JOINT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 16 Sep 2009

Vol. 689 No. 1

Collapse of Malahide Viaduct: Discussion.

Chairman

We will now have a discussion with Iarnród Éireann, the Railway Safety Commission, the investigative unit of the commission and the Department of Transport regarding the collapse of the viaduct in Malahide on 20 August.

I wish to draw the witnesses' attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege, but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the parliamentary practice that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against any person outside the House or of an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded that civil servants while giving evidence to the committee may not question or express an opinion on the merits of any Government policy or policy objectives or produce or send to a committee any document in which a civil servant, member of the Defence Forces or member of the Garda Síochána questions or expresses an opinion on the merits of any Government policy or policy objectives.

I welcome Dr. John Lynch, chairman of CIE and Iarnród Éireann, Mr. Richard Fearn, chief executive officer and Mr. Barry Kenny, corporate communications officer. I also welcome commissioner John Welsby and principal inspectors Ms Mary Molloy and Mr. Anthony Byrne. I welcome too Ms Caitriona Keenahan, head of administration of the Railway Safety Commission, Mr. Nigel Lindsay from the railway accident investigation unit, Mr. Andy Cullen, assistant secretary at the Department of Transport, and Mr. Jim Humphreys, principal officer.

I suggest that as we have received written submissions from the three groups, we do not need a full rendering of them. I propose we take a short presentation from each group, beginning with Dr. Lynch. This should be simply a summary and we will then have a question and answer session on the various issues involved.

Dr. John Lynch

Since I have been with CIE and Iarnród Éireann, safety has been the single most important issue. At any board meeting we have, the first item on the agenda is the minutes, the second is matters arising and the third, and fundamental one, is safety. This concerns every single board meeting and is very important to us because it is very important the board sends out a message that safety is the most important aspect. Under the safety aspect of the agenda, the chief safety officer gives his presentation. We have also formed a board safety committee in the past nine years which is grilled by board members on safety matters. Safety is a very important item on the agenda in Iarnród Éireann.

There is a lot of expertise on the board that has been taken in from abroad. There is the former chief executive of Hong Kong MTRC and there are experts on mechanical matters and operations matters, both of whom are from the United Kingdom.

It is very important to understand that we take safety extremely seriously. There are a number of reasons for this. In the period 1987 to 1999, the total capital spent on the railway was approximately €16 million. As a result there are many reports about which I am sure the Deputies will ask. If one considers the matter, one will see we have certainly averaged at least €100 million per year by way of spend on safety and safety matters. That includes not only safety but also tracks, signalling systems and the training of management throughout the entire railway. It is important for us to put in context the developments since 1997.

I would like the committee members to consider that our organisation is probably the most investigated of all semi-State organisations in respect of reports. There have been at least six, and possibly seven, reports in the nine years. We take the reports, consider them and implement their recommendations to ensure safety is of the greatest importance.

The minute the collapse of the viaduct at Malahide occurred, we formed a group to examine the cause and rectify any problems to ensure it would be brought back into operation quickly. We apologise to our customers for all the inconvenience we have caused but, regrettably, we cannot totally rectify the problem until such time as the viaduct is put back into operation. The other step we took was to form a separate grouping within Iarnród Éireann to examine for scour every bridge that goes over water — there are 84. At present, the group has completed the examination of all 84 bridges and we must now have a detailed examination in respect of scouring.

Besides using Iarnród Éireann engineers we decided to avail of a lot of expertise from outside the organisation. We have Professor McKeogh from UCC, who is an expert on hydrology. At present he is modelling to determine why the collapse happened. We are curious as to the volume of water and the content, but that is another matter. We have also brought in a company called Roughan & O'Donovan to carry out a peer review on any recommendations that arise. Another group, O'Connor Sutton Cronin, has been tasked with assisting with the repair of the viaduct. In addition, a board advisory group has been appointed. It is chaired by a gentleman called Mr. Phil Gaffney, who was the head of Hong Kong MTRC, and he is assisted by another board member, Mr. Michael Giblin. The board, in turn, has a consultant to assist and advise it who is generally regarded as the expert in Britain on such matters, Mr. John Buxton. While there is an executive group looking after the issue and trying to find out about the problem, we are trying to ensure a degree of vigour in anything they will come up with about which the board will be happy.

That is the up-to-date position. There is an investigation but it has not yet reached conclusions.

Mr. John Welsby

The Railway Safety Commission was established on 1 January 2006. Its mandate derives from the European railway safety directive, under which we are a national safety authority. The European Union is developing a standardised approach to railways and their operation and to the way in which they are regulated. Some of that framework is in place relating to how safety cases of operators are assessed. Other strands are in development but I am happy that the way in which we currently approach our work is in line with the philosophy of the directive.

We are a small team but have sufficient resources to meet our mandate. Where we need additional support and expertise, we have the capacity to buy it; we have standing arrangements with a number of companies which we can call upon immediately. On the reconstruction of the Malahide viaduct and our oversight of the process, like Irish Rail, we have sought support to assist us.

Following the accident at Malahide, we were on site that evening. We also met Irish Rail on site the following day and indicated what we wished to do to seek information on how it would manage the operation of the railway pending reinstatement of the viaduct, the work it was doing to inspect the more than 80 structures the Chairman mentioned and our requirements when it came to reconstruction of the viaduct.

As the committee knows, an investigation is ongoing. Therefore, we will not comment further at this stage.

Chairman

I now invite Mr. Andy Cullen, assistant secretary at the Department of Transport, to make his opening remarks.

Mr. Andy Cullen

The main points I allude to in my statement are that in the last ten years railways have formed a very important part of our investment in public transport and that there has been significant investment in upgrading and modernising our railways and expanding them in those ten years.

The specific figure for investment in railway safety measures is €1.2 billion, which sum has transformed railway safety in Ireland. Hand in hand with rail safety has been the putting in place of structures to ensure standards are applied by reference to international standards. In addition, the Oireachtas has passed the Railway Safety Act 2005 which is comprehensive legislation to replace Victorian legislation. It was supplemented by a statutory instrument of 2008 which gives full effect to our EU obligations. When looking at these obligations, they involve governance and accountability of the regulatory processes, clearly defining the role of a Minister and his or her Department, the independent regulatory bodies, the independence of the railway accident investigation unit and the role of the railway operator.

Irish Rail has two roles. It is the provider of services and the manager of infrastructure. Those roles are clearly defined in law. Accountability to the relevant Oireachtas committee and the Committee of Public Accounts is also enshrined in the legislation. The committee has that. As the members know, I have clearly set out in my statement where the focus of investment has been and there is a record to demonstrate the improvements in rail safety which have taken place over that period. The incident at Malahide viaduct came as a total surprise to everybody. The reassurance from this side of the table is that there will be a substantial investment programme arising from the investigations which are under way. We await those investigations to ascertain what lessons can be learned in terms of investment priorities or of the regulatory code of practice which, as I said, delineates the roles and responsibilities of the operators, the infrastructure managers, the Railway Safety Commission and the rail accident investigation unit, with their independent roles to fulfil, and of the Department and the Minister.

Chairman

I ask Mr. Nigel Lindsay of the rail accident investigation unit to give us a brief synopsis of how the investigation is progressing and, in particular, when the unit would hope to have a conclusion to that investigation.

Mr. Nigel Lindsay

In summary, the rail accident investigation unit is a totally independent unit within the Railway Safety Commission. The purpose of our investigation is to improve railway safety by establishing as far as possible the cause or causes of an accident or incident. This is with a view to making safety recommendations for the avoidance of accidents in the future or otherwise for the improvement of railway safety. The important point is that it is not the purpose of our investigation to attribute blame or liability.

As far as the incident at Malahide is concerned, once notified of the collapse on our call-out system on 21 August 2009, our on-call investigator went to the scene immediately. She realised the severity of the incident and we mobilised and were on scene the next day. Our investigation is ongoing. The content of the investigation is confidential, which is to give reassurance to those who come to give us statements or evidence. We cannot discuss that with anyone. While I am happy to answer any questions as best I can, members should bear in mind that our investigation is confidential.

Our timescale under legislation and statutory instruments gives us a year to provide a full, written public report. The chief investigator is fully aware of the publicity and the concern with regard to Malahide viaduct and we will expedite that as best we can.

Chairman

We would hope it will not take a year or anything like it.

Mr. Nigel Lindsay

While I would not like to be pinned down, we are working to get the report out as quickly as we can.

