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Nuclear Safety.

Dáil Éireann Debate, Thursday - 4 November 2004

Thursday, 4 November 2004

Ceisteanna (6, 7, 8, 9)

Enda Kenny

Ceist:

6 Mr. Kenny asked the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he will make a statement on the recent CERRIE report into radiation risks in the United Kingdom with particular reference to Sellafield. [27550/04]

Amharc ar fhreagra

Freagraí ó Béal (22 píosaí cainte)

The committee examining radiation risks of internal emitters, CERRIE — I apologise for the use of acronyms in this reply — was established in the United Kingdom in 2001 in response to concerns that the models accepted by Government Departments and regulatory bodies in the United Kingdom substantially underestimate the risks to human health from internal radiation. Internal radiation in the human body is caused by radioactive matter which has been inhaled or ingested.

The committee's remit was to consider these models in light of recent studies and identify any further research considered necessary. As with most issues, there is a wide range of opinion in the scientific community on the issues under consideration. This range of views was reflected in the composition of the committee. The committee's report, published on 20 October 2004, has been examined by my Department and by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland which advises my Department on these matters.

The committee examined in some detail the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiation Protection. These recommendations form the basis of radiation protection standards in use worldwide, including in the European Union. They are also the standards used in national legislation. The recommendations are under review by the ICRP and new recommendations are due to be published in 2005.

The UK committee highlighted a number of concerns regarding uncertainties in the use of certain methodologies by the ICRP and recommended that these be reassessed. The majority view of the committee was, however, that the available biological evidence does not point to the need for a fundamental change in radiological protection standards. The RPII, the relevant Irish authority, agrees with this view. I have been shown a copy of the report, which could be reasonably described as a selection of essays written in difficult English. Incidentally, it makes no reference to Ireland.

With regard to epidemiological evidence, the committee concluded that the evidence is compelling that moderate and high levels of exposure to internally incorporated radionuclides produce a raised risk of adverse health effects, which is not a surprise.

Additional information not given on the floor of the House

Little consensus could be reached, however, for lower levels of exposure. CERRIE concluded that epidemiological studies were only of value when they were conducted to a high standard and subject to both ethical and peer review. The RPII concurs with these views concerning the conduct of epidemiological studies.

From an Irish viewpoint, the most important section of the CERRIE report concerns its findings on Sellafield and Dounreay, Scotland. The report accepts the finding of many studies showing excesses of childhood leukaemia around Sellafield and the nuclear facility in Dounreay, Scotland. According to the report, the majority of CERRIE members did not accept that the evidence showed the risk of cancer in general was increased near nuclear sites.

The report does not make reference to the radiation risks associated with Sellafield as regards the Irish population. The RPII has advised my Department that the findings of the report do not change, for better or worse, the RPII's assessment of the radiation risks associated with Sellafield for the Irish population.

Two members of the CERRIE committee stepped down and prepared a minority report on radiation risks of internal emitters. I have asked the RPII to examine this minority report also and report to me.

A separate report was also published on 20 October by CERRIE's parent committee on medical aspects of radiation in the environment, COMARE. The COMARE report gives a response to the CERRIE report and provides advice to United Kingdom Ministers highlighting, in particular, the internal radiation health risks presented by radon. These reports will be considered by the relevant United Kingdom Ministers and I will await with interest the outcome of that consideration.

I am disappointed with the Minister's response, for which I thank him. Professor Goodhead, the chairman of the committee examining radiation risks of internal emitters, stated that the danger from such emitters may be ten times higher than previously believed for children living near nuclear plants, although it may not be as significant for adults. I welcome the pressure the Government put on the British Government and, in particular, British Nuclear Fuels and hope it will continue. The Opposition and the Government are united on this issue. In light of Professor Goodhead's report, will the Government put additional pressure on the British Government to reduce discharges from Sellafield?

With a new nuclear decommissioning authority set to move into Sellafield to decommission much of the plant, the Government's hand will be strengthened as regards the pressure it can exert on the British Government to reduce all emissions from Sellafield, notwithstanding the points the Minister made regarding international standards.

