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Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 14 Sep 1976

Vol. 85 No. 4

Emergency Powers Bill, 1976: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill to be now read a Second Time."

Cavan): This is a very straightforward measure that has only one new substantive provision, namely, that which proposes to give power to the Garda Síochána to hold in custody for up to seven days persons suspected in connection with offences under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, or of offences that are scheduled offences for the purposes of that Act. The proposal is that the provision will lapse 12 months after the date of enactment of the Bill unless it is continued in force by Government order but that when it has lapsed it may be reactivated by Government order. The proposal in relation to the proposed Act as a whole is that it will expire whenever the Dáil and Seanad resolve that the national emergency under which it is enacted has ceased to exist.

Subsection (1) of section 2 of the Bill empowers a member of the Garda Síochána—on production of his identification card, if demanded, where he is not in uniform—without warrant to stop, search, question and arrest any person if he suspects with reasonable cause that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of that Act or if he suspects with reasonable cause that the person is carrying any document or other article or thing or is in possession of information, relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence.

Subsection (2) of the section empowers a garda to stop and search any vehicle or vessel which he suspects with reasonable cause to contain a person whom he is empowered to arrest without warrant pursuant to subsection (1).

Section 2 also provides that a person arrested under the section may be kept in custody in a Garda station, prison or other convenient place for a period of 48 hours from the time of his arrest and may, if a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent so directs, be kept in such custody for a further period not exceeding five days. At any time during the period of custody a person may be charged before the District Court or a Special Criminal Court with an offence or be released by direction of a Garda superintendent. If he is not so charged or released, he must be released at the expiration of seven days.

This is the only emergency measure considered by the Government to be necessary at present to enable the Garda to deal more effectively with the problems created by the activities in our society of subversive groups. The Garda asked for the extension of the power conferred by section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act to keep persons in custody by a provision raising to seven days the period for which a person may be held. This, in effect, is what the Bill proposes, though the proposed section 2 is self-contained and the Bill provides that the powers provided by section 30, which is of course part of the ordinary criminal law, shall not be exercisable during any period when section 2 is in force.

I am satisfied and I should like this House to be satisfied also that there are good and sufficient reasons for the request made by the Garda. We must bear in mind that the powers in question are intended to be used against persons who are involved in subversive activities, who have an organisation and a commitment which, however misguided, is not to be found among the general run of offenders. Special measures are needed to deal with such persons who, for example, are prepared and capable of intimidating witnesses and otherwise hampering the Garda in their investigations. The power to keep such persons, when suspected of serious offence, out of circulation for some days can be of extreme importance in enabling the Garda to ensure that the ends of justice are served.

I commend the Bill to the House.

First of all, I should like to get the meaning of this Bill into proper perspective. A number of us who said that virtually or effectively the Constitution is suspended for the purpose of this Bill have been regarded as using too intemperate language. In fact the Bill is declared in its title to be "an Act for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of an armed conflict in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas has adopted a resolution ... pursuant to subsection 3º of section 3 of Article 28 of the Constitution". That means that any offences under enactments for the securing of public safety and the preservation of the State in time of an armed conflict are suspended from constitutional scrutiny and secure immunity from the invocation of any Article or section of the Constitution.

Which offence?

An offence for which the person so arrested is subsequently detained for seven days. That detention for seven days is removed, as far as that person detained is concerned, from the protection of the Constitution. In effect the Constitution is suspended as far as that person detained is concerned. That should be quite clear, because if anything is calculated to bring lawyers and legal argument into disrepute at times it is, in my view, semantics.

I would have far preferred initially if this Government came quite clearly and openly to us and said: " Yes, we want to suspend the Constitution. We have to suspend the Constitution for the purpose of bringing in this legislation to give us the powers of detention for seven days because of a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h security reasons", and spelled out the serious reasons why the Government were impeded in the administration of justice under the present law of the land and the present security and police arrangements. This case has not been made, and in case there is any doubt as to whether any Bill such as this Bill, when it becomes law, is immune from the Constitution, I would quote a very interesting book published in 1967 by Deputy J.M. Kelly on Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution. Professor Kelly, on page 20, quotes the Article, section and subsection under which this Bill is being introduced, stating emphatically that “Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate any Act enacted by the Oireachtas which purports to be in the nature of this Bill.”“Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate”— that is what is in the Constitution, so that in effect nothing in this Constitution can be invoked to invalidate this Bill when it becomes law. That is quite clear. That is in the Constitution and it is not just Deputy J.M. Kelly talking in his book. It is further on that Deputy J.M. Kelly in his book on Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution becomes very interesting, because, talking about the article I have just referred to, he states quite clearly on page 21:

Thus it is perfectly possible in time of war or armed rebellion for the Oireachtas by prefixing to any Act the declaration——

That is the declaration that is here in this Bill before us

——that it is for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State, to withdraw the contents of the Act entirely from the control of the Constitution.

That is the exact phraseology then used by Professor Kelly, now Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach —"to withdraw the contents of the Act entirely from the Constitution". That means that, as far as the purpose of this Act is concerned, the Constitution is suspended. Yet I happened to be in a debate with Deputy Kelly, the Parliamentary Secretary, on this particular matter and he had the effrontery to tell the Irish public, through the television medium, that the Constitution was not suspended for the purposes of this Act. He says here quite clearly in his own calm, detached and properly legal book that the effect of the invocation of Article 28 of the Constitution is to withdraw this Bill entirely from the control of the Constitution.

By virtue of the Constitution which of course is not suspended.

This is sort of semantics that does no credit to lawyers, in my view. I am quoting from the Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Kelly here, and perhaps I could be told the difference between invalidation, suspension, withdrawal of the contents of the Act entirely from the control of the Constitution" and Deputy Cosgrave's proposal when he described it as putting the Constitution in cold storage on the similar Emergency Powers Bill being introduced in 1939. Let us forget about the semantics. The Parliamentary Secretary describes it accurately here when he says that, in effect, a Bill of the kind we are now discussing here is withdrawn entirely from the control of the Constitution. He goes on to say:

Even where the contents of the Act or some of them have manifestly nothing whatever to do with such a purpose....

And here is the important quote which starts at the bottom of page 22 and continues on to page 23. He talks about the withdrawal of an Act from the control of the Constitution and says:

The significance of all this would be slight were it not that the various fundamental rights which were previously notionally present in the common law have been subsumed in and replaced by the written guarantees. Thus—

and this is the example—I say again in parentheses—that I quoted on the debate on the motion and again which Deputy Kelly denied to the Irish public on television was the case.

—to take the most obvious example. No right to habeas corpus exists independently of Article 40 which contains provisions for a procedure in the nature of habeas corpus.

Then he goes on to quote two cases, Burke's case and the State, Walsh v Lenihan and others which have found that Deputy Kelly's statement of the law there is correct. Therefore, in effect, the only right to habeas corpus that exists as far as Ireland is concerned is contained in Article 40 where you have the fundamental right to human liberty set out. Article 40 is the Article specifically designed to cover the type of detention case envisaged in this Bill. Article 40 is now effectively suspended as far as this Bill is concerned and, indeed, that was the whole purpose of bringing in the declaration, Deputy FitzGerald, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, came at it another way. And he is reported in The Irish Press of this morning as describing the introduction of the state of emergency and the need for a power to detain people for seven days as a technically. At least he is honest to say, and I quote from The Irish Press:

The State of Emergency had been introduced to give this period of detention immunity from Constitutional challenge.

That is the other way of coming at it. For the past two weeks the Constitution has not been suspended at all. The right of habeas corpus has not been taken from people who will be detained in accordance with this Bill. The Constitution is not in any way removed from inquiring into the case of a person who is detained under this Bill, but today we have Deputy FitzGerald as Minister for Foreign Affairs coming at it the other way: The constitutional guarantee is removed but it is a mere nothing. That is, in effect, what Deputy FitzGerald states when he describes the State of Emergency as being introduced to give the period of detention immunity from Constitutional challenge and describes the introduction of this State of Emergency as a technicality. If it is a technicality, we are in the same company as the Greek government who are the only other government who were forced to derogate from the Convention of Human Rights because of their attitude towards basic freedoms and basic rights. That is the only other member government, high contracting party, who have been put in that position. The Colonels found that their operations were not in accordance with the Convention on Human Rights and were forced to derogate. We are going to be forced to derogate as well and yet, the Minister, Deputy FitzGerald, describes the matter as a technicality. Other people take the view that this is not going to be at all harmful as far as investment and tourism in Ireland are concerned. Indeed that was the reason the Minister for Foreign Affairs described it as a technicality. He was trying to reassure a group of American businessmen who were obviously concerned. With his usual perspicacity he decided in Killarney last night to reassure those businessmen and he made it the main theme of his speech that this suspension of the Constitution was——

The Senator wants to remove that reassurance?

——a technicality. I am concerned about the fact that an Irish Government takes a positive and deliberate step to suspend the Constitution in regard to detention without trial for a period of seven days——

The Senator wants to tell the American industrialists they should not invest here?

——and that by reason of doing that has to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy FitzGerald, is suggesting that the rest of the world does not know about that. Of course they already know about it. The media world has been humming since the decision was made. I did not make the decision and nobody on this side of the House made the decision. The decision was made by the Government to blazen our name in the worst possible manner on the teleprinters, along the wires of the world and in every newspaper and other media presentation in the world. We are now branded as a country that has been forced to suspend its Constitution for certain purposes—that is what this Bill is about—and a country that will have to derogate, as the Greek Colonels were forced to derogate, from the European Convention on Human Rights. These are not matters of our decision.

These are matters of governmental decision. If Deputy FitzGerald is trying to pick up the pieces at this stage, that is understandable. The damage having been done, Deputy FitzGerald goes down to Killarney last night to a group of American businessmen and the whole tenor of his speech is that this declaration of an emergency is a technicality. He describes legislation, first of all, declaring an emergency by way of motion, incorporating that declaration of emergency in the title of a Bill thus effectively removing from constitutional challenge any matter contained in this Bill, such as detention without trial for seven days, as a technicality, in order to soft soap the American businessmen. It is not regarded as a technicality. This was Deputy FitzGerald's problem when talking to the American businessmen last night. I sympathise with his problem because what has erupted here over the past three weeks is not by any means a technicality; it is a sign of a Government who have lost their nerve, a Government who are guilty of the worst form of over-reaction to a situation that could be dealt with under our present laws and under the present security arrangements within our community.

As I have said here on the debate on the motion and as the Fianna Fáil Opposition have done in the Dáil, we are willing to give a Second Reading —and we have given it in the Dáil— to the Criminal Law Bill and agree that within the corpus of legislation —tough though it may be and regarded by some people as undesirable —known as the Offences Against the State code, which does not impinge on the Constitution, the existing penalties could be increased drastically as they are under the Criminal Law Bill. We went along with that as an Opposition and with other offences related to the existing Offences Against the State code. Further powers of arrest and so on could be given to the Garda Síochána, and we had no objection to that.

Short of specific objections on two sections of the Criminal Law Bill, our case has been that it is a Bill which is firming up the existing code in regard to dealing with members of unlawful organisations and we will support the Government on that. That is what we have done in the Dáil in regard to the other measure which is not before us yet.

I mention that in order to point out that if this Government, instead of playing politics with a highly inflammable area of security, had come to us with a reasonable Bill strengthening the existing code, prescribing increased penalties under the various headings of the Offences Against the State Act, providing for increased powers for these purposes, for the Gardaí if necessary, in regard to search and arrest we would have supported them.

Do you not feel that it is a question for the Garda?

We are talking about the judgment of a Government. The Government must exercise their judgment in regard to the advice they receive from the Garda and the Army and their own political judgment. The most important judgment exercised in the governmental democratic process is the judgment exercised by the people who we elect as our Government.

The Senator is asking us not to be political, in one breath, and in the next breath he is saying we must exercise political judgment. He should make up his mind.

I am talking about politics in the better sense of the word which Senator Markey would not understand, because that is what real politics is about. Real politics is about electing Ministers to a Government who exercise political judgment in the national interest, and by political judgment I mean real political judgment. I am not talking in party political terms. Basically this Government have been guilty either of the worst form of over-reaction or just straightforward stupidity, and that is the sympathetic way of looking at it. Otherwise, they were just playing mean, despicable, point-gaining politics for the sake of wrong-footing Fianna Fáil, for the sake of creating an artificial issue on which possibly an election might be based, for the sake of any one of a number of motives such as erecting a smoke-screen so as to hide the defective handling of the economy.

We are not that professional.

I am not going to ascribe these motives, because I prefer to ascribe motives to the present Government that are based on fundamental stupidity and lack of judgment rather than on what I might call political criminality.

Leaving aside base political motives and taking the decision on its merits as an act of judgment by an allegedly responsible Government, one cannot but be appalled by the situation that has given this legislation massive publicity, massive adverse criticism and comment about this country throughout the world, leading us inevitably to a situation where we will have to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights and where we are telling the world we are in a critical state of national emergency. The critical state of national emergency that was given as the reason for introducing this state of emergency and this Bill was the unfortunate and tragic assassination of the British Ambassador and the placing of explosives in Green Street courthouse during a recent trial.

That was the culmination.

These were the two specific matters referred to by the Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach himself. There is nothing in this Bill to deal with that problem and there is nothing that a declaration of a state of emergency is going to do to deal with that problem. They are fundamentally problems to be dealt with by more effective security. They are problems that could be met to a very large degree if the Government would put sufficient police personnel on the ground for 24 hours of the day and get off their hobby-horse and give the personnel the overtime payments they require to do that job. That is the way it should be handled. It is not going to be handled by suspending police operations, as if a criminal or security investigation could be handled on a time basis, as if one could clock in and clock out at specific times. That is what is rendering security and crime investigation ineffective at present. Every member of the Garda Síochána will tell you that, from commissioner down to garda. That is what is preventing the Garda from properly organising a 24-hour scrutiny on the ground, with their personnel working full out.

That would have been far more important and effective than all the states of emergency created in the world and would have dealt comprehensively with the job. Fundamentally we are in a certain state of lawlessness at present that has got nothing to do with a state of emergency but rather the Government's inefficiency in handling it. Figures were published yesterday which show that there has been, as compared with this time last year, a 20 per cent increase of violence in this country— crimes of violence to property. Ninety-nine per cent of these crimes of violence have nothing to do with the provisional IRA or other un-unlawful organisations. They have to do with criminals who are being let loose, footloose and fancy free, around this State due to the inadequacy of ordinary security work. There is a lack of personnel on the ground on the part of the Government and a lack of Garda personnel working full out over 24 hours a day each day.

That is where the flaw is, and there is no point in ascribing the Government's own security and police deficiencies to the police or the security personnel. They are due to the Government's not giving sufficient money and personnel to this area. There is no point in ascribing those flaws as providing the basis for the declaration of the state of emergency such as we have here on foot of this legislation before us.

If we are in an increasing state of lawlessness and if crimes of violence to property, which is a matter of severe concern and worry to the citizens of this country at present, are increasing, it is not for want of legislation but for want of more police personnel on the ground. This legislation serves no purpose in that area. This legislation introduces a sweeping situation under section 2 of the Bill, and for very good reason the Government had to suspend the Constitution so far as section 2 of this Bill is concerned. For very good reason they have admitted that it is in derogation of the European Convention on Human Rights and that the Government will have to withdraw from their adherence to that convention.

Under section 2 of this Bill what we have, in effect, is a situation where, on suspicion by any member of the Garda Síochána a person about to commit an offence, as well as a person having committed an offence, can be incarcerated for seven days incommunicado. I refer to this now because it is also very important and it is the reason why I quoted at length from Deputy Kelly's book on the withdrawal of constitutional rights and Deputy Kelly says that habeas corpus does not exist outside Article 40 of the Constitution. Unless it is written into this Bill how can such a person invoke any rights that he may have in regard to seeing a doctor or a solicitor or having himself or herself brought before the courts under habeas corpus, if, in fact, the whole Constitution is suspended so far as the matter contained in this Bill is concerned? If by some amazing operation some member of the Garda Síochána decided to technically bring the detained person before the court—I am in the realms of fantasy now——

(Cavan): That is the best thing the Senator has said to date.

——if the person is committed incommunicado for seven days, who is going to ascertain where he or she is? There are no obligations imposed here on the Garda Síochána to inform his relatives, who can then inform a medical or legal person of his whereabouts. Assume it is done— we are not going into the area of the garda himself doing it directly— and the garda does tell the detained person's relatives of his whereabouts, if that relative seeks to bring an application of habeas corpus before the courts, and it could be argued that he or she has a right on behalf of the detained person to bring such an application to court, as there is no deprivation of that right, the court could not look at the situation because the court has no right under this Bill to look into the reasons why that person is detained.

Here again on a legal technicality and on a basis of legal semantics, it can be argued that somehow if either a garda himself or the garda through informing a relative or friend did bring an application to the court, the High Court judge would have an obligation to hear the application. I am not denying that. But that is as far as it could get. All the State would have to do is say: "My lord, Article 40 of the Constitution, guaranteeing habeas corpus and that this person's detention must be in accordance with the law, is suspended by the Emergency Powers Act and this person is being detained in accordance with the law under section 2 of that Act”. That is the end of the story. That renders habeas corpus a very nugatory matter. It is all very well for the Minister for Justice and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, Deputy Kelly, to say that the Constitution is not suspended in regard to habeas corpus. As Deputy Professor Kelly says rightly in his book, habeas corpus is now only included in Article 40 and Article 40 is abandoned so far as anybody seeking to have his detention inquired into if he is detained under section 2 of this Bill.

To use the words habeas corpus absolutely, you can have the body before the court, but that is as far as the body can get because when this enactment is law the court is precluded from examining into the circumstances of that person's detention, and that is what the right is all about. The right is not just about having the body before a court in front of a High Court judge. The right is all about that High Court judge's right to inquire into the reasons for the detention, into the whys and the wherefores and whether that person is detained in accordance with law and the Constitution. That is what habeas corpus is all about.

Is the Senator saying he cannot inquire into the reasonable cause?

I want to come to this aspect, because this is the whole basis for the declaration of emergency by the Government. The reason why the Constitution is suspended in this manner is that the Government, with their legal advice, know that 48 hours has existed already within the Offences Against the State legislation and would have been regarded as reasonable cause by the courts if challenged and would always be accepted as such. Therefore any extension beyond 48 hours led the Government straight away into this area of inquiry into whether or not the detainee was detained with reasonable cause but——

(Cavan): I said coming in here that I would not interrupt, but really the Senator obviously has not understood what Senator Robinson said. Senator Robinson was talking about the Garda having reasonable cause for suspecting an offence and Senator Lenihan is going off at a tangent and is talking about something else.

I think we are talking about the same thing actually.

No, I would maintain that there can be inquiry into reasonable cause.

It is the same Bill anyhow.

That is not the important one. The important one that they cannot inquire into is the rights or wrongs of a habeas corpus application. That is precisely the reason this Bill has been brought in, because the extension from two days to seven days is a matter that no court would regard as being reasonable and no court would regard such detention as being reasonable without giving reasons for arrest. The court at present would take the view that 24 hours or 48 hours would be regarded as a reasonable period, but there is a further question of whether seven days' detention would be regarded by the courts as being a reasonable period for detention without trial or without charge. I take it that, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy FitzGerald, said last night, that is precisely the reason why the Bill is being introduced. The reason why the Bill is being introduced is that the existing two days' detention would be held by the courts to be reasonable; seven days' detention would not be held by them to be reasonable, and therefore the reasons for the detention for any longer period than 48 hours could be inquired into by a High Court judge acting under Article 40 of the Constitution. For that reason Article 40 of the Constitution is no longer valid as far as this measure is concerned.

