Mr. T. Dalton (Secretary General of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform) and Mr. D. O'Callaghan (Secretary General of the Department of Defence) called and examined.
Analysis of the Cost and Usage of Air Support
Introduction
The Garda Air Support Unit (GASU) has been operational since September 1997. It operates a twin engine helicopter and a fixed wing aircraft out of Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel. The unit is staffed by Gardaí who have responsibility for the operations of the unit, while the Air Corps are responsible for maintenance, hangarage, pilotage and flight safety which are governed by military regulations.
Audit Objectives and Scope
The purpose of the audit was to undertake an analysis of the cost and usage of the helicopter and fixed wing aircraft from September 1997 to December 2000. The key objectives of the audit were to:
1. Examine the background to the purchase of both aircraft
2. Establish and analyse the initial capital cost
3. Establish and analyse the ongoing running costs of both the GASU and the Air Corps
4. Establish and analyse the usage of the assets 1997 - 2000
5. Compare actual costs and actual usage with the budgeted figures
6. Identify the procedures employed to establish, analyse and maximize the effectiveness of the usage of the assets in support of Garda operations.
Background
Historically the Air Corps have provided air support to the Garda Síochána. From 1993 to 1995, the Air Corps flew an average of 680 hours per annum in support of Garda operations. This support was however limited to daylight hours and to favourable weather conditions due to the type of aircraft available. Tactical response by the Garda Síochána to serious crime was constrained by these limitations.
In May 1995, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (the Minister) established an Inter-Departmental Working Group ("the Group") to examine all aspects of air support for the Garda Síochána and to determine how best to provide the Force with the most effective air support. The Group comprised representatives of the Departments of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Department of Justice), Defence and Finance, the Garda Síochána and two representatives from Aer Lingus (the latter to provide the necessary technical expertise).
In March 1996, the Group, in a report to the Minister entitled "Report on Air Support for the Garda Síochána" indicated that there were significant limitations in the existing arrangement with the Air Corps. These resulted from the lack of suitable aircraft to provide continuous airborne surveillance in all weather conditions and during the hours of darkness. The Group noted that 40% of indictable crimes and 48% of robbery, armed robbery and burglary occurred during the hours of darkness.
The Group concluded that:
7. Air support was a vital resource for the Garda Síochána in implementing its strategies to combat crime particularly organised crime gangs, drug trafficking, paramilitary activity and serious mobile crime
8. The capability to operate outside daylight hours and in unfavourable weather conditions was a crucial element of Garda tactical requirements and
9. The most effective means of providing the Garda Síochána with such air support was to establish a dedicated air support unit with twenty-four hour capability.
Government Approval
The Group recommended the establishment of a dedicated Garda air support unit piloted by the Air Corps but with operational control and policing responsibility resting with the Garda Síochána. It concluded that the Unit should be set up with a helicopter and a fixed wing airplane. A single engine helicopter was recommended. The Group was undecided as to whether the fixed wing plane should be single or twin engine. It felt that decision could best be taken when determining the final tender specifications or possibly during the tender evaluation process.
The Group estimated the cost of operating the Unit from 1996 to 2000 at £3.79mviz. initial capital costs of acquisition for aircraft and mission equipment £2.62m with operating costs over five years of approximately £1.17m. The Group reported that the equivalent estimated cost of an independent unit operated by the Garda Síochána alone would be £5.69m viz. £3.62m for capital costs of acquisition, hangar and office accommodation and operating costs of approximately £2.07m.
The Air Corps had indicated it would be willing to provide air support with twenty-four hour capability if the appropriate aircraft were available and could provide back-up in terms of additional aircraft if operational needs so demanded.
The Minister, in a Memorandum to Government dated 17 April 1996, sought approval to establish a dedicated Garda Air Support Unit as recommended by the Group. The Minister for Defence fully supported the proposal and confirmed that the Air Corps would be available to operate the air support unit as recommended in the Report of the Inter-Departmental Group. The Minister for Finance had no objections in principle to the proposal, provided that the financial and staff resources of the Garda Síochána required to run the unit would be provided from existing agreed allocations for the Justice group of Votes.
On 23 April 1996, the Government approved the establishment of a dedicated Garda Air Support Unit as recommended by the Group. Approval was given for the purchase of two aircraft with twenty-four hour capability, namely one helicopter for observation/patrol duties at an estimated capital cost of £1.2m and one fixed-wing airplane for technical surveillance purposes at an estimated capital cost of £1.35m.
Purchase of Aircraft
A Technical Subgroup drawn from the Group and from the Air Corps prepared draft tender specifications for both aircraft. In light of these draft specifications, and previous consideration of Garda operational requirements, including the balance of safety and cost, the Group decided to seek tenders for both single and twin engine aircraft. The Group also took account of changed Garda operational requirements for increased offshore air support capability. The Garda authorities were advised, after tenders had been sought, that the Air Corps would not operate single engine aircraft at night, over urban areas or over water. It was also established that the majority of other Police Air Support Units in the U.K. and Europe were using twin engine aircraft and intended to phase out the use of single engine aircraft.
In view of the perceived requirement for sensitivity and secrecy regarding operations of the Garda Síochána and the exacting nature of the technical specifications in the tender documentation, the Group decided that the proposed contracts fell within the ambit of the EU Supplies Directive 93/36/EEC permitting the use of a restricted tender procedure. On 18 July 1996 the Department of Justice invited tenders for both aircraft from a restricted list of manufacturers.
The tenders received for each aircraft were ranked according to tendered contract price. Five tenders were received for the fixed-wing airplane. The two lowest tenders were rejected because they were for a single engine airplane. The next lowest - a twin engine plane - was recommended at a contract price of £2,382,207 excluding VAT. Five of the tenders received for the supply and delivery of the helicopter were for a single engine design, with five others proposing twin engine craft. The lowest tender for a twin engine design (third lowest overall) was recommended at a contract price of £2,025,672 excluding VAT.
On 15 November 1996, the Department of Justice sought sanction from the Department of Finance to award the contracts to the recommended firms. The Department attributed the substantial increase in purchase price of each aircraft when compared to the original approved estimate to the
10. subsequent decision to select twin engine aircraft
11. reality of current market prices that emerged only on receipt of the tenders
12. exclusion of any allowance for VAT in the original estimate of cost.