Chairman

Before I hand over to the Opposition spokesman, I have one question. Before I ask it, the committee should acknowledge the exemplary response and quick action of the train driver, Keith Farrelly. It is my understanding — the witnesses might confirm this — that a train with 1,100 passengers on board was four minutes away from the viaduct at the time he reported the incident. He certainly prevented a huge catastrophe and he must be acknowledged for his quick action. He is a credit to the company.

My question concerns the report on 17 August from a member of the public who was supervising sea scouts who had been canoeing in the estuary and who reported by telephone to Iarnród Éireann that he had seen excessive evidence of water damage to the bridge structure at Malahide. Iarnród Eireann had an inspector visit the site the following day and found no evidence that would give cause for concern in terms of the structural integrity of the piers. The witnesses say they are satisfied that this is correct and that the ultimate cause of the accident, namely, erosion at seabed level, could not have been identified by this inspection. Why was a proper undersea investigation not carried out as a result of that report by a member of the public? In saying this, I acknowledge we all are experts at preventing problems after they have happened and hindsight is easy. However, this investigation must examine carefully this fundamental question in the light of the catastrophe that could have happened.

My second question is directed to the Railway Safety Commission. While it may not be correct, I have heard media comment to the effect that owing to the lack of staff or resources, the commission does not have the ability to carry out the safety audits expected of it. The joint committee acknowledges the great emphasis placed on safety by CIE, Iarnród Éireann and the Department. However, lack of resources should not be used as an excuse or perceived to be a reason not to have the continuous investigation into safety issues that is required. In particular, I have been concerned by instances in which the Railway Safety Commission has been very slow to respond. For example, during the construction of the N6, it has taken 18 months to two years to build bridges such as the railway overpass in Athenry, that could have been built 18 months ago with proper preplanning. The level of safety risk in that area due to the presence of trucks running up and down small roads because the Railway Safety Commission was not in a position to approve the building of the bridge with proper preplanning must be corrected. Witnesses should respond to these two questions.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I will take the question on the report from the sea scouts. First, I wish to put on record our appreciation of the civic-minded manner in which the sea scouts leader took the decision to call us about what he thought he had seen at the viaduct. We greatly appreciate such calls and take them very seriously. The member of staff who took the call noted it and immediately contacted a senior engineer. Our assistant divisional engineer then personally rang the sea scouts leader to ascertain the story for himself. On foot of this, it then was decided to send a qualified structural engineer the following day to conduct an assessment of what had been reported. The structural engineer attended at low tide and so was able to assess the situation regarding the piers and the erosion markings thereon that had been reported by the sea scouts. At that time, on foot of the assessment he made, having looked closely at the relevant piers, he made a judgment that there was nothing which gave cause for concern in terms of the structural integrity. We are satisfied he could not have seen and could not then have noted what we now know to be seabed erosion that was undermining the pier. However, as for what he was looking at, which was the structural integrity of the pier, that was what he believed and we support that. There was no evidence for him to realise that what was happening was happening underneath the pier.

Very soon afterwards and just one day before the accident, our track recording vehicle, which is an automatic system that records any problems with the track, passed over the viaduct and produced a very good trace and report on the state of the track. Normally any evidence of structural subsidence, whether it be on a bridge, a viaduct or an embankment, shows up as some kind of undulation problem with the track. However, nothing showed up and so just one day previously, there was no subsidence that showed up on the trace. Consequently, at that stage there was no further evidence to suggest that the structural engineer who visited the viaduct had missed something. However, after the event, as the Chairman noted, we now know that there was a serious issue of seabed erosion which is now very much the subject of our inquiry. Out of that inquiry no doubt will come much more information and recommendations on what we must do in future in such circumstances. In these circumstances, however, there was no evidence on this occasion.

Mr. John Welsby

I will take the question in respect of resources. The press commentary was taken out of context. We have two strands of ongoing inspection and monitoring since the International Risk Management Services report in 1998. Irish Rail and the Department committed to a periodic independent review of the sector. We commissioned the two most recent audits at the end of 2006 and 2007 and are committed to carrying on that process. As issues arise, either through international safety data, our safety data, feedback from our peer organisations in Europe or representations from the public, we carry out local inspections on a risk basis. The reference to resources in the annual report was to the fact that we hoped to carry out the audit process in-house. However, we were not able to do so and it was done externally. At the beginning of the year we recruited three additional inspectors and hope we can do the work internally rather than externally.

Regarding approvals and delays, whether it concerns Irish Rail or third parties, developers are required to seek approval for structures over a railway. In 1998 we issued over 90 approval certificates and I am satisfied that in playing our part in the process we did not delay any of the projects. I invite Ms Molloy to comment further.

Ms Mary Molloy

To which bridge on the N6 is the Chairman referring?

Chairman

The bridge adjacent to Mellows College, Athenry, on the land of Mellows College. The road bridge running beside the railway bridge has been open for 12 to 15 months. The railway bridge opened in the recent past. Had the railway bridge been built and opened at the same time as the road bridge, it would have been possible to transport materials from the quarry for the motorway under construction. I do not want to make an issue of it today but we can talk about it later.

Ms Mary Molloy

I would like to respond. We have 28 days in which to respond to submissions received and I can guarantee the committee that we do not delay submissions. Once the railway operator makes a submission to us for approval, we respond within 28 days, sometimes in a much shorter time.

Chairman

I ask Iarnród Éireann to respond to the committee in writing on why construction and approval for the bridge project took so long.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

I warmly welcome the delegation and echo the comments of the Chairman on the vigilant driver. He is a hero in the vigilance he exercised which I hope the company recognises. Many issues spring to mind. When Mr. Fearn received the report from the sea scouts, why did he not stop the trains? It is a simple question.

Mr. Richard Fearn

The first action was to note the detail and for a senior engineer to contact the sea scout leader. From that conversation, there was no information that would have led the senior engineer to believe he had to stop trains. There are circumstances in which a member of the public may report something has been thrown onto the line and immediate action is taken.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Mr. Fearn has a track record in this respect. The International Risk Management Services report of 1998 seemed to indicate that there was a 60% chance of a major problem arising at the Broadmeadow viaduct. Changes were made to the permanent line in subsequent years but in 2003 the Cahir viaduct collapsed. We knew there was a history of problems with 84 bridges. Given this history, these reports and the fact that we have invested little following the European rail safety directive, was Iarnród Éireann just not vigilant enough when it received the report that the piers were being scoured and moving? It should have stopped the trains.

The main business of the Dáil today is the NAMA Bill which we will discuss after lunch and which has huge consequences for the country. However, there is no question that the collapse of the viaduct at the Broadmeadow Estuary could have been an incredible catastrophe with hundreds of people dead. Most of the Deputies present who represent Dublin, Meath and Louth constituencies could have been attending funerals for weeks. This could have been one of the most horrendous events in the history of the country. Therefore, it is appropriate that it is the first item on the agenda today. We could have been speaking in completely different terms. I again ask why the trains were not stopped on 17 August when Iarnród Éireann got word that there was serious movement beneath the bridge across the Broadmeadow Estuary?

Mr. Richard Fearn

As I stated, we take all such reports very seriously and we took this one particularly seriously. The reports to which the Deputy referred, the 1998 report and the issue of the Cahir viaduct were all taken very seriously and action was taken. In this case a qualified senior engineer contacted the caller to seek detailed information on what he had seen and reported. As a result——

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

The committee knows——

Chairman

Please allow Mr. Fearn to reply.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

This is an important point. Members of the committee visited Malahide in recent days; committee members also visited there a couple of weeks ago. We have been very well instructed and informed by Iarnród Éireann engineers on the work taking place and the November deadline. However, we stood on the causeway in the middle of the estuary and wondered why a diver was not present and why a chance had been taken on 17 August.

Mr. Richard Fearn

We did not take a chance; we reacted properly and professionally. When we received further information that there was no immediate risk but that issues needed to be examined, we sent a structural engineer to make an assessment. The report from the sea scout leader did not state there was an immediate risk of collapse; he reported markings on the piers and erosion. That was why action was taken. I emphasised that we considered the sea scouts were very civic minded in reporting the matter and we took it seriously. I also mentioned that we did not just examine the evidence of the engineer who had observed the piers; we also considered other evidence such as the trace from the automatic train, which is very accurate and shows any movement or change in the alignment of the railway. It showed no such evidence.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Is that good enough? The report from the Railway Safety Commission on the Cahir derailment six years ago seemed to indicate that there were serious deficiencies in Irish Rail's management of the infrastructure and concluded that the inspection and maintenance regimes had been principally responsible for the accident.

Mr. Richard Fearn

If I could comment on the Cahir viaduct derailment——

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

That was only six years ago.

