Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Bill, 1998: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Mr. O'Donoghue)

This short Bill amends the law contained in the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts, 1921 to 1997. The purpose is to expressly provide, subject to certain conditions, for amendment of an instrument which appoints a tribunal, incorporates terms of reference of the tribunal and applies the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts to the tribunal. The terms of reference of such tribunals are those which have been adopted by resolution of both Houses. Section 1 of the Act of 1921, with which the Bill is concerned, requires that prior to the making of an instrument which applies the Act, both Houses must have resolved that it is expedient that a tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance. The importance of the provisions contained in the Acts of 1921, as amended by Acts of 1979 and 1997, is that they give to a tribunal certain powers, rights and privileges that are vested in the High Court for evidential purposes.

Tribunals of inquiry are by their nature inquisitorial and, with the powers given to them, are in a position to thoroughly and properly investigate matters of urgent public importance. The powers of a tribunal of inquiry, to which the Act of 1921 is applied, are unique in the Irish legal system. These include the power to enforce the attendance of witnesses, whom the tribunal may examine under oath, and to compel the production of documents. If any person summoned as a witness fails to attend or answer any questions or produce documents the tribunal may certify the offence to the High Court. The court may inquire into the matter and if the person concerned is found guilty he or she may be punished in the same manner as if it were contempt of court.

Since the Act of 1921 the law in relation to tribunals has been developed not only by provisions in the Acts of 1979 and 1997 but also by the courts which have explained in various decisions that the presumptions providing for fair procedures and natural and constitutional justice apply to the procedures before tribunals of inquiry. The overriding concern in relation to tribunals is to ensure that appropriate procedures apply to enable justice to be done to parties before those tribunals.

On a number of occasions in this House in recent times various views have been put forward as to whether the terms of reference of a tribunal, established pursuant to a Resolution of both Houses and to which the Tribunals of Inquiry Acts apply, can be amended. The view of Members of the Government side has been that once a tribunal is established, it should be allowed to proceed with certainty in the knowledge that its terms of reference will not be changed. If otherwise, the obvious danger is that persons who have co-operated with the tribunal on the basis of the established terms of reference may find their position prejudiced under any proposed new terms of reference. A change in terms of reference, without safeguards, could jeopardise the operation of a tribunal.

Much has been made in previous debates in the House of the words in section 1 of the Act of 1921 which provide that "the instrument by which the Tribunal is appointed or any instrument supplemental thereto may provide that this Act shall apply". The advice available to the Government is that the particular words "any instrument supplemental thereto" do not bestow a power of amendment of the original instrument and that rather what is envisaged by those words is that the original instrument may contain the terms of reference of a tribunal and the appointment of one or more members of the tribunal but the original instrument would be silent as to the application of the Act of 1921.

The purpose of a supplemental instrument apply the Act to a tribunal subsequent to its establishment. This view is supported by the reference in the first line of section 1 of the 1921 Act where it states: "Where it has been resolved (whether before or after the commencement of this Act).". This clearly envisaged the setting up of a tribunal prior to the coming into force of the Act to which the panoply of powers contained in the 1921 Act could be applied. Accordingly, if an instrument existed by which such a tribunal had been appointed, a further instrument — an instrument supplemental thereto — can further provide that the 1921 Act may apply to it. The supplementary instrument is merely a supplemental instrument to apply the 1921 Act and the powers of enforcement which that Act imports. It further contemplates the making of an instrument without reference to the 1921 Act at a future date and an instrument supplemental thereto applying the 1921 Act to a tribunal already established.

It was previously suggested in this House, in a debate on 29 January, that since the law in Australia is the same as here, the Australian book entitled Royal Commissions and Boards of Inquiry: Some Legal and Procedural Aspects by Leonard Hallett should be authority for the view contained in it that the terms of reference of a tribunal can be amended. However, the excerpt cited from the book deals with the position in the State of Victoria in Australia where the Act of 1921 is not and never has been law.

In England, a Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry was set up to review the working of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921 — the Act which also applies here. That commission reported in 1966 but the report in question does not contemplate an amendment in the terms of reference of a tribunal.

