty that it will not set up any such inquiry.

We believe that because the sub-committee now has stronger evidence of collusion, it is vital that it take the opportunity to recommend the establishment of a public tribunal of inquiry into all aspects of the atrocities committed in this period of the 1970s through cross-Border incursions into the State. The Government should establish the inquiry and call on the British Government to co-operate fully. The exact mechanism through which this might be done has already been devised for the Smithwick inquiry. One need only look to the opening statement of Mr. Justice Peter Smithwick in the Breen and Buchanan tribunal of inquiry set up under the 1921 Act to see how this might be done.

We will leave the sub-committee's members with the words of Deputy McDowell, the current Tánaiste and then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, to Dáil Éireann on 23 March 2005 when he established the tribunal into the Breen and Buchanan murders. He stated:

I must tell the House that I considered going down the road of a commission of inquiry but I found it did not match up to the criteria laid down by Judge Cory. The form of public inquiry proposed and its proposed terms of reference constitute the most open, potentially expansive and powerful form of inquiry available under our law here or anywhere else to ensure that the full truth emerges. We owe it to the families of the late Chief Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan, the people of Northern Ireland and the people of this State, given the concerns raised about organs of this State.

The following day in the Seanad, he stated:

Regardless of the identities of the victims, the families should not be placed in some hierarchy of sympathy. Everybody is equally entitled to whatever rights can be vindicated under the Constitution and to the greatest extent possible, by an inquiry of this kind.

If the murders of the two RUC officers deserve such an inquiry because of a single allegation of Garda collusion, which they certainly do, the victims of these atrocities, where there is greater evidence of collusion by the British security forces, deserve no less.

I thank Ms Urwin.

In the interests of time and procedure, I will ask questions that our guests should bank, as they will be addressed to both Ms Urwin and Mr. Ó Dúlacháin. I welcome Justice for the Forgotten and commend it on its excellent research, work and support for the families and survivors that have suffered due to the different incidents.

Ms Urwin stated that collusion was rife, but when people speak about it, many are under the impression that it occurred because the security forces wanted to take out a military force on the other side. However, upon reading page 2, paragraph 3 of our guest's significant report, there is a broader political agenda for collusion. I refer to Mr. Colin Wallace's letters, in which he states that the sectarian killings that took place at the end of 1974 were designed to destroy Mr. Merlyn Rees's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire and that targets were identified by both sides by intelligence and the special branch. That is very serious and significant information. Is Mr. Ó Dúlacháin suggesting that collusion was a broader issue involving more than just military or conflict factors? Was a broader political agenda at work?

My second question relates to section 5. Ms Urwin referred to the Patrick Livingstone incident and the case of the two young people with paramilitary connections who were caught when obviously casing Dublin Airport. Are the witnesses suggesting this is another incident that was not investigated properly by the gardaí involved, given that they met the gentlemen later and commented on it?

With regard to collusion, Mr. Ó Dúlacháin makes the point that ten times more powerful evidence is available now compared to what was available when we began the debate about the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Can he provide one practical, sensible example that sums up all the evidence from Justice for the Forgotten?

With regard to whether collusion was low level or whether it was known to the higher authorities, is Justice for the Forgotten suggesting it goes right to the top? Mr. Ó Dúlacháin raised fundamental questions on the identity of known subversives in Armagh in 1974, who formed a powerful and dangerous group. If they were so well known, why does Mr. Ó Dúlacháin believe nothing happened on the ground with regard to them? We have heard of the obstruction by the security forces with regard to evidence. Can he provide an example of this?

Ms Urwin referred to direct collusion with regard to the Miami Showband killings and she referred specifically to a white Ford Escort car. She stated that special branch knew about the car owner, who was linked to other bombings. Is Ms Urwin suggesting that, at best, this is appalling police work and, at worst, state-sanctioned murder? Does she agree with this interpretation? When one considers the evidence and the summary of the report, which is very comprehensive, I am amazed nothing has happened in regard to these issues.

The members of the special patrol group in County Armagh were involved in murder and mayhem. The only reason they stopped was because they were contemplating an attack on a primary school. This was more than a military agenda. Do the witnesses agree that the agenda was to terrorise the whole Northern minority community? Do they agree it was not just a case of trying to attack violent republicans?

On the broader issue of public inquiries, are Justice for the Forgotten and the families suggesting we cannot demand a public inquiry of the British authorities if we are not prepared to hold a public inquiry in our jurisdiction?

Ms Urwin raised the important question of the .38 Star pistol which belonged to the UDR member who was also involved in the UVF. This pistol had a long history in both security and loyalist circles. Is Ms Urwin suggesting not enough attention is being paid to the information on this pistol, which jumps out when one reads the report?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin stated that the Irish Government was yielding or conceding to the British Government of the time. Will he expand on that? Is he suggesting the Irish authorities rolled over under pressure from the British?

What is Mr. Ó Dúlacháin's point with regard to the Dundalk and Castleblaney photographs? Is he suggesting gross incompetence or something more sinister with regard to the photograph of the garda holding the part of the bomb and timer?

In conclusion, is Justice for the Forgotten's bottom line that collusion took place but the only measure which will resolve the issue is a full public inquiry?

I am not sure if that was questioning or a speech but I am sure Mr. Ó Dúlacháin and Ms Urwin will respond.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

I will take some of the points. First, it has been long a subject of political commentary in relation to the period of 1973, 1974 and 1975 whether there were internal political differences within the broader British establishment as to policy in Northern Ireland. It comes through some of the historical papers that there are internal tensions — that there are elements within the security forces and the broader intelligence services and political establishment as to whether Sunningdale was an appropriate policy to adopt. There is believed to have been resistance to Sunningdale and attempts to undermine Sunningdale. Therefore, when one goes on to December 1974 and the attempt to re-establish a ceasefire, similarly, there is a belief that certain elements of the security agencies may have been quite willing to provoke violence to unseat or unsettle ceasefires. That has remained a matter of political comment and political speculation. Beyond that, anything that unseated a potential ceasefire did suit an alternative political agenda.

Second, in terms of identifying the specific indicators of collusion, they go from specific court cases where people are, we believe, represented as having no known association and no previous criminal record in cases where that simply is not so. From that local type of matter, you then end up at the other end in 1980, when the trials take place in relation to the Rock Bar, and one reads the transcript of the sentencing in relation to the Rock Bar. The sentencing transcript reads very much as "This is an isolated rotten apple situation", and, therefore, the sentence is given down on that basis.

Read in isolation, it is capable of appearing very reasonable and rational until one realises that the sentencing judge has over the previous two months sat on a number of other trials of special patrol group officers. Therefore, when one takes the context of what was known to that particular court, the actual sentencing statement and rationale for the sentence handed down in the Rock Bar trial just does not stand up. It becomes incompatible to what is known to have been on the court record in the broadest sense, rather than simply in that trial. That indicates a level of cover-up at that stage involving the highest officers of state, because that was the matter that was dealt with at that time.

Does Ms Urwin want to list some other instances?

Ms Urwin

I think Deputy McGrath's first question was about the first Colin Wallace letter. He asked was it more than just a military thing. I think it has long been known that the British were fighting a propaganda war as well. Was it not said to Lord Widgery when he was conducting the Bloody Sunday inquiry that we are not just fighting a military war here, we are fighting a propaganda war? Also, according to John Weir, there was an element of keeping the pot boiling, which is how he described it. In that way one would get a group to carry out an atrocity to force a retaliation from another. For example, we heard yesterday from the O'Dowd and the Reavey families and the following night there was the retaliation in the form of the Kingsmill massacre. John Weir certainly believes that there was an attempt to keep the pot boiling, as he describes it.

What was the second question asked by Deputy Finian McGrath? I have the answer but I cannot remember the question.

It related to section 5 — Patrick Livingstone and Dublin Airport.

Ms Urwin

We do not know the answer to that because we are not in a position to know. We were told by a source. We know that it happened because we have been able to find it in newspaper reports which we have provided to the committee. We know the episode took place. We do not have any way of knowing whether they were linked or whether the Garda believes they were linked. Our source told us that a special branch officer said to him after the bombing, "You were right", but that is all we know. As Judge Barron does not mention it at all in his report, we have no way of knowing. We are not in a position to know that.

The Deputy asked another question about the star pistol. I have just taken one weapon. The Pat Finucane Centre will probably deal with all of the weapons and the links between them in more detail. I mentioned that one specifically for the particular reason that it is linked to the guy who owned the car at the Miami and it is also linked to the murder of Dorothy Trainor, as well as that of John Francis Greene.

The Deputy asked what I said in regard to the photographs. Again, I am not in a position to say anything really, except that this is what happened and that it is visual evidence that this evidence was handled in this particularly unprofessional manner and also that it was not sent with some other material to the forensic laboratory. Why that was the case is a different question. I do not know the answer to that. All we can say is that we have discovered that this happened.

Deputy Finian McGrath also asked about whether the Irish Government had rolled over in terms of agreeing co-operation. The main focus of the British Government from the beginning of 1974 was to obtain co-operation on cross-Border security between the Garda and the RUC. Even more so, what they really wanted was co-operation between the Garda and the British Army because it was effectively the civil force, particularly in Border areas and more particularly in south Armagh. That is what they were looking for.

It would appear that the Irish Government was reluctant to get involved in this but eventually agreed. It had been intended to go ahead earlier but it was delayed until September. I have no idea why it was delayed. I am not saying the Irish Government rolled over but it certainly agreed to this co-operation. We know this from all the papers released from the National Archives in the UK. It would appear that all of the information was one-way. Questions were never asked about cross-Border incursions from the North into the South. All of the minutes detail questions and, more importantly, concerns arising about cross-Border incursions from the South into the North.

Deputy Finian McGrath covered many of the areas on which I wished to touch. I welcome Justice for the Forgotten, Margaret, Kevin, Cormac and the families. Reference was made to research undertaken in the National Archives in the UK. How accessible were the records and how much other information which is known about was not available? There is much detail in the Wallace letters and John Weir's evidence. I am interested to know the extent of the research that has been done in co-operation with the Pat Finucane Centre. Is information available that it is not possible to get one's hands on?

My second question relates to the gang that has been named as the perpetrators of the atrocities. To what extent did that gang get co-operation south of the Border. I refer in particular to the bombing incidents south of the Border in Dublin, Monaghan and Castleblaney. Did these people cross the Border, come to Dublin to plant the bomb and go away again, or did they have people working for them down here in the guise of other agencies of the State? I am interested to know if there is any evidence in this regard.