Mr. Richard Fearn

The Cahir viaduct derailment was surrounded by significantly different circumstances in that there were no structural deficiencies in the piers of the viaduct on which the train derailed. However, the report on the derailment was taken extremely seriously and the actions recommended were taken and have been implemented on viaducts of similar construction to the Cahir viaduct.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Given that we came within seconds of a catastrophe at Malahide, is Mr. Fearn stating Irish Rail's maintenance and invigilation processes were effective on 17 August; that nothing more could have been done and that it was through the grace of God and the actions of a brilliant driver we did not have a terrible catastrophe? A number of members of the staff of the Houses who were returning to their homes in north Dublin, Meath and Louth were on that train.

Chairman

Why did the investigation of 18 August not include a survey of the seabed?

Mr. Richard Fearn

We are now aware that erosion of the seabed undermined the pier. However, there was no evidence obvious to the structural engineer who visited the viaduct at the time — other evidence did not emerge as a result of the track inspections that took place — which would have led us to believe that erosion had undermined the viaduct. I fully accept Deputy Broughan's comments regarding the severity of this incident. From the outset we have accepted that we narrowly avoided a very serious tragedy. We are taking the various investigations seriously.

As Dr. Lynch explained earlier, we have cast a wide net in the context of bringing on board people with the necessary expertise, such as hydrologists and those with expertise in geological erosion and bridge scour — that is, the action of water when it runs up against bridges — to assist us in reaching an understanding of how this happened. We know what happened but we do not know how it happened.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

One of the most astonishing statements we heard this morning was made by the Railway Safety Commission. Mr. Welsby stated that the commission has adequate resources at its disposal to allow it to meet its responsibilities. That is an outrageous statement to make to a Dáil committee. The commission does not have adequate resources. It did not check any of these matters and did not investigate how the operator was performing. It had four people working in the area of inspection at the time and it now has seven.

This afternoon the Dáil is due to discuss matters relating to financial regulation. We are sick of regulators not doing their job. The Railway Safety Commission did not do its job and it is not true to say that it has adequate resources. I accept that this is a political as well as a cost issue. However, the commission just did not do its job. It was checking all of the new infrastructure but it was not checking the existing 2,000 km of rail line.

Dr. John Lynch

A question was posed as to why we did not check the seabed. Under the Arthur D. Little report, we check the seabed or the viaduct. It was checked in 2006 and cleared. At that time it was estimated that it would not need to be rechecked until 2012. That was the view of the experts at the time. This is puzzling us and we will not know what the cause was until we receive the report of the rail investigation body.

Mr. John Welsby

On the issue of resources, I reiterate what I said. I firmly believe we have the resources required to allow us to meet our mandate in the way intended. As already stated, we carry out inspections based on risk. Those inspections are not intended to and will never replace the inspection regime of the primary duty holder, that is, Irish Rail. We work to a mandate that comes from a safety directive. I am satisfied that the way we do our work is in line with that directive and that it is also in line with the way our peer organisations throughout Europe operate.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Did the commission inspect the line at Broadmeadow Estuary, either since its establishment or in the past 12 months?

Mr. John Welsby

No.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

Keith Farrelly performed a tremendous act and saved hundreds of lives. The committee should show its appreciation, in a humble but thankful way, in respect of what he did. I am familiar with the line in question and I have personal knowledge of hundreds of those who were passengers on the train. Those people would be dead if the train had crashed off the viaduct and into the 4 metres of water in the estuary. The electrics on the train would probably have failed and it would not have been possible to open the doors. It is an appalling vista. It is important that we should take this opportunity to examine calmly and carefully the relevant issues in the best and most accountable way possible.

I respect what Iarnród Éireann, and Barry Kenny in particular, did in the context of immediately and openly admitting that this was a serious incident. I propose to take that as the starting point for my questions. I wish to make it clear that if my line of questioning becomes tough, it will not be out of hostility but rather as a result of a desire to obtain the facts.

I have spoken to Mr. Welsby on a number of occasions and have always found him to be extremely professional, competent and qualified in his work. I have questions, particularly about the cutback of €2 million in his budget announced by the Minister for Transport, Deputy Noel Dempsey, this year, about which Mr. Cullen may be able to speak. If the man is not given the money he needs, he cannot do the job. That is how I look at it. We are talking about the job done, the job which needed to be done and the facts as I can find them. What I say is based on the examination of documents which I have and which are in the public domain. In other words, they are on the Internet. There are facts which I do not have and reports which I have requested. I have spoken privately to Mr. Fearn about the issue which I will raise shortly.

The starting point is the 1998 IRMS report on the state of the railways. The report states:

The safety inadequacy rating is based upon the scores assigned as part of the infrastructure site surveys. It is a measure of the safety score assigned as a percentage of the maximum score possible. A score of zero is safe; 5% is considered to be best practice.

The report assesses the northern end of the Malahide viaduct and the track north of the viaduct and relating embankments and awards a 60% safety inadequacy score. That very serious issue was raised at the time. It was a big red flag. I acknowledge that Iarnród Éireann will come back on the issue and that the report deals with viaducts over water. The Malahide viaduct over water is given a 40% safety inadequacy score. Very serious concerns were flagged on a national scale in 1998 regarding infrastructure about which there were safety issues. The IRMS report of 1998 paid considerable attention to the question of bridge inspection. While it spoke of two-year inspections as a rule of thumb, this was not borne out by the facts. A significant number of bridges were so new and modern that they did not need inspections every two years. However, others did.

The question of scour has been raised. The 1998 report states:

Inspections for scour, that is the undermining of bridge foundations by water, are not formalised, except that they form part of the standard bridge inspection procedures. However, frequently the danger areas are under water and cannot be easily inspected. There is a need for divers to go under the surface to carry out proper inspection.

I stress this was the practice at the time. In an update on that report in 2001 there are a number of references to scour. That report states:

Although no major problems have been experienced at Limerick Junction with scour there are quite a number of bridges that are potentially liable to scour and some have shown signs of minor scour. There should be an exercise undertaken to risk assess all such structures for susceptibility of the foundations being undermined. Based on the result of the risk assessment, an inspection management regime should be put in place.

The same chapter of the report recommended that all structures potentially vulnerable to scour action should be identified, that a engineering risk assessment should be undertaken and that a remedial works programme should be put in place. Dr. Lynch has referred to the scour experts he now has available. What scour experts did he consult at the time? What did they report and what inspection regime was in place?

Mr. Richard Fearn

The 1998 report came after many years of under-investment in the rail network. It was in the context of that under-investment that decisions were made as to whether the railway should remain, there should be investment in it or it should it be closed. Thankfully, the decision was to keep the railway open and invest substantially in it. In 1998 there were risks across the network which had to be dealt with. These have been dealt with. There has been a substantial programme of investment in excess of €100 million each year since. Mr. Cullen has mentioned that over €1 billion has been spent over the ten years of the programme to date. The programme continues and we will spend in excess of €100 million this year in these same areas.

The specific areas highlighted in the report relating to the Malahide viaduct indicated there were processes in place to assess the risk. This is one of the reasons for the low score. Some specific works were necessary on the causeways either side of the viaduct. These works have been done and processes put in place. Subsequent reports have validated these processes, such as the A.D. Little report of 2006 for the Railway Safety Commission. This has underpinned what we are doing in terms of the two-year structural engineering assessment of all averages. The Malahide viaduct has been kept in date within that process. The report strongly recommended a six-year underwater structural scour survey by specialists was the right frequency. As Dr. Lynch mentioned, in 2006 specialists conducted a very detailed underwater scour survey at Malahide. That survey showed no evidence of scour and gave a clean bill of health for the following six years. If scour is found, it is not satisfactory to wait another six years for action to be taken.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The question is not what is stated in the report but what was said earlier and what scour plan was put in place. Can we have a copy of the report?

Mr. Richard Fearn

We have a clear scour plan. As mentioned, we have a cycle in order that every bridge where there is a risk of scour occurring is kept in date. Divers are commissioned from a firm experienced in this kind of work and assessments and measurements taken. If a risk is identified, it is acted upon. We do not wait; it is a priority that is acted upon as part of our railway safety investment programme. Unfortunately, in 2006 no evidence of scour was identified in the report. Therefore, what has happened since has happened for a reason which we do not yet understand. We will try to get to the bottom of it; that is what the inquiry is about.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The point I am trying to make is that most inspections should take place where the likelihood of scour occurring is greatest. Does Mr. Fearn have the 2001 report on the scour action plan and, if so, can we have a copy?