When the Act of 1921 was framed it did not appear to envisage amendment of the terms of reference of a tribunal of inquiry or the instrument by which the tribunal is appointed. If the Act had envisaged such change it is reasonable to assume it would have expressly provided for any such amendment. It is the prudent and legislatively responsible course of action to create an express power to so amend and put the matter beyond doubt. Given the doubts surrounding the issue, surely it is prudent that the legislation should be amended to confer express power to amend.

There is an argument that tribunals are not established as such by the Act of 1921 but by a resolution of both Houses and the Act of 1921, in so far as its evidential provisions are concerned, is merely applied to such tribunals.

I am advised by the Attorney General that if the Houses were to pass a resolution with amending terms of reference, and a Minister of the Government were to make an instrument appointing a new tribunal and applying the Act of 1921 to the new terms of reference, the new instrument would not be an amending instrument but a distinct instrument with separate terms of reference, the effect of which would be the creation of another tribunal parallel to the original tribunal. In other words, the tribunals would be distinct entities, albeit with the same individual as chairperson.

This could not have been intended by section 1(1) of the Act of 1921 and would produce an absurd result, but because there is no express power of amendment of an instrument this would be the legal effect of passing new resolutions and making another instrument applying the Act of 1921. The new instrument would apply the Act to the new terms of reference only. The Bill addresses those legal or technical difficulties. The effect is not to create another tribunal but to simply allow for amendment of the instrument containing the original terms of reference.

The advice of the Attorney General, which reflects the consistent view of senior legal officers of the Attorney General's office expressed by them over the past ten years, and with which the Government agrees, is that primary legislation is necessary to properly deal with the matter by amending section 1 of the Act of 1921, expressly providing for amendment of terms of reference of an instrument appointing a tribunal and applying the Act to the tribunal. This view is supported in independent legal advices obtained by the Attorney General for the particular purpose of analysis of the request by the sole chairman of the tribunal of inquiry into certain planning matters for an amendment to the terms of reference which apply to that tribunal. Independent senior counsel opinion was not sought because the Attorney General or his advisers in the Attorney General's office had changed their minds or had doubts about the issue.

The urgency of resolving issues now, as proposed by the Bill that has been initiated, is that in the interim report of the tribunal of inquiry into certain planning matters, dated 26 February 1998, a request had been made by the sole member of the tribunal, Mr. Justice Flood, for amendment of its terms of reference. That tribunal was established following a resolution of both Houses in October 1997. The instrument establishing the tribunal provided that the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts shall apply to the tribunal.

The terms of reference of the tribunal include the following at paragraph A5: "In the event that the Tribunal in the course of its inquiries is made aware of any acts associated with the planning process committed on or after 20th June 1985 which may in its opinion amount to corruption, or which involve attempts to influence by threats or deception or inducement or otherwise to compromise the disinterested performance of public duties, it shall report on such acts and should in particular make recommendations as to the effectiveness and improvement of existing legislation governing corruption in the light of its inquiries".

The tribunal's interim report indicates, at paragraph 19, that a number of matters which are said to have occurred prior to 20 June 1985 have come to its attention and that it has been advised that evidence in relation to such matters is admissible if, and in so far as, it is relevant to matters which occurred after 20 June 1985. However, the tribunal considered that the fact that such a date had been specified in its terms of reference might give rise to a legal challenge which would inevitably delay proceedings. Consequently, notwithstanding its legal advice and to avoid any such legal challenge, the tribunal requested the Oireachtas to amend paragraph A5 by the deletion of the words "committed on or after the 20th June 1985".

This is the background to the Bill. I hope I have dealt sufficiently with the matter to enable the House to be informed about the complex issues involved. In the circumstances which have arisen it is the desire of the Government to clarify the position in relation to the question of amending terms of reference of tribunals to which the Acts of 1921 to 1997 apply.

I will now deal with the provisions of the Bill and explain how it is proposed that the law should operate in this area.

Section 1 inserts a new section 1A into the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. Subsection (1) of the new section 1A provides that an instrument to which the new section 1A applies shall be amended, pursuant to a resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas, subject to certain conditions which are specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the subsection. The conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) are that the tribunal has requested the amendment and is satisfied that such amendment would not prejudice the legal rights of any person who has co-operated with or provided information to the tribunal under its terms of reference.

