At the end of the last meeting Deputy Shatter raised the question as to whether or not amendment No. 44 was in order. He said it was not and the Minister had just begun to discuss it. So would the Minister care to move the amendment at this stage?
NEW SECTION.
I move amendment No. 44:
In page 7, before section 7, but in Part I, to insert the following new section:
"(1) After the commencement of this Act, no action shall lie for divorce a mensa et thoro.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not have effect in relation to any action instituted before the commencement of this Act.".
The Bill uses the term judicial separation. It does not abolish as such the action for divorce a mensa et thoro. It merely removes the jurisdiction to grant such decrees from the Circuit Court and High Court, something which in so far as relates to the High Court cannot be done unless the action itself is abolished. However the change proposed in the Bill is more than nominal since the decree of judicial separation will have effect different from a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro particularly in relation to guardianship and succession. Accordingly, formal abolition of the action is required and subsection (1) of the amendment will provide for that. Subsection (2) is a standard provision and would exclude the application of subsection (1) to any case in which proceedings for a divorce a mensa et thoro is instituted before the passing of the Bill.
While I do not wish to anticipate the discussion on a later section of the Bill, I think I should refer to the fact that section 31 (4) of the Bill provides for the conversion of existing divorce a mensa et thoro proceedings into judicial separation proceedings. That proposal will be against general practice and may be constitutionally unsound because of the element of retrospection. My proposal in subsection (2) of the amendment accords with existing practice and I feel is a proper way to proceed. It will, of course, be open to the applicant for divorce a mensa et thoro to discontinue that action and commence a new action for judicial separation.
Firstly, I want to raise a procedural issue about this amendment and I also want to reply to the substantive case made. It would seem to me that this amendment is now out of order and, if I could explain why it is. Divorce a mensa et thoro is merely the Latin terminology for judicial separation, just as the terminology divorce a vinculo is the Latin terminology for a decree of divorce or dissolution. What is of relevance is the grounds or the basis for the bringing of proceedings. What this Bill is doing, of course, is entirely reforming our judicial separation laws. The fact that the Latin terminology for a decree of judicial separation may remain divorce a mensa et thoro though, does not create any major difficulties and we cannot change that. That is the correct Latin terminology worldwide for such proceedings for it is the Latin terminology.
In section 1 of this Bill which is now part of the Bill, it is accepted that that is the case because section 1 which we have accepted reads:
"After the commencement of this Act the sole ground upon which an application for judicial separation (divorce a mensa et thoro) may be presented to the court by either party to a marriage and granted by the court shall be that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.”
In other words, in section 1 we accepted that an alternative name for proceedings for judicial separation is an action for divorce a mensa et thoro.
What the Bill is doing is reforming in its entirety a mensa et thoro proceedings. It would seem to me that first the Minister’s amendment is now out of order because his earlier amendments, one of which would have replaced section 1, were not accepted and section 1 has been accepted. If we were to accept it as the Bill is currently constituted, we would in section 1 make provision of the granting of divorce a mensa et thoro based on irretrievable breakdown and in section 7 say that after the Bill commenced no action should be brought for divorce a mensa et thoro would be providing new grounds for the granting of decrees in respect of which we will say no proceedings can be brought. That is the logical outcome of this. I appreciate the technicality of what the Minister is trying to do if his original amendment to section 1 had succeeded that the reference in this Bill should be to judicial separation not to a mensa et thoro. Initially, it would seem to me that a ruling should be made as to whether this amendment has now fallen by virtue of section 1 remaining part of the Bill.
The second point I want to make is that section 31 correctly, in my view, properly deals with the position. Currently, the grounds for granting a separation decree or a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro are adultery, cruelty and unnatural practices as prescribed by the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1870. Section 31 repeals that provision. In essence, following the passage of this Bill, the grounds for granting a decree of divorcea mensa et thoro or judicial separation will be irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the subheads in subsection (2).
Section 31 is also designed to ensure that litigants who are already involved in family law court proceedings which have not been concluded and in respect of which no decree of separation has been granted and who are involved in such proceedings at a time when this Bill becomes law do not incur unnecessary expense in litigation but allow them to continue to process existing proceedings on the basis of the new law. The Minister is correct in saying that, of course, if existing proceedings exist, they can discontinue them and then start them on the basis of the new Act.
Section 31 which we will deal with in more detail at the end of the Bill is designed to avoid people having to do that because clearly, anyone who has proceedings in being at that date will want to avail of this new Act. If they discontinue proceedings and have to start all over again, they would be in a position where they would incur unnecessary additional legal costs and expense and suffer unnecessary delays. They would still in the context of their proceedings be bound by the provisions of the Act with regard to the courts being able to adjourn for mediation and other matters but that is an issue we can deal with in the concext of section 31. I merely make the point that the Minister's amendment on the substantive issue would not allow for that and you could have many people with court proceedings ready for hearing at the time when the Bill comes into force who would literally have to be put back three or four or six months in a court calendar and have to start all over again. I see no benefit in that.
The suggestion has been made that there could be some constitutional difficulties with that approach. I would suggest that there would not be. It has been consistently the approach in family law statutes that where legislation comes into force, for example, changing maintenance laws or other laws, they have extended jurisdiction to the courts to make orders based on new powers granted in old court proceedings issued before the Act was passed. This is a procedure this Bill follows.
I would ask for a ruling as to whether this amendment can be properly taken. I would accept it could be properly taken if the term "divorce a mensa et thoro” was not in section 1. In the context of its being there I do not see how this amendment can be taken.
I am ruling that the amendment is in order. While it may be somewhat illogical for various reasons that you have explained, nevertheless, procedurally it is in order and if there are any difficulties they can be tidied up at Report Stage. At this stage I am allowing the amendment.
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Abbott, Henry. |
Harney, Mary. |
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Ahern, Dermot. |
Kitt, Michael P. |
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Calleary, Seán. |
McCartan, Pat. |
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Cowen, Brian. |
O'Donoghue, John. |
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Desmond, Barry. |
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Níl |
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Fitzpatrick, Tom. |
Shatter, Alan. |
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Flanagan, Charles. |
Taylor-Quinn, Madeline. |
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Nealon, Ted. |
There is a number of amendments tabled to section 21. Amendments Nos. 45 and 46 constitute a composite proposal. Amendments Nos. 51 and 55 are consequential. Amendment No. 47 is an alternative to amendments Nos. 45 and 46. Amendments Nos. 49, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57 and 58 are consequential on amendment No. 47. I propose to take amendments Nos. 45, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 58 together, if that is agreed. Agreed.