Is that an accurate summary of the situation? If not then the Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported this morning is not speaking the truth. I take his word in this respect, because he tends to be one member of the Government, fortunately or unfortunately, who comes out with the truth in situations like that. We usually get from him the real reason behind a Bill, whereas this sort of thing is usually clouded by other members of the Government. I want to get back to this point about seven days' detention being an exclusion from Article 40 of the Constitution and the rights of habeas corpus. I quote directly from today's Irish Press, page 4:

Speaking about the seven days' detention measure, Dr. FitzGerald said that because this goes beyond what would normally be permitted by a Constitution "that is vigilant with respect to human rights" the state of emergency had been introduced to give this period of detention immunity from Constitutional challenge".

If that is not a precise summary of what I have been saying for the past few minutes, I do not know what is. It is the first honest and precise summary of why the Government have brought in this measure. It is headed "Emergency a Technicality, Fitzgerald on New Law". He was talking in Killarney last night, addressing a meeting of the Chief Executives Forum, a group of American businessmen and he said that:

No similar problem...

and I quote again directly.

Is the Senator trying to provoke the Chair by indicating that he proposes to quote and requote?

No. This is a separate quotation. I have been building up to this one. He was addressing a meeting of the Chief Executives Forum, a group of American businessmen and I have not quoted this yet, a Chathaoirleach, so please wait in future—entirely with respect:

No similar problem to that which exists in the North is to be found in the Republic but in this part of Ireland we have of course suffered from the overflow of the Northern Ireland problem.

If there is no similar problem here to that which exists in the North, why the state of national emergency? Why the Bill suspending the Constitution in respect of detention? The Minister for Foreign Affairs assures the Chief Executives Forum of the United States that no similar problem to that which exists in the North exists in this part of Ireland Then he said:

Speaking about the seven days detention measure, Dr FitzGerald said that because this goes beyond what would normally be permitted by a Constitution "that is vigilant with respect to human rights," the state of emergency had been introduced to give this period of detention immunity from Constitutional challenge.

That is not the same as habeas corpus.

Deputy Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, on page 22 of Fundamental Rights in Irish Law, is talking about the significance of what we have here before us, the resolution which has been passed, the inclusion of that resolution in the Title, and the Bill which we have here. You will have to take my word for it that that is a summary of what he has been talking about. Then in reference to this type of measure he says and I quote the second paragraph on page 22:

The significance of all this would be slight were is not that the various "fundamental" rights which were previously notionally present in the common law have been subsumed in and replaced by the written guarantees. Thus, to take the most obvious example, no right to Habeas Corpus exists independently of Article 40, which contains provisions for a procedure in the nature of Habeas Corpus

Then he refers to what Johnston J. says in Burke's case and what Maguire P. said in The State (Walsh) v Lennon and others. I am not before a court so I am not going into details of what they said but I take it that it will be accepted here that Deputy Kelly has summarised the position pretty well in that paragraph.

He is talking about habeas corpus to challenge constitutionality and not habeas corpus to challenge the grounds of reasonable cause for arrest or detention.

That is a matter for the courts to decide at some future date, but the judges are even stronger on what they say and they are talking about fundamental principles. I quote from Johnston J. on page 23. He is even stronger than Deputy Kelly.

The Constitution of 1937 represents a fresh start in respect of the fundamental principles that are to be the guide of this country for the future, and I do not think that a further Constitution—an unwritten one—was intended by the people of Eire to exist side by side with this written Constitution, or even—perhaps it would be more correct to say—outside and beyond the present Constitution.

In the State (Walsh) v Lennon and Others Maguire P was even more explicit: I am still quoting from Deputy Kelly's book I am now quoting from the judgment.

The contention is that the constitutional principles which assure to a citizen his personal liberty, his right to resort to this Court for an order of Habeas Corpus, his right that he shall not be tried on a criminal charge save in due course of law, have as their source the common law, and exist side by side with these rights in the written Constitution. I do not find in the judgment of Murnaghan J. or elsewhere in the judgments in (Burke's) case any basis for the contention that these rights are to be found in a body of principles which exist side by side with the written Constitution, having their source in the common law, and of equal validity with the principles stated in the Constitution, and which, on the argument here, would have the added virtue that they are uncontrolled by Article 28, s.3, sub-s.

which I take it, has been adverted to here.

The constitutional rights relied upon in this case find clear expression in Articles 40 and 38 of the constitution. In my view they cannot be found elsewhere than in the Constitution.

There is no point in arguing across the floor of the House about that book. It is a very well argued book, but Deputy Kelly's whole contention is to point out and point up the serious consequences involved in the declaration of a state of emergency by reason of the fact that our fundamental rights in our society are guaranteed by the Constitution and by a particular guarantee by Article 40 of the Constitution in so far as they relate to personal liberty. That is the tenor of Deputy Kelly's case. He is arguing very cogently, and I agree with him, that this is such a serious matter that it should not be taken flippantly and it should not be in any way regarded as a mere matter of administrative or executive convenience. He would of course totally repudiate the fact that such a declaration is only a technicality.

Deputy Kelly, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, was of course writing for a serious audience. The Government should also treat the Irish people as being serious people in regard to their views. The Government through a very hasty, very stupid, very ill-judged over-reaction in this matter have antagonised the common sense and the good sense and the intelligence of the Irish people. This is very evident, and it is not enough to say that, because the media are rightly opposed to the matter because of the other censorship clauses in the criminal Law Bill, that it is only the media who are opposed to the Government in this matter. They are not. They are not just opposed to the Government because of their own interest. The media , in my view, are accurately reflecting the mood and the opinions of the Irish people at present in this matter. The people have always in Ireland rightly looked with the gravest suspicion on any type of legislation that smells of coercion. There is a long history of it in Ireland, a history of hundreds of years. It is built deeply into the Irish character and embedded in the Irish psyche. I think the people supported such a measure in 1939 because there was a world war engulfing most of the globe which we as a tiny country managed to escape. In order to escape from it we had to undertake severe measures in our domestic legislation. It is of interest to note another point that has been made in regard to the declaration that existed in regard to the emergency. that no legislation existed under that declaration of emergency in 1939, since the Emergency Powers Act was finally terminated in 1946. Subsequent Offences Against the State legislation was introduced by Fianna Fáil Governments and subsequent actions taken by them were taken under the Offences Against the State Act legislation, which is constitutional. A point sometimes missed is that the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, was found to be constitutional and any offence created under the Offences Against the State Act code is in accordance with the ordinary law of this country under the Constitution and requires no suspension of the Constitution.

Therefore why did the Government not exercise the proper and prudent judgment in this case by extending the powers under that code that has been found to be constitutional and which they have done in the sister piece of legislation, the Criminal Law Bill? It defies comprehension why they had to embark on this exercise of declaring a national emergency and passing this unconstitutional legislation which can be implemented only on the basis of removing the Constitution from it. It defies comprehension as a matter of an exercise in political judgement and political common sense. They have done themselves grievous harm, and I am not sorry in this respect. I suppose it is only right that politicians do suffer electorally by reason of poor judgment. In this sense the poor judgment that has been exercised by the Government is having the required political effect as far as their support is concerned, because basically Governments survive on their credibility with the electorate. If the electorate get the notion the Government have lost their nerve, are over-reacting, making stupid decisions because they have lost their nerve, or think they are being politically smart—and this is exactly what the public think at present about the whole Government approach to this package, and I can assure the Minister for Defence it is—there is only one answer for a Government in that situation and that is to get out.

Could I ask Senator Lenihan do I understand or represent fairly his position with regard to emergency powers, that it was proper to take them in 1939 and to maintain them throughout the war years or that it would have been improper to take them for an extended period beyond the war years? I think he said that they ended just with the end of hostilities.

Effectively. The resolution stayed there but the legislation——

The resolution of emergency stayed there but that the legislation ended. Would I surprise Senator Lenihan by reminding him of his own biography of which I made a close study even when irrelevant to any debate in this House? The very first piece of legislation that Senator Lenihan ever supported when elected a Member of the Oireachtas was emergency powers legislation, an Emergency Powers Act which depended for its validity and was preserved from constitutional criticism to the extent and to the extent only that this Bill will be preserved from constitutional criticism. The very first Bill which he supported on his election to the Seanad in 1957 and the very first piece of legislation that Senator Eoin Ryan supported was a Bill which depended for its validity and preserved from constitutional criticism to the extent and to the extent only that this Bill is, and that the Bill when enacted was called the Supplies and Services (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1946, Continuance Act, 1957. Senator Lenihan said that the emergency powers legislation came to an end in, I think, 1945 or 1946. It would be of interest to jurists in case Senator Robinson had not observed this point——

I am looking at the Continuance Act.

——to know that in 1946 the Fianna Fáil Government continued the emergency powers legislation which was enacted in 1939 but with the usual Fianna Fáil adroitness they changed the Title.

That was to deal with imports of tea and things like that.

It depended for its validity on the fact that it could not be criticised under the Constitution. The Title to that Act, when first introduced was

An Act to provide for the continued exercise during a limited period, of certain powers, in relation to supplies and services and certain other matters, conferred by the Emergency Powers Act, 1939—

It included, incidentally, according to the Minister who introduced the Bill in 1946 some 2,000 orders. In fact, they did not know precisely how many or what matters were affected by this——

The Senator is making a very clever debating point.

—and to continue in force for a limited period certain orders and instruments made under the said Act, and to provide for divers other matters, (including the charging of fees on certain licences and other documents connected with the matters aforesaid.

(Interruptions.)

Import licences.

The Minister introducing that Bill in Dáil Éireann in 1946, disingenuously, I regret to say, and only in his defence can I say that it was as a result of a question put to him in the course of the debate, said "This Bill does not depend upon the emergency powers resolution". That Act did depend upon the emergency powers resolution. The first Bill which Senators Lenihan and Ryan both supported in 1957 depended on the existence of the resolution——

There was certainly no vote at that time.

——was very relevant indeed to the whole question which was raised by Senator Robinson here the other day when debating the motion as to how long these matters can, in fact, go on for. If you look at the Title to the Act it also disposes of any question of the validity of an Act depending upon the recital in the Title because there were thousands of prosecutions brought under these Acts. So far as my researches have gone their constitutionality was never impugned although the provisions did go beyond and infringe the rights of the individual as set forth in the Constitution. The research of the Fianna Fáil Party is available during the continuance of this debate to refute anything which I may have said.

Senator Robinson quoted a judge, a friend of hers, who said a Bill enacted under the existing emergency resolution would lack all reality and would be without support. On that I would like to say first that a judge's authority depends on your knowing what his name is, because some judges are better than others. It also depends on the extent of the arguments which he offers in the course of his judgement, as to the authority it would carry. The passing remark of a judge to Senator Robinson at a party or a meeting or somewhere else bears no authority whatever. I would suggest that if, in 1967 when there was no greater armed conflict than exists in 1976, legislation was valid then, the Government could dishonestly have come forward with a Bill under the existing resolution and that such would not have been found to be unconstitutional. If I am wrong in that, may I say that it reinforces——

Which you are.

——the argument against the extravagant language used with regard to the abrogation or suspension of the Constitution because, if a resolution passed in 1939 could have been challenged in 1957, or a Bill enacted pursuant to it, or if it could have been challenged in 1976, then it would seem to me that it supports the view I expressed that under this Article this Bill can be challenged. As I happen to support the Bill and to understand why it is being introduced it is not my business to offer anybody who wants to attack it any argument which might make his attack successful. I do not feel that in this place I have to play the part of a amicus curiae, if there is such a picture known to the Irish courts, and I shall not be an amicus to any of the people who need friendship and against whom this Bill is enacted.

From that I would go on to join issue with Senator Lenihan and with some language which has been used by Senator Robinson, which I regretted to hear her use in her usually stimulating and well-researched contribution, when she suggested this was an abrogation or suspension of the Constitution.

I think I quoted the report of the All-Party Committee on the Constitution.

Which was held in 1967 and which was certainly a year or two before the events which have since occurred. I have the greatest doubt that it would have been expressed in the form in which it was expressed if in fact these events had then occurred. I regret to have to criticise Senator Robinson on any matter, as the Senator well knows. We share an ability to differ without differing in human relations. I do not think it is at all fair for the Senator to say that successive Governments bear a very substantial measure of deep responsibility for this because they employed political attitudes and excuses which did not carry any weight to continue latent powers which go beyond what would be acceptable in a democratic society. Latent powers have been used—and here I must confess that I was unfair to Senator Yeats in the course of the earlier debate on the motion when I thought he was interrupting me: only when I read the full report did I realise he was properly correcting me because he was saying, which is true, that of course the motion, as such, does permit the introduction of other Bills. I will deal with that in due course.

At the moment I would just like to deal with the general matter of what is not in the Bill, what is not true. First, it is not true to say in any language which is meaningful and legally sustainable, as a statement of the law which would be acceptable by any court, that this Bill involved any suspension or abrogation of the Constitution. That is a falsehood. I am not saying that anybody who utters it is telling a lie because he may believe it to be true. The sole effect of this Bill when enacted will be to deprive a person, of whom a member of the Garda Síochána has reasonable cause to suspect that he is about to commit an offence, of his liberty for a period which cannot be greater than seven days. He takes no other right whatever from him.

Except that right.

That is all I said.

May I say that you went much further than that? It does not involve a suspension of the Constitution any more than the Act that was enacted in 1957 involved a suspension or abrogation of the Constitution. I do not accuse the Fianna Fáil Government of suspending or abrogating the constitution. I commend the Fianna Fáil Government for the extraordinary skills with which they managed to dispatch the Dáil in 1957. Can Senators remember the 4th July, 1957. Can they remember what happened the next day when the Government introduced internment? It was the day after the ending of the Dáil session when internment could no longer be subject to criticism. If one looks at the Dáil debates which preceded 4th July one will not find one hint or suggestion that internment would be introduced.

Internment can be for an indefinite period. It is copperfastened by the Supreme Court decision in 1940 when the Amendment Act was introduced and when it was referred to the President. By virtue of another Article of the Constitution when a Bill has been referred to the Supreme Court by the President, it can never be criticised or attacked for its validity.

What is interesting in the democratic attitude of the Fianna Fáil Party at that time. What debate took place within the Fianna Fáil Party on that? What public debate took place in Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann which continued to sit after the 5th July, 1957? What was open to the Senators to say? What did they say? This is the party which is so deeply concerned for the liberty of the subject—which dare now to say that the Constitution is suspended or abrogated.

That is the first falsehood. The second falsehood which has been stated is that witnesses can be arrested. Witnesses cannot be arrested. The only power under this Bill is to arrest somebody who is reasonably suspected to have committed, to be committing or to be about to commit an offence. That has been said by responsible people and is false.

"...in possession of information...

If he is suspected of being in possession of information. And he can be arrested if he is suspected of doing what he ought not to do under a law which Fianna Fáil proposed, enacted and maintained and which I do not criticise as being incorrect.

It could be a witness.

With great respect, there must be a reasonable ground. Senator Ryan made a very good contribution to the motion, a very rational and cool-headed one. I do not want to let this discussion degenerate into a party political debate at all. I do not think there is very much dividing the Opposition from the Government in reality and in heart as distinct from what is expressed.

A member of the Garda Síochána ...may without warrant stop, search, question and arrest any person, or do any one or more of those things in respect of any person, if he suspects with reasonable cause——

There has to be reasonable cause. He can have recourse to the courts, or someone can have recourse to the courts for him, if there is not reasonable cause,

——that that person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences against the State Act, 1939, or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of that Act, or if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person is carrying any document or other article or thing, or is in possession of information relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence.

That is a very limited and restricted power. I do not want to mislead anyone in the House because I find that the more I reflect on these things the more importance I attach to individual liberty.

It is incorrect to state that one's rights under habeas corpus legislation are gone. It is incorrect to state, even if the entire Constitution were abandoned—which it is not—that the habeas corpus rights would have gone. If we refer to the transitional provisions under Article 50 there then arises the position that the laws which were in force, subject to this Constitution, to the extent to which they are not inconsistent therewith, immediately prior to the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, “shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or all or any of them shall be repealed or amended by an enactment of the Oireachtas.”

It is suggested that the persons arrested under this section are deprived of their rights. This is a falsehood. Whatever rights these persons have at this moment they will continue to have after the enactment, just the same as if they were in custody under any other Act enacted by the Oireachtas. On the question of their rights to audience, it is well-known to all that the matter of what the nature of these rights is, will come up for judicial determination fairly soon. It is interesting to look at the British rules with regard to the evidence which they admit. They do not bind here but they are very similar —some are more extended—to the rules which exist here, the Judges' Rules.

They do not have a written Constitution.

The Judges' Rules contain a preamble which I would think to be a correct statement of the law here. These are administrative rules. They are a guidance to the police so that they will conduct their inquiries in such a way that evidence will not be inadmissable in court against the people whom they seek to convict on the evidence they get. They are not rules of law. They have at the moment in Britain a preamble which I take to be a finding of Queen's Bench judges and this is a good indication of what would be found to be the rules here. I want to quote this piece because it is important enough to be put on record.

These rules do not affect the principles.

(a) That citizens have a duty to help a police office to discover and apprehend offenders—

a duty which is more honoured you may say in the breach than in the observance but it has relevane to the question of employment of military—

(b) the police officers, otherwise than by arrest, cannot compel any person against his will to come to or remain in any police station

(c) that every person in any stage of investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor—

—That is stated as a principle—

This is so even if he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay of hinderance is caused to the process of an investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so.

(d) When a police officer who is making inquiries of any person about an offence has enough evidence to prefer a charge against that person for the offence he should, without delay, cause that person to be charged and informed that he may be prosecuted for the offence.

The final provision which has a strong comment on it, is:

(e) That it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any person equally of any oral answer given by that person to a question put by a police officer and of any statement made by that person that it shall have been voluntary in the sense that it has not been obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority or by oppression.

A principle set out in paragraph (c) I suggest is overriding and applicable in all cases. I suggest to the House that it is overriding and applicable to the cases of all persons held in custody against whom charges are brought in any subsequent proceedings; that the judges will require as a principle of our law, even if the Constitution were abolished that the confession was voluntary.

The matter has been dealt with in a whole series of cases, which I have assembled here but they are not orderly enough to quote from them immediately. One of the cases, which is not too old, is that of a Customs case against a man called Harz, Commissioners of Customs and Excise and Harz and another respondent, reported as a House of Lords' decision as recently as 1966. It is interesting to note that in the course of Lord Reid's judgment, he says:

Some statutes expressly provide that incriminating answers may be used against the person who gives them and some statutes expressly provide that they may not.

This is interesting because it may come for the consideration of the court as to whether or not under the law there has been any express right claimed by the Executive here to require a person to answer and incriminate himself. There was an earlier Irish Act, an earlier Customs Act, where Chief Justice Sullivan, I think, held that because the defendant or the accused person was "obliged to answer truthfully", because these words were in the legislation, this in fact set aside the ordinary principle —this would not be a matter of a constitutional right—that he could not be required to incriminate himself. It is a matter for consideration as to whether or not it applies in this particular case. I have quoted it as being relevant to this question.

It is untrue to say that the accused can be rearrested, although it has been held in the Lawless case that they can be detained within the internment provisions of the Offences Against the State Act, 1940. A member of the Fianna Fáil Party, a lawyer, actually said that they could be assaulted. This is absolutely untrue. If they are assaulted, they can bring charges which could be not merely of a tortrous but of a criminal nature in the conditions of their detention and they will succeed if they prove their case.

Somebody has mentioned that they can be tortured. This is not merely untrue but a gross misinterpretation of any intent of the Executive. I would join with all Members who wish to see that every safeguard is taken in the circumstance which have brought about this legislation, to prevent any degeneration in the attitude of a highly-respected force which could lead to such suggestions.