On 28 November 1996, the Department of Finance sanctioned expenditure of up to £5.56m including VAT for the establishment of a dedicated Garda Air Support Unit (GASU).
Separate contracts were entered into by the Minister in December 1996 for the supply of one equipped BN2T - 4S Defender 4000 Airplane at a cost of £2,882,470 including VAT and one equipped AS 355N Ecureuil Helicopter at a cost of £2,451,064 including VAT.
The increase in the capital costs associated with the establishment of the Garda Air Support Unit are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1 - Increase in costs of Garda Air Support Unit
|
Fixed Wing £m
|
Helicopter £m
|
Ancillary £m
|
Total Cost £m
|
|
Government approved Department of Finance sanctioned
|
1.35
|
1.20
|
.07
|
2.62
|
|
|
|
|
5.56
|
|
Final Contract Price
|
2.88
|
2.45
|
.33
|
5.66
|
Garda Air Support Unit
The stated purpose of the GASU according to its Mission Statement is to provide a patrol/response/surveillance capability, both overt and covert, in support of operational ground units of the Garda Síochána1.
1An Garda Síochána (1997) HQ Directive 155/97.
The official operation of both aircraft commenced on 1 September 1997. A fully equipped building has been purpose-built at Casement Aerodrome and has been occupied by the Unit since 18 June 2000.
The GASU has a staff complement of four Sergeants and twelve Gardaí under the command of a Superintendent. Nine Air Corps pilots are assigned to the Unit: five pilots to the fixed-wing airplane and four pilots to the helicopter.
Requests for the services of the GASU are made directly to the base at Baldonnel or via the Garda Communications Centre, Harcourt Square, Dublin. GASU staff monitor Garda Communications Channels and may deploy an aircraft to any incident that would benefit from GASU assistance. A purpose built computer system was installed in the GASU building to record and monitor all such operations carried out by the aircraft.
At present, the GASU operates an immediate response from 7am to 1am daily, with helicopter response times of 2 to 5 minutes to airborne and the fixed wing airplane 10 to 15 minutes to airborne. From 1am to 7 am, the Unit operates an on-call service with a 40-minute response time to airborne for both aircraft.
Garda Operational Costs
The Garda Síochána is responsible for the salaries and allowances, training and subsistence costs of the Gardaí assigned to the GASU. These costs for the period September 1997 to December 2000 are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 - Garda Staff Costs
|
Cost
|
1997 2
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
|
£
|
£
|
£
|
£
|
|
Salaries
|
172,481
|
517,443
|
674,332
|
689,250
|
|
Training
|
-
|
6,000
|
9,800
|
2,790
|
|
Subsistence
|
10,175
|
9,037
|
13,721
|
9,789
|
|
Total
|
182,656
|
532,480
|
697,853
|
701,829
|
Air Corps Operational Costs
The Air Corps bear the costs of pilots, technical support, repairs and maintenance and fuel for both aircraft. These costs, for the period September 1997 to December 2000, provided by the Department of Defence, are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 - Air Corps Costs
|
Cost
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
|
£
|
£
|
£
|
£
|
|
Pilots Salaries
|
141,121
|
244,523
|
303,347
|
310,793
|
|
Technical Support Salaries
|
119,898
|
505,320
|
622,933
|
542,467
|
|
Training
|
58,560
|
39,945
|
67,643
|
14,800
|
|
Repairs and Maintenance
|
61,230
|
679,101
|
510,210
|
559,089
|
|
Fuel
|
55,326
|
109,220
|
98,917
|
94,701
|
|
Total
|
434,135
|
1,538,164
|
1,603,050
|
1,521,850
|
It should be noted that there were significant variations between budgeted and actual expenditure in respect of the combined costs of repairs and maintenance and fuel over the years 1997-2000 as shown in Table 4.
2From 1 September 1997 to 31 December 1997.
Table 4 - Total Air Corps Maintenance and Fuel Costs
|
Year
|
Budget 3 £m
|
Actual £m
|
|
1997
|
125,000
|
116,556
|
|
1998
|
275,000
|
788,321
|
|
1999
|
275,000
|
609,127
|
|
2000
|
275,000
|
653,790
|
|
Total
|
1,100,000
|
2,167,794
|
Total Operational Costs
The operational costs of providing the Garda Air Support Unit over the years 1997-2000 are summarised in Table 5.
Table 5 - Total Operational Expenditure
|
Cost
|
1997 £
|
1998 £
|
1999 £
|
2000 £
|
Total £
|
|
Garda Staff
|
182,656
|
532,480
|
697,853
|
701,829
|
2,114,818
|
|
Air Corps Staff
|
319,579
|
789,788
|
993,923
|
868,060
|
2,971,350
|
|
Maintenance
|
116,556
|
788,321
|
609,127
|
653,790
|
2,074,862
|
|
Total
|
618,791
|
2,110,589
|
2,300,903
|
2,223,679
|
7,253,962
|
GASU Operations
The unit supports Garda operations such as Crime Prevention Patrols, Intelligence Gathering, Anti-drug Operations and Traffic Management. A computer system installed in the GASU headquarters at Baldonnel records and monitors all GASU operations. Both flight details and task details are recorded. Information in respect of downtime, numbers of flights/tasks undertaken, hours flown and a breakdown of some outcomes are given in respect of each aircraft in Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 6 - Airplane Flights, Tasks and Results
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
|
Hours to be covered per annum 4
|
2,920
|
8,760
|
8,760
|
8,760
|
|
Downtime
|
513(18%)
|
1,681(19%)
|
2,688(31%)
|
3,202(37%)
|
|
Hours Available
|
2,407
|
7,079
|
6,072
|
5,558
|
|
Hours Flown
|
323(13%)
|
971(14%)
|
831(14%)
|
455(8%)
|
|
Average Hours Flown per Day
|
3.5
|
2.7
|
2.3
|
1.3
|
|
Flights/Tasks Undertaken
|
208
|
576
|
479
|
331
|
|
Direct Arrests
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
7
|
|
Assisted Arrests
|
2
|
16
|
10
|
0
|
|
Missing Persons Recovered
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
|
Vehicles Recovered
|
1
|
7
|
0
|
4
|
|
Property Recovered
|
£8,751,500
|
£4,936,200
|
£2,800,000
|
£9,500
|
3 Based on the estimate presented to Government on the basis of single engined aircraft and annual usage of approximately 1250 hours.