I firmly agree. The Deputy knows my views on Sellafield, which are on public record and have not changed because I have changed my status from backbench Deputy to Minister. The reports in question, a set of essays, contain contradictory material.

With respect, a consensus has emerged that internal radiation is at least ten times as dangerous for children as previously believed. There is no disputing that fact.

I do not disagree with any scientific element in the report — I am making a general point. The report states: "Most environment groups and some scientists have not accepted the view that the occurrence of a pronounced leukaemia cluster [in the village of Seascale close to Sellafield] adjacent to one of the world's largest sources of radioactive discharges was due to coincidence or to some other unidentified factor." As I stated, it is a complex report. As regards the Deputy's question, I will continue to apply the pressure exerted by my predecessors to ensure that some sanity pertains in all matters relating to Sellafield.

Paul Connaughton

Ceist:

7 Mr. Connaughton asked the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he will raise the issue of air security around Britain’s nuclear installations following reports of more than 100 breaches of no-fly zones at these facilities, including two at Sellafield, over the past five years; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [27544/04]

Amharc ar fhreagra

Gay Mitchell

Ceist:

12 Mr. G. Mitchell asked the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he has satisfied himself that the no-fly zone surrounding the Sellafield nuclear facility is sufficient to prevent a major terrorist attack or accident; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [27543/04]

Amharc ar fhreagra

Paul Connaughton

Ceist:

21 Mr. Connaughton asked the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government if he has satisfied himself with the general level of security at Sellafield; his views on whether the possibility of an accident or incident is of a sufficiently low level; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [27545/04]

Amharc ar fhreagra

I propose to take Questions Nos. 7, 12 and 21 together.

Due to the risk posed to Ireland by the potential transboundary effects of an accident or incident, including a terrorist attack by aircraft or otherwise at Sellafield, the security arrangements and procedures in place at Sellafield have been a particular concern of this and previous Government. These concerns are repeatedly raised both by direct correspondence and in face to face meetings with my ministerial counterparts and other United Kingdom Ministers. These concerns are raised at official level in meetings between my Department and its United Kingdom counterparts.

The UK authorities have given assurances that they are satisfied the arrangements for ensuring security in the UK's civil nuclear industry are robust, that additional measures put in place since September 2001 to reinforce security are appropriate and that these security arrangements are subject to continual review. I understand there is a press report, perhaps prompted by these questions, in a British newspaper today which refers to an additional £20 million being spent on security at Sellafield. The UK has also indicated that the Royal Air Force maintains a high state of readiness in the air defence of the UK, including the defence of particularly sensitive targets and its state of readiness is kept under constant review.

Assurances have been given that the UK Ministry of Defence's low flying directorate thoroughly investigates complaints of military aircraft breaching the air exclusion zones surrounding civil nuclear facilities, as does the Civil Aviation Authority which has responsibility for investigating such complaints about civil aircraft. The assurances and information on nuclear security issues from the UK authorities are received by us in good faith. Ireland understands that sensitive security information must be guarded and that dissemination of such information must be contained in a highly secure manner.

However, our legitimate concerns could be met even more satisfactorily through the development of an agreed, structured and meaningful system between the UK and Ireland for the exchange of security sensitive information without compromising the security needs and concerns of the UK. This point has been emphasised in exchanges with the UK. This House and the nation can be assured that I will continue to press for better information in this regard.

I welcome the Minister's assurances. This is a matter on which the Government and Opposition can work together. Question No. 7 refers to the no-fly zone at Sellafield. I understand the zone is less than 500 metres. It would take just milliseconds for an aeroplane, fully laden and with intent, to get into Sellafield. If it were aimed at where the radioactive waste is stored, it would cause immediate fatalities and problems in Sellafield and if the wind were blowing towards Ireland, there would be a significant and adverse impact, initially on our agriculture, on our eastern boundaries. Will the Minister again put pressure on the British Government? Will he, through his membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency, insist that the information on security — the British Government cannot and I do not expect it to give such details to Ireland — be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency? The agency could be the honest broker and benchmark it for us. It is the international body with responsibility for all matters relating to radiation. However, the significant point about the radioactive waste——

There is a one minute time limit on supplementary questions.