I move amendment No. 45:
In page 12, before section 21, but in Part III, to insert the following new section:
"21.—In this Part ‘family law proceedings', in relation to a court, means proceedings before a court of competent jurisdiction under—
(a) this Act,
(b) the Adoption Acts, 1952 to 1976,
(c) the Family Home Protection Act, 1976,
(d) the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976,
(e) the Family Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) Act, 1981,
(f) the Family Law Act, 1981,
(g) the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964,
(h) the Legitimacy Declaration Act (Ireland), 1868,
(i) the Married Women's Status Act, 1957, or
(j) the Status of Children Act, 1987,
or between spouses under the Partition Act, 1868, and the Partition Act, 1876, where the fact that they are married to each other is of relevance to the proceedings.".
The effects of amendments Nos. 45 and 46 will be to replace section 21 of the Bill with the different and more comprehensive provisions regarding the courts before which separation proceedings may be brought.
Section 21 provides only for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. My amendment, No. 46, proposes that, as with other family law statutes, for example, the Married Women's Status Act, 1957, the Family Home Protection Act, 1976 and the Family Law Act, 1981, which relates to property — the High Court and the Circuit Court should have concurrent jurisdiction. The amendment makes clear that either the High Court or the Circuit Court may hear and determine separation proceedings and that if proceedings are initiated in the Circuit Court and the rateable valuation of any land is over £200 the respondent may, if he wishes, have the proceedings transferred to the High Court. He must apply to the court to do so before the hearing of the action.
In practice, the vast majority of separation cases should in any event be heard in the Circuit Court because of the cost factor and because of section 17 (4) of the Courts Act, 1981 which limits the cost of an applicant, where proceedings are taken in the High Court rather than the Circuit Court and the jurisdiction was proper to the Circuit Court. The purpose of that section is to discourage the taking of actions, including family law actions, in a higher court than is necessary.
Subsection (4) of the amendment would allow jurisdiction in separation proceedings to be grounded on the domicile or ordinary residence of either spouse. This will represent a widening of the present jurisdiction, which appears to be confined to cases where it can be shown either that the respondent's domicile was Irish or that he had sufficient residence in Ireland.
Subsection (1) of the amendment would bring about a change in nomenclature for the Circuit Court when dealing with family law proceedings as defined in amendment No. 45. These provisions would have the same effect as subsection (1) of section 21 of the Bill.
Deputies may wish to note that there is no collective citation for the Partition Acts of 1868 and 1867. My amendment No. 45, which is a definitive section, takes that matter into account whereas section 20 (3) does not. The use of a collective citation in that subsection is incorrect.
Amendments Nos. 51 and 55 are technical amendments only, which fall to be made if amendments Nos. 45 and 46 are accepted.
Do you wish to take amendment No. 47?
Yes, because it is an alternative to amendments Nos. 45 and 46.
It might help the process of debate if, on behalf of Deputy Mervyn Taylor, I discussed amendment No. 47, which amendment relates to an insertion of an entirely new section before section 21 but in Part III.
I will make five points in support of the amendment. The first point is that the District Court will have certain limited jurisdiction, which is outlined in the amendment, in the monetary amounts for adjudication. These limitations are also confined within the statutes referred to. My reason for introducing the amendment in that framework and for strongly supporting the views of my colleague, Deputy Mervyn Taylor, is that I think in many respects it puts this Bill to a singularly acid test, namely, do we or do we not want to provide to people of limited income a democratic access to the courts to plead judicial separation in the framework of this Bill? If we are not prepared to answer that question in the positive, then the bona fides of this Bill must be called into question.
My second point is that it is far cheaper to go to a District Court. I recall, as a Deputy, 12 or 13 years ago, being involved in the drafting of the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976 as was my distinguished legal colleague, Deputy Tom Fitzpatrick. Subsequently there were very protracted debates with the then Minister for Justice, Deputy Cooney, on the Family Home Protection Bill, 1976, which was put through by Fine Gael Ministers for Justice. The important point in relation to those Bills was that they had District Court jurisdiction and the benefits of that legislation would never have been passed on to the electorate at large, particularly those on low income and very limited means if were not for the access to the District Court.
I recall vividly at the time many lawyers casting grave doubts on the competence of District Courts in relation to these statutes. In time, on balance, they have been proved wrong and many a district justice is more than capable of arriving at a fair and reasonable assessment of that fundamental for social protection in our society. It has been done at virtually no cost to those involved and that has been of great benefit. In the event of this Bill being passed, I can see the ongoing scandal, no more and no less, whereby in particular, woman after woman will come to me in my constituency as they do now — and I know it is dangerous to use the outcome of the last clinic as a process of amending legislation — and tell me they have not the £1,500 to put in the law office before the case is taken in hand. They do not even have the £1,000 up front, nor even the £500. These women certainly do not have the £2,500 or £3,000 by the time the whole process is finished to pay for the cost of such proceedings.
Therefore, it is more democratic, it is infinitely fairer and, indeed, makes it far more accessible to have this amendment made to this legislation. There are already six specific statutes where jurisdiction is conferred on the District Court and the addition of this statute, in my opinion, would enhance the role of the District Courts in that regard. I do not hold any brief for district justices or some of their aberrations. I hold lesser brief for some of the aberrations at Circuit Court level and I hold even lesser brief for what emanates on occasions from the High Court.
Be that as it may, there are many district justices who are more than capable, with their long experience and wide knowledge, of discharging the rigours of this Bill and to suggest that it should be confined to Circuit Court level does not hold water. So, accordingly, on behalf of Deputy Mervyn Taylor who is detained at a Council of Europe meeting, I want to propose this amendment and to say how pleased I am to have the opportunity to do so.
If I could, first of all, take the Minister's amendment. Could I say that, first I am not sure that the amendments the Minister is tabling are particularly necessary in that, if the Minister wishes to confer a concurrent jurisdiction on the High Court, it seems to me that is the reality because of the High Court's original jurisdiction under the Constitution. As a result of a judgment delivered since this Bill was published, in a case called F and F, by Mr. Justice Egan in the High Court in February of this year, the High Court automatically has a concurrent jurisdiction in any case, although the ideal is that these matters are dealt with at Circuit Court level to keep the costs down. In the Courts Act, 1981, which deleted all references to the High Court in the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, and the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and in some other legislation, it was sought to remove the High Court's jurisdiction and to confine jurisdiction to the District Court and the Circuit Court. Indeed, the court jurisdiction as conferred on the Circuit Court in this Bill to some extent mirrors the phraseology of the Courts Act, 1981.