4 Number of days per year by 24 hours.
Table 7 - Helicopter Flights, Tasks and Results
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
|
Hours to be covered per annum 5
|
2,920
|
8,760
|
8,760
|
8,760
|
|
Downtime
|
286(10%)
|
1,776(20%)
|
1,810(20%)
|
2,515(29%)
|
|
Hours Available
|
2,634
|
6,984
|
6,950
|
6,245
|
|
Hours Flown
|
376(14%)
|
930(13%)
|
884(13%)
|
763(12%)
|
|
Average Hours Flown per Day
|
4
|
2.5
|
2.4
|
2
|
|
Flights/Tasks Undertaken
|
512
|
1,277
|
1,295
|
1,163
|
|
Direct Arrests
|
8
|
79
|
114
|
134
|
|
Assisted Arrests
|
53
|
94
|
105
|
93
|
|
Missing Persons Recovered
|
3
|
5
|
4
|
8
|
|
Vehicles Recovered
|
45
|
90
|
62
|
52
|
|
Property Recovered
|
£221,000
|
£379,950
|
£1,333,750
|
£239,800
|
Down Time
The main reasons for downtime on both aircraft are Garda Equipment Failure, Mechanical Defect, Re-Fuelling, Servicing, Technical Equipment Failure, Weather Conditions and No Pilot available. The most significant downtime is caused by servicing needs of both aircraft, which has averaged 64 occurrences and 1220 hours for the airplane and 76 occurrences and 1479 hours for the Helicopter for the years 1999 and 2000.
Task Denials
Requests for assistance are reviewed by the Sergeant-in-charge of the GASU from an operations point of view and by the Air Corps from a safety point of view. It is not possible for the GASU to respond to all requests. A record is maintained of the number of task denials and the reasons for the denial. Table 8 gives details of the task denials for both Aircraft for each year.
Table 8 - Task Denials
|
Reason
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
Totals
|
|
No Pilot
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
5
|
|
Servicing
|
4
|
5
|
14
|
15
|
38
|
|
Time Lapse
|
1
|
6
|
13
|
12
|
32
|
|
Task Inappropriate
|
5
|
23
|
24
|
19
|
71
|
|
On Standby
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
|
Weather Conditions
|
4
|
32
|
13
|
22
|
71
|
|
Area not Contained
|
1
|
2
|
8
|
9
|
20
|
|
Insufficient Information
|
2
|
3
|
12
|
10
|
27
|
|
Aircraft Mechanical Defect
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
15
|
|
Higher Priority Task
|
0
|
12
|
13
|
8
|
33
|
|
ATC 6 Refused Access
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
5
|
8
|
|
Incident Terminated
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
|
Garda Equipment Failure
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
|
Air Corps Directive 12/99 7
|
0
|
0
|
14
|
18
|
32
|
|
Other
|
0
|
6
|
10
|
8
|
24
|
|
Total Tasks Denied
|
20
|
99
|
130
|
135
|
384
|
|
Total Tasks Undertaken
|
720
|
1,853
|
1,774
|
1,494
|
5,841
|
|
Tasks Denied as % Tasks Undertaken
|
2.8%
|
5.3%
|
7.3%
|
9.0%
|
6.6%
|
Weather Conditions
The Department of Defence points out that all flying operations are subject to weather to some degree and, therefore, despite the Working Group's analysis of Garda requirements, the provision of continuous airborne surveillance in all weather conditions is not possible
Training and Safety
The Air Corps are responsible for the training of pilots assigned to the GASU while the Garda Síochána are responsible for the training of observers assigned to the Unit. Initial pilot and observer training took place prior to the official commencement of operations.
5Number of days per year by 24 hours.
6Air Traffic Control.
7Directive on night flying pursuant to Air Accident Report.
As a result of an air traffic incident over Co. Clare involving the helicopter on 12 May 1999, the Air Accident Investigation Unit of the Department of Public Enterprise carried out an investigation. Its report of the 26 August 1999 recommended inter alia that
13. The Air Corps should suspend GASU helicopter night operations in rural areas with immediate effect until GASU pilots complete an effective programme of extra night flying. (SR 30 of 1999)
14. The Air Corps should conduct an intensive course of night flying to achieve at least a minimum of 100 hours for each GASU helicopter pilot and those marked for GASU in 2000. This course should commence immediately, with a target date of completion by end of March 2000.
The need to provide adequate levels of training has given rise to disparate proposals
15. The leasing of an AS355N helicopter recommended in the report of the Air Accident Investigation Unit of the Department of Public Enterprise
16. Citation by the Minister for Justice of training of specialised Garda units as one of the arguments in favour of the purchase of a second Garda helicopter.
17. An announcement by the Minister for Defence in February 2000 that an AS 355 helicopter was to be acquired for the Air Corps as soon as possible for the purpose of pilot training in connection with the operation of the GASU
18. The Department of Justice raised the possibility of paying for Air Corps pilots to get night training abroad but this was not pursued because the Air Corps/Defence favoured purchasing or leasing a helicopter specifically for training.
In practice minimal use has been made of either existing aircraft for pilot or observer training. Only 104 flight hours have been recorded for pilot training. This represents less than 2% of hours flown and less than 0.3% of hours available. The hours used for observer training are less still totalling 17 over the4-year period. The Department of Justice has informed me that while the Gardaí have offered to release the existing helicopter to the Air Corps for night training between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m., this offer has not been taken up because the hours were not suitable. The Air Corps advised the Department in June 2001 that neither the existing nor ordered helicopter could be used for night training as while both can be fitted with dual controls, they do not have dual instrumentation.
