I move amendment No. 27:—
In page 20, Section 37 (1), to delete paragraph (e), lines 43 to 51, and insert in lieu thereof the following new paragraph:—
(e) in the case of a dwelling—
(i) the dwelling is reasonably required by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any person bona fide residing or to reside with him, and either—
(I) in the opinion of the court greater hardship would, owing to the special circumstances of the case, be caused by refusing the order for possession than by granting it, or
(II) the court is satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available, or
(ii) the dwelling is reasonably required by the landlord for occupation as a residence for some person in his whole time employment of some tenant from him, and the court is satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available, or.
Paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 provides that, in the case of a dwelling, the landlord may recover possession if he reasonably requires the premises for occupation as a residence for himself or for any person bona-fide residing or to reside with him or for some person in his whole-time employment or in the whole-time employment of some tenant from him, provided that the court considers that it would be a greater hardship to refuse the landlord possession than to allow the tenant to remain. The overriding provision that the court must consider it reasonable to make an order for possession applies also.
Paragraph (e) was the subject of a keen debate on Committee Stage and I undertook to reconsider the paragraph in the light of what was said on that occasion. I am now proposing in this amendment to substitute a new paragraph (e) which, I think, represents a considerable improvement on the existing draft and is fairer to both landlords and tenants. The proposed new paragraph distinguishes between the case in which the landlord requires possession for himself or for some person bona-fide residing or to reside with him and the case in which he requires possession for an employee of his own or of a tenant of his. In the former class of case it would seem reasonable to provide that the landlord should be entitled to get possession when he is able to satisfy the court that it would be a greater hardship to refuse him possession than to allow the tenant to remain on, or, alternatively, that other accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available for the tenant. For the landlord to be able to satisfy the court on either point should be sufficient. On the other hand, where possession is required for an employee, the landlord should be required to show that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant. The “greater hardship” clause should not operate in this class of case.
The amendment has been drafted accordingly on these lines and, as I have stated, I think that it is a distinct improvement on the present paragraph (e). In the case where the landlord wants the premises for an employee, he should be able to show that there was alternative accommodation for the occupying tenant.