Vol. 63 No. 12
I propose amendment No. 1:—
In sub-section (1), page 6, line 10, to insert after the word "for" the words "or in connection with".
The object of this amendment is to make it clear that the definition of aerodrome in the Bill shall cover the position of hangar, workshops or other adjuncts to an aerodrome as well as the aerodrome itself.
I move amendment No. 2:—
In sub-section (1), page 6, line 24, to insert before the word "borough" the words "or other".
This is to ensure that other boroughs besides county boroughs shall be included in sub-section (1) of Section 2.
In the definition itself?
Section 2 (1), page 6.
That is the definition section.
Yes.
Where does the local authority reference come in?
Clause (a) "the council of a county borough" is considered not to be complete and the expression "or other" is being inserted between the words "county" and "borough" to make it clear that a borough such as Sligo, which is not a county borough, will come within the scope of the definition.
What have the local authorities to do with this? What section has this definition reference to?
Later on in the Bill it is proposed to give them powers.
What section has these powers?
Part V, which deals with the establishment and maintenance of aerodromes, under Section 36 and Section 41. Under Section 36 the local authority may have power to establish and maintain aerodromes, and under Section 41 to acquire land for the purpose, so that there is definite provision. There are other matters such as the formation of committees representing different local authorities to co-operate for the provision or establishment of aerodromes or for other matters. There is provision under Section 47 for the setting up of committees and under Section 48 for borrowing. So that there are a number of sections in Part V which deal with local authorities.
Does State aircraft not come under the international conventions?
Under this section the Bill, except Part III, shall not apply to any State aircraft. Power is taken in sub-section (2) to apply such provisions of the Bill, other than Part III, which deals with the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, as may be found desirable in future.
Do any of these other international conventions apply to State aircraft?
The Warsaw Convention applies provided, however, that the State aircraft is engaged in the carriage of persons, luggage or goods for war. The others do not apply.
They do not apply?
So I am informed.
What is the lighthouse authority in this country?
The Irish Lights Commission.
By whom are they controlled at present?
I think at present they are being finally transferred to the jurisdiction of the Saorstát Government.
Is there any Vote taken in this House for their expenses? I think not.
No.
Then that means that we do not allow any legislation of this House to affect regulations by an authority that is outside the House? That is the meaning of Section 4.
The matter is, I think, under consideration at the present time.
That is the general lighthouse authority. Is it not clear that Section 4 means that, while the present position remains, nothing done under this Bill can interfere with an authority outside this House?
The matter is at present under consideration, and I assume that, in the event of a settlement being reached, this section will not prevent another authority from assuming the jurisdiction.
I am not speaking of that. The situation at the present moment is that the lighthouse authority is an authority not paid by and not under the control of this House. We are establishing a new service, and, in the Bill establishing the service, we are making a general rule that no regulation made under the Bill can in any way affect the general lighthouse authority. Surely my summing-up is correct—that we are now saying to this House: "In passing this Bill you cannot affect the authority of the Lighthouse Board, which is outside the authority of this House and not subservient to it."
I do not think we are likely to interfere with them, even if they were within our control.
That is only an evasion. The point is that we are definitely asking the House now to say that this House cannot, under this Bill, do anything contrary to the wishes of an authority outside this House—an English authority at the moment.
The whole matter is under consideration at present.
It is not. Section 4 is not under consideration.
I presume that, if any adjustment is required, Section 4 can be very easily dealt with.
Section 4 is introduced in the present circumstances. The present circumstances are that the body controlling Irish Lights is not subservient to this House. The Minister wants this House to pass a Bill and say, "Nothing contained in the Bill passed by this House can interfere with the authority of that extra-Irish body." Let us know where we are.
That is absurd. This particular section is only in connection with the regulation of aerial transport and has not anything to do with the question of national rights.
If it has nothing to do with national rights, and there is no conflict between aerial navigation and the lighthouse authority, why is the section there? So far as the section has any meaning, it is this: If there is any conflict between the lighthouse authority, which is an English body, and the company established under this Bill, the English body, the lighthouse authority, must prevail.
The Deputy was operating the 1920 Act when he was Minister, was he not?
What Act?
The Aerial Navigation Act.
As amended by the Adaptation of Enactments Act, yes.
This is a re-enactment of that section of that Act.
Can I have the section read?
The object of it is to ensure that the rights and powers and privileges of the lighthouse services, which are essential to the safety of shipping, shall not be interfered with by the powers conferred by the Bill.
Which, as adapted under the Adaptation of Enactments Act, referred to Irish lighthouses and the control of Irish lighthouses, but this does not. This is not adapted by the Adaptation of Enactments Act. This is a new Act. The section is as I have described it.
It is exactly the same: "Nothing in this Act or in any orders or regulations made thereunder shall prejudice or affect the rights, powers or privileges of any general or local lighthouse authority." That is the section.
Of what Act?
The 1920 Act.
The Minister does not pretend to be as innocent as that. That Act cannot be read alone. It must be read with the Adaptation of Enactments Act. As so read, it means that nothing in the Act shall allow interference with the Irish lighthouse authority, if and when established. This Act is only an emendation. This Bill says that we are not to prejudice or affect the rights, powers or privileges of any general or local lighthouse authority, and when there is an Irish lighthouse authority, it will have the effect that the Minister read. But, at the moment, the situation is that the House is asked to say "You can pass all the Acts you like but one of the prohibitions you are to ordain for yourselves is that you cannot interfere with Irish Lights and Irish Lights are at present controlled by a British body.
I should like the Deputy to quote the portion of the Adaptation of Enactments Act which deals with the point he has raised. The Deputy says that the rights of the future Irish lighthouse authority were preserved and guarded under the Adaptation of Enactments Act. Perhaps the Deputy will quote the portion of the Act he refers to?
There is no question of getting the Minister to refer himself to a few court decisions. Under the Adaptation of Enactments Act every Act passed by the British having a reference to matters inside the Free State had to be construed as if the words "Free State" were written in. The difficulty here is that this particular measure is taken away from the shelter of the Adaptation of Enactments Act. This is plain and straightforward. The general lighthouse authority in relation to this country is a British authority. That might have come to an end sooner if it had not been for the nonsense of the economic war. It would have come to an end years ago.
Why did it not come to an end when the Deputy was Minister for Industry and Commerce?
It was on the point of being settled, as the President admitted here.
It did not come to an end because the service would be too costly an undertaking for this country.
This refers to the general lighthouse authority, and the general lighthouse authority is a British authority. Deputy Briscoe's patriotic soul, when asked to pass this, says this is a new Irish board, but you cannot do anything contrary to the regulations of that British body.
The Deputy cannot have it both ways.
