Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 10 Jun 1936

Vol. 62 No. 15

Seanad Eireann (Consequential Provisions) Bill, 1936—Second Stage.

Minister for Education (Mr. Derrig)

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. This Bill, as its title indicates, is consequential on the abolition of Seanad Eireann. The first section provides that all references to the Seanad shall cease to have effect, and also that references to members of the Seanad, or to the Cathaoirleach and Leas-Cathaorleach of the Seanad, shall cease to have effect. Section 2 provides that every mention or reference contained in any Act of the Oireachtas to either House or to both Houses of the Oireachtas shall be construed and take effect as a mention or reference to Dáil Eireann. The second portion of that section provides also that, wherever in an Act of the Oireachtas it is required that anything should be done by both Houses or by either House of the Oireachtas, such thing may now be done by Dáil Eireann, and, furthermore, if and when done, it shall have the same effect as if done by both or either House of the Oireachtas as the case may be.

The best-known example of the conditions under which this sub-section would operate is in connection with the well-known provision which appears in many Acts of the Oireachtas by which regulations made by the Minister are laid before each House, and within a period, generally of 21 days, if a resolution providing for the annulment of such Order is passed by either House, the Order shall cease to have effect. If this section be passed into law, it will mean that in future regulations of that character will have to be brought before the Dáil and, unless annulled by resolution of the Dáil, will have full force and effect as if they had hitherto been passed, that is to say, had not been annulled by resolution of either House of the Oireachtas.

There are other examples, such as the Control of Imports Act, which make this provision necessary. Under the Control of Imports Act, 1934, it is provided that a quota order shall expire at the end of six months, unless, before the expiry of such period, a resolution is brought before either House of the Oireachtas in a manner similar to that in respect of regulations. If this section becomes law, it will suffice that any import order or amendment of an import order shall be brought before the Dáil. The third section of the Bill deals with the Private Bill (Costs) Act, in which there are certain references to the Seanad. Section 3 and the First Schedule of the Bill provide for the consequential amendments necessary in this Private Bill (Costs) Act. Deputies will see from this Schedule that the references to the Seanad are deleted. Unless this amendment of the Private Bill (Costs) Act becomes law, there is danger that that Act would become inoperative and ineffective.

Section 4 provides that, wherever the Executive Council are of opinion that it is necessary, in consequence of the abolition of Seanad Eireann, that any general or specific modification or adaptation of any Act of the Oireachtas should be made, they shall have power to make by Order such modification or adaptation, whether the Act be public or private, and that the Order in question shall have the effect of making the modification or adaptation in question have full force and effect. The second sub-section of Section 4 provides that any adaptation or modification of the Act made by order of the Executive Council shall not be contrary to or inconsistent with any adaptation or modification made by this Act. The third sub-section of this section provides that the power of the Executive Council to make Orders for the adaptation and modification of Acts of the Oireachtas shall also extend to Orders or regulations made under such Acts. This section is on the same principle as the Adaptation of Enactments Act of 1922, under which the Executive Council has been empowered to make adaptations from time to time to suit the altered conditions and altered needs of the Saorstát, and should it become necessary for the Executive Council to make an Order adapting any Act or any Order or regulation under such Act because of the abolition of the Seanad, then the Executive Council, under this section, will be empowered to do so.

Section 5 provides that that power of the Executive Council to adapt or modify Acts of the Oireachtas shall apply to private Acts as well as to public Acts and to any Order, regulation or other instrument made under any such Act. Section 6 provides that the enactments referred to in the Second Schedule of this Bill shall be repealed. These enactments deal very largely with electoral questions. For example, Part VII of the Electoral Act of 1923, which lays down regulations regarding the eligibility of certain people for election to Seanad Eireann, is dealt with. The Oireachtas (Payment of Members) Act, 1923, is also dealt with to a similar extent dealing with the Seanad. It also deals with the Prevention of Electoral Abuses Act, 1923, as well as with the Seanad Electoral Act, 1928, the Seanad By-elections Act, 1930, and the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1933. The object of the repeal, so far as it is effected in the Acts referred to, is to delete all references to Seanad Eireann. These references, if continued, would simply mean that there would be nothing on which they would operate, and hence it is desired and is thought convenient that they should be repealed at the present juncture. There is also a reference to the Oireachtas (Payment of Members) Act, 1933, and it is considered suitable in connection with this Bill to amend a portion of that measure which deals with Seanad Eireann.