Mr. Richard Fearn

We have the reports which are available. We also have the later reports which underpin what we are doing. The A.D. Little report is particularly important in that context.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I understand the difference in respect of coastal defences and the viaduct. Nevertheless, I have asked a number of times, publicly and privately, for a copy of the Carl Bro report on coastal defences. I understand it is a 50 volume document, but I would like to have a copy or the relevant parts of it, although Mr. Fearn says it is not relevant. I am concerned that I do not have a copy. An issue arises with regard to coastal defences. The 2001 report may not have been produced by Carl Bro, but it stated:

The consultant exercise is taking shape for the strategy for the management of coastal defences. There is a clear need to formalise the inspection machinery, particularly the requirements for enhanced inspection during times of bad weather or especially high tides. The large expenditure suggested in the consultants' report will need critical review.

Are there issues around expenditure on these coastal defences? Will Mr. Fearn comment on the matter?

Mr. Richard Fearn

There are no issues with regard to expenditure, but there are issues with regard to prioritisation. We can make available any element of the report the Deputy requires. It is a detailed and technical report on where the railway runs near the coast, but it does not relate to bridges and viaducts which did not come within the remit of Carl Bro. The remit had to do with places where the railway was close to rocks, by cliff edges and at other such locations. Carl Bro set out a series of actions that should be included in the railway safety programme. Our railway safety programme which accounts for €100 million for the year is based on prioritisation of the information we have received from these reports. It was pleasing to receive last year a value for money report for the Department of Transport that stated, among other conclusions, that Iarnród Éireann had got its prioritisation right. It was stated the €100 million — €1 billion overall — had been spent on the right priorities. Many of these priorities were taken from the Carl Bro report and have been acted upon in the specific area of coastal defences, not bridges and viaducts because they were not the subject of the report. We have made available copies of the full tome — all ten volumes — to the railway safety commissioner and the railway accident investigation unit. If members wish to digest it, it will be made freely available to them.

Let me make two other points. Deputies mentioned the potential risk which we accepted up-front. We accepted the narrowly avoided incident under discussion was potentially very serious. We prepare for all incidents on the railways jointly with the emergency services. In November 2008 there was a joint exercise with the emergency services where the railway runs adjacent to Lough Owel near Mullingar, County Westmeath. We carried out what is called a table top simulation-type exercise and asked what would happen if a train went into the water. We ensured the fire officers who are always responsible for evacuation in a major incident were able to understand how to evacuate our trains. They actually come to our depots to learn about the new rolling stock. We take the potential for accidents very seriously.

Let me make a positive point on behalf of our driver, Keith Farrelly. I am very pleased Deputies have mentioned the excellent work done by him and his colleagues in the signalling centre in Dublin. His reports were acted upon immediately by his colleagues in the signalling centre to stop all trains. We are very proud to have colleagues who show such professionalism, and of such competence in our workforce. The chairman, Dr. Lynch, presents safety awards each year. Members can rest assured Mr. Farrelly and his colleagues in the central traffic signalling centre will be high on the list of nominees this year.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

As I understand it, there are three inquiries, one by Iarnród Éireann, one by the Railway Safety Commission and one by the railway accident investigation unit. The problem is that none of them is taking place in the public domain. I am not questioning anyone's integrity or credibility but I do not understand the need for so many inquiries. I would prefer if there was one inquiry on the part of the Railway Safety Commission and the investigation unit. As I understand it, the unit carries out the investigation and the commission decides whether to act upon it. Iarnród Éireann is totally independent in this structure but decides whether to prosecute. It has authority to hold public sessions during the process. There is an absolute need for responsible public accountability in investigations into the incident. My saying so is not a criticism.

Let me outline the questions that need to be asked and which no doubt will be. I believe Deputy Broughan has asked them. The last time an engineer had crossed the Malahide Estuary on foot of a complaint was two years earlier. The CIE chairman, Dr. Lynch, told me that if an engineer crossed it every day, he still would not have identified the problem. The public is just not happy with this. I am not saying there is anything wrong or that the official acted unprofessionally, because he or she acted with total integrity. We would just like to see more probing of the issue. Obviously, the official in question took the complaint seriously enough to visit the site the next day. The key question concerns the reason an underwater inspection did not take place. The Malahide Estuary is and has been prone to scouring. The economic implications of stopping the trains which has since happened are significant but we should know why that did not happen at the time. If it had been done, the scouring would have been discovered and we would have saved hundreds of lives, as we have. That is the core issue, a lack of public accountability.

Notwithstanding all the first class experts in Irish Rail who are recognised internationally, how do we know what is being done represents the best approach? It might be the cheapest, quickest, most efficient or safest but I would like an independent audit to be carried out. The Railway Safety Commission has told me it is not its job to decide if there is a better way to do this; its job is to ask what has been done, if it is safe and if it meets best practice. The gap in the process is the gap in our knowledge and that worries me.

Dr. John Lynch

Economic considerations do not enter matters of safety. If there is a threat, we close down the network. As I said, safety is paramount. In all three companies safety is the major item.

We can only tell the honest truth, that a structural engineer checked and saw nothing. We accept that the train track recorder should have picked something up. Something has gone wrong. As we explained in Malahide, the scouring occurred on the sea side, which perplexes us. We will come back as soon as——

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Did the track stay in place?

Dr. John Lynch

Yes.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

I wonder about the track recorder at that location. The problem occurred underneath the track and Irish Rail took a chance.

Dr. John Lynch

We did not take a chance. If there is any movement, we instantly stop everything. We know the scouring occurred on the sea side, which perplexes us. We do not know if the volume of water or the water content caused the problem. It has worried us sufficiently that as soon as we receive anything, we will let everyone know.

Chairman

That is the issue being investigated; there is no point in our wasting time on it now.

Dr. John Lynch

All viaducts have been checked and this week divers are going down to check them.

Deputy Shane McEntee

Is the same machine being used to check these others that was used the day before the accident?

Mr. Richard Fearn

No, the machine is not being used to check the scouring but to check track alignment. It is a good machine which is constantly recalibrated to ensure it is correct.

I mentioned the track recording machine because if there is subsidence, not necessarily on a bridge but on an embankment, sometimes it first manifests itself through the track being out of alignment. The real purpose of the machine is to check on a regular basis that the track is in good condition. It is an interesting fact that the machine passed over the viaduct and accurately collected the measurements and there was no movement in the track; therefore, there had been no subsidence of the pier one day before.

The checks mentioned by Dr. Lynch on the 84 structures are detailed structural and underwater checks; they have nothing to do with the track machine. All 84 bridges over water have been initially surveyed to check to ensure there is no evidence of anything happening similar to what happened in Malahide. There is only one other viaduct that is similar in its construction over a causeway in the network, the structure just north at Rogerstown. We prioritised it and have been underwater to check it and there is no such evidence. We are working our way through the network with detailed underwater scour inspections to check that there is no other evidence on any of our over-water bridges that these circumstances could apply.

Mr. Andy Cullen

Deputy O'Dowd was anxious to know how the Railway Safety Commission is funded. The annual report for 2008, at paragraph 6.11, outlines a change in the manner in which the body is funded. Traditionally, it was funded 100% by the Exchequer but it is now funded by a combination of Exchequer funds and levies on the operators, which are Iarnród Éireann, Bord na Móna, Veolia and the Railway Procurement Agency. I am aware of no suggestion that the Railway Safety Commission is being deprived of funds.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The public record, in terms of what the Irish Examiner reported on 9 or 10 April of this year, states that there is a cutback of approximately €2 million to the railway safety programme.

Mr. Andy Cullen

I can say that in terms of the current funding——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I am talking about the budgetary funding.

Mr. Andy Cullen

I will cover both capital funding and current funding. With regard to current funding, the resourcing of the Railway Safety Commission comes from both Exchequer funds and levies. I am not aware of any cut in that respect, and there is no cut in regard to the commission being able to fulfil its statutory function. That is the position with regard to current funding.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

It is a question of the number of years it will take to carry out that function.

Mr. Andy Cullen

That is the position with regard to current funding. Let me be very clear. As I understand it, there is no cut in the funding available to the commission to fulfil its statutory functions.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

The commission will have less State funding. Is that not the point?

Mr. Andy Cullen

That is correct. That part is funded by the industry.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

Let us be clear about this.

Mr. Andy Cullen

There are other processes like——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I am talking about the Department of Transport. Was there a cut this year for the Railway Safety Commission, yes or no?

Mr. Andy Cullen

The answer to that is "Yes" because——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

There was a cut.

Mr. Andy Cullen

I ask the Deputy to listen. It is because there is an alternative method of funding.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

That is not the point.

Mr. Andy Cullen

It is the point.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

No, the point is there was a cut.