Subsection (2) of new section 1A provides that, where an instrument to which the new section 1A applies is so amended, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, shall apply to the instrument as amended.

Subsection (3) provides that section 1A applies, in the case of a tribunal to which the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, is applied under existing section 1 thereof, to the instrument by which the tribunal is appointed. Section 2 of the Bill is standard and provides for the short title and collective citation.

The proposed new section 1A of the 1921 Act is obviously the core of the Bill and gives legislative effect to a number of principles in a coherent and structured way. First, it makes clear that an instrument by which a tribunal is appointed may only be amended following a further Resolution of the Houses of the Oireachtas. Second, it provides that the instrument by which the tribunal is appointed may be amended following such further resolution even if it was made prior to the enactment of this Bill. This clearly comprehends the current situation of the request from the Flood Tribunal but also takes into account any future requests which are of a similar nature. Third, it sets out clearly the conditions which must be satisfied prior to the initiation of this process.

The first condition, that the tribunal itself must have requested the amendment, ensures that when a tribunal sets about its task of publishing its terms of reference in newspapers, asking for information, considering whether information supplied is within its terms of reference, considering requests for representation and takes evidence, it will be able to proceed with some certainty in the knowledge that a change in its terms of reference would be rare and then only on the basis of its own initiative. Where it is contemplated that any change be made to terms of reference of a tribunal, the tribunal itself is best placed, given the facts already before it, to determine the nature of any such amendment.

The second condition, that the tribunal must satisfy itself that the amendment would not prejudice the legal rights of any person who has co-operated with or provided information to the tribunal under its terms of reference, is intended to ensure that the effect of the amendment of the terms of reference of the tribunal would not result in unfairness to any person who has co-operated with or supplied information to it.

The Government is satisfied the Bill represents a clear statutory framework on the position that should obtain where a tribunal, to which the Act of 1921 is applied, requests a change in its terms of reference. Where the Houses are asked to resolve that the amendment that is sought be granted and the full panoply of powers which the 1921 Act imports shall apply, they will do so on the basis of the law that is already contained in section 1 of the Act of 1921 which requires the Houses to resolve that the matter in issue is "a definite matter of urgent public importance" and they must have regard to the provisions contained in new section 1A.

The Bill, when enacted, can be applied to a sitting tribunal whether such tribunal is established before or after the passing of the Bill. It is important that the tribunals, and parties who co-operate with tribunals now and in the future, have a statutory framework on which to base their position. The Bill provides that necessary framework.

I commend the Bill to the House.

Mr. Higgins

(Mayo): This Bill is unnecessary, superfluous and restrictive. It is legally possible to change the terms of reference of a tribunal by resolution of the Oireachtas. Such a resolution would do exactly what Mr. Justice Flood requires. A similar resolution would also enable the investigation of the Ansbacher accounts. The Bill is not only unnecessary, it is also unwise in that retrospective legislation clearly opens the way for legal challenge.

The Bill is the product of three weeks of dithering and indecision by a fumbling Government. It would never have happened had the Government not received wrong legal advice from the Attorney General. I hope the Attorney General was not trying to please his political masters by giving them legal advice simply because he knew it was what they wanted to hear.

This Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrats Government has firmly set its fact against establishing and revealing the identity of Ansbacher account holders who may have been involved in illegal money transactions, mainly for the purpose of avoiding tax. For some reason, best known to itself, the Government does not want the identities of the Ansbacher depositors revealed or established.

In adopting such a negative and retrenchant attitude, the Government is badly misreading the public mood, which is for a thorough investigation of Ansbacher. The Ansbacher auditors expressed major concerns about a certain number of transactions. McCracken made a distinct and pointed reference to this. The public wants to know; last week's Supreme Court decision means the public is entitled to know. The Supreme Court judgment is very welcome because, as with the National Irish Bank fiasco, the public's right to know must take precedence over the so-called right to anonymity of those depositors who collectively owned £38 million which was operated under codes similar to the S.8 and S.9 accounts set up to facilitate the financial transactions of Mr. Charles Haughey.