I do not want to be misunderstood because the Garda are entitled to an expression of belief in them and in their morale which I hold, but my own opinion on this matter is well expressed by the late Kevin O'Higgins who uttered the strong words: "If the police break the law I'll break the police". Having said that, I want to emphasise that I have absolute faith in the force and in their ability and preparedness to do what is right, to comply with the law and to be fair. They, too, are in sympathy with the people; they do not want torture or any abuse.

There is no use at all in enacting legislation of this kind if it alienates the people. There is no use— and this is the important fact—in attempting without the support of the people to combat this mischief which I regard as a conspiracy to take away civil liberties from people. That is, in essence, what the IRA are all about, suppressed under a proclamation bearing the signature of Éamonn de Valera and continuing to be supressed by virtue of that order to this day. That is the only order in existence which makes it, by presumption, an unlawful organisation which attempts to suppress the civil liberties of the people; it attempts to take away from them their right, not merely to live their own lives as they choose to live them within the law but it attempts to frighten them. It endeavours to take away from them the right to freely remove this Government from office and to put in another. It attempts to usurp the functions which are vested by the people in the Executive elected by Dáil Éireann. They attempt to determine what our foreign policy should be; they attempt to take from the people their right by free voting in free conditions to determine who shall have the power of making laws, who shall be under their judgment and how they are to be judged.

I am not concerned with the political question of whether any other organisation ought to be suppressed. That is a political question requiring political judgment. All I know is that one particular organisation has been suppressed as unlawful. There are other unlawful organisation which can be proved to be so. The mischief they represent must be measured against the Bill which this Government must have felt sad about introducing which the whole controversy indicates the people are sad at having to face and which I am sad at having to support. Let us know who are the creators of this small subtraction of liberty from people who are capable of being suspected of committing offences or having committed an offence. It is the unlawful organisations that are in question. They are the cause of this legislation. If there is any subtraction from liberty it is caused by the unlawful activities of people who will not even give the people the right to draw breath against their wishes if they decree, by some mysterious processes of their own decisions, that their lives are to be terminated. They are prepared to denigrate in a tradition which, admittedly, has long deluded them. I find myself very much in agreement with what Senator Noel Browne said in the course of the motion which led to this Bill with regard to their education and political background. I agree with Senators Horgan and Robinson about the battle for the minds, wills and hearts of the people. I agree with these Senators and, I think, with Senator Higgins also. I agree that this is only a short-term measure in the sense that it is only one part of the one set of techniques which we are forced to adopt.

But let us not fool ourselves. What if we had abrogated the Constitution, which we have not? I will give examples of those Articles of the Constitution which are still alive and kicking, kicking against us as Members of the Oireachtas, kicking against the Executive as operators of the executive power. Let us realise what we would have done if we had abrogated the Constitution in its entirety. We would have created a situation in which we would have been as unfree as British subjects and no more unfree than British subjects.

If this Bill subtracts from the liberty of certain suspected persons in the manner in which it clearly does, let us be quite clear a similar subtraction has been taken by an Act freely enacted by the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Let us understand that they could in the morning do all sorts of things with regard to the abrogation of people's freedom which cannot be done here unless in the same British conditions we have a people prepared for what further subtraction is necessary, unless in these conditions people are prepared to accept it. At the end of the day it is the people who will decide whether this was right or this was wrong. If we in this party, or in the Labour Party, wrongly judge that this is necessary in the people's interests to protect the people's civil liberties, the cornerstone of civil liberties is the maintenance of the order, which regulates the matter of their exercise.

Let me remind the House that it was a British Labour Government which introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Bill and duly enacted it. It is substantially the same with respect to Senator Horgan. The differences, which I will argue when we get to the Committee Stage of this Bill, are not as substantial as to make it anything important. What is significant is that there was no difficulty for that Labour Government in introducing it in circumstances infinitely less dangerous to the British people than the circumstances in which we live in this State at the moment. There is nobody who would dare say properly of the IRA that they are claiming to be the Government of Britain. There is nobody who would dare say of the IRA in Britain that they are pretending to represent British policy. Nobody could possibly suggest that the IRA are representing Britain to the world as truly expressing majority British opinion.

What are these people doing? They are challenging the very legitimacy of the institutions which we are operating when we freely speak in them. They are challenging the people's rights in their fullest powers, and they are challenging them by fear and intimidation. People say that there is no emergency, some justifying it on the most trivial grounds that the Houses have not sat over the weekend; some have suggested it is bogus; some have said it is too late. I would judge it not too late not to be counter-productive, not to be an over-reaction.

There has been an over-reaction, which I understand is due to a complete misunderstanding of what is not in this Bill but is in the other Bill. May I just tell the House some of the things that are not in this Bill? There is not in this Bill what there was in the Emergency Powers Act, 1939. Section 2 (1) of the 1939 Act reads:

The Government may, whenever and so often as they think fit, make by order (in this Act referred to as an emergency order) such provisions as are, in the opinion of the Government, necessary or expedient for securing the public safety or the preservation of the State, or for the maintenance of public order, or for the provision and control of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.

It was later amended to make it quite clear that the list set out in section 2 (2) did not exhaust the powers of the Government or in any way limit the powers of the Government under subsection (1). May I refer to one or two of the things that are contained in subsection (2) (h)? The gentlemen of the press might take note of the fact that the very proper advice that the Government of the day got to introduce what they did introduce was that they could not take the power of censorship unless they took it by virtue of an Emergency Powers Act. It is not contained in the Offences Against the State Act which was permanent legislation. It was not introduced in that because it could not be introduced. It would have been unconstitutional if it had been in that permanent legislation, but it was included in section 2 (2) of the Emergency Powers Act, 1939. I am going to say something which the gentlemen of the press ought to remember in fairness to Fianna Fáil with regard to that and I quote:

...authorise and provide for the censorship, restriction, control, or partial or complete suspension of communication by means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs or by any other means, whether public or private, specified or indicated in such emergency order.

That provision is not contained in this Bill, nor was it intended to be contained in this Bill. If that were contained in the other Bill, which it is not, it would be unconstitutional. The other Bill can in no way be protected from the provisions of the Constitution giving liberty of expression and guaranteeing freedom of expression to the people.

In favour of Fianna Fáil I should like to say the truth of the matter is that all the parties represented in this House have over the years had an identity of view with regard to an assault on the institutions of the State, an assault on their liberty. There may have been an error of judgment in duration on this or on that. There may have been opposition voiced in public which would have been voiced in private within either party in any case.

It is fair to say of Fianna Fáil that section 6 (1) of the 1945 Emergency Powers (Continuance and Amendment) Act, which Senator Lenihan thought was the end of the emergency powers legislation, which it was not, continued until 31st December, 1957, by virtue of his own support in that year, stated that:

Nothing in section 2 of the principal Act shall be construed as authorising the Government by order under the said section—

(a) to authorise and, provide for the censorship, restriction, control, or partial or complete suspension of communication by means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs of any other means, whether public or private, or,

(b) to make provision for prohibiting the publication or spreading of any matter, or to authorise or provide for the control and censorship of newspapers and periodicals, ...

It is interesting to those who think that the Executive in Ireland can or wants to take steps which involve suppression of people's liberties. They do not for the good reason that they know people do not want it so, except when it is necessary, as it was in 1945. I will agree that the same Fianna Fáil Government made in 1946 a curt decision to withdraw and terminate it. I will go further and say that if there was any real tendency at that time towards dictatorial power— which I never thought for one moment and do not to this day in relation to the current Fianna Fáil Party—they might not have been put out of office in 1948 if they had not repealed section 6 of the 1945 Act. If there had been some type of political dishonesty involved—as Senator Robinson suggested, but she may not have used those exact words—there was a good excuse for them to pretend that nothing was really safe quite yet. But they did not and in due course criticism of them mounted and they were put out of office. The point I am making is that they were advised in 1939 by their law officer that it would be necessary to have this under the protection of a resolution passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas. It ceased when it was no longer necessary for the protection of the safety of the State.

The word "state" seems to upset some people. There seems to be some suggestion that this is some legal word which is a justification for doing anything in the interest of the status quo. Somebody recently distinguished for me the state from the status quo. One of the noblest people involved in the Easter Week Rebellion was James Connolly. He was referred to by Senator Browne or some other Member of this House. James Connolly was quoting St. Augustine when he said that it was up to the people of Ireland But he did not use the word “state”. His language can be used much more in criticism of the republican tradition —because he was a socialist—than of the type of society which we now have and which is moving in the direction in which it will inevitably move. “Ireland needs nothing but the people of Ireland”. That is exactly what St. Augustine said about Rome, or, to be precise, “What is Rome but the Romans”. It is the people we are talking about when we are talking about the State. It is their liberties we are talking about, their welfare and the protection of their rights, their ability to choose and put out Governments and to accept any political philosophy they want to whether it is our philosophy or not. It is their power to do that. These powers are in no way affected by the provisions of this Bill.

Perhaps we could be honest with each other on this. There is some talk about the Labour Party wrestling with its conscience. This type of wrestling with conscience goes on in all parties in relation to all sorts of issues. It is a matter of public knowledge that there are differences of opinion within the Fine Gael Party, differences which are on the records of both Houses, certainly on the record of the Dáil, with regard to the 1972 Act. There may be even differences of opinion at this moment as to the precise form, timing and nature of this legislation. There is in all parties a lesser or greater appreciation of the importance of strengthening the institutions of the State so that these institutions can protect the people and the people's liberties.

Deputy John Kelly made a particularly good speech on September 2nd in the Dáil which seemed to get lost in the swamp of protests in the reporting generally. He talked about the timidity of western Governments in standing up for democracy. If that timidity is not replaced by determination that it should be otherwise, these democracies which I believe are capable of doing great things, whatever criticism you may make of them, are certainly better than any institution of society existing at the moment.

With regard to this whole question of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour, let me just quote Law in the Making by C.K. Allen, 1961, 6th edition, when he talks of the effects of legislative industry, which is what we are engaging in. He epitomizes in the terse phrase, “Laws foster or create law-making opinion.” In connection with one of his fully expounded examples of reformative legislation on the status of women in England he sums up:

Law and opinion are here so intermixed that it is difficult to say whether opinion has done most to produce legislation or laws to create a state of legislative opinion.

Then there is a comment on the suffragette movement and so on:

The popular consciousness with which legislation must always stand in harmony, at least in societies with representative government is the code of prevailing convictions which we call public opinion.

He goes on to quote Dicey:

There exists at any given time a body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, accepted principles or firmly rooted prejudices which, taken together, make up the public opinion of a particular era, or what we may call the reigning or predominant current of opinion and as regards, at any rate, the last three or four centuries, especially the 19th century, the influence of this dominant current of opinion has in England, if we look at the matter broadly, determined directly or indirectly the course of legislation.

So it is true of Ireland. Can there be any doubt from the course of elections—and I have not gone beyond the year 1939—and the answers at referenda of the attempt of lawless conspiracy to stifle the people's liberties, the civil liberties that the civil libertarians want properly to preserve? Can there be any doubt as to what is the prevailing public opinion on this matter, a public opinion which none of us, either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael, should try to exploit? Very little divides us on this; and the same is true of Labour. Labour has its honourable abstainers, even honourable opponents to this legislation. This is a good thing. Is it thought that there is no conscience in either of the other parties? Is it thought about this Government, with all the support we want to give it because we believe it is seeking to make this society one that we will the more value, one that we believe will be regarded as the more just? Is it to be thought that if for example, the Taoiseach was seated there instead of the Minister who is substituting for the Minister for Justice, that I or other Members of my party would be found accepting any serious attempt similar to, for example, the Emergency Powers Act of 1939? Is it thought that we would vote for these measures? Is it thought that Senators Owens, Quinn, Mary Robinson or any other Senator would vote for them? You know it is not true. You know that the Bills would not even come in here and it is because of this matter of public opinion and the shared view with regard to all of this.

On the last occasion I tried to say that the cornerstone on which the whole edifice of the civil liberties is erected, is the support which the citizen gives the Parliament and the Executive for executing the laws of Parliament. Without that support, it is no good paying your daily debt; it is no good if we do proper acts of redistribution of income or wealth between people. None of this is any good unless the citizen himself is concerned to support the State and unless the State governs, making the decisions it has got to make, the brave decisions it has got to make in necessarily in direct conflict with the freely expressed opinions of the time, many of them beset on misunderstanding as to what is involved and based on an insufficient jurisprudence, an unsufficient understanding of the basis of all law; that the authority of the law maker derives essentially, ultimately and freely from the people.

I should like to put this final point to the House, and that is: in 1932 in Germany there was a very fine Constitution. I remember getting lectures on it, its qualities and the refinements of that Constitution and how delicate all the balances were. What we had not got in Germany at that time was an executive which was strong enough in its own self-confidence to defend the democratic values which were valued by the people of Germany then. We had not got an executive prepared to face up to Hitler, to face up to and suppress an illegal organisation, an organisation whose founder had declared his intention to take power by violent means if necessary, although he was lucky enough to perform a constitutional trick and get his power that way. But he had declared his intentions. If we were talking about a Nazi conspiracy now, in Irish terms how close is the IRA to a Nazi conspiracy? It is close because it is prepared to use violence. It is close because it is extremely nationalistic. It is close because it exploits an ancient belief of the Irish people. If necessary, measures which will not devalue the democracy whose values we should seek to preserve should be taken.

I wonder if the letters to the newspapers would have been different. I wonder if the judgments of the different associations would have been different. There are so many of them now I am lost. I would want to get a list of scheduled associations with regard to civil liberties. I do not know which is the good one, which is the semi-good one, or which is the louser. I know you have got to be very careful dealing with perfectly respectable bodies because I am not sure which of them is which. What if this law was directed against, for example, racial discrimination? What if this was a law promoting racial discrimination? Do you think there would have been quite as much correspondence as there has been. This would have been a popular liberal theme that you should not racially discriminate. For God's sake, get it clear. I am not in favour of racial discrimination. Let us get that clear in case anyone should misunderstand it. Say, for example, there was such a move afoot and this was a Bill attempting to deal with it and was subtracting from their civil liberties by giving a superintendent the power to extend the detention of persons who were concerned to pursue this vile objective. Would we have had quite so many resolutions, quite so much expression of concern? I suggest not.

It is worth considering why it is so. For many years I have puzzled over it and I have not yet found an explanation. Why is it that liberals who value freedom of expression of opinion would never allow anybody else to disagree with them? Why is it that liberals are always saying the same thing? If what they are fighting for is the right of free expression, surely to God they should be expressing different opinions from time to time instead of the same opinions. We ought to value the liberal tradition for the reason that we own to that liberal tradition in Britain more than we have ever allowed for the establishment of this State.

Instead of Senator Lenihan telling us that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was misleading the United States industralists in Killarney last night by telling them that the Constitution was not abrogated, Senator Lenihan ought to go on the radio and withdraw that remark. Senator Lenihan ought to tell the United States industrialists and Greece—I gather some woman has written to say they are not to come here on holidays any more because we are living in a state of total suppression— that our state of suppression is this; we are as subject as the subjects of the Queen; we are as terrified as the citizens of London. We have more liberty than the subjects of the Queen.

It is a gross misrepresentation of this State and of what the people of this State want, or would ever support, to suggest that we have suspended the Constitution, that we have limited the free expression of opinion, the freedom of thought or any of the other personal liberties. We have done one small damn thing, or are proposing to do it. We are proposing to give to a Minister who has made a judgment, in company with the other members of his Government, that he needs a certain power. Presumably he has asked that this power be taken by the advice from his security advisers, which advice it may be presumed under our system has been sifted by the civil servants who advise him; that this small power is taken and taken only to protect people and that this power goes no further than in the small detail that the extra five days are to be certified for in Britain by the Home Secretary and certified for here by a chief superintendent.

I ask you, is that such a monstrous inversion of order? The Minister for Justice is answerable anyhow to Dáil Éireann for the performance of the Garda. It is a matter of political judgment. Maybe that should have been the decision of the Government. Maybe it should have been the Minister for Justice, but if it is not, how material a matter is that—unless we are going to take up in this House, as I certainly do not think any one of us want to take up in this House, that we lack confidence in the professionalism of the Garda in their desire to do that which is right, in the desire to combat mischief by methods which are not themselves mischievous? If damage has been done, the mischief makers have done it.

I dislike this legislation. It has been forced upon us to introduce it. The creators of the mischief who have led us to do what is a sad thing for us to have to do are the IRA and all those who have engaged in violence and all those behind them who have taught them to believe in violence. They are the real mischief makers and this Bill and its sister or brother lying completely within the ambit of the Constitution will only succeed if the people are not misled as to its contents, are not misled into a belief that all the provisions of the Constitution are not there still to protect them, that theirs is the right to raise and maintain an army and theirs only. But let it be said for the Fianna Fáil Government, that even when in the middle of the war they established a military court without power of appeal and with a right to try people, convict them and to sentence them to death without appeal, even when the emergency powers legislation which was then used and then successfully operated to protect the liberties of the people at that time, the article of Constitution providing that they shall not be deemed to be offencer which were not so at the time they were committed, was not ignored, as it could have been. Even in the heart of the war that was not done, even with censorship in full operation that was not done. But the people's right to vote, their right to require the Taoiseach to come before them, for the Government, to come before them for judgment, to have a secret ballot within periods of years provided, none of these rights are anything other than preserved by this legislation. All their other liberties set forth in the Constitution are there.

Damage will have been done to the tourist trade no doubt. People will have been frightened, people who do not know our situation. I do not think the people of Ireland are frightened by this legislation, though they might be frightened by a Government that have not the courage to go ahead and face into this organisation. It might be frightened by timidity and division in the Executive, and there has been no timidity and no division in the Executive. I share the regret that has been expressed by Senator Quinlan in this House, that there was not consultation between the parties before this was enacted. I share the regret that in the nights of December, 1972, Fianna Fáil had not consulted with us when I said, speaking for myself: "If you had come to us we would have given you any power you wanted." I may add that Senator Boland, more alert to what I was saying than I was myself, made a far better speech later and said: "I am sure he meant any reasonable power", which of course was what I meant to say. But I am not very good at doctoring the record of what I actually said, so I am afraid it is there. However it was not a good precedent. Because it was a bad precedent it is no reason to follow it. I am sorry the parties are divided on this, because I think the parties ought to be united on it.

I am in full support of this Bill and recommend it to the House.

Senator FitzGerald has ranged far and wide in an effort to take the harm out of this Bill. He has been very entertaining and I think in fact deliberately entertaining, because he was reluctant to face up to the real issues that are in this Bill and in the declaration under which this Bill has been introduced. He has blown hot and cold about the Constitution. First of all, he says that the Constitution is not abrogated, is not affected, is not set aside. But then, in case he is wrong about that, he says in any event it does not really matter because, even if the Constitution was not there, well then we are no worse off than any subject of the Queen and that is a very healthy thing to be. Then he tells us that Constitutions are not very important, that they are possibly rather dangerous things, because the Germans had one in the early thirties and what did it do for them? This is all a very interesting, philsophical kind of dissertation, but as Members of the Oireachtas one of our duties is to protect the Constitution, whatever our views may be about Constitutions in general and this one in particular. One of our duties is to ensure that no laws are passed which are contrary to the Constitution or likely to infringe the Constitution, and consequently we are, whatever may be our private views about the Constitution, under an obligation to discuss this Bill against the background of the Constitution.

Senator FitzGerald has said that this Bill does not affect the rights of the individual under the Constitution, but of course the right to liberty, the basic right in the Constitution, is affected by this Bill. It is nonsense to say that the right to liberty is not affected by this Bill, because it is quite clear that in order to introduce this Bill the Constitution had to be set aside. It is nonsense to say that the Constitution has not been set aside in this respect. The declaration was introduced apparently for the sole purpose of passing this Bill and it had to be introduced because it would not have been possible to introduce this Bill without having the declaration, and the declaration was to set the Constitution aside in so far as the rights to liberty are being affected by this Bill. Therefore it just is not so, and it is nonsense to pretend that the Constitution has not been affected. Again Senator FitzGerald has talked about habeas corpus, saying that the rights tohabeas corpus have not been set aside or affected.