On the issue of collusion and the Garda Síochána, to what extent was the Garda aware of the membership of the RUC and the various paramilitary groups that have clearly been outlined here? Do we know the extent to which the Garda was aware of the dual and perhaps triple roles played by people in that regard? Do we have any evidence that the Garda was involved in collusion?

Ms Urwin referred to the European Court and the fact that it sent her back to get the Government's co-operation and to make further inquiries, in other words to get the domestic situation sorted before going back to the European Court. In Ms Urwin's opinion, how much will the element of time militate against the full pursuit of justice and the full facts in the cases we are following?

In the inquiries that have taken place, including our work as a committee, all we are seeking is justice for the families. Will Ms Urwin define what would constitute justice? Would it mean that people would be charged at this stage or whenever the final conclusions are made or are apologies being sought? Various different levels of outcomes are anticipated and expected by the families and the people who are represented.

Ms Urwin

The first question Deputy Hoctor asked was about the extent of the research we have done. Justice for the Forgotten has been travelling every January to London for the past four or five years to look at the newly released papers under the 30-year rule. We have found a considerable amount of material relating to Irish affairs. The British are great at keeping records and everything is written down. The Tánaiste and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform told the committee that at a certain stage in meetings the pens are put down but I say to him that as soon as he is gone out the door the pens are up again and they are writing furiously because absolutely everything is recorded by the British.

They are very good at releasing a lot of their material. Obviously a lot of material is withheld but at least with the British one knows what is being withheld. It is stated when a file is closed and how long that will be the case or whether it will be closed indefinitely. One has the file number and usually the title of the file and one is pretty clear about what is being withheld. Under freedom of information orders, one can also apply for what has been withheld. We know that many files have been withheld for 1974 and 1975 and we keep those under constant review. We have already put in a freedom of information request and we will see how we get on with that.

We interviewed Colin Wallace on several occasions and also Fred Holroyd and John Weir. As the committee can see, they have all given us a lot of information. In terms of the archives here, I am afraid we find very little useful information in what is released here.

The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform set up an academic group to look at what might be released in terms of the matter of security in Northern Ireland and The Irish Times recommended yesterday that files be released up as far as 1956. We are seeking files up to 1976 and while one appreciates that, naturally enough, not everything relating to security in Northern Ireland can be released, we would have hoped that certain files could have been released and that at least we might discover what is being withheld or how many files are being withheld. The most useful source of information here would be the Army intelligence files, the G2 files.

Deputy Hoctor also asked whether these people got assistance here. We have no way whatsoever of knowing that. We do not know about Dublin. I would say in Border areas they did not need any assistance. The only evidence we have of such collusion is in respect of the Littlejohn brothers' operation here — that was an earlier period which the committee looked at in the second Barron report — and, of course, the case of Garda Crinnion collaborating with John Wyman, who was a British agent. We have no evidence of any other collaboration at this time.

What else did Deputy Hoctor ask?

How aware was the Garda of the dual, if not triple, membership of RUC members in the underworld? Were gardaí aware of that through their own interactions and were they themselves responsible for some of it?

Ms Urwin

I think that Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan, when he appeared at the Ludlow hearings, said that there were rumours or it had come to his attention that there were allegations about members of the security forces being associated with loyalists in the 1970s. Of course, the committee has this information that was given, which I referred to during my presentation, in relation to the four RUC members, namely, the allegation that they were members of the UVF in Portadown. Certainly, gardaí at a senior level were aware of that, but again it does not appear to have gone any further because, in fairness, I suppose they would have had to give names for that or certainly the British were not going to follow it up without further information.

How will time militate against the final findings?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

Time will always present a difficulty, but it is in the nature of conflict situations that one ends up many years later invoking investigations of various kinds and we see that in various parts of the world. It goes back to the fact that there is a great deal of information available about these events. The manner in which the Pat Finucane Centre has been able to link various forensic reports is indicative of the type of information that does exist.

In terms of the personal type of information that is available, from our own National Library and National Archive going right back to the Fenian police files more than 150 years ago, we know the detail that was being recorded. That same system of intelligence has been in place, and has been in place in Northern Ireland. We know that for every name on a Wallace list, there is a detailed file. We know they were kept in registries. We know they were divided into two sections — effectively, the Protestant registry and the Catholic registry. Those registries have not been destroyed but they have never been opened up.

The type of information that is indicative and that leads to questions in relation to conclusion still exists. There are difficulties regarding people no longer being alive and about recollections, but they, of themselves, are not insurmountable in that respect.

I would add that we may get a further and deeper insight once the McEntee report, which I believe is due to be delivered to Government at the end of October, becomes public and available to this committee. We will see further what digging can be done when the resources are applied. In so far as time and access to materials are concerned, it is more a question of will rather than of limitations.

What of the question regarding the outcome? Does Mr. Ó Dúlacháin see, at the end of all of this, people being charged, or just apologies and clear identification of people who were the perpetrators?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

There are a number of different outcomes and what any one individual wants can differ from family to family and between people within families. Where it comes in respect of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings is that, to this date, there has been no formal acceptance by the Irish Government that collusion was a factor in those bombings and, in fact, the institutions of the State went out of their way, for a number of years from 1992, to effectively deny or repudiate such allegations, or to throw cold water on them. Therefore, there is a question of whether a state, on behalf of its people, acknowledges, recognises or sets the record straight.

As regards the United Kingdom, collusion has never been an unacceptable policy. It is one of the standard tools in which political affairs across the world have been managed. What seems to be unacceptable is to admit that it has been applied as a policy and, to date, the various victims have been denied an admission of truth, an admission that there is a state involvement or a state culpability. It is ultimately about the truth and the admission, as opposed to whether there are convictions or apportionment of individual or personal responsibility.

Of all of the information they have accumulated on all the events during the period in question, what is our guests view on the continuation of those two gangs, in particular, operating with impunity and the fact that that could happen without some political acquiescence at least, if not direction?

Ms Urwin

I think we have shown very clearly that it really could not have. I think, effectively, it was one gang. The particular gang we are talking about was one gang. Sure, they divided up if they wanted to do — to put it colloquially — a double whammy. They would divide up and, as the RUC superintendent said, permutations of the gang would do one attack and other permutations of it would do another.

Following up on something Deputy Hoctor asked about collusion from here, there is no evidence of collusion, but in a sense we must ask ourselves why did all the Garda investigations fail so abysmally and why was it, in relation to Dundalk, that nothing happened until Superintendent Courtney was appointed as the Border superintendent in, I think, 1976. He then started to investigate it, but why was nothing done in obviously what would be, even from a lay person's point of view, the vital time immediately after any crime has been committed? One would say that the vital time is immediately after a crime has been committed and it was allowed to lie until Superintendent Courtney made efforts when he was appointed in 1976. That is a serious question. Why did all of the Garda investigations fail so abysmally? What was the reason for that?

Senator Jim Walsh stated that there were two gangs in Portadown and Glennane. Are they both the same?

Ms Urwin

Yes. The Portadown gang was mainly the UVF loyalist parliamentary element.

The other was the UDR-RUC element.

Ms Urwin

Yes, but they were operating together in Glennane.

I thank Ms Urwin. I appreciate her attendance and her assistance. We have problems with time and traffic has caused problems. The representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre, therefore, have agreed to defer their presentation until next Wednesday, 4 October, because the Dáil is sitting at 2.30 p.m. and we must hear from other witnesses.

We will now hear from two former gardaí, former Superintendent John Courtney and former Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan next. I welcome both men, who previously appeared before the sub-committee when it dealt with a different report by Mr. Justice Barron. They were very helpful, particularly regarding their visit to Belfast during the investigations into the Dundalk bombing, which was revealing to us and to the nation at large.

I am grateful to both witnesses for attending and assisting us with the fourth Barron report on the Dundalk bombing. They are aware of the sub-committee's procedures. While members have privilege, they do not have the same privilege. The sub-committee, as a result of the Supreme Court case regarding the Abbeylara incident, is prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. No individuals are to be named.

I do not know whether the witnesses had an opportunity to read the report. Does Mr. Courtney have any comment to make?

Mr. John Courtney

No, I have nothing to add to my report on both investigations at the time.

Does Mr. Corrigan wish to comment?

Mr. Owen Corrigan

I have nothing to say. I am here to answer questions to assist the sub-committee in any way I can.

Is Mr. Courtney prepared to answer questions?

Mr. Courtney

Yes.

The questioners will be Senator Jim Walsh and Deputy Ó Fearghaíl.

I welcome Mr. Courtney and Mr. Corrigan. Were they involved in the investigations of all three bombings at Dundalk, Castleblayney and Dublin Airport or only one or two of them?

Mr. Courtney

I was not involved in the Dublin Airport bomb investigation.

However, Mr. Courtney was involved in the other two.

Mr. Courtney

I only investigated the Dundalk bombing at the time.

Does Mr. Courtney have any knowledge of the Castleblayney bombing?

Mr. Courtney

None whatsoever.

Does Mr. Corrigan have any knowledge?

Mr. Corrigan

It was a similar situation for me. I was only in Dundalk.

I refer the witnesses to the third last paragraph on page 65 of the report, which states, "The investigation report stated that inquiries were being undertaken with the RUC regarding [a named person]. The file does not say what form those inquiries took". The next paragraph suggests that even though Mr. Courtney and Mr. Corrigan might not have received the co-operation of the RUC, the witness who identified the named person referred to him as somebody who carried a banner during 12 July parades in Belfast and the inquiry suggests that steps could have been taken to attend on 12 July to confirm the identification.

Mr. Courtney

I would not dream of travelling to the North on 12 July to look at a parade, particularly with a witness. I asked him. It was ridiculous.

That was a positive identification. Did Mr. Courtney attempt to follow up the account of that witness?

Mr. Courtney

With regard to all the suspects, we depended on the co-operation of the RUC on these matters because we had no entitlement or authority to cross the Border and monitor the suspects. The only hope we had was we were watching them to see would they cross the Border on the way to Dundalk and they could be intercepted at the checkpoint. We would definitely have talked to them then.

We discussed this during previous hearings and we heard conflicting reports from different Garda members. A number travelled to the North to conduct interviews whereas others did not. There was not a common picture in this regard.

I refer to the fingerprints mentioned on page 68. Photographs were taken of the finger marks on the clock found at the bomb scene and the report states, "On 18 January, Superintendent John Courtney signalled his intention to raise the issue of fingerprint checks once more with the RUC but there is no mention of the matter in the Garda files". Was that pursued?

Mr. Courtney

I asked the RUC a number of times for its co-operation in checking the fingerprints but nothing came of my inquiries.