All one has to do is to read through the tangled web of events which occurred between the setting up of the Guinness Mahon Cayman Trust in February 1971 and the massive transfer of deposits once the Moriarty tribunal was established in 1997 to realise the extent and intent of the whole Ansbacher operation. However, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, who pontificated daily in Opposition about zero tolerance of crime, seems to have a total blind spot when it comes to facing up to the reality of white collar crime.

The shunting of money from bank to bank and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for tax evasion purposes can be dressed up any way one likes but it is white collar crime. It must be treated as such, investigated and stamped out. It should be investigated by the Moriarty tribunal. There is no reason the terms of reference of the Moriarty tribunal cannot be extended and amended now to enable it to so do. The Supreme Court judgment last week is a clear insistence on the precedence of the public right to know over privacy and personal identity.

It is particularly interesting to watch the tactical manoeuvres of the Government as it seeks to duck its responsibility. The Minister for Finance, Deputy McCreevy, told the Dáil on 20 January, "Once a resolution has passed both Houses of the Oireachtas, and once an order is made appointing the tribunal under specific terms of reference, the power to amend the order does not exist in legislation". That statement was untrue. Has it not been torn to shreds by Mr. Justice Flood, chairman of the planning tribunal, who himself sought an extension of the commencement date of his inquiries to before 20 June 1985? Here, we have a High Court judge making a simple request to the Government to broaden the scope of his investigations, without any reference to the need for legislation to so do.

The Government, knowing that its legal advice was wrong, still clung to the wreckage and decided, nevertheless, that it would go the legislative route to protect itself and its Attorney General. Not alone that but it tried to pull the cloak of protection around itself by involving the former Attorney General, Mr. Dermot Gleeson. The Minister for the Environment and Local Government, Deputy Dempsey, went on record as saying that Mr. Gleeson had given the same advice to Deputy John Bruton when he was Taoiseach. That was wrong. The Taoiseach repeated the falsehood by asserting, "Deputy Bruton had the same advice from Mr. Dermot Gleeson when he was Attorney General".

I spoke to Mr. Gleeson about these allegations and he is clear that he never gave such advice. He was never asked by the previous Government as to whether it was possible to extend the terms of reference of a tribunal after it is established. Indeed, Mr. Gleeson asserted that the Finlay tribunal could go back to the Dáil after 20 days and seek a change of terms. The Taoiseach should correct the record of the House.

Given it is so adept at U-turns, it is strange that the Government has failed or refused to do an about turn on this issue. It continues to dig itself deeper into the hole. Officials of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform were asked to draw up the legislative amendment with officials of the Office of the Attorney General. In the course of their consultations — this is well chronicled — it transpired that the amendment might not be necessary. It is not necessary. Yet the Government refused to concede and put two legislative options to the Cabinet, one of which is before us in the form of this Bill.

Apart from being unnecessary, the effect of the Bill is to restrict and not to extend or expand the scope of what can be done by tribunals. It provides that any request for an extension of the terms of reference must come from the tribunal itself. This is wrong because it precludes the Dáil, the Seanad or the Government from requesting an amendment of the terms. The initiating agency for all tribunals, the Oireachtas, the elected assembly of the people, will be unable to initiate a change in the terms of reference once a tribunal has been established. This is wrong. The Government or the Oireachtas should be enabled to seek a change to the terms of reference. Of course the agreement of the chairman of the tribunal would be of paramount importance in seeking to achieve this. However, this Bill is designed to thwart the right of the Oireachtas in this regard.

The Government purports to be the guardian of the public good. It hid behind the legal advice of the Attorney General by stubbornly insisting that the terms of reference could not be changed and that Ansbacher could, therefore, not be investigated. That fig leaf was removed by Mr. Justice Flood's request. The Government then discovered that a new Bill might not be necessary, yet it is not only proceeding on this basis but is intent on introducing a measure which is deliberately designed and intended to ensure that the Moriarty tribunal is prevented from ascertaining the identities of the Ansbacher depositors.