Mr. Andy Cullen

The commission has two sources of funding, namely, current funding from the State plus a levy on the industry. It has the funding to fulfil its function so——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

What the report actually says is a matter——

Mr. Andy Cullen

I could not rely all the time on journalists' reports. I have not seen the report.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I cannot rely——

Chairman

I call Deputy Connaughton.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I want to make this point clearly because it is key. At the time of the budget, there was a statement on the Department's website from the Minister, Deputy Dempsey, outlining the changes. One of them was a cut for the Railway Safety Commission. Is that correct?

Mr. Andy Cullen

Well——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

Just answer the question. Did he say that or did he not?

Mr. Andy Cullen

The Deputy has access to the website because that——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

No, I do not have access to it because that report is not on the website or I cannot find it. However, I remember looking at it at the time.

Mr. Andy Cullen

To be clear, the commission sources its funding from both the Exchequer and a levy on the industry. That was the first point. The second point is in regard to capital. The capital available to the commission has not been cut.

Chairman

I will take questions from Deputies Connaughton and Kennedy.

Deputy Paul Connaughton

As a regular user of Iarnród Éireann services, I have always credited it with being very safety conscious. However, if one were an ordinary member of the public listening to what has been said at this meeting by Ms Molloy and her colleagues, the next time one was on a train and arrived at a viaduct or a point where it was passing over water, one would be very worried. The reason for this is simple. According to the witnesses present, this was a ghost accident, one that could not and should not have happened but did happen. First, the tracking system did not identify the problem. Second, Iarnród Éireann reacted very promptly, as one would expect, and sent out the structural engineer. I have no idea who the structural engineer was or what he did or did not do. All we know is that two days later, the whole thing fell into the sea.

The ordinary commuter will seek answers to two questions either from this meeting or from wherever this investigation is leading to. I will direct my point to the chairman, Dr. Lynch. He should consider a hypothetical case in which he was buying a house. Let us assume that being the intelligent man he is, he decided to acquire outside expertise in the form of a structural engineer to ensure the house was worth the money he was paying for it. If, having been informed by the structural engineer that the house was safe, he paid the money only for the roof to fall in on top of him the next day, he certainly would tell himself that either the information he received was not great or that another set of unprecedented and unforeseen circumstances had arisen. The witnesses must provide an answer to this question to the travelling public. In other words, the public will have a doubt in their minds whether the witnesses were able to discern a problem. Regardless of whether they should have been able do so, it is evident they did not because this terrible accident happened.

Mr. Fearn referred to the emergency services, of which we are proud. However, without ever having been involved at a professional level, I do not care how many emergency ambulances or firemen were around, had 1,100 people gone into the sea at that point——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

They would have been dead within three minutes.

Deputy Paul Connaughton

—— I assure Mr. Fearn there would have been little that anyone could have done, even had they been standing on the railway track. Obviously, one hopes their services never will be sought in such circumstances.

My final point pertains to Mr. Welsby and the Railway Safety Commission. At the outset, he noted the commission has sufficient funds to carry out its inspections and so on and I have no reason to doubt him, good bad or indifferent. However, I assume the portion of track that goes over such sensitive areas as viaducts, bridges and so on only constitutes a minute part of the permanent way nationwide. This is for obvious reasons because the track mainly runs on solid ground and while I oversimplify somewhat, such an accident could not happen unless the track was passing over the sea, a river, a bridge or whatever. Since the establishment of the Railway Safety Commission, I would have thought it would have employed divers. There is not much point in having a structural engineer examine a pier. As for scouring, I assume it takes the elements a long time to scour one of these massive pillars and one does not need to be a structural engineer to know this. However, in respect of what happens at the bottom of the sea, should divers not be employed as a matter of course?

One should not be obliged to wait for such an incident to happen. Unless I have misunderstood the evidence from all witnesses, little diving was done anywhere under any set of circumstances either last year or the year before. Given that we now know what happened, does Mr. Welsby not think that someone took his or her eye off the ball? Would one not expect divers to be diving all the time because not many such points exist? They are the locations at which one would assume something like this might happen. Even if such incidents had not happened previously, one imagines that international evidence would prove that divers should be used. According to the evidence given to members, in recent weeks divers have been going down all over the place. Why was this practice not taken more seriously before now?

Deputy Michael Kennedy

I also concur with the remarks in respect of the driver, Keith Farrelly. I also wish to throw bouquets towards Iarnród Éireann, Dublin Bus and Bus Éireann regarding the continuance of services for commuters. It should be put on record that the vast majority of those who have contacted me — and I am sure all my colleagues here — are more than satisfied with the service that is provided at present. Moreover, thankfully the aforementioned companies are still enhancing those services in response to deputations and communications from the public and from public representatives. Equally, I compliment the companies on the speed with which they carried this out. As members are aware in respect of transport services, quite often in the past the urgency in this regard was not appreciated. In this instance, the ongoing enhancements are excellent. Deputy Thomas Byrne had to leave to attend another meeting but wanted to refer to the inadequate service provided in Stamullen which he would like to have investigated. We know the questions that need to be asked. We look forward to receiving the report on the investigation in the next few months.

Regarding the use of tracking devices countrywide, how satisfied are the delegates that these are accurate? It has been said a tracking machine passed along the track and recorded nothing. Who checks this? Is there a system in place to come to a conclusion it is out of date and needs to be replaced? Who came to the conclusion a six-year time limit could be used for underwater surveys? Have worldwide experts conducted studies every three years and come to the conclusion that it is unnecessary? I say this with an eye on the future. The incident took place but a tragedy was averted. We must ensure such incidents do not happen. If they do, they must be minimised. Have experts decided on the period of six years? Having conducted dozens of underwater surveys in the past few weeks, are the delegates satisfied they do not have to conduct another until 2016?

The railway investigation unit claims to be totally independent of the Railway Safety Commission. To whom will the unit report and will the report be made available to public representatives? What authority or body will make it available? When we get on aeroplanes, we know that part of the safety drill is to tell passengers that there is a life jacket under the seat. I shudder to think about losing Deputy O'Dowd or Deputy McEntee in the River Boyne.

Deputy James Reilly

The Deputy did not say anything about me.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

We are more likely to be pushed off than to fall off.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

Exactly, by one's own colleagues.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

That happens all the time, as Deputy Kennedy knows. Deputy Darragh O'Brien will tell him about it.

Deputy Darragh O’Brien

I have just arrived and members not should not blame me for anything.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

Where trains travel over water, does it occur to the delegates that life jackets should be available on board? The train that followed shortly after the incident occurred was carrying 1,100 passengers. If it had ended up in the River Boyne or the Broadmeadow Estuary, how would we have taken passengers from the carriages when they were in the water? Have the delegates considered this issue? If they received a similar report from the sea scouts today, would they do anything differently, apart from getting the engineer out? I ask Dr. Lynch for an honest answer on whether he would act differently from what was done a few weeks ago.

An issue for all parties concerned is how soon emergency service boats would have reached the Broadmeadow Estuary if the train had gone into the water. I make the comment in the context of the Malahide marina, with a minimum of 500 boats, being beside the Broadmeadow Estuary. Is there a contingency plan to involve nearby sailing yards, boat yards and marinas in getting people out of the water?

Dr. John Lynch

I shall take the easy question first which is on Stamullen and we will examine whether we can put more buses on that route.

Deputy Shane McEntee

I believe Flexibus and Bus Éireann are working together to ensure a service.

Dr. John Lynch

Yes. What is important at all stages for a railway is confidence. I understand Deputy Connaughton's point because if people do not have confidence, it causes us trouble because they will not travel and that is understandable. That is why safety has always been an issue from the very beginning. I do not want to say too much but it is 26 years since there was a fatality on the railway and that is a good record. That is not to underplay the incident at Malahide by any means.

Our inspection regime was set out by experts over a period of time. As I stated, to my knowledge there have been six reports in nine years. We have taken each one of them seriously and, as Mr. Fearn explained, we have a risk model. We have an inspection regime for bridges and viaducts based on established standards and procedures which draws on the best international standards available to us and independent reports and recommendations, the most recent being from Arthur D. Little in 2006.

The standards require inspection by a structural engineer once every two years. One could ask whether we will continue to do this but we will wait to see the report. The standards also require a detailed underwater structural and scour survey by specialists every six years. These standards were set down for us by Arthur D. Little in conjunction with the Department and everyone else. The instructions are supported by other elements of the safety management regime in Iarnród Éireann and the line is walked three times a week.

