Dáil Éireann Debate, Thursday - 10 March 2022
5. Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú asked the Minister for Defence the time frame for consideration of the development of an Irish radar surveillance capability; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13539/22]
Amharc ar fhreagraI thank the Acting Chairman for facilitating me. The timeframe for the consideration of the development of the radar surveillance capability that we are lacking became evident when we had the threat of manoeuvres by the Russian military. There has been much conversation on the criminal invasion of Ukraine by the Russians and the particular circumstances we are in. I mention the capacity that we will require into the future. We know there is a fear of hybrid cyberattacks and whatever else that we will be facing in the future.
I know people link the radar capacity with Russian naval military manoeuvres but we knew all about those manoeuvres. The Russians informed us and looked for permission. They informed the Irish Aviation Authority, which is what happens when a military wants to engage in manoeuvres in international waters that we are responsible for. That is not to say there is not an issue with primary radar; there is.
The equipment development plan for the Defence Forces was published in June 2020 and was completed following extensive military work. It provides a comprehensive list of planned equipment projects which will be progressed over five years. This plan builds on the intentions set out in the White Paper on equipment acquisition, modernisation and upgrade. It was developed to ensure that our Defence Forces have the major equipment platforms, ancillary equipment and force protection equipment which are necessary to carry out their important roles both at home and overseas. I am advised by the military authorities that the Defence Forces operate many different types of radar systems. Existing capabilities available to the Army include radar systems such as the Giraffe Mk4 short-range air defence system and the Foxtrack X-Band ground surveillance radar. The Air Corps uses surface search radar on the CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft and all aircraft are fitted with a transponder and an automatic identification system for identification and tracking. The Naval Service uses maritime surface search radar and the recognised maritime picture systems for surveillance and tracking.
There is a range of further detail on equipment that I could outline to the Deputy but his core question is on the primary radar capacity for monitoring and understanding what is in Irish or Irish-controlled airspace off our west coast. This has been a question that continues to be asked. The report of the Commission on the Defence Forces recommends that we should deal with that by providing increased resources and that we should put that capacity in place. I do not disagree with that and this issue was also raised during the White Paper process. However, it was subject to the availability of resources because if one is going to spend money on that one has to reduce one's spend in other areas. I hope we will be able to progress with increasing that capacity but it involves more resources.
Gabhaim buíochas leis an Aire and I welcome the answer. There will be general agreement on the necessity involved in this. When I spoke of the Russian manoeuvres I did so from the point of view that it highlighted the issue in the public domain; I get that they told us about them beforehand. Following that we had the Irish Aviation Authority before the Joint Committee on Transport and Communications and there is the scenario whereby it is given certain information by its equivalent in Britain, which is informed by the British military and the Royal Air Force. There is a capacity failing in that and that goes to the wider question of what neutrality means and the fact that we need to have capacity in order to be neutral.
I will digress slightly to the wider question of the threat we are under, which has been mentioned earlier, that is, cyber and hybrid attack. I know the National Cyber Security Centre, NCSC, gave out particular guidance to companies because it felt there is a higher threat. What is the situation with the Defence Forces and what is the action plan for the near future?
The issue of primary radar has been under discussion since 2015. When I was last in this portfolio and when Deputy Kehoe was Minister for Defence we were both involved in that discussion. Plans have been put in place but it is primarily a resourcing issue. We have a lot of capacity gaps such as long-range strategic lift capacity and the need to invest more in cyber protection and primary radar. There are a range of other capacity resource issues.
That is what the commission was put in place to address. We have recommendations now so it is up to the Government and me to respond to that.
On the primary role of the Defence Forces on cybersecurity, the NCSC is primarily the responsibility of the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications and not the Department of Defence. Our primary responsibility is to make sure that our defensive and military systems are protected from cyberattack and we review that regularly.
I will allow the Minister to expand on that. The only question I have is on the wider issue of cyber-meets-hybrid and the new world in which we are living and the new threat we are facing. I accept that he cannot go into absolute detail on it, but will he give whatever information he can about the preparations being carried out? Deputies Brady and O'Rourke and I went to a conference about hybrid and cyber attacks, which I was delighted to attend. It was at the time of the invasion and the head of the NCSC decided not to go because he obviously had far more important issues to deal with that day. Will the Minister provide information about where the Defence Forces are on cyber-meets-hybrid?
The Government has been doing a lot in this space in recent years and a number of Departments are contributing to that. The Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, under the Minister, Deputy Eamon Ryan, is the primary Department involved, but the Defence Forces contribute to that. We have Defence Forces personnel at the NCSC. On a European level, there is also an awful lot of sharing of information. There is a centre of excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, for cybersecurity. We have seconded a person from the Defence Forces to that facility in terms of gaining knowledge. For a number of years, the Defence Forces and the State more generally have been increasing the resourcing of our cybersecurity defence capacity, and we continue to do that. The Defence Forces has a dual role here. We have to make sure that our systems are protected within the defence networks and, of course, we have to contribute to tackling the broader challenges the country faces. There is a lot of focus on that within the Government at present.
