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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 10 Feb 1966

Vol. 60 No. 14

Air Companies Bill, 1965—Second Stage (Resumed) and Subsequent Stages.

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time".

A good deal of the Minister's speech was devoted to the question with which the Bill deals, that is, of tidying up the present relationship of the three air companies. I must say that when I listened to him and afterwards read carefully what he had to say, I found some of the reasons he gave somewhat unconvincing. There may be good reasons for this change. There probably are good reasons but, as I say, the reasons given did not seem very convincing.

First of all, he suggested that our existing arrangement of a holding company and two subsidiaries was undesirable because some people in the other House could not understand the balance sheets involving holding companies. This seems to me to be an extraordinary argument to put before even the House that apparently is not subject to this particular accusation! I wonder whether the Government intend to proceed to the logical conclusion of breaking up the relationship of CIE and Ostlanna Iompair Éireann, and of the Dairy Disposal Company with its subsidiaries, and carrying this through also with the Industrial Credit Company and its subsidiaries? I simply cannot understand why such an argument should be put forward as the reason for making a change.

The change may be justified on other grounds but certainly not on that particular ground. Another ground given for this change is that the existence of a holding company, holding shares in the two air companies, which is concerned with the management of an airport used by other competing airlines, is unsatisfactory. There certainly is something in this and it is true that at times other airlines have been dissatisfied with the fact that the holding company for the Aer Lingus and Aerlínte, operating companies has been running Dublin Airport, particularly in view of the close management links between the two companies. This has given grounds, perhaps, for some dissatisfaction. However, the Minister has indicated that the whole question of the management of the airport is under review, if I understood his words correctly. Indeed, it is widely reported that a review is under way out of which will emerge a national airports authority and that this will involve, in fact, taking away from Aer Rianta their existing function of the management of Dublin Airport. This national airports authority would probably be a civil service body which would take over the running of the three airports including running the airports at Cork and Shannon. If this is the intention in his mind, or even a possibility, then the position of Aer Rianta running the airport while also being the holding company for the airlines would no longer be a particular reason for breaking up the companies and would no longer apply. One would have thought if this was in contemplation by the Minister that the Government would have waited before breaking up the Aer Lingus-Aerlínte-Aer Rianta group on those grounds in order to see what solution, in fact, can be found with regard to the whole problem of airport management here and if, in fact, the solution found is handing them over to a national airports authority run by the Department or civil servants, as distinct from State bodies like Aer Rianta, then this reason, again, for making this change is simply not valid.

I think there was some other reason mentioned in the course of the Minister's remarks which again, did not seem to me to be an important one. This other reason given for the change was that under the existing arrangements between those three companies, which, presumably, could be altered in any event without the necessity of abolishing the holding company, when Aer Lingus or Aerlínte want to borrow money they must do so through Aer Rianta. This has never been an insuperable obstacle nor has it caused serious inconvenience. If there was a problem it might be possible to arrange for the subsidiary company to borrow direct without the necessity of breaking up the relationship between the three companies.

Therefore, none of the three reasons put forward by the Minister for the change is at all convincing. It could be, of course, that it is simply a tidyingup operation and that it does not matter much one way or the other. I am not convinced of that. The fact is that the two operating companies are separate and distinct for purely technical reasons and, indeed, to a purely technical extent. I think I am right in saying that the origin of the two separate operating airlines, with Aer Lingus operating as a separate company from Aerlínte, lay in the fact that in 1946-47 the Government of the day proposed to establish a trans-atlantic airline. Aer Lingus was then owned as to 40 per cent by BEA and BOAC. BOAC was a trans-atlantic operator which did not look with favour on the prospect of an Irish transatlantic operation but took the view that the Irish should know their place and stay within the general protection of the British sphere of operations. The Irish Government took a different view and found it necessary to establish Aerlínte, as a separate company, to overcome this difficulty. Now, as the Minister has pointed out, this British shareholding no longer exists. The only reason I know of today for having two separate airlines— separate as companies although operationally, they are not distinct but are united—is, and I am open to correction again on this if I am wrong, that the licence to operate to the United State as held by Aerlínte and to change that to Aer Lingus would raise the whole question of traffic rights, where we have been resisting American pressure for a long time. The Government, therefore, prefer to keep the two airlines distinct to avoid raising this legal difficulty. In fact, the two airlines are operationally united; they have the same management as far as I know although, in the early period, some managers of Aer Lingus were not managers of Aerlínte; the staffs are identical; they operate, as far as the public are concerned, under the title Aer Lingus Irish International Airlines, which applies to the activities of both; and, indeed, the aircraft can be shared at times as has been done in the past with regard to the transatlantic Boeings which have at times operated on Aer Lingus routes.