It is quite a proper thing for the Deputy to do. He has done it more than once.
Perhaps the Deputy would show how this interferes with the rights of the body which is to be set up.
If this body passes an order or a regulation that is found to be in conflict with the orders and regulations of the British lighthouse authority, then the British lighthouse authority wins by this Bill of ours. That is all.
This section means that the Minister may not make a regulation in regard to lighthouse matters if it is in conflict with what the general lighthouse authority has done.
That is the Deputy's interpretation of the section.
Does it mean that?
In my opinion it does not.
Would the Minister reconcile an order made under Section 6 with Section 4? If the Minister makes a regulation that is found to be in conflict with, or that prejudices in any way the powers and privileges of the general lighthouse authority, will it overpower the general lighthouse authority?
The lighthouse regulations should be dealt with as a separate matter. The Minister is scarcely going to endeavour to prescribe regulations for lighthouses under Section 6.
But suppose he makes an order in regard to air navigation which has a prejudicial effect upon the powers of the general lighthouse authority, will it be good?
That is a matter that the courts would have to decide.
Can the Minister tell the House what he proposes? Does he want the regulations of the Minister to be supreme no matter whether they are in conflict with the general lighthouse authority or not, because if he does he will have to change Section 4?
It is only in the Deputy's imagination that this conflict exists.
I did not introduce the Bill. Whoever is responsible for it had sufficient imagination to write down in Section 4 that
"Nothing in this Act or any order or regulation made thereunder shall prejudice or affect the rights, powers or privileges of any general or local lighthouse authority."
Somebody, apparently, thought there might be a conflict. Somebody had imagination enough to arrive at that conclusion, at the possibility that there might be a conflict between the regulations made under this Act and some of the powers or privileges of the general lighthouse authority. Under Section 6 the Minister is taking power to make regulations in relation to a variety of things. I am asking the Minister to decide this for me: If the Minister makes a regulation which affects or prejudices the privileges of the general lighthouse authority, a British board, will the regulation win or will the general lighthouse authority win?
I say that the Irish lighthouse authority is an Irish board, manned by Irishmen.
I think that, within the jurisdiction of the area of the Saorstát, the Minister's regulation, if properly made, will at least have a reasonable chance of succeeding.
Deputy Kelly says this is an Irish board manned by Irishmen. It may be an Irish board manned by Irishmen, but this House does not appoint it, and the Minister has no control over it.
The point that the Deputy has been trying to make all the time is that this is a British board. It is not.
This House has no control over it.
There are many Irish boards over which this House has no control. The Dublin Corporation is one.
Deputy Kelly as a member of this House cannot criticise the Irish lighthouse authority.
Of course, I can. I can criticise anybody I like.
The Deputy would not be in order in doing so.
The order part of it can be considered afterwards.
The Deputy can be disorderly at any moment he likes, but in an ordered way there can be no criticism of the Irish lighthouse authority because this House does not appoint it, it does not sack anybody belonging to it, it does not pay anybody belonging to it, and this House does not regulate how the lighthouse authority acts. Under this Bill, which Deputy Kelly probably is backing, we have it specially laid down that no order or regulation made under it can affect any of the privileges of the lighthouse authority.
The Deputy's point was that it was a British board.
The point is this, that the general lighthouse authority is a British board. That has been admitted.
No.
The Minister admitted it.
I do not care what the Minister has admitted.
The position, at any rate, is that the general lighthouse authority, a British board, is being established under this measure in at least a superior position, so that if there is any regulation made by the Minister within the confines of the Saorstát which in any way affects or prejudices the privileges of this British board, then the Minister's regulation falls to the ground under Section 4. There is no shadow of question about that.
That is a great political point.
The Minister thinks that Section 6 is more powerful than Section 4. If you want to have it that way, then it is much easier to fight this than the economic business and you can wipe out Section 4. But you cannot have Section 4 and Section 6 together and pretend that Section 6 is the one that wins. Section 6, in the teeth of Section 4, cannot carry a regulation made by the Minister under this Bill if that regulation prejudices the privileges of a British board—the Irish Lights.
If the Irish Lights were in the hands of the Free State the position is that Section 4 would have to stand.
Of course, it would, and that is a good situation, but why bury your heads in the patriotic desert? At this moment, and for some years to come, the authority ruling Irish Lights is a British board and is going to be a British board, and as long as that situation lasts the Minister for Industry and Commerce by an Act of this House has to bow himself, to yield before a British authority in its regulations. That is the situation.
The Deputy is trying to make a big point out of something that does not exist. He knows quite well from his experience as a Minister what the position is with regard to the Irish Lights. He knows quite well that even if the Irish Free State had control of the Irish Lights Section 4 would have to stand as it is in the Bill.
At the moment the British authority rules the Irish Lights, and as long as that authority rules the Irish Lights the situation is that the Irish Free State Minister for Industry and Commerce cannot make any regulation which affects or prejudices the privileges of that British body.
This is the Deputy's scare for the Galway by-election.
The scares for the Galway by-election are all on that side of the House.
This is the scare for the by-election—the best the Deputy has.
I think the Minister for Industry and Commerce is not likely to make regulations governing the question of lighthouses. I have already explained to the House that the whole question of the possession of Irish lighthouses is under consideration and the British board, which Deputy McGilligan seems to be so fearful of, but which, nevertheless, he was compelled to recognise during his term of office, is maintained largely by dues collected from ships.
Has the Minister any authority for saying that?
Yes.
Not one part of every hundredth part of the expenditure is collected by way of dues from ships around the coast here, I venture to say. If that is the case, why do we not take over Irish lights? Is it not because it is too expensive and we cannot collect the dues from ships?
It is much easier for the British Government to maintain the lighthouse and lightship services because of its extensive commerce.
The reason the Deputy's Party, when they were in power, would not take over Irish Lights was because they were too expensive.
The Minister said that the question of the Irish lights is under consideration?
Yes.
What particular aspect?
The transfer of the authority over the Irish lighthouses to the Irish Free State Government.
Nonsense. The transfer could be got to-morrow if you are prepared to bear the expense.
The Deputy and his Party should have got it years ago.
No, because it would mean half a million a year. We might have wanted to have control of the Irish Lights service, but we did not want to pay for it. You can get control of them immediately if you are prepared to meet the expense.
The Dublin Corporation have elected six persons to be members of the Irish Lights Board. That is not a sign that it is a British board.
I think it is. Anyway, it is a sign that the Dublin Corporation did not know what they were doing.
They knew quite well what they were doing. It would be a good job for you if you knew as well.
With regard to Section 9, what are the likely expenses falling for payment by any Minister other than the Minister for Finance? Where does the Minister for Justice come into this?