As a result, did Mr. Courtney deduce that the RUC had no information or that it was not co-operating?

Mr. Courtney

Any fingerprints of suspects we sent to the RUC were forwarded by its officials to its fingerprint section at headquarters. They were asked to check them. They did not have results but they co-operated in this respect. Nothing came of it.

Mr. Courtney said they did not have any results. Did they communicate that to him or did he deduce that from the fact that no information came back?

Mr. Courtney

That result would have been sent to the fingerprints section of the Garda technical bureau, which would have informed me of any results because we were stationed there. I was stationed in the fingerprints section. I checked with this section but nothing came from it.

As a matter of procedure within the Garda Síochána at the time and as the investigating officer, would Mr. Courtney not have taken the proactive step of contacting the bureau to see if it had a response and what that response was?

Mr. Courtney

I would have contacted the ballistics section and any other section that could give us assistance every other day.

Is it simply that Mr. Courtney cannot recollect what response he received?

Mr. Courtney

If there was anything significant about it I would have been told. I would have checked them. We would have expected to receive fingerprints from the Ford Cortina used to bring the bomb down. We were checking this and hoping that something would emerge.

It is stated on page 72 that there were some pre-attack warnings in this regard. Perhaps Mr. Corrigan and Mr. Courtney would like to comment on this. The third paragraph states:

It should also be remembered that warnings of loyalist attacks on Dundalk were a regular occurrence during this period: former D/Sgt Owen Corrigan told the Inquiry that such warnings tended to increase in frequency around Christmas time, and that Dundalk shopping centre was often mentioned as a potential target.

Given that this was a regular occurrence, did the gardaí take any specific or additional steps when they received such pre-attack warnings or was it regarded as simply another warning that was possibly false?

Mr. Corrigan

Certainly not. It was treated with the utmost seriousness.

What steps were taken in this case?

Mr. Corrigan

As I have stated, mobile patrols would have been assigned to the shopping centre, which was the only one in Dundalk at that time. Other public buildings deemed to be possible targets for attack would have been covered by way of mobile patrols on an ongoing basis. In addition to the normal strengths available, special patrols would have been allocated in the period up to Christmas.

Would roadblocks have been used?

Mr. Corrigan

There would have been roadblocks but they would have been-----.

In respect of this specific incident, can Mr. Corrigan recall any specific steps being taken as a precaution?

Mr. Corrigan

Not specifically, but there were roadblocks at the different approaches to the town in conjunction with the additional patrols in the town. At that time, there was a roadblock on the Newry road which practically operated on a full-time basis and there were occasional roadblocks on the minor roads leading from south Armagh, such as the Crossmaglen road.

Nothing specific arose from any of them to prevent this particular occurrence.

Mr. Corrigan

No.

Mr. Courtney was appointed Border superintendent in 1978.

Mr. Courtney

That is correct.

I think it has been acknowledged by Justice for the Forgotten that at that stage the investigation of this atrocity was pursued by Mr. Courtney.

Mr. Courtney

That is correct.

There is a note here that Mr. Courtney's report of 24 January expressed a certain amount of optimism possibly arising specifically from the likelihood of receiving fuller co-operation from the RUC in these matters. However, it states that this optimism seems to have been misplaced because by 12 June Mr. Courtney was stating that nothing of note came from these discussions. Does Mr. Courtney wish to comment on this?

Mr. Courtney

I reopened the case after consulting with Detective Sergeant Corrigan, who was the Border detective sergeant in Dundalk at the time. We decided to put every effort we could into the case because it was very serious. Both of us felt that the RUC would be able to co-operate with us. I knew a particular officer in the RUC whom I visited to discuss the case. I told him we were very concerned that nobody had been arrested, charged or questioned in connection with the case. He said he would do his best and try to arrange to speak to some of the suspects. I hoped he would but he never told me that he had spoken to them, although I asked him about developments on a number of occasions. He would tell me that he was keeping on eye on matters and that he was doing his best. We had no authority to go up to the North to question these suspects. I believed the two people mentioned were very strong suspects and I was very anxious to talk to them if I could, but I did not have the authority to go up to the North to do so. I hoped to stop and question them at checkpoints if they came across the Border to visit Dundalk or anywhere else across the Border.

Who was the RUC officer Mr. Courtney met at that time?

Mr. Courtney

His name was Frank Murray. He held the rank of chief superintendent and was very helpful to me in connection with many investigations.

What does Mr. Courtney believe is the reason he did not get that type of co-operation at the time?

Mr. Courtney

I do not really blame him because he always helped me in connection with other cases we were involved in. He helped me in respect of two murders in Buncrana. Boyce and Porter were shot dead in Muff in County Donegal, on the Border, on New Year's Eve. Frank Murray was a detective inspector in Derry at that time and was of great assistance in this case. I was investigating this case and I was attempting to secure the arrest of a suspect by the name of Taylor. Eventually, Detective Inspector Murray rang me in connection with the case, having previously been away on holiday. I asked if he could interview Mr. Taylor.

Perhaps Mr. Courtney would refer to the named individual as the person he believed to be culpable.

Mr. Courtney

He arrested this person and charged him with the murders. The suspect was subsequently extradited to Dublin and his case heard in the Special Criminal Court. Mr. Murray was very helpful on that occasion.

Did Mr. Courtney discuss with anyone in Garda headquarters or his superiors the fact that he was not getting co-operation from the RUC?

Mr. Courtney

I did discuss the matter because they would have asked me about it. The late Chief Superintendent Fitzgerald would have asked me about developments and how the investigation was proceeding.

Would the failure to get this co-operation from the RUC in connection with fairly terrible atrocities have been a matter of major concern to Mr. Courtney's superiors?

Mr. Courtney

They were concerned that those people should be interviewed. I told them we were doing our best to ensure that they were interviewed but that we had been unsuccessful.

Does Mr. Courtney know if they would have taken up the matter at political level?

Mr. Courtney

There are a few more cases in the South where Chief Superintendent Murray was very helpful. He was the person who pointed out these individuals as suspects to me.

Was Mr. Courtney aware of the names of the suspects at the time?

Mr. Courtney

He gave me the names of people he said were very strong suspects.

Was Mr. Courtney aware that one of the suspects was an RUC reservist?

Mr. Courtney

He probably gave me their history.

Would he have given that information?

Mr. Courtney

I cannot remember if he did.

It would probably have struck Mr. Courtney as significant if Mr. Murray had given him that information.

Mr. Courtney

It would have been very important.

It would have possibly explained whether Mr. Courtney was likely or unlikely to secure co-operation from the RUC.

Mr. Courtney

I was surprised at the time that he did not ensure these two people were interviewed.

Was Mr. Courtney aware of the probability or possibility of collusion between the security forces in the North and loyalists at the time?

Mr. Courtney

No, I never had any reason to suspect that Mr. Murray was that type of officer. He was always helpful to me. I did not meet him that frequently. I only met him when something serious happened along the Border.

Mr. Courtney and Mr. Corrigan travelled to Belfast on 15 February 1979.

Mr. Courtney

Yes.

Mr. Courtney met Bill Mooney of CID.

Mr. Courtney

Yes, that officer was in charge of CID.

What were Mr. Courtney's impressions of that meeting?

Mr. Courtney

Detective Sergeant Corrigan had met him before and knew him. They appeared to be on friendly terms. We explained to him our problem and asked if he could help us in any way in investigating the bombs that went off in Dundalk, killing two people. He said he would give us every help possible and there was a constable down at the Crumlin Road station who was in a position to help and would be able to tell us who took or stole the car. We were delighted with that and we went to the Crumlin Road station. We did not know our way and he brought us there. We met a detective inspector and he introduced us to him. I told the inspector that we wanted to see this constable. He told me the person in question was an assistant constable who was off that day but that he would bring him in immediately and we should wait. With that, Chief Superintendent Mooney stepped in and said, "You are not going to see that man." I said that we were only going to ask him a couple of simple questions about who took the car, what person was involved. That was all we wanted to find out. He told me that I would not see that man. I told him that he could question him himself and give us the result of the conversation, but he did not allow it. We were very disappointed. Having the name of the person who took the car would be the first lead in the investigation.

Mr. Corrigan also attended the meeting. What were his impressions of it?

Mr. Corrigan

The facts have been outlined by Mr. Courtney. We met Mr. Mooney and he made all the arrangements to have the member who had the information recalled from his day off. Up to that point he had been very helpful to us. Suddenly, his total attitude and demeanour changed. From what I can recall, he left the room and returned and gestured with his hands as he told us that we would not see that man. He just disappeared from the place. As has been stated, I had known him very well and he had known Mr. Courtney very well because both had been in CID and he was a CID officer.

I might elaborate for the information of the committee. He was the head of CID. The RUC operated with CID and also had a special branch. Special Branch worked in liaison with British military services. The CID investigated the matters on the ground but they were governed by certain stipulations. In other words, Special Branch dictated or were the senior partner in the arrangement as I knew it. Everything had to go through Special Branch for approval. My impression from the moment Mr. Mooney arrived with us at Tennant Street station was that he was in good form. His attitude totally changed in Crumlin Road station. We had made arrangements to wait for this man. We had waited for ten or 15 minutes for him to be collected from his home or come to the station of his own accord to help us. Mr. Mooney suddenly came in the door and told us that we were not going to see that man, turned on his heel and walked out.

Can Mr. Corrigan recall why he left the room? Mr. Corrigan said that he left the room and returned and his demeanour had changed in the interim.

Mr. Corrigan

That is right.

Can Mr. Corrigan recall why he actually left the room?

Mr. Corrigan

No, I am only outlining the sequence of events as they happened.

Is it Mr. Corrigan's belief that the withdrawal of co-operation was at the behest of Special Branch?

Mr. Corrigan

I could not speculate; I am only giving an outline. That is why I mentioned this for the information of the committee.

Mr. Corrigan does not know.

Mr. Corrigan

Both of us were very surprised at the change of attitude. We did not meet him at the station. We met him at Knock and then travelled to Tennant Street. On the way up there was banter and general and cordial conversation. He left the room and, as I have already outlined, he returned a short time later.

The witness is permitted to speculate. What would he speculate?

Mr. Corrigan

I would say there was an input or he was acting under influence from some other quarter. His attitude changed so dramatically in the short intervening period.