One airline operating as two companies without any common link of a technical legal character and, indeed, with different Boards, seems an untidy arrangement and, yet, this is what is now proposed. We have at the moment a situation where you have the holding company, Aer Rianta, with its Board and then the two operating companies — Aerlínte and Aer Lingus with their Boards. For some reason, Board membership is not common to the three; there are two Board members common to all three; another which is common to both companies, and each company then has separate directors of its own. It is difficult to understand this when Aer Lingus and Aerlínte are operating as a single airline in all respects, even as to the title by which they sell themselves to the public, and the purpose of having different Boards is obscure. In the past it has, at times, given rise to some difficulties because of divergences of the view at Board level. It would seem more appropriate, in these circumstances, if, for technical reasons, you must have two companies but one airline in all operational respects—to have a common link and have them at least owned by Aer Rianta and have a common Board for all three. Instead of this, eight years after the start of Aerlínte operations to the United States, we still have these different Boards and, instead of moving towards having a common Board for the three companies, the Government have done nothing whatever about this, but now propose to break the common link and to have them operating as separate companies with no common link between them although they are Irish airlines with a common name, common management and common activities. The reasons given for making this change are that the Dáil cannot understand the balance sheet, that there is a problem arising out of Aer Rianta managing the airport, which may well disappear if the review at present in progress is carried through, and that there is a little difficulty about borrowing money through Aer Rianta.

I have no very strong views about this—I was quite prepared to hear the Minister say there were good reasons for this and to give good reasons. If there are good reasons, then the complication caused by dividing up these companies goes and might be justified or overcome. It probably will not give rise to very many difficulties but I do think the Minister would need to satisfy the House a little further on why this is being done. One almost wonders if there is some other reason because these reasons are, as I have said, so very unconvincing.

On the question of airport management, to which the Minister has referred, I should like to have some more information about this review. Is there a review in progress? The Minister's words seem to be ambiguous; they seem to imply that without specifically saying so. If so, who is carrying out the review? One would hope that the review is not being carried out simply by his own Department which would be concerned in the results of that review. I would have thought it would be inappropriate that his Department, without any further views being expressed or without any outside opinions, should decide the issue of whether or not they should manage the airport. The arrangement under which Aer Rianta have managed the airport has not been entirely satisfactory for the delegation to Aer Rianta by the Department has not been sufficient at times to enable the airport to be run in the flexible way in which an airport should be run. But that could be overcome. If this review is being carried out by the Department itself and if the outcome of the review, then, is that the Department will take over Dublin Airport—which at present is run by Aer Rianta—this would seem to be inappropriate. I would have thought that if the possible outcome of this is that the Department should take it over and run it through a national airports authority, we would need an independent and partial view. The Department should not be sitting in judgment as to whether Aer Rianta have managed the airport well or whether this is the best arrangement. There should be some other views expressed on that change over, if the Department were to take direct responsibility for managing the airport. I think the Minister should tell us more about this review and what is involved in it.

Another question I should like to ask the Minister—for his explanation was singularly unconvincing—is why the Government's shareholding in the Intercontinental Hotels is being transferred to Aerlínte. The Minister dismisses this in a single line:

The Bill transfers this holding from Aer Rianta to Aerlínte as the company most closely identified with the operation of the hotels.

I am not quite sure what this means, unless it means that a statistical survey has shown that more people who stay in the Intercontinental Hotels have entered the country by Aerlínte than by Aer Lingus.

The Board of Aer Rianta have been very assiduous in protecting the Government's interest in this project, which has not been very successful so far. I am not quite clear as to why this should now be transferred to Aerlínte. In fact, the whole operation suggests that the Minister has decided, or has in mind, even before this review is completed, that the management of Dublin Airport will be handed over to a national airports authority, and that he is making this change in order to strip Aer Rianta of every function in respect of the management of the airport, not only to remove this function of holding shares in the two operating companies, but also to transfer the hotel interest to Aerlínte on grounds which seem to be extremely poor. If the Minister intends handing over Dublin Airport to a single authority, he should explain more fully the reasons for the decision that has been taken, which was inadequately explained yesterday.

With regard to the Intercontinental Hotels and our interest in them, so far as I am aware the Board of Aer Rianta have carried out their functions as effectively as they could. I cannot, however, compliment them on the manner in which they have treated this project in their annual report and accounts. So far as the accounts are concerned the interest in the hotels is shown at £284,307, at cost. I cannot detect any dividend in the profit and loss accounts of Aer Rianta. This could be explained by the absence of a dividend. If that is the case, the public should be told that the investment is not paying off. We have been told:

The Intercontinental Hotels in Dublin, Cork and Limerick which were opened in 1963 are now in their second full season. Business is developing normally in each and they are already playing an important role in the promotion and expansion of tourism envisaged in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion. Their steady progress is expected to continue.

This was written last summer. Anyone who has had any reason to read the reports of State bodies and, indeed, of private companies, cannot but be a little suspicious as to precisely what is happening, and as to whether, in fact, this very substantial State investment is paying off. If it is not paying off, I do not think we should be given platitudes about steady progress of the kind I have referred to.

I note that in the Dáil when this Bill was under consideration some Deputies expressed puzzlement as to what exactly was a profit in the case of a company like Aer Lingus, whether there was a profit and how it should be calculated. I was disturbed to see that the Minister endorsed the confusion of mind shown by some Deputies on this point. When he was summing up he said:

...if you compare it with a private company, you will have to take from that profit what represents the remuneration of the capital, as in the case of the ESB, whose capital is repaid over a period of years.