I imagine that certain police work would probably be necessary in carrying out the regulations.
Apart from imagination, is that right?
The regulations in connection with the control of aircraft will be largely in the hands of the police.
On Section 10, what is the Paris Convention?
I think I have already explained that.
Is it possible to have a brief summary of the Paris Convention?
The Deputy will find under Section 12 a number of matters in-regard to which the Executive Council make provision. These are largely matters which arise under the Paris Convention. I have not a copy of the Convention at hand.
What was the main purpose of the Paris Convention?
To try to effect the international regulation of air traffic.
How was it to be achieved?
I am not here to be cross-examined by the Deputy.
Perhaps we could meditate on this. I think the Minister ought to answer the House.
Does the Deputy really expect me to read out the terms of the Paris Convention?
No. My point is that part of the Bill deals with the application by the Executive Council of certain provisions of the Paris Convention with a view to achieving something. Surely it is possible to state, shortly, what the object is and how that object mainly is to be achieved?
Did the Deputy himself not adapt, and adopt, the Paris Convention?
Did the Deputy say adopt or adapt?
Adopt and adapt. On one occasion the Deputy was asked a series of questions with regard to the training of air pilots, and I recollect that he referred me to the Paris Convention.
I am not denying that.
The Deputy should have knowledge of the Paris Convention. Where is the use in wasting time about it?
I suggest it is only right that the House should have information, and we can get it if the Deputy will assist me in asking the Minister questions.
We both know it.
Will the Deputy tell me how the object of the Paris Convention is to be achieved?
Do you mean that I should give you the sense of it or the verbatim contents?
The sense of it will do.
The sense of it is to have uniform behaviour on the part of all Governments with regard to several things concerning air navigation. One of the items is concerned with the training of pilots and giving them licences. Certain qualifications have to be acquired by air pilots; certain tests have to be gone through, and all these things are based on agreements adopted internationally. These were put on paper and called the Paris Convention, where they were agreed to.
I would not give you 2 per cent. for that answer.
If the Deputy would not give two points for it, will he volunteer to give us some information about it?
I am the examiner on this occasion. Perhaps the Minister will tell us.
Perhaps the House will have an opportunity of getting an answer from the Minister responsible.
The convention, as Deputy Briscoe has pointed out, was the first ever to secure international agreement and uniform treatment on the question of aerial transport. Some of the matters dealt with I will summarise. The general principles of the International Convention laid it down that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory; that each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord free passage above its territory to the aircraft of other contracting States; that each contracting State may prohibit flight by aircraft over certain areas of its territory, and that each contracting State may conclude special conventions, not contradictory to the general principles of the International Convention, with non-contracting States. It went on further to deal with the registration of aircraft, the certification as airworthy of aircraft, and the provision of the personnel of aircraft with certificates of competency and licences to be granted in conformity with the conditions laid down.
Article 15 deals with the conditions under which aircraft of a contracting State may cross the air space of another State and provides that each contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorisation the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines with or without landing on its territory. The convention also deals with the documents to be carried by aircraft engaged in international navigation, prohibits the carriage of explosives and of arms and munitions of war and entitles each contracting State generally to apply restrictions as to carriage of articles including photographic apparatus. It defines State aircraft and prohibits the flight of military aircraft across the territory of contracting States without special authorisation. One of the most important provisions is the setting up of the International Commission for Air Navigation which is a permanent commission placed under the direction of the League of Nations. The Saorstát is a member of the International Commission. I think these are the main features of the convention.
Is there anything in it about it being open to a Government to make it a condition of passage from and to its coast that the company should be State-owned or should be under monopolistic control?
I think that is not part of the convention.
Is there not a phrase in the convention which permits that?
A nation may reserve local traffic to its own aircraft.
Does that mean traffic originating in its own area, or traffic which originates in its own area but goes outside and lands elsewhere?
It means traffic originating and ending within its own territory.
Is it on continuous voyage? The whole tendency of the last part of this Act is to give monopoly control to a particular company. I understand that certain people who wanted to inaugurate air services in the country were refused permits by the Minister. The Minister, at any rate, pretended that he had power under the Paris Convention to make it a condition precedent to any passage out of this country and back to it that there should be a licence, and that he could, therefore, make it a condition of the licence that there should be State supervision, State control, and even monopolistic State control. Is that right?
I presume the Minister can attach such conditions to the licence as he may think proper, and as the company is largely monopolistic, I take it that he can embody monopolistic conditions in the licence.
I suggest that the Minister for Industry and Commerce did say to various people who wanted to establish services in this country that they would not be allowed to do it, and could not do it without a permit from him; that when he was challenged about that permit point he referred to some International Air Navigation Convention. Is it the Paris Convention, and if so what is the paragraph?
The Minister has made an Order as the Deputy knows—the Air Navigation (International Lines) Order —under which the authority of the Minister for Industry and Commerce must be sought and obtained before a service can be established, an international service or a service to or from the Saorstát by either a Saorstát or a foreign company. I think I explained on the Second Reading that it is proposed to exercise those restrictive powers contained in the Bill, and a regulation under this Order was made by the Minister in 1935 in favour of the national company.
Was the 1935 regulation made under the 1920 Act?
Yes.
Was it made in any sort of reliance on an international convention, and if so, which one?
The Paris Convention.
What paragraph of it?
Article 15.
Would the Minister oblige by reading Article 15?
It gives the right to each contracting State to make conditional on its prior authorisation the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing on its territory.
It allowed the Minister to make as a condition precedent the granting of a permit with certain things in it?
Yes.
That is not ordained by that Convention? It is only permitted?
Yes.
Is it a fact that the letters which were written to people who wanted to establish services were framed in such a way as if compliance with that particular Air Navigation Convention made a permit necessary? It was not put forward to those people that he was enabled to do it, but that he must do it in order to comply with the Convention? Is that so?
I think that that would not be the case. The Minister may have stated that it was his policy to restrict those services as far as possible to this national company which he had in mind and the subsidiary company.
And it was possible to do that under the 1920 Act, which was merely implementing the International Navigation Convention?
Yes.
Then what was the necessity for this?
The necessity for this Bill was to take powers to enable the Government to set up this national company, and also to embody all the existing legislation as far as possible under one statute.
May I suggest a different reason—that the Minister operated, and operated after being advised that he was wrong in attempting so to operate, on the basis of that International Convention enjoining on him those permits in order to comply with the international navigation code; that in fact he was not so authorised either under the code itself or under the 1920 Act, and that this is to clear up the mistake?
I think the Minister was authorised. If the Deputy contends that the Minister said it was mandatory on him, or that he was bound to do it, I should like if he would produce the letters to the Dáil.