I refer the witness to pages 2 and 3 of Justice for the Forgotten's report. It refers to Colin Wallace's letters. The witness does not have a copy of the report so I will read it. He talks about the sectarian killings and attempts by Rees to negotiate a ceasefire. This was obviously in the early 1970s. He said, "They also believe that some very senior RUC officers are involved with this group." This refers to the gangs we have been talking about. He continued: "...and intelligence/special branch members have formed some sort of pseudo gangs in an attempt to fight a war of attrition by getting paramilitaries on both sides to kill each other." On page 3, his memorandum to the GSO dated 28 June 1974 names the main two suspects, not just in this atrocity but in other atrocities as well. He makes reference to the fact that they were on an excluded list: "Wallace claims that the names with a line through them and an asterisk beside them were excluded from being targeted and the reason for this was that they were working for either special branch or British intelligence."

Given the witness's experience of working on the Border over the years, and the information that has subsequently come to light through media and court cases, does he concur with the proposition that there was a high level of collusion between British forces and a number of these paramilitaries and that in fact some of the paramilitaries were members of the British forces?

Mr. Corrigan

I would accept that, yes.

These are paramilitaries who carried out these atrocities.

Mr. Corrigan

Yes.

Mr. Courtney

Between the British forces and who?

Between the British forces and the people named in these reports as the prime suspects for many offences, not just this one. Some of them were involved with the RUC. Given the witness's experience of dealing with the RUC at different levels, would he believe there was a high level of collusion between British forces, RUC and some of these loyalist paramilitaries?

Mr. Courtney

I would think so, all right. I was in charge of the investigation into the murder of Captain Nairac who was murdered in Dundalk. Detective Sergeant Corrigan was also involved in the investigation. We thought it rather strange that during the whole investigation the British armed forces never communicated with either myself or anyone else in the investigation. We tried to get information about him, but we did not get even one telephone call. I was very disappointed about the whole thing. We solved the case, irrespective of the non co-operation from them.

I welcome Mr. Courtney and Mr. Corrigan and thank them for their assistance. In one of the earlier submissions it was forcefully put to us that there was a high level of co-operation at this time between the Garda and RUC authorities and that there was a degree of political co-operation and willingness to see active engagement on the ground. I get the impression from listening to the witnesses that the contacts they were making were based on their own personal connections within the RUC. Were no formal arrangements for engagement and co-operation in place at that time?

Mr. Courtney

There used to be regular cross-Border meeting between Garda and RUC officers once, or perhaps even twice or three times, a month. We would have other meetings arising from the course of investigations, but there were regular meetings between the Garda and RUC every few months.

In the course of those type of meetings, would Mr. Courtney have been strongly aware of the existence and members of this gang at Glenanne?

Mr. Courtney

We would discuss what was happening on both sides of the Border.

Were matters discussed in a general way?

Mr. Courtney

Yes.

Again, was the Garda aware there was a lethal hit squad north and south of the Border? Would that issue have come up for discussion at the time?

Mr. Courtney

We had an agenda for the meetings and the points on it would be covered.

Does Mr. Courtney remember whether the Glenanne gang was on the agenda?

Mr. Courtney

No, but I remember that the names of those who were strong suspects for the bombing in Dundalk were mentioned.

Was there a sense that this was part of a co-ordinated effort?

Mr. Courtney

All these issues would be on the agenda and would be discussed. There would be no more after that.

Mr. Corrigan

At the end of the day, it came down to the relationship of the people with their counterparts on the ground. The committee meetings were at a certain level and it is a question of what one was told, but the man on the ground-----

The real work happened on the ground.

Mr. Corrigan

Precisely.

Did Mr. Corrigan have an awareness of the existence of this gang at Glenanne?

Mr. Corrigan

Yes, of course. Absolutely.

Was it known that some of the members of this gang were members of the UDR and RUC?

Mr. Corrigan

I was personally aware there were members of the UDR and UVF in the gang. Their base was Glenanne, the home of a UDR——

——and RUC reserve.

Mr. Corrigan

An RUC reservist. That was well known.

And also full-time RUC officers who were attached to special intelligence.

Mr. Corrigan

They called them the G group.

They were also involved in paramilitary activity.

Mr. Corrigan

Two of them were convicted in the 1970s of the murder of a Catholic RUC sergeant in Ahoghill and another gentleman.

Given that Mr. Corrigan was aware of this, will he give us a sense of how that information was fed back through the system?

Mr. Corrigan

In which context?

From Mr. Corrigan's activity on the ground, he was aware of what was going on and that members of the RUC and others were involved; how did he feed this intelligence back?

Mr. Corrigan

The ongoing problem was that one had to seek the co-operation of the RUC. The RUC was quite slow to co-operate from my experience of co-operating with it regarding activities carried out either side of the Border by the loyalist element as distinct from those carried out by the Nationalist.

The point I am trying to get at, but putting badly, is whether you, Superintendent Courtney or anybody within the overall operation had seen to it that information was fed back to the Commissioner directly or to the then Department of Justice to ensure there was a high level of awareness of what was happening on the ground?

Mr. Corrigan

We would be reporting on any intelligence that we would come by but we would expect such intelligence to be coming from the RUC.

Would C3 have been informed of these bits of information that were coming at a local level?

Mr. Corrigan

It would be. We submitted a condensed monthly report to C3 on all activities on the Border.

A monthly report.

Mr. Corrigan

Yes, a monthly report.

Would it have been put in writing to C3 that people who were in the RUC, the special branch, RUC reservists and the UDR were involved in paramilitary activity?

Mr. Corrigan

No.

Would it have gone verbally to C3?

Mr. Corrigan

Not that I am aware of.

That would seem to be very significant information.

Mr. Corrigan

Absolutely.

Why would it not be passed up to senior officers in headquarters, particularly officers in C3 who were in charge of intelligence?

Mr. Corrigan

As far as I knew, the level of intelligence available to C3 was infiltrated by the security forces in the North, both RUC and UDR.

Would Mr. Courtney have passed information to C3 or headquarters directly stating that members of these gangs, which were notorious at the time, were also permanent and reserve members of the RUC and UDR?

Mr. Courtney

Certainly, I would have.

To whom would Mr. Courtney have passed on that information?

Mr. Courtney

To C3 section.

Who was in charge of C3 at that stage?

Mr. Courtney

The chief superintendent was Michael Fitzgerald and I dealt with him more than any other person.

Would Mr. Courtney have communicated in writing or verbally?

Mr. Courtney

He would call me into his office and ask me how things were going on the Border. I was not on the Border permanently. I could be down the country. When the bombs went off in Dublin, I was down in Cork city investigating the murder of a child. I stayed in Cork, because people were very worried about the case until it was solved. I was away all that time. I was on Border duty for a few months in the year. I was also down in Galway and I was in Connemara investigating a murder in the Gaeltacht. However, whatever I heard, I passed it on to C3.

The main point is that one could work when one had personal contact with a member of the RUC. As for the conferences and meetings for exchange of information, one would not get a whole lot of information from them.

Yesterday, some of the witnesses criticised the local Garda because there was good quality intelligence in October, November and December on the likelihood of a bombing campaign or incident in Dundalk. Is Mr. Corrigan satisfied that adequate precautions were taken at that time?

Mr. Corrigan

I have explained to the committee that the Garda did all in its power. One must remember that Dundalk was a hive of activity on many fronts. Subversive activity was at an all-time high and resources were diverted to cover the shopping centres and all the approach roads.

Does Mr. Corrigan think that such criticism is unfair?

Mr. Corrigan

I do not accept that criticism.

Will Mr. Corrigan tell us about the investigation of the atrocity? Was an incident room set up and were people assigned to the task of investigating the bombing? How many were involved and how long did it last?

Mr. Corrigan

Perhaps Mr. Courtney will deal with this. There were 20 or 30 involved in the investigation team and conferences were held on a daily basis. The intelligence was collated.

Who headed up that operation?

Mr. Corrigan

Mr. Courtney was there.

Would there have been 20 or 30 people working to Mr. Courtney at that stage? What was the duration of the active investigation at that stage? I am aware that Mr. Courtney reopened the investigation again when he returned to that area in 1978.

Mr. Courtney

It went on for a number of months. The numbers on the team were boiled down but a team was involved in the investigation all the time.

Therefore, the investigation would never have been formally wound up.

Mr. Courtney

Never. It was always ongoing. I reactivated this when I came back as I was anxious to solve the case. Detective Sergeant Corrigan and I discussed this to determine what we could do about it.

Some 15 witnesses made identifications. While Mr. Justice Barron seems to cast doubt on the quality of the identifications, there were two pretty positive ones. As part of the process those brought in to make identifications were apparently only shown photographs of known loyalist subversives. Was that normal practice rather than looking at a general album of mug shots?

Mr. Courtney

We would make up an album of photographs. Suspects would be included in the album but there might be at least 20 photographs. There would be nothing to indicate who those people were. Most of them would have been UDA, UVF or UDR. These would have been suspects who had been known to the gardaí for a length of time and very likely suspects involved in the bombings. People would be asked to make identification from the photographs.

An individual is named in the fourth paragraph on page 25 as having been identified by a witness. This person is also supposed to have been involved previously in Orange parades on 12 July etc. Am I correct in taking from the report that this particular witness was not shown the photo albums and was not asked to specifically identify anyone?

Mr. Courtney

This is the person referred to on page 25?

Mr. Courtney

The Deputy is asking if he was interviewed.

He was interviewed all right and identified someone he said he knew from his childhood and that he had seen this man participate in parades on 12 July. He was adamant this was the same person he saw getting out of the car. It appears that photographs were not presented to him in the same manner as they were for the other 15 witnesses.

Mr. Courtney

I could not recall at this stage. It probably was. We would be very slow to show photographs because an ID parade might come up afterwards and it would take from the accuracy of it and may have implications for court proceedings.

Would that be normal? If someone was fairly sure that he could identify someone he had known from his childhood, and 15 other people had already helped make identifications, would it be normal not to show the same photographs to this person?

Mr. Courtney

Certainly, we would have shown photographs. There would have been at least 20 people in the album.

I thank Mr. Courtney and Mr. Corrigan for again meeting with us and co-operating so forthrightly with the sub-committee. I wish them good luck in the rest of their retirement. I hope that we do not need to call on them again but I know that if we do, they will be able and willing again.

Sitting suspended at 12.04 p.m. and resumed at 12.05 p.m.

I welcome Seán Aylward, the Secretary General of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and his officials. I know Mr. Aylward has a busy schedule and I thank him for making the time to meet with the sub-committee. We are considering the Barron report on the Dundalk bombings and Mr. Aylward will be aware of the procedures. I invite him to make his opening comments.

Thank you very much, Chairman. I am accompanied by colleagues from the Department, Mr. David Walker and Mr. Martin Power. I thank the Chairman and the sub-committee for inviting me comment upon and answer any questions they might have on the Barron inquiry report on the bombing of Kay's Tavern in Dundalk in 1975.