There is persistent confusion about the question of what is a profit in a State company. That statement by the Minister does not seem to agree with normal company practice. In the case of private companies in which there is a share holding and loan capital, profit is shown after deducting interest on loan capital. There is no question of calculating the profit of the private company by deducting notional interest on the share capital at, say, 6½ per cent, and showing what is left as profit. There is no reason to apply a more stringent calculation to the profits of a State company than to the profits of a private company. It is unfortunate that the Minister should have endorsed this idea which is misleading in regard to the air company.

Any attempt by the Minister or by anyone else to play down the profitability of these companies should be rejected and rebutted. These companies have reached the stage where no further State capital is required, and they can develop using their own resources, and by borrowing. That is certainly good news and, in fact, over the years since 1949-50 these companies have been profitable. There has been no subsidy since 1959-60, apart from a technical payment arising out of a revision of the BEA shares in 1957. If the companies were to pay a dividend, they would have less money available for expansion, and the Government would have to subscribe more towards share capital. The fact that this has been the policy rather than paying a dividend and injecting extra capital, is no reflection on the companies or on the Government.

There is one other point, about comparing the profitability of State companies. It should be possible to make valid comparisons of their profitability by examining their accounts. Unfortunately these accounts are prepared on widely different bases. In one company, the Dairy Disposal Company, no profit and loss accounts are published or given to the Dáil— at least they were not when I looked into this question several years ago. No report is published, and this company's affairs have never, to my knowledge, been discussed in the Dáil, in recent years at any rate.

That is one extreme case, but most companies do publish profit and loss accounts at least, and naturally all publish balance sheets. From these one can discover quite an extraordinary variety of treatment of different elements in the accounts, with no homogeniety and a very obvious desire on the part of the companies to present the profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets in the manner that will make their performance most attractive. Companies making small profits adopt a more devious technique while those doing better do not have to use such subterfuges.

It is reasonable that State companies, like private companies, should be left free to present their accounts in whatever manner they wish, so long as it is in a form that is legally permissible. But the country has a right to see the performances of these companies presented in such a way as to make it possible to measure them against each other on a comparable basis. Some arrangement should be made by the Department of Finance—and in view of the Minister's interest in such a number of the State companies, it would not be inappropriate for him to discuss it with the Department— to introduce a standard accounting form for all the companies, not to replace their present systems—let these continue, if they wish—but so that side by side with the accounts presented in any legal form they like, their accounts will be presented in a strictly comparable form so that anybody can pick them up and say: "The profits of this company on the same basis, CIE, ESB, Aer Lingus or Irish Shipping, are so much and represent a return on capital of so much compared with the figure on a similar basis for other State companies."

That cannot be done at present. To attempt to assess the relative performance of State companies in this country is a major research project. It would be all right for a postgraduate student of economics to attempt this for an MA thesis, but I do not think that a Deputy, a Senator or a member of the public should be forced to employ MA students to carry out research of that kind. The figures should be provided on the basis of presenting them in a manner that can be readily understood, which is not the case in existing balance sheets, and in a manner which makes them comparable to each other.

Perhaps the Senator would come back now to the Bill before us.

Another provision of this Bill which arouses concern is one which I shall not deal with in any detail now. It will come up on Committee Stage. It is the question of membership of the Houses of the Oireachtas by directors and members of the staff of these companies This was raised in this House before, some months ago, and we were told that it would be looked at. It is a matter that we should take further, and I should like to raise it on Committee Stage because the provisions continually being introduced in legislation about State bodies to ensure that members of these State bodies will be discouraged as effectively as possible from any attempt to do something with their talents for their country by becoming Members of either of the Houses of the Oireachtas is undesirable, contrary to the public interest, and should be resisted.

In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute such as is always paid on these occasions to the management of the air companies. I can do so particularly appropriately because of the fact of my having spent 12 years as a member of the staff of Aer Lingus and I can say truthfully from the inside as well as the outside that these companies have been well managed and efficiently run. I think that the occasion is appropriate to pay tribute to Dr. Dempsey, the General Manager, who over such a long period of years has given up his life to the air companies and who has achieved so much for them. His decision to retire at an age much earlier than that which would be normal or necessary or required is in keeping with the way in which throughout his period as General Manager of the company he has endeavoured to bring forward younger people and give opportunities for younger talent. It is a remarkable thing that he should retire in this way to make way for younger people and that in doing so, he should leave behind a management team so strong and indeed so young. I think I am right in saying that four of the five assistant general managers are under 40—somewhere around 35 years of age. This talented team he leaves behind him will ensure that the air companies will continue to serve the country as in the past not only in the material way of providing transport services but also by increasing the prestige of our country, carrying its reputation abroad, where the name of Aer Lingus stands high in every country where it has any activities, and there are very many countries where it is active. I am sure that this will continue in the years ahead.