I have too many of them here. They would take too long to read.
Produce one.
Some of those sub-sections are rather important. What is the particular purpose of sub-section (a)—the authority by which powers are to be exercised? Why is that picked out as a special provision after the general powers that are taken previously?
Under some sections of the present Bill the Minister for Industry and Commerce is the authority. Under other sections the Executive Council is the authority.
But this is the Executive Council here. Sections 10 and 11 give what, to the mind of the ordinary lay person, would seem to be the widest powers possible, and it is the Executive Council that takes them. What is the necessity for picking out special matters in Section 12?
Section 11 seems to me to be confined to the Paris Convention. I cannot say definitely that Section 12 is confined to the provisions of the Convention.
I am to take it then that sub-section (b) of Section 12 is to give the Executive Council power in regard to aerodromes, whether governed by the Paris Convention or any other convention?
But in conformity with those conventions.
Then surely the Paris Convention is in the atmosphere of all of this?
There may be certain matters not covered by it.
Can we get an example?
In any case, in connection with those conventions minor modifications have often to be made to suit the circumstances of particular countries.
That is definitely provided for in Sections 10 and 11.
Section 13 establishes offences by way of breach of Orders made under the special powers of Section 12, about which the Minister cannot tell us anything.
I can tell you that those are already in the Paris Convention.
What are?
The State must have power to stop aircraft——
I am not speaking of Section 13. Section 13 compels compliance. With what? With orders made under Section 12. I have asked the Minister what are those special orders under Section 12. He cannot tell us, but we are establishing a series of offences for breach of them.
Regulations are necessary in connection with the national or domestic aircraft which may not be covered by any of the Conventions.
Can we not get some information as to the necessity for Section 13 in relation to the undisclosed objectives of Section 12?
There is a well-known provision by which Governments are empowered to prevent aircraft from flying in certain areas for military or other reasons. Section 13 enables us to compel compliance when aircraft disobeys signals.
Paragraph (c) surely goes beyond anything that this country has yet seen. The whole of the section, as a matter of fact will have to be considered. It says: "If any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area under or by virtue of an order made under this Part of this Act"—that is, an area that is scheduled as a prohibited area under the general powers of previous sections —"or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order, the following provisions shall have effect." Among the provisions set out are that it shall be lawful for any officer designated for the purpose by such order to cause such signal as may be prescribed by such order to be given, and if, after such signal has been given, the aircraft fails to respond to the signal by complying with the provisions of such order prescribing the action to be taken on such signal being given, it shall be lawful for such officer to fire at or into such aircraft and to use any and every other means at his disposal to compel compliance. The next provision, paragraph (c), goes on to say that no action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court in Saorstát Eireann in respect of the doing of anything authorised to be done by any such officer under this section, whether such thing is done personally or by a person acting in aid of or under the direction of such officer.
There have been any number of very sacred decisions taken by courts from time to time on the power of the military, even in times of veiled riot, to act, and there have been many cases in the courts which have laid down what is the duty of the soldier acting on orders and whether or not he can shelter himself entirely behind the authority or order of an officer, or whether or not he is bound to use any discretion in such cases. This section makes it clear that nobody need use any discretion, and, whether the order is to be justified or not, no proceedings lie in the courts.
This is already in the 1920 Act also. The Deputy has read certain sub-sections but he has failed to point out to the House that it shall be lawful for an officer specially designated for the purpose, causing such signals as may be prescribed to be given to these aircraft, to fire at such aircraft if, after the signal has been given, the aircraft fails to respond to the signal. Obviously, the circumstances will determine whether the officer should fire at the aircraft or not. At any rate, I think it is obvious that it is essential in connection with aircraft that there should be rather stringent powers for dealing with aircraft which refuse to comply with signals. In any case, the provision is already in the 1920 Act.
The 1920 Act was a British Act and only carried into the laws of this country by Article 73 of the Constitution.
Was this particular clause in it, and, if so, in what way?
It was, of course, and the whole Act is subject to it. That does not help me in the point I am making. But of course the whole Act is entirely subject to it. Here, however, for the first time, we are asking the House to face up to legislation of a permanent type. This is not a carry-over type of legislation. After all, there is such a thing as the rights of the ordinary civilian population.
Where does the question of the rights of the civilian population come in here?
Apart from the ordinary people on the ground, there is the right also of the person in the air who may be a member of the civilian population. This is not aimed against military aircraft but against every type of aircraft. Suppose there is something of a barrage put up against hostile aircraft, or so-called hostile aircraft, or something designated for the purpose to be hostile aircraft, and that people on the ground— not in the air at all—are hurt, the Minister precludes anybody inquiring in a court of law as to whether the orders to fire were properly given or whether the persons to whom the orders were given found themselves in such circumstances that they were bound to obey the orders. My point is that this cuts across the whole of the ordinary law as it has been carried over in this country and as it has been practised on behalf of the people of this country. If it is desired to have these provisions in, I suggest that it should be limited to, say, a time of war or threatened war or civil commotion. The idea, however, of somebody, simply because the Minister says he is an officer designated for the purpose, giving an order and that order resulting in somebody either firing at or using some other lethal weapon to prevent aircraft entering the Saorstát, as a result of which damage is done to people in the Saorstát—not in the air at all, but on the ground—and that that procedure cannot be questioned, is absurd. Surely it would be right for the courts to follow the ordinary procedure in matters like this. Of course, I am not very alert at turning this type of case against people in authority. I think it will be found, generally, that courts acting in a responsible fashion and carrying out the law in the usual way will get the help of the ordinary people; but here, according to this, proceedings may not be instituted even to question whether or not such an order was properly given or whether the person who carried out the order in such circumstances was bound to obey it. This, if it is carried into effect, will mean in the future that nobody will ever think of disobeying an order because there is no question of the matter ever being considered in court and they can be sure that their conduct will never be questioned. I say that it is a very grave power to take for no reason given.
The Deputy has become terribly legal since he went into opposition. I have here a copy of the Air Navigation Rules for which he was responsible in 1930, and all I can say is that, if they were suitable in 1930, why should they be unsuitable now? The Deputy, in any event, Sir, is wasting his eloquence, because this Bill simply re-enacts in very large measure the provisions of the 1920 Act as adapted to this country, and also provides that certain action will be taken by the Government in regard to international conventions. There are then certain financial provisions in the Bill. The Deputy has already wasted a large portion of the time of the House telling us of the terrible things we are bringing into this Bill, although this is the second occasion on which I have shown the Deputy and the House that we are simply re-enacting measures that the Deputy himself introduced when he was Minister for Industry and Commerce. The Deputy has not told the House that this provision with regard to firing at aircraft is confined to prohibited areas and that there is only one such area at present in the country.
