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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 27 May 2004

Vol. 586 No. 4

Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) (Amendment) Bill 2004: Second Stage.

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

As Members will be aware this House will be asked shortly to initiate a process to deal with a matter of the highest national importance. I refer to the solemn responsibility placed by the Constitution on Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann in regard to the possibility of the removal of a judge from office in accordance with Article 35.4 of the Constitution. It is proposed that motions to initiate that process will be brought forward next week. In the meantime, the Government, acting on its legal advice, has introduced this Bill to facilitate whatever procedures the Houses decide to put in place to enable them to discharge that responsibility.

This Bill provides a power that will be available on any future occasion that the Houses of the Oireachtas may be called upon to contemplate the removal of a judge, of which I hope there will not be many.

Under its provisions, a judge may be compelled to appear before and provide evidence to any committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas that may be set up in connection with the exercise by the Houses of the power provided in Article 35.4 of the Constitution. Mindful of the importance of preserving the independence of the Judiciary, the power to compel a judge proposed by this Bill is framed very narrowly and specifically.

It relates only to circumstances where the removal of a judge, pursuant to Article 35.4 of the Constitution, is being contemplated. It also relates only to a judge who is the subject of such a process. It is inconceivable that the Houses of the Oireachtas should embark on such a solemn process without having the capacity to require the judge to assist them in that process. In all other circumstances, the exemption from compellability for judges in their capacity as judges will remain. The independence of judges in the exercise of their judicial functions is not compromised by this measure.

It is proposed to amend the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 by inserting a new section, section 3A, after section 3 of that Act. Paragraph (a) of the new section 3A provides that section 3 of the 1997 Act shall, notwithstanding section 3 (4) and (11) of the 1997 Act, apply to a judge where a committee is established for the purpose of a matter arising under: (i) section 4 of Article 35 of the Constitution; (ii) section 39 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924; or (iii) section 20 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act 1946.

Paragraph (b) of the new section 3A clarifies that a “committee”, as defined in the 1997 Act, which is established in connection with the behaviour or capacity of a judge, means a committee established before or after the enactment of the Bill. The paragraph also clarifies that such a committee may deal with the behaviour or capacity of a judge whether the behaviour or capacity in question occurred or occurs before or after the enactment of this Bill.

When the Bill is enacted, a committee, established to consider the possible removal from office of a judge, will have the power to direct a judge to attend before it, to give evidence and to produce any document in his or her possession or power as directed by the committee.

This is merely an enabling power. It is a matter for decision by any such committee as to whether it wishes to invoke the power, following the procedures laid down in the 1997 Act, which requires among other matters, the prior consent of the appropriate subcommittee.

Deputies will also be aware that the "appropriate subcommittee" referred to in section 3A is defined in the 1997 Act. Where a committee appointed by either House of the Oireachtas or a subcommittee of such a committee is seeking powers of compellability, the necessary consent is given by a subcommittee of the Committee on Procedure and Privileges of that House. Where the committee in question is appointed jointly by both Houses of the Oireachtas, the consent must be given by a subcommittee appointed jointly by the Committee on Procedure and Privileges of each House.

Under the existing legislation, a committee already has these powers in respect of other potential witnesses. The issue of compellability is only one component, but an essential one, of a framework in which a committee of the Oireachtas can effectively carry out its functions in regard to a process of this kind.

I commend the Bill as an essential component in a framework under which the Oireachtas can, when necessary, effectively discharge its duty on foot of Article 35.4 of the Constitution, by providing it with the power to call all witnesses who have pertinent information, and also to obtain all relevant documentation and material.

My focus and that of the Fine Gael Party since the Judge Curtin controversy blew up, has been twofold; first, to ensure confidence is retained in the Judiciary and, second, to ensure fair process will apply in any dealings with Judge Curtin, or any judge facing removal under Article 35 of the Constitution.

In addressing the legislation before the House, to some extent we have to take the Government at face value. It now says an amendment to the compellability legislation is required in the context of the Oireachtas discharging its functions under section 35 of the Constitution.

I do not oppose the legislation on the basis that the Government, which has unlimited legal resources, knows exactly what it is doing and has thought through the process. I also accept it on the basis that the Government must accept full and complete responsibility for the process it has initiated and the legislative and other procedures now proposed.

Two points arise in connection with the timing. It was clear when the Judge Curtin controversy blew up that we were operating in a legislative and procedural vacuum. We must ask why? The Sheedy case occurred five years ago. This problem was recognised by the Government on its formation two years ago, when it gave a solemn commitment to legislate to provide effective remedies for complaints about judicial misbehaviour. Nothing has been done due to incompetence on the part of the Government. This is all the more serious in view of the weighty constitutional matter of how to deal with the Judiciary.