Three questions are being taken together.

The Deputy can ask three supplementary questions with a time limit of one minute on each.

Thank you. I am not sure of the procedure.

The Deputy will have plenty of time to ask further questions.

I accept the validity of the point made by Deputy O'Dowd. The consequences of a catastrophic failure or a terrorist event in Sellafield could be horrific for this country. I agree with the Deputy. When nations decided to go this route they opened a Pandora's box. The Deputy is correct about the no-fly zone. Even a substantial no-fly zone causes problems and the narrower it gets, the more improbable it is that it will work. I do not disagree about the necessity for some type of international oversight. I said previously that it would help to assuage, although not dismiss, our fears.

The construction of the roof of the building in which the highly active tanks are stored in Sellafield is such that the possibility of an aircraft hitting it at high speed was not considered. It was excluded from the construction capacity of Sellafield to withstand a terrorist attack. People believed it could not happen. However, it happened in New York when the aeroplanes hit the World Trade Centre and it could happen in Sellafield. Is the Minister satisfied with the general level of security at Sellafield? There are 12,000 to 14,000 people employed there. It is easy to get access to the site. There are many gates and a reinforced chain-link fence around the area. However, I believe Sellafield is not secure. If there is a determined attempt by terrorists to get into the site, they could do it. Has the Minister considered that there is a railway line parallel to the site and it is not beyond the capacity of al-Qaeda to take over a train and load it with explosives which could be exploded in the heart of Sellafield? What representations will he make to the British Government about this issue?

I do not disagree with anything the Deputy said. There is no such thing as absolute security. One need only recall that in September 2001 the Pentagon was attacked. It was supposed to have the benefit of protection, including ground to air missiles and so forth, but none of it succeeded in preventing the horror. There is a huge risk and that fact should not be diminished. The validity of our case is self-evident and everything the Deputy said is common sense. I have made the point repeatedly to British colleagues. The Deputy can be assured that I will take every opportunity to indicate to the British authorities that we have continuing and valid concerns about this issue.

Has the Minister been officially informed of any breaches of the no-fly zone around Sellafield and, if so, how many? Has he been informed of any threat of a terrorist attack on Sellafield? If so, what was the number and nature of such threats?

Nothing has been brought to my attention in the past four weeks but I presume the Deputy is referring to the office of the Minister. There have been 100 breaches of the no-fly zone area, which is a substantial number and indicates the validity of our concerns. These are concerns which we have raised with the British authorities. With regard to the second question, I am not sure if any such notification has been received. It might not be given if there is a security element in it. That indicates the validity of the point made by Deputy O'Dowd, and by other Members from time to time, about the necessity for an international organisation to which these matters could be reported and through which risk could be assessed. I will ask in the Department if there is a specific instance of such notification and I will communicate it to the Deputy.

Has the Minister a view on the risk to citizens on this island posed by radiation emanating from Sellafield in the event of such a breach of security or an attack? What would be the level of risk? What is he doing about it?

What successive Governments have been doing and the pressures that have been applied through various agencies are on the public record. The risk to this country would be substantial. Clearly, if there was a catastrophic failure, it would cause untold environmental hazards for this country. The Taoiseach has said on more than one occasion that Sellafield is the biggest environmental hazard and danger facing this country. It is not something we should over-emphasise but it is not to be underestimated either. I will do neither during my term in office.

When the third aeroplane involved in the attack on 11 September 2001 crashed into a field near Washington, it was reported that the aeroplane was headed in the direction of either a large dam or a nuclear power station. In his discussions and representations, both through the International Atomic Energy Agency and directly with the British Government, will the Minister stress that there is real and present danger to people in Britain and in this country if a plane were to hit Sellafield? That is the real worry, not the fear of an accident in the operational structure of Sellafield. It is not built to withstand the type of attack which happened on 11 September 2001.

The Deputy is correct. It was suggested, for example, that the third plane was heading towards the Capitol Building and there is also speculation as to how the plane was brought down. This illustrates the validity of our common concern in this area. I had a short social meeting with my UK counterpart and I will continue to emphasise this point on every possible occasion.

I thank the Minister.

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