Mr. Cosgrave

The Minister, in introducing this measure, read out and gave us a short description of each one of the sections of the Act as it is before us. That has grown to be a practice with Ministers in recent times. We get no information, in general, as regards the measure or as regards the reasons for the measure, and we are left then to infer, practically from the Title of the Bill, what is the reason for the introduction of this measure. This measure is necessary in order to implement the policy of the Executive Council— a policy, as everybody knows, that was hastily conceived, carried out with very little delay, and ultimately passed, leaving a gap which it is proposed to fill up or otherwise to provide for by this measure. There is one point about which the Minister would have been well advised to have taken the Dáil into his confidence, and that is that, as matters stand now, directly this Bill becomes law— and this is the last grip that this House has got in that connection— once this Bill passes into law the Ministry are at liberty, so long as they have a majority in this House, to do as they please. When this Bill passes into law, we can be presented on any sitting day of the Dáil, so long as the notice is on the Order Paper, with the introduction of a Bill for its passage into law before night.

That is not a very attractive proposal. It is quite possible that the Minister will say there is no such intention. Whether the intention is there or not, it ought not to be there, practically inscribed in our Standing Orders or regulations, giving such power to a Ministry. Having passed the abolition of the Seanad through this House, and now proceeding to clear up any of the debris that may have been left, the Minister would have been very well advised in an Act of this sort to make provision to deal with a situation such as I have described. He could have provided in this Act that in future a certain notice should be given in respect of each stage of a measure, allowing for due consideration by the people of the country of any Bill that is introduced here before it would pass into law. The Minister may urge in that connection that if the Dáil wants to pass a Bill why should it not have the power to do so? If necessary, it could be provided for in the measure that a large majority of the House would be required. When I speak of a majority in that case, I mean a majority of the whole House rather than a majority that would be composed of the majority Parties. I mean a majority of the House, or two-thirds, or three-fourths, or five-sixths, or something of that sort. All that would be required would be to provide for the crank—the person who would object under any circumstances to allowing a Bill to go through if it were required in a short space of time.

The Minister may say that that sort of thing can be provided for now in the Standing Orders. Yes, but they can be amended at any time. He may say that you could alter or amend this Bill. Yes, but at least a certain amount of time would elapse before that could be done, and the very fact of doing so would be an indication to the public that the intention was to rush measures through this House. It is a bad headline to set in this country which is unaccastomed, except for a little over a decade, to the exercise of political responsibility. It was bad enough to be setting these headlines even in our earlier years, and while the Ministry might have made a case that in the first year or two that they were in office they might require such powers, now, in their fourth or fifth year of office, they can make no such excuse. In the first place, they did not come into office after a revolutionary period. They were presented with the various institutions of the State already functioning, and they ought to have been able to make up their minds in regard to legislative proposals instead of trying to stampede the people by hasty methods such as this. Accordingly, I think, not alone the debris should be cleared up, but some regular plan should be outlined to prevent abuses which will very rapidly creep in once the door is opened for them, and the door is left open by this measure.

The other point to which I desire to direct attention is that here the Executive Council takes power to make Orders, and they content themselves with simply recording these Orders in Iris Oifigiúil. It is not a very big point, but now, with a single House, it means that we shall have these Orders being made without the opportunity to enter an objection to them, when we know that even now one must go almost salaaming to the Whips in order to get accommodation in the House for the discussion, not merely of an Order or a regulation, but of a positive motion.

Until a week or two ago we had two Houses, and it was open to certain people to approach one of these Houses when objection was taken to any of these Orders. There was there a forum or an opportunity for different bodies to get explanations, and if they were not given, the Orders could be annulled. Now there is no such power except in one House, in which there is a well regimented majority. It may not be always so, but whether it is or not, it is a blot upon the legislation of the State to have even that situation for a short period. I think it is not a big point in connection with this Bill, having destroyed the second House of the Oireachtas. Even if it has an absolutely free hand, the Ministry would be well advised to have as much publicity as possible in what is left of representative institutions, and to put their deliberate decisions before it. The Bill is one which the Ministry requires in the circumstances of the case, and there will be no objection taken to it on that account. That it has defects is apparent, and if they can be remedied, the Ministry will be well advised to consider doing so.

