——because I think it is vital to the future of this country and this country's people that there should be no doubt in the mind of the general populace that the Government can rely implicitly, and does rely implicitly, upon the loyalty of the Army and of the Gárda Síochána. But I say, and I say it with a great deal of diffidence, and I am sorry that the debate has made it necessary for me to refer to it at all, that the Army has a certain history which has made a certain element in this country, without any justification whatsoever, look askance at the Army, and deny to the Army the confidence which the Government feels in the Army. So far as the Army is concerned, we wish that every citizen will regard it, as we regard it, as a truly national army, as a sure bulwark and defence of this country against external aggression. We wish that Army to be cherished and regarded by every element in our population as something to be proud of, as something to be honoured, and as something to be sustained and supported when the country's need requires it. Therefore, on the ground of the highest public policy, we would refuse, unless we were driven to the last extremity, ever to bring out the Army in the streets of the capital of this country, or in any city or town in this country, against the Irish people, no matter what section of the Irish people might be involved. That is why we thought it undesirable and inadvisable, on the grounds of the highest public interest, to involve the Army in the proceedings of last Sunday, if they possibly could be kept out of it. I say, on general principles, that that is the soundest and the safest line for any Executive to pursue, particularly any Executive that is the successor, as we have been, to the aftermath of the civil war. That is why, whatever may have been the practice in other countries, which have a longer tradition behind them, I think it would be exceedingly undesirable, unless, as I repeat again, in the last resort, and there is no other weapon to which recourse may be had, to utilise the Army in the preservation of internal peace in this country.
The question then arose, as we had an under-manned Gárda, weak and insufficient for any abnormal demands upon it, what were we to do? We did exactly what our predecessors did when, in 1931, they had determined to put the Public Safety Act in operation. We recruited at once men of good character, wherever they were to be had, who would accept the duty, which members of the ordinary Gárda might not accept, of having to bear arms to defend public buildings in an emergency. I do not know whether some of the Senators who laugh remember their own speeches during this debate. We were told how, because it was necessary to prevent this parade of a private army on Sunday, the townships has to be denuded of Gárda, and burglaries were committed in the open daylight. Because the Government is forced to deal with a situation, which is not of its own creation, which it has tolerated almost to the point of weakness, because at last it is compelled to deal with it, are we to denude the townships and the suburbs and the surrounding towns of their proper police protection, and to leave them the prey of every robber, every burglar, every housebreaker that may feel himself at liberty then, and with licence then, simply because we would hesitate to follow the precedent that in a similar situation had been created for us by our predecessors? There was a certain list of people who had applied for membership of the Gárda. Those of them who had experience were taken on at once and were brought in for a limited time. It is our intention, as soon as the emergency passes, to reduce the strength of the Gárda again and to revert to our old policy and suspend recruiting to the Gárda until such time as the force can be reorganised, upon a new basic. It must be remembered that it is difficult for us to bring about that reorganisation in the course of 12 or 18 months. We had started on that road but now we find ourselves, as any Government may find itself, compelled temporarily by circumstances to reverse our policy, but only temporarily, I hope. At the same time, we find ourselves with an organisation based upon the maintenance of numerous isolated units, scattered all over the country. Barracks have been built for those scattered units and those barracks and premises must be maintained. The organisation of the force has been based upon that decentralised dispersion. We cannot undo that in the course of a night and I think that, when an emergency such as this arises, we have got to deal with it, limited as we are by the organisation which we have inherited.
As soon as the emergency passes we will proceed with that reorganisation. I feel confident, and I am sure that the general public feels confident also, that the emergency has passed already and that it has been made clear that the present Government will not tolerate any attempt to overthrow representative Government in this country unless those who wish to change our present system of parliamentary Government come, first of all, before the people as parliamentary candidates and secure a clear parliamentary mandate from the people for their programme. I think, that when it has been made clear to all elements, both to those who would seek to have such a change and to those who would oppose it, that the menace which many people feared a month ago has passed and that the emergency has passed, we will be able to dispense with the recruits brought in during the past three or four weeks.
Again, I should like to put it to the Seanad that, in so far as anything we did in 1933 is concerned, we followed exactly and meticulously, I might say, the course pursued by our predecessors in 1931. We were a Government called upon to deal with a sudden emergency and we had to find the people who, we were confident, would deal with that emergency. The emergency I believe has passed and I trust that we shall be able, in due course, to dispense with the services of the supernumerary Guards. But there is no new force. These men have been recruited to the Gárda and are being subject to Gárda discipline. They are under the control of the existing Gárda officers and are in uniform. So that, at any rate, they are not subject to the criticism which might easily have been levelled at their predecessors who were enrolled in 1931. The people, at any rate, will know that they are officers of the State and members of the State forces.
I think I have dealt—possibly more fully than was advisable—with some of the statements made during this debate. I should like to go back, however, again to what, I think, is the real measure at issue in this debate, and that is whether the Seanad, by insisting on this amendment, will hold up the Bill. I have pointed out already that, if that course is taken, it can only mean one thing, and that is the imposition of additional taxation upon the backs of the people. Frankly, I admit—I have admitted it from the very beginning—that I am very anxious about the present position in that regard. I am looking forward eagerly to the time when we shall be able to reduce the present rates of taxation but I am not, and the Government is not, going to permit a situation to arise in which at the close of the year we should face a deficit. We believe that would be very damaging to our credit, that it would be more damaging to our credit than all the scares and ballyhooing which have taken place in the newspapers in the last five or six weeks. I say that it would be a very serious thing for the Seanad to do anything that would endanger our credit. We have seen the present Government come into office in circumstances of extreme difficulty. The moment we came into office the National Loans began to fall, but after two or three months of our administration a change came about. When we came into office the purchases of Savings Certificates were falling off, but some time after we came into office a change came about there also. People began to see that our régime was not going to be accompanied by scenes of bloodshed and turmoil, as had been so freely predicted. They began to see that we were tackling such difficulties as we had to meet manfully and courageously. The price of the National Loans began to appreciate in the market and the sales of Savings Certificates began to go up. A couple of months ago the sales of the Savings Certificates were mounting at such a rate that we became alarmed, withdrew the old issue and substituted a new issue carrying exactly the same rate of interest as the British Savings Certificates. We have found that the sales of these certificates show a very acceptable increase over the sales of the old certificates at the corresponding period of last year. At any rate, so far as the mind of the small investor in this country is concerned, we have placed the credit of this State upon a level with that of the British State and our Savings Certificates can be freely sold here to yield only the same return as the British Savings Certificates.
One way or another, whether due to the policy of our predecessors or not, it has taken almost 11 years to bring about that condition of affairs. If the Seanad insists on this amendment to-day and by such action holds up this Bill, what is the position with which we are going to be faced? The position will be either that we have to face the situation and impose additional taxation upon the backs of the people—and does anybody think we can do that?— or else refuse to face it and run away from it and allow expenditure to go on without taking any corresponding steps to provide revenue to meet that expenditure and thus be faced with a deficit at the end of the year which, I hold, would be disastrous to our credit. Such a situation, I think, would do irreparable damage to our credit. For that reason, I ask the Seanad not to insist on this amendment and hold up this Bill, and I ask them to do so on the only ground on which this matter should have been discussed to-day, and that is on the ground of the effect of such a situation upon the public finances. For that reason I ask the Seanad not to insist on this amendment and to agree with the Dáil in allowing the Bill to go through.