To start with, it is not confined to prohibited areas in the Bill. However, as far as the 1920 Act is concerned, we will get that cleared up first. The difference between the 1920 Act and this Bill is that the 1920 Act was a piece of carry-over legislation.
Would the Deputy show us where the provision is that is applicable to areas other than prohibited areas?
Does it not mention any aircraft entering or attempting to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order?
I do not know what the Deputy is reading from.
I am reading from the preamble to Section 13, which mentions prohibited areas, and it says that "if any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order, the following provision shall have effect," and then it goes on to state the provisions. Surely Saorstát Eireann is not a prohibited area?
Not yet.
Well, while that is sinking in, I can refer again to the 1920 Act. As I have said, the 1920 Act is a carry-over piece of legislation, and this Bill is put up for consideration so that it may be passed as a permanent measure.
It is only in the event of any area being appointed as a prohibited area by an order made under this part of the Act that these provisions would come into effect.
Does that sink in now?
It has gone in and out again.
That is the trouble.
Listen to this:—
"If any aircraft flies or attempts to fly over any area appointed as a prohibited area under or by virtue of an order made under this part of this Act——"
The order is not an order making a place a prohibited area; it is an order under this part of the Act.
"—or enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of any such order——"
I am going to interpret that as I read this part of it as "in contravention of an order made under this part of the Act." Is that right?
It is grand to be a lawyer. You can interpret or argue it in any way.
How do you spell it?
The grapes are sour, Deputy, I suppose. Is that the correct interpretation? I think the plain meaning of the English there is:—
"If any aircraft enters or attempts to enter Saorstát Eireann in contravention of an order made under this part of this Act."
I think that is right. It is then lawful to fire on it. It is not confined to prohibited areas.
Certainly it is confined to prohibited areas.
It is? The Bill says that orders may be made under this part of this Act under Sections 10, 11 and 12. Section 10 is in regard to such orders as appear necessary for carrying out the Paris Convention. Does the Paris Convention relate only to prohibited areas? If not, orders made under this part of this Act may go beyond prohibited areas. Section 11 sets out:—
"The Executive Council may from time to time direct that the provisions of the Paris Convention ... shall apply to or in relation to any aircraft in or over Saorstát Eireann...."
Unless the Paris Convention is confined to prohibited areas, that again is extensive. Look at the series of things in Section 12. We get down to the letter (n) a series of special powers about which orders may be made, and, in relation to any of these if there is any of them which have an effect on an entry into Saorstát Eireann, there may be an entry, or attempted entry, contrary to the provisions of an order made under this part of the Act. For that, an officer designated may cause whatever signals are prescribed to be given, and if the aircraft fails to respond to the signals, it may be fired on. Not merely may it be fired on but the officer may use any other means at his disposal to compel compliance. If any such firing is attempted, or any other method of enforcing the authority of the officer is brought about, no proceedings may be instituted to question it.
The 1920 Act, if I may return to it, was a piece of carry-over legislation. The House never thought about it and the Executive Council hardly thought about it. It was a piece of legislation designed as a temporary expedient and, under it, certain regulations were made. These regulations—and one knows the fate of these regulations— were laid on the Table of the House. They were not intended to meet a permanent situation. They were made, like the Minister's 1935 Order, to meet an emergency as an emergency arose. They were, in fact, made in order to comply with the navigation code to which we had become a consenting party, and about which trouble was being raised, because certain regulations implementing the code had not been brought in. So far as operating the regulations was concerned, I was never guilty of operating any part of them—certainly not any part about firing on people—and I never would have thought of proposing them to this House as permanent legislation. There may be a necessity, and quite certainly is in regard to specialised areas, to forbid the aircraft of a foreign place, or even our own aircraft, from flying over them, but to say that if and when an officer uses force by firing to get an aircraft to comply with his signals, his conduct should not be challengeable in the courts, is going too far.
Remember that that legislation is founded almost entirely on the Continental situation in the post-war period and about the time when although people were pretending to turn their thoughts towards disarmament, it was seen that the clear way out of disarmament was the provision of the equivalent of a mercantile marine—a civil aviation service, easily changed into military aircraft more or less at a moment's notice. It also was recognised that the easiest method on the Continent, with its fortified areas, of getting spying done as to the latest development of the fortification of large areas was through the medium of aircraft flying overhead, and by the special progress that had been made in certain photographic methods. There was what amounted to a panic on the Continent amongst all the warring powers as to these matters. There is a tradition with regard to espionage in respect of the fortified areas on the Continent which this country knows nothing about, and does not require to know anything about, and against which it certainly does not require regulations to the same extent. In those circumstances that code was passed. Why should we now attempt to set up such a piece of legislation for permanent lodgment on the Statute Book? Why should we copy what has been done in a panic way on the Continent under circumstances which do not hold here at all?
We are definitely breaking down one of the best known standards. One of the most rigid regulations which the people trusted to serve the community under arms have to obey is that which ordains that if they seem to outstep the bounds of their duty, from the officer giving the commands to the men obeying them, they can be brought before a court and have their conduct inquired into. It is a safeguard not merely to the community, but to the serving-soldier. For instance, I am sure the House would be horror-stricken if a regulation of that type were brought in with regard to the Army generally— that, no matter what the command of an officer was, so long as he was an officer designated, that is to say, an officer properly in the service, it must be obeyed and, no matter what the result of it, his conduct could not be inquired into. The House should not be asked by any Government to pass any such clause in a Bill. Why say it with regard to aviation? And certainly not until a case has been made for it.
I suggest that if you allow the ordinary law to prevail, if you wipe out that clause, you have a situation which is as much a safeguard to the serving man, the man in the ranks, as it is to the community, because it at any rate puts him up against this position that, from time to time, he has to use his mind and his humanity in deciding whether a command given by an open maniac of an officer ought to be obeyed or not. That was the safeguard which certain people tried to shelter behind in a very definite tragedy that occurred in this country. You do strengthen the soldier in his attempt to be humane towards the ordinary population if that type of thing is not there. Once that particular regulation is there, no soldier for the future will ever think of questioning anything except one thing: Is this man an officer and is he designated for this purpose? If he is, anything he says goes; it cannot be questioned.