We are being asked today to rush two legislative measures through both Houses of the Oireachtas. What is the rush? I thought there would be an explanation for this. I spent two hours with the Attorney General on Wednesday, 19 May. I raised with him the question of the need for legislation and was assured it was not necessary; that what was proposed was a motion to be put before the House under Article 35 of the Constitution. On Tuesday of this week I was advised by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Deputy McDowell, that one item of legislation would be required in addition to two motions. Yesterday at 5 p.m., the Minister of State, Deputy Hanafin, informed me that a second item of legislation would be required. In seven days we went from no legislation and one motion to two items of legislation and two motions. There is an old saying, "More haste, less speed", in the part of the country I represent.

In many ways the Government reminds me of a group that embarked on a journey while, in political terms, trying to give an impression of strength and assertiveness. It embarked on the journey in a rusty old van without checking whether there was enough fuel in the tank, whether there were headlamps to illuminate the darkness and, apparently, without brakes to enable it to slow down or stop when required. There have already been two breakdowns or pitstops to make emergency repairs. My view, which I hope is constructive, on behalf of the main Opposition party, in dealing with matters of such grave constitutional import, is that it is better to do it right than to do it quickly. I know of no reason for this rush to judgment.

I said that I will not oppose the legislation. However, I have considerable concerns about it. These concerns are in no way assuaged by the record of the Government to date in dealing with this issue in general and in dealing with the controversy since it erupted some weeks ago. Essentially, the substance of the legislation is that it will make a judge, about whom a removal motion is tabled under Article 35, amenable to a committee of the Oireachtas. That judge will be compelled to attend before the Oireachtas. Under the section, it is not just a question of attending before the Oireachtas because the committee will be able to direct in writing a person's attendance and it will also be able to direct that person to produce to it any documents in his or her possession. In addition, it will be able to issue such further directions it considers reasonable in the circumstances.

Will a question not arise as to why a judge should be required to produce documents or other evidence? Will the judge not ask how such a request stands with the issue of self-incrimination or what consideration has been given to the right to silence? Under our law, a person cannot be forced to answer questions which could lead to self-incrimination. The American equivalent is the fifth amendment. That a person cannot be placed in a position to incriminate himself or herself is one of the unenumerated fundamental rights that exists under our Constitution. Irish law is clear in this regard. Have matters been fully teased out in what the Government is proposing in this rushed legislation?

There are precedents in cases under the European Convention on Human Rights. I refer to the Saunders case in the UK, involving an employee of Guinness, the Quinn case in Ireland, taken under the Offences against the State Act, and the Fulk case in Austria. Have these authorities been checked in terms of what is being proposed here?

There is also the question as to whether one can confer powers which enable compellability to be exercised in respect of actions or events which preceded the existence of the power to compel. I refer here to retrospection. Is it possible to provide or exercise new powers in respect of events which occurred in the past? Has this matter been considered and, if so, what is the position in respect of it?

Are we, in effect, changing the conditions of employment of judges? Has this matter been looked at? Under the Constitution, security of tenure is provided and goes to the basis of the independence of the Judiciary. Are we now providing a power to a committee of the Oireachtas that will change those conditions? Will it apply to existing judges or only to new judges? Does a question mark hang over matters in this regard?

There is also the matter of privilege. I would have thought that this would also have been dealt with. What is the position regarding the privilege of the judge? As I understand it, under the 1997 Act there is a difference between a person voluntarily attending and a person compelled to attend. Is it because of that distinction that we are dealing with this legislation or is it because of questions raised about the admissibility of certain evidence to be brought before the committee?

The House deserves a more detailed explanation with regard to this legislation. I am not pointing the finger of blame at the Minister of State, Deputy Hanafin. This matter is the responsibility of the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Attorney General. The House deserves more than having an item of legislation put before it without answers to the questions I have raised being provided. The public also deserves more. We are dealing with such fundamental issues, as far as the Constitution is concerned, that the wisdom of this unseemly haste must be questioned. I do not believe the Government is taking a wise approach. I would have much preferred to see a full Bill dealing, as promised, with the issue of misbehaviour by judges and judges in general come before the House. I would also have preferred to see such legislation emerge without the current controversy intruding upon it.

Has full consideration been given to all the issues? In the past seven days the Government has lurched from one crisis to another and, as a consequence, we are being presented with legislation on the hoof. My experience is that such legislation generally tends to be bad legislation.