That is true to an extent. There is still the right to habeas corpus; it has not been set aside. One can still bring a case before the court, but the fact of the matter is that the case would now have to be thrown out by the court because although the right to habeas corpus is still there, it is virtually useless because what the court will have to find is that anybody who has been deprived of liberty by this Bill has been deprived of it in accordance with law, in accordance with a law which was introduced under the declaration and which would otherwise be contrary to the Constitution.

The position is that the nominal right to habeas corpus in this respect still applies, but in fact it will be useless to bring a case for habeas corpus because the court would have to find that the liberty the person was deprived of was according to this law which can now be passed but could not be were it not for the fact that the Constitution was set aside in so far as this applies. What we are really concerned with is the declaration which has apparently been made for the purpose of this Bill, at least that is what the Government have said; we must accept that that is the position for the moment until we see otherwise. In order to introduce this Bill the Government sought and got a declaration of a national emergency, which means they can introduce any other Bill they like and these Bills can affect all and every provision of the Constitution if the Government so desire and if the Bill in question says that it is a Bill introduced under the declaration.

But it would have to be in accordance with this law.

(Cavan): And if it is passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas.

And of course the Government have shown in the last few weeks that they can and will introduce such a Bill and will apply the guillotine if the Opposition are being anyway sticky about it. We now have a declaration under which the Government can do something which is normally contrary to the Constitution and are in a position to take further action if they want to do so. When Senator FitzGerald says—and I am really appalled that the he should attempt to dismiss it—that the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his speech in Killarney, was right and this is only a technicality, that "we only did one damn thing, a small little thing, a technical thing", is be really serious or is there any sense of concern about the gravity of what has been done by the Government? I am more appalled in one way by the attitude of Senator FitzGerald and the Government in attempting to dismiss this as a mere techinicality than I am by this Bill or the declaration itself.

If this is being shrugged off as being of no importance or not being a serious matter, of not having any ramifications, then it seems to me the Government are quite likely to introduce several more Bills just as serious and far-reaching and shrug them off as being technicalities and just another damn little thing of no consequence. It is the attitude of the Government, the effort to shrug this off, the effort to suggest that it is not of any gravity, that is in a way more frightening than the actual Bill itself.

I want to say one more thing about what Senator FitzGerald said in his speech in connection with whether section 2 of the Bill is applicable to a witness. This is a matter of interpreation of the Bill. Perhaps Senator FitzGerald is right in saying it could not and does not apply to a witness. It seems to me that it can and does apply. The last three lines of section 2, in so far as I interpret them, mean that a person can be arrested if he has information about a crime which has been committed or is about to be committed.

Senator Ryan will agree that this will be a matter for the courts who, If the Constitution has been suspended or abrogated, would not be there.

The interpretation of the section would be a matter for the courts certainly. But in my view I am very determined in the opinion that a court could and should interpret it—if they ignore the merits and ramifications—as meaning that a person who merely has information about a crime and its accordingely merely a witness of the crime can be arrested because he has information about the crime.

(Cavan): will Senator Ryan agree that that has been the position since 1939 under section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939?

We are talking about the detention provision.

We are taking about the extra five days. I am well aware there has been a provision for 48 hours up to now.

(Cavan): Would the Senator agree that, if what he is saying now is correct, a witness could have been held for 48 hours at any time since 1939 under the Offence Against the State Act, 1939?

I have not compared the two sections. If the Minister says the sections are identical I must agree.

This is a more lenient one.

This is what we are taking about, the extra five days.

There has to be reasonable cause for suspicion here. That was not in the 1939 Act.

It is bad enough for somebody about whom the police have reasonable cause to suspect of having committed a crime to be held for seven days, but it is much worse for somebody who has merely witnessed a crime to be held for seven days. Consequently, every way in which a person is affected by the extra five days is of great importance, even thought some people who have spoke on this do not think any of it is important.

Circumstances do not justify the declaration and certainly not in a general way for the purpose of introducing one Bill. I do not agree with this Bill. I do not think it is necessary to introduce the provisions that are introduced by this Bill. The declaration has been passed and this Bill has been passed in the other House, and I have no doubt will be passed in this House. Accordingly, let us consider the prose and cons, look at the positive and negative aspects of the Bill and agree for the purpose of argument that it may have some possible advantages. The Minister is convinced that the police want this Bill and the police apparently are convinced that they can be more effective with it. Let us accept that for the moment. There are those who think the Bill will in certain ways be effective. I do not think anybody, even those of us who are in favour of the Bill and support it, can deny that there are serious objections to the Bill, that even though it may help in one way, it may have apparent merits in one way, it has serious objections to it in other ways. This is proved by the fact that it is contrary to the Constitution. It was necessary to have a declaration in order to bring it into operation.

If the Bill was necessary and if the Government considered it necessary and was willing to go to the lengths of having a declaration of national emergency, one would have thought that the Minister, having gone to these lenghts to achieve something which seemed important to him, would be equally conscious of the objections to the Bill, that he would be equally conscious of the fact that rights and liberties of the citizen were involved, that he would be equally conscious of the fact that rights would be in jeopardy when this Bill was brought into operation. One would have thought that he would have been willing to go to equal lengths to ensure that if the Bill was brought into operation the rights of the citizen would be preserved in so far as it was possible to do so under this measure.

Several amendments have been suggested for this Bill. There have been numerous expressions of concern by the various civil liberty bodies which Senator FitzGerald has referred to, some having impeccable credentials and possible some of them not so impeccable. There have been views expressed on whether the family of the person detained under this Bill would be informed, whether he would have the right to see his legal and medical advisers. There has been concern expressed about the fact that the Bill can continue indefinitely.

If the Minister had the same concern for the possible dangers of this Bill as the enthusiasm which he has displayed in bringing it into operation, then it might have been more acceptable to us than it is at the moment. It is remarkable how the priorities of the Minister have changed in a matter of three or four years. In 1972 the Minister was vitally concerned in a Bill that was going through the House at that time. He was vitally concerned about the rights of the individual. Apparently he was not very much concerned about the problems of security at that time. In a matter of three or four years the Minister now seems to be vitally concerned about the matter of security and not very concerned at all about the rights of the individual. This is very distressing and very hard to understand. If the Minister really considers that the Bill is necessary why has he not shown the same concern, why has he not asked for the same precautions as he would have done and did do three or four years ago?

It is distressing and disquieting to see this lack of concern, this refusal to go to the same lengths to protect people who may be affected by this Bill, to go to the same lengths as he is willing to go to give the security force the powers they want. If the Minister can move from the attitude of mind he had in 1972 to the attitude of mind which he seems to have at the moment, then one would be very concerned about how this Bill would be put into operation if the Minister continues to be in office and if his concern for the individual continues to deteriorate. It is quite clear that there are abuses possible under this Bill. We are reassured that the security force will be given directives and so on. There is doubt in anybody's mind that abuses of liberty and human rights are possible under this Bill.

The Minister says that the police will not abuse their powers under this Bill. He says they are reasonable and decent men and have not abused their powers in the past, and there is no reason to believe they will abuse them in the future. I am quite willing to accept that 99.9 per cent of the police are reasonable, decent men who will not abuse their powers. Bill this is not good enough. The Constiution is there. The European Convention on Human Rights is there. There are hundreds of precautions written into hundreds of Acts passed by these Houses, because we know we cannot always rely on the rectitude of Governments, and security forces when they are under stress, when they want to do something which, in the spur of the moment situation existing, may seem to be a very effective way of dealing with the situation.

We have a Constiution for that reason. We have these precautions in numerous Bill because one cannot always depends on Government and on security forces to do the reasonable thing, not to abuse their powers. It is not sufficiently reassuring for the Minister to say that he will issue directives, that he will issue codes of conduct and so on under this Bill to make sure that the powers are not abused. These precautions that seem to be necessary and, I believe, are necessary should be written into this Bill. The Minister may say they are not necessary; perhaps they are not. Is there any harm in doing if? Is there any harm, when we are introducing a Bill which admittedly contains provision that are contrary to the Constitution, in writing a few sections into the Bill which will ensure that the power given are not abused? I am concerned and puzzled at the dogged reluctance of the Minister to consider any of the amendments which have been put to him.

Not one iota.

One cannot but suspect in the circumstances that there is some reason, that there are further Bills, some measures or some aspect of the present situation which would be affected by these amendments. Otherwise why is the Minister so reluctant to write them into the Bill?

Apart from the question of ensuring that families are informed and so on, one of the last-ditch precautions which has been suggested is that there should be a lapsing of these powers at the end of 12 months. This is certainly not an unreasonable suggestion. It is true to say that the emergency powers introduced in 1939 were there for many years and that successive Government did nothing to dispose of them, but they should have done something. That does not mean, at this stage, when we are reconsidering the whole question of emergency powers, that we should not have the precaution of allowing these powers to lapse at the end of 12 months unless they are reintroduced by a new order. After all, perhaps the powers in this Bill are excessive; perhaps the precautions are not enough—they hardly exist at all—and it would be reasonable to look at the Bill at the end of 12 months to see if it necessary of renew it and, if it is being renewed, to review it and to see what amendments are necessary. It is an eminently, reasonable and proper way of dealing with it. It is very little to ask the Government to include that provision in the Bill but, like all the other suggestions which have been made, that was has been turned down by the Government.

There is one other aspect of the Bill which has been discussed and on which I intend to put down an amendment, that is the question of how often this power can be used. Can it be used in relation to the same person again and again? There is noting in the Bill to say that it cannot be so used. There is nothing in the Bill to say that, a person having been detained for seven days, can not be detained again in a very short time, and again and again in the course of the year. The Minister has said that it would be improper to do this and he will so advise the security forces. That is merely an expression of opinion by the Minister. As far as the Bill is concerned, as far as the Act is concerned, when it becomes an Act, as far as a court is concerned when it looks at a situation where a person has been detained more than once in a short time, there is nothing in the Bill and there will be nothing in the Act, unless my amendment is accepted, to say this cannot be done.

Certainly, as this measure now stands it gets very near to detention and internment. It should contain a positive provisions which would say that detention for seven days is something which can happen to the same person only at very long intervals. I do not think an amendment to that effect has been put down so far but I hope that the Minister, who has stone-walled so many other suggestions for precauations for the individual, will not turn down this one too. If the Minister turns this down without giving some very good reason for doing so, then the anxiety and disquite which one feels about this Bill will be increased considerably.

As I said a the beginning, one must be reconcield to the fact that, to matter how much we object to this declaration of emergency, no matter how much we object to this Bill, it will go through. The Government have a majority in the House and they will push it through. Consequently, we can only do our best to ensure, however much we doubt the merits of the necessity for this Bill, that looking at it from the other point of view that of the citizens who will be affected by it, those who will be detained for seven days, every effort will be made to see that reasonable precautions will be taken to ensure in so far as it is possible, within the confines of the Bill, that their rights will be guaranteed and included in a specific way in the Bill. I hope that the amendments that will be put down will be seriously considered by the House and will at least be given some measure of support, which I am sorry to say was not given in the other House.

As a lay person following the debate on these measures in this House, in the other House and indeed in the media, my impression is that there seem to be as many interpretions of what is in the Bill and what is not the Bill as there are lawyers. Quite frankly, the contributies of the eminent members of the legal profession from all sides of the House have not done much to case my confusion.

I should like to agree with Senator FitzGerald when, towards the conclusion of his contribution, which I thoroughly enjoy, he said that he did not like this Bill. I do not like the Bill and I did not like the 1972 Bill, neither did I like the 1939 Bill when I reached the age when I could read it and understand what it was about. However, like Senator FitzGerald, I dislike even more what is happening in the country. I dislike seeing Dublin denuded of its people at night. I dislike having to submit to security searches when I enter an hotel. I dislike feeling fear in a public cinema or theatre. That fear is genuinely felt in the city today. Therefore, it is in the light of those dislikes and fears that I will make my decision on this Bill.

However, the real reason I wish to contribute at this Stage of the Bill is to raise a specific item which is of vital importance to many trade unionists in the country and one which has not been thrashed out as yet in the debate in the other House and so far in this House.

Arising from decisions of the courts, notably in what is generally referred to as the case of the Dublin Working Men's Club, and also in the British and Irish Steam Packet Company versus Brannigan: and Others, known as the Carlingford Lough Commissioners case, the protections for workers engaged in industrial disputes provides under the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, do not extend to a vast number of workers who are found mainly in the public services or employments that are termed as not engaged in trade or industry. This may not appear to be very relevant to what is before the House but I am advised that because of these decisions the following position in law pertains. Section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, provides among other things that:

Every person who...

Watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides, or works or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place;

Such a person shall be liable to prosecution and an conviction to pay a penalty or to be imprisoned. In 1972 this offence was scheduled as an offence under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, by means of statutory instrument No. 282 of 1972. Section 37 of that Act further provides that:

attempting or conspiring or inciting to commit, or aiding or abetting the commission of, any such scheduled offence shall itself be a scheduled offence...

Because of the position under the Trades Dispute Act, 1906, I am advised, and the union which I represent have received legal advice on this matter, that for instance a union picket on the premises of a local authority constitutes watching and besetting under the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. Equally no office of such a union is protected if he does any act which induces some other person to break contract of employment.

Section 2 of the Bill before the House enable a member of the Garda to arrest and keep custody in certain circumstances for a period of up to seven days any person suspected of an offence under of Offences Against the State Act or any offence scheduled by the Act. Equally section 18 of the Offences Against the State Act declares as illegal any organisation which promotes, encourages or advocates the non-payment of money payable to the central fund or the non-payment of local taxation. As the law seems to be, would industrial action in a local authority called by a union in pursuit of its genuine demands, which could at least result in the non-collection of some funds —for instance in a local authority area the collection of motor taxation —be considered to be the operation of an illegal organisation? Would a union, in the absence of the protection or the Trades Dispute Act, 1906, be deemed to be an illegal organisation and liable to the extended penalties under section 2 of the Bill now before the other House?

The House will therefore appreciate my concern about the application of this Bill to many trade unions. The Minister towards the end of his opering speech stated that the powers in question are intended to be used against persons who are involved in subversive activitise. I accept that as a sincere statement. However reason able the intention may be in this case or in the type of case I have quoted, it does not necessarily lie with this Minister or any future Minister. For instance, any employer in the areas I have referred to could act.

For example a city or county manager, a chief executive officer of any of our health boards, or the manager of a private school could take an action and succeed. We have cases on this. Such an action was taken in 1967 by the manager of Dublin Corporation against a group of workers when he sought an injunction to prevent their picketing and the injunction was granted. In the situation we have been in since 1972 and now with the additional powers of detention under the Bill before the House, we could find ourselves in a position which I do not believe was envisaged by either the drafters of statutory instrument No. 282 of 1972 or the present Bill. Therefore I must ask the Minister to carefully examine the situation that I have outlined.

The protection of the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, must be extended to all workers. This problem has been brought to the attention of the Minister for justice and I ask the Minister present, either in his reply to the Second Stage debate of this Bill or during or before Committee Stage, that he would outline the action the Government propose to take to remedy what is an entirely intolerable position and which is now being made absolutely and completely intolerable. Might I had to this plea that intolerable. the assurance and the support of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions?

I would like to preface my own contribution by welcoming that intervention by Senator Owens, because I had proposed and I still intend to deal at some length and very much in support of the importand point that the she was making about the unacceptable scope of this Bill, It is an extremely important point on which I will have other suggestions apart from what the Senator said about what must be the minimal response by the Government to curtailing the potential scope of the Bill and its impact when it becomes law, it is becomes law.

Last week we debated in this House a motion to declare a state of emergency. In my contribution I linked that motion to the Emergency Powers Bill which is before the House today because I viewed the motion as not being a motion in the abstract, as being a motion related to this Bill before the House today and also to the possibility of further legislation being brought in, but primarily related to this Emergency Powers Bill, 1976.

I opposed the motion declaring the emergency because I was not satisfied that the Government had discharged the burden of satisfying the Members of this House that the power being looked for was necessary in the exigencies of the situation and limited to what was necessary in the exigencies of the situation. The whole purpose of declaring a state of emergency and of having an Emergency Powers Bill is that the Government were looking for a licence to being in what would otherwise be unconstitutional measures. I do not propose to respond to the already long-drawn-out verbal debate about whether there is a suspension of the Constitution. I think one can maintain a view of the Constitution as performing several functions: as describing and limiting the powers of Government, the relationship between the Executive and the Oireachtas and also setting out in the fundamental rights part of the Constitution the basic rights of Citizens. If then you have a formula whereby the Government can being in ligislation which is not subject to constitutional challenge you certainly upset the balance in the Constitution and you remove from constitutional review by the courts the Bills that are entitled by that formula that they for the purposes of "securing the public safely and the preservation of the State in the time of armed confict" as extended until the state of emergency is brought to an end by resolution of both House. Undoubtedly, the effect of this technical device-and I would agree with calling it a technical device althought I do not think it is mere technically but a most serious legal step-is to licence the Government to bring in measures which would otherwise be inconstitutional and which are not subject to constitutional review.

I agree very much with the point which has been made by all the Senators who Contributed towards the debate this afternoon: that the real threat and the underlying reason for these measures is the threat of armed violence, the threat to the State, and that this is a very serious situation, that our democratic institutions are under challenge. That assumption I do not dispute in any way. I do not quibble about the evil of violence and I am not soft or ambivalent on that issue at all.

Nevertheless, I am deeply concerned as a lawyer, as a member of the Labour Party, at the scope of the Government's power. In talking about the state of emergency I said we must be like misers in this situation, be cause we are giving the Government power to bring in what would otherwise be unconstitutional measures. I posed several specific question to the Minister in the course of the debate on the motion to declare a state of emergency. I was very disappointed that his response to this debate was not a specific respons to the questions asked. He did not, in fact clarify the situation as to what precise extra power was needed and whether there would be the acceptance of amendments to bring in the appropriate safeguards to ensure that the scope of the power did not go beyond the identification of the need for the power.

The Minister this afternoon, who is substituting for the Minister for Justice, has gone some way to identify ing the need. His speech in opening the debate here this afternoon was brief but was, to me, a little more helpful in clarifying that need. He indentified the need in the following terms. He said that the Garda asked for the extension of the power conferred by section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act:

to keep person custody by a provision raising to seven days the period for which a person may be held.

That is the need-to extend to seven days the period for which a person may be held. He went on to make two further important clarifications of that need and said:

We must bear in mind that the powers in question are intended to be used against persons who are involved in subversive activities, who have an organsation and commitment which, however misguided, is not to be found among the general run of offenders.

That is an import clarification. They must be persons "involved in subversive activities". Like Senator Owens I will deal with what I believe to be a much broader scope of the present Bill—a dangerously broader scope of the Bill. He then went on to make the further point:

Special measures are needed to deal with such persons who, for example, are prepared and capable of intimidating witnesses and otherwise hampering the Gards in their investigations. The power to keep such persons, when suspected of a serious offence, out of circulation for some days can be of extreme importance in enabling the Garda to ensure that the ends of justice are served.

I should like to ask the Minister if I am correct in understanding that the need for this legislation is as follows: to keep person involved in subversive activities out of circulation for seven days in order to prevent them from doing things such as intimidating witnesses, tampering with evidence, falsifying a prosecution? If the need is as I have stated, if it is requested by the Garda and strong stood over by the Government, them would not be against a legislative measure which met that need. I would not oppose that.

