On the section, I wish to raise the whole issue of the principle contained in it. To me it was one of the most amazing sections that could appear in a Bill of this character. I pointed out on the occasion of the Second Reading of the Bill that I could see no necessity for the transfer of the jurisdiction which has been exercised by the Chief Justice for the past 11 years, in reference to lunacy and minor matters, from him to somebody else inexperienced in these matters. I also pointed out that so far as I knew there was no public demand for this change. There was no demand from any branch of the profession for tins change and no case had been made by the Attorney-General when he was introducing this Bill for this change over. I requested some information on these matters. I was anxious to know why it was thought desirable, or why it was considered to be in the nature of a reform, to transfer this jurisdiction which had been exercised in such a pre-eminent fashion by the Chief Justice for the last 11 years to some judge of the High Court. I got no satisfactory explanation of the appearance of this section in the Bill at that time, nor have I got it since, nor have I been able to find any satisfactory explanation whatever, or any satisfying reason for this change. I repeat that there has been no public demand for this change; that there has been no demand from any branch of the profession for the change. The fact, as I pointed out on Second Reading, that during the entire of the 11 years during which these jurisdictions were exercised there were only three appeals from the Chief Justice is a singular appreciation or monument to the manner in which he has carried out his duty in that connection. When the Chief Justice took up these new duties a certain practice existed in the office that he took over on the transfer—a certain practice that had existed during the old Lord Chancellor days.
If this matter were being considered for the first time, if we were now considering the setting up of a new system of judicature in this country, some argument might be advanced in favour of the proposition that the initial jurisdiction in reference to lunacy and minor matters might be placed, in the first instance, either in the President of the High Court or some judge of the High Court. But, when we find that the Oireachtas 11 years ago, having considered the matter and having had the advice of a Judiciary Committee, considered that the wise thing to do in reference to these lunacy and minor matters was to give exclusive primary jurisdiction to the Chief Justice, and when we find that that practice, not merely worked well and satisfactorily for 11 years, but had been demonstrated to have worked in a far better way than the old practice of the Lord Chancellor, it passes belief that now, without any proper reason or any satisfactory explanation, these jurisdictions should be suddenly transferred from the Chief Justice to some other people, who have not had the same experience as he has had in the last 11 years. You are putting some man, whether he be President of the High Court or anybody else, into the position of having to take up entirely new duties with which he has not had touch in the last 11 years, and you are taking these duties from a man who has had complete personal touch with every patient in lunacy and with every minor under his care in the last 11 years. You are dislocating, for no reason that I can see, and for no satisfactory reason that has been advanced, the whole practice of the office and the whole procedure that has obtained therein for the last 11 years. Why I do not know. I hope to hear some reason, either from the Minister or the Attorney-General, before this section is passed. I do feel that if the members of this House took the trouble to attend here and to consider the implications in this matter, this scheme would not be passed. No satisfactory reason, I repeat, has been given. There are innumerable reasons why the section should not have appeared in the Bill, and why, having appeared in the Bill, it should now be gracefully withdrawn.
The Attorney-General referred to the fact that the President of the High Court has onerous duties to perform. In the last 11 years he has had very onerous duties to perform. He is the head of the High Court, he has to attend to jury actions, he has to attend to appeals in the Circuit Court, he has to attend in Green Street at the Central Criminal Court, he has to sit in the Court of Criminal Appeal, he has to attend to certiorari, mandamus and State matters, and all matters that come before him. With all these onerous duties which he had to fulfil in the last 11 years, we now propose in this Bill to impose upon him the duty of going at least twice a year to the Assizes; and we propose to put further onerous duties on him of a very personal character, requiring personal contact with the individual patient, if the continuity of the tradition which has been maintained by the Chief Justice is to be kept up. We propose to put these very onerous duties on the President of the High Court for no reason that has been given and no reason that I can see. I should like to have some reason. As no reason was given in answer to my questions on Second Reading, I can only conclude that there is no real reason for this section.