The purpose of the Bill appears to be to place a member of the Judiciary in the same position as any other citizen as regards attendance before a committee. It can, in one sense, be presented in that fashion but I am not sure it will achieve that purpose. In effect, we are talking about putting a judge in a situation only when he is facing a charge or a situation where removal under Article 35 is under consideration. If, under the 1997 Act, that judge fails to comply with a direction under Article 3 in this situation, he or she is guilty of an offence. Such an offence gives rise to a situation where, on summary conviction, the judge can be fined up to £1,500 or imprisoned for 12 months. On indictment, the fine rises to £20,000 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years. That is a serious power we are invoking, in statutory terms, and it requires further consideration. No other person would be placed in that position because there is no other person against or about whom a removal motion can be tabled under Article 35.4 of the Constitution.

I will conclude as I began by saying that I am not opposing the legislation because the Government is seeking it on the basis that the Oireachtas needs it. However, I have major concerns about some of the provisions it contains and some of the consequences to which it might give rise. I am also concerned about other aspects of this matter, such as those relating to the admissibility of evidence, in general, to any committee that we might establish. It is not in the interests of the people, the House or justice that we should rush with unseemly haste to place a bung in the hole as soon as we see it without recognising what could be the consequences and that further damage could be caused.

It is with reluctance that I go along with what is proposed today. I do so on the basis that the Government must accept complete responsibility for the consequences of its actions here and for any difficulties that may arise as a result of its hasty actions and legislation.

I will start at the point where Deputy O'Keeffe ended regarding the manner with which we are dealing with the issues today. It is always unsatisfactory to deal with legislation in a restricted period of time. It is particularly careless to deal with all Stages of two such Bills on the same day in both Houses of the Oireachtas.

I hope the legislation being put through today will be without flaw and will stand the test of time. However, the track record is that difficulties arise in such instances. This legislation has not had a great preamble. Initially we were told all that was required to deal with the matter was a single motion. Then we were told we needed two motions and following this that we would need some form of enabling legislation. We have gone from one motion to two motions and from no Bill to one and then two Bills.

The proposed method of dealing with the issue has been very much something of an ad hoc process over recent weeks. If this type of stumbling approach pertains, flaws none of us has perceived may still remain. In her reply the Minister of State should give us the benefit of her thoughts on why this legislation must be put through so quickly without opportunity for reflection between the different Stages or the different Bills.

However, this Bill is welcome as a desirable general measure which is not limited to a particular case. It fills the gap in the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997. That Act had a general exemption for judges which was far too wide. In cases of impeachment there should be provision for compellability of judges. We should acknowledge also that privilege is an interesting follow on of compellability.

Although the process has been flawed to date, I welcome the opportunity it provided for consultation in drafting legislation, an opportunity the Labour Party availed of. Our concern was that the original draft applied only to removal of a judge under Article 35.4 of the Constitution, which only applies to High Court and Supreme Court judges. We suggested to the Government that the legislation be extended to cover the Courts of Justice Act 1924, which covers Circuit Court judges, and to the legislation which applies to District Court judges, the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act 1946. After the extensive consultation yesterday between the Labour Party and the Government we welcome the Government's acceptance of our point and its adjustment of the draft of the Bill to include the statutory provisions relating to Circuit Court and District Court judges. It would cause considerable embarrassment if the only reference in this legislation was to Article 35.4 of the Constitution, particularly as the specific purpose of this legislation, as well as its general intent, is to cover a measure relating to a judge of a lower court.

We note that the judges of the Special Criminal Court are not covered by this legislation. I presume that is because they are removed in such circumstances by Government decision and not by the Oireachtas. There is therefore no necessity for a committee of inquiry in such a situation. However, this is another example of the distinctions that exist between statutory provisions, the constitutional provision and the entitlement of the Government to act in the removal in a particular category.

We are also conscious that notwithstanding this Bill some exemptions as to compellability will remain in law, particularly the exemption for the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions. In the event of any motion of impeachment being proposed and a committee being established, it would be vital that the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions provide full co-operation to the committee so that the absence of compellability would not arise as a problem. This is a considerable concern.

The Minister of State towards the end of her address said:

I commend the Bill as an essential component in a framework under which the Oireachtas can, when necessary, effectively discharge its duty on foot of Article 35.4 of the Constitution, by providing it with the power to call all witnesses who have pertinent information, and also to obtain all relevant documentation and material.

This is the intent of the Bill. However, a situation might arise where it would be pertinent to call the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions as witnesses. It would be expected that they would come voluntarily, nevertheless we should reserve the entitlement to return and amend the legislation in this respect. I hope, this is a problem that will not arise. However, if it does, it must be addressed. Nobody can be above the law.