Second Helicopter
The Minister submitted a Memorandum to Government on 5 November 1998 seeking approval for the purchase of a second Helicopter for the GASU. Arguments advanced in favour of the proposal included
19. making good downtime due to scheduled servicing of the first Helicopter estimated at up to 60 days a year.
20. provision of air cover outside the Dublin Metropolitan Area
21. provision of increased traffic control capability
22. provision of training.
On 10 November 1998 the Government approved the acquisition of a second twin engine Helicopter with a 24 hour capability for the GASU at a total cost of approximately £2.54m. A tender competition under EU procurement regulations was held in January 1999. Four tenders were received from three companies including a tender for the supply of an AS 355 helicopter akin to that delivered in 1997. A Technical Committee that included a representative of the Air Corps and a Financial Committee reviewed the tenders. Both Committees recommended the purchase of an EC 135 Helicopter on the grounds that it was quieter and more versatile than the AS 355, cheaper to maintain and a more modern aircraft.
Department of Finance sanction and Government Contracts Committee approval was received in June 1999 for the purchase at a cost of £3.5m.
Air Corps and Garda representatives evaluated the proposed craft at the suppliers in August 1999 and following this evaluation the GASU Garda representatives assured the Department of Justice that there were no major difficulties with signing the contract.
A contract was signed on 6 August 1999 and a down payment of approximately £204,000 was made to the company. The contract stated that the Avionics and Mission Equipment were to be agreed by 6 September 1999 in order to assure delivery in March 2000.
This deadline was not met, as there was a difference of opinion between the Air Corps and the Garda Síochána on the need for the inclusion of certain features including an autopilot in the EC 135. The tender submitted had not included an autopilot although the specification document agreed at Technical Sub-committee in December 1998 provided for one. The company by letter in October 1999 stated that it had halted production work on the Garda EC 135 and that delivery would be in November 2000 if agreement could be reached on the avionics and the autopilot. The Report of the Air Accident Investigation Team had recommended that all future helicopters should be fitted with a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and a Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The Department of Justice informed the Department of Defence in November 1999 that the new Helicopter would be fitted for such equipment.
In December 1999 the Department of Defence wrote to the Department of Justice appending a document in which the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Air Corps set out his views on the purchase of the EC 135 in some detail. These included
23. The EC 135 is not the most suitable aircraft for GASU operations on the basis of its single engine performance capability, the lack of flight evaluation, lower fuel endurance than other aircraft and it does not have the same range and radius of action as other aircraft in its class.
24. The operation of two different Helicopters by the Garda Síochána poses difficulties in economy of scale from a maintenance and flying point of view.
25. Training of pilots and maintenance staff will have to be duplicated.
26. There will be inefficiencies and a need to hold two different sets of spare parts.
27. Rostering of pilots and maintenance staff will be extremely difficult.
28. It would duplicate the current difficulties being experienced of pilot ratings.
29. The purchase of the EC 135 should be discontinued in favour of a second AS 355.
Notwithstanding these views the GOC concluded that the EC135 could complete the GASU mission. On this basis the Department of Defence accepted that it would be appropriate to proceed with the purchase of the EC135 fitted with an autopilot. A second payment for the helicopter of £2.096m was made in December 1999.
At a meeting in February 2000 most of the issues relating to the fitting of flight equipment to the Helicopter were resolved between the Garda Síochána and the Air Corps. The Department of Justice then sought a new delivery date from the supplier. The indications were that the Helicopter would be built by October 2000. It would then have to be fitted out with the Garda equipment. The Department confirmed to the company in March 2000 the specification of optional equipment, avionics and mission equipment to be fitted to the EC 135. The Department of Finance sanctioned an additional amount of £500,000 in May 2000 for the increased cost of the EC 135 due to the inclusion of an autopilot and digital avionics.
The EC 135 was delivered to a fitting out contractor in December 2000. It is expected that it will not now be delivered to the GASU before September 2001 at the earliest. The estimated cost to date of the EC 135 is £4m. The Garda Síochána and the Air Corps have not yet concluded an operation, servicing and hangaring agreement for the new craft.
Conclusions
30. The decision to opt for twin engine craft was not taken until after tenders had been received which suggests that the requirement, arising from evolving safety concerns, may not have been properly researched before then. This decision led to a significant increase in costs over original estimates.
31. Full coverage by helicopter has not been achieved since September 1999 due to failure to train for night flying. Overall, the integration of training and operational needs does not appear to have been managed effectively to-date.
32. Operational costs, and, in particular, repairs, maintenance and fuel costs have been far in excess of what was envisaged.
33. The Air Corps put forward serious cost and operational implications of having two different types of helicopter after the contract for the second helicopter was entered into.
34. The second helicopter has not been delivered two years after a contract for its supply was signed. It is not possible to say if this delay was as a result of difficulties in agreeing the type of equipment to be fitted
35. The Department of Justice and the Department of Defence have been unable to come to agreement on the role of the Air Corps in the operation of the new craft. The arrangements whereby the Air Corps would fly and maintain this craft are currently being reviewed by both Departments.
36. Split responsibility for the operation of the unit has not been conducive to the effective and efficient delivery of the service and has impacted adversely on its financial management.
Mr. Purcell
According to the agenda, the first matter to be dealt with is the Garda air support. That is reflected in a section from my 2000 report which records the results of an examination of the procurement and operation of an aeroplane and helicopter for dedicated use as air support to the Garda. It will be recalled that the committee touched on this matter previously during its examination of the Accounting Officer of the Department of Defence last December.
Following the Government decision in April 1996 the two aircraft were purchased under a restricted tender procedure and officially commenced operations in September 1997. The total capital cost for both was £5.66 million. I will stick with pounds because we are dealing with it in a historical context. That particular figure was £3 million in excess of the estimated cost presented to the Government but the additional expenditure was covered by Department of Finance approval. The arrangement for operating the air support unit provided that the Air Corps would bear the cost of the pilots, technical support, repairs, maintenance and fuel, while the Garda Síochána would be responsible for the remuneration, expenses and training costs of the gardaí assigned to the unit. The operational costs to the end of 2000, which are recorded in the report, total £7.25 million with maintenance and fuel expenses costing twice as much as had been envisaged in the original estimate.