Mr. Dillon

I would like to ask the Minister a question. I have not the faintest hope that he will be able to answer me, but as this Bill is designed to sweep away the last vestige of the Seanad which exists in our institutions, and as we are engaged in the pious belief that we are to get something sometime from an inquiry to be set up, I want to know: Can anyone tell me are we going to have a Seanad or are we not? I want to make a submission to the House that neither the Minister nor the docile Deputies on other seats, who are supposed to be members of the Labour Party, know that. Nobody else does. A lot of people might interpolate that President de Valera knows and that he will tell the country when it is good for it to know. President de Valera does not know, and no one knows. In six months' time, if he has a headache we will be told. If he has a toothache or rheumatism, we may have no Seanad, but if he is in good humour or goes to the seaside, we may have a Seanad. I consider that a country which has reached that stage of degradation, not to speak of a Party that is prepared to submit to be dragooned, and not to contemplate a Minister much less an Executive Council which submits to the public humiliation of being dragooned by one individual who masquerades as a democratic leader, speaks ill of democratic institutions. I hope out of the mess into which we have been led there will emerge a bicameral Oireachtas. It is right that the country should realise the humiliating position into which it has been allowed to drift by the complacency of the dragooned and futile members of the Fianna Fáil Party, who are prepared to accept the position that they are prepared to go bleating into the Lobby on Monday for a unicameral system, and are prepared to go into it for a bicameral system on Tuesday; just to do what they are told. I regard it as the greatest crime against this country for them to use the minds that God gave them, having no higher duty to the country or constituents than to ask an individual what they are to do, without bothering to consider the merits of the gravest question that could be put before them. They meekly do that bidding from hour to hour. I do not blame some of the back benchers of the Fianna Fáil Party. Possibly better could not be expected from them, but for a Minister, masquerading as a Minister, to allow himself to be driven into bringing a Bill of this kind before the House—being himself wholly unaware of what the policy of the Executive Council is—seems to me to be about the lowest depths to which a Minister of an Executive Council in this or any other country could sink publicly.

Mr. McGilligan

I hope whatever thought strikes the Minister he will not let out of his mind when he comes to speak, because there should be some thought on this matter, something more than the mere reading of the clauses of the Bill. Deputy Dillon put one point pungently. Should not the title of the Bill be amended? It has only certain provisions in consequence of the abolition of the Seanad as a constituent House. What about dealing with the whole thing at one sweep. Is not the Minister prepared even to consider the possibility, although his leader does consider it, that such might be the case? The circumstances are undoubtedly peculiar. We took a vote for the abolition of Seanad Eireann as a constituent part of the Oireachtas, and we have a group of people meeting to try to put up proposals for a Seanad in the event of someone deciding that a Seanad is desirable. It is to be noted at any rate that there has been associated with that committee certain people who will not be intrigued any longer into repudiating their own signatures. There is a committee gathered together with a see-saw type of mind.

An Ceann Comhairle

I do not think the constitution of this committee is relevant to this Bill.

Mr. McGilligan

The circumstances are relevant, and if the committee that is being set up while we are discussing this Bill advises that a type of Seanad might be established in this country after something else has disappeared, surely that is relevant.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Bill is consequential upon an Act of this House.

Mr. Dillon

So is the committee.

An Ceann Comhairle

A committee set up to consider the possibility of a Second House is certainly not relevant to the matter we are discussing, much less is the personnel of that committee.

Mr. McGilligan

I had not intended to refer to the personnel other than to indicate certain distinctive types gathered together in it.

Mr. B. Brady

And the types that are not gathered in it.

Mr. McGilligan

There can be very many comparisons made of an odious type. I think this is relevant when we have a Bill consequential on a measure that was passed for the abolition of the Seanad. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that there is a body gathered together to make representations. Of the matters referred to by Deputy Dillon and by Deputy Cosgrave two are outstanding, in which the Executive Council takes power not merely to sweep away but remove all reference to Seanad Eireann as a constituent House and to give this special power— the terms are noteworthy:—

(1) Whenever the Executive Council are of opinion that, in consequence of the abolition of Seanad Eireann as a constituent House of the Legislature created by Article 12 of the Constitution, any general or specific adaptation of or modification in any Act (whether public or private) of the Oireachtas is necessary to enable such Act to have full force and effect, the Executive Council may, from time to time, by Order make all such general or specific adaptations of or modifications in any such Act as are in the opinion aforesaid necessary to enable such Act to have full force and effect.

The whole thing founds upon the view of the Executive Council that the modification has become necessary. We had in the Emergency Imposition of Duties Act a clause laying down that certain things had to be decided by the Executive Council itself before the duties could come into operation, and when we questioned later as to whether the Executive Council had met to decide these matters, we got the clear-cut statement that they had not even considered the point, that they had introduced the emergency duty and that had to be taken as covering everything that was supposed to be envisaged in the Act. Here I have no doubt it will be urged that the fact of making a modification proves that the Executive Council considered it necessary. If that is to be the situation surely, as Deputy Cosgrave stressed, notice should be given here. There are various types of Orders made, some of which do not come into effect until a formal resolution is passed approving of them, others of which come into effect but which may be annulled on an adverse vote of the House but still having force during the interval. There is the other type of Order which we are told is purely of an administrative type, something in the nature of a minor regulation carrying out a well-known procedure. That is sometimes allowed to be done by Order without submission to the House. Here we are to have Orders which may result in modifications of, or additions to, the statute law and the Government take upon themselves the right to make these modifications when they think they are necessary.

