I have been to the House on a number of occasions to debate this subject with Senators. I welcomed it then and welcome this occasion even more so in the light of recent happenings. Senators will recall that the last time I addressed a debate in the House concerning Sellafield was in March 2000. That debate took place in the immediate aftermath of the publication of three reports on Sellafield by the United Kingdom Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, including a report on the falsification of safety related data relating to MOX fuel manufactured at Sellafield's MOX demonstration facility and a report on the control and supervision of operations at Sellafield.
Those reports by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate were severely critical of safety standards at Sellafield. They, effectively, reinforced the already long held concerns of this and pre vious Irish Governments about the safety of the Sellafield operations and the steadfast view of the Irish Government that the Sellafield plant should be shut down.
The Government is totally opposed to the continued operation and any expansion of the Sellafield plant. Since taking office I have spared no effort in making known to the relevant UK Ministers, both in face to face meetings and in correspondence, the concerns of the Irish Government about Sellafield. The Government's concerns about existing operations at Sellafield relate mainly to: the management of safety at the site; the storage in liquid form of high level radioactive waste; the continued reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at the site; the continued operation of the old Magnox reactors; the discharge of radioactive waste to the sea; and the risk of a catastrophic accident.
A dominant theme of the Government's campaign against Sellafield has been the genuine fear of an accident at the site. The multiplicity of existing operations at Sellafield increases the risk of a major accident. This risk has now become much more acute in the light of the horrific events of 11 September.
I need hardly remind the House of the Government's dismay and anger at the announcement last week by the UK Government that it has given the go ahead to the Sellafield mixed oxide or MOX fuel fabrication plant. At a time of heightened tensions around the world arising from terrorist threats and when one would have expected countries with nuclear installations to consider the very real threat to safety and security, I find the UK Government's decision, which will effectively result in an expansion of operations at Sellafield, difficult to comprehend.
British Nuclear Fuel's proposals to establish a MOX fuel production plant at Sellafield date back to the early 1990s when it first applied for planning permission to construct the facility. Ireland objected strongly to the project at that time but planning permission for the plant was granted in 1994. Construction of the MOX plant was actually completed in 1998 at a cost of over £300 million and I understand that capital expenditure of some £450 million has already been injected into the project.
In 1996, BNFL applied to the UK Environment Agency for approval to operate the plant. It is amazing that this approval was sought so late in the life of the project. Since then, the BNFL application has been the subject of no less than five public consultations held by the UK authorities and Ministers – the most recent of which was completed in August 2001. The Irish Government has strongly and consistently opposed the commissioning of the MOX plant and its concerns about this plant have been conveyed to the UK authorities in every possible manner and in our responses to each of the five separate rounds of public consultation over the period 1997 to 2001.
The MOX fuel to be produced at Sellafield would be made from uranium and plutonium material separated from spent fuel which is reprocessed mainly in BNFL's thermal oxide reprocessing plant or THORP as it is better known. Therefore, the production of MOX fuel is part of the spent nuclear fuel reprocessing industry at Sellafield. Ireland is strongly opposed to nuclear reprocessing activities which generate gaseous and liquid radioactive discharges which contaminate the terrestrial and marine environment. Furthermore, the resulting production of plutonium creates an unnecessary risk that plutonium could be diverted for nuclear weapons production or terrorist activity.
Even countries with nuclear programmes are questioning the merits of reprocessing on economic and safety grounds. The nuclear spent fuel reprocessing industry is now separating more plutonium than the nuclear industry is able to absorb. Sellafield now has a stockpile of plutonium which presents a potential risk to existing and future generations. The existence of such a large stockpile demonstrates how ill-advised it is to persist with reprocessing. The commissioning of the MOX plant will add even further to the multiplicity of operations already at Sellafield, thereby increasing the risk of an accident. It will increase the volume of world-wide transport of MOX fuel with obvious additional volume of traffic in the Irish Sea, thus posing an unacceptable safety and security risk as well as the potential for a major accident or terrorist attack.