The availability of air support is clearly essential to the effective operation of a modern police force and while much good work has been achieved, there have been problems that have militated against optimum use of the resource. Helicopter night operations in rural areas have been suspended since August 1999 because of concerns over the Air Corps pilots expertise to operate safely in such conditions. I understand that the required night flying training to enable this to be overcome is now being undertaken. The Defender aeroplane was grounded for almost nine months in 2001 following safety concerns relating to the weight of the equipment on board. Clearly, this would have had an impact on the delivery of this service.
Although a contract for a second helicopter for the unit was signed in August 1999, the fully fitted-out helicopter only commenced Garda operations on 1 February this year. Quibbling over the required level of equipment, among other factors, contributed to the delay. In November 2001, the Government approved a proposal from the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to contract out the piloting and maintenance of the new helicopter with a view to assessing alternative arrangements in terms of efficiency and cost effectiveness. I welcomed this development, as one of the main concerns expressed in my report was that the then existing arrangements might not have been conducive to the effective and efficient delivery of the service and may have impacted adversely on its financial management. However, the proposed arrangements did not materialise for legal reasons on which I am sure the Accounting Officers will be able to elaborate. Although maintenance for the new helicopter has been contracted out, the Air Corps provides the pilots as heretofore.
I invite Mr. Dalton to make a brief opening statement.
Mr. Dalton
I have provided a rather lengthy statement, which I assume the committee does not wish me to read in full, although I can do so if that is appropriate.
An abbreviated outline of the salient points will be adequate. May we publish the full statement?
Mr. Dalton
Certainly. I also have a summary of my statement, which I can present.
Mr. Dalton
By way of background, certain matters need to be borne in mind in relation to the Garda air support unit. First, it was - and still is - a relatively new concept in the Garda force and, inevitably, there was an element of trial and error at the outset. Quite frankly, we are still in the process of learning the best way of doing things. Second - this may not have been fully understood at the outset - the level of skill and experience required to fly a police helicopter is not the same as for other operations. A police helicopter is not usually flying on a point to point basis but is almost invariably following a target on the ground. That requires a higher level of skills and I am not sure that point was fully appreciated at the beginning. Third, technological developments are constantly taking place and it sometimes makes sense, half way through a programme, to opt for a new piece of technology which has just become available, even if it is more expensive than older technology.
In 1997, the Government decided there should be an air support unit and, as the Comptroller has said, that it should be piloted by the Air Corps. It was also decided there should be a fixed wing aircraft and a helicopter. An expert group considered the options as between a single engine or twin engine helicopter and recommended a single engine, which was less expensive at £1.2 million as against £2.6 million for the twin engine. Both figures are exclusive of VAT. Eventually, in view of developments elsewhere in Europe and emerging practice elsewhere, a decision was made to opt for a twin engine helicopter, mainly for safety reasons. This was sanctioned by the Department of Finance. While there was a difference between the original figure put to Government and the eventual figure, Government was made aware at the time of the possibility of opting for a twin engine aircraft, as was subsequently decided for good reasons of safety.
Initially, the helicopter carried out night flying operations and this continued until 1999, when there was an air incident in County Clare. I believe that occurred during the visit of Mrs. Clinton, when the aircraft accidentally went into a cloud bank. This gave rise to some concern and, as is routine in all such cases, the matter was examined by the air accident unit of the Department of Public Enterprise, which recommended that night flying should cease immediately. Accordingly, there was no option at that time other than to cease night flying operations. The assessment was that Air Corps pilots would require more training for night flying operations. The Comptroller has mentioned this but, as I have said, we did not have a choice but to discontinue, for safety reasons. Obviously, that limited the effectiveness of the air support unit. However, that should not be overstated because many of the operations happened to be over urban areas, particularly Dublin as that is where most of the action occurs.
The Comptroller commented on the fact that there was split responsibility for the air support unit as between the Departments of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Defence and between the Air Corps and the Garda Síochána and that this probably did not make for an ideal management structure. I would not disagree with that. Obviously, where one has split responsibility for any operation, it is not ideal. However, it was inherent in the original idea that we should have the aircraft piloted by the Air Corps and operated by the Garda. As I said, we were in a new situation and it made a great deal of sense at the time that the Garda would make use of an existing State resource in the form of trained pilots. As the Comptroller mentioned - I will come to this later - we also considered, subsequently, the desirability of continuing as we are.
There were teething difficulties at first. There are different cultures in each organisation. As a general proposition, I believe it is fair to say the Garda would sometimes wish to take on operations in a hurry whereas Air Corps people experienced in the limitations of flying these machines might be a little more cautious. There were, perhaps, certain tensions and misunderstandings but I am glad to say all of this has now settled down and there is a better understanding of the requirements of each party. In 1998, the Government decided to buy a second helicopter of a different type - in fact, it was of the next generation. We were aware that this would give rise to difficulties with regard to maintenance and so on, having regard to the experience of the Air Corps. However, it made sense to opt for that helicopter because it carried a promise of 30% less down-time and a significant difference in maintenance costs. Although the new helicopter was of a different type, it was provided by the same manufacturer in Germany. There was an understanding that maintenance would be out-sourced as is now the case. I fully acknowledge that an element of delay arose in the delivery of that aircraft, as I have detailed in the notes circulated. I will not go into all the details unless the committee wishes me to do so.
Basically, there were differences of view between the Garda and the Air Corps in relation to the need for auto pilot in particular. The Garda took the view that a similar aircraft was being used by the British police forces without auto pilot. On the other hand, the Air Corps insisted from the beginning on auto pilot. Given the experience of the Air Corps, that was probably the right view and, indeed, the aircraft now has auto pilot. When we looked into it, we found that pilots in the UK have considerably more flying experience than our Air Corps, though I hasten to add that the Air Corps is doing an excellent job and has done so for many years. However, there was a safety issue involved and it had to be fully debated. That caused some delay but, in the final analysis I do not believe it was the major delaying factor.