It is also important that any committee dealing with impeachment should keep the scope of its compellability powers under review so that in the event of a problem arising the matter would return to the Oireachtas for consideration as to whether further amending legislation was required. In this area the draft motion, as envisaged, could be amended to ensure that if an issue, obstacle or problem arises which needs addressing by legislation, the committee can return the legislation to the Dáil or Seanad for amendment. It would be appropriate to deal with this issue also.

Let us examine the various methods by which impeachment can take place. The constitutional entitlement to impeach refers only to High Court and Supreme Court judges. The 1924 Act refers to Circuit Court judges and the 1946 Act refers to District Court judges. We also have the authority of the Government to remove Special Criminal Court judges. These various methods cause something of an anomaly and confusion on how to deal with what might be regarded as gross misbehaviour on the bench.

It is time to consolidate the legislation into some Act which will cover the scope of what is required. This would mean we would probably need separate legislation from the proposed judicial conduct and ethics Bill. We are not just talking about the normal range of misconduct and guidelines for ethics etc, but about an impeachment process. We are therefore talking about two Bills which need to be put in place in the near future. I hope legislation which will incorporate all levels of the Judiciary will be put in place at an early stage.

The judicial conduct and ethics Bill, to which Deputy Quinn referred on the Order of Business, was promised for this year.

I will refer to what has been promised regarding that Bill and to its purpose. I was glad to hear the Tánaiste say she envisaged it would be published in 2004, but from memory I recall it was promised in 2003 and in 2002. We remember the debacle in 2001 when the botched constitutional referendum was introduced by the then Minister responsible, Deputy O'Donoghue, which clouded the scene. I hope there is an intent in respect of that Bill to address this area. There has always been a reluctance on the part of the Executive to engage in any fashion with the Judiciary in terms of procedures in legislation that would direct and regulate the behaviour of the Judiciary because of the separation of powers. It is time to grasp that particular nettle. This Bill proposes to provide effective remedies for complaints about judicial misbehaviour, including lay participation in the investigation of the complaints.

All of us will be aware that from time to time judicial behaviour can be something of an embarrassment in terms of remarks made by judges. There are no guidelines, structures or induction process for a person who becomes a judge. A person who sits in the Bar Library or a legal practitioner in the Law Library may suddenly be appointed to the Bench. Such a person would move from a position where he or she pleads a case for or against a client in a manner that advocates as strongly as possible a particular position, to suddenly becoming like Solomon sitting on the Bench and operating in an impartial fashion. There are no rules laid down for that and there is no induction process. We cannot accept any longer that we can operate in this fashion without professional standards and regulations and a code of conduct clearly outlined as to how we will move from the point of appointing a judge to that judge operating in the fairest and best way possible. From that point of view, the introduction of the judicial conduct and ethics Bill is most important.

Together with that legislation, we also require the putting in place of procedures on judicial appointments, in respect of which I do not know if legislation will be required. There is an anomaly whereby, on the one hand, there is a separation of powers among the Executive, the Houses of the Oireachtas and the Judiciary and, on the other, there is a cosy arrangement whereby virtually all those appointed to the Judiciary are members of one political party or another.

Including the Deputy's party.

Including all parties. There is no doubt there is a certain political element to judicial appointments. We all hear of cases of lobbying in the Bar and so on. If there is to be a proper separation of powers, we must have an independent judicial appointments structure. A Government should not appoint a person to the Judiciary on the basis of what seems to be a political capacity. I have no doubt that judicial appointments in the vast majority of cases are persons of the highest calibre. Nevertheless, all practices should be transparent and we should put in place the necessary structures to ensure they are because currently that is not the case.

In terms of this legislation, no citizen is above the law. If we are to promote justice in a meaningful fashion, nobody should have the right to choose to appear before a tribunal or in this case, impeachment proceedings, on a voluntary basis. Justice and the issues involved are too important for us not to have in place procedures on compellability that ensure every citizen is treated equally before the law in that regard.

I wish to share my time with Deputies Boyle and Ó Snodaigh.

Is that agreed? Agreed.

As members of the Technical Group we are a little disorganised and have not yet quite sorted ourselves out, a little like this legislation, which we welcome. I received this Bill this morning and have had little chance to look at it. I am informed it must be passed by 1.30 p.m. The Bill deals with a serious issue which must be addressed. Members of the public must be placated to some extent regarding this issue. We have extended the sittings in a week by a day on numerous occasions during the lifetime of this Dáil. I would have thought this would be a suitable occasion to devote a full day to debating this Bill tomorrow and not to have to rush it through today. We have to quickly put forward our views on it and it is likely to be subject to some form of constitutional challenge. We are expected to give in a matter of minutes expert opinion on it. We only received the Bill this morning and it is dangerous to rush it through these Houses.