My contention is that this Bill, in significant and unacceptable ways, goes beyond that need as I have been trying conscientiously to identify it and as the Minister has expressed it here today. It goes beyond that need in quite significant ways. That is the concern of all Members of this House. It may sound as though we quibble like lawyers over small print, that we use exaggerated examples to illustrate points. In examining this Bill I do not think it will be necessary to use any sort of exaggerated examples or language. The clear language of the Bill, and the plain meaning of the words in it, would be sufficient to illustrate that the Bill goes beyond the need as I have tried to identify it from the Minister's speech in introducing this measure.

Let me first talk about its scope in relation to the Minister's affrmation that the powers in question are intened to be used against person who are "involved in subversive activities". Section 2 provides that:

A members of the Garda Síochána (on production of his identification card, if demanded, where he is not in uniform) may without warrant stop, search, question and arrest any person, or do any one or more of those things in respect of any person, if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of that Act, or if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person is carrying any document or other article or thing, or is in possession of information, relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence.

The intention that appears to be expressed by the Minister is that this section would confer the powers of arrest and question and detention for a maximum of seven days but that they would be confined expressly to persons involved in subversive activities. But that is not the scope of the section I have just read out. It goes considerable beyond that because it includes the phrase:

...or an offences which is for the time being a scheduled offences for the purposes of Part V of that Act,...

It is relevant to remind ourselves that the scheduling of offences is a matter for the Government; it does not involve the Oireachtas at all. It is done by a Government order under section 36 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, and that order does not even have to be laid before the Oireachtas. It is done under the following terms. Section 36 provides:

Whenever while part of this Act is in force the Government is satisfied that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order in relation to offences of any particular class or kind or under any particular enactment the Government may by order declare that offences of that particular class or kind or under that particular enactment shall be scheduled offences for the purpose of this part of this Act,

Subsection (2) goes on:

Whenever the Government have made under the foregoing subsection of this section any such declaration as is authorised in that subsection every offence of that particular class or kind or under the particular enactment to which that declaration fell until otherwise provided by an order be a scheduled offence for the purpose of the part of the Act.

This scheduling has legal consequences of which the Minister is well aware. It means that a person tried for such an offence will be tried before the Special Courts, either brought before the Special Court and charged and then tried by the Special Court, or referred from a District Court to the Special Court, unless the Attorney General or now the DPP, otherwise positively directs. A person charged with a scheduled offence will be streamed to go before the Special Criminal Court.

So a very great deal depends on the use the Government make of the power to schedule offences. Since the necessary declaration was made in May, 1972—that the ordinary courts were inadequate—invoking the part of the 1939 Act, there have been two Government orders scheduling offences. They both took place in 1972 under the Fianna Fáil Government. The first order was the Scheduled Offences Order, 1972, which was passed on 30th May, 1972, and it provided that the following offences would be scheduled offences: (1) Offences under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861; (2) Offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1883; (3) Offences under the Firearms Act, 1925-1971 and (4) Offences Against the State Act, 1939.

There was a second Statutory Instrument in that same year, in November, 1972, which extended the list of scheduled offences to include offences under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. I know it may seem indulgent to quote one's own work, but I would like to refer to an assessment which I made of the scope of the powers of the Special Criminal Court and of the operation of that court. At page 10 of my booklet on the Special Court having quoted the fact that it required the declaration that the ordinary courts were inadequate to try the offences I go on:

However, on what possible grounds can the Government be satisfied that the ordinary courts are inadequate to deal with the vast majority of offences under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861. This is a long and detailed Victorian statute which is still part of our criminal code. Sections 1 to 6 create offences of maliciously setting fire to specified kinds of buildings. There are numerous other offences dealing with offences of damage to buildings, machines and goods in process of manufacture, growing things, mines, animals, river beds and railways, as well as a general offence of malicious damage to property under Section 51. There are undoubtedly specific offences under sections of this Act which could properly be classified as scheduled offences, such as offences under Sections 9, 10 and 28 relating to endangering life or property by the use of explosives. But in view of the terms of the Government declaration—affirming that the ordinary courts are inadequate to try the offences listed therein—the list should be tightly controlled and specific.

It is particularly hard to justify such a broad classification in view of the discretion that the Attorney General has under section 46 and 47 to refer non-scheduled offences to the Special Criminal Court. One can only conclude that in the absence of Parliamentary scrutiny the Government decided to cast the net of scheduled offences very widely. Indeed it is surprising that the trade union movement has not reacted sharply to the inclusion of offences under Section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 as scheduled offences.

It was indeed surprising that the trade union movement did not react more sharply in 1972 when the Fianna Fáil Government included as scheduled offences, offences under section 7, of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. It is now extremely important that the trade union movement insist on the "descheduling" of offences under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. That is the very minimum that the trade union movement and indeed the Labour Party should demand if they are going to support in any way this legislation. The method by which the Government can do this is by a Government order which could be published in the morning, repealing the particular statutory instrument of November, 1972, and removing section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act from the list of scheduled offences. This would remove a considerable part of the apprehension already expressed by Senator Owens. I intend to support in every detail the apprehensions expressed by her. I think her legal advice is perfectly right. The scope of this Emergency Powers Bill does extend to offences under section 7 of The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act so that picketing by somebody who does not come within the formula of being employed by a person in a "trade or industry" is watching and besetting under section 7. This includes a person who is employed in the Public Service, employed in Local Government, indeed employed by the universities for that matter, employed in a voluntary charitable organisation who places a picket on premises. Someone employed there who pickets a Department of State or pickets a Local Government office is potentially committing an offence under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, and is open to risk of use by the Garda of the whole range of power in section 2 of this Emergency Powers Bill; open to being detained for seven days; open to being questioned by the Garda, and to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law Bill which is before the other House.

I thought in 1972 at the time of examining the scope of scheduled offences, and I think even more so now, that it is very difficult to know why the Fianna Fáil Government of the time decided to schedule offences under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. There are various possibilities. One is that the person who was deciding on the scope of the Special Court saw the words "Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act" and decided that sounded as though it was conspiracy and intimidatory in some way and that it should be included for trial there. That is the most innocent interpretation. Much more sinister interpretations, perhaps getting nearer to the truth of it, may be that it was felt useful to have a broad scope of power of that sort in reserve. Whatever the motivation, it is extremely undesirable.

I would like to ensure that the particular legal arguments are clear on the record of the House showing that the Emergency Powers Bill does appear to extend and to apply to persons who come within section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill extends to those who do not have the protection of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and therefore effectively extends to employees in the Public Service and Local Government who place a picket on their place of employment.

(Cavan): The scheduling of these offences was to deal with something very far removed from employment, really as far as anything could be removed from it.

I would be inclined to agree with the Minister. I would hope that the Minister would take an opportunity to meet the particular point.

(Cavan): I will deal with the Senator's argument at length, but I would just like at this stage to say that the scheduling of these offences was as far removed from employment as anything could humanly be.

Despite the fact that the particular motivation may have been "as far removed from employment as anything could be" in the words of the Minister, the legal effect is that a person who engages in what is prohibited by section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, namely among other things:

...watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on business or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, or, follows such other person with two or more persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road shall on conviction thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction, or on indictment as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding £20 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months with or without hard labour.

The Trades Disputes Act, 1906 was brought in primarily to amend this law in relation to the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act so that it would not apply in the case of trade disputes. I do not think I have to repeat what Senator Owens said about the fact that the wording of the 1906 Act as interpreted by the Irish Courts is narrowly confined to a trade dispute where the meaning is that the employer must be a person engaged in trade or industry in order for the employees to be engaged in trade or industry. This excludes employees in the Public Service or an employee in a local authority who do not have the protection of the Trades Disputes Act. An ordinary trade unionist or indeed an ordinary citizen might well ask: how has this not given rise to very considerable tensions and difficulties up to now? I would agree with Senator Owens that it has in fact given rise to considerable tensions and difficulties in the civil implications of the law: the successful bringing of injunctions to prevent the picketing, injunctions against mental hospital workers, injunctions such as those referred to by Senator Owens, injunctions against engineers employed by local authorities. To that extent, the purpose of the Trades Disputes Act 1906 because of the legal interpretation of it has been undermined so that it has lost some of its significance.

In my view—which is not that of an expert in trade union law but of somebody aware of expert commentary on it—we are in breach of the European Social Charter. I would agree with the reports of the Committee of Experts who have expressed this view that we are in breach of the European Social Charter in the particular narrow way in which the law operates in this area in denying the right to employees in the Public Service and in local authorities of the protection of the Trades Disputes Act, 1906.

The present practice if such employees engage in picketing activity is that their names and addresses may or may not be taken by the Garda; but they have not to my knowledge been prosecuted and that is an important point. I have examined statistics supplied by the Department of Justice in relation to the type of offences that come before the Special Criminal Court which was established on 30th May, 1972. The list covers the type of offences, the number of persons convicted and the pattern of sentencing between May, 1972, and July, 1976. It shows that of the 1,042 people who came before the Special Court in that period, 752 persons were convicted, 270 persons were acquitted and there is a list of the types of offences which does not include a prosecution or a conviction for an offence under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. But it is possible that that could change by a change in administrative policy as to prosecutions. This would not be determined, nor indeed controlled, by the Minister for Justice or by the Government. It is not in the Minister for Justice's hands or the Government's hands after we pass this Bill. That is a very important point. It is in the control and the discretion of an independent legal authority, of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The effect of bringing in the necessary legislation to establish the particular position of Director of Public Prosecutions was to hand over an exercise of discretion that had been a Government function up to then, to hand it over to an independent prosecuting authority, the Director of Public Prosecutions.

(Cavan): I think the Senator agreed.

I do agree with that, and I did support it. What I am saying is that I never accept that we should legislate for ministerial good intentions. I do not even want to hear ministerial good intentions on this point because ministerial good intentions do not carry weight at all on this point. It is not a ministerial controlled function, which is a very serious consideration indeed. It would be possible quite legally and validly, with no contortion of the wording of section 2 of this Bill, for the Director of Public Prosecutions to send out a directive indicating to the Garda that he would like them to prosecute under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act; that he would like these prosecutions brought, and that the powers of section 2 should be used in relation to the arrest and detention of people concerned. This may sound unlikely in our present circumstances.

He has nothing to do with the question of arrest and detention, only with whether or not there should be a prosecution.

Yes, I agree. The Garda at the moment, I maintain, are not exercising the powers which they do in fact have to prosecute under section 7. If that position were to change and if they were to bring prosecutions and if they were to start arresting and detaining for seven days——

I may have misunderstood the Senator, but I thought she said that the Director of Public Prosecutions might direct the attention of the Garda to the fact that they should arrest under this?

That was part of the point I was making.

Arrest and detention would not be his function at all.

That would be his function because it is he who is in control of the sort of prosecutions that are brought. Discussions on this matter probe into the area of administrative policy. It is a strange grey area but it is certainly there. An example that I could use is in relation to the question of hours of trading enforcement. If the Director of Public Prosecutions wants the hours of trading regulations to be enforced he can issue a directive to have prosecutions brought for trading during prohibited times.

The kernel of my point is this. The arrest must be based on a suspicion which is in the mind of the guard, and that in itself must have reasonable cause. To that extent it is at least a step removed from the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is not his suspicion, it is the guard's.

I totally accept the point, but I do not think that makes much difference. What I am trying to lead up to is the sort of situation in which we might find ourselves in a relatively short time in this country, where employees in either the Public Service or local authorities, or, indeed unemployed persons, put up pickets outside Government Departments. Because they were picketing outside Government Departments or local authority offices, then a member of the Garda could for reasonable cause arrest, detain for seven days such persons because they would not have the protection of the Trades Disputes Act and because they would be in the process of committing or suspected of committing, or aiding or abetting or attempting—under section 37 of the Offences Against the State Act—a scheduled offence. Obviously this is an offence that should not have been scheduled in the first place. It is now absolutely indefensible to leave that offence, section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, as a scheduled offence. It is as easy to remove as taking a pen and writing a ministerial order tomorrow to deschedule section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act. I would ask the Minister for some clarification of the Government view on that and for a specific undertaking that the Government will remove section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, from the list of scheduled offences.

I would argue, then, that the scope of the Bill as it stands is much broader than the need which I identified—the need to keep persons involved in subversive activities out of circulation for a period of a maximum seven days. In other ways, too, I think that the Bill goes beyond the scope of this need. Subsection (3) has aspects to it that go beyond keeping "out of circulation" persons suspected of subversive activities. First of all—I made this point at some length when speaking on the Emergency Powers Motion so I will not repeat myself unnecessarily—the place where the person can be kept out of circulation is unacceptable. This can be a Garda station, a prison or other convenient place. That is going further than is necessary if the need is to keep them out of circulation. I would contend that the Government should be prepared to accept an amendment that the place they must be kept in being kept out of circulation is the place equipped for custodial functions, namely, a prison under prison regulations, under prison visiting regulations, a known place, a place that would be accessible to legal advisers, to relatives and so on and I will come to that point later. Also the decision to keep the person out of circulation should be made by a politically accountable figure, by the Minister himself and not by a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent. It is important to distinguish between the investigatory powers of the Garda and the custodial functions of the prison and of prison officers. A Garda station is not equipped, the Garda themselves are not equipped to be custodians of the body of a person in that sense for a period of seven days. To give them the powers in the way in which they are framed in subsection (3) of section 2 to my mind risks causing a very substantial diminution in trust and good relations between the Garda and the public.

Again I have already made this point at some length: we should be trying to protect, strengthen and fortify the democratic institutions and processes of this State. I believe this particular provision will undermine respect for the Garda, and create apprehensions of abuse of this power by the Garda. There are sufficient actual incidents of Garda abuse— small maybe but there—to give rise to apprehensions and rumours of further abuse. The Government will damage unnecessarily the reputation and the operating ability of the Garda. If the need is to keep a person out of circulation, why risk the relationship between the Garda and the citizens in this way? Why give such a dangerous propaganda point to those very subversive people and organisations against whom this Bill is directed? Why allow the scope and potential for rumours of abuse centring around a "convenient place" where the Garda can have a person without any adequate control and supervision for seven days?

Next I come to the question of the powers which the Garda would appear to have in relation to a person kept in custody for seven days. On this point the House is entitled to clarification, which as yet has not been forthcoming, of what the Garda would be entitled to do and would be doing in relation to the person kept for seven days. Is the need to keep the person out of circulation confined to preventing them from intimidating witnesses, tampering with evidence, falsifying a trial or whatever? If so, there is the appropriate safeguard of an appropriate place for that: the prison with its prison regulations and custodial functions. To what extent do the powers of section 52 of the Offences Against the State Act change the nature of the power of the police from a power to keep somebody out of circulation to a power to question persistently over seven days?

I asked this specific question when debating the emergency motion, and I have not seen, despite reading with care all that was said, this point dealt with by the Minister. I think it is a very important point. Section 52 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, provides that the Garda Síochána can go beyond the normal protection of the Judges Rules, go beyond the question of investigating to the point of getting the name and address of the person and then allowing the person, when asked further questions by the Garda. to remain silent, not to incriminate himself, to have the privilege against self-incrimination, to have the presumption of innocence by remaining silent and be protected by the full scope of the Judges Rules in that regard. Section 52, which I invited Senator Alexis FitzGerald to deal with but which he —significantly, in my view—did not embark on at all although he admitted it was relevant, whatever is meant by "relevant" in that context, gives very broad and unusual powers to the Garda.

It provides that:

...any member of the Garda Síochána may demand of such person, at any time while he is so detained, a full account of such person's movements and actions during any specified period and all information in his possession in relation to the commission or intended commission by another person of any offence under any section or subsection of this Act or any scheduled offence.

If that person refuses to give an account of his movements or other information as mentioned or gives misleading information, he is guilty of an offence.

Are the Government intending in this measure to give the Garda power to question persistently about accounting for movements both of the person detained and any other person, requiring that the person so detained answer truthfully those questions? Is that a significant part of the need for this legislation? That question will have to be answered. It has to be met specifically. Do the Government intend to give the Garda a power to question persistently? I say persistently because it says "any member of the Garda" can question under the power of section 52. I am not blaming the Government of the moment for the scope of section 52: it has been on our Statute Book for some time. It is a very far reaching provision. It is used by the Garda. What I want to know is: are we talking about not just keeping somebody out of circulation but having somebody detained by the Garda in circumstances where that person can be persistently questioned and is legally obliged to answer those questions and incurs criminal penalties for failure to or misleading or false information in the light of those circumstances?

Would detention under this Bill when it becomes an Act be detention under Part IV of the 1939 Act?

Yes, an offence under Part IV includes membership of an unlawful organisation and so on. It is covered by section 2.

Those are the offences for which a person can be detained; but section 52 refers to detention under Part IV of the 1939 Act, which is not detention under this Bill.

But this Bill covers the position. I will argue it step by step if the Senator will bear with me. It covers offences under Part IV of the 1939 Act, and Part IV includes

S.27. Prohibition of certain public meetings.

S.28. Prohibition of meetings in the vicinity of the Oireachtas.

Arrest and detention of suspected persons under section 30.

Offences by bodies corporate under section 31.

Recapture of escaped prisoners under section 32.

The others are not actually offences but deal with certain forfeitures and disqualifications. It includes the main offence under section 30 but it also deals with escape from prison and others. The difficulty which I see is that I have not yet heard, in all the discussion about the need for emergency powers and the fact that the emergency power asked for by the Government is this particular power to detain for seven days, what the precise need is that must be argued and identified specifically. If it is a need to keep a person out of circulation for seven days that need should be qualified so as not to go so far beyond that, as this particular section 2 does. I am, in fact, slightly disjointed at the moment. I am shivering.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

We are trying to remedy the situation in regard to the heating.

The Senator is on a very warm point.

It is not keeping me from shivering.

I would like to turn to the question of the sort of safeguards which should be minimal safeguards if one identifies the need to keep somebody out of circulation for seven days. On the general point, I would like to refer to a commentary on this very difficult subject of emergency law which was made by a lecturer at Queen's University. Michael O'Boyle made a speech at a meeting of the much maligned Council of Civil Liberties on Sunday 5th September, and this speech was contained in an article in The Irish Times of 10th September last. In the course of his speech he identified the sort of safeguards that should accompany legislation which a Government reluctantly have to bring in when there are the sort of threats and challenges to our system that pertain at the moment. He says:

The function of law in an emergency situation highlights the thorny problem of emergency powers in a liberal democratic state. The problem can be stated thus—can a democracy invoke drastic emergency legislation and still remain a democracy? The attention of the lawyer is toward a system of emergency law which attempts to facilitate the delicate balance between the demands of order and freedom, which both leaves the state freedom of action to deal with internal threats and attempts to safeguard legality and the rule of law by the provision of checks and constraints on the emergency powers. These checks and restraints in our jurisdiction ought to take the form of (1) independent machinery to examine complaints against the police and the army. It is ironical that the Irish Government in the inter-state case against the United Kingdom were complaining that such machinery as this did not exist in Northern Ireland. Further, the defeat of terrorism requires ordinary people to come forward and be prepared to give evidence in courts—are they likely to be willing to do this if they know that the police and the army can go unpunished for criminal offences that they commit? (2) Regular parliamentary scrutiny of the measures introduced by the executive and of their use. (3) The availability of habeas corpus to control the overuse and the abuse of powers. (4) Codes of behaviour issued to the police and the army which contain the following provisions: (a) that detainees be allowed access to lawyers at the time of their detention, (b) that the relatives of detainees be informed of their whereabouts, (c) that detainees be examined by a doctor both before and after detention and at regular intervals if detention is for long periods. That a detailed log be kept of the detainees movements signed by the person in charge of the detainees and capable of inspection by lawyers or, if for security reasons it is felt undesirable, by magistrates. (5) Review clauses in the legislation which provide for its expiry and its review by parliament after one year.