It will also perpetuate nuclear reprocessing activities at Sellafield and add to radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea. While I am advised that the increase in discharges associated with the MOX plant is likely to be small, any contamination whatsoever of our marine environment is objectionable and unacceptable. The Government sees no justification whatsoever for the MOX plant and will do everything possible to bring about a reversal of the UK Government's decision of last week. The Irish Government has already initiated legal action against the UK under the OSPAR Convention in regard to the MOX plant. The Government's legal action began in June this year and relates to the fact that the UK, on grounds of commercial confidentiality, withheld pertinent information essential to assessing the economic justification of the MOX plant. This action is proceeding on schedule and an arbitration tribunal is in the process of being established under the OSPAR Convention to consider the case.
I had specifically requested the UK not to take any decision on the MOX plant while the arbitration process was in train. However, the UK did not accede to my request and instead have taken the decision to give the go-ahead to the plant, a decision which is totally unacceptable to Ireland and difficult to fathom, particularly in the current climate of heightened terrorist threats. In my responses to the public consultations held by the UK, I had made it clear that the information being made available to the public in the consultation papers was inadequate and insufficient to assess or support the economic justification of the MOX plant. I had repeatedly demanded, without success, full release of the information withheld by the UK which purports to support the economic justification of the plant.
At this stage, the Government has exhausted all efforts at a bilateral level with the UK in trying to stop this plant being commissioned. The next step as far as the Government is concerned is to pursue the legal route. I understand that it will be some time before the MOX plant is fully commissioned. In the meantime, the Government will, in tandem with the legal action already proceeding under OSPAR, now press ahead with a view to finalising consideration of all legal options under both EU and UN law. Consideration of these legal options is already well advanced and, based on our best legal advice, the optimum path for proceeding from here will be determined and pursued.
The Government does not accept the UK Government's decision that the MOX plant is justified. Indeed, in announcing its decision to give the go-ahead to the plant, the UK Government said that some 2,000 of the 9,000 respondents to the consultation process were against the proposed commissioning of the plant. Apart from the depth of economic data and information deleted from the UK's public consultation documents relating to the plant, the Irish Government cannot accept an economic analysis which writes off capital costs of some £450 million already injected into the project. Furthermore, there must be serious question marks about the projected markets for MOX fuel, notably in respect of the Japanese and German markets which are identified by BNFL as the primary markets for MOX. Germany has already announced that it is phasing out nuclear power. Japan has its own plans to produce MOX fuel which would further reduce the demand for MOX fuel from Sellafield.
Last year I met the German ambassador to Ireland and informed him of the Government's concerns about the MOX project. In addition, our ambassador to Japan also met an official in the Japanese foreign ministry and expressed similar concerns. Our aim was to address the main markets in Japan and Germany and point out the concerns that pertained in Ireland. It is difficult to see, based on any reasonable commercial principles, how a project for which firm contracts amount to only 11% of output can be said to be economically justified.
It is unthinkable that the UK Government should, at this point, allow BNFL to expand its present operations, when the company, only some 18 months ago, was the subject of what can only be described as a damning report by the UK nuclear installations inspectorate into its safety standards and safety management. As I understand it, very few of the 28 recommendations for safety improvement contained in the inspectorate's report of February 2000 on the control and supervision of operations at Sellafield have been implemented to date. Such a situation does not inspire confidence for the safety of an expanded Sellafield operation.
The future of nuclear power worldwide remains highly uncertain. Some countries have decided to reject nuclear power. On the other hand, arising from concerns about global warming, climate change and the need for sustainable development in energy, Ireland is acutely aware that some Governments, international organisations and other stakeholders see these concerns as an appropriate basis on which to re-launch and re-invigorate the nuclear solution as a response measure. Ireland is firmly of the view that nuclear energy is incompatible with the objectives of sustainable development, principally because of the real risks which nuclear energy continues to present in terms of security and safety, such as the transport of nuclear materials, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, environmental contamination and increased proliferation risks.
The Irish Government believes that the suggestion that nuclear technology might be a solution to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions does not hold merit because of the dangers which I have outlined above. The awful effects of nuclear accidents are well known. Such accidents do not respect international boundaries and countries which have rejected nuclear energy should not be exposed to such risks. It is our firm view that the risks posed by nuclear energy should always mean that it has no role to play in any sustainable development policy. At a time when some developed countries, including some of the world's most advanced countries, are phasing out their nuclear installations, Ireland would be concerned if developing countries were encouraged to develop nuclear industries as part of their energy mix and their efforts to strengthen their economies. It would be a mistake to encourage this approach. I made Ireland's views in this regard very clear at meetings of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development and the International Energy Agency earlier this year.