Members of the public are outraged that the case against Judge Curtin was lost on a technicality. It appears there was a good deal of bungling in that regard. Effectively, in the eyes of members of the public, Judge Curtin is still innocent. I did not see Judge Curtin specifically mentioned in the Bill, therefore it will apply to people across the board. It will apply to gardaí and to people who are innocent who can be brought before committees of the Oireachtas. We are threading a fine line in terms of impinging on people's constitutional rights and as to whether an innocent person should be brought before an Oireachtas committee. It would be much more preferable to allow time for reflection and proper debate on this Bill by extending the sittings this week by one day. Members of the public will not be pleased when they learn Members were presented with the Bill this morning, that they have had only a few minutes to look at it — I do not fully understand it — and are being asked to pass intelligent comment on it. It is quite difficult to do so.

The Bill provides that the Oireachtas may direct any person to attend before a committee. That is a wide-ranging and dangerous provision. Everyone knows the reason we are passing this legislation at this point in time. It has to do with the Judge Curtin case. The Bill also provides that the Oireachtas may direct a person in attendance before a committee to produce to the committee any document. It is desirable in the case in question that people can be compelled to produce documents. People will link this legislation to the Judge Curtin case. At this point such a provision is desirable, but in the long term and when the Judge Curtin case is long past, I do not know how desirable it will be to have such a provision inserted in legislation.

The Bill provides that the Oireachtas may also direct in writing any person to send to the committee any document in his or her possession. This is a serious provision. There is no difficulty with linking that provision to the case in question. Everybody would want legislation rushed through to deal with a difficult position but in the longer term such legislation could have dangerous consequences. The Bill also provides that the Oireachtas may direct in writing any person to make discovery on oath of any documents that are or have been in that person's possession. This provision is highly desirable at this point in time but in the long term it could have severe implications for people's constitutional rights

Section 3(1) of the 1997 Act states that a committee may "give any other directions for the purpose of the proceedings concerned that appear to the committee to be reasonable and just." We know what we consider to be "reasonable and just", but a committee may have a different interpretation. This is what happens when laws are rushed through. When this case has been dealt with, we will have to consider the future implications of the legislation.

We are told that hard cases lead to bad law, but there is a danger today that the House will create bad law to justify hard cases. Such a danger always exists when legislation is rushed in reaction to specific instances. Emergency legislation has been introduced half a dozen times in this Dáil in a political response to various court decisions and other activities outside the House. Such legislation could and should have been the subject of more consideration. The Green Party will not oppose this Bill, although our instinct is to oppose it because of our belief in certain principles. Not only are we opposed to the haste with which the Bill is being brought forward, but we have concerns about the fact that an important issue is once more being addressed in a piecemeal fashion with a Bill that needs wider consideration and amendment.

Although issues of judicial misconduct and incapacity have existed since the Sheedy case, the House has failed to introduce legislation to address properly such problems. The power of Oireachtas committees to act effectively in respect of compellability has been compromised since the court decision on the Abbeylara sub-committee, but no legislation has been proposed for the consideration and approval of the House. The Government's failure of management has to be seen as a factor in the way we are rushing this Bill and the Bill we will consider this afternoon. It is only fair, therefore, to state the Green Party's concerns and fears that such an approach will not be successful in the end. As regards the wider issues of judicial misconduct and incapacity, the House has yet to debate in detail the crying need for legislation to address areas such as induction and ongoing training of the Judiciary.

The principle of separation of the Government, the Legislature and the Judiciary is a sound one in any democracy, and we should be slow to allow it to be compromised in any way. As we embark on an unnecessary and dangerous constitutional referendum on citizenship, we need to ask why a more important and necessary constitutional consideration — the relationship between the Judiciary and the political system — has not been addressed. My party argues that the constitutional provision being discussed with this Bill should continue to apply to judges and justices of the High Court and the Supreme Court. If we have a proper Bill and a proper constitutional amendment, it will be much easier to deal with future cases involving District Court and Circuit Court judges. We should examine the constitutional implications of such a measure. We are choosing not to pursue such a consideration because we prefer to proceed in such a rushed manner.

The power of the House to address public interest issues would be taken more seriously if political responsibility were removed from the compromising manner in which people are appointed to the Judiciary. I do not doubt for a moment the independence of such people, following their appointment to the Judiciary. One's previous track record and associations remain too large a factor in determining how and when one becomes a member of the Judiciary. The failure of the House to address that issue will continue to put a mark on the degree of independence that should exist in the judicial system. A young barrister approached me several years ago to ask to join my political party. His logic for wanting to join my party was that a judicial position would be influenced in his favour at some future time.