First of all, I should like to say that I could not agree at all with Senator FitzGerald that there would be any use in having all the accounts of the State companies under my supervision standardised so that they could be compared with other State companies. Their purposes are so different, the policy directions to them are so different, their characteristics are so different, that I could not see any point in it at all. It would be impossible to compare the accounts of CIE with those of Aer Lingus because the conditions in which CIE operates are totally different. I think it is possible, with the accounts as they are at present prepared, for any member of the Dáil or Seanad to see what progress they are making from year to year. In the case of companies where there have been difficulties and changes of policy, there are other documents to study such as the very fine pacemaker report prepared by CIE, a copy of which is in the Library and can be read by any Deputy or Senator, and which gives the financial history of the company and suggests various alternative methods by which its operations could be changed. Equally there is the Beddy Committee on Internal Transport which throws further light on CIE, one of the companies which have given us the greatest difficulty in the past. I would not agree with him and would not see very much point in it.

Senator FitzGerald also raised the question of the manner in which we discuss the question of the capital construction of the air company and the fact that it does not remunerate its capital. I thought that I had made it absolutely clear to the Dáil and Seanad in time past that the Government policy has been that the air company should extend its operations at a more rapid rate that could be achieved if it had to remunerate State capital, and that, for example, going back to the year 1948/49 after the war, when Aer Lingus would have had to wait for a great deal of profit on the Birmingham and London routes before opening some less remunerative routes such as to Manchester and Liverpool, which would have been the way that a private company would have operated.

Although a private company might not have paid a dividend on its ordinary capital, equally there would be some limits in regard to the extent to which shareholders would be willing to wait to receive some remuneration on the capital they had given. I made it quite clear that the Government instructed the air companies to go ahead, to increase their routes, and as a result the State capital was not remunerated. I made it clear in the Bill, that the air companies from now on will have to remunerate their capital. By 1970 a very considerable proportion of the total capital of Aer Lingus and Aerlínte will be remunerated in one form or another, either by the companies repaying advances from the Minister for Finance or by their repaying the private insurance companies which loaned them money. It is a fact that if the air company paid the Minister for Finance a reasonable rate of interest on State capital for the year ended March 31st, 1965, there would be a very slight total eventual net profit, but, as Senator FitzGerald has said, the company needs that money to plough it back into its reserves for increasing its fleet and, indeed, apart from that a great part of the operating profit of Aerlínte has also been ploughed back into additional depreciation funds for the purpose of increasing the transatlantic fleet.

I agree with everything the Minister has said but that was not my point. In the Dáil he was concerned with the point about the definition of profit, which he said should be calculated after providing national interest payments for remuneration of share capital. This is not a fair comparison with a private company.

One can argue the toss one way or another. I think I have made the position clear now.

Senator FitzGerald next raised the question of whether, having detached Aer Lingus and Aerlínte from Aer Rianta, they should not be one company. We feel the best way is the present method—a transatlantic company with transatlantic rights and a company with traffic rights in Europe. We think it is better to have a distinction between the two companies. The patterns of traffic are different, the problems are different. The traffic to Great Britain and Europe is shorthaul traffic with immensely high overheads and landing costs per passenger mile travelled. It is intended in the future that the same directors will be on both boards.

There are directors in Aer Rianta who are also directors of Aer Lingus. It is hoped the directors will be the same. There is not, as Senator FitzGerald feared, any overlapping in administration. There has not been any overlapping account-wise either, but I think it is very important that there should be a clear distinction between the transatlantic services and the European services from the standpoint of accountancy and administration. They represent different types of traffic and are subject to different bilateral agreements with different groups of companies.

On the question of the running of Dublin Airport, Senator FitzGerald will have to accept my statement that it is absolutely essential to detach Aer Lingus-Aerlínte from Aer Rianta before we go into the question of what would be the final direction of the three airports. Senator FitzGerald should not assume that if the three were run by one concern they would be run by civil servants. It would be quite possible to have them run by a State company and to have businessmen employed. Before we can engage in any study of this kind we must work out the problem of the integration of staff — a mixture of civil servants and staff appointed by the State company. There are also questions of pension rights, questions involving the whole structure of staff which would have to be gone into at considerable length.

If it is advisable to call in an outside consultant to examine the whole question, Senator FitzGerald can be assured I would not have the slightest hesitation in engaging such a person. I have frequently appointed outside consultants at various times when I was Minister of different Departments. For example, at Shannon Airport, where civil servants are employed, I have done so and I shall continue to engage in the practice so long as it is considered desirable.

The Minister even had me at one stage!

That is correct.

That is what the Senator thought the Minister would say.

Senator FitzGerald asked a question about the Intercontinental Hotels. They were established to encourage the trans-Atlantic traffic. One of the shareholders is an American air company, Pan-American Airlines. Pan-American Airlines had invested in Intercontinental Hotels and it was thought desirable to have that portion of the capital previously held under the care of Aerlínte. That is as good an answer as I can give to the fact that the shares have been transferred to Aerlínte. If that company holds capital in Intercontinental Hotels, it is quite natural that as an operating company on the same route as the Irish air companies, they should hold the capital previously held by Aer Rianta. They are both trans-Atlantic carriers, both are interested in directing passengers to the hotels.