It has now been clearly decided in the most recent case this year, in February 1988, that despite the Courts Act, 1981, not expressly conferring a jurisdiction on the High Court to deal with maintenance matters and custody matters, the High Court has such a jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution. Clearly, under the Bill, the High Court would have such jurisdiction. It might be as well, in the light of that judgment, just to spell the matter out. I must say I have no particular objection, having considered them in some detail, to the new sections 21 and 22 that the Minister proposes. There is one aspect though of section 21 about which I have a limited reservation. If we accept these sections I would like an assurance from the Minister that this aspect of it can be dealt with by agreement on Report Stage.
The Bill is designed to ensure that, when family law proceedings are brought, any matters in dispute between a husband and wife can be resolved in the context of those proceedings without multiple court actions being necessary. Section 21 in the original Bill, refers to the jurisdiction to be exercised in the Partition Acts. The Partition Acts are evoked where there is property which is jointly owned by a husband and wife and where normally this is disputed between them and one or other of them wants the property sold and the other does not. The property that people most often identify with as being involved in a dispute between a husband and wife about sales is the family home, but under the Partition Acts, in my experience when marriages have broken down, there can be applications for the sale of all sorts of other property. There might be a small family business, such as a grocery shop, or a large business such as a public house, the property of which is held in joint names. The wife or husband may wish to sell it and have the proceeds divided. In the way section 21 of the Bill, as I have it, is phrased clearly that matter can be dealt with.
This peculiar phraseology is at the bottom of the Minister's proposed definition section where he talks about proceedings between spouses under the Partition Act "where the fact that they are married to each other is of relevance to the proceedings". When there is a dispute about the sale of the family home, the fact that they are married to each other may be of relevance. In the context of a dispute about the sale of a business premises or, perhaps, a small property divided into a couple of flats or something of this nature, the fact that the marriage has broken down may be the reason why the couple want the property sold, but the fact that they are married to each other is not of necessity of relevance to the proceedings. What is of relevance is that the properties are jointly owned and one of the joint owners wants to effect a sale. I would be anxious that that provision is not construed as delimiting the court's powers and forcing husbands and wives back into the arena of being involved in these two sets of court proceedings where one should be sufficient.
In the context of accepting the Minister's amendment which now spells out the High Court position which probably in the light of the recent High Court judgment should be expressly spelt out, it would seem to me that the phraseology relating to the Partition Acts that should be included ultimately on Report Stage, would be simply a reference to proceedings between spouses under the Partition Acts. I do not really see any purpose in having the words "where the fact that they are married to each other is of relevance to the proceedings". If it is simple proceedings between husband and wife, under the Partition Acts, and at the same time they have brought separation proceedings, they should be able to have the Partition Acts proceedings dealt with in the separation proceedings. Subject to the Minister's assurance on that, I am happy to accept the two new sections the Minister is going to insert.
The Minister might clarify one thing for me and confirm that my reading of this is right. There is a reference to the Adoption Acts, 1952 to 1976 in this. I am assuming this is just generally for the purpose of the definition of family law proceedings in particular as it will go on to apply as regards the High Court. The Circuit Court, of course, currently has no jurisdiction under the Adoption Acts at all. Only ten days ago we passed a very complex Bill relating to the adoption of abandoned children born to married parents, which would confer a jurisdiction on the High Court solely with regard to adoption proceedings. In my belief, it is of importance that the High Court retain sole jurisdiction in adoption proceedings in the context, both of the recent Bill that was passed and of the previous adoption legislation, because these proceedings always involve constitutional issues which I think are beyond the competence of the Circuit Court.
I am assuming that I am right in interpreting this amendment as saying that the Adoption Acts reference here is merely as regards the definition of family law proceedings for High Court purposes. I would like that confirmed.
Finally, may I deal with Deputy Desmond's amendment? At the time when this Bill was drafted I was anxious to ensure that judicial separation proceedings will be as accessible as is possible to people who require to avail of such proceedings. I was also anxious to ensure that we would get as close as we could, within the limitations of a Private Members' Bill, to starting to establish a structure for a family court system as opposed to a system in which every single court in the land exercises a different jurisdiction in family law matters. I was also anxious to ensure that when this Bill came into operation there would be a uniformity of approach on the part of the Judiciary in operating its provisions so as to ensure that both husbands and wives who sought assistance under the Bill were truly equally treated before the courts. I was anxious to ensure that there would be a degree of interaction within the Judiciary so as to ensure a uniformity of approach. The ideal court system — as I keep on saying endlessly — is not provided for in this Bill and it cannot be. The ideal court system is a unified family court which can only be established with the Minister passing the necessary legislation and making the necessary financial allocation. I cannot provide for that.
We are going as close as we can to it in this Bill by centralising the jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. There are far fewer Circuit Court judges than there are District Court justices and that gives a better opportunity to ensure a uniformity of approach on the part of the courts in dealing with family law matters. It also seeks to ensure that there is a greater possibility of the judges developing a specialist knowledge of the areas they are dealing with. The problem with the District Court is that there is a large number of judges, many of whom are competent to deal with family law matters and I am afraid many of whom are not competent enough to deal with family law matters. Anyone who comes before those courts is fully aware of that. Indeed, I have on occasion heard members of Deputy Desmond's party suggesting that other matters that the District Court currently deals with should not be dealt with at District Court level.
I do not believe that Deputy Desmond's proposal, or Deputy Taylor's proposal which was made with Deputy Desmond, would in fact improve the situation at all. I think you then have three different disparate sets of courts, District, Circuit and High Court, all dealing with judicial separation proceedings, different judges at different levels adopting different approaches. No one would know what the approach is because, in particular, District Court decisions are never published or made known. There would be no coherent body of law developing that either lawyers could look to to advise their clients or that husbands and wives could look to to get any guidance as to what would happen in proceedings they were involved in. Indeed, the amendments that have been tabled could give rise to a situation where a District Court case was taking place and it could emerge during the course of that case that in order to afford protection to a wife she should get, for example, a large lump sum payment. It may be discovered during the course of the District Court case that a lump sum payment in the order of £30,000 could be made by husband to a wife and the court could feel it should so order or the court may feel that it should order the transfer of a home from the husband to the wife as it can under this Bill. The District Court will suddenly discover under Deputy Taylor's amendments that it could have no jurisdiction to do this. The wife might have to discontinue her proceedings, go off to a Circuit Court and start all over again.