The Deputy has not explained to the House why he found it necessary to embody this provision in these regulations made in 1930. I cannot find his explanation that the panicky condition of the Continental Powers, the war condition, has lasted until 1930, and was so effective that it compelled the Minister of that day to put this provision into his regulations. At first, when the Deputy criticised this provision, he was anxious to safeguard the civil population, the gentlemen who refused to obey the signals given; now he wants to protect the soldier. Surely we can rely on the Government to have regard to the general circumstances of aircraft when they are making orders designating these signals and laying down the circumstances under which officers may fire upon such aircraft. I cannot call to mind a particular circumstance in which it would be dangerous for aircraft to refuse to obey signals. I know that we have had examples recently of aircraft flying over prohibited areas in defiance of international regulations. Are we to take it that, under regulations properly laid down, it would be improper for officers properly designated, and knowing their duty, to fire upon such aircraft if they considered it necessary to do so? The Deputy assumes that officers designated in the section are mere robots, and will fire at every aircraft that comes along. I think we can assume that officers of the Army are reasonable and sensible individuals and that they will have full regard to all the circumstances, and consider such a serious action as firing on aircraft before they do it.
I only want to deal with the last argument, which means that the Ministry can justify the bringing of a clause into the Army Act, under which an officer can give a signal to a man to halt, and if he afterwards orders anyone to fire, anything arising out of that is precluded from inquiry by the courts. The same argument will hold, that you can rely upon the officer being a good fellow; that he will not do it. Why have other countries decided, as far as ordinary defence and land forces are concerned, that it is proper to allow the courts to inquire into the activities of officers and men serving under them when it seems to the courts that there is reason for such inquiry? If other countries had the same view as to the giving of orders to men, as the Minister pretends to have to justify this clause, there would be no necessity for any such intervention by the courts. We are to pass this and to rely on the intelligence, humanity and good nature of the officer and the men under him. The Minister can say if he likes that countries that have even the human viewpoint that I spoke of in regard to land forces generally are not in the majority in that view as regards aircraft. Will the majority of them have it? Are we so definitely stabilised in our institutions with regard to defence that we think it proper to protect an officer, no matter what type of order he gives, as long as it is something permitted by the paragraph, from any inquiry by the courts?
We will put men serving under him in such a position that they know that an officer's order once given cannot be questioned in the courts, and to that extent there is greater persuasion on them to obey. I think that an outrageous situation to bring about by way of permanent legislation. What is the fear? If we were entirely dependent on some huge arsenal for our entire defence, and if it was easily located and was in such a dangerous place that we could only guard it by having very stringent regulations about people flying over it, and if there was imminence of some attack by aircraft going to destroy it, then, in regard to that type of prohibited area, it might be possible to have officers and other people protected from judicial inquiry. This may have relation to any order issued by the Executive Council under this part of the Act, when some aircraft fails to comply with signals in relation to any matter. As to general matters detailed in Sections 10, 11 and 12, we say that we are not going to have the conduct of the officer who gives the order inquired into. There has been no case made for a breach in the old situation that prevailed as between the civilian community and the serving forces. The Minister appears to regard that as important. We should think of the danger to the civilian community. Surely the Minister's memory has not failed him, and he will remember that quite an amount of the anti-aircraft machinery used during the Great War had an effect, not upon the people at whom it was aimed, but on the unfortunate civil population, upon whom the stuff rained down, inflicting more casualties amongst them than those defending the country against offensive aircraft. It does not need any flight of imagination to see such a situation as that being brought about if orders are so general. I suggest to the Minister that he should think seriously before he makes this very considerable breach in the old system of the courts, a system that has allowed proper action, with the judges always moulding themselves to help the Executive, recognising that the Government must be assisted. Notwithstanding that, the Government appears to be against action being taken before an inquiry into the conduct of officers and men. I think it is a safeguard to the community and to the men and prevents officers getting out of hand, which I think is not likely to happen here.
The first Convention lays it down that for military reasons or military safety the Government shall be empowered to specify certain areas as prohibited areas. In spite of what the Deputy argued, that this section deals with other than prohibited areas, I state definitely that it applies only to prohibited areas specified by order. When aircraft are challenged and refuse to obey signals, then the Government is quite justified in enabling officers to fire on such aircraft. I do not see why, if officers carry out their duty and try to prevent aircraft from disobeying signals in prohibited areas, the Deputy should be so terribly anxious that these officers should be hauled up in court. They will carry out their duties in this matter, presumably as they carry out their other duties, according to the law of the State and according to lawful orders given by superiors.
I intervene in this debate with the desire that neither Fascism nor the Reds should prevail in this land. I feel that the Minister does not understand the terrible powers being given to any officer controlling even what he alleges is a special area. Supposing the courts decided that the area in which something happened was not an area as prescribed by the Minister, a person aggrieved has not even the right of appeal to the courts. The legislation of this country has tended towards the removal of the old theory that the King can do no wrong, and the Road Traffic Act allowed the ordinary civilian to take action against a Minister or a soldier. Previously a civilian, if injured, could not proceed for damages. I thought we had got so far away from that that, at least, the Government would take a wider and a more democratic view or, if you like, would be republican in their outlook, rather than saying that they could do no wrong and that no one could question what they did. That is the position this section sets up. No one can question what they do, even the courts that have been set up in this country. The Minister would be well advised to consider this section, because it goes beyond all the notions we hold concerning the rights of the individual. When I was an officer in the Army, if someone was knocked down while I was being driven by someone else, there was no action against me. An Act of the Oireachtas changed that position. The Minister relied a good deal on the Act of 1920. I wonder does he remember that that Act was really a "take-over" of regulations that were set up during war time? Deputy McGilligan said that it was due to the post-war terror in Europe. I believe, in fact I know, that it was due to what they called D.O.R.A. Some of the provisions of that Act still exist. I had the pleasure of being imprisoned under some of them. I am prepared to give the Minister and the Executive Council all necessary power, but if the House accepts the principle that any officer or anybody with authority can fire at any aeroplane passing, mind you, not over a prohibited area— because I do not agree with the Minister that any spot in this country is prohibited—I feel we are giving a power to such officers that the people of this country do not desire to give to any officer or soldier. I am not suggesting that the Executive Council should not have sufficient powers to deal with occasions of danger, if such danger existed. I think the Minister would be well advised to reconsider the section, especially paragraph (c), and have it withdrawn.
If the Government of the country decide that for the safety of the community it is necessary that aircraft should be prevented from flying over certain areas, and if as a result of failure to obey these regulations—if this provision were not the law of the country—any aircraft flying over such territory caused such damage as would entail loss of life and property, what answer would Deputies on the opposite side make to people who suffered? What alternative safeguard do they consider the community should have against aircraft which flagrantly defy the laws and regulations of the country?