Mr. Fearn will reply to the question on the train vehicle recorder which travels throughout the entire network and that includes viaducts and bridges. While people walk the routes three times a week, the train track recorder records items not visible to the naked eye. A question was asked about how accurate it is and the answer is that it is very accurate, as it was in this particular case because we checked it. That is our inspection regime. We adhere to it, it is international practice and it was recommended to us. I do not know whether we will continue with it but we are not underplaying in any shape or form the incident at Malahide viaduct. We will implement whatever recommendations are made because it has shaken us a bit and I do not want Deputies O'Dowd, McEntee or Reilly to disappear.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I will respond to the issues raised by Deputy Kennedy. Dr. Lynch mentioned the automatic track recording machine, which is regularly recalibrated and checked for accuracy. It is a very accurate machine. We use external expertise. Ours is not by any means the only railway company in Europe using technology of this nature. Ours is a relatively small railway company in European terms and we use the technology that is well established and authorised across much bigger networks than ours. That also applies to the issues to which Dr. Lynch referred in the context of scour inspections. These are not by any means criteria that we have made up. In the 1980s two very serious viaduct collapses occurred in the United Kingdom. The first occurred in Wales in 1987 and resulted in the deaths of a number of people, while the second happened near Inverness in Scotland in 1989 when an entire viaduct collapsed under the pressure of flood water. As a result of the UK and wider European experience of the implications of bridge scour for viaducts — not just railway viaducts but also road viaducts, in respect of which the same issues arise — the level of knowledge was expanded significantly. We have based our standards on that knowledge. Arthur D. Little's report underpins this and states what we are doing is consistent with these processes. As a result of this incident, inevitably some changes may come. It there are changes for us, there will be changes for other networks also. We shall be responsible for communicating this to other rail operators across Europe and elsewhere in the context of what we discover.

With regard to the specific question on evacuation, we have contingency plans for all eventualities. God forbid, a rail accident is not something any of us wants. However, as good, professional railway operators, we must have contingency plans. These plans cannot just be our own; they must be consistent with the plans the emergency services would help us to implement. We practice them and have routines, etc. I have referred to some of the things we have done in conjunction with the emergency services in this regard. Fire officers are the people who, through national emergency plans, are given the responsibility of leading evacuations. They have their processes to follow and one of the things they need to understand is how to get people out of a train. Therefore, they examine the details relating to our new trains in order to discover how the doors can be opened in an emergency, etc. We have contingency plans for all eventualities, including accidents on land and in the water.

As far as I am aware, there is no railway company in the world which routinely carries life jackets for its passengers. Do people carry life jackets in their cars because they drive over bridges and viaducts? Of course, they do not.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

People wear seat belts in their cars.

Mr. Richard Fearn

Yes. However, the circumstances are different in the case of rail travel. We do not make these things up for ourselves; we take the best international experience and follow it. We have been very fortunate, as a result of investment in the company in recent years, to purchase an entirely new fleet of trains. Our trains are designed to the best international standards. We specify that they must meet these standards which we do not make up ourselves. We take the best international standards and have our trains built to them.

Deputy Kennedy asked if we would do anything differently if we were in possession of a similar report from the sea scouts today. What we would do is what we did, namely, take it very seriously. Any report from a member of the public on any issue relating to rail safety we immediately take very seriously. We took the report very seriously and acted professionally. We now know, however, that we did not identify the undersea erosion. I am sure we will learn a great deal——

Deputy Michael Kennedy

That is the point I am making. When a report is made with regard to a pier in a viaduct, does the company not automatically send down a diver to ensure erosion has not occurred? I am of the view that should have done in this instance.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I made the point which was endorsed by Dr. Lynch that we were carrying out scour inspections of all our viaducts. As a result of this special work, we will be right up to date. We are saying we now need to know if there are different circumstances relating to other bridges. We are carrying out our work in this regard immediately. The good news is that we have done initial checks on all our viaducts and bridges and have not discovered any evidence of erosion. We are proceeding with detailed diving. We have prioritised those as the ones which are most similar to this kind of case. However, in circumstances of this kind there was no evidence and it was at low tide. We need to know much more from the detailed investigation, including the scientific work being done by the hydrologists and geological erosion experts from UCC and TCD. We need to see their work in order to understand how this happened. Safety and knowledge of these kinds of things are continually developed in all industries and particularly in the transport and rail industries. We shall examine everything we find from this survey in great detail and implement what is necessary.

Deputy Shane McEntee

It is good that we can come to this meeting and talk about this issue. I was appointed road safety spokesman by my party following the bus crash in County Meath in which five young girls died. At least we are not having to go through that. We must look positively at this incident. I am sure it affected individuals, particularly those employed by Iarnród Éireann. However, I would like to think that money cannot be an issue in ensuring that the necessary measures are taken. Even if people must be brought from abroad or staff numbers doubled, a full inspection of every bridge must take place. Five people were killed in a bus crash in County Meath and 23 were killed within half a kilometre of Slane bridge. In this incident we got away with no casualties. I have no doubt we will have an air disaster at some stage. Every country gets its turn. This committee must ensure that necessary funding is provided. I wish the inspection team well in their work in the next six months.

Deputy James Reilly

I wish to be associated with the words of encouragement, congratulations and praise for the train driver, Mr. Keith Farrelly, who saved many lives through his swift action. I acknowledge that other people were involved in relaying his report and stopping the trains. I thank Mr. Barry Kenny and Iarnród Éireann for organising a second visit to the site. The first visit was not communicated to us in a timely fashion and many of us were not able to be there, even though we were available.

It is clear the public do not have confidence in Iarnród Éireann's inspection regime to date, because it failed. That is a blunt and indisputable fact. If another report similar to that given by the sea scouts was received by Iarnród Éireann would things be done differently? There seems to be a reluctance on the part of officials of Iarnród Éireann to say they would. This is deeply disconcerting. The public want reassurance that when this problem has been fixed a similar risk will not be taken by them again. This incident, by the grace of God, did not cost any lives.

As a doctor, I know the international standards for the performance of colonoscopies to detect cancer. People over a certain age should have a colonoscopy every five years. They are given the all-clear and are told to come back in five years. However, if a patient returns after two years with symptoms which indicate cancer, a doctor will not wait another three years to order a colonoscopy. The patient will be sent immediately for the examination.

We are talking about a similar situation here. A sea scout leader saw the evidence of change in the water flow. Therefore, to send an engineer out to make a visual inspection above water, even if this was at low tide, was clearly insufficient. Why, despite international recommendations for routine inspection, was a particular inspection not undertaken given new events had occurred and new information suggested there was a serious problem? Mr. Fearn must answer this question.

More importantly, Mr. Fearn must reassure this committee and people who use the rail line that the regime will change and reflect a more realistic approach so that when new information arises they do not rely on routine inspections, but conduct a full inspection. I hope that is the message that comes from this meeting. If not, Mr. Fearn will have failed to reassure the public. It is the least we expect.

I wish to comment on some earlier statements. I congratulate Dublin Bus, in particular, for putting on extra buses. These are working well, but there is little service after 6 p.m. This needs to be improved. There is also a poorer service at weekends and people in Donabate feel the need for an increase in the number of shuttles bringing them to Malahide.

I asked about the opportunity that now presents itself to do electrification work, but I understand there is no budget for that. Have costings for that not been done under Transport 21? I understand the sidings in Skerries is the nearest point to which the electric line could be brought. The infrastructural work should be done rather than delayed. It might also bring social gain and make people feel good if the opportunity was used now — the Fingal County Council manager supports this — to put a walkway and cycleway along the causeway. It is part of the broader plan to have such a route right around Fingal.

The other issues I wish to raise relate to Mr. Welsby and the Railway Safety Commission. How many inspectors does the commission have now? Is it seven? There are 84 viaducts or water bridges, but how many hundreds or thousands of other bridges are there? How many miles of track are there? The commission is also responsible for inspections of Luas tracks etc. Mr. Welsby has said that seven inspectors is sufficient and he does not feel there is any problem vis-à-vis carrying out his work. That stretches the imagination.

Another issue is the inconvenience to people in the village of Lusk as a result of passengers parking all over the village when getting the bus. The car park at the railway station is undergoing extension, but how soon can that car park be opened? It should be opened as soon as possible for free parking until the issue is resolved. It is bad enough that people must suffer the inconvenience of the loss of the train without having to suffer further inconvenience.

We must ask why, given the increase in rain levels, alarm bells did not go off when the sea scout leader made his report. I do not blame the engineer and fully understand the limitations of a visual inspection. I have absolute confidence in the tracking machine, but it is there to detect changes in the track and will not see physical evidence of problems underwater, unless the problem has reached the point where it interferes with the structure and causes a rattle in the track. This brings me back to the main point.

Chairman

We have got the questions. May we have a response now?