There is one other point to which I desire to refer. I do not know whether it is deliberate, or to retrieve the Attorney-General from the rather difficult position in which he placed himself here on a former occasion, but the Attorney-General is going to occupy a prominent position on the committee set up to-day, and he will have the task there, which he will find somewhat difficult, of disproving what he said in this House. Under statutory provisions judges could only be removed from office in a particular way heretofore. That I take to be an operation which falls under sub-section (2) of the Bill, because the constitution is scheduled to an Act of the Oireachtas —requiring something to be done by both Houses of the Oireachtas. When the Bill for the abolition of the Seanad was before the House, the view was put forward that, in future, judges could be removed by one House. When that problem was before the Dáil, at an earlier stage, the Attorney-General had an ingenious device—to introduce into the resolution abolishing the Seanad or into the legislation which led to that resolution, a phrase that judges could not be removed from office until there was a vote of a certain majority of the House in favour of the removal. It was pointed out to him that that was not going to be of very much effect, because that particular provision could be repealed by whatever bare majority the Government had in the House. We had an addition to that, saying that no attempt should be made to repeal that section until a resolution had been passed by a certain majority of the House. It was again pointed out to him that that would be of no effect, because that could be again repealed by a bare majority in the House. He professed to believe that it could not. He asserted vigorously in the House that the provision could not be touched by a bare majority, that it must have whatever fraction of a majority was required by the resolution. What is the effect of this measure on that? That explanation has been described by two or three authorities outside as something that no child for a moment could imagine, but he has asserted it here, with all the weight of whatever reputation he has in the House, that it is a good and binding provision and that an amendment can only be effected by the necessary four-sevenths majority.

We are now faced with a later piece of legislation which in the ordinary course of events will override the earlier legislation. This Bill states: "Whenever any Act of the Oireachtas requires anything to be done by both Houses of the Oireachtas or either House of the Oireachtas, such thing may ... be done by Dáil Eireann and shall, if and when so done, have the same force and effect for the purposes of such Act as if done ... by both Houses of the Oireachtas." It used to be that the judges could be removed only for stated reasons by a majority of both Houses of the Oireachtas. Is this really an attempt by the Government to put us where I think everybody then knew we were heading, despite what the Attorney-General said, notwithstanding the previous phrase? I regard this as an amendment of the old provision that judges could only be removed by a vote of a majority of the Dáil and Seanad. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 will hereafter entitle a majority in this House to dismiss a judge. The same thing will apply to the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the provisions in the Constitution which are supposed to be protected. It is possible that this may be a blunder caused through people walking into an area which they have not surveyed beforehand, but the effect may be what I have described. I suggest to the Minister that if these Orders making adaptations and modifications of the statute law of the country, are to be made operative, they should not operate until they have gone through one or other of the processes I have described. Surely, when we are making a new law by modification it should require an affirmative resolution of the House.

General Mulcahy

Deputy Cosgrave when he was speaking raised a point that I think is one that should be openly discussed in the House, that is the question as to whether additional provisions should not be made to safeguard the privileges of the House generally in the matter of discussing legislation. The matter will, no doubt, arise at the Committee on Procedure and Privileges, but it is one of such importance that it requires discussion, too, here in this House. As has been pointed out, it is possible by the operation of a bare Government majority of one vote, to introduce any measure dealing with any aspect of the country's life in a very widespread and thorough way, the Bill being introduced one day, and passed through all its stages on the following day. When we have reached the point that we are going to have a unicameral Legislature, for no matter how small a period, we require to look frankly at the situation.

In fairness to the important matters we are dealing with here, there should be adequate time to appreciate the details of measures brought before the House. Not only should Deputies have time to consider these matters, but Deputies should have time to consult the people of the country, and the people of the country should also have time to consider these matters. It is, therefore, essential that a definite period should elapse between the circulation of a Bill and the Second Reading. There should be a similar safeguard with regard to giving an adequate amount of time for the discussions that are likely to take place between the different stages of a Bill. I raise this matter at this point with a view to putting to the Ministry that some discussion by them of the principles on which they propose to act in the future would be of the greatest possible assistance to the House. That is necessary if certain important things are to be decided in the proper way at the Committee on Procedure and Privileges. I, therefore, move the adjournment of the debate.

Debate adjourned until Tuesday, 16th June.