In trying to defend its insistence that the changing of the terms of reference can only occur on foot of a direct request by the chairman of the tribunal, the Taoiseach and the Government point to the fact that there are no requests from judges, as the Taoiseach puts it, "dealing with other tribunals. " Did anybody from the Government ask Mr. Justice Moriarty if he was agreeable to an extension of the terms of reference of his tribunal?

It is extraordinary that the McCracken tribunal should have discovered the existence of this huge hoard of money, should comment on exchange control breaches in definitive terms and should talk in forthright terms about a so called ingenious system which allowed Ansbacher account holders to hold their money offshore. Yet neither the Attorney General nor any representative or official of Government would appear to have been willing to approach the tribunal which is investigating one of the major Ansbacher depositors and ask if the chair considers that Ansbacher should be investigated by him. Surely there is a duty on the Government to do so. In the same way as Mr. Justice Flood considers it necessary to probe into areas beyond the original terms of reference of his tribunal, Mr. Justice Moriarty may find it desirable and appropriate to establish the identify of the Ansbacher depositors.

While the Government may try to evade its responsibilities in the Ansbacher affair it should face the fact that Ansbacher must be investigated now or at an early stage. Now is the time to establish the facts and clear the decks once and for all. Not revealing the names means that these people cannot be pursued by the Revenue Commissioners for the income tax they owe and which they have evaded and avoided. The Government knows that the Finance Act, 1983, makes it clear that the Revenue Commissioners cannot investigate such deposits unless the names of depositors are supplied. By refusing to go after Ansbacher and the Ansbacher names, the Government is frustrating the Revenue Commissioners from getting at the facts. In addition, by failing to face up to its responsibility, it is fuelling an ongoing public suspicion about the extent of its determination to root out fraud, corruption and tax evasion.

This perception is strengthened by the flippant language and approach taken by the Minister for Finance in dealing with the recent revelations that Irish registered non-resident companies are being used for tax avoidance. Some of the cash involved derives from the proceeds of fraud, money laundering and Russian Mafia activities. It also involves multinationals determined to avoid taxation in the US. Yet the Minister appears to have trivialised this serious situation in the rather dissuasive terms of "all this fuss and recent commentaries" while blaming the media and Opposition for "making such allegations" and "making political capital". The Minister's recent comments on National Irish Bank amount to saying they are all at it and that we all know this has been ongoing for a long period of time. How can the public have any confidence in the Minister's bland assurance that there is no place for what he calls "these undesirables" in the companies register of this State when he and the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment fly in the face of the advice of the legal section of her Department to the effect that all registered non resident companies should be abolished without exception? Both she and the Minister for Finance have rowed back from that.

Accountancy firms secured revenues of approximately £40 million by facilitating 40,000 companies in moving £20 billion laundered through the Irish economy without a penny accruing to the economy by way of benefit. Is it any wonder that the average income taxpayer is angry when the Department of Finance recently published a survey of income tax paid by high earners showing that 8.5 per cent of those earning over £250,000 paid no income tax because of accounting ingenuity and that a further 21 per cent of high earners paid tax at a rate below 25 per cent? The Government is sitting on an equality time bomb and unless there is decisive action to cut deep and root out unhealthy elements and practices in our commercial and financial structures it will explode.

The Minister said the Attorney General advised that the Opposition proposals could not be met because it is not possible to have anybody other than the chairman of a tribunal investigate a move for a change in the terms of reference. Yet the same Attorney General had to seek independent legal advice and discovered in the course of deliberations with officials of the Minister's Department that it is possible to do what we seek on this side of the House. What independent advice was given to the Attorney General and the Government after they discovered they had gone up a cul-de-sac on this issue?

This legislation is restrictive. It is deliberately designed to ensure that salient facts in relation to other controversies and scandals are not got at. In bringing forward an amendment to the terms of reference by way of resolution in this House, there is no intention of prejudicing the rights of third parties who co-operate with the tribunal. That can and must be provided for in terms of any resolution before this House, just as the Minister is providing for it by way of legislation here.

The Minister makes the point that one of the merits of setting up a tribunal that has a beginning and an end is that one can advertise in the public media, seek information from the public or interested parties, and build up a portfolio. Presumably, in the wake of the move to facilitate the request from Mr. Justice Flood that this also will be done and the fact that the date has now been extended prior to 20 June 1985 will have to be advertised in the public press. Likewise, if a simple resolution of this House was used as the mechanism to extend terms of reference beyond what was originally decided by this House, it would be possible to put an advertisement in the paper notifying the public that this had been done and seeking information under the remit and within the scope of the new terms of reference.