The answer is very simple. Nobody wants to prevent the Government of this country taking power or having power to prevent hostile aircraft flying over part, or the whole, of this country if necessary, but we think that coincident with that power there should be power given to the courts to prevent officers running amok, to prevent officers losing their heads, to prevent them acting under the influence of drink. These things happen. I am not saying that they happen in the Free State Army but they could happen. Are we going to prevent a man losing his head by having him conscious that he may be hauled before the court to answer for his conduct, if aircraft have failed to respond to a signal in a particular way, or is he more likely to lose his head if he feels that no matter how irresponsibly he acts he will not be brought before any court? It is futile to think that an answer has been given to the matters discussed here by pretending that if we take away paragraph (c) the Government would be left powerless either to prevent aircraft entering the country or passing over a prohibited area. Everybody will agree that the Government should have that power if they want to make any part of the country a prohibited area, but that must be done regularly. The prohibition must be effected with some degree of reason. Is there not a greater likelihood of unreason prevailing if an officer knows that he must only put himself in either of these positions to escape liability in the courts: (1) he must be an officer designated for the purpose, (2) he must give a signal and (3) the aircraft getting the signal must fail to respond to such signal by not complying with the provisions of the order prescribing the action to be taken on such signal being given. Once these three things happen, that man can fire at oncoming aircraft and no matter how irresponsible his action is, nobody can question it.
I say that if his action is irresponsible it should be open to question. When I say that that irresponsible action should be open to question, I am not suggesting that the Government should not have full powers to prevent hostile aircraft from passing over the country. There is a great difference, however, between saying that you must have power to prevent hostile aircraft passing over the country and telling a man who runs amok that his action cannot be challenged in the courts. By all means give these men all the protection they require but if they are irresponsible and if the courts find that they have acted irresponsibly then they should be liable to punishment, and there is no punishment laid down here. You preclude any proceedings of a civil or a criminal type against a man who has caused loss of life through irresponsibly giving an order on the nonobservance of some small point of the provisions for replying to a signal. In addition to that you prevent this. Some officer may lose his head on a certain occasion and decide to fire upon aircraft. A civilian member of the public, miles away from the scene, is injured, yet that person cannot take a civil action for damages if this section is passed in its present form. Surely we ought not to be asked to agree to that.
Army officers are subject to Army discipline and to the Army Act, which, I hope, will soon be in operation. The Deputy desires that provision should be made in this Bill to drag military officers, who do certain things in the execution of their duty, before the civil courts when as everybody knows they are subject to military regulations and military discipline if they do anything irregular. I think the Deputy ought to assume that officers who have laid upon them the duty of signalling aircraft, to prevent their flying over areas which are prohibited for national reasons or for the safety of the community, will carry out their duties lawfully according to the orders which are given to them, and that any cases in which they may act illegally will be dealt with in the same way as any other wrongful act for which an Army officer may be called upon to account.
In the same way as a breach of discipline?
Why prevent the courts from dealing with them?
Does the Minister think that Army officers in regard to certain crimes are subject only to Army discipline?
They are subject to Army control for any failure or neglect in the carrying out of their duties.
Does the Minister think that if an officer carrying out his duties commits some illegal act or some crime the civil courts are powerless? If the Minister thinks that, he is a long way from realities.
They can be dealt with under the Army code.
If the Minister attempts to bring in an Army Act to prohibit the courts from dealing with officers——
When the Army Act is before the House we can discuss that.
How can we discuss it on the Army Act if we find that this clause has been passed into law to debar the courts from dealing with an officer who has been guilty of some illegal act in connection with this Bill?
They can be dealt with under Army Regulations.
The Minister is really very far away from the ordinary realities of the code under which he lives. Does the Minister believe that if a member of the Defence Forces— I am leaving the question of aircraft out of it for the moment—runs amok and kills somebody, he should be dealt with under the Army code only?
I do not think any such thing.
Does the Minister think it proper to produce a Bill to prevent the courts from dealing with such an officer or does the Minister think that that should have application only in regard to aircraft? If that is intended it should be dealt with in a certain way. The Minister evidently will allow a man to be irresponsible in the discharge of his duty in regard to aircraft but will not allow him to be irresponsible in regard to any other of the activities of the Defence Forces of the Saorstát. That is rubbish. The Minister obviously does not know what the situation here is with regard to the interaction of the civil code on the Army code. We are passing this as permanent legislation—as permanent as statutes can be—and the Minister is blindly following what the Continental people did round about the time when espionage from the air and attack from the air were present to the minds of the people, as it is not present to our minds. If it is present to our minds, we have failed to make any provision against it. In this Bill we are telling officers to do as they please and that they will not be hauled before the courts no matter what they do. This is not a defence provision; it is a lunacy provision and it is breaking across the ordinary law. Owing to the Minister's view as to what the provisions of the ordinary law are in connection with military affairs, I suggest that he should take this provision back and have it considered. It is quite clear that it is not being brought forward by anybody who understands what the real position is.
It is in accordance with the terms of the Paris Convention.
It may be. The terms of the Paris Convention cover a great many things. It was the greatest common measure of what a lot of people desired. Are we to go to the extremity?
You included it in your regulations in 1930.
If I did, I was wrong. It was never thought of as a permanent provision, and it ought to be abandoned. It establishes a completely new situation with regard to the interaction of the civil code on the penal code which enforces military discipline. It creates a new situation with regard to the supervision by the civil courts of military men who, in the pretended doing of their duty, do something criminal. In such circumstances the ordinary military man could be had up before the civil courts for at least the graver crimes. This provision will prevent any such matter being investigated by the civil courts. That should not happen.
The Deputy suggests that officers should be brought before the courts for carrying out their duty in defending the population?
They can be brought before the courts at present.
Suppose the Minister is brought before a military court and is censured for acting irresponsibly. As a result of his action an individual may have suffered a very substantial loss for which he would ordinarily have an action for damages. Is it the Minister's intention to deprive that citizen of the right he would otherwise have? That man may have a family dependent upon him and he may be crippled. In the ordinary course he would get damages which would maintain him in something like the same standard of comfort he enjoyed before. If the military court finds that the officer has acted in a wildly irresponsible way, is that citizen to have no right to recover damages simply because he happens to have been injured by an irresponsible officer and not by an irresponsible civilian?
That is a hypothetical case.
Does the Minister deny that soldiers have recently been brought before the criminal courts for manslaughter because they knocked down and killed people?
I am not going into the question of any other charges that may be brought against officers. I am dealing with this particular section.
I am taking an analogy.
There is no analogy.