It would seem to me that that is not the correct procedure we should be adopting. Even in the context of people who have low means, they may be living in family homes that are certainly worth in the region of £25,000, £30,000 or £35,000. In the context of dealing with inheritance rights or family property, so as to give a dependent wife a degree of protection that she cannot be given by making a low maintenance order, it may be in her interest that the court make an order transferring, for example, the family home from her husband to her. The complicated provisions that Deputy Taylor's amendments would insert into this Bill could leave many dependent wives embroiled in District Court proceedings and being told half way through them by district justices, "You should not be in this court; you should go to another court because it is a different sort of order that should be made". It seems to me that rather than simplifying the procedure and making the law more accessible and indeed providing protection for dependent wives who are very often the people who seek their protection even more so than husbands, Deputy Taylor's proposals would spread total chaos in the operation of this Bill and could create problems with people seeking to transfer from one court to another and recommencing court proceedings which were formally half way dealt with in another court. Indeed, a wife may discover, if a district justice makes an order which is the maximum order that can be made on the application, for example, of her husband, that if her case had been brought in the Circuit Court she could have done a great deal better and it may be too late for her to do anything about it because the court has dealt with the case. It is not as simple as the issue of maintenance.
Within the context of the current legal framework I very much agree that the District Court should continue to retain a maintenance jurisdiction to make maintenance orders under the legislation that Deputy Desmond referred to that was enacted in 1976. Indeed, the court's financial jurisdiction should be increased. To spread this jurisdiction into the District Court in the way it is set out by Deputy Taylor could, I think, effectively sabotage the workings of the Bill and place everyone in a state of confusion and more particularly those who seek benefits from it.
The final point that should be made is that the case is made that that would in some ways save people legal costs. In fact, Deputy Taylor's amendment could more likely increase legal costs. We all know there is a lack of uniformity of approach at District Court level in dealing with what I would describe as the more simple family law applications in the areas of maintenance and custody. They may be simple but they are matters of great concern for the families who are affected by the court decisions. To put it mildly, there are differences of approach. There are some justices who reach decisions that are automatically appealed currently into the Circuit Court. There are others who in most cases make the correct decisions. Deputy Taylor's amendment provides that having dealt with matters at District Court level there can then be a full oral hearing on appeal at the High Court level. It would mean that people having gone into the District Court will then, under Deputy Taylor's amendment, head off to the High Court. There would be an endless series of appeals from District Court to High Court and instead of people having their family problems dealt with by and large at a Circuit Court level with a small number of appeals, people would have their problems dealt with at District Court level with a large number of contested oral High Court appeals in which they will incur a great deal more legal costs than is the case under the Bill as drafted and in respect of which, according to Deputy Taylor's amendment, the High Court on appeal would then assume a completely different jurisdiction from the jurisdiction exercised by the District Court in the initial hearing which is of a more limited nature. You then have the High Court dealing apparently with an entirely new case based on entirely new principles and possibly reaching a decision that neither the husband nor the wife envisaged was possible which then neither of them could appeal to anywhere else. It seems to me that these particular amendments, while they may be well meant, are particularly badly put together and instead of saving legal costs could greatly increase them, could create a great deal of chaos, could result in dependent spouses not having the benefits to which they are entitled under this Bill and could greatly add to the amount of time in processing family court proceedings to a conclusion.
Very briefly, I find myself somewhat in agreement with Deputy Shatter. I note that he seems to be saying that they may take on the amendments made by the Minister. I agree with him to a certain extent in relation to that last phrase in amendment No. 45 and I personally feel that perhaps the Minister could take a look and see if there is a necessity for that to be there at all. Probably it could lead to a situation where, perhaps, a complication could arise in a later hearing arising out of this phrase. Perhaps it might be better if it were not in. Again, I will listen to the Minister in relation to that.
The two amendments set down by the Minister are far more comprehensive than the section we are dealing with. For instance, subsection (3) of amendment No. 46 allows the possibility of unlimited jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. That is omitted in the actual section. Whereas it may be allowed between the parties, it should be stated and the Minister's amendment does allow for that to happen if the respondent so requires.
Coming to amendment No. 47 by Deputy Taylor, discussed by Deputy Desmond, I have to agree with Deputy Shatter that the amendment is a very far-reaching amendment. It is something that is giving the District Court jurisdiction which it never had and, in fact, probably never was intended to have. Up to now, the District Court could not deal in equity or property matters. This amendment is giving it that power. The District Court is not the place for these matters to be raised. It may very well be necessary, if this amendment was accepted, to have a complete overhaul of the District Court rules in order to facilitate an amendment like this. I have to agree with Deputy Shatter on that. I think the proper place is the Circuit Court. I would be against that amendment.
I want to speak in support of the amendment in the name of Deputy Taylor and to deal in some way, if I can, with the points made by Deputy Shatter and more recently by Deputy Ahern in denigration, if you like, of that amendment. The purpose of the amendment is to seek to introduce and to make available to litigants the right of hearing in the District Court. It is a theme that has been pursued both by Deputy Taylor and myself on a number of occasions when jurisdiction of the courts has been raised in debate in the House.
The basic belief is that the District Court is a court that should be developed and enhanced in its jurisdiction as opposed to being constantly detracted from and visited with a lot of, if I can use the expression, benign abuse. There is constantly a view about, that justices in the District Court are somewhat less talented, less aware of the law and less capable and able to deal with matters that come before them. It is suggested that if we are to introduce this régime of jurisdictions by bringing the District Courts in, we will have three different levels of courts, three different venues and three different jurisdictions dealing with the matters and that that in some way will introduce chaos and make the law unworkable. Virtually in every other area of litigation the District Court has a say and you have three levels of court and three jurisdictions and there is no chaos, no confusion. I do not see why it should develop here.
The importance of the Labour Party amendment, which we support, is that you are making the most democratic, cheapest and most readily available court readily accessible to litigants in this whole area. It is specifically to try to meet the whole problem of the absence of a comprehensive legal aid system on the one hand, and the exorbitant cost of lawyers on the other hand. Anyone who practises or has practised in the area of family law will no doubt immediately testify to the exorbitant costs that are — and, I will concede to a great extent, have to be — imposed on litigants who are not in a position to pay. A day in the Circuit Court or the High Court is not something that anyone of us would ever hope to or want to have to pay for. They are expensive places to go to. It is to deal with people who cannot afford the exorbitant costs involved in this litigation that we are concerned, and to ensure that this legislation just does not become the law or the domain of the very well off.