He had great faith in the Deputy.

He did not join my party.

Tiocfaidh ár lá.

He should have concentrated on his practice.

That such thinking persists does not do the political system credit. We should engage in a wide-ranging and in-depth examination of the relationship between the political system and the Judiciary to ensure that events of this type do not happen again. I refer to the introduction of legislation in this way.

Tacaím leis an leasú seo in ainneoin na buartha atá orm agus ar Shinn Féin mar gheall ar an deifir atá romhainn an Bille a rith tríd an Teach inniu. Is trua é nach bhfuil tuilleadh ama againn agus leagan amach an sórt ama agus an sórt próiséis gur chóir go mbeadh ann i leith reachtaíochta sa doiciméad "Regulating Better". Leagann an doiciméad amach faoi reachtaíocht ar dtús go mbeadh "draft heads" foilsithe roimh ré agus ansin "regulatory impact analysis" foilsithe chomh maith. An rud atá i gceist ansin, bheadh freagraí ar fáil do cheisteanna an Teachta O'Keeffe dá mbeadh sé seo déanta mar, i "Regulating Better" deir sé "regulatory impact analysis is a policy tool designed to identify and quantify, where possible, the impact of new regulations." Níl sé sin déanta go hiomlán sa chás seo.

Tuigeann gach duine a labhair go dtí seo cén fáth go bhfuil seo á dhéanamh. Tá an Freasúra ar fad sásta glacadh leis agus tacú leis tríd an Teach de réir an chuma ar an scéal go dtí seo ach tá buairt orainn mar gheall ar an deifir. An fhadhb leis an deifir ná go bhfuil an judicial conduct and ethics Bill fós ar an gclár, mar a luaigh roinnt de na Teachtaí cheana. Ba chóir dúinn a bheith ag deileáil leis an mBille sin inniu mar is léir dom ó bhí mise sa Teach seo gur féidir leo siúd a chuireann reachtaíocht le chéile reachtaíocht a chur le chéile faoi deifir agus ansin gur féidir linn treabhadh tríd agus déileáil leis focal ar fhocal. Ní gá gur é an reachtaíocht is fearr é nuair a dhéantar deifir. B'fhearr liom go mbeadh níos mó ama againn go mbeimis in ann suí síos agus dul tríd seo pointe ar phointe agus ansin teacht go dtí staid gur féidir linn ar fad glacadh leis agus go bhfuil na freagraí do na ceisteanna ar fad atá luaite cheanna féin ar fáil.

Leagann an Rialtas amach an am-chlár. B'fhéidir gur chóir go nglacfadh sé leis go bhfuil freagracht áirithe aige, toisc go bhfuil sé ag déanamh na deifre seo. Níl a fhios agam an mbeadh mórán difríocht dá bhfanfaimis seachtain nó dhá sheachtain eile chun deise a thabhairt don bhFreasúra, ach go háirithe, comhairle dhlí cheart a fháil air seo. Ní bhfuair mé an deis dul i dteagmháil le dlíodóirí nó abhcóidí chun treabhadh tríd an mBille ina hiomlán agus féachaint an bhfuil aon mhór-cheisteanna ann. Caithfidh mé glacadh le meon an chuid eile den bhFreasúra agus an méid a luaigh an tArd-Aighne ar an gceist seo go dtí seo. Is trua sin mar b'fhearr liom an rud a chíoradh i gceart mé féin.

Beidh orainn, dár ndóigh, mar a luaigh an Tánaiste níos luaithe, teacht ar ais chuig an cheist seo nuair atá muid ag déileáil leis an judicial conduct and ethics Bill. Tá súil agam ansin, má tá aon mhion-bhotúin nó mór-bhotúin sa reachtaíocht seo, go ndéanfaimid é seo a athrú chomh tapaidh agus is féidir. Tá sé ceart go leor an t-athrú seo a dhéanamh mar tá sé gafa go díreach leis an cheist áirithe seo, an cheist faoi compellability, agus nach bhfuil ach i gceist breitheamh a bheith cúisithe nó a chaithfidh freagra a thabhairt mar gheall ar cheist Alt 35.4 den Bhunreacht. Sin an t-aon bhealach ba chóir go mbeimis ag déileáil leis seo. Glacaim leis an mBille agus tacaím leis in ainneoin na buartha atá orm.