I asked whether this was the Minister's view or the view of Aer Rianta.

It is my view. The air companies as a whole are quite satisfied with all proposals in this Bill. There is no conflict. Senator FitzGerald referred to the report of the board of directors of Aer Rianta:

Aer Rianta is beneficially entitled to more than 20 per cent in nominal value of shares carrying voting rights in Irish and Intercontinental Hotels Limited, an hotel owning company. While the investment has not yet reached the revenue earning stage, the Directors regard it as in the course of development.

Intercontinental Hotels are slightly improving their position but I think it is realised it takes a number of years before hotels of that type can become remunerative. No doubt this undertaking will have to face all the difficulties involved in the establishment of any very large hotel seeking new traffic. I do not think the report of Aer Rianta is over-optimistic or over-pessimistic. It simply states the position accurately. I think I have answered all the questions Senator FitzGerald asked me.

Question put and agreed to.
Agreed to take remaining Stages today.
Bill considered in Committee.
Sections 1 to 11, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 12.
Question proposed: "That section 12 stand part of the Bill".

I welcome the Minister's statement that the aim is to have a common board for the two companies. I wonder if he can say something about the position as regards a managing director. He is to be appointed by the Minister with the consent of the Minister for Finance. Normally speaking, a board would determine the appointment of a managing director. The position of Aer Lingus is obscure in this respect. Dr. Dempsey is a director of Aer Lingus, though not managing director. He is General Manager and director—a very subtle distinction. He is not on the board of the other two companies. Why this rather odd arrangement and why should the Minister keep to himself the power to appoint the managing director? Why not leave it to the board?

This is purely a permissive section. In State companies if a managing director is appointed, the directorial part of his appointment must be subject to ministerial approval. There is not any significance in it. It does not mean the managing director will be appointed. We could have a very long discussion on the whole question in regard to any State company—whether you have a fulltime chairman and a managing director or a fulltime chairman and no managing director. The best policy, to a considerable extent, relates to the character of the company and even to the personal characteristics of existing directors at any one time. Policy on executive management also depends on the progress the company is making and its efficiency.

It says here that a managing director of the company may, if the Minister so thinks fit, be appointed from amongst the directors of the company.

The Minister appoints the directors.

The question which arises is, having appointed the directors, whether the Board have the right to appoint one of them managing director?

They have, with my consent, the power to appoint a managing director.

It says here that a managing director may be appointed by the Minister and, not only that, with the consent of the Minister for Finance. What is the purpose of this? I do not understand it. Could the Minister also explain just why there is an arrangement under which the general manager of the company is a director of Aer Lingus and not managing director? What is the purpose of this distinction between general manager and managing director?

This again is purely a permissive section which is being put into the Bill in case a situation might arise where it is desirable for the Board to appoint a managing director. This could only be done with my consent and that of the Minister for Finance. The reason the general manager is not a director, and is described in the terms Senator FitzGerald has given, is simply that he was appointed by the board.

We are getting further confused. As regards the latter point, that the general manager is director of Aer Lingus——

He is appointed by the Board.

The general manager was appointed by the Board originally and the Minister appointed him director at a certain point in time, five or seven years ago. He is now, as a result of the Minister's action, general manager and director. What is the difference between that and managing director?

I get confused myself over this. You see, with the three companies, that is one of the reasons why we are passing this Bill. The directors of Aer Rianta appoint the directors of Aer Lingus. That is the reason for the confusion. As I said, between Aer Rianta, Aerlínte and Aer Lingus there is a sort of interlocking of directorships. Aer Rianta appoint the directors of Aer Lingus. The Minister does not appoint them. That would explain the difficulty.

This certainly gets the Minister out of the difficulties as to why this arrangement exists, if he is not responsible. It does not explain why the General Manager should be a director of one of the three companies but not of the others, to which the Minister could have appointed him. He is not a managing director which would seem the appropriate appointment for someone who is both general manager and director. The Minister could, perhaps, explain that a little more. The Minister says this section is permissive. As I read the section the managing director can only be appointed by the Minister with the consent of the Minister for Finance. Perhaps I am reading it wrong. Perhaps the section means that the board can, of course, appoint the managing director at any time they like but so can the Minister? As I read the section, however, it is not permissive only the Minister can appoint the managing director and not the board. I wonder why the Minister would hold on to that right?

I was using the word "permissive" wrongly. I meant there was not any immediate intention of doing that. The managing director can only be appointed with my consent and that of the Minister for Finance but there is not any reason or intention of appointing a managing director or joint managing director.

Would I be right in saying that the Board can appoint a general manager without the Minister's consent?

Yes, they can.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 13 agreed to.
SECTION 14.
Question proposed: "That section 14 stand part of the Bill".

This is the section where we have this problem of the prohibition on members of those bodies being Members of the two Houses of the Oireachtas. If in fact a senior official of the company is prepared to give up his appointment and remuneration, he can become a member of one or other House of the Oireachtas but when he did so, he would give up part of his livelihood and his prospects of promotion. He would have to live on the remuneration thus afforded him. It seems this provision introduced in many Acts is one which should be seriously considered.

