I thank the Cathaoirleach, Deputies and Senators for the invitation to speak to the committee on the subject of EU security and defence. It is a little over 12 months since I last spoke to the committee, when I focused on opportunities for Ireland to address its own security and defence capabilities gaps. Today, I would like to speak on three main points: the challenges facing Ukraine in responding to Russia’s ongoing aggression and the implications for European security and defence; new initiatives at an EU level to further co-ordinate defence production, procurement and research that have emerged since we last spoke; and the policy challenges facing Ireland in dealing with this new security environment.
First, I will speak on Russia's war in Ukraine. Over the past 12 months, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself has been under strain. In recent weeks, in addition to small gains in the south east, Russia has begun to reopen a front in the Kharkiv region. While this may be a feint or a tactical manoeuvre, it signals Russia’s willingness to test the resolve of Ukraine, Europe and Ukraine's other allies. To date, these allies have provided enough support for Ukraine to survive, but not sufficient support to win. This is a problem for the EU for a number of reasons.
First, the EU has made clear it supports a European future for Ukraine, but an occupied or partially-occupied Ukraine cannot become a member state. The recent announcement of a draft bilateral security agreement, which sits alongside a number of other bilateral security agreements between Kyiv and European capitals, is a further public statement of EU intent. It reportedly excludes direct military participation by EU member state forces in defence of Ukraine, but it signals a further commitment to Ukraine's ongoing security. The second issue for the EU is that the view of the Russian threat varies significantly among EU member states. For those who share a border and, in some cases, minority populations with Russia, the damage to EU credibility as a security provider if it fails in this case may be fatal. Third, Russia has demonstrated throughout this conflict that it is a rational calculating actor, which is willing to escalate and de-escalate in response to the level of resistance it experiences. An appeasement approach has been taken since 2008, when Russia occupied parts of Georgia and subsequently parts of Ukraine and we are reaping the rewards of this approach today. Were Russia to succeed in redrawing European borders through force, it would have a significant destabilising effect on both the region and the world and a red line would be crossed.
In responding to this, the EU has engaged in a number of new initiatives in security and defence. While Ukraine may need further support, even the limited support provided to date has exposed limits in Europe’s defence production capacity. In response, the EU has attempted to move further than ever before in co-ordinating defence production, development and procurement in a more centralised manner. I apologise for the upcoming acronym tsunami that is about to come. First, through the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement Act, EDIRPA, and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, ASAP, which provide EU level supports to offset the risks of joint procurement and development and to co-ordinate the procurement of munitions. More recently, it has launched the European Defence Industrial Strategy, EDIS and the European Defence Industry Programme, EDIP. There is an initial fund of €1.5 billion for the programme until 2027. The purpose of the strategy and programme is to enhance the European defence technological and industrial base, to increase European capabilities and, in particular, to reduce reliance on external suppliers and customers and the geopolitical risk this entails during times of crisis.
A number of caveats need to be highlighted regarding how dramatic an impact these initiatives will have. The first is the low level of funding. A sum of €1.5 billion over three years across the entire EU is a small, in defence spending terms. That figure is unlikely to significantly shift the dial on European capabilities. For this reason, some European states are arguing for common European financing, either through mutually-raised debt or through future funding cycles. However, some member states remain sceptical, including Ireland due to concerns around neutrality, and Germany which has been reluctant to engage in common borrowing across a number of policy areas. Second, member states have different interests in defence industry policy, whether it is to protect domestic producers or to avoid over dependence on a reduced number of suppliers. That creates friction in co-ordinating procurement, research and development. Third, I highlight the failure of these initiatives to involve the UK. Brexit meant that the EU lost significant military capability and any credible approach to European autonomy in security and defence needs to rebuild the link to British defence capabilities.
Finally, one of the push factors driving the EU’s drive for greater self-reliance, the potential for a less reliable partner in the US, may paradoxically encourage some states to continue, and even increase, their purchase of US weapons systems. The first Trump administration demonstrated the President’s transactional approach to foreign policy. Being a good customer to the US defence industry will likely outweigh any normative commitments in a second Trump White House. However, even if the impact of the EDIS is limited in terms of developing EU military capability, it signals a direction of travel and is working in the same direction as initiatives within NATO and national levels among member states. They indicate an increased level of investment in European security and defence, which reflects the changed threat environment. It is in this context that Ireland needs to consider its position.
Ireland, of course, has not been immune to this increased attention to security and defence. To date, Ireland has also been an active participant in EU battle groups and military CSDP missions, which have, with one exception, operated under UN mandates compatible with the triple lock approach to deployment. However, the geo-strategic location of Ireland, in particular its central role regarding communications networks, has brought more external focus on our lack of capabilities. These gaps are well documented and the Government has committed to achieving level of ambition 2 at least, as identified by the Commission on the Defence Forces. The reality is Ireland has significant choices to make on its own security and defence. The lack of a published national security strategy and associated review process to help frame the political debate around these choices is really regrettable.
Ireland has a number of gaps in capabilities and needs to decide how those gaps might be addressed. Greater integration in EU security and defence initiatives, including those outlined above but also PESCO, in particular, is one potential avenue, which we have begun to explore. Closer co-operation with NATO though an enhanced partnership agreement is another. Again, steps have been taken by Government to move forward on this. A third is to examine more bilateral or mini-lateral arrangements with like-minded states or states with whom we share a common border. There are examples of how these work in central Europe where the Visegrad countries have agreed to provide for Slovakia’s air defence while it transitions to F-16s, and in the Benelux countries, where the Netherlands and Belgium operate a joint rapid air response capability.
In conclusion, these are, unfortunately, challenging times for the security of small states like Ireland and for the security of Europe. We need to take steps to protect our interests and, as a small state, these steps will likely need to be with partners. How deep those partnerships go and with whom they should be is a vital political question that needs urgent attention.