Mr. Richard Fearn

I will deal with the main point first. I understand the point Deputy Reilly made about what he as a doctor would do. As a doctor he would scan every five years, but if some information arose between scans, such as loss of blood, he would look again. The same happens in the case of railways. If our inspector had seen something when he went to do his survey or if the track machine had noticed some undulation in the rail, that would be analogous to the example Dr. Reilly gave about a patient with another symptom that was of concern. If we had seen any of those things, we would have realised something else was going on. However, we did not. There was no other evidence to the inspector and there was no other evidence when we did the track inspection.

Deputy James Reilly

He did not do the colonoscopy. He did not do the underwater inspection.

Chairman

Okay.

Mr. Richard Fearn

That is the——

Deputy James Reilly

I will not have my analogy perverted.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I was not trying to pervert it but was emphasising that we had carried out the equivalent of the colonoscopy in the sense that we had the 2006 report. I was trying to say that these further symptoms, identified in the sea scout's report, were taken very seriously. A survey was done on the piers, yielding no evidence. The train went over in the next two days. We looked at the track and saw no evidence of any subsidence and, sadly, there was no indication whatsoever of what was to happen.

Nobody in Iarnród Éireann is taking the issue of scour lightly. It is being taken extremely seriously and are doing all we can to reassure people that this whole matter has been taken very seriously. We narrowly avoided a very serious accident and will do everything we possibly can to address this. We will consider all the evidence we get, from the inquiry and from our own work with the experts, to ensure we do not have conditions on our bridges again that are analogous to those at Malahide before the collapse.

The Deputy expressed his support for the train driver, Mr. Keith Farrelly. I am grateful for that comment.

Let me make a point about training. Part of the railway safety programme, involving €100 million per annum, or €1 billion over ten years, is about training. It is not all about physically doing works along the line. Much of the programme concerns systems and training. Driver Farrelly and his colleagues in the central traffic control signalling centre have all benefited during their careers from that investment in safety training. It is good when we see the returns for that in the form of workforce competence. We are very pleased to see that.

Let me take up the two central points about electrification and the walkway. The electrification of the line north of Malahide is part of the Transport 21 programme. In due course, the line over Malahide viaduct will be electrified. However, electrification is quite a complex matter and requires design etc. before implementation. It would be wrong, for safety reasons and others, to rush electrification over three months while we are repairing the bridge. The electrification north of Malahide will be a crucial part of the Transport 21 programme and will occur, but in the proper order. Implementation must be preceded by design work and approval.

The walkway is a slightly different matter. Our priority is to get to the bottom of what happened at Malahide and then reconstruct the bridge in a very safe way. If in the timescales in question a proposal is made to create a walkway as part of the work, we will consider it. No detailed proposal has been submitted but if it is, by Fingal County Council, for example, we will consider it.

Chairman

I ask Mr. Fearn to answer Deputy McEntee's question because I am conscious of the time.

Mr. Richard Fearn

We are upgrading the bus arrangements all the time. If we have not got the arrangement quite right in the evenings or weekends at Donabate, we will definitely consider that.

Deputy James Reilly

What about the carpark?

Mr. Barry Kenny

We have had meetings with officials in Donabate and Skerries over the past 48 hours to go through the various issues. I will revert to the Deputy on the carpark as I do not have the relevant information.

Deputy James Reilly

In Lusk.

Mr. Barry Kenny

Yes.

Deputy Darragh O’Brien

A number of members mentioned competence and this is what the issue is about. I use the train pretty much every day and I grew up about half a mile from the viaduct and station. Thousands of commuters use the service every day. Whatever needs to be done to reinstil confidence in Iarnród Éireann and the safety measures must be done because it is crucial. Every group I met in my constituency raised this. Thankfully, we were not in circumstances in recent weeks in which we had to bury hundreds of people. The investigative report Mr. Welsby will do with the Railway Safety Commission and the engineer's report should be published.

I visited the bridge last week and I am impressed with the work that has taken place so far. Could we get an update for the schedule for the completion and reopening of this crucial line?

The walkway was raised at the meeting of Fingal County Council on Monday and the council has committed to contacting Iarnród Éireann. If there is an opportunity we should do this.

To instil confidence, and we have spoken about the adequacy of the inspections, Iarnród Éireann has followed best international practice but for any bridge crossing water, and not necessarily just railway bridges, there should be sub-aqua motion sensors, otherwise, if there was a shift of the seabed, how would we detect it without sending a diver down every couple of weeks? If there were motion sensors on bridges, the line could automatically be closed if there was a shift. Measures of that nature are crucial to restoring confidence.

Have the emergency services considered how they would have responded to an incident such as this that thankfully did not happen at the Broadmeadow Estuary and their response times?

Mr. Fearn mentioned the train drivers and staff and I commend them. The way in which both Dublin Bus and Iarnród Éireann workers have dealt with the public has been exceptional. There were initial teething problems that were to be expected. I also commend those passengers who have got on with things and used the contingency plans. As a local TD, I have found both Dublin Bus and Iarnród Éireann to be receptive to feedback from residents in the area who say off-peak and weekend services must be examined.

Staff training for emergencies was mentioned. How much knowledge would a passenger have about what would happen in an emergency on a train? I use a train at least three days a week and know very little. It is not like getting on an aeroplane. While I do not expect staff to get into carriages to point out the exits, passenger information is crucial. As a passenger, other than knowing where the nearest door is, I would not have a clue what to do.

Chairman

Several committee members have asked that if this situation happened again, a diver would be sent down. Could the witnesses confirm that this should have been done?

Deputy James Reilly

Or that camera inspections are carried out.

Chairman

I also commend the sea scout who did an outstanding civic duty. We do not know who he is but if anyone knows his name, he should be mentioned.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

To whom will the accident investigation unit report?

Dr. John Lynch

We have been asked what would happen if we had known what we know now. We are not in the business of taking risks. The entire safety programme has a risk profile and we eliminate risk all the time.

Deputy James Reilly

Clearly not sufficiently.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

We are sitting here looking at very lucky people.

Chairman

We were all lucky.

Dr. John Lynch

I am and that night I went out and bought a lotto ticket but it did not turn up. I am looking at that matter, as is everybody at senior level in Iarnród Éireann. However, the point I am making is that we have endeavoured to do our best. Such incidents only occur very infrequently. We did not know. In reply to Deputy Reilly, given that we now know what we know, when the report comes out, I am certain the regime will change with regard to what went on.

Deputy James Reilly

That is a key statement.

Chairman

Mr. Fearn might respond to Deputy O'Brien.

Mr. Richard Fearn

Deputy O'Brien asked about the plan for the bridge reconstruction. It is going very well. We announced recently that we expected to have it completed by the end of November. We are working closely with the Railway Safety Commission because the final scheme will obviously need its approval. The chairman has mentioned that we have a firm of structural engineers, Roughan O'Donovan, which is working with us to peer review the reconstruction.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Does Mr. Fearn accept the total cost will be more than €4 million?

Mr. Richard Fearn

That is a reasonable estimate. We do not yet have the absolute final estimate because some of the work we do will be as a direct result of what we find in the investigation. However, it is a reasonable estimate and the amount will be of that order.

With regard to the walkway, our priority is to have the bridge fit for purpose — for rail. We will do this safely and as the highest priority. If a walkway scheme is brought forward that could be completed within the timescale, we will certainly consider it, but the priority has to be completion of work on the rail bridge.

The question of motion sensors is an interesting one. I accept that technology is advancing all the time. If there is technology that we could use on this and similar bridges which would help us to identify issues, we will be very keen to look at it. In the same way, as I explained, we are using technology in track inspections and so on. We are very keen to consider how the new technology available such as motion sensors can help us in dealing with these issues.

The other point concerned passenger information. There are instructions by the doorway on all of our new trains telling passengers how they can open doors in an emergency and so on. This is consistent with what we have found to be best practice elsewhere in Europe. If one uses some of the busiest intercity rail services across Europe and examines what is provided on trains as information on how one can get out of the train in an emergency, it is similar to what we provide.

Deputy Darragh O’Brien

I understand completely. However, in regard to the northern line in particular, we nearly had an accident. While I am not suggesting this should apply to every single train every day, when the line reopens, Iarnród Éireann should consider re-educating passengers in this regard. Mr. Fearn is referring to information on the walls of trains but I put it to him that on the line from Dundalk or Belfast to Dublin, during the reopening period up to Christmas, we should re-educate passengers on what they should do in the event of an emergency. It is just a suggestion.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I understand the point the Deputy makes and we will definitely consider it.

Chairman

There were two further points.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

There was a question about the report.