Our hearts go out to the families of the men who died as a result of this bombing, and indeed to the families of the victims of the other incidents that have been dealt with in the appendices to that report. By way of a preliminary comment, I would like to make the point that although as Secretary General since 2004 I am responsible for current matters affecting the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, I am not in the position to be completely familiar, and would not wish to pretend to be, with the practices and policies in place more than 30 years ago. I was a young public servant in the Department of Defence back in 1975. Sadly, many of the people in the Department who might have been in a position to help the sub-committee have passed on to their eternal reward, including one of my distinguished predecessors, Mr. Andy Ward, who was Secretary General at the time.

I will turn now to the Garda investigation as examined in the Barron report. The report provides exhaustive and comprehensive detail on the process of investigation followed by the gardaí which ensued in the immediate aftermath of this atrocity on 19 December 1975. As described, the Garda investigation team devoted considerable time and energy to gathering information from eyewitnesses, following up various leads, and obtaining all the information they could about the bomb car, its movements and its associations. It is very important that we should note that Mr. Justice Barron has found that the gardaí did everything that could reasonably have been expected of them in response to the pre-attack warning which had been received from the then RUC two days before the bombing took place. Unfortunately, because the warning was vague and non-specific as to timing and target it did not prevent the attack from taking place or lead to the interception of the bombers. I know the Barron inquiry makes criticisms of specific actions, or failures to act, on behalf of the Garda organisation at that time in the course of its investigation. For example, it cites that Garda photograph albums were not shown to all possible witnesses. I do not want to get into that too deeply as I am conscious that the Garda Commissioner will shortly discuss those points with the sub-committee. However, the gardaí went into this deeply at the time and made quite thorough inquiries to bring those involved to justice.

As has been a feature in all the Barron reports, the report into the bombing of Kay's Tavern raises the issue of the adequacy and co-operation from the RUC at the time. I have told this and other committees of the Houses that we need to recall and balance the account. The Garda organisation received significant and valuable assistance from the RUC on many occasions during that period. In this instance, they received co-operation about the provenance of the bomb car and they obtained photographs of potential suspects from Portadown RUC station. For all the question marks that remain, and some of them may never be resolved, we need to recall that the RUC at the time did things on many occasions which helped prevent mayhem taking place in this jurisdiction.

The Barron report notes with concern that when the Garda officers in this investigation sought to meet an RUC detective constable who was said to have had information concerning the theft of the car which contained the bomb, they were prevented from doing so by a senior criminal investigation detective officer. I am unable to elaborate any further on this point. As far as we can establish the Department was neither notified of the lack of co-operation at the time nor asked to intervene.

Perhaps the most serious concern expressed by the inquiry relates to new information received from the RUC in 1979 concerning the naming of suspects for the Dundalk and Silverbridge attacks. This information received by a Garda detective superintendent was reported to Garda headquarters in the hope it would lead to the arrest and interrogation of suspects. Unfortunately, the hoped for co-operation from the RUC in this instance failed to materialise. The Barron report notes that the reaction at Garda headquarters level was "muted". It goes on to state that it appears the matter was not taken up at a more senior level with the RUC. I am not in a position to gainsay or to speculate on that as we do not have a paper trail in regard to this issue.

To put things in context, I would like to touch on the issue of cross-Border co-operation in the 1970s. Cross-Border co-operation up until the 1990s was largely based on policeman to policeman co-operation on an informal case-by-case basis. The Department did not drive or lead in that regard though in common with everybody else, it benefited from it. It was not the custom or practice for us to receive daily or monthly reports on the state of that co-operation. That does not appear to have been the case. Lacunae did exist, we know that now from the report. Despite this, participation today in extrajurisdictional interviewing of suspects is now an accepted part of police practice by way of formal mutual assistance requests thanks primarily to the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1994. The Department now plays a critical role in promoting mutual assistance through its mutual assistance and extradition division which acts as what is termed a central authority for the processing of mutual legal assistance requests to and from Northern Ireland.

My submission, which has been circulated, also mentioned that the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Bill 2005 has been published. If and when passed into law, it will give effect to three new mutual assistance instruments: mutual assistance in criminal matters between member states of the European Union; the protocol to the convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters between the member states of the European Union of 2001; and a second additional protocol to the European convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters. The Bill also provides for certain amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 1994 which have arisen in the context of operational experience.

I will now deal with the absence of departmental files. The Barron report notes that although the Department does not have a contemporaneous file specifically dedicated to the Dundalk bombing, relevant papers on the matter, including Garda reports, were found on a general bombings file maintained by the Department and were forwarded to the inquiry team. I realise that people may be surprised the Department did not open a specific file on an incident which claimed the lives of two citizens. However, as a general rule the Department only opens files when specific policy or advisory papers are created or where specific action is required to be undertaken by the Department. In the case of the Dundalk bombing, the associated criminal investigation was exclusively undertaken and delivered by the Garda authorities. The Department did not see its function as shadowing such investigation and continues to take that line.

The Barron report notes on page 119 that information provided to the inquiry by the Department of Foreign Affairs could not be located on any of the Garda or Department of Justice files. That was a two-page record dating from August 1975 which included a one-page Garda report from a chief superintendent issued to the Secretary of the Department of Justice at the time, Mr. Ward, and a one-page covering letter from the Department of Justice security division to the Department of Foreign Affairs, passing on the report.

The Garda report in question stated that gardaí had received confidential information that four members of the RUC in the Portadown area were members of the UVF and that one of them was actively engaged in the murder investigation of the so-called murder triangle. The report did not provide any names or more specific details. The one-page covering note from the Department of Justice was signed by the then head of the security division and was addressed to the Assistant Secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sean Donlon, subsequently Secretary of that Department.

During its investigations, the Barron inquiry team forwarded this record to us and asked if the Department had any further information on it. This triggered a very exhaustive and intensive search of the Department including interrogation of every file created in that period. However, we were unable to find any trace of the two-page communication on our records. I wish to emphasise that we are not seeking and do not believe we have a missing file. This involves a two-page note which was sought from the Garda and passed on to our colleagues in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The report in question predates the Dundalk bombing and does not deal with potential attacks in this jurisdiction. It is interesting that the record contains no Department of Justice file reference number. We have no way of tracking a file on this issue without a reference number. The search has been something of a needle in a haystack search. However, an extension search was undertaken of several years of files created around the August 1975 date. I regret I have not been able to advance this matter further for the benefit of the Barron inquiry or the sub-committee.

I will now touch, with the Chairman's indulgence, on recent developments in terms of the relationship between the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Garda Síochána. In my view the relationship between the Department and, in particular, its Minister and Secretary and the leadership of the Garda Síochána has, since the foundation of the State, been an extraordinary one. However, the relationship has always been an informal one reflecting the personalities of the time. I do not believe that is satisfactory in this modern era. It is important to note that the Oireachtas has, through the enactment of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, passed into law a much more formal structure in regard to the relationship between the Garda Síochána and civil authorities. That Act provides a fundamental restatement of the oversight and accountability relationship which has always existed between the Department and the Garda Síochána. In particular, it recasts in statutory form the formal relationship between the Executive, the Minister, the Oireachtas and the Garda Síochána as well as the latter's relationship with local government. In doing so, the Act introduces significant fundamental structural changes in the Garda Síochána and represents a significant overhaul in the structure and relationships of that organisation. One of its provisions relates to the appointment of a Garda Síochána inspectorate which, I am happy to say, is now fully in place and is completely independent of the Garda Síochána. The inspectorate is tasked with monitoring the operation and administration of the service and with reporting to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform with advice on best practice benchmarked against international best practice. We anticipate that the benchmarking approach now under way will compare and contrast Garda operations and responses to particular situations with examples of best practice in other jurisdictions and positive recommendations.

The reports of the inspectorate which will be forwarded initially to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform will be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and the chief inspector, Ms Kathleen O'Toole, will, when requested, attend before this and other relevant Oireachtas committees. The Act also specifically obliges the Garda Commissioner to inform the Minister and Government, through the Secretary General, of information on any development which might adversely affect public confidence in the Garda Síochána. It also obliges the Commissioner to supply any information necessary for the Secretary General to discharge his or her duties to the Oireachtas. I am sure the sub-committee will recognise that these are significant developments which have a profound significance for the kinds of issues and concerns expressed by the Barron inquiry in its successive reports.

The Garda investigation into the Dundalk bombing displayed clear positive and negative elements which I do not wish to rehearse. I am not in a position to guarantee that things will not go wrong again in the future in relation to specific Garda investigations. However, I believe the accountability arrangements now in place are much more robust than those in place previously and that they accord with international best practice. I believe the Garda Síochána Act will formalise arrangements and responsibilities in a more modern and transparent manner. This should benefit all concerned, not least gardaí on the ground who must work on the front line protecting us all from people who would visit murder and mayhem upon us.

I thank the joint committee for hearing me out. I will endeavour to respond to the best of my ability to any questions members may have.

I thank Mr. Aylward and his officials for attending. Mr. Aylward indicated that the two page document which Justice for the Forgotten wanted to have pursued has not been found despite his best efforts. Can he explain the reason it was not found? Did it reach the Department? Does he have further comment on the matter?

Filing is now within a different remit. What role does technology play in filing from the PULSE system in Garda stations through to Garda headquarters? What is the role of the Department? How much information is relayed from the Phoenix Park to St. Stephen's Green on atrocities or major investigations carried out by the Garda Síochána?

I believe the Department of Justice received a query from the Department of Foreign Affairs asking whether there was any intelligence or information about collusion. The Department was acting as a post box in this regard. It sought the information and transmitted it, as it were, for what it was worth to the Department of Foreign Affairs. I believe it reached the Department and was forwarded by it but, for whatever reason, the Department did not retain a copy or, if a copy was retained, it was misfiled because we have not been able to trace it. I do not believe there was any attempt at collusion or concealment. Members should remember that it was a speculative intelligence report which does not appear to have been regarded as information that could be taken any further. Beyond that, I cannot speculate.

As to filing, the Department has new software, technology and systems in place for file tracking. Future historians will find, however, that significantly fewer files and reports will be generally available because the administrative culture in Ireland and the public service is changing, partly arising from the Freedom of Information Act. People put far fewer things on paper. While this is a loss to history, it is partly the price one pays for a regime which extracts information very soon after it is generated.

That is a disgrace.