The analogy is perfect. There is no special reason why these people should be put on a special footing. In the case of the ordinary member of the defence forces, if he does what the courts think is murder, even though he has done it in compliance with a military order, the courts will inquire into the matter. They will inquire into the order given, and, even if the man was subject to penal discipline if he did not obey, they will consider whether he was justified under the civil code in obeying the order, in the circumstances. Again, I point out that this matter of orders is not confined to prohibited areas. It is no answer to say that the Paris Convention has some reference to prohibited areas. A variety of orders can be made under Sections 10, 11 and 12. If aircraft operates under these circumstances, all an officer has to be satisfied about is that he is an officer, that he gives a signal, and that the aircraft fails to respond in respect of one matter. Then he can fire and nobody can inquire into his action no matter how irresponsible it be. We should not be asked to pass such a provision. The answer may be that you can rely on your officers. If that be so, why not introduce this principle into the ordinary law? It would be an outrageous provision to introduce into a Defence Forces Act. This House—even with the mechanically propelled legislation to which we are becoming accustomed —would never consent to that. It is absurd to ask the House to agree to it in connection with this Bill.
The Minister does not realise the significance of this provision. The Executive Council found it necessary to suppress a certain ceremony at Bodenstown a few weeks ago. Suppose some people from London, Liverpool or Manchester chartered an aeroplane and came along to Bodenstown. If an officer fired on that aeroplane, he could not be brought into court for injury done to the occupants of the aeroplane or to citizens on the ground. That is going against all the notions of liberty of the individual and democracy and I am sorry that it is a Republican Government makes the proposal. I instanced that case of Bodenstown because the Minister knows of the habeas corpus case in regard to Wolfe Tone. It would indeed be an extraordinary tragedy or perhaps you could describe it as a comedy—it would be a comedy in 1936-'37—if a person or persons going to the Wolfe Tone anniversary were wrongly fired at and that the officer responsible could not be questioned before a court.
Where would the authority be to fire on them?
The authority will be there without paragraph (c). Take out paragraph (c) and the Minister will have plenty authority.
Not at all.
Why?
Because there has to be a prohibited area and there is only one such area in this State.
But paragraph (c) of the section has nothing to do with that. Take out paragraph (c) and you have the rest left.
Then, the person can fly over any area. The paragraph reads:—
(c) no action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court in Saorstát Eireann in respect of the doing of anything authorised to be done by any such officer under this section, whether such thing is done personally or by a person acting in aid of or under the direction of such officer.
What is the order?
The order making the area a prohibited area. No order has been made about Bodenstown.
But it can be made.
I mentioned Bodenstown because the real point of this case is that the matter could not be raised in the Civil Courts. As is well known to the House, the most important case decided in the Civil Courts in regard to the military and others was the case of Wolfe Tone.
There was another case besides that.
That was before the Deputy's time.
No, it was during your time; there was another case raised.
With regard to the civil liability that would arise in the event of an officer having been found acting in an irresponsible way by a military court, is it the Minister's intention to deprive the civilian of his legal remedy against an officer so convicted by a military court?
The Deputy is quoting a hypothetical case.
I quite willingly admit that it is a hypothetical case. I want to know, in that hypothetical case, is it the Minister's intention to deprive a civilian of his remedy to sue for damages? Let me put it in this way: An officer, acting under Section 13, behaves in an irresponsible way, as a result of which the citizen loses his earning capacity; is it the Minister's intention or desire to deprive that citizen of his right by law to recover damages against that officer?
I think that is the intention of the section.
Does the Minister wish that to be the intention of the section?
Can the penal provisions for the Army be enforced against such an officer?
Why not?
Is it intended that they should be?
Certainly.
Is the military body that is to hold the inquiry into his action a court?
I do not know what type of court the military regulations provide for a case such as the Deputy has in mind.
Is it a court? If it is, paragraph (c) of Section 13 prevents the civilian from proceeding in any court with any legal proceedings against the officer.
Paragraph (c) applies only if the officer carries out his duties as his duties should be carried out.
No, the paragraph is in respect of anything authorised under this section.
I am trying to follow the points put by the Deputy. Some of them are peculiar and others serious. The Bill does not provide protection for an officer who is drunk and starts shooting all round.
It does.
It provides that in certain circumstances, say, where an area is a prohibited area and where an aeroplane flies over that area, or attempts to fly over it, the officer shall warn that party, and if the aeroplane, in spite of having got the warning signals, persists in the attempt to fly over the area, the officer is then to fire on it. Whatever method of firing that may be, whether it is shrapnel or some sort of shot, he is empowered to fire. He is only doing it in the course of his duty. The Bill does not specify that a drunken officer shall be on duty; if this drunken officer who may be outside the prohibited area comes into that area and acts, he is not in that event protected by this Bill. As I understand it, that is the case the Deputy is making. The Bill does not provide for that sort of thing.
It does not prohibit it.
First of all, the officer will only be on duty in that area——
Who told the Deputy that? It is not in the Bill.
Deputy McGilligan will surely grant thus far—the officer is in the area——
I cannot imagine the protection of prohibited areas being carried out only through officers serving in the prohibited areas.
There is a Government in the country——
We know it. We made it.
There is a Government in the country. That Government is so far responsible that it has an Army such as the Deputies on the Opposition had in their days. It is found to be an efficient Army, and it has done its duty by the people of the country——
Hear, hear.
There is no use in Deputy Dillon saying "Hear, hear." Deputy Dillon is new to this thing.
Yes, Deputy Dillon must have come from abroad.
His "Hear, hear" is strange to this country.
This is really rich.
This is the position. There is a prohibited area; an officer is on duty in that area. He is an officer of our Army. He is not an officer who, when his duty is finished, puts the cannon on his back and walks home. There is such a thing as order in the country.
Not on this. If this section stands there is no remedy for the civilian.
I propose to accept the Minister's view that the areas that are prohibited areas are prohibited for the protection of the people of the country. I do not agree with the Deputy's contention in regard to this Bill. On this particular section here, as I understand it—and I have been following it very closely, and following the efforts of the Deputy to make his points—I am satisfied that in voting for this Bill there is no danger to the community. On the contrary, there is protection to the community. There is no danger of the officers of the Army being in the main drunk.
In the main!
Yes, in the main, or the greater number of them being drunk. It may happen in every army that you may have one man, out of a large number, who may be irresponsible.
And we want to hit that fellow.
We had Bowen-Colthurst.
The Deputy wants to alter the whole thing; in fact, he wants the whole country to be put into a lunatic asylum because of what might arise through the irresponsibility of one maniac. He wants to put the whole Army into fetters because of that. That officer in the near future might be responsible for Deputy McGilligan's pet scheme, the Shannon scheme. The officer might be in that area, which might be described as a prohibited area, and the Deputy wants to put the officer in charge of the Shannon scheme in the position of saying to himself after an aeroplane has disregarded his signals: "I must not fire on that aeroplane, because somebody afterwards might take an action against me." Consequently the officer may allow the whole works at Ardnacrusha to be blown up.
