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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 10 Oct 1922

Vol. 1 No. 20

In Committee on the Constitution of Saorstat Eireann Bill. - ARTICLE 69.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Article 69 reads:—" No one shall be tried save in due course of law and extraordinary courts shall not be established. The jurisdiction of Courts Martial shall not be extended to or exercised over the civil population save in time of war, and for acts committed in time of war, and in accordance with the regulations to be prescribed by law. Such jurisdiction shall not be exercised in any area in which the civil courts are open or capable of being held, and no person shall be removed from one area to another for the purpose of creating such jurisdiction." I may say that we would be prepared to consider, with a view to adoption, the amendment as it stands on the Paper in Deputy Gavan Duffy's name.

" To insert after the words `shall not be established' the words `save only such military tribunals as may be authorised by law for dealing with military offenders against military law.' To substitute the words `military tribunals' for the words ` Courts Martial.' "

Mr. GAVAN DUFFY

Do I understand that both my amendments are acceptable to the Government, subject to any change of wording that may be thought desirable? The object of the amendments that are on the Paper is to authorise Courts Martial for dealing with Military Offenders against Military Law. If you do not put some Clause of the kind in you cannot have a Court Martial, even for a soldier, under the Constitution. Therefore something of the kind is required.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

We accept both amendments.

Professor MAGENNIS

The Clause as it stands is " No one shall be tried save in due course of law and extraordinary Courts shall not be established." I take it that refers to a time of peace, and not a time of war, inasmuch as special provision is made for a time of war lower down. There is no such term as "extraordinary court " known in British law. It is a phrase that has been borrowed from the new Austrian Constitution. I presume the reference is to courts of the type set up under what was popularly called the Crimes Act. That is, the Act of 1887. The extension through martial law to military tribunals of the power to deal with civilian citizens is the setting up of " extraordinary Courts," and if you declare in the first sentence of the Article that "extraordinary Courts" shall not be established it is sheer contradiction to declare in the next sentence "the jurisdiction of Courts Martial shall not be extended through or exercised over the civil population unless in time of war." There is a great deal of confusion here. The public do not seem to be aware of the distinction between military law and martial law. The amendment which, I understand, the Ministry is about to accept says, "save only such military tribunals as may be authorised by law for dealing with military offenders against military law." There is the celebrated judgment of Chief Justice Mansfield delivered in 1802, and repeated quite recently by Lord Chief Baron Palles pointing out that a soldier is still clothed with all his character, his responsibility and rights as a citizen, but has superimposed on him others which arise out of the capacity of being a soldier, and the military law applies to the soldier as a soldier everywhere, always, in time of peace, in time of war, abroad, and at home. That is one of the fundamental things with regard to military law. Now, a military tribunal dealing with a soldier for a military offence against the military code is not an "extraordinary Court," and Deputy Gavan Duffy ought to know that, being a lawyer of practice.

Mr. GAVAN DUFFY

I know it is.

Professor MAGENNIS

Excuse me, it is a court set up under the statute law of England. This is one of the most elementary things in law, that the military code has, in recent years, by gradual development, become a Military Act. Almost all the regulations to which a soldier is subject as a soldier are under the Army Act. That of itself has no authority, and carries with it no force only each year the Army Annual Act is passed, and on the occasion of that various alterations may be and have been introduced. But it is a Court under the ordinary law of England. It is applicable to soldiers; it is an ordinary and not an "extraordinary Court." Everyone here knows that at various times, when Kings tried to be tyrants, and when invasions of the Constitution were attempted they took the form of extending military law to civilians. And it has always been declared illegal to apply military law to civilians. Martial law is understood in the original draft here. The original draftsman is a better authority on the status, I think, than the acceptor of the amendment. Martial Law applies here to a very special situation, namely, where there is suspension of the ordinary statute law and the whole country, or part of the country, has to be put under military control. In that case you do not require a statute of the legislature, and it is the setting up of an "extraordinary court," it is the extension of the jurisdiction which will otherwise be wholly illegal and altogether at variance with the rights and liberties of the civilian subject. I would ask the Minister to be very cautious before he tampers with the words of this, as on a previous occasion, when tampering with another Article, by which he swept away a number of recently made statutes. " No one shall be tried save in due course of law and extraordinary courts shall not be established. The jurisdiction of Courts Martial shall not be extended to or exercised over the civil population save in time of war." That is the very doctrine we had before in an earlier debate on another subject altogether, where I contended we were taking over a going concern. That was disputed. At the present moment during the transition period we are working under the British Constitution, and the whole British code of law. These have not been set aside. According to this draft what is being made use of is the common law right, that is in the Crown and in the officers that it appoints to discharge this work for it, the common law right to repel force by force and take such measures as are necessary to quell insurrection or riot. I would ask the Minister to be very careful before introducing into the Constitution in the way of amendments something that would take away by the Constitution that common law right. Apart altogether from Constitutions and legal enactments every organised community has in it, as every person has in him, the inherent right of self-preservation and protection against force or force imminent. Every organised community, especially so with regard to the system we are carrying on at present, has the common law right, not merely to repel force by force when force is actually offered, but in the expectation of it where it is obviously imminent to take such measures as are necessary to repel it. Whoever drafted this Article had all that in view.