The loss to history and public administration is an unfortunate side effect. The law of unintended effects has kicked in. That said, the files and records we keep today are tracked much more carefully. I have been personally involved in establishing a good, technology based file holding system. Again, as an aside, the Tánaiste made a press release announcing that the Department proposes to release a great many files which were held as secret files from the foundation of the State right up to today. These are files which were always held under lock and key in the Department. We believe we have a debt to history and the files and papers in question will be of great interest to historians and policymakers in the future. We are working towards that. I do not know if there is anything further to say in response to Deputy Hoctor.

I welcome Mr. Aylward and thank him for being so frank and honest. While I agree with his assessment, it is still a disgrace that officials no longer keep records. Mr. Aylward stated he cannot guarantee that things will not go wrong in future and I accept that because none of us can give such a guarantee. If something was to go wrong in the future, would the type of detail now available to us still be available, assuming Mr. Aylward is correct? This is a worrying development but it could be put right if political leaders, including the Tánaiste and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and his ministerial colleagues, ordered officials to keep written records. It is important that this be done.

Due to the various reports available to us and the work of the Justice for the Forgotten group and Pat Finucane Centre, the joint committee is not engaging in much speculation. It has a great deal of information before it, little of which is in the realms of speculation. I accept, however, that Mr. Aylward, like me, was not around at the time of the events under investigation. I was particularly struck by the evidence given by retired Detective Sergeant Corrigan this morning. Clearly, he and others knew that investigations were hitting a brick wall. Investigations into particular incidents in particular areas got so far but stopped the minute they went over the Border. They clearly knew something was amiss. This was the subject of the two pages received by the Department. Even if the Department of Justice was only a post box, once the matter came before it and the Department of Foreign Affairs showed interest in it, the issue moved into the political realm. Does Mr. Aylward know or is it possible to check whether the matter was raised in political discussions? Was it raised as a relevant issue during meetings between the Irish and British Governments?

I believe the report records that the Department of Foreign Affairs took the matter up with the Northern Ireland authorities but it does not seem to have gone much further than that.

I was going to make a very small point. In the milieu of crime investigation and dealing with subversion there is a tremendous gap between intelligence and evidence. The former is often pinpoint accurate but cannot be used in a court. There is nothing one can adduce from it because that is the nature of the intelligence on which it is based, namely, informers, touts and people like that. It can often be very accurate but very hard to stand up. That distinction must be acknowledged. While there may be a mass of material, indications and reports, an actual forensic trail was not available.

It could not be available——

——because the people charged with investigating it were not investigating it. It did not even get to that point. My question does not relate to the Northern Ireland Office. When the two pages were dropped into the Department's post box and were then sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs, was the matter discussed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and British Foreign Secretary or the Minister for Justice and the British Secretary of State?

I am afraid I have no knowledge on that point.

I will ask Mr. Aylward another question because I accept he has no knowledge of the matter. Where would we find that information?

If such a dialogue took place, the only place to find it would be in the minutes or notes of a meeting between, say, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Southern Ministers. Those would usually be held by the Department of Foreign Affairs, if such an exchange occurred. To my knowledge and to the knowledge of my colleagues who researched the matter, the Department does not have anything with which to help the sub-committee on that point.

Some of the witnesses yesterday spoke very positively of the work of the Historical Enquiries Team. Will Mr. Aylward comment on the ongoing work of the team and provide the sub-committee with the benefit of his wisdom on the question of whether it would be advantageous on this side of the Border to establish such a team to deal with cases of the type under consideration?

We must acknowledge that the police service in Northern Ireland has moved on significantly. The PSNI is a very professional organisation with a professional and committed leadership.

The scale of unsolved murders in Northern Ireland is massive. The launch of the Historical Enquiries Team, HET, in January 2006 was an initiative to help relatives towards closure on unresolved deaths in Northern Ireland that were attributable to the security situation between 1968 and 1998, during which period 3,268 people lost their lives. The team has a budget of approximately £30 million and a staff of 84, including analytical and administrative personnel. The HET includes an external investigation team made up of officers from outside Northern Ireland and an investigation team composed of serving PSNI and former RUC officers. I am not persuaded that establishing a similar exercise in the South, where the number of cases is far smaller, would bring us any nearer to closure here. It would also involve a significant diversion of human and financial resources from ongoing Garda activities and live investigations, which would be of concern.

While the Commissioner can speak for himself when he attends, the Garda authorities advise that they have co-operated fully with the Northern Ireland Historical Enquiries Team on a number of cases. In its own policing plans, the Garda makes provision for the review of unsolved crimes and carries out regular retrospective programmes on them. It is our view that to establish such a team here would not be the right thing to do. I am not convinced.

Perhaps, Deputy Ó Fearghaíl can raise the matter in the Dáil or another forum.

Mr. Aylward may have heard the former detective superintendent, Mr. Courtney, say that the gang under discussion contained central figures in many of the Barron reports we have received to date. The gang contained full-time members of the special branch of the RUC, RUC reservists and UDR members, which information was conveyed to Michael Fitzgerald in C3. What records are held in the Department on the gang, especially in view of the evidence to the sub-committee that Michael Fitzgerald was in daily communication with the Department at the time?

We do not possess written reports which back that up. It should be noted that on a daily basis the people in the division in question were on scrambler telephones to the people in C3. While a great many conversations and oral briefings would have taken place, they would not necessarily have been writing very much down, especially where communications were speculative or just providing information rather than hard facts to be put before the Government. We have not been able to find documentation of the character Senator Jim Walsh has described, though we can review the matter further in deference to the point he has raised. My colleagues have not come across anything which fits the description Senator Jim Walsh outlined of reports of gangs. While there is one document which the sub-committee and the Barron team received, we do not have documentation of the type referred to by the Senator. We can further review to be on the safe side, but I am not aware of anything.

Does it not appear inconceivable that information which had not just legal and security but political implications would not be recorded by an official? Specific information was supplied to the effect that a gang responsible for atrocities included in its membership full-time special branch and reservist RUC members as well as UDR people, which had significant political implications. Is it not inconceivable that its import would not have been apparent to a senior official dealing with Michael Fitzgerald in C3?

The problem is that we are on a chain of speculation that information was relayed from a chief superintendent.

With respect, the former detective superintendent, Mr. Courtney, recorded just a few minutes ago to the sub-committee that the information was passed to C3. While we are assuming it was passed from C3, the assumption is a reasonable one.

My point is that it is an assumption and no more. I do not have any information to sustain the assumption or presumption. I do not question the veracity of what Mr. Courtney, who was eventually a chief superintendent, said. I do not have information to back up the assumption or presumption that the information was relayed to officials other than in the single item of correspondence which was found. Sadly, Mr. Caldwell has gone to his reward and I am in no position to verify the information.

Mr. Aylward said there were monthly reports from the Garda to the Department.

There were written reports from the Garda on a monthly basis.

That was indicated by gardaí who were previous witnesses.

There were monthly and quarterly reports. I will ask for further scrutiny of those reports.

Did Mr. Justice Barron see any of those reports? Did he go through all of them?

He did. It has been made clear to Mr. Justice Barron and his team that they are welcome to go through any data we possess. That will remain the case.

I thank Mr. Aylward for attending. As usual, he has been very helpful to the sub-committee.

Sitting suspended at 12.40 p.m. and resumed at 1.40 p.m.

I welcome the Garda Commissioner, Mr. Noel Conroy, with the Assistant Garda Commissioner, Mr. Martin Callanan, to the meeting. We also welcome Detective Inspector Joseph Kinsella from the Garda Technical Bureau. We are grateful to them for agreeing to assist us in our consideration of the Barron report on the Dundalk bombing. They will be aware that as a result of the Supreme Court decision in the Abbeylara case, we are prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against any individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. We will not name names as regards anyone who may be culpable of any misdeed. The members of the sub-committee have parliamentary privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses.

I would like Detective Inspector Kinsella from the Garda Technical Bureau to focus on the Dundalk bombing first and then we will go to Commissioner Conroy to hear about the overall Garda investigation and other matters. I welcome Mr. Kinsella to the committee and thank him for coming. Could he now say a few words that will bring us to speed with the ballistics, forensics and technical matters involved?

Detective Inspector Joseph Kinsella

I can deal with how we have handled the case, North, South, suspects and things like that. I think that would be more appropriate because the Commissioner is dealing with what I will already be dealing with. If that is okay.

That is fine.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

Following discussions with Mr. Justice Barron, myself and Detective Garda Brendan Howley from the Garda fingerprint section travelled to the PSNI fingerprint department in Belfast on 11 October 2005. Mr. David Traynor, a senior fingerprint officer in the department made crime file 4375 available to us. Am I okay?

This is good background to ensure we get the feel of the situation.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

File 4375 is the file from the Dundalk bombing on 19 December 1975.

A handwritten record on the file cover indicated that the late Detective Chief Superintendent Dan Murphy, investigation section, Garda Technical Bureau, delivered the finger marks to the then RUC fingerprint department on 31 December 1975. A list of six suspects was handwritten on the file cover and behind each name a fingerprint classification was written. Fingerprint classifications were used to store and retrieve fingerprints prior to computerisation. A Northern Ireland criminal record number was also written after each name, along with the word "neg".

A record of the marks being searched with negative results on the PSNI automatic fingerprint retrieval, commonly known as a computerised system for retrieving fingerprints, on 13 December 2000 was also noted on the file. Detective Sergeant Brendan Howley had requested this search. He also searched the similar Garda AFIS system at that time with negative results.

Apart from the list of six suspects written on the front of the file, the file contained three typed and hand written lists of suspects. The first list contained 21 names, the second list contained 15 names and the third list contained 29 names. Allowing for duplication, and there were many duplications from list to list, a total of 49 persons were listed as suspects for checking against finger marks developed on black adhesive tape which was attached to the alarm clock found at the scene of the bombing at Crowe Street, Dundalk, on 19 December 1975.

A new AFR system capable of searching palms was installed in the PSNI fingerprint department in 2004-5. On 15 July 2005, Detective Sergeant Howley requested a further search of the fingerprints in the new AFR system. This was carried out with negative results.

At that time we searched the marks again in our own system. What happens when a finger mark is searched in the fingerprint system is that it is either identified positive or negative. If it is negative, it is stored in a file known as an unsolved latent file, or ULF. Any new fingerprints that come into the system will be checked against those marks. That applies in the North's system. It is in all systems.

In Northern Ireland, are all recruits to the security forces automatically fingerprinted or does it happen at all?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I believe it happens at the moment but not always.

Were they fingerprinted back in 1975?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I would not think so, that would be my honest opinion.