Mr. Nigel Lindsay

I will address Deputy O Brien's concerns with regard to public accountability and our unit. There are six stages to the investigation we have commenced. There is evidence collection which includes all evidence from the scene and people, including witnesses, and about processes within Irish Rail. We then go through an analysis stage, during which we bring in specialists, if required, to consider the evidence. This may lead to further investigation. The questions the committee is asking are the type of questions we will be asking of those involved. We will then draw conclusions and make recommendations and furnish a draft report. The draft report will be given to those who have made statements or given evidence to us in order that they can express their thoughts on it. The final report will then be published. Importantly, although our process is confidential, the final report will be made public and available to all. These are the six stages of the process. I note that there might be a seventh in that I might be back to answer questions from the committee following publication of the report. The committee may invite us back to go over it.

In this investigation we realise how massive is the concern on the part of both members and the public and have taken the step of posting notices in all railway stations from Connolly Station to Drogheda to elicit public evidence. While I do not wish to go into detail, we have looked into all the features and bits and pieces in the newspapers regarding comments by members of the public, as well as other stuff and I hope we will miss nothing. Moreover, the report will be completely public and transparent and members may question us on it.

Mr. John Welsby

I wish to revert to the issue of resources and funding that has been raised a few times. I echo Dr. Lynch's comments to the effect that in respect of safety, funding never has been an issue. That had always been the case with the inspectorate prior to the commission's establishment in 2006. Our remit has changed consistently and regularly in the past ten years. We have sought additional staff and funding and at no time have we been constrained. Were our role to change and the European directive and framework under development to dictate that we should approach our work in a different way, I am satisfied that if additional resources were needed, they would be forthcoming.

Deputy Thomas P. Broughan

Is it not the case that had this disaster occurred, the commission would have been a total and utter failure? It has admitted that it played no role in invigilating the bridge. Mr. Welsby cannot come before the committee and assert that it has the necessary resources because clearly it does not. Incidentally, members have a responsibility to invigilate the commission. The failure of the Railway Safety Commission under the 2005 Act is a highly significant matter to which the joint committee must return.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

We have had two budgets in the past 12 months and I refer to the second one. I understand it contains a clearly identified cutback in funding to the Railway Safety Commission. That is a fact. I have three short questions.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

I apologise for interrupting but this has been raised twice with Mr. Cullen and Mr. Welsby——

Chairman

Deputy Kennedy should not interrupt.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

That is a fact.

Deputy Michael Kennedy

It is not true.

Deputy James Reilly

It is. There were cuts in the budget.

Chairman

Deputy O'Dowd to continue without interruption.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

Ultimately, I revert to the key points with three questions. Did the engineer use a boat for his inspection? How did he inspect the line or markings? I seek a response to this first question.

Chairman

The Deputy should ask his three questions, as we are out of time.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

While I understand the Chairman is out of time, as a member of the joint committee, I am happy to facilitate the speedy answer to these questions.

A red herring has been introduced to the effect that sometimes trains might be overweight. In other words, as the track is built to carry weight X, a train carrying weight Y can affect the foundations. Is there any truth in the rumour that trains were left on that part of the viaduct while works were being undertaken in Malahide? If so, were such trains heavier than normal or were they freight trains?

Another important question pertains to the opening of doors. Were the electric systems to fail, how would one open the doors underwater?

Another important point relates to the advice one should give to the public. I believe the last thing one should do is to break the window because in so doing one would allow the water in and the oxygen out. While I accept floatation aids will not be available inside the carriages, clearly there is a need for public information on what one should do in this respect. If one keeps the airlock intact for as long as possible, one has some chance of being rescued. However, if one breaks the window, assuming it has not been broken, one will have a problem.

My final point reverts to the question that appears to be at the core of this issue. I return to the IRMS report of 2001 and its findings in respect of bridges, structure and scour which state, "Although no major problems have been experienced [in Dublin with bridges affected by scour], there are quite a number of bridges that are potentially liable to scour". It continues by stating, "Based on the results of the risk assessment an inspection and management regime should be put in place that would include underwater inspection where the condition of the structure cannot be determined during a dry summer inspection where appropriate". The key point is that "monitoring of the behaviour of the river bed should be included in the management regime". Has there been monitoring by Iarnród Éireann of the riverbed or seabed of the Malahide Estuary since 2001?

Mr. Richard Fearn

The Deputy asked if the inspector used a boat. He did not use a boat but it was low tide——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

How could he look at it?

Mr. Richard Fearn

He took the action he needed to get a good view of the issue raised by the colleague from the sea scouts.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

He cannot look down through the tracks.

Mr. Richard Fearn

He took a number of vantage points where he could see what was being raised. We now know that he could not see the issue that arose. Our colleague from UCC, who is helping us, told us that matters can move very quickly in erosion, subject to volume and velocity. Things changed between the point he made the inspection and the collapse some days later.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The key point is that comments were made in the IRMS report about examinations or inspections. It was not an examination if he did not examine the bridge.

Mr. Richard Fearn

He examined the issues on the piers that were raised in the telephone call. He did not see the undersea erosion and that is the issue of our inquiry. We will understand what evidence we need to find in future for that.

There is no issue with the weight of trains and trains standing on the viaduct. Train weight, axle weight and permissible axle weight are key parts of railway safety. No trains standing or passing over the viaduct have had problems with axle weight.

The fire officers take the lead in evacuation. There are ways of getting train doors open when the electrics have failed. If there is a derailment on land and the electrics have failed, it is necessary to be able to get the doors open.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

What would happen in water?

Mr. Richard Fearn

In water, that might be a problem because opening the door lets water in. One of the issues covered by the emergency services in the Lough Owel exercises was how the various emergency services would work together in order to carry out the rescue. Rescue is not the expertise of railwaymen, it is the expertise of the emergency services. We need to give the emergency services all the information we can about the technology so that they can carry out their work as best they can. I cannot answer the question of how precisely the emergency services would have rescued people. Emergency services officers would be more proficient on this question. We co-operate fully and provide all the information needed about the nature of the trains.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The key point is that the photograph in The Irish Times shows the sea scout standing on the abutment of the supports and pointing at the bridge. Is Mr. Fearn telling me that the engineer did not physically go to that point?

Mr. Richard Fearn

He did go to that point but he did not get a boat out. The fact that we see the sea scouts standing at the base of the pier demonstrates to us that the base of the pier was intact at that point.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I found that unacceptable.

Mr. Richard Fearn

We have reached a point where that is the key issue for the investigation.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The point is that Mr. Fearn's investigation did not do this. Sea scouts float on water in their crafts. They talk about what changes they may have detected in the way water flowed through this point. The key issue was how the water affected the bridge. The engineer did not go next or near the water.

Chairman

The investigation will examine this matter and we will not solve it today.

Mr. John Welsby

In response to Deputy Broughan's last remark, the commission carries out its work appropriately and effectively. We welcome the opportunity to explain that more thoroughly.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I want the answer to the question I asked concerning the monitoring of the seabed in 2001.

Mr. Richard Fearn

I am sorry, I did not answer that in the first round. That was an important recommendation. The 2006 report by Arthur D. Little finds that we had put in place arrangements for scour——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

The question concerns examining the seabed.

Mr. Richard Fearn

Yes, and the 2006 survey——

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I am not talking about that; I am talking about the issue raised in 2001 of examining the river bed. Has it been examined?

Dr. John Lynch

That was a recommendation made in 2001.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

Was it done? That is the question.

Dr. John Lynch

By 2006 Arthur D. Little had gone through it and put recommendations to us. We sent a diver down in 2006.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

That is not the issue. Two issues are raised: underwater examinations and monitoring the river bed. Was the river bed monitored?

Dr. John Lynch

Yes.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

When?

Dr. John Lynch

In 2006.

Deputy Fergus O’Dowd

I mean continuous monitoring.

Deputy James Reilly

"Monitoring" implies ongoing and what happened in 2006 was a once-off. I want to ask another question for clarity. Did the engineer stand at the base of the pier?

Chairman

All of this will form part of the investigation. We have had a comprehensive response. Will Mr. Fearn give us the name of the sea scout who made the telephone call?

Mr. Richard Fearn

The sea scout leader who reported the issue to us is Mr. Ivan Barratt. We called him back and subsequently our engineers met him. We are very grateful to him

Chairman

We commend Mr. Barratt on doing his civic duty by taking the trouble to make that call. I thank all of the delegates for their forthright responses. We are all extremely lucky that the driver acted so quickly and a serious tragedy was averted. I am sure lessons will be learned. We look forward to early publication of the report.

The joint committee adjourned at 12.50 p.m. until 3.45 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 September 2009.