There is a shortage of talent in the country for no other reason than there are only 2.8 million people in the country, and it is necessary to use those talents to the full. Many of the talented people are officials of State bodies who have succeeded, because they were the employers in the country during the difficult years when jobs were scarce, in attracting a very high proportion of the available talent in the country. It seems to me to be a mistake that those people should be insulated off from politics instead of being encouraged to enter politics. I would prefer to see in legislation regarding State companies and ultimately in legislation regarding private companies a provision that if a member of the staff wants to stand for either House of the Oireachtas, then he should be seconded for that period and that the difference in salary shall be paid to him by the company concerned. If that were done, he could later go back to his previous position but he could serve the country during his period of secondment.

Any person in a State company who reaches a position of significant responsibility and who does well is the kind of person we want to serve the country in a public capacity. But if he wants to serve the country in a public capacity, he can do so only if he gives up his position and falls back on the remuneration he would receive from either the Dáil or Seanad. The remuneration paid to Deputies and Senators is adequate for people who are part-time legislators but in this instance we are saying in effect that the remuneration is adequate for a fulltime person. We have to make our minds up whether or not we want full-time or part-time people in the Dáil. If, in fact, we feel the present system is correct and that the remuneration we pay to Deputies and Senators is appropriate to the kind of people we want, working in the way we want, as part-time people, then to make a provision in an Act that anybody in a responsible position in a State body can only enter the Dáil or Seanad if he is prepared to live on what we have specified to be part-time remuneration is something designed to prevent those people from entering the Dáil or Seanad. The provision here seems to be the wrong way round. The whole legislation in this regard seems to be misconceived.

It is also proposed that a director of a company, if he wants to be a candidate for election, has to resign his directorship first. This seems to be all wrong. I can quite see there could be difficulties about directors of State companies being Members of either House of the Oireachtas. Although I am not sure that we should indefinitely make this distinction. I think the type of people who are directors of State companies may not always be the best people for the job, but in very many cases they are first-class people and I think it is a mistake to try to insulate them off from politics. Whatever about that, and one can argue that legitimately either way, we should not have it that a man loses his job as a director on nomination. This seems to be quite wrong. This certainly makes sure that many of those excellently qualified people will not go into politics. Many of them are very well suited for politics but they are not prepared to go into the Dáil or Seanad on the basis that if they take their chance and then fail to get in, they will have lost their position as director. I do not see why the Government insist on putting this into legislation and on trying, once again, to keep another group of responsible people— who could make a contribution to public life in the country—out of public life. Again, it seems wrongly directed. We overdo this business. It is all very well in a large country where there are lots of talented people to divide people off into compartments but, in a small country such as ours, to try and divide people into categories, in this way, impoverishes politics and the national life of the country. I would ask the Minister to have another look at this and to reconsider it. If he has any difficulty about considering this I suggest that he take it up with his Cabinet colleagues and consider whether we are going in the right direction in this regard.

In reply to the Senator, I think there are certainly two sides to this question. It is felt very strongly that officers, servants and directors of companies which receive their capital from the State and which are under general State supervision should be precluded from taking part in political life. I do not need to go into it in detail: the reasons are very obvious for this. It is felt that it would be possible for them to misuse their positions and it is simply due to a belief in the weakness of human nature, which exists among all of us and in many different countries.

As far as the directors are concerned, if a director of any of the State companies under my supervision became a candidate and failed to be elected, I would certainly re-appoint him to the company again. I am quite sure that if the candidates from State companies failed to be elected, they would resume their position in the company, so it is not a question of being out on a limb, not knowing whether a candidate will get back his job or not if he becomes nominated as a candidate for the Dáil or Seanad. I do not think that arises at all, or would be likely to arise. But the Government at the present time are fully determined to maintain this provision in State companies and there is no need for me to enlarge on the reasons for it.

I agree with Senator Garret FitzGerald, that we are a very small country and we need a wealth of talent for the Oireachtas but there are these difficulties which will arise. From what I know of the operation of State companies, one could conceive that people being elected to the Dáil could make very serious trouble for the State company, for the Minister and for the Dáil, by adopting certain attitudes and revealing information which might be derived from being an officer of a particular company, which might be entirely out of context, might be untrue and which would require some kind of special inquiry to deal with it. I can see a series of possible difficulties, but I like to take a better view of human nature than that and I think a lot of what Senator Garret FitzGerald says is right.

The Minister has not made a case for the section as it stands. He has made a case— and there is a case—for not having members of the staff of State bodies as members of the Oireachtas at the same time. This, as he said, can be argued. But I raised a different issue, as regards members of the staff, whether it is right to say in subsection (2) (b):

he shall not be paid by, or entitled to receive from, the company any salary or wages, as the case may be, in respect of that period.

It seems to me we should do the opposite and we should say:

He shall be paid by, or entitled to receive from, the company any salary or wages, as the case may be in respect of that period, less his Dáil or Seanad allowance.

That would be more appropriate.