Eventually, the aircraft was delivered from Germany to McAlpine in Oxford in December 2001. It was always envisaged that McAlpine would carry out the finishing off in terms of fitting specialised Garda equipment - that was always part of the deal. There was also provision for a subsequent testing period for that equipment. In November, prior to the aircraft reaching Oxford, the Government decided to look at the idea of privatisation, having regard to cost factors, the fact that the aircraft would have to be maintained independently of the Air Corps in any event, the possibility of buying in private sector expertise and flying experience and several considerations of that nature. That being said, it would be with great reluctance we would move away from the Air Corps, because it is a State resource and it is probably of benefit to Air Corps pilots to have the experience of flying police helicopter services. There were many reasons for each option.
However, given the general trend towards out-sourcing where that approach promises cost savings, the Government decided that we should at least look at this option. An inter-departmental group was set up to give effect to this and see it through. It was only after we had been in session for about two or three months that a major problem arose, in that it emerged that a State aircraft could not be registered on the civil register in this country. There are only two registers, civil and military - we do not have a police register. That is a matter for examination by the committee concerned. We decided that the best approach was to continue to examine the option of privatisation, which is still ongoing and, in the meantime, to go back to the Air Corps with a view to getting an aircraft up and running as it appeared we were facing several further months delay while the registration issue was being considered.
That had taken place in March and another issue then arose. The Air Corps had to check every item on the helicopter to confirm that it should be registered on the military register. This seems to be routine procedure. It is very slow and time-consuming. The records of literally every part of the aircraft have to be traced, involving the records of all agents. All of that took time. I understand it is not unusual that that should take several months to complete. The end result, as the Auditor has noted, is that the aircraft did not become available until the end of 2002 and is now in operation.
I acknowledge without any dispute that the experience of buying this second plane was not what one could describe as a model of best practice. All I can say is that there were reasons along the way. Things that were done for genuine reasons, like trying privatisation, caused difficulty. The fact that there were not clear understandings about the need for an auto-pilot also caused difficulty and there were delays. Overall, however, I cannot say there was any significant cost involved, if at all. There was the loss of the aircraft in that it was not flying for a period of 18 months when it might have been and, obviously, that is a loss in law and order terms. While being held in the UK, hanger and maintenance costs came to £2,500 sterling per month but had the aircraft been flying we would certainly have had maintenance costs, which would probably have been in excess of that. Apart from that, we got the helicopter well within the kind of figure that was quoted to the Government. The original estimate was €4.4 million and we eventually paid €4.17 million so I do not think there was an identifiable cost in that sense. There was a cost, however, in that the plane was not available for 12 to 18 months.
Is it not true that the Government approved the establishment of a specialised unit in the belief that it would cost the State €3.79 million in the period 1996-2000? Is it not true that it actually cost the State €13 million instead?
Mr. Dalton
I cannot confirm those figures, Chairman. I do not know where the €13 million comes from.
That is the capital cost, which has doubled from the initial projections.
Mr. Dalton
I do not think that is correct. The Government was made aware, in relation to capital costs, that a single engine option would cost a certain amount, which we recommended. A twin-engined aircraft would cost considerably more - about twice as much actually. The Government was not in any sense deceived about this and it would have been quite disappointed had we gone for an unsafe option in the end, despite the fact that it was told a lower figure at the beginning. The Government was in no doubt that going for a twin-engined option would cost more. We did that for solid safety reasons and I do not think any other decision on our part would have been responsible.
As regards maintenance costs, there is an increase but I am not in a position to deal with the maintenance side of it because that was a matter for the Department of Defence.
Is it not true that the GASU helicopter flew only two hours a day on average in 2000? Is it not true, also, that the GASU aircraft flew only for one hour and 20 minutes? When one does the sums they indicate that it is costing €1,500 per hour to keep each aircraft in the air.
Mr. Dalton
I am not in a position to follow up those calculations, Chairman, and I have not been put on notice about them. However, no Garda helicopter or plane would be flying on a 24-hour basis in any event. The amount of flying time one expects from a helicopter is not substantial. For example, as regards the first helicopter, the guide is that for every ten hours flying time, 20 hours maintenance is needed. Apart from that, the helicopter would not be used by night. In addition, the machines are used when they are needed. For example, a fixed-wing aircraft is not put out by night unless there is a need for it. That is used substantially for counter-subversive operations, which are not going on all the time. However, I do not think it is right to take the number of hours it was in operation and conclude that, therefore, the rest was waste, because all planes are on the ground for a certain amount of time.
Perhaps the Accounting Officer for the Department of Defence could brief us on those figures. I will be disappointed if we cannot ascertain the cost per hour. By my calculations, it would appear that both aircraft were in the air for three hours and 20 minutes and it was costing €1,500 per hour.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Certainly the figures in table 22 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, which refer to the budget for total Air Corps maintenance and fuel costs, are based, as Mr. Dalton said, on the single-engined aircraft. They were also based on 450 hours per annum but we are, in fact, doing an average of approximately 800 hours per annum in the air for the Squirrel, which would be about average for an aircraft of that size. In industry terms, 800 hours would be at the higher level of expected output. So, I think it is doing the average for that type of helicopter based on industry standards.
One can talk in parables but I am concerned that we have not got the information. As we have discussed, both aircraft were in the air for three hours and 20 minutes. In addition, the costs have doubled from the initial projections in 1996. It is totally mind boggling to try to analyse the figures having gone through the reports I received before this meeting. I am not at all impressed by the under-estimation of costs due to the huge maintenance and capital costs attached. Having made an initial mistake, another mistake was made with the acquisition of the second helicopter.
Mr. Dalton
I would be glad to come back to you, Chairman, about figures and costs but we have to bear safety considerations in mind. There is a limit to the amount of time one can keep a helicopter in the air. As Mr. David O'Callaghan said, it is flying at the maximum time that is regarded as being safe. If one bases the costs on what is safe and reasonable, one may come out with a different assessment. I would be glad to come back to you, Chairman, with much more detail on costings. I am not in a position to assess whether those costs are high or low by normal standards but I suspect the plane is being flown at its maximum capability at the moment.