This is an abstraction of the framework for considering the present Emergency Powers Bill and of the sort of safeguards that a Government should be willing to concede and bring in as part of the legislation while ensuring effective emergency legislation to deal with what is seen to be the threat and the need. I should like to take some of those points and add one or two of my own, and join with Senator Eoin Ryan in asking why the Government are so reluctant to concede these points?

I should like to begin with the point about the establishment of independent complaints machinery. It appears that the Minister for Justice regards the demand for this form of protection as somehow coming from an IRA or subversive source, and therefore it would be weakness to concede it. I do not think Senator Eoin Ryan or myself or the various people who have called for the need for an independent complaints machinery should be in any way either identified with or slurred with coming in on a point which has been put forward from that particular source, so that it is deemed to be without merit and without being worthy of consideration.

It is extremely important for the sake of the democratic structures of the State, for the integrity, trust, loyalty and allegiance of citizens of the State, that we bring in an independent complaints machinery, something we criticised Britain for not having. We alleged as part of our case before the European Court in Strasbourg that Britain did not have an independent complaints machinery. I am not saying that it would be possible to provide it in this particular legislation. It is important that the Minister should give substantial undertakings now that he will—at the nearest opportunity, either by referring it to the Law Reform Commission as a top priority of that commission or by referring it to some other body that could deal with it— so that we could have in the next few months before this House machinery establishing an independent complaints body to investigate complaints against the Garda. That should not be something that the Government would be reluctant to concede. It should be viewed as a priority in order that this emergency powers legislation does not damage the relationship between the Garda and the citizens of the country, that it does not give rise to actual or alleged abuse by the Garda or the Defence Forces of the powers which they have and which this package of legislation will extend so dramatically.

It must surely be one of the key points of envy of the Northern Ireland administration that there is a relationship of trust and allegiance between citizens and the forces of law and order in the Twenty-six Counties. It is not something we should undermine or damage. It is extremely important that we fortify it and strengthen it and have proper. effective and fair complaints machinery to investigate complaints.

I should like to make a point about the comments of the Minister for Justice. The Minister is taking a strikingly different attitude in relation to comments about either actual or possible abuse by the Garda of their powers, and his attitude to possible abuse by his own profession, by solicitors, of their professional code. The Minister is over-reaching in both directions. He is over-protecting the Garda against allegations of abuse. I believe that it is not credible for a Minister for Justice to give an indefinite undertaking that powers will not be abused. One cannot give a solicitor's undertaking that the Garda will not abuse their powers. That is not credible. We have to be concerned that there is scrutiny and control of the powers that the Garda have, that there is a structure for complaints to be processed and aired. The actual amount of abuse is small and it is important that it be not made more significant by this extension of power. Power is corrupting. People will cut corners if they can get away with it. People will abuse powers. That is the nature of power itself. It is no reflection on any particular Garda force at the time being. It is absolutely necessary and an essential part of our structure that we ensure that there is not abuse by the Garda.

Similarly, the Minister for Justice is giving rise to apprehensions about one branch of the legal profession, his own profession, in his approach to the prison rules regulations and more recently to the submissions made by the Incorporated Law Society on the emergency package. He gives the impression that he considers that there is abuse by solicitors which requires a particular type of control. I note that he has made a concession in the light of the submission made by the Incorporated Law Society, and maybe the amendment of the prison rules will be tested in the courts by the Incorporated Law Society. But any attempt to suggest that solicitors in general are abusing their role as legal advisers of people in prison is a very serious undermining of one of the basic structures, one of the tenets of our legal code and one of the basic concepts of the rule of law.

This leads me to the question of access to a legal adviser. I made an attempt when the emergency motion was being debated in this House to get some clarity on the situation and to get some undertakings that there would be provision for access to a legal adviser. The Minister for Justice said that this Bill would not change the law in that area. He admitted on the record that the law was "unresolved". There has been a certain deviousness in comments made about this: that no right as it exists is being "taken away"; that the position is not being changed in that regard; these are the sort of comments. As far as I know—I would be glad to be corrected—there may be a latent constitutional right of access to your lawyer—and if we follow American cases that right will be identified—it may be that one can get it recognised by the process of the courts; but, to my knowledge, the courts have not decided that. However, it is open to us as a Legislature to provide it, not as a matter of a latent constitutional right, which the courts may identify when a particular case comes before them, but as a matter of legislative policy, that a person should have access to his legal adviser.

The point may be made that this type of legislation, the Emergency Powers Bill, may not be the best vehicle in which to insert a right of access to a person's lawyer, that it should be a provision of the general criminal code which is not subject to termination. We would all consider it desirable that this particular legislation come to an end as soon as possible. It may be that a more appropriate place for such a right to a legal adviser would be in permanent legislation so that it related not just to this type of offence but to the whole range of offences. It might even pose the problem of appearing to discriminate in favour of those involved in subversive activities by giving them rights which are not so clearly identifiable for the ordinary person suspected of an offence and brought to a Garda station.

I fail to see why the Garda should be apprehensive about such a provision in our code. I fail to see why they should in any way resist such a safeguard. I fail to see why the Government do not see that, if we are giving power to the Garda to detain a person for seven days, then it is essential that there be clarification and highly desirable that it be in the form of a legislative proposal to that effect and not in the form of interpretation by the court ultimately, when somebody manages to bring the sort of constitutional case where the issue is put squarely, where the case is not decided upon on other grounds, or where the precise issue is unresolved, as I maintain it is unresolved at the moment.

Again, because we want to maintain and foster mutual trust between the Garda and citizens, it would be desirable and not a sign of weakness —if anything of strength—for the Government to provide for medical examination of somebody at the point when they are being detained for a further period up to a maximum of seven days. I see absolutely no reason why it should be considered as a confession of weakness or an admission of anything. We may not be talking about a Bill which will last only for 12 months; we may be talking about a piece of permanent legislation. Whether is lasts for 12 months or only six months or however long it lasts, if we give power for detention for a period of seven days we should be prepared to write in the safeguard of a right to a legal adviser being present at the time of detention, the right to a medical examination and the right of relatives to know as soon as it is practicably possible the whereabouts of the detained person. All of these are key provisions if the need is to keep a person out of circulation. They do not detract from the fact that the scope at present seems much broader than that, in that it is scope to question persistently for a period of seven days, which I would not regard as desirable.

Senator Alexis FitzGerald made reference to the Judges' Rules and to the fact that if a person was persistently questioned for a long period then surely any statement made by that person would be inadmissible. I agree with that view. I think our judges would uphold the rules in those circumstances and would refuse to admit as voluntary a statement made on the sixth day of a seven-day detention. That is only one aspect, although it is important. The fact is that after persistent questioning, if a person refuses or fails to answer, he can be charged under section 52 of a criminal offence. There can also be persistent questioning about the activities of others. There is too much opportunity for harassment, bullying and further abuse of the person being so detained with the scope of the powers given to the Garda.

I should like to deal now with the question of habeas corpus. It has been raised and dealt with by Senators Lenihan, Alexis FitzGerald and Eoin Ryan. I asked the Minister for Justice, when the House was discussing the motion declaring an emergency, if he would clarify the position in relation to habeas corpus, but he did not do so. We have had varying versions from the legal Senators who have spoken so far, and I should like to give my interpretation of the operation of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus will be limited in its scope by the Emergency Powers Bill but will still apply to a person detained under the Emergency Powers Bill. It will be restricted in its scope because Article 40.4.3º will not apply. Article 40, as Senator Lenihan stated, is the provision relating to habeas corpus. Article 40.4.1º provides that “No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.” Then it provides for a complaint to be made, for a person to be brought before the court and that, if his detention cannot be justified, then he should be released.

Subsection 3º provides:

Where the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained is produced before the High Court in pursuance of an order in that behalf made under this section and that Court is satisfied that such a person is being detained in accordance with a law but that such law is invalid having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall refer the question of the validity of such law to the Supreme Court by way of case stated and may, at the time of such reference or at any time thereafter, allow the said person to be at liberty on such bail and subject to such conditions as the High Court shall fix until the Supreme Court has determined the question so referred to it.

Obviously, the High Court cannot refer the question of the constitutionality of this measure, because it is outside the scope of the Constitution. That particular part of the constitutional right of habeas corpus is undoubtedly not available to somebody held under section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill, 1976.

I believe that it is open for a person detained under section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill, 1976, or for another person on his behalf, to bring a habeas corpus application. The grounds for doing it would be that the Garda did not have reasonable cause to suspect that a person had committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences Against the State Act or a scheduled offence or that the Garda did not have reasonable cause to suspect that the person was carrying a document or article or thing or in the possession of information relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence.

I think that the habeas corpus proceedings would lie to challenge the reasonable cause there. I believe that —if it were effective and possible to do so—a person detained and being physically assaulted, tortured or abused by the Garda could bring habeas corpus proceedings and those habeas corpus proceedings would be upheld and vindicated by the courts. I have some doubt about whether a person would be able to do that in reality under this section at present but I think if they could, if somebody else outside heard of an abuse of power by the Garda, that habeas corpus proceedings could lie for that reason.

I have very substantial doubts as to whether a person would be able to succeed in a habeas corpus application in discharging the burden of showing that a member of the Garda had no reasonable cause. The wording is so broadly framed that it is difficult to see how the habeas corpus proceedings would be successful, but I think it is important that in examining the text of this section we do not say it has ruled out habeas corpus. I do not believe that the Bar and the courts and the judge of this country would in fact rule it out. It would be a very important part of the function of the Bar and the function of the judges to ensure that it was not ruled out, that it was in fact vindicated as a right, even though I believe it is substantially limited—and it obviously does not apply to testing the constitutionality of a provision.

If the Minister is prepared to accept the sort of amendments which write in safeguards, the habeas corpus begins to be more meaningful. If a person has a right to their legal adviser it is more likely that if there is a lack of reasonable cause or evidence of abuse by the Garda, habeas corpus provisions will be brought. If a person cannot be kept in a “convenient place” but must be kept in a prison, then if there are reasons which justify a habeas corpus application, it is more likely that a person will be in a position to bring a habeas corpus application.

The more it were possible to write in safeguards to the scope of section 2, the more real one would make the possibility of bringing an application for habeas corpus. This is my own analysis of it—and I still await some clarification from the Minister on the point—that it is possible to bring an application of habeas corpus although the scope of that application is limited in that it cannot in any way challenge the constitutionality of the legislation as one can do in relation to a habeas corpus application for a Bill which is not a piece of emergency legislation.

So far in contributing on the Second Stage of this legislation I have been dealing in some detail with the wording of section 2. I would like to deal briefly with the wording of section 1 —the question of the Bill's duration has come up. I did develop this when talking about the Emergency Powers Motion, about the duration of the state of emergency and the duration of emergency powers legislation. I believe that the Government would be stronger in the case that they are making for bringing in emergency legislation if they made the duration a genuine duration of 12 months. If they would, instead of the particular formula in section 1, do as was done in previous situations where emergency power was brought in: either require an emergency powers Continuation Act at the end of the period or accept a formula that this provision would come to an end unless there was active involvement by the Oireachtas in its extension for a further period.

I think that the Minister for Justice, in responding to arguments made for ensuring that the Bill only endure for 12 months unless the Oireachtas otherwise decide, was misleading in saying that section 1 (3) gives a power of "parliamentary review" of the Government order extending the duration for a further period or reactivating the powers of section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill. The present situation is that under section 1 the first part of it appears to suggest that the Act will remain in force only until the expiry of the period of 12 months, beginning with the passing of this Act, unless it is continued in force or is again brought into force by an order under this section.

Subsection (2) gives the Government power by order to continue it in operation for longer than 12 months or to re-activate section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill if it has lapsed—lapsed for a couple of years, perhaps, or lapsed for an indefinite period. I think it is wrong that the Oireachtas is not actively involved—as we are actively involved in this House and the other House for the last few weeks—in consideration of either extending or reactivating the powers under section 2 of the Emergency Powers Bill. I am not particularly interested in a weakened power of parliamentary review afterwards. It is the Oireachtas which should take the decision either to extend the Emergency Powers Bill or to reactivate section 2 of that Bill.

That is where the considerations come into play. It is not enough to say that it can be annulled by the negative motion procedure. I think any of us who have been in this House for any length of time know that that is a very weak form of parliamentary control, especially since it does not involve the Oireachtas in the actual assessment of the decision. The assessment would be a purely Executive assessment of whether to continue the Emergency Powers Act for further periods beyond the initial 12 months. I would hope once again that the Government would consider an amendment to ensure that the duration is a duration of 12 months unless the Oireachtas resolves that it be continued for a further period or periods.

Finally, as a more general comment on this legislation, I would like to refer to the more general background to bringing in legislation of this sort. I have spent most of my contribution identifying what I think is the specific need, the need to keep a person out of circulation for seven days who is engaged in subversive activities. I have shown, I think, that the Bill goes much further than this. It does not give the safeguards which it should give if that was the need that was identified and it has dangerous implications for the trade union movement and dangerous implications for the maintenance of trust and allegiance between the Garda, the Defence Forces and the citizens of this country.

I would now like to refer to the need for this emergency legislation in its more general sense. This need—I think we would all agree on it in a general sense—is the need to respond to threats to use violence against the institutions of this State. It is the need of a democratic society to protect itself, the need to protect its citizens and the need to retain a balance in its response to these threats. What I fear is that in using language such as references to an "alien and sinister force" and "something alien and outside of ourselves", we are actually failing to come to terms with the threat to our institutions and to our society. We are, therefore, analysing this threat in a very narrow and, I would fear, counterproductive way.

I do not regard the IRA as an alien and sinster force. I regard it as a tragedy from deep within ourselves and a deeply indigenous force. We have to look at ourselves to know what the IRA is about, not say that it is "alien and sinister" and out there. How come, as a people—a small population on a small island—we have bred and allowed to flower and foster in our country an organisation which uses violence against people, against men, women and children, against the lives and expectations and basic human liberties of citizens of this country? If we cease to think in terms of an alien and sinister force out there, then we must ask very serious question about our own cultural attitudes down the years.

People have been asking me seriously about how to solve the IRA problem. I have been trying to cope with it. We should ask ourselves also about what sort of response we should be making to the threat of the IRA. There are various levels of response, at the educational level, at social level, at the level indeed of the way in which our State is evolving. Is our State allowing for a degree of evolution and change, a degree of participation by the citizen? Is it seeking actively the allegiance of the young citizen of this country? Is there a political openness to political initiative, and the willingness to work out a response which can have some prospect of bringing about a peaceful solution to the very complex political problems on this island?

To talk about an alien and sinister force and say we need force to meet it is a very narrow and rather bankrupt approach, in my submission. It creates some distance between ourselves and the IRA which is not, itself, a justifiable distance. It is from within our own society and there are the roots, the roots, the flowering and the force of the IRA. We must understand that and fairly meet that; we must identify all the failures down the years that have led to that; we must try to pick them and meet them at all different levels. We are not doing that. We do not have the appearance of a society that is willing to come to terms seriously with the political dimension of the existence of the IRA and the challenge posed by the IRA. I do not think that we really do try in a way that, for example, the political groupings in the North of Ireland have tried and do try to respond to the problem. In the North there is more serious heart-searching and attempts to get a political solution there than there is a willingness to examine it at a serious level here.

The Government, in responding to the threat of the IRA, to the very serious dangers to our country and the lives of citizens and institutions of the State, should be careful not to respond in a narrow way of relying on the use of force against some sinister and alien influence. They should try to have a broad-based approach, including considerable political initiative at various levels and a very serious concern about the political developments to parallel emergency powers in a conscious attempt to fortify and strengthen, though not congeal, the institutions of the State. Sometimes when we are talking about fortifying and strengthening institutions it sounds as though we want them fixed and unchanging. I would like to see very substantial change in the institutions of our State, but I would like to see them strengthened by the devolution of more power to citizens, more involvement of workers in the workplace, of local citizens in the local community, of parents in the education of their children—all that sort of involvement of impartial machinery of investigation of complaints against maladministration, complaints against the Garda and Defence Forces.

Aligned to that the Government can and must at times bring in measures such as this emergency measure is, a measure that does infringe the civil liberties of the citizen. The response of the Oireachtas to that, if the Government can justify the need for that, should be to concede it and to allow legislation, however sad we may all be, as Senator Alexis FitzGerald said, that there is need for such legislation. We should be very particular that the Government do not exceed their powers in the matter and we should look at every section and subsection. The Government's response to that attitude should be a willingness—and the Minister for Justice said he was willing—to accept reasonable amendments in order to confine the scope of such otherwise unconstitutional powers, if they were not emergency powers, to the bare limits of what is necessary within the bounds of the actual need for the power.

That gets back to the fact that the Government have not still identified with sufficient precision the need. My attitude towards this legislation is that, since the Government have not identified the need, since in so far as I can identify the need the legislation goes far beyond it in ways which are unacceptable, it is hard to support this legislation. It is difficult to allow the Government to come before the House and seek this sort of power under the aura of an emergency situation which encroaches in ways which the Government have not justified, not supported and not argued for in the specific way in which they would have to do it. There the balance must come down in favour of the protection of the liberties of the citizen and not an unwarranted and unspecific extension of power at the Government level to bring in a measure which would be unconstitutional if it were not for the declaration of the state of emergency and the recital of this in the text of the Bill.

There is an onus on the Government which the Government have not discharged. There are extremely worrying aspects, not minor aspects or technicalities, about this legislation; and I would hope that either the Minister in the House today or the Minister for Justice in replying to the Bill will take time, lots of time, to answer these specific points.

My view would be that the Government as well as the events over the last few years have given adequate justification for this measure. Before I go on to deal with that, let me say that, by and large I agree with the view expressed by Senator Robinson regarding the question of habeas corpus. It seems to me that, as at present, the test must continue to be whether or not the detention is lawful or unlawful. If the detention is lawful detention within the provisions of this Bill, then to that extent clearly it will not lie within the ambit of the court to operate the Article of the Constitution which refers to the invalidity of the laws in relation to the Constitution. On the other hand, if it is found that, by reference to the provisions of this Bill, the detention is unlawful, then clearly the court will still have the power to operate on the doctrine of the principle of habeas corpus.

As regards another point which Senator Robinson raised in connection with section 52 of the Offences Against the State Act, I must say I would rather differ from the view to which she appeared to be inclined. Section 52 of the 1939 Act reads:

(1) Whenever a person is detained in custody under the provisions in that behalf contained in Part IV of this Act...

Now the provisions contained in Part IV of the 1939 Act in relation to custody are of course the provisions in section 30 of the Act, and it seems to me that if a person is detained in custody by virtue of the powers of section 2 of the Bill we are now discussing when it becomes an Act, then he is not in custody under the provisions of section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act of 1939, and accordingly the power which Senator Robinson sees of perpetual questioning, interrogation, contained in section 52, to my mind, would not apply.

It might be of some help and of some significance in considering this to note a difference between the wording of section 30 of the 1939 Act and section 2 of this Act, that is, that in section 30 of the 1939 Act the word "interrogate" is used rather than the word "question". There is a point that, under the amendment, the part contained by section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, shall not be excercisable during a period when section 2 of this Bill is in force, but quite apart from that, the point I am making is that the powers contained in section 52 of the 1939 Act relate to custody under section 30 of that Act. They do not relate to custody under section 2 of this Bill. However, I agree that this is a matter which the Minister would probably be able to spell out better than I can. I am just giving my own view on it.