The Tánaiste put her finger on it this morning when she said we are dealing with uncharted waters, which is certainly the case. I have a difficulty with the fact that we are dealing with emergency legislation in a rushed manner. I saw a copy of the Bill late last night that Deputy Jim O'Keeffe furnished to me. However, we are elected to enact good legislation and therefore we need time to consider the legislation that comes before us. I appreciate this is not the longest Bill ever published and, effectively, only runs to three pages. Since its potential ramifications for the future are quite substantial, it is regrettable to deal with it so quickly. I do not understand the urgency. Some years ago, during the Sheedy case, all these matters were discussed and legislation may even have been published to deal with this issue, yet nothing happened in the interim.

The two Bills before us do not, in any sense, refer to why we are here, which is because of what has happened in the Curtin case. We are expected to put those facts to the back of our minds and examine the legislation as if it did not refer to anyone specifically — and it is not supposed to — yet we cannot do that. We are here because of that case. We must accept that the legislation is coming about because of what happened in that case and because the Government intends to proceed under Article 35.4 of the Constitution.

During my short time in the House, I have seen difficulties arising with rushed legislation on a few occasions concerning immigration, radar guns and alcolysers used by the Garda Síochána. We have seen court judgments on such legislation, which amounts to giving Members of the Oireachtas a rap on the knuckles for having passed legislation that turned out to be flawed. I am concerned that at some future date we will find ourselves re-examining this legislation since I have little doubt it will end up before the Supreme Court whose judges may take issue with it.

I wish to pose a number of questions because, like previous speakers, I am not sure of the answers. It is a pity we do not have answers to some of the issues that have been raised concerning this legislation. The first issue is that of retrospection. Neither the House nor an Oireachtas committee will be dealing with criminal proceedings when the matter comes before it; the criminal aspect of the Curtin case was dispensed with. We are not dealing with civil proceedings either, so in dealing with this matter we are very much in virgin territory.

Under section 1(3A)(b) we are establishing a committee, “for the purposes of, or in connection with, the behaviour or capacity of a judge whether occurring or first arising before or after such passing.” I see potential difficulties in that because we are enacting legislation to deal with something that has already happened. We do not know what will happen to anyone, particularly this judge, who will be compelled to attend before the committee. I do not know if the serious ramifications that could arise have been examined sufficiently. Adopting retrospective legislation for actions that occurred previously is a new departure and one about which I have a great deal of concern. I accept what the Minister of State, Deputy Hanafin, said earlier, that it would be inconceivable for the House to commence such a solemn process without having the capacity to require the judge to assist it in that process. However, it is a serious issue to ask somebody to attend a committee and, effectively, lose his or her right to silence, which is what may be happening here.

The purpose of the Bill is to put a member of the Judiciary in the same position as any other citizen as regards attendance before an Oireachtas committee. I do not know, however, if we are really putting that person in the same position as any other citizen because, in some ways, we are placing a different obligation on him or her, compared with other citizens.

If one is satisfied the evidence acquired under the warrant is admissible in any hearing pursuant to Article 35.4, why are powers of compellability required? If the evidence can be used anyway, I do not see where the compellability issue arises. If a person is compelled to attend, the rule against self-incrimination may prevent his or her answers being used to support any contention of stated misbehaviour. That question needs to be answered before we go any further. Another question that needs to be answered is where the power of compellability will sit vis-à-vis a person’s right to remain silent.

It is a pity we are considering this legislation in such a rushed manner. I note there is not a queue of Deputies, either on the Opposition or Government benches, waiting to speak on the legislation, which, in itself, says something. It would be better to have a proper allocation of time in which to tease out the legislation before us. What is said during this debate may be re-examined in the future and we may all be questioned about it.

In common with other speakers, I am concerned that we are debating this legislation in a hurry. It is said that rushed legislation does not make for good law and we should have learned that over the years. If the Legislature finds itself in a difficulty, the answer is not to introduce legislation in a hurry in the hope that it will meet some future contingencies. Past experience has shown that is not the correct route to take, so I am concerned about the speed with which the legislation is being debated.

I recall that, not so many years ago, when the original Bill was passed, it was said it would mark the end of all squabbles in that context, and that no unforeseen difficulties could arise in undertaking inquiries or investigations under that legislation. Apparently, however, that is not the case. It seems odd that we should now proceed to pass legislation under duress, as it were. The most worrying aspect is that on countless occasions in the past, we have done the same thing. We have passed legislation in a hurry and then found it did not meet the requirements, so we had to return to deal with the issues again.