Mr. O’Callaghan
As I said earlier, the estimated budgeted costs were based on a different aircraft, a single-engined aircraft based on 450 flying hours per annum. Under the budget heading in table 22 there is probably no inflation factor either. So, whereas the maintenance and fuel costs would appear to have doubled, we are doing twice the output on a more powerful and expensive aircraft, which costs more to maintain.
It is mind boggling. There are certainly no budget flights being operated in my opinion.
To go back to the working group that examined this matter, and the opening remarks by Mr. Dalton, it would seem there was quite a turf war between the Department of Defence and the Garda Síochána as regards how both groups would proceed in terms of this purchase and in defining the type of equipment required. While Mr. Dalton says there were new concepts and a certain amount of trial and error, in addition to a level of skill involved depending on whether the aircraft was a fixed-wing with a single or twin-engine capacity, the wheel was not being re-invented. Other police forces have similar facilities for flying aircraft of this kind. What effort was made by the group to take in expertise beyond that of the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces? It would seem that there was a difference of opinion there. I believe there was direct contact on other issues with a particular college in New York, which can provide and share skills with police forces, as it does from time to time. The New York police force has a lot of skills, including substantial knowledge and expertise in purchasing such equipment, yet Mr. Dalton did not avail of that type of expertise. The group seems to have spent more time arguing than getting the finer details of the purchase of this very expensive equipment.
While Mr. Dalton would argue that what was purchased was state-of-the-art and there was not that much difference in the price, the price doubled from where it started. Granted, there is a difference in the equipment but the price doubled and there was a change of mind. Maybe there was a certain freedom because it was taxpayers' money or money from the Department and it was easy enough to spend it, but there was not a focus on the type of equipment being bought, value for money, a complete audit before the purchase in terms of the skills required, how they would manage it and what they would do with it in the context of service from the date it was bought. If this committee and the public are being told it takes seven months to a year to get millions of pounds, as it was then, worth of equipment on to the military register, it must be a wonderful piece of equipment. The focus of the group should have been on purchase, value for money and getting the equipment in the air to do the business for which it was being purchased.
On the issue of service and use of the equipment, I have a table in front of me which refers to "Task Denials". Twice in 1997, twice in 1998 and once in 1999 there was no pilot available. The aircraft was in servicing four times in 1997, five times in 1998, 14 times in 1999 and 15 times in 2000. It lists aircraft mechanical defects at five in 1999 and six in 2000. In respect of Garda equipment failure it lists one, one and two.
Is it not normal practice when purchasing equipment, particularly when millions of pounds are being spent, that all the expertise in the field is exhausted - we are not talking about reinventing the wheel but getting advice that would be readily available - and that the equipment is ordered with everything on board? Is the time lapse of years, in the context of ordering and delivering, not unusual? Does that happen in every police force? The representatives would have knowledge of defence and the gardaí in terms of making comparisons with other defence forces throughout the world. Do they all wait years for delivery?
Would Mr. Dalton like to reply to some of those questions?
Mr. Dalton
The Deputy raised a few points. On the question as to what we did about getting external expertise, we did the reasonable thing and that is what I am expected to answer to. We set up a group consisting of the people who would be using it - the gardaí - the people who would be flying it - the Air Corps - and the independent expertise we have in this country, Aer Lingus. It was not a matter of the Garda and Air Corps people having a row. It was a matter of having experts involved in it. We also consulted extensively with the Home Office where there is experience in this and gardaí went to New York in connection with the purchase of the aircraft. There was no lack of external expertise. Looking back on it, with the benefit of hindsight, if I was asked to do it all again we might have more external expertise but we certainly had it and we did what was reasonable.
That committee did not come up with a split recommendation. It came up with an agreed recommendation which was to purchase a single engine helicopter - the proposition that we reasonably put to Government - and we reasonably departed from it when we discovered that the rest of Europe was going in other directions. By the way, they all changed their minds too. The people in the rest of Europe who had been using single engine aircraft also concluded that it was safer to go for twin engine aircraft and in those circumstances it would have been irresponsible of us to continue with the single engine option.
On the doubling of price, as David O'Callaghan has said, that was inherent in the fact that we switched from single engine to twin engine aircraft which, as I said, we did for very good reasons. We could have opted for the less safe option but to do so simply because we told the Government originally that the recommendation was a single engine aircraft would have been irresponsible. The Government was not deceived. The Government knew all along that a twin engine aircraft might have been required. The Department of Finance was involved in it and the Department of Finance sanctioned it.
As regards the military register and the time it took to register the plane off the British civil register, I cannot answer for that. My understanding, and I have no responsibility for the Air Corps or the military, is that it is a genuinely complex process. I do not know whether Mr. O'Callaghan is in a position to say more about it but the best we can do is provide the committee with more information about what is required in that regard. I am told it is a complex process and I accept that.
As regards the use of the aircraft, the comparison is what is normal use and as I understand it, it is at its limits and it would not be sensible to go beyond those limits in terms of usage. Its success rate has been quite significant over the years. As I mentioned, there have been some hundreds of arrests. I will give the committee those figures; I will not go over them again but its success has been quite significant.
Downtime is something that occurs with every helicopter and plane that is made. There is an element of downtime. I cannot say whether the downtime was excessive but I do not have any indication that it was excessive. Planes have to be taken down for maintenance which, by the way, is one of the reasons for getting a second helicopter because of downtime with the first. We have less downtime with this one and apart from that, if one helicopter is down we can use the other one. Being down is not a fault in the system. It is an in-built feature of trying to operate aircraft, and certainly helicopters.
I do not have the information the Deputy requires about comparisons to other jurisdictions but I know that in the process of examining it, the committee would have looked at other jurisdictions fairly extensively.
Mr. O'Callaghan, would you like to comment on the military register before I let Deputy McGuinness come back in?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Yes. We got involved in recertifying the second helicopter in May 2002 when it was decided to put it on the military register for the advantages Tom Dalton outlined. It took seven months. It was a very intricate, detailed and complex procedure which was not helped by inadequate documentation by the people who were making the modifications in the United Kingdom. Eurocopter, which manufactured the original helicopter, indicated that it could take up to 12 months to have the new equipment recertified on the basic shell helicopter. We actually did it in seven months. If we were to do it again I think we could improve significantly on the seven months. There is a new helicopter, an S61 Sikorsky, which is going on the military register in Sligo for search and rescue. The Air Corps certified that in about four to six weeks. Could we have done better? If we had been involved from the start of the certification of the second helicopter we could possibly have done it faster.