The legislative packet, of which this Bill is a part, has been subject to questioning from the news media, to opposition from Fianna Fáil and to a certain amount of flak from what I would describe in general terms as the civil liberties lobby. I disagree entirely with those—I think Senator Lenihan was one of them—who have apparently sensed that there is widespread public opposition to the measures. I do not think that is so, and I believe that, contrary to what I think were the genuine expectations of the news media, there was in fact no public outcry against this legislation, instead there was a degree of public support and understanding which, in the view of many people, was perhaps unexpected, I have the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that some sections of the news media may have been a little bit nettled that they misread the public mind and found that the anticipated critical public reaction simply was not there.

So far as the Fianna Fáil opposition is concerned, it was of course predictable. It strikes me as being very much of the show-must-go-on variety. I do not blame Fianna Fáil for opposing. I suppose they are entitled to say that it is the job of an Opposition to oppose, and so long as the opposition which is meted out to a measure such as this or any other legislation for that matter is constructive, well and good; but I think it is right to say that of all political parties in existence in this State Fianna Fáil are perhaps the one party who are not in a particularly strong position to attack this legislation. Their own measures, what might be described in general terms as emergency legislation and legislation dealing with offences against the State, is there on record, and I propose to refer to some of it relevantly, I think, in connection with this Bill before I finish.

The civil rights lobby of opposition is perhaps in a rather different position either from the media opposition or the Fianna Fáil opposition, because it is a very natural type of opposition, and I do not doubt the sincerity and the genuine concern of many of those who oppose generally this kind of legislation and this legislation in particular on grounds of civil rights and civil liberties. But it is a question of perspective, a question of balance. It is a question of priorities, and I feel that over-concern with the theoretical problems and perhaps academic niceties may incline people to believe that a liberal approach to the point of cotton wool softness is the panacea which is going to lead to Utopia.

It is important to realise that we do not live in Utopia. We live in a world where there is evil and viciousness and violence. We live in a country, part of which has been devastated by violence and atrocities for the last six or seven years, and we live in a State where, in the last few years, more than three dozen people have been bombed to death and nearly 200 people have been maimed, where there have been kidnappings, armed robberies and the foul murder of the Ambassador of a friendly nation, and we are Members of a House of Parliament who have buried the dead body of one of our colleagues riddled with the assassin's bullets. That is the kind of world, that is the kind of country and that is the kind of State we are living in. Faced with that horrible picture of viciousness and violence, I wonder can we seriously afford to play either party politics or to discuss this kind of legislation in an abstract, theoretical manner.

I have heard it suggested that one of the dangers of this legislation is that it might be counter-productive. I have heard it dubbed as repressive legislation. I have heard vague talk of what is described as institutional violence. We have a case made that the Government have over-reacted. "Counter-productive", just what does that mean? Are we to say: "Let the murderers, the bank robbers, the kidnappers, carry on. Do not interfere; it might be dangerous; it might be counter-productive"? As far as I am concerned, I say, thank God this Government is not made up of men of that calibre. Thank God this Government is made up of men who are prepared to face whatever dangers may be involved in saving the people of this country and saving the rights and liberties of the people of this country by introducing legislation of this sort when it is timely to do so. If a Government were in office that was afraid to introduce this type of legislation because of the dangers of it being counter-productive, to my mind that would be an invitation to anarchy.

We are told that this is repressive legislation. Yes, of course this is repressive legislation, because it is the Government's job to repress the murder and the maiming and the kidnapping of innocent citizens and to protect their property. This legislation is repressive in that it seeks to repress violence, in that it seeks to prevent murders, in that it seeks to prevent people being maimed and kidnapped, in that it seeks to prevent the property to which citizens are entitled from being robbed and taken away from them.

We are told that the Government are over-reacting. But what are the Government supposed to do? Again are they merely to turn their backs and say: "All right boys carry on. We will not over-react. We are too sensitive of being accused of repressive measures"? That kind of attitude on the part of any Government would, to my mind, be a cowardly abdication of their responsibilities in the face of violence. "Over-reacting"—what exactly are the Government doing? I think we should examine it. They are asking this House and the other House as part of this legislative package to pass this Bill which contains the provisions which have been so much criticised in section 2. It is hardly necessary to read out subsection (1) of section 2 again but it might be as well to do it. It provides:

A member of the Garda Síochána (on production of his identification card, if demanded, where he is not in uniform) may without warrant stop, search, question and arrest any person, or do any one or more of those things in respect of any person, if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of that Act, or if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person is carrying any document or other article or thing, or is in possession of information, relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence.

The first thing we have to ask ourselves in relation to that subsection is, what justification is required before the guard can act? Here there is a very clear distinction between this provision and the Fianna Fáil provision in the 1939 Act. Section 30 of the 1939 Offences Against the State Act was in very similar terms to this. It gave power of arrest to a garda acting on suspicion. The big distinction is that under this section vague suspicion is not going to be enough; distrust is not going to be enough; uneasiness on the part of the garda is not going to be enough. There must be suspicion, and that suspicion must be based on reasonable cause. It is only when the garda has positive suspicion based on a reasonable cause that he can exercise the powers contained in subsection (1) of section 2 of this Bill.

What does he need to be suspicious of? He must have suspicion based on reasonable grounds that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Act of 1939. His suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds that one of these offences has been committed, is being committed or is about to be committed, leaving out for the moment this question of information; I am talking about the main part of this subsection. He must be satisfied that his suspicion is reasonable and that it relates to these things. What are these offences which gave rise, first of all, to the Act of 1939 and now to this Bill? Section 6 of the 1939 Act sets out one of the offences as usurping or unlawfully exercising any functions of Government whether executive legislative or judicial. Are we going to stand over that or not? Do we want to allow people to usurp the functions of the Government or unlawfully exercise any of those functions? Do we want to see those who have no mandate whatever from the people, who have never been able to secure such a mandate, to be in a position where, without risk of arrest or penalty, with impunity, usurp or unlawfully exercise the functions of the Government? I do not think anybody in this House would adopt that attitude. That is one of the offences under the 1939 Act.

Section 7 refers to another as preventing or obstructing by force of arms or other violent means, or by intimidation the carrying on of the Government or any branch of the Government of the country. That is one of the offences this Bill is aimed against. It is one of the offences for which, if a garda is satisfied or has reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit it, he can arrest without warrant. Will anybody say that is unreasonable? Is anybody in this House going to stand up and say that a person or organisation who by force of arms or other violent means endeavours to prevent or obstruct or by intimidation to prevent or obstruct the carrying on of the Government or any branch of the Government should be immune under the laws of this country?

Section 8 of the 1939 Act refers to preventing, obstructing or attempting, et cetera, by force of arms or other violent means or intimidation to prevent the President of the country from exercising his functions. Again, is it not reasonable that a Garda officer should be entitled to put a stop to that if he sees it happening? If he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is about to happen or that it has happened should he not be entitled to arrest the person concerned? There are various other offences under the 1939 Act set out in its various sections. It is not necessary to go through them in detail. These are the kind of things which are being dealt with under this Bill.

It is well to remember that we are dealing with matters which affect the security of the State which in turn affect the carrying on of the Government and all its branches. Senator Alexis FitzGerald has dealt very effectively with the scope of what is being done in this Bill as an extension of the existing law. At present under section 30 of the 1939 Act these powers are there for a period of 48 hours. What is suggested is an extension of five days. In introducing the Bill the Minister made the case that when dealing with subversives it may be necessary and certainly helpful to the Garda when investigating any of these matters to have the persons concerned out of circulation for an additional five days. The advantages of that from the point of view of the State hardly need emphasising. If we are thinking of protecting the State and its citizens, is it not right that we should also take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that there is not going to be intimidation of witnesses in the event of court proceedings being brought, to ensure that there is not going to be the destruction of evidence and that those who are arrested may be amenable to the processes of the law? We are told this is internment by another name, that after seven days are up a person can be rearrested, and so on.

Let us think of what internment is, because we have provision for it, a provision which was put on the statute book by the Fianna Fáil Party. The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940, deals with internment. It provides in section 4 (1) that:

Whenever a Minister of State is of opinion that any particular person is engaged in activities which, in his opinion, are prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or to the security of the State, such Minister may by warrant under his hand and sealed with his official seal order the arrest and detention of such person under this Section.

That is what internment means. What is the Fianna Fáil outlook with regard to internment? What, in the view of the Fianna Fáil Party, would justify a declaration to bring into operation the powers of internment contained in that section of the 1940 Act? That, too, is on the record because during the term of the last Fianna Fáil Government, in December, 1970, the then Government were apparently given information which they regarded as reliable by the Garda authorities that there was a plan on foot to kidnap one or more prominent persons. Because they were informed by the Garda authorities, and regarded the information as reliable, that a threat of kidnapping existed, the then Government thought that that justified them in issuing a threat themselves that they would introduce internment. On 9th December, 1970, an announcement was made by the Fianna Fáil Government. I am quoting from columns 487 and 488 of the Official Report of 9th December, 1970, the text of the statement as given by the Taoiseach to the Dáil on that occasion:

The Garda authorities have informed the Government that reliable information has come into their possession to the effect that a secret armed conspiracy exists in the country to kidnap one or more prominent persons. Connected with this conspiracy are plans to carry out armed bank robberies which the police believe may well involve murders or attempted murders.

The Government view with deep gravity the situation arising from this information which has been carefully checked. They have given the fullest consideration to the problems that this gives rise to and they have decided that unless they become satisfied that this threat is removed, they will bring into operation, and without further notice, Part II of the Offences Against the State Act, 1940 which provides for internment.

The Government have given instructions that places of detention be prepared immediately and the Secretary-General, Council of Europe, is now being informed of the Government's proposal as these proposals will involve derogation from certain provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.

This is a serious situation. The Government trust that those who are most directly involved will appreciate just how serious it is and just how determined the Government are to take effective action when they have already gone to the stage of informing the Council of Europe that derogation from an international Convention is in prospect notwithstanding the gravity of that step.

That was a formal announcement made by the Fianna Fáil Government in 1970 in face of a threat of kidnapping, of armed robberies and possible murders associated with them. Since then we have had two kidnappings, if not three. Perhaps one was an attempted one. My recollection is that of a relative of a Member of this House, in addition to the Dr. Herrema and the Donoughmore kidnappings. We have had murders. The British Ambassador, who depended on us for safety and security, was blown up outside his home and an unfortunate civil servant blown up along with him. We have had a plethora of armed robberies. The mere threat of these things was enough to induce the Fianna Fáil Government to issue that declaration that unless they were satisfied that these things were no longer a danger, they would bring into force Part II of the Offences Against the State Act, 1940, providing for internment; that they would bring internment into operation. It was not a question of two days or seven days, but indefinite detention in custody, and that on the certificate of any Minister of State. It did not have to be the Minister for Justice or the Minister for Defence, who might be regarded as the security Ministers.

Any Minister at any time, maybe when playing a round of golf, could decide to issue a warrant against someone. That is what internment means and that is what was threatened by the last Fianna Fáil Government. It is perhaps historically correct to say that every Fianna Fáil Government, other than the last one, actually introduced internment and the last one threatened it because they regarded a threat on reliable sources of kidnappings, armed robberies and possible murders as sufficient reason. Now all these things have happened—the murder of the British Ambassador and the Northern civil servant in our midst only a short time ago.

This Government has not over-reacted. They have not threatened internment. They have not introduced internment. They have asked the Parliament, on the advice of the Garda, to extend the power of detention from two days to five days. That cannot be called over-reacting or unduly repressive in the circumstances of this State at the moment. The Government are right to do what they are doing in so far as they have to withstand the taunts of political opponents, in so far as they have to face the risks of violence because of the action they take. I regard them as a team of courageous men who are doing the right and best thing for the country.

This clearly is a lawyer's Bill with a remarkable number of nuances and interpretations, as Senator Owens said. Presumably it will lead to quite a lot of work in the courts. It would be a very courageous non-lawyer who would enter into the side of the discussion regarding the the legal implications of each section and subsection of the Bill.

It has to be taken, however, as part of the group of measures by the Government in the context of what they described as being an emergency. They cannot be isolated one from the other because they are interdependent. For that reason it seems to me rather disingenuous of Senator Alexis FitzGerald to tell us that all we have given the Minister is this small power —referring to the extension from 48 hours to seven days—of detention without trial.

His contribution was, as others have noted, very tortuous and, while well-argued, was not really as logically and closely argued as we have learned to expect from him—the kind of logical and clear argumentation which we have expected from him in the past. "We have given the Minister this small power" he said, while going on to say "I dislike this legislation"—I suspect he does "and it is a sad thing for us to do" and so on. Most of the other Senators supporting this Bill know well that it is a very distressing and disturbing new provision in regard to the legal powers within the State.

I will not go back over what has been said, but broadly what was said by the present Minister when in Opposition and by a number of people in the Labour Party was that we have for various historical reasons an enormous number of very stringent and strict laws against what have been called over the years subversive organisations particularly the IRA and especially the Provos, the laws being wider than those in most of the western European democracies. It is for that reason that the Labour Party, while in opposition, fought the extension of these repressive-style laws. There is no doubt that this is a retrograde step. It is not a declaration of strength. It is paradoxically enough, an admission of weakness by the Government. Furthermore, it is an admission of weakness by what we call the democratic-style parties.

We further must bring into question the whole apparatus of this kind of Government applied to the enormous complexities of modern societies. It appears it is becoming unable to deal with the great difficulties of the growing demands of modern society, between improved literacy, better understanding of issues involved, greater range of transport and better communications between one country and another, the powers and methodology of subversion, the introduction, as I said on the motion, of the whole process of urban guerrilla warfare. Probably democrats have to reconsider the position in which they find themselves in a very fundamental way.

This is not a 12-month Bill; we all know that. Nobody is foolish enough to believe that the Northern problem is soluble within the next ten, 20 or 30 years. Most of us know that it is a particularly intractable problem. The application of the political solutions, which I believe must be applied before the problem can be resolved, will take a very long time to operate. They should have been operating over the last 50 years but because of the failure of successive political leaders to take the risks, in domestic and political terms, of changing our society in a way that would make it less objectionable for the Northern Loyalist, we are starting all over again and are faced with the end-product of our failure. We should not underestimate the measure of guilt which all of us carry in this part of the State, all the leaders in all the parties, that we have allowed this kind of State to develop with which the Loyalist, in his wildest moments, could not seriously consider accepting any kind of serious association or membership. We have done nothing to reduce the barriers. We have increased them over the last 50 years. For those reasons, we now find ourselves attempting to deal by law with a problem which can only be dealt with by political means that simply will not work.

I find it difficult to understand how this simple lesson cannot be assimilated. I listened to Senator O'Higgins reeling out the various provisions of all the Acts—he could have started much earlier than 1939—but they did not solve anything; we know that. They got rid of the problem for a period, five or ten years, but it recurred. The origins are very much deeper than we give them credit for—we will deal with it on the next Bill rather than on this one—these reasons why young men do what they do.

An odd authority in support of this view is Mr. Kenneth Newman, who was a former head of the RUC, in the report of The Irish Times of 11th May, 1976. He said:

Every new restriction, every sacrifice of a liberty, every compromise on the quality of justice, every new restrictive law is pure gain for the terrorist.

We know that to be true. It is a retreat. We are retreating from our ideal of democratic freedoms, a step-by-step retreat. It is the Provos who are winning. It is we and the system in which we believe, the democratic freedoms, the parliamentary freedoms, the right to debate, who are losing this struggle. We should not be mistaken about that. This man, who is a policeman of long experience and certainly cannot be called in any way a radical, or a revolutionary. He has no doubt that what he says is right. This is a defeat for the Government. Even the quotations from the speeches at the time of the threat of internment was an advance on this. That was a threat which was not carried out. It was probably a very perceptive move and it appears to have worked at the time for a time.

It surprises me that all these authorities on the Fine Gael side should accept so lightly this business of setting aside the courts and the right of appeal. Then there is all the subsequent possibilities arising out of this: the fact that any other freedom can be voted guaranteed under the Constitution can now be voted away from us by a simple majority should the Government decide that the State is threatened. This is the cry of all the people who have progressively lost faith in democracy.

As one watches these increasingly severe, increasingly repressive laws going though the Oireachtas one would being to wonder whether all the protestations that the public is behind us are valid or justified. If we have so much support within the community why is it necessary to bring in all these laws? Why is it necessary to restrict the democratic freedoms and civil rights of individuals if in fact these people—Provos, these subversives—have been and are being totally rejected by the community? To what extent is the truth much nearer the statements made after the death of the British Ambassador by Bishop Daly about the ambivalence that there still is in the minds of our people about violence and that it is not anything like as black and white as we try to pretend it to be, as we think it will be or should be or we like to think it should be? Again this is something which I prefer to deal with on the next Bill rather than this Bill.

It seems to me all the time that, as one sees these types of further repressive laws forcing people, compelling people to take a particular line when they are clearly not willing to do that voluntarily, it is an admission of weakness; it is an admission of defeat. It would be better to see it that way rather than as a strong, good Government.

Look North and see what happened there. There was every possible device of repression, including an Army given a pretty free hand to do what they wanted. Look at the situation which it has brought about and internment on top of it all. We saw Mr. Faulkner admitting that this had been a disastrous policy on his part—just straight total repression. It is not as simple as that. Repression breeds resistance and has always done so. That is why we ended up with the freedom we have today because our people resisted. For centuries they resisted the most terrible laws that anybody could ever devise, really horrifying, expropriation, eviction, hanging, everything that really evil minds could devise to force the minds of men into their way of thinking, and it did not work. Surely we should learn that one simple lesson from our own history. This is not the way to attack it.

This debate has been very interesting. I have been very critical of Parliament but at the same time I know that it has many fine aspects—one of the most heartening things has been the effect the debate here in the Oireachtas has had on public opinion. The main Opposition party have dealt with this matter extremely responsibly in so far as they have said to the Government. "We appreciate your difficulties. We will give you every help that we possibly can in dealing with these difficulties but we feel it is our job to oppose certain incursion into the civil rights of ordinary individuals and there we must ask you to desist".

The whole influence of this kind of debate in the country has been particularly interesting because, as I think most people are aware, that the debate started off with the general public, as a result mainly of the Press and of the reality of the situation, feeling that all these repressive laws should be brought in, particularly the imprisonment and sentences. At a certain point a couple of weeks ago—I think it was triggered off by the particularly inept interview given by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Deputy Conor Cruise-O'Brien, to The Washington Post—everything changed. That seems to me to have been a complete watershed. Suddenly the public became very frightened. There were odd hints, as if what Young used to call the “collective unconscious” came into action. All our fears and memories of informers and felon setters and collaborators with the Government were aroused by this business of keeping files and threatening to tell the editor of The Irish Press that he would punish him for publishing letters in the paper. This seems to me to have completely changed the whole feeling of the public and we have now pouring in from all directions an extraordinary response by all the papers, first of all in defence of their own rights as a free press and in defence of the individual paper that was threatened by the interview.

Then there was the flood of protest from the various highly responsible groups of bodies: the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the labour unions within the trade union movement, the Incorporated Law Society, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Dublin Regional Council and I think even the Irish bishops protested at the stringencies of the laws. We have a group of Quakers who have written in, and they cannot be accused of being in favour of violence. Within my own party there was a very heartening doubt in some of their minds and total rejection in the minds of others. Six or seven of us out of the total parliamentary representatives in the party have refused in one way or another to go along with this kind of legislation.

So it is no good for Senators O'Higgins and FitzGerald whistling past the graveyard, trying to convince themselves that this is a mass movement and that everybody is behind them in their proposals—by that I mean in respect of some of their proposals. On some of their proposals they are going to get full support, rightly or wrongly, from the broad mass of people in Parliament and outside it and in the press. But there is great apprehension about certain elements of the group of procedures which the Government have in mind, particularly in relation to the appeal to the courts which is a constitutional right and which we all feel is the possible beginning of further encroachments on our liberties and freedom.