We do not have a comprehensive legal aid system. It is not simply good enough to say or suggest that anyone who cannot afford it will get legal aid or advice. They will not. I do not have to go at length into the problems that are at persent being experienced by the law centres. Their most recent report relates to 1986. In that report they regret that they were so late in having the report published well outside the time laid down in legislation. They explained that it was simply because they do not have the staff or resources to keep even their reports up to date. In a recent reply from the Minister in the House, it appears that only one centre in Dublin is currently in a position to take on new cases. A constituent yesterday told me that the appointment she was offered was for some time about the 14 or 18 August.
How do we suggest that that system is working? In the absence of anything approaching a comprehensive national legal aid scheme and in the knowledge that the existing scheme is totally overworked to the extent that legal aid is virtually non-existent at this stage, we have to look to an alternative. In the clear indication that there is no will — particularly with this Government — to invest money in the right of people, who cannot afford it, to get to court we have to think about this not just as a short-term problem but as one that is going to exist and has existed since the law centres were establised and will continue to exist for the very foreseeable future.
The only way to deal with it is to give the right of access to the cheapest, most quickly available and most democratic court in the land, which is the District Court. Our argument is that the working of the District Court is virtually the same as that of the Circuit Court. There are as many judges of variable mind in the Circuit Court — or, indeed, in any court in the land — as in the District Court. They do not record written judgments; they do not assemble volumes of decisions to lay down a coherent body of laws, that Deputy Shatter has argued for, and for that reason all the criticisms he makes of the District Court can also be made of the Circuit Court. The only difference is that they tend to have better physical conditions. Their atmosphere seems to be a bit more rarefied and of course you have barristers who like to frequent them.
Here another problem with regard to legal aid arises. I understand the major reluctance among family law practitioners for bringing the District Court in, is that it comes into the legal aid area and the Legal Aid Board currently, under their rules, will not certify the payment of barristers to go into the District Court and carry the workload of the law centres. That simply could not be done by solicitors alone at this stage. The only way the law centres survive at the moment is because they can bring their court work into the Circuit Court and get the legal board to certify for counsel there and counsel virtually takes on the work from day one, single-handedly, and relieves an unmerciful load of work from the shoulders of the barristers.
All of that is not an argument for doing down a basic proposition, that is, that the District Courts are capable and are well endowed to deal with issues like this. In fact, anyone who suggests that they do not deal with property issues does not know anything about the District Court at all. They do so on a daily basis and they do so even in a round about way. The barring order procedure, which is used in the District Court, has as much to do with property as the transfer of property itself. Putting a man who abuses the institution of marriage or the spouse out of the family home is to deny him of his property and use of the family home for as long as he is barred.
That is specious.
It is not specious. If you want to go into any other of the many jurisdictions of the District Court, they deal with property interests on a daily basis: the granting or refusal of licences deals with property; the question of civil claims again deals with the transfer from one party to another of property in one form or another. I accept the points about equity but these should not be the reasons we would seek to reject the amendment in the name of Deputy Taylor.
The manner in which Deputy Taylor has gone about drafting his amendment, to recognise that the jurisdiction of each of the courts must be limited in this regard, is a very good one. The measures he has laid down are equally good in regard to identifying the various areas in which ancillary orders can be made and demarcating for each of the courts, be it the District or Circuit Courts, the limit to which they can adjudicate on the matters.
I do not accept the arguments of Deputy Shatter. It is a great attribute of Deputy Shatter's in advancing his arguments oftentimes to instance the probable scenario of the likelihoods that could arise. I pay tribute to him in that he has an incredible imagination in this area and I have listened to him many times worry about how laws could eventually be worked but the more ridiculous or the more extreme the instance he uses, and he has used a few ridiculous ones here today, make me all the more firm in the belief that the arguments being advanced are not real and are not ones we should concede. We must look at the concern of those very poorly off people in this jurisdiction who will have real need of recourse to this legislation and who will simply not have the means either in their own pocket or through the State services to get to court and avail of the remedies which are so badly needed here. What the Labour Party, through Deputy Taylor, is advocating is the only real solution and means of getting about that.
While appreciating that we are dealing with 12 amendments together, may I ask members to be a little shorter in their contributions?
Very briefly, I believe that one of the areas in which the Judiciary are least competent in this country is in family law matters. There is a grave need for a re-education, if you like, of our judges, regardless of which court we are speaking about. The effectiveness of this Bill will be severely dented unless there is a re-education, if you like, of judges in family law matters in general.
I would have grave reservations about transferring the jurisdiction to grant a decree of judicial separation to the District Court. Indeed, it is highly significant that Deputy Taylor in his amendment, while allowing the District Court to grant a decree of judicial separation, goes on to insert limits as to the amount which the District Court may award to an applicant. This, in itself, would appear to indicate a certain reservation which Deputy Taylor may have in relation to a decision which the District Court may make in cases such as this. If a District Court is entitled to make a decree of judicial separation, the question which then arises is, why is it not allowed to make decisions in equally serious matters such as High Court actions involving negligence in excess of £2,500? It is not, and the gravest danger of all is that you would certainly have a lack of uniformity and this, in turn, would lead in my view to certain decisions being clearly at variance with one another and would ultimately lead to discontent.
I have mixed views about the matters we are discussing. First of all, it is fair to way that the most appropriate way to deal with family law matters would be in the context of family tribunals. The court structure as we know it is not appropriate to deal with the kind of problems that are involved in family disputes. It is regrettable that in the context of a Private Member's Bill it is not possible to set up a system of family tribunals because of the additional expenditure and so on that that would place on the Exchequer and, therefore, it is not in order even to propose amendments of that kind. Having said that, whether one goes to the District Court or to the Circuit Court or to the High Court or wherever, a lot of members of the Judiciary are neither interested in nor suitable for dealing with family law matters. Perhaps they are not suitable to deal with other matters either and that is probably a reflection on those who appoint them, not on the persons themselves.