We have a photograph from the Dundalk bombings of detectives holding a device in their hands. Has Detective Inspector Kinsella seen that photograph?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

Could the Senator refresh my memory with it, please?

Would that have been considered best practice at the time? Obviously it would not be at this stage but what about at that time? Would that be the way evidence would be gathered?

What is in the photograph?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

In the photograph, Detective Inspector Billy Byrne, head of the fingerprint section at the time, and Detective Sergeant Colm Dardis appear, with Detective Inspector Byrne holding something and it says at the top of the page "Castleblayney bombing". He is holding a rectangular-type object in a way that would have been recommended at the time. It is impossible to get fingermarks off actual corners. One will get them off flat surfaces, but he is endeavouring to hold it by the corners.

That would have been the common and recommended practice at the time.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

It definitely was the common practice, yes.

There is another photograph of the Castleblayney one. One is on page 7 and the other one is on page 8. I want to ask about the co-operation between the Garda and the RUC at that time. What type of co-operation was there concerning the Dundalk and Castleblayney bombings? I know Detective Inspector Kinsella was not there himself but what is on file?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I can only speak about what I have on file. From a fingerprint viewpoint, the co-operation seems to have been good. There was an exchange of our marks — fingerprints returned to Dublin. What was asked for was done, I believe.

Even though the results were negative. There were no positive results from them.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

No. To clarify that area, the quality of the marks was not good. It was not clear whether they were fingers or palms. Not all fingerprints at that stage had palms attached. A lot of the fingerprints on file at that stage were fingerprints taken of people who had served sentences. The fingerprints were taken at a later stage to support the conviction. Palms were not the issue. We are talking about 31 years ago. Palms were taken if a person was in custody in a police station or a Garda station, but for a lot of the prints on file there were no palms available.

Detective Inspector Kinsella was there last year. Is all the forensic evidence collected at the time still intact and available?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I do not believe so, no.

Is the fingerprint evidence still available, for instance?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I have copies of the fingermarks.

We read about number plates and pieces of electrical tape. Is all that still available?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

The trail of that type of thing, as far as my records show, finished with Detective Inspector Byrne, who was head of the fingerprint section at that stage, and is since deceased. I do not have a record — other than of him developing fingermarks on items — of where the items were stored or went. At that stage also, the technical bureau was in a different part of the city, across from Heuston Station in John's Road. We moved in 1980. There was a lot of movement of stuff at that stage. The investigation unit was part of the bureau at that stage. In subsequent years, they separated and become a different unit. While property would have been stored, in this case I do not know where it is now.

Is there any indication as to how much of it is still intact and stored? Is it a quarter or a third of what was originally collected?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

What was collected, other than the rubble of which there were two bins, was relatively small for the seriousness of the crime. As regards any exhibits that I am familiar with from a fingerprint point of view, the trail finished with Detective Inspector Byrne.

Therefore, what Detective Inspector Kinsella has are photographs of the originals.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

Yes. I do not have the clothes of the victims or of the injured parties.

The file that Detective Inspector Kinsella viewed in 2005 had 49 names, I think he said.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

Yes.

Were they names that had been suggested by the RUC at the time, were they names that were suggested by the Garda Síochána to the RUC, or were those 49 people considered as a result of a degree of collaboration?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I would say possibly as a result of a degree of collaboration because in a statement it says that the Garda looked for 21 names. I have a list with 21 names on it and I can only assume that is the same list. I am saying that what we looked for we got and what we gave them they dealt with. I would be happy in dealing with it, reading through the files and seeing the actual lists, that they were searched thoroughly in 1975-6, 2000 and 2005.

Would the names of the so-called Glennane gang be included in those 49?

Detective Inspector Kinsella

I am not familiar with those names. I am sorry.

Commissioner Conroy might be.

Commissioner Noel Conroy

They would indeed.

They would have been included in it?

Commissioner Conroy

They were. Those names would be familiar, particular to our officers along the Border at the time. We would be very conscious of those individuals. Indeed, investigations were carried out by Chief Superintendent Seán Cannon and another chief superintendent also looked at those individuals in view of the bits of information coming in. There is no doubt that they would be very familiar to us and our people along the Border.

Was the Garda Síochána aware at that time that they were members of the UDR and the RUC Reserve, and were possibly RUC people themselves?

Commissioner Conroy

I cannot say for definite personally, but from what I have read that would appear to be the case. No doubt, like any police force working along a border, there are verbal communications on a pretty regular basis, despite what people may think or read. That is the nature of policing. Policing is such that we would have wished to get information about outrages here, particularly if the suspects were in Northern Ireland. That would be our aim. Likewise you can take it that the PSNI today would be working similarly on that premise as regards crimes committed in their jurisdiction. That is the nature of policing. It is a different matter to reach a successful conclusion in so far as there were barriers to progress then — not so much today, as the barriers are somewhat removed. The area of mutual assistance, police-to-police co-operation, has changed for the better.

Detective Inspector Kinsella

May I back that up, Chairman? On Monday of this week we had a visit to our bureau from the head of the fingerprint section and the scientific support manager. I visited their bureau last year. We meet and discuss common problems in our areas.

Before we go on to Commissioner Conroy, other members may wish to question the Garda representatives generally. Perhaps he has some opening statements. We received a statement which we have all had the opportunity of reading but if there are parts of it that the Commissioner wants to emphasise, please do so.

Commissioner Conroy

As Commissioner of the Garda, I express my deepest sympathy to the families of those who were tragically killed and those who suffered serious injuries and pain, and continue to do so, arising out of the atrocities. From a Garda point of view, we co-operated fully with the late Mr. Justice Hamilton's inquiry and thereafter with Mr. Justice Barron. We made everything that we had available to him, such as intelligence reports, so that he could view it and arrive at preparing a report.

If what happened at Kay's Tavern on 19 December 1975 was to happen today things would be much different in so far as we have now a forensic science laboratory to deal with issues ourselves. Whereas then we brought stuff into Northern Ireland for scientific evaluation and examination, today that would go to our technical bureau to be examined locally. Our people in ballistic section are trained to the highest grade in relation to explosive devices. We have a special section in Garda headquarters dealing with that and we relate to the UK, Scotland Yard and other agencies in England plus with our counterparts in Northern Ireland.

We have now moved on to the area of DNA and, hopefully, in the very near future we will have a DNA databank ourselves. There are a lot of national units now in place which would be straightaway involved in the investigation of atrocities of that nature. We also have trained agent handlers who would actually be involved in dealing with people with information and proper evaluation of that information and, also in some cases, we have CCTV, and we detect quite a lot of serious crime in examination of CCTV footage. All those things have changed and many more and I do not intend to take up too much of your time on that. Perhaps it would be more relevant to answer questions if that is all right, Chairman.

I thank the Commissioner very much. The questions to be asked will be mainly about the Dundalk bombing.

I thank the Commissioner for his statement. His submission was helpful in enabling us to put questions. The question I am about to ask was asked of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The information we have is that people involved in these gangs, and many of the inquiries we have looked at, involve the same perpetrators who operated just north of the Border. Some of those were involved in the RUC Special Branch, apparently, some were RUC Reserve and some UDR. That information was passed to C3. Are there records in C3 concerning the activities and the information flow in regard to those people and, specifically, is there any information on file as to where that was further sent? Was it sent to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and for the attention of the Minister?

Commissioner Conroy

All I can say on that front is that anything that Mr. Justice Barron asked of us we provided to him if we had it. It is clear that we have not got those documents in our possession right now. A lot of documents were got rid of many years ago because of storage and that has been certified by a very senior officer who is no longer on this earth. What I have read in relation to information collected by Mr. Justice Barron was intelligence reports and also verbal briefings from people in Northern Ireland, in the same way as he got verbal briefings from us. Turning that intelligence into factual evidence is a totally different being.

I accept that.

Commissioner Conroy

The Senator probably saw where we interviewed one of those former police sergeants in relation to certain matters that occurred in our jurisdiction. We tried to pursue that as far as we could at the time and, of course, we ended up at a brick wall where we got no further. Naturally enough the individual concerned is a convicted criminal but, nevertheless, we were conscious of the fact that he was giving us information, whether that was factually correct or not, to this day, I cannot say. If one looks at the intelligence reports in Mr. Justice Barron's report one will note they add credence to the statement that individual made to our people.

What I am trying to get to is significant information which was passed from the superintendent and the gardaí operating on the Border to headquarters, clearly specifying collusion at a fairly significant level in these crimes. It would have been of such import, I would have thought, that alarm bells would have gone off in many directions. One would have assumed, obviously, that information would have been properly filed and, second, would have been passed on to, presumably, the Department of Justice because there were legal, security and political implications in all of this.

Commissioner Conroy

I was not involved in crime security or, indeed, along the Border at the time but when one reads about what was happening, there were difficulties on both sides of the Border. No doubt, equally, the RUC would, I am sure, point out that there were certain individuals who came across into our jurisdiction whom they would wish to talk to and deal with. Given that the protocols and various things now in place were not in place then, of course there were difficulties. To answer the question about documentation, if the documentation was at Garda headquarters I can assure you that would have been made available to Mr. Justice Barron. Indeed, our dealings with the Department are on a one to one basis and much of the time on the telephone when dealing with section heads in the Department on security issues. In the case of crime it would be with different section heads and generally we would be in daily contact with them. I cannot say there was daily contact with them back in 1975 but I can tell the Senator definitely that in the 1990s there was daily contact with the Department when I was in headquarters.

The Commissioner mentions that files were destroyed at a certain stage. At what stage or what period were they destroyed? Were the files there from the early 1970s onwards or were the files during the 1970s subsequently destroyed?

Commissioner Conroy

I will ask the assistant Garda Commissioner, Martin Callanan, to deal with that question.

Assistant Commissioner Martin Callanan

As we have indicated previously in other hearings in relation to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, at the time Mr. Justice Barron engaged in his work he asked for a number of security files, largely flowing from a number of investigation files in relation to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and, indeed, there were others that he has looked at as well. Flowing from those reports there were a number of named individuals contained on the covers of them. He had asked for specific files, the named individuals, and from those files he saw names of other individuals.

There was a domino effect resulting in Mr. Justice Barron looking at hundreds and hundreds of files. Within each of those individual files there were references to individuals who have been involved in many serious crimes and incidents, mostly in Northern Ireland. There were no particular indications that any of those individuals had a direct link to the bombings in this jurisdiction, other than in some cases there were references to them being nominated as being involved but they were purely items of intelligence and nothing more.