I am also aware there are other items of comprehensive legislation that could have the same effect as the Bill before us and which could have been brought before the House during the last two years but were not, for some unknown reason. One can speculate as to why that did not happen but I have heard no argument from the Government side as to why certain legislation was not introduced in the House. It could be introduced now and be passed through the House in the next week or so, achieving what it is intended to achieve with this amendment Bill. However, that was not done presumably because it might be deemed to have been rushed in attempting to legislate for past events which, as Deputies stated, is not such a good idea. For whatever reason it did not happen, even though it is on the legislative schedule which has been circulated to us during the life of this Government. There are problems which could well surface again. As the Minister of State knows, like other speakers, I am concerned that we might find ourselves in a cul-de-sac in three or four months' time. I wonder how we will then be able to look back on the passing of this Bill and its purpose.

Whatever difficulties are likely to arise or have arisen, we need to be extremely careful not to bring ourselves into disrepute by running hither and tither to shore up positions willy nilly in regard to which comprehensive legislation could and should have been introduced and which would have dealt with the matter in its entirety.

I thank the Opposition parties for their co-operation in progressing this legislation. I accept it is unusual to introduce legislation to go through all Stages in the House at once. However, whereas this Bill has general applicability, the House is about to embark on a specific process. Article 35.4 of the Constitution gives the Houses of the Oireachtas the power to remove a judge for stated misbehaviour or incapacity but it does not give us the procedures by which this can be done. We all accept that it would be very dangerous to embark on a process without having all the necessary pillars, procedures and frameworks in place before we do so. This Bill is part of that framework to enable the Houses of the Oireachtas to discharge its duties in fulfilling our constitutional role.

Different views were expressed as to whether this Bill is necessary, as was evident from the briefing which was attended by the Opposition parties. However, it was felt that to bring clarity to the matter, it was advisable to proceed with it. Deputy Jim O'Keeffe raised a number of question as to how this Bill would affect judges. In the first instance, this measure will in no way affect the independence of judges. It is very specific in its application because it refers only to judges who would be the subject of a process which would be initiated by the Houses of the Oireachtas under Article 35.4 of the Constitution. Arising out of those consultations, the Bill before us is clearer and I thank Members for their input.

Deputy Jim O'Keeffe raised the issues of attendance, documents and material, all of which are provided for in the existing Act for everyone except judges. This limited amendment will bring judges into the same position for one purpose only. Therefore, it in no way compromises them in their capacity as judges or their independence in carrying out their functions. Security of tenure of judges was also raised, which issue is set out in the constitutional framework, part of which is Article 35.4, therefore, there will be no change in that regard.

In regard to the appointment of judges, Members will be aware that the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board was established by the Government under the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995. It is a high level board comprising the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Presidents of the High Court, Circuit Court and District Court, the Attorney General, two representatives of the legal profession and up to three representatives of public interest. The board assesses suitability under a number of different headings set out in the legislation and the Government then chooses from the recommended people.

This Bill is very confined. It is an enabling power under the constitutional right which the committee may or may not need to use. The question of privilege was raised and it is important to point out that it is envisaged that the procedures, to be put in place to manage a process under Article 35.4, which would be applicable in any circumstances where a committee would have to gather evidence, would be in camera. Therefore, that is not an issue. More importantly, persons who are required to attend under compellability enjoy the same privilege as a witness before the High Court — that security is there for people.

Members raised the haste with which this Bill has been introduced. It is a general Bill with general applicability but we are about to separately engage in a process. It is true to state that the issue was raised a number of years ago, but it was difficult at that time to get all-party agreement when the proposed constitutional framework on the matter of judicial oversight was set out. Therefore, we were not able to progress the matter at that time. An Agreed Programme for Government states that we would progress legislation in this area and, as Deputy Durkan more than anyone knows, the Government has passed more than 80 items of legislation since June 2002. Therefore, it is not as if we are slack in passing Bills.

Careful consideration has been given to this Bill in the past few weeks, including by the Attorney General. The reality is that there is a current issue which has given rise to public disquiet and a lack of public confidence. In that context, we want to move without delay to try to resolve the issue. In doing so, we need to put in place the procedures which will enable us to fulfil our constitutional duty, procedures which will guarantee fairness and ensure that proper rights are given to everyone involved and to allow us to discharge our duties as Members of the Oireachtas. Other legislation will be introduced later in the year, including a Bill on judicial conduct and an ethics Bill.

However, in the meantime, we believe this amendment is necessary. Questions were asked about the procedures which do not refer to this Bill but will be dealt with by the CPP and, in the particular circumstances of this one case, by motions which will come before the House next week. I thank the Opposition for its careful consideration and for allowing the Houses of the Oireachtas to discharge our duty.

Question put and agreed to.
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