Mr. GAVAN DUFFY

The Deputy who has just spoken has nearly made me breathless with some of the most extraordinary statements I have ever heard in this Dáil. I have no great object in traversing them, except in so far as they deal with the amendment which the Ministry has expressed itself willing to accept. That amendment is directed to providing military tribunals for military men guilty of military offences. It must be remembered that the soldier is a citizen as well as a soldier, and, consequently, you have in the British Army Act, which, as an Army Act, is an excellent one, you have the express provision made whereby any soldier who commits any civil offence may be tried before a civil court, except, I think, in time of active service. It goes further than that. Certain offences—treason, treason-felony, manslaughter, murder, and one or two other offences committed by soldiers not on active service, must be tried by a civil court. These regulations, and the existence of these Courts Martial, are the creatures of statute. The Deputy thinks we have them under the common law of Ireland. I respectfully differ from him. What is essential is to provide here some clear jurisdiction which, while allowing these extraordinary courts, which we call Courts Martial, to exist in the case of a soldier on active service, yet in the case of a soldier not on active service will preserve that soldier's rights as citizen in respect of civil offences. That is why I am glad the Ministry expressed themselves disposed to accept the amendment. I think Deputy Magennis's remarks were calculated to give a wrong impression as to the state of affairs and the object of the amendment.

Professor MAGENNIS

I wish to say a word or two to correct a wrong impression that may have been created by Deputy Duffy in purporting to give a refutation of what I said—that a soldier is a citizen all the time he is a soldier. Why, I began with the judgement of Lord Mansfield in 1802, and I referred to the words of the late Chief Baron in one of the last judgements he delivered when he explained that a citizen by becoming a soldier takes all the additional responsibility and is thereby subject to Military Law. I also said—and to repeat what I said is not a refutation of what I said—that the Military Law to which soldiers are subject as soldiers is, since recent years, an enactment by Statute under a Law passed from year to year, whereas Martial Law in the proper, strict, technical sense, the sense in which Martial Law ought to be understood, is a suspension of the Civil Code in times of stress and danger in virture of the power exercised by virtue of the Common Law. I have not said—or, if I have said it, I have spoken contrary to what I thought that I was saying, and I claim that that is not likely to happen—that Martial Law is Military Law. I tried to impress on the Dáil that they are two absolutely different things. That what is called Court Martial is military tribunal dealing at Military Law to military offences and military offenders, and what is called the Proclamation of Martial Law, what we have been quite familiar with in recent years in Ireland, is a declaration that the State or Crown is about, for the protection of the community, to suspend the ordinary law and set up this extraordinary thing. It is quite possible to extend the jurisdiction, and it has been in some cases necessary. Now, on the Third Reading, I propose, with the permission of the Dáil, to bring down, for the consideration of Deputy Duffy, legal authorities, and to read him cases and judgements, and I am quite confident of being able to persuade him that they are two different things.

Mr. GAVAN DUFFY

There is no dispute about that. The Deputy is running away from one of the things, at least, I have strongly objected to. I understood the Deputy to assure the Dáil solemnly and emphatically that when a soldier joined the army he became subject to Military Law, and the Deputy gave the Dáil the impression that that was the law the soldier was subject to, to the exclusion of the ordinary Civil Law.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

No. Motion made and question put: "That Article 69, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Agreed.

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