The assessment of that particular information----

Did the information include the fact that these were active, permanent members of the RUC in some cases, RUC reservists and members of the UDR? Was this information included in the files?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

In a number of files and reports there were references to the people concerned occupying certain positions in both paramilitary organisations and as members of the UDR and UVF.

I am not just asking about the UDR; I am also asking about the RUC special branch and the RUC reserve.

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

I do not ever recall seeing that type of linkage being made in the files.

I do not wish to labour the point, but would the assistant commissioner agree that the selection of files — I do not suggest they were selected with anything but the utmost integrity for Mr. Justice Barron who has said he received everything he looked for and full co-operation from the Garda Síochána — was probably made in the first instance by the liaison officer-----

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

I am the liaison officer.

—— and would be subjective to a degree——

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

No.

—— and that he subsequently sought other files?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

Please allow me to explain the whole context. Initially, when Mr. Justice Barron was asked to examine these areas, I assembled for him all of the available investigation files of which I was aware. In other words, these were the files on the investigation into the Dublin bombings of 17 May 1974 at Parnell Street, South Leinster Street and Talbot Street. In addition, I also located for him the full investigation file on the Monaghan bombing which occurred an hour later on the same date. Following these investigations, the Government asked him to look at a number of other bombings and murder cases. I assembled all of the investigation files for him. It was obvious from the beginning that there would be other collateral material which I could not determine whether Mr. Justice Barron would want to see. However, at all times it was made perfectly clear to him when I was appointed to my position that any file he wished to see would be made available to him.

I am trying to provide the context for all of this. For example, if the Senator was to ask me whether I could have produced over 700 files, possibly 800, at the beginning or whether I would have had any appreciation that they were the type of files that would have been required to assist Mr. Justice Barron in his work, the answer is no. I simply could not have done that for him. It was clear from the nature of all of these investigations that there would be other matters surrounding the material he was examining that would be required. They were all made available. However, it would have been impossible to make the determination early on. Therefore, the answer is no; I was certainly not subjective in what I produced for the commission.

With regard to the monthly and quarterly chats with C3 from the Border area, if I were to telephone some senior person in the North, would it not be natural for that person to have a pen and jot down what was being said to him by reporters around the area? On the basis that people are human, they will not remember everything they are told.

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

Absolutely. I assume that would have been the position.

Has the assistant commissioner come across these memos or jotted down notes from telephone calls? Are they not together somewhere?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

Within the files there are several references to telephone calls and conversations.

If there was a more generalised type of discussion on, for example, the Glennane group, some of whose members it is understood were suspected of having committed atrocious crimes and were members of the RUC, the RUC special branch, the RUC reserve, the UDR and the UVF, would that not ring alarm bells and cause movement to have the information filed immediately as being too hot to handle or something that should be passed on to the Minister responsible for justice matters?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

The particular file to which the Chairman refers is referenced under the name of an individual. The location of the farmyard is included. There are references to a whole spectrum of people who from time to time have visited that location. That is all included in the file as a matter of record in C3.

Is it a thick file?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

It is not a substantial file. It is a long time since I looked at it.

Is the assistant commissioner saying there are no references in the file to the exact positions the people concerned held in the RUC and other groups?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

It is quite some time since I looked at the file. From memory, there are references to individuals who had associations with paramilitary groups and members of the security forces. I do not specifically recall individuals linked to the RUC.

Chairman, will the committee agree to request the assistant commissioner to take another look at the file and respond to us in writing, providing any information he can on the Glennane gang and those associated with it or any security force personnel of whom he is aware from the file who visited the farm? Perhaps he could also provide dates as to when the information was acquired. This might be helpful.

Yes, or would it be possible for one of our legal team or the committee clerk to look through the file to see if it contains anything of use to the committee in its work?

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

There is possibly information on the file. A number of files include references to this particular farmyard. It may well be that this is information we received from the RUC.

Commissioner Conroy

Allow me to add an explanation regarding how we arrived at so many files. Bear in mind that the people named in most of the files at which Mr. Justice Barron would have looked during his inquiry were living in Northern Ireland. We got their names from our counterparts in Northern Ireland. As the assistant commissioner pointed out, when one opens a file, one might find five or six names in it, but the file relates to one individual. When one looks at one of the names and then goes to another file in respect of one of the individuals, one finds five or six more names. This is what we end up with.

As the assistant commissioner also indicated, when Mr. Justice Barron started looking at the files in Garda headquarters, he was looking at them on the basis of the information he had collected. Then there was the add-on of names, some of which would not be relevant as far as we are concerned. I am sure the same was true as far as Mr. Justice Barron was concerned when he examined the files. Therefore, we are not talking about 700 files relating to the bombings in question.

I have no recollection of seeing any of the files in my time identifying members of the RUC. I have never seen them.

Can the file be checked? I do not know what answer the Chairman received to his request. If the answer is in the negative, may I make my request again?

Could this be done, if necessary? Mr. Hugh Mohan, our senior counsel, could look through it.

Commissioner Conroy

Can I offer to get back to the committee in writing? We can re-examine the file and reply in writing because of the nature of the information involved. Otherwise we would have to return to our counterparts in Northern Ireland. We have no difficulties in going through and examining the files and telling the committee whether that information is there. I am sure if it was there, Mr. Justice Barron would have indicated that in his report. We have no difficulties in doing this.

The committee should take up the suggestion that the Commissioner go back to his counterparts in the RUC and inform them that we want our senior counsel to look at the files. If their response is not favourable, the second course of action should perhaps be followed.

Commissioner Conroy

I understand the point being made by Senator Walsh. First of all we will go through the files. Before we take the next jump I think it would only be fair to indicate to the committee exactly what is in the files, if there is anything. If the committee then decides it wants to see it, we had better go back to the PSNI. I do not think the information that the Senator is referring to is on file. I will check, however, and inform the committee if it is on file.

It would seem extraordinary if the Border superintendent has sent information to C3 regarding the activities of members of the security forces in the North who were involved in paramilitary activity and this is not actually recorded in C3. I would like the committee to receive all available references to all the members of the gang that have been mentioned there and in particular those members who held either permanent or reservist positions in the RUC, the UDR or the British Army. We are trying to track the collusion element.

Commissioner Conroy

I can see where the Senator is coming from.

I suggest this request should be put in writing to the Garda Commissioner. It should not just be a verbal request from the committee meeting but rather it should be a written request from the clerk of the committee, detailing the specific information the committee is requesting. I ask the committee's legal people to examine whether there is further legal information of which I might not be aware which the committee should seek to discover. We should ask for a formal response from the Garda Síochána with regard to the specific questions we have asked.

Commissioner Conroy

I have no difficulty, provided we are given the information about whatever Border superintendent is saying this in order that we can verify whether it is correct. We also just want clarity.

We will send it and the Commissioner can then ruminate and I hope come back to the committee in a very positive way.

I have some brief questions which just require yes or no answers.

The Commissioner refers in his submission that regarding items such as fingerprints, DNA examination, there is a full exchange of technical information and intelligence with the authorities in Northern Ireland and in Britain. Is there reciprocity in that regard? Has the Commissioner technical information and intelligence that would have been available to the London Metropolitan Police in connection with the bombings in London on 7 July 2005?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes.

Therefore, it works both ways.

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. We have to ensure we are aware of what happens in other jurisdictions in order that we can put preventative action in place if it is required.

The Commissioner referred to trained agent handlers being in place now for the purposes of cultivating informants and obtaining information. Is it part of the modus operandi of the Garda Síochána to have trained people currently infiltrating paramilitary or other gangs?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. This is part of the duties of certain members of the Garda Síochána.

I have a question on the technical bureau, the maintenance of the exhibits and on how files are now centrally controlled and retained. Is a register maintained which records the location at any time of an exhibit or file? Who takes responsibility for this? If a file or part of a file is distributed, is a record kept and is somebody policing the return of the details in order that files remain intact? Our inquiries have highlighted that the one major deficiency of the policing system in the 1970s has been a failure to maintain files and exhibits. This in turn has hindered the pursuance of cases.

Commissioner Conroy

I will ask the assistant commissioner in charge of that area to respond.

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

The one thing which is different nowadays from the time we are dealing with is that we now have computers and electronic records. All the mechanisms in place now when conducting a major investigation cater for the preservation and integrity of the exhibits. The technical bureau is housed in Garda headquarters and it has a facility called the forensic flow office. When a person arrives from the country with an exhibit, this is recorded in this office. A record is produced of where that exhibit goes, whether to the forensic science laboratory, fingerprints, ballistics or mapping. There is auditable trail of where an exhibit goes. We are currently far advanced with a proposal to Government for an IT solution for integrating all the areas such as exhibit tracking and filing.

Therefore, what happened previously could not happen again — what happened in the 1970s would not happen now.

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

We would hope that would never ever happen again. The audit trail is our safeguard.

My final question to the Commissioner is in connection with the last sentence in his submission to the committee. It refers to the ongoing investigation into the murder of Seamus Ludlow and the Commissioner's contacts with the PSNI and the Historical Enquiries Team. Has any progress been made in that investigation? Is a conclusion likely regarding the identity of the perpetrators and what action is likely to be taken?

Commissioner Conroy

To be honest,I would not be over-hopeful about a final conclusion but nevertheless, we are receiving co-operation from our counterparts in the PSNI. We appointed a superintendent who has a small staff. He is acting as a liaison. It is hoped a file will eventually be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions and this is being worked on.

The committee has had reports from victims and witnesses that the HET, the Historical Enquiries Team, is operating very effectively and appears to have the confidence of the victims and the relatives of victims. The team is examining all the investigations in a new and more comprehensive way than was the case in 1974 to 1976. Is any similar body being considered and, if so, would it be helpful?

Commissioner Conroy

Our policing plans have been published. It will be noted that cold case reviews of a number of cases are being conducted every year. We evaluate any new information that comes to us with a view to bringing people to justice. That does occur. Assistant Commissioner Callananhas a team working full time on such matters.

Assistant Commissioner Callanan

As the Commissioner says, this is one of the key performance areas within the remit of the National Bureau of Criminal Investigationwhich as the committee is probably aware, falls under my remit. Quite a number of cases are taken on by the bureau every year, in addition to whatever new information comes to light. This is enshrined in our policing plan. Outside of that, several Garda divisions take that initiative themselves. For instance, I am aware of two cases being investigated in Store Street Garda station. We look at old cases and cold cases within that framework.

Commissioner Conroy, Assistant Commissioner Callanan and Detective Inspector Kinsella have been very helpful and I thank them for attending.

The sub-committee adjourned at 2.30 p.m. until 9.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 4 October 2006.
Barr