I have some sympathy with the points being made by Deputies Desmond and McCartan because, regardless of the kind of legislation we have, it is not much good unless people have access to it. In my experience, a lot of people do not have access to the law in dealing with family law matters simply because they do not have the money to get involved in all of the legal proceedings which are often necessary. However, the most appropriate way to deal with the question of access is not in the context of which court you give jurisdiction to but rather in the context of a proper legal aid system. The District Court is a minor court, a court of minor jurisdiction. It is regarded as such by most people in this country. The matters we are discussing here are not of minor substance. In many ways because of the finality involved, because of the huge differences they will make to people's lives, particularly questions like custody and so on, it is important that they would be dealt with in a single court structure, if that were possible and I do not think that would be possible if we start diversifying this law all over the place and having it in three different sets of courts. Ideally, I would like to think that we would only have one court that would deal with these matters but I take the point being made by the Minister in his amendment and the point made by Deputy Shatter in relation to a recent judgment. The High Court, in any event, has now concurrent jurisdiction. It is a pity that through this legislation we are not able to put it all into the one family court structure, because in that way we will get uniformity, we will get an expertise and we will get some people who will be able to develop an interest in this whole area. At the end of the day what matters is that the person presiding over the case is interested in ensuring that there is justice done, that the very personal problems that are involved are attended to in a fair way. It is also important that we have a proper back-up system to whatever courts are going to deal with the new legislation. Again, I do not believe it will be possible to have a caring and comprehensive back-up structure of psychologists, marriage counsellors and so on if we start to give this jurisdiction to a number of different courts.
If we are going to encourage some people to move away from the idea of courts and to avail of mediation and if we are to extend the already limited mediation service that exists, we are not going to be able to do that again if we have three different layers of courts that are responsible for making decisions in this whole area. In my experience, people who come before the courts at the moment in relation to family law matters find that they have to wait in the most appalling conditions outside courtrooms, that there is not privacy despite the fact that their names may not be referred to. Husbands and wives and their various legal teams have to stand in corridors with all kinds of other people waiting to get into court. It is appalling the way we treat the victims of marital breakdown. Until such time as we move to a single unified family tribunal sysyem as recommended by all parties in the Dáil through the all-party Committee on Marriage Breakdown some years ago, we are not going to be able to deal realistically with the whole question of the law as it affects marital breakdown.
Finally, if we are going to allow people to avail of the one set of procedures and to sort out all the different problems that are part and parcel of the break-up of marriage in the one set of proceedings, some matters, such as questions relating to maintenance, and questions relating to who would live in the family home, could come within the competence of the District Court, but there are other matters with which I believe the District Court is not competent to deal. For that reason the amendment, as proposed by the Minister, is what is desirable in the circumstances, although I have a great deal of sympathy for the proposal of the Labour Party, but I think it is best to deal with that by way of improving the legal aid scheme rather than giving additional jurisdiction to a court of minor importance.
I will be very brief. I would point out to Deputy McCartan, and I agree with what Deputy Harney says, that the problem here lies in particular in the context of access to the legal aid system. I would point out to Deputy McCartan that under the way in which the legal aid system operates the Legal Aid Board requires legal aid solicitors to bring proceedings, on behalf of people who require legal aid, in the lowest possible court in processing their cases. If the amendment Deputy Taylor seeks to have made to this Bill was made it could result in many wives, who do not have means, being forced by the Legal Aid Board to bring their judicial separation proceedings at District Court level in circumstances where, if those proceedings were brought at Circuit Court level, those wives would do substantially better at the end of the court proceedings in the context of the orders that they could get because the Circuit Court would not be exercising the more limited jurisdiction. The District Court jurisdiction would be conferred by Deputy Taylor's amendment.
Rather than helping people of low means, this proposal, without referring to what I have said previously about the chaos that could be created, could actually deprive wives who are dependent, and whose husbands have low incomes, but where there is substantial property there — substantial property even simply in the sense of the family home — of the entitlement to get the family home into their names. The way in which the Bill is drafted currently ensures that if the Legal Aid Board continue to operate the rules they currently operate this cannot happen. I notice that Deputy McCartan, or Deputy Desmond, addressed the kernel of this, which is the action replay of the District Court proceedings by way of an entire High Court hearing on appeal. How that saves people money or facilitates the ready resolution of family problems in a way that will assist people on low means, I just fail to understand. So, I really cannot agree to the amendments that are tabled by Deputy Taylor. I would be anxious to hear the Minister's response to that one brief query I raised.
May I raise a query with Deputy Shatter? Could he elaborate a bit on the suggestion — because it does cause me a little concern — that the only recourse by way of appeal is from the District Court to the High Court? How does that arise?
It arises under the amendment that Deputy Taylor has tabled. If you look at amendment No. 52 it states that: "An appeal from any order made by the District Court under this Act shall lie . . . to the High Court sitting in Dublin . . ." or it could be the High Court sitting on circuit, and it goes on to say in subsection (3): "In hearing and determining appeals from the District Family Court under this section, the High Court shall exercise full and unlimited jurisdiction" which would mean——
We are not taking No. 52 at the moment, are we?
No, but we are taking these as a group of amendments.
We are.
We are taking these as a group of amendments. Either one lot is accepted or they are not. They are all inter-linking.
We are taking Nos. 52, 53, 54, 56, 57 and 58, and 49, because they are consequential on No. 47.
They are all consequential and interacting.
That was agreed at the outset of the meeting.
On a point of order, I do not accept the proposition that No. 52 is consequential on what is being proposed. If No. 52 fell, though No. 47 stood, what would then be in place would be the ordinary rules of appeal that currently exist from the District to the Circuit Court. I did not appreciate that we were taking all of those at the one time and I thought we were coming to it later. I was out of the room at the time. I would certainly have views about No. 52.
My colleague, Deputy Shatter, has reminded me very much — in this Millennium Year — of the comment by Oscar Wilde that it is the sincerity that matters, not the content. He has advanced three points that prove Oscar Wilde's comment. He has advanced the numbers game: the number of Judges. What in God's name has this got to do in terms of the merits of the argument that — if I may quote Deputy Shatter —"there are far fewer Circuit Court judges". Therefore we are going to have better family law. This will be a better Bill because there are far fewer Circuit Court judges than District Court justices. I am surprised at such a disingenuous argument being put forward. He went on to say that because there are far fewer Circuit Court judges, their specialist knowledge could be developed. That, with due respect, is a highly problematic and highly subjective argument which does not have any real bearing on the amendment. Then he spoke of — I can only use the general argument which he put forward —"the relative competence of district justices versus Circuit Court judges". I do not propose to partonise this committee by commenting on that matter but that is very, very subjective. I know quite a few district justices — in no way am I attempting to patronise the committee on anecdotal awareness, which Deputy Shatter has intruded into this argument — who are eminently sensible, competent and outstanding justices, who would be more than capable of dealing with the rigours of this Bill, just as I know some Circuit Court judges and I would not let them near this Bill in 1,000 years. So, it is all relative and subjective. It is not a real argument for rejection of this Bill.