There was one reason given, an absurd reason, that it was felt by somebody, who was not named, and whom I do not know, that it was not right that in the case of the jurisdiction exercised by the Chief of the Judiciary there should be an appeal from him to the Appeal Court. That is the only reason that was given. As I said earlier, that might have been a good reason in 1924, but, after the lapse of 11 years, when the office has built up a new practice and tradition, and it has been handled by one particular man who knows every patient in the lunacy side of the office and every ward in the minor side of the office, that it should be transferred now for that ridiculous reason passes my comprehension.
This section, in my view, is one of the worst sections in the Bill. I should like to know to what extent the Chief Justice was consulted about this matter. I should have thought that whoever was responsible for initiating this particular section would have taken the trouble to inquire into the position as it exists in that side of the court at present. I gather from the remarks of the Attorney-General on the Second Reading, when he was introducing it, that the Chief Justice had no objection to the proposal provided certain safeguards were given to him in reference to the staff. I should like to know, apart from being asked whether he had any objection to this proposal, whether he was consulted as to whether this was a desirable thing to do, in the present circumstances, and after the lapse of 11 years, or whether his experience over those 11 years in dealing with these matters was availed of by the Department of Justice when they made up their minds to bring this revolutionary proposal into this Bill, unasked, unsought for, and undesired.
If there is anybody in this country who knows that particular branch of the jurisdiction it is the Chief Justice. I think the House is entitled to know from the Minister or the Attorney-General what the views of the Chief Justice are in connection with this transfer. It is not enough for the Attorney-General to tell the House that the Chief Justice has no objection. Nobody would have any objection when the Minister says to him: "We wish to transfer portion of your jurisdiction to another branch of the courts." No judge would feel perhaps that he was entitled to object. Once the head of the Department of Justice said: "In the exercise of my duties as Minister for Justice I think this ought to be transferred," no judge would feel it his duty to object. Even if he felt it his duty to object, he would only do so to the minimum degree. If he were asked for his views as to the desirability of such a transfer, then it might be an entirely different matter. I think the House is entitled to know whether the Chief Justice was or was not consulted on the specific point that I put, not as to whether he had any objection to the transfer, but what were his views as to the suitability, in present circumstances and after the lapse of 11 years, of making the proposed change. I think we are entitled to get some specific answer to that question, and if the Department of Justice have had the advantage of hearing the views of the Chief Justice on this matter, then I think the House is entitled to hear what these views are.
Certainly I see no reason for this transfer. I described it, I think, on the Second Reading as a vicious proposal; if I did not, I so describe it now. By itself it might have been, again I repeat, a good thing or a bad thing to give this jurisdiction originally to a member of the High Court. But I say that it is entirely unsound and uncalled for when a practice has grown up in an office of this nature, of the delicate kind required in connection with these matters, over a period of 11 years, suddenly to change that entire procedure and practice and to transfer it from one judge to another. It should not be done unless there are very grave reasons indeed for doing it, and no such reasons have been given.
Now, when the Chief Justice took over these jurisdictions, he found that to a large extent the affairs of patients in lunacy and wards in minor matters were regulated by the officials. He conceived, in his wisdom, and very properly as I think, it is admitted on all sides now, that it was his duty to interfere personally and to control personally each individual case and every aspect of each individual case. The result was that he revolutionised the entire practice in reference to the care of patients in lunacy and the care of minors in minor matters, and he has had, according to his evidence before the Joint Committee, a very busy time in connection with the transaction of this jurisdiction. We all know that he sits there on a Friday— sometimes until 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening—and that after court every evening he interviews people in connection with these lunacy and minor matters. He has a peculiar and personal knowledge of each individual case that has gone through his office and that is in his office at the present moment. That is all going to be taken away at one stroke by one section in this Bill and transferred to a man who has not been dealing with such matters, who cannot have the same intimate knowledge, who has been out of touch and too busy to give the same personal attention as the Chief Justice has been able to give and who, because of the additional duties that will be imposed on him by this Bill, will be unable, in my view, at all events, to give the same personal attention as the Chief Justice gave. I do protest very strongly, Sir, against this section. I have heard no reason for it and I await with some interest the reply of the Minister as to whether he has any reason for the introduction of this section.