The Government has set its mind against this measure that we on this side of the House want — doing this by way of resolution of the House. If this Bill passes Second Stage, this side of the House will introduce an amendment — and it will be interesting to hear the Minister's defence in Committee — to ensure that the rights of the Oireachtas are respected, that the Oireachtas, as the initiating body, the instituting instrument will have a right, as the elected representatives of the people, to come back here and collectively decide that the terms of reference of the tribunal can be extended in certain circumstances, provided the consent of the chairman of the tribunal is sought. If the Government in its wisdom thinks the terms of reference should be changed, it should be able to put forward a resolution to amend the terms of reference, in consultation with the chairman. That is what we seek and we will settle for nothing less.

Dr. Upton

The Bill before the House is unnecessary, unwarranted and an attack on the democratic powers of the Oireachtas. Its sole purpose is to paper over the shamefaced refusal of this Government to widen the terms of reference of the Moriarty tribunal. The fact that this Government will use every trick in the book to deny an independent, judicial inquiry into the £38 million salted away in the Ansbacher accounts is well documented, but today's initiative represents a new low in this saga, even by this Government's standards.

The Government now intends to limit the powers of Dáil Éireann and, by extension, the powers of the citizens of this country, in an attempt to cover their tracks on the Ansbacher accounts. This course of action is an insult to the House, to the citizens and the chairmen and staff of the tribunals of inquiry currently under way.

I will briefly recap the course of events that have led to the proposal of this undemocratic and unnecessary legislation. This Government voted down a Labour Party amendment to the original terms of reference of the Moriarty inquiry, which would have empowered the tribunal to fully investigate the Ansbacher accounts. The Government subsequently voted down an Opposition motion seeking to extend the terms of reference of the Moriarty tribunal. The Government attempted to justify this action by citing unspecified legal advice that has never been brought into the public domain, and this despite the fact that the primary legislation governing the establishment and conduct of tribunals of inquiry, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, seems specifically to recognise the possibility of amending the terms of reference of an established tribunal by way of Dáil resolution. The 1921 Act refers to "the instrument by which the tribunal is appointed or any instrument supplemental thereto". The only reason a supplemental instrument could be required would be to amend by addition, variation or repeal, the terms of the original instrument.

Despite the massive public concern over the Ansbacher accounts and the public demand that these accounts be fully and publicly investigated, the Government stoutly refused to accede to this request. Its reasons for doing so remain unclear. This buttoned lip approach to the Ansbacher accounts and indeed the wider question of how we establish and conduct tribunals of inquiry was a disgrace and an affront to the democratic process.

The Government may have believed it had heard the last of this matter in January and could be content that it had successfully managed to sweep it under the carpet. However, its strategy was again thrown into crisis on foot of a request by Mr. Justice Flood to extend the terms of his inquiry into certain planning matters. I am convinced that when Mr. Justice Flood made his request to extend the terms of reference of the planning tribunal, he was expecting the necessary resolution of the House to be made under the terms of the 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act. I do not believe Mr. Justice Flood requested that new legislation should be drafted. Neither do I believe that Mr. Justice Flood expected his reasonable request to be used to restrict the powers of the Oireachtas to set the parameters for the conduct of all future tribunals. However, if the Government were to accede to Mr. Justice Flood's request, it would expose its stance on the amendment to the terms of the Moriarty tribunal's terms of reference.

Mr. Justice Flood published his interim report on 26 February. It is quite obvious that the planning tribunal has serious grounds for believing that certain events committed before 20 June 1985 must be investigated in the public interest. The Cabinet discussed this request at a meeting of 3 March, and the events that have followed since that meeting give rise to extremely serious questions that go to the heart of our democratic process. At best the Government's attitude to this matter can be described as incompetent, and at worst as downright dishonest and disingenuous.

Debate adjourned.

Dáil Éireann debate - Thursday, 26 Mar 1998