Then there was the prospect of chaos, the final "Wilde-ism" advanced against this amendment. The prospect of chaos has never particularly upset the legal profession in any court. Indeed, I have no doubt that the family law officers in the District Courts and the — and generally speaking, if I may presume to comment on them — the general competence of the officers who heroically serve in those offices and are more than capable of advising an unfortunate client who, for the first time in the history of the State, would have access to get in there and have something done about their tragedy. They are more than competent to say to them: "Look there are certain limits and if it goes beyond this, naturally it will go further in terms of general competence". I have not the slightest doubt that the solicitors involved at District Court level would equally handle such particular limitations quite effectively and competently on behalf of their clients.
Therefore, I think the prospect of chaos, the prospect of the Bill being sabotaged, is no more than, if I may be caustic about it, a kind of middle class antidote for a middle class problem of separation. What we are dealing with here is the simple fact that hundreds of my constituents, in the wealthiest constituency in Ireland, simply cannot afford to pay the legal profession not less than, if I may put a general figure on it, £1,500 to £1,700 a day to get the bright boys. It is £3,000 to £3,500 by the time they get out of it. If you really want your separation and are determined to go the whole hog——
You are not living in the real world.
Unfortunately, and I quote a three year old report, the report of the Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown: "One day full hearing in either the Circuit or High Court could be in the region of £1,000 to £2,500". In the past three years I have not known the legal profession in terms of the fees I have seen — per day. The report goes on to say — this is the crucial argument of Deputy Taylor's comment —"This level of legal costs is a major disincentive and in many cases effectively prevents people obtaining the remedy they require". As a trade union official of long standing before I became a Dáil Deputy I can smell a closed shop about five miles away. The closed shops in Ireland have been slowly but surely dismantled and what we are maintaining in this Bill is the closed shop and no real effort to address the problem put forward here. While I warmly commend Deputy Shatter on bringing forward this Private Members' Bill, my ire has been raised, as indeed has that of my party, in examining the exclusivity of coping with a problem but retaining the loot in the process. If we want to be really honest and give real access to the tragedies of people of no income, women who have not a shilling to their name, who are desperate to go ahead and take out proceedings, and invariably it is women who suffer in this process and we say to them, "Off you go to the Circuit Court——
We are having repetition now, Deputy.
I regret repetition but I feel so strongly on the matter that I think I will be excused.
It is regrettable the Deputy did not feel equally strongly during the four and a half years he was in Government to establish family courts.
If the Deputy's party had been as co-operative as I was——
We would not have had to have this debate. I did not notice this great concern during that period.
I will not be tempted.
Far be it from me to get involved in a disagreement between former colleagues or old friends. First of all, I do not agree with Deputy McCartan. The fact that I am opposing Deputy Taylor's amendment as proposed by Deputy Desmond does not mean that I am doing down the amendment or that I am doing down Deputy Taylor. Rather it is that I am not satisfied that it would be appropriate to give the District Court jurisdiction to grant decrees of judicial separation. A lot has been said about the District Court but it is important to bear in mind that the District Court is specifically designed to afford some real local relief in matters which are generally of a minor nature. I do not think if one was to judge by the arguments here today that the granting of decrees of judicial separation fit into that framework.
It should also be remembered that until quite recently petitions for divorce a mensa et thoro were heard exclusively in the High Court. The Courts Act of 1981 conferred jurisdiction for the first time on the Circuit Court in divorce a mensa et thoro proceedings. Proceedings to annul a marriage remain exclusively with the High Court. As far as I am aware, this is the first time a suggestion has been made that judicial separation proceedings be heard in the District Court.
Deputy Desmond quoted the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown. That committee and others did not recommend that judicial separation should be heard in the District Court. Indeed, to come back to the point made by Deputy Harney, that joint committee recommended that a new family court should form part of the High Court.
I have some sympathy with the points raised by Deputy Desmond and Deputy McCartan but I honestly believe that it would cause a lot more problems than they think it would solve because, while a case could undoubtedly be made where a couple have been separated for a year or so and consent to a decree granted, that matter could be dealt with by the District Court, not every case would be as simple or as straightforward as that. Even in separation by consent cases, the main reason for coming to court would be to resolve disputes about other matters including property matters. The District Court should not have jurisdiction over the division of property, including the family home. I would be concerned also that the public might consider it quite inappropriate that a court solely of summary jurisdiction should have jurisdiction to grant decrees of the importance of judicial separation decrees. I do not consider it appropriate either to give the District Court jurisdiction over the division of matrimonial property because, as the committee will agree, the District Court has no jurisdiction at present in equitable matters of this nature.
As already mentioned, the present monetary jurisdiction of the District Court does not exceed £2,500 and I would be opposed to any increase in that limit other than by way of a general review of the jurisdiction of the District Court, which would inevitably involve a review of the Circuit Court jurisdiction also. I accept what Deputy McCartan has said but all of these amendments are being discussed together. While Deputy Taylor's amendment would appear to be based on the fact that he is providing greater accessibility to the courts for couples in a marriage breakdown situation, I find it very hard to understand then why he would go on carefully to suggest that the High Court would be the only source of appeal.
Quite a lot has been said about the question of legal aid. Again, from the report of 1985 and 1986 which Deputy McCartan mentioned, it would be quite evident that the demand at the moment is for remedies in the District Court for proceedings for barring orders, maintenance, custody, access, that they as of now constitute the highest proportion of legal aid cases. While, as has been mentioned, the Legal Aid Board is experiencing difficulties in meeting the demand for services, the argument, that people who qualify for legal aid — and I presume that is the type of person Deputy Desmond and Deputy McCartan are talking about — will not be able to obtain services under the scheme, cannot be accepted.
Deputy McCartan talked about a delay in a case. Bad cases make bad law. However, the Deputy should also bear in mind that those of us who have to consult a solicitor privately will not get in straightaway. We also have to wait. While I have sympathy with the idea behind the amendment, I must oppose it.
In relation to matters mentioned by Deputy Shatter and Deputy Ahern in connection with the Partition Acts and the phrase "where the fact that they are married to each other is of relevance to the proceedings", I am quite happy on behalf of the Minister to say that we will have a look at what Deputy Shatter and Deputy Ahern had to say in relation to that wording before Report Stage. He also made some queries about the Adoption Act. The use of the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" will ensure that the phrase "the Adoption Acts, 1952-76" can only be interpreted as referring to the High Court jurisdiction.