I was possibly one of the few people to mention, before Deputy Cruise-O'Brien's intervention, that the press censorship could be one of the first parts of the policy of further repression. Like most politicians, I have always had a very ambivalent relationship with the press through the years and I have often wondered whether they had or had not a lot of power. But anybody who has watched the effect of the sense of outrage and then the continuing rumbling thunder of press activity since against these measures and the public response in train with that protest by the press on behalf of the press—it is somewhat cynical really but I suppose it is grand it is there—must feel a considerable sense of wonder at the fact that such power is entrusted to newspapers who can be bought and sold by presidents of multi-nationals and so on who certainly will not be interested in the liberal ethic in any society. But we are all very grateful for the remarkable enlightening process which has taken place in recent weeks which has brought about this sense of apprehension towards what is going on. Indeed, I might include no less a person than the general secretary of the Labour Party who is concerned and the Government Whip and Labour Party Whip who both also expressed their doubts about the wisdom of this kind of legislation and the necessity for the part to which most people object.

Most of us agree on certain fundamental parts of these laws but the Minister knows well the ones to which most of us object. Is there any chance whatever, even at this late stage, the Government would not recognise that they have made a remarkably clumsy and, from the political point of view, dangerous blunder in the way in which they have handled the problems which are certainly facing them? I think the general feeling is that they have grossly over-reacted!

What I find always illuminating is the level of virtual intolerance and this hankering for violence which we find among people who protest that they are really very conventional, peace-loving members of society, particularly members of the very conservative parties in our society. They seem to get a certain pleasure out of saying that they can be just as violent as these thugs. That being so, what do they consider differentiates them from the thugs? If they choose to behave like thugs in their dealings with what they call these violent people, these people who behave in a violent way, what is the difference between them? This is the argument we always had when we were fighting against capital punishment many years ago—the person who kills is adjudged to be a guilty man. How on earth can we protest that our hands are innocent of blood if we then go and, like the so-called criminal, we decide to take life. Equally, when we behave in repressive ways and if we tacitly accept—and this is the point with which I should like to deal in some detail—the possibility that these powers may or will be abused and that in the suppression of these people, in the abuse of these powers, certain objectives of the police will be achieved.

I should like to deal to some extent with the question which is uppermost in the minds of most of us opposing these provisions. That is the decision to hand to the Garda this right of taking somebody into custody and keeping them up to seven days without clear guarantees written into the Bill that the Garda will not exceed their powers in whatever objective they have. The objective suggested in the Minister's speech was that they would get information. The Minister in his speech said:

...who have an organisation and a commitment which, however misguided, is not to be found among the general run of offenders. Special measures are needed to deal with such persons who, for example, are prepared and capable of intimidating witnesses and otherwise hampering the Garda in their investigations. The power to keep such persons, when suspected of serious offence, out of circulation for some days can be of extreme importance...

That is the power asked for, and most of us accept it without question. This is something with which we could not disagree.

This, then, brings us into a very difficult position in which we are going to impute to members of the Garda the possibility that they could abuse this power given to them. Senator Robinson dealt in some way with it when she referred to the Judges Rules, under which one is arrested, one must give one's name and address and nothing more and then sit silent, and then the rules under which a person may be questioned so that all the information they had may be elicited from them. That is clearly a very much more serious provision, a very much more dangerous provision which we believe could be abused.

Now I would have to read again, I am afraid, what I said about the Garda before I go on to deal with this question, because in quoting what I said, the Minister, in a recent radio broadcast, said that I had simply said that the majority of the members of the Garda were honourable, good and consciencious men doing their job as best they can under terribly difficult conditions. I do not take away one syllable from that statement. I completely stand by it. But I then went on to say something which the Minister did not quote:

At the same time we know that there have been abuses within the force in recent years when young men have been taken in and treated violently in order to try to elicit a confession.

I think most of the other Senators in their own various ways, directly and indirectly by implication or direct charge, suggested that that was a general feeling among us: that there is a minority, a tiny minority within the Garda Síochána, of whom the body of the Garda Síochána, I suspect, are very much ashamed, because they know well that the effect of this minority is to detract from the high level of the kind of behaviour we know we can expect from the Garda at all times. The wonderful tradition of an unarmed police force is quite a tremendous tribute to them, the fact that they have been able to go on for so long in that way. But, at the same time, this small minority exists, and I feel that this power of the extension of being held incommunicado for seven days could be a very serious and a very dangerous power to give to any police force without guaranteed safeguards written into the Bill. Obviously there should be a right of access to the relations, a right of access to legal advisers, and a right of access to medical advisers, should the person make a case for it. There are obviously very many conditions in which the person should have the right. He is still innocent; even if he were guilty, he should still be treated correctly. There is no reason in the world why free access to the individual kept in custody should be written into the Bill. I think most of us feel very strongly about this.

My own experience of the Garda goes back many years in pickets and marches, protests of one kind or another. Do not think I refer here to the incident of the dogs a long time ago. I would like to say that, as far as I knew at the time, Deputy Haughey had nothing to do with the setting of dogs on us. But it was interesting because in a way it substantiates what I have just said here—what happened that particular night when we marched down to the American Embassy. Throughout the Garda behaved with remarkable patience, tolerance and restraint. It was only when a tiny minority I think—a couple of guards with a van full of dogs—came along that everything became chaotic. This again was a minority within the force which was responsible for this absurd over-reaction on that particular night.

With no provocation, I suppose.

Not certainly to the extent of setting dogs on us, because we certainly did not bite them back you know.

Now the interesting thing there to me was that of the anger of the few people who did get angry. Most of the gardaí did not. They were extremely patient. There was a tiny minority who did get very angry, because I think it is a horrible thing to set a dog on a human being. I think it does terrible things to one inside emotionally. I can say quite honestly that I was very much more frightened of the man who was trying to get at me than I was of the dog. Clearly he was completely out of control of himself. It was Deputy Haughey who declined to permit me to be prosecuted that night. For what it is worth to you, that is the way he intervened: on my side rather than against me so it is not fair to accuse him of these things wrongly. My point is that it is only a minority in the force we need worry about at any time. However, if we give increased powers of this kind, it would be hypocritical of us to give those powers and not at the same time protect the gardaí from themselves, from their own minority who could abuse them, who may abuse them.

In the course of the debate in the Dáil the Minister gave the impression that he was rather shocked by the Opposition suggestions. I quote from column 426, Volume 292, of the Dáil Official Report:

I was distressed to hear the point made frequently from the other benches that there had been abuses of the power of the Garda Síochána to hold people for 48 hours. I am not aware of them. There may have been isolated cases in which because of an excess of zeal or for some other reason persons were detained for successive periods of 48 hours. I am satisfied that would be an abuse and a wrong exercise and use of these powers and that such abuse would be amenable to correction in the courts. I would be glad to have details...

Now on April 8th in the Irish Independent there is a report of both the abuses—the abuse of the 48 hours and the repeated arrest and indeed the physical abuse of a person taken into custody. I am simply giving it as one example because there have been many reports of this kind of thing happening. The Minister wrongly dismissed these reports as being made by subversives and therefore not worthy of serious consideration. This report does not happen to be made by a subversive. I am sure you will agree that the man who is quoted here is a responsible and reputable member of the legal profession. This deals with both of these suggestions that some of us have made, that there have been abuses of the powers the Garda have. This quotation is in relation to the case of Osgur Breatnach:

In evidence Mr. Breatnach's solicitor, Mr. Dudley Potter, told how he went to the Bridewell station after midday yesterday to take instructions, following a phone call. Mr. Breatnach told him he had been arrested on Wednesday of last week under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act. This was extended to 48 hours' detention and he was released last Friday.

On Monday last he was again detained at 12.30 p.m. Mr. Breatnach inquired why he was being detained and the Garda told him it was under Section 30 of the Act. He was then taken to the Bridewell.

Mr. Potter added that at 1.15 yesterday he suggested to the Garda in charge that his client's time of detention would be up at 1.30, and that he would either have to be charged or released. When he returned to the Bridewell at 1.40 p.m. Mr. Breatnach told him he had been released at 1.30 but was rearrested when he went outside the front gate of the Bridewell.

Mr. Potter said that Mr. Breatnach told him he had been under interrogation....

—this is the interesting part, and the important part in connection with our seven days' extension proposal—

...between Monday and yesterday. At 5.30 yesterday morning he was taken to a tunnel linking the Bridewell to the District Courts. His leather coat was taken off and he was beaten by two or three members of the Garda Síochána, one at a time. He was then taken back to a room adjacent to a ladies' toilet and beaten and punched. Mr. Potter asked him to take off his clothes and show him the marks on his body. There were clear signs of marks and he said these were attributable to beatings he had got. Mr. Breatnach said it was made clear to him that this would continue unless he made a statement. He subsequently made a statement implicating himself in the commission of a criminal offence.

Those really are the three points, the main points that I am concerned with. The danger of the power being given to the Garda too lightly. I do not agree with the acceptance of the chief superintendent. I share the views of people who think that it should be somebody like the Minister, so that he is answerable to the House, as in Britain it is the Home Secretary. We know this happens. The Minister must know that that happened; it was in the papers. Presumably there are other incidents reported. A court case has been settled in favour of the plaintiff about a beating by a guard. So the Minister's protestations of innocence must be considered to be bogus. What one would like to know is what has happened about this case. It is no good dismissing these boys who do these terrible things from time to time. I am not saying this about this man now. There is an origin for the actions of these youngsters who kill people or blow up people or whatever they do. It is a very complicated one. They are our own people, they are the product of our own society and our own culture. We cannot just shrug them off. We cannot take credit for all the ones that bring credit on our society and then get angry and simply punish rather than attempt to rehabilitate the ones that we consider are a disgrace to us and to our society.

The really dangerous thing is that the standards of western democracies are deteriorating. I am sure we must have been all terribly shocked—or were we shocked? I do not suppose we were really—by the approbation with which the torture charges, lately proved at Strasbourg, were treated. The British Press thought it was a good thing, that it was permissible, that it should have been done. I understand that Brian Faulkner's comment was that it was justified by the results. Some of us here, listening to people speaking and the very violent way in which they discuss their feelings about these things, will have to examine our consciences. We will have to try to worry about the response which so many of us seem to feel is permissible in this sort of situation. Where is the passivity of the Christians: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them who trespass against us"? Where has all that gone, all that talk by these people who feel that there is no punishment severe enough to mete out to these misguided youngsters, products of our schools, colleges, homes and families? It is no good saying, as many of the Government speakers have said, that these boys are misguided. Who misguided them? Is it not our society and our culture? Are we not also guilty? Do we not share the guilt with them? What interested me in reading about the torture trial was the fact that in many of the cases the torturers did not lay a hand on the tortured. This is something which is really quite frightening in the Minister's attitude. As Minister for Justice he must know about these things as well as the rest of us. The whole methodology of torture has become very sophisticated indeed. The behaviour of these people who beat up this unfortunate child— that is all he was—when he was totally defenceless and at their mercy, was the behaviour of barbarians, of savages or whatever you like to call them. They did not need to do this; they did not need to waste their energy on this kind of thing. Any of us could take anybody here and give us a week, given a very good torture organisation, people skilled in the black art, and that person would be, within say a week or fortnight—some would last longer than others—transformed into a lunatic, a total, hopeless psychotic.

This can happen to any one of us simply by the various techniques of what is broadly known as sensory deprivation, this business of being totally cut off from all stimuli, and not only the simple obvious ones like relations, legal advisers, support of visiting clergymen, doctors and so on. The really sophisticated methods of sensory deprivation were perfected in the last war and have made further advances in the Korean war in which quite a lot of the British, Americans and Turks defected to the other side and, no doubt, the Communists defected in reverse. Nobody laid a finger on them.

As we heard in this particular case and as we know from talking to people who have been subjected to these sort of processes, the crude techniques of the Inquisition, the racks and other tortures which used to be used are not used at all now. It is possible that we are looking for the power to isolate the person who has been arrested for the reasons stated here: that he will not interfere with witnesses or evidence and so on. But it is asking too much to think that this sector of the garda —a squad or whatever it is called— are not going to resort to all of these techniques. The terrifying thing is of course that nobody goes to the Council of Human Rights in Strasbourg because we are derogating from the responsibility imposed on us by that code of behaviour. We are taking out an insurance against having to answer in our own time against torture charges made against this Government.

It is all very well, as I said on the motion, that we think we are not like the rest of men. There is a Senator in this House who had his nails torn out by his opponents in the Civil War. Each one of you knows quite well that we have behaved terribly towards one another in the past, and we can do so in the future. We can justify it in terms of the defence of the State and so on. We are like the rest of men. Let us get over this illusion of ourselves that we are a specially priviledged people who do not behave terribly under provocation. We do, we have done, and we will again.

I reject it totally, but a case could be made by the other side for extending this detention period from two to seven days. It should only be made with the most stringent safeguards against abuses which we know have already happened—exceptional maybe, but they can happen again. Until these people have been processed through the courts, they could be innocent victims. By the time you have finished this process of a period of sensory deprivation, an individual will admit to anything. It is quite possible that, when that child eventually admitted to taking part in some criminal escapade, it was not true, that he was simply terrified of a renewal of the beatings. This is not unheard of. It was accepted generally in the French Resistance that nobody felt they could last longer than 48 hours with cruder forms of torture. People will eventually admit to anything in order to stop the punishment and pain. I believe it is quite wrong to give this power and authority without some safeguards.

I was glad that Senator Owens referred to that other dangerous position. Senator Robinson dealt with it excellently. There is very little I can add to it. It concerns the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, the dangers to trade unionists under that law and the scheduled offences making picketing illegal for certain employees of health authorities, myself included. This brings us to another very disquieting development. In his speech the Minister said:

...the powers in question are intended to be used against persons who are involved in subversive activities, who have an organisation and a commitment which, however misguided, is not to be found among the general run of offenders.

This question of subversives is an important one these days, particularly in the light of the Minister's known views on subversives. On the Motion I referred to the inevitability of very serious political stresses and strains in the months ahead. Obviously the standard of living of workers is going to be crushed down and down; it must be, in order to maintain the inequitable kind of society the Government believe in. There is bound to be a series of severe reactions in the next two to five years.

People have aspirations in relation to the education of their children and themselves, in relation to housing, health services, old age, retirement, recreation. These are not being realised, are not going to be realised and, to a considerable extent those benefits which they presently enjoy are going to be taken away from them. There are a number of us in politics who have over the years said that a clash between the people and the State was inevitable in the kind of monopoly capitalist society in which successive Governments believed. The name then given to people like myself here and in other countries is that we are revolutionaries, socialists who want to change society in a fundamental way, and this is where this Bill now becomes particularly dangerous from our point of view.

The Minister's own views were printed in Hibernia, 7th May, 1976. This is an extraordinary speech made in St. Anne's Church, Dublin, on the theme of violence, war and revolution. This would support my view concerning the serious emergency the Government know is impending. Anyone reading the Minister's opening speech would realise there is no serious emergency here that could not be dealt with, with much less stringent proposals than those contained in the Bill. The emergency that is inevitable in the next two to five years as a result of the failure of the economic system, the total breakdown of the economic system, and the inevitable reaction from the trade union movement and the Labour movement, is the real emergency. The Minister talks about revolutionaries like this:

The revolutionary aims to provoke repression, that in addition to attacking, the revolutionary will necessarily impinge by way of searches, security checks, curfews etc. on the convenience of the ordinary citizen.

He is setting out to bring about these security checks, the curfews and so on. He knows they impinge on the ordinary person and he is now beginning to blame the revolutionaries for this. The Minister continues:

The revolutionary agitator is constantly alert to take advantage of every discontent that exists in society. He will seek to locate and nurture new grievances, to induce a climate of continuous protest and dissent. Such an atmosphere, if sufficiently constant and widespread, may enable him or tempt him to seek power through the normal constitution machinery. If this technique, of revolution from above, works, it is simpler than violent revolution, but the latter is never abandoned for it is an inalienable part of the creed of Marxist inspired revolutionaries that violence is to be used to achieve its ends if other means fail.

He continues:

They are no longer frightened by the fact that democracy must on occasions use force to defend itself, to be as tough as its opponents and the characterisation of such activities by the pejorative cliches "institutionalised violence" is now seen for what it so often is, subversive propaganda.

The best defence against the terrorist and revolutionary is a vigilant public, constantly on the alert to spot the burrowing of the subversive, as he tries to infiltrate professional of vocational organisations, trade unions, student organisations. By identifying the revolutionary, his effectiveness is immediately blunted.

Student and youth organisations are particularly vulnerable to be manipulated. Youthful enthusiasm for a cause and the quota of naïvete which often accompanies such enthusiasm possibly explains why so many international student organisations become dominated by Marxist revolutionaries, trained and financed to achieve precisely that. Parents and educators have a duty to expose the political philosophy of such organisations and to endeavour to stop young people becoming involved in them.

It is reasonable to assume that not only are trade unionists, as Senators Robinson and Owens pointed out, to be included under this kind of legislation but we are also getting this new blanket description of the subversive. The subversive is no longer the Provos. The Minister said in his speech "...against persons who are involved in subversive activities". Subversive activities are clearly outlined in the Minister's speech to be the activities of people who protest against the condition of people in society. Many members of the British Labour Party are Marxist. Some members of the Irish Labour Party are Marxist. As far as I know, at least one member, if not more, of the Minister's Cabinet is a Marxist. In the course of a conversation with him about the Communist Party in France he made the comment, "Are we not all Marxist now"? This kind of blanket condemnation of people because they have a particular political philosophy, the labelling of them as being subversive and then the introduction of this kind of legislation which can be used against people who are protesting about bad housing, bad education, evictions, unemployment, cost-of-living rises, bad conditions for old people, the apparently uncontrollable selfishness of the ruling classes in our society—this is quite wrong.

It is quite wrong for the State, under the guise of declaring an emergency against a non-existent serious threat to the State, to introduce provisions which will take away from socialists, trade unionists or political activists, who will become more and more powerful as the demand for them grows because of the failure in the kind of society which we choose to run.

People operating in what are called essential services will find themselves subject to this kind of law. We can recall what happened in relation to the ESB workers when there was an attempt to bring in a law to put people in prison. Practically anybody can be designated as part of an essential service. Power workers, light workers, cleansing services, pumping stations, civil servants, dockers, Post Office workers, transport workers—if they choose to go on strike or indulge in industrial action they can find themselves being considered by the Government as a threat to the State.

I read recently that this whole question of security was left to the Taoiseach. Is this true? Did the Leader of the Labour Party, Deputy Corish, who appears to have taken a Carthusian vow of silence about all these proposals in respect of the civil rights of so many people in our society, agree to these? If he did, as a trade unionist and as leader of the Labour Party surely, when it is so clear that he has failed totally, as he has failed to give serious leadership, the only honourable thing left for him to do is to resign as leader of the party.

I am not making extravagant claims when I point out the real dangers implicit in this kind of legislation. The recent killing of the British Ambassador or the bombing of Green Street Courthouse, or the various other episodes such as the breakout at Portlaoise jail, were incidents that showed that there was a defect in security. It is to that aspect that one should look rather than to be giving these extraordinary powers.

A number of Senators dealt with section 2 and the question of reasonable cause for arrest. Anybody who has listened to the pleas made by many Senators to the Minister and has read the debate in the Dáil and the reasoned requests by various Deputies to the Minister to make changes and watched his total intransigence, must know quite well how meaningless is the use of the word "reasonable". We all know of cases in which people have been arrested on what the Garda has presented as a reasonable cause. Up to now one had redress in the courts. One appears before the court, makes one's case, and has the protection of the law. Under the provision of the extension to a seven-day period, it is quite possible that that alone is imprisonment which to many people would be an intolerable and totally shocking experience.

Debate adjourned.
The Seanad adjourned at 8.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 15th September, 1976.
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