The terrible events of 11 September have highlighted new security risks which were previously unimagined. These events show that the onus is on those countries with nuclear installations to protect them from attack. They have a duty to do everything possible to protect their dangerous installations, irrespective of the cost of doing so. It is unthinkable that they should authorise new installations until they have successfully addressed these issues.
Concern about terrorist attacks on Sellafield or other nuclear plants has raised public concern about our preparedness to deal with the consequences of a nuclear incident. The Department of Public Enterprise, in conjunction with the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII) has primary responsibility for emergency planning for nuclear accidents. A national emergency plan for nuclear accidents is in place to ensure a rapid and effective response to accidents involving the release, or potential release, of radioactive substances into the environment, which could result in exposure of the public to radiation. The plan is designed to cater for a major disaster at a nuclear installation in another country, which would result in radioactive contamination reaching Ireland.
I should point out that the plan is not designed to deal with a direct nuclear attack on Ireland, but obviously a number of the arrangements and measures in the plan would be relevant in such a scenario. The plan provides a structure for the management of the effects of such an accident, under the overall direction of a committee of Government Ministers. It outlines the measures which are in place to assess and mitigate the effects of nuclear accidents. It also describes the early warning systems operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union for alerting states to any radiological accident, and shows how accident management will operate, how technical information and radioactivity monitoring data will be collected, how public information will be provided, and what measures may be taken for the protection of the public in the short and long-term.
Once the plan is triggered, the emergency response co-ordination committee goes into immediate session in a central control room. Armed with information from the RPII and other agencies, notably Met Éireann, because prevailing weather conditions will play a vital role, this committee, comprising representatives of key Government Departments and State agencies, will decide on, and co-ordinate, the implementation of counter-measures and public safety advice.
Providing accurate information and advice to the public is of major importance. Information will be released throughout the course of the emergency by the RPII using national radio and television and the Internet. We are concerned with a nuclear accident, not an attack, so normal methods of communication will remain operational. The public should stay tuned to bulletins which will provide information and best advice on a frequent basis.
If there was a nuclear accident, at Sellafield for example, even if the wind was blowing in our direction the contamination would take some period of time to arrive here. That period can be estimated and taken advantage of. The areas most likely to be affected may be identified. It would be unusual if the entire country was affected in the same way. There would be time, for example, to put animals indoors and perhaps to take limited steps to protect their fields, in order to protect the food chain.
The Department of Public Enterprise has overall responsibility for the nuclear emergency plan, and for ensuring the co-ordination of the responsibilities and functions of the relevant Government Departments and statutory organisations. These have responsibilities under the plan to establish procedures for implementing measures within their own particular fields of competence, including integration, where appropriate, with emergency services already provided for other civil emergencies.
The national emergency plan which is currently in the public domain dates back to 1992. Since then the plan has been reviewed, and a number of refinements and improvements to the plan have been introduced. I hasten to add that the updating of the plan has nothing to do with the appalling events in the USA. Emergency plans, by their nature, are subject to continuous review and updating as appropriate. Our nuclear emergency plan is a product of years of learning and review. It is not the plan of any particular Minister, and not my plan. It represents the accumulated input of energy Ministers through the years. For example, it was improved dramatically using the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident. The monitoring stations around the coast are a direct legacy from that time. The current plan, published in 1992, has been undergoing review and testing for the last two years, and an updated plan will be ready for publication towards the end of the year.
The changes for the plan are largely institutional in nature, and are designed to streamline administrative arrangements, and to reflect advances in science, technology and meteorology. They are designed to ensure prompt and effective analysis of any emergency and prompt communications to the public and to key players concerning risk analysis and recommended counter-measures. The plan has been the subject of independent evaluation and a full-scale exercise of the plan will take place early next month. The exercise, based on a simulated accident abroad, has been planned within the Department, in conjunction with other Departments, for two years. It has been worked on intensively for the last twelve months, and independent consultants were brought in to advise on the most appropriate and user-friendly plan. I intend to publish the updated plan in the near future and to deliver a fact sheet drawn from the plan to every household in the country.
This House should be assured of the Government's strong resolve to remove the threat to Ireland posed by the Sellafield plant. To encourage the cessation of all activities at Sellafield remains a priority for the Government and we will pursue every diplomatic and legal means of achieving this. More immediately, our action to prevent operation of the MOX plant is proceeding.