I move amendment No. 46:
In page 12, before section 21, but in Part III, to insert the following new section:
"22.—(1) The Circuit Court shall be known as ‘the Circuit Family Court' when exercising its jurisdiction to hear and determine family law proceedings or, where provided for, when transferring family law proceedings to the High Court.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, the Circuit Family Court shall, concurrently with the High Court, have jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings under this Act for a decree of judicial separation.
(3) Where in proceedings under this Act for a decree of judicial separation an order could be made in respect of land whose rateable valuation exceeds £200 and an application commencing those proceedings is made to the Circuit Family Court, that Court shall, if the respondent so requires before the hearing thereof, transfer those proceedings to the High Court, but any order made (including an interim order) or act done in the course of those proceedings before such transfer shall be valid unless discharged or varied by order of the High Court.
(4) The jurisdiction referred to in subsection (2) of this section shall only be exercisable where either of the spouses is domiciled in the State on the date of the application commencing proceedings or is ordinarily resident in the State throughout the period of one year ending on that date.
(5) The jurisdiction referred to in subsection (2) of this section shall, in the Circuit Family Court, be exercised by the judge of the circuit where either spouse to the proceedings ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation.".
My apologies, I was thinking about the Munster final next Sunday. I failed to interrupt your flow and to call a vote on amendment No. 47.
I understand thet amendment No. 47 is an alternative to Nos. 45 and 46 and as those amendments have already——
On a point of order, given that these are the central issues to the whole section we are talking about and on the basis of that perhaps Deputy Desmond's attention was elsewhere, perhaps you might take No. 45 again and allow the opportunity of a division.
The committee have already agreed Nos. 45 and 46: 47 is an alternative to 45 and 46 and they replace section 21 of the Bill which is automatically deleted, so 47 cannot be moved.
Perhaps in deference to the arguments and the debate that is going on you would allow a division.
I appreciate your concern but I am not allowing that and I am going on to——
I crave your indulgence. It appears that there are only two Deputies who are in favour of amendment No. 47. I would like to have the opportunity of seeing if we could increase our numbers. Accordingly, I call a division on this section
Perhaps Deputy Desmond——
I had a consultation with my legal adviser here. I will not be here for Report Stage but I do want to indicate that the amendment can be reinstated on Report Stage by Deputy Taylor and I want to give notice of that. I do not want to delay the proceedings of the committee.
Amendment No. 47 has not been moved, it has only been discussed.
I am working purely on legal aid for Deputy Taylor. I am getting no fees for this.
I am sorry, Deputy, but I cannot facilitate you.
I accept your ruling.
I move amendment No. 48:
In page 12, subsection (2), line 18, after "occupation" to insert "who shall have been appointed by the President of the Circuit Court to preside in such Circuit Family Court".
It is our contention that all Circuit Court judges are not suitable people to deal with family law matters. We believe that the President of the Circuit Court should carefully select the judges who would preside over family law matters. Only persons who would be interested, who would be suitable, who would have some kind of expertise and training in the whole family law area, should be so appointed to preside over these very special cases. I am moving the amendment on behalf of Deputy Colley and ask the support of my colleagues.
I have problems in relation to this amendment. As Deputy Harney in particular will know, the Dublin Circuit family law court sits full-time in a purpose-built court room and the President of the Circuit Court has assigned a judge full-time to it. In all other circuits, the appointed circuit judge takes all business, including family law cases. If that arrangement was intended to continue, there would be no difficulty about the President designating the circuit judge as proposed in the amendment. However, as I can only presume that Deputy Colley has in mind the assignment of a judge or judges by the President especially to hear family law cases throughout the country, there would be a serious difficulty outside Dublin.
The idea, presumably, would be to have a roving judge or judges to deal exclusively with family law cases as and when they arise. It is certain that the President could not afford to do this from his present judicial resources because the specialisation which would be introduced would for example, reduce his flexibility in assigning spare judges as and where he needed them, for whatever business. He would need additional judges if the amendment were carried through. The amendment would give rise to extra Exchequer spending from the point of view of staffing and I must be opposed to the amendment having regard to the present Exchquer position.
Is it envisaged that in parts of the country other than Dublin, when this proposed legislation is enacted, Circuit Court judges would preside over family law cases and other cases as well, or is the Minister saying that he will consider having certain people only to deal with family law cases.
My presumption was that that was what Deputy Colley had in mind. However, I am saying that existing Circuit Court judges in their own area will preside over the family law cases.
And other cases?
And other cases as well.
It is just a matter of practicality, as I see it. In Dublin it is possible, because you have a large number of Circuit Court judges, to assign various specialisms to them and the various specialisms are assigned at present to Circuit Court judges in the Dublin area. Very serious problems arise in the country. In the more sparsely populated counties you would have very serious problems in servicing a roving Circuit Court judge who is hearing only family cases. That Circuit Court judge would find it very difficult to get solicitors to attend his court and very difficult altogether to get barristers to attend his court. The whole overhead of the legal system, both from the State end and from the professional end, could not really be shared between two systems not running in tandem with each other.
The only basis on which I could see two judges operating in that instance would be to have them always in tandem. That would not be feasible in the context of the resources available. It is not a practical proposition at all in relation to the country. The only protection country people have is the sound quality of the Circuit Court judges doing the circuits and indeed, the quality of the professional personnel serving these circuits.
I do not think there has been any major criticism of any of the personnel on any of the circuits in relation to their ability to deal with family law matters. In my experience, with reference to earlier comments about people not getting the service, on the Midland Circuit, which is one I am very familiar with, no person has ever been denied, to my personal knowledge, legal representation in the family courts. I have never come across a situation where a solicitor that I knew was refused the services of a counsel in a case of a person who was not, there and then, in a position to pay for the service.
That is the practical experience in the country. I regret if Deputy Desmond finds in his constituency that the situation is otherwise. I would like to put it on record that there is a very flexible situation in the country and as a Deputy I found that people coming to me have not found that they have been unable to get the service.
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Tá |
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Harney, Mary. |
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Níl |
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Abbott, Henry. |
Desmond, Barry. |
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Ahern, Dermot. |
Kitt, Michael P. |
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Ahern, Michael. |
McCartan, Pat. |
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Calleary, Seán. |
O'Donoghue, John. |
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Cowen, Brian. |