The cost involved would be small and easily borne by the State companies in the very odd case which might arise and, it would make it possible for such people to be elected. It is out of the question at the moment for a responsible person in a senior position in these bodies to stand for election without the prospect of a loss of income which he could not face as he could not look after his family during his period in the Oireachtas. I would ask the Minister to delete the word "not" from subsection (2) (b) and say that he "shall be" paid the difference between the salary and wages he would have received in the company or was receiving at the time of his secondment, and his Oireachtas remuneration.

As regards the directors, the Minister has made an excellent case for amending the section. He has given his personal assurance—which is very welcome—that in the case of directors who are nominated but fail to be elected, he will re-appoint them. But could the Minister explain, why, in fact, he is suggesting this curious procedure? What possible advantage is there in requiring that if a man is nominated, he should be dis-appointed and then on failure to become elected, re-appointed? If there is a guarantee from the Minister in regard to companies under his control that, in fact, any person who is nominated——

(Longford): His nomination would be invalid.

I do not understand why his nomination would be invalid. Is there something in the legislation? I am not aware of any such provision which states that if a director of a State company stands for nomination, he is not validly nominated because he is a director of the company. Certainly, that is not the position in the case of the air companies. There is no such provision and so it does not arise.

I would suggest that the Minister, being prepared to give this assurance, should implement it here. He has only to say that where a director of an air company is elected to either House of the Oireachtas, he shall, thereupon, cease to be a director of the company. That would implement what the Minister intends to do. I see no point in having a procedure of this kind to raise doubts in people's minds which are not going to be implemented. I would suggest that the Minister introduce an amendment on Report Stage.

I should say also I am a little puzzled by the wording in subsection (1):

a candidate for election to either House of the Oireachtas or as a member of Seanad Éireann

Surely, Seanad Éireann is a House of the Oireachtas?

Yes, but remember the Taoiseach's nominations—the 11.

The Taoiseach nominates him to Seanad Éireann. I am sorry then; I should not have raised that point. I would ask the Minister to implement what he has said he intends doing.

I am afraid I am unable to accede to the Senator's suggestion. If it is considered undesirable for directors, officers or servants of State companies to be members of the Oireachtas, then it is just as undesirable that they stand as candidates, as such. That is the view held by the Government. A person who is a director of CIE or other State company ceases to be a director before he offers himself to the electorate. It is the same principle, I grant. It is an almost overstrict principle but, there it is.

In regard to the difference between the amount being earned in the State company and the allowances received from the Oireachtas, there again, one cannot start a precedent of that kind by arranging to pay the difference. I do not think we can provide legislation directing a State company to pay the difference to a person who becomes a member of the Oireachtas. That would create all sorts of anomalies, and I am not prepared to do it.

It is one thing for the Minister to say he is not prepared to introduce legislation requiring them to do it, and another thing to ask him not to introduce legislation requiring them not to do it. Subsection (2) (b) should be deleted. If a State company feel it is their duty to the country, if one of their officials is elected to the Oireachtas, to pay the difference in remuneration, they should be free to do so. There should not be a requirement that they should not do so. That is a narrow strict view for which there seems to be no justification.

On the question of the nomination of a director, I am puzzled, because the Government seem to take the view that it is undesirable that a director should stand for election——

In his capacity as a director.

No one stands for election in his capacity as director. One stands as a person. If the Government take this extraordinary view that it is undesirable for a director of a State company to stand for election, I am puzzled by the Minister's assurance that the director will be re-appointed if he fails to be elected. If the Minister takes the view that it is undesirable for such a person to stand, I do not understand his guarantee to re-employ him as a director if he fails to be elected.

I am not guaranteeing his re-appointment in the Bill. There is no provision in the Bill whereby such a person would be re-appointed as a director if he fails to be elected to either House of the Oireachtas. I am just stating my personal view.

I can appreciate that, But I am a little puzzled that the Government take the view that it is undesirable for such a person to stand for election, and the Minister is prepared to re-appoint such a person if he fails to get in.

We are engaging in a sort of political dialectism. I think the Senator misquoted me. I did not say it was undesirable that the director of a State company should stand for election. I said that if he stands he should separate himself from the State company and stand only as a private person. I am concerned factually and by law and by Acts of the Oireachtas with him as director of a State company. I think we are beginning to quibble.

The dialectics and the quibbling are on the Minister's part and not on mine. Why is there such a vital distinction between a director standing for election while he is holding a directorship and a person standing for election after resigning his membership, when the public know that the Minister will re-appoint him if he does not get in? To suggest that that is a vital distinction is a quibble. I do not think I misquoted the Minister and I think the record will show that I quoted him correctly, although I may not have understood him correctly.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 15 and 16 agreed to.
SECTION 17.
Question proposed: "That section 17 stand part of the Bill".

This section deals with profit and loss accounts. I do not agree with the view expressed by the Minister on Second Stage that there is no possible merit in having standardised accounts. Perhaps the Minister did not understand me. I was not suggesting that the companies should be forced to use only one standardised form of accounts. The companies should be free to present their accounts in the ordinary way, in any form which is legally acceptable, but side by side with that form of accounts —and they are highly individualistic— there should be a standard form of accounts which would show a comparison between the different companies.

