I move amendment No. 1:
To delete subsection (3).
The offence which we are considering can be described as an establishment offence. It is hard to imagine how an individual could commit an offence against the Genocide Act. Consequently, we are thinking in terms of some kind of institution or establishment or Government committing this offence. It is therefore singularly inappropriate that you should have this restriction which says:
Proceedings for an offence of genocide shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Attorney General.
It is difficult to imagine this kind of offence being committed in this country by a Government or any establishment in this country, but if we are to consider the Bill at all we must consider the possibility that at some time somebody will commit an offence against it, or do something which somebody considers to be an offence against the Act. It is almost inconceivable that any Government or establishment in this country would commit the kinds of offences which are defined under (a) and (b) of Article 2 of the Convention. It is just possible that somebody might commit an offence which is defined under (c), that is "deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part".
Without going into details, you could possibly take a group such as the people in the Gaeltacht areas or itinerants, and that some body or establishment might do something— perhaps not fully understanding the impact of what they were doing— which could be regarded as an offence under this Act. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the Attorney General, being an establishment figure, would move against them. For that reason it should be possible for a citizen who takes a view that what is being done is an offence under this Bill to move to institute proceedings against the establishment or the institution concerned because of the fact that the Attorney General is unlikely to do so.
At an earlier stage the Minister referred to the fact that this offence was of an international character and that it was desirable and appropriate that the Attorney General should be the person to institute proceedings. In moving this amendment I am not suggesting that the Attorney General should not be entitled to institute proceedings, and the fact that this subsection is gone does not in any way interfere with the right of the Attorney General to take proceedings if he wishes to do so. It merely means that he is not the only one who can do so.
The Minister pointed out on the Second Stage that, even if a citizen was entitled to institute proceedings, the proceedings could only go as far as return for trial. That is correct. Nevertheless, if you have a situation where a person has been returned for trial and if it is in one of these grey areas I mentioned earlier, it would be difficult for an Attorney General not to take up the proceedings from there on, unless he was a very ruthless or arrogant Attorney General. In such a grey area, where a citizen felt strongly that what was happening was an offence under this Act, it would be difficult for the Attorney General not to take up the proceedings from there on. He would certainly be subject to very severe criticism, and public opinion would look very critically on his lack of action if he refused to take the proceedings from there.
This is an offence where the opportunity should be available for a citizen to take proceedings, no matter how unlikely it may be that the kind of situation would arise where that would be done. We are talking about an offence and about a situation which is most unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, if we are to take the Bill seriously we must conceive the possibility that this kind of situation might arise, and there should be freedom for the citizen to move.
I should like to refer to one other matter. In having this subsection in this Bill, the Minister is, to an extent, taking a step backwards. There were many offences and proceedings in the past where the State was involved and where the citizen could not take proceedings without the permission of the Attorney General. That was a situation that went back for many hundreds of years: it went back on the basis that the king could do no wrong, and consequently you could not proceed against the king. When we no longer had a king, the same principle applied to the State—the State could do no wrong. Some years ago that restriction was removed. It meant that a citizen could now proceed against the State. In the same way to some extent this Bill is now taking a step backwards and is reintroducing the concept which it was thought well to get rid of several years ago. For that reason, as well as for the others that I have mentioned, I would ask the Minister to consider removing this subsection from the Bill.