I fail to understand the Minister's suggestion that it is impossible to compare the performance of State companies because they are different. With respect, that is nonsense. It is possible to compare in some degree the performance of all companies on a comparable basis and to reach some valid conclusion, if for example, their depreciation is calculated on a comparable basis, and if their treatment of the different forms of expenditure is the same. It is certainly desirable that we should reach the stage where a reasonable comparison could be made between State companies. I undertook a job like that myself in regard to the State companies.

I would not wish to interfere with their freedom to present their accounts, but the Dáil, the Seanad and the public have a right to see this data presented on a comparable basis. There is no reason why that could not be done. In fact, I was taken aback by the Minister's attitude. I thought he had quite a lot of sympathy with this view, and I thought some consideration might be given to it. It seems extraordinary that the Minister should stand in the way of a reasonable proposal which even if it does not find favour in the Department of Transport and Power, would probably find favour in the Department of Finance.

There may be some value in what the Senator has said. I may have read this analysis of accounts which he made, but I should be glad to read it if I have not read it, and to see what benefit could be derived from a comparison. It would be extremely difficult in the case of the ESB which remunerates its capital, and the air company which has £13 million capital which it is unlikely ever to remunerate. I do not know what value there would be in comparing the accounts of two companies. There may be some limited value in it, but I should like to read the Senator's comment on it.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 18.
Question proposed: "That section 18 stand part of the Bill".

This section provides:

The appointment by the air companies of auditors shall be subject to the approval of the Minister given after consultation with the Minister for Finance.

I should like to ask the Minister if this is a universal provision in regard to State companies. There is some public concern in certain cases about the appointment of auditors, and it has been suggested that some appointments have been made under pressure of an undesirable character from a Minister. I should prefer to see it written in that the Minister shall have no power to influence the appointment of auditors. In saying this, I want to emphasise that I am not in any way reflecting on the Minister for Transport and Power. Indeed, if the Minister were responsible in all cases, I would not be in any way concerned. But I think it is undersirable that in the exercise of their power to appoint professional assistance of any kind, a State company should be influenced politically.

There is no evidence of State companies appointing incompetent auditors. I am not aware that there is criticism of that being done. If the board of a State company are appointed to run the company, they should be trusted to appoint the auditors, and it is undesirable that a political element should come into it. It would be equally undesirable if a Minister were to decide to appoint a solicitor or a person in any professional capacity.

I know of no reason for doing this. The fact that it is practised in certain cases has given rise to quite undesirable political controversy on the merits of which I do not pronounce. It is undesirable that a matter of this kind should be brought into public controversy in relation to a company with which the Minister is concerned. It is desirable that he should not be involved—I do not mean the present Minister but any Minister responsible for any State company. I would ask the Minister whether this is a universal arrangement in all State companies and whether in fact he thinks it is a desirable position.

This provision as far as I know is almost universal and certainly holds good in respect of State companies under my supervision. There is nothing sinister in it. There is no point in Senator FitzGerald trying to read anything sinister into it. I have not interfered in the appointment of auditors to the company and I do not intend to. The Minister for Finance is the sole shareholder in the air company and I do not see why he should not approve the appointment of auditors. I fail to see it.

I would hesitate to suggest that the Minister is politically innocent, but in fact this has been a matter of controversy about the State companies and indeed there has been public comment passed on this, and there have been unfortunate allegations that State companies have not been permitted to appoint the auditors they wished, highly reputable firms, but because of the use of this power by a Minister, have been required to appoint a particular firm of auditors with particular associations. Whether this is true or not is not relevant. The fact is that introducing this provision in the case of the air company or wherever it exists does not reflect favourably on the political situation. It seems to me that in view of the fact that this has been said, this point made, and that rumours of this kind exist, it would be better if Ministers did not involve themselves in this unless there was a very strong reason. If a Minister thinks that on certain occasions a State company might appoint negligent auditors who could not be trusted, then that might override all other considerations, but the Minister does not suggest that, and it seems, therefore, most undesirable to have political involvement in a matter which has created controversy because this power is given to a Minister. Again I am not referring to the present Minister at all but it has arisen in other cases and it is something to which we should give very serious consideration.

I absolutely disagree. I have never interfered in the appointment of auditors and never been pressed by anybody to interfere in the appointment of auditors by a company or to suggest to the chairman or directors of a company that a particular firm of auditors should be appointed. I am quite satisfied with the provisions of the Bill. I believe they will not be abused by this or any other Government.

I accept the Minister's personal assurance without hesitation but he has not answered my point at all. I am sure that it will not be abused by any Government, but even if one could be quite sure of that, the fact would remain that because this power is known to exist and in certain cases particular firms have been appointed and rumours have circulated that this was not the original intention of the board of directors but was a decision made by a Minister, we have a situation that despite the fact that we accept the Minister's assurance with regard to himself, the existence of this provision makes it possible for people to say things which reflect adversely on Irish politics, and if there is not good reason for putting in this provision, that is a very good reason for taking it out.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 19 to 23, inclusive, agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment, received for final consideration and passed.
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