Why was the agreement between the Garda, the Air Corps and the GASU representatives on the inclusion of certain features not reached before the contract for the second helicopter was signed on 6 August 1999? What was the reason for the delay?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Is this the auto-pilot issue?
It relates to the fact that there was not an agreement before the contract was signed which resulted in this facility being lost to the State.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Is this to do with the second helicopter?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Is the Chairman referring to the policing equipment?
Yes. What was the reason for the delay?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Surely it is a matter for the gardaí to specify the policing equipment that is required. We were not involved from the outset with certifying any equipment going onto the second helicopter until May 2002.
To pick up on your question, Chairman, and not lose sight of its importance, is it not the case that the central difficulty is that it appears Defence passed it to the Garda and the Garda passed it back to Defence when the task in hand was to deal with the purchase of this equipment together? They should have arrived at a single specification at the end of that discussion and submitted it to the manufacturers rather than saying the Garda added something on or it was not their business. Is that not the core of this problem? I want to ask one more question, Chairman.
The nub of the problem is that this service was lost to the State. The State was the real loser. Mr. Dalton said there would have been maintenance costs but the issue is that that facility, which the Government agreed was necessary, was left in abeyance due to the inability to reach an agreement prior to signing the contract on what was needed. That is the nub of the problem. It is grossly inefficient that State bodies dealing with security could not agree on the equipment needed for a helicopter, the contract for which was being signed by them.
That question needs to be addressed.
We need to understand why it did not happen from the very beginning. To go back to the complex nature of dealing with such matters, I have read part of a report on page 42 which states the Department attributed the substantial increase in the purchase price to a number of things, one of which was the exclusion of an allowance for VAT in the original estimate of cost. Surely, an expert group dealing with the purchase of the equipment would know exactly what it intended to purchase before seeking a tender. It would not add on bits at the end, which essentially is what happened in terms of the Garda equipment that was required. One would be constantly conscious that there is a price and a VAT issue, yet that is offered here as one of the reasons the VAT element was simply overlooked in the context of costs. The original question posed by the Chairman and me concerning the Garda Síochána and Defence Forces reaching an agreement on this needs to be answered.
Mr. Dalton
Is the the Deputy asking why the Garda Síochána and the Army did not reach agreement beforehand.
Before the contract, yes.
Mr. Dalton
I do not know but it may well be - because there were cultural differences and so on - that we would still be waiting for a helicopter if we waited for absolute agreement in advance. The differences were deep. It was only in the light of experience that we had to push things in the end to get the helicopter in the air. I would not doubt that was a factor in securing agreement in itself. I am not saying that is the ideal way of going about things but that is the reality.
That is an appalling way to do business and this report contains a comedy of errors. Mr. Dalton has just confirmed what this is all about, which is a turf war between the Garda Síochána and the Department of Defence over reaching a decision before the tender was sought on the purchase of a very important and costly piece of equipment. They decided to overlook the detail but the devil was in the detail in this instance.
Mr. Dalton
From the beginning I have not denied there were differences in culture and viewpoint. I do not think it was a matter of a turf war; there were genuine differences of view as to whether one needed items such as an auto-pilot. The Garda Síochána looked at what was happening in the United Kingdom and drew the reasonable conclusion that if it can be done in the UK without an auto-pilot, why could we not do it here.
The Air Corps was flying the planes and was very concerned about safety. The incident at Clare gave rise to concerns and there were other concerns. It was a genuine difference of view rather than people asserting themselves in a turf war. I would not accept that it was simply a turf war issue. Neither do I accept what the Deputy said earlier - that we approached the whole thing in a cavalier way because public money was involved. We do not behave in that way.
It would seem to be that way, from reading the documents before us. It is hard to escape that conclusion, which crossed my mind. The responsibility the group had was to reach a conclusion in total on the purchase of the equipment it was being asked to buy on behalf of the State. All obstacles, including VAT, the military register, skills and subsequent maintenance, should have been clearly understood. There are issues, including downtime and the reasons that equipment was not in the sky, which Mr. Dalton has not addressed. Apparently, they continue to be issues. The other overriding issue is that it seems most of the figures were arrived at and then multiplied by two, because that was the outcome. In the context of most of the actions that were taken, there has been a doubling of costs right along the line.
Mr. Dalton
I have to reject some of what the Deputy is saying. I do not want to be in conflict about this but it is incorrect to say that we simply wrote down figures and then doubled them. I have explained why it happened.
Mr. Dalton
It happened for very valid reasons; we opted for safety. We could have got our figures very neatly with an unsafe aircraft but that would have been irresponsible. I cannot say any more than that there were valid reasons for what we did. I also said, and I am repeating it, that the whole thing was not a model of best practice. I have acknowledged that. If we were doing it all again, with the benefit of hindsight, we probably would have done things differently. If we are asked to buy another helicopter we will probably do it differently. There were valid reasons for what happened, however.
As regards the examination of privatisation, we probably would have got the aircraft up and running much faster had we never gone down that route. Like in many things, however, it seemed to be the right thing to do at the time. The general message being given to us was that if we could out source things more cheaply in the private than in the public sector, then we should go to the private sector. So, we tried that and found there was a brick wall, which will probably only be pulled down eventually when we set up a Garda register, if we ever get that far. As I said, however, there are reasons for what happened. It was not ideal but it was not a question of people approaching it in a lackadaisical manner or with any lack of regard for the fact that public money was involved.
The acquisition of one helicopter seems to have been on an amateur basis. It seems extraordinary that in this day and age we could not reach agreement prior to signing the contract. It is very hard to explain that, Mr. Dalton.
My line of questioning relates to the overtime issue. Is it in order to move on to it at this stage?
I will wait until that comes around so.
I wish to preface my remarks by saying that, like Deputy Rabbitte, I live within two miles of Baldonnel as the crow flies. I am familiar with seeing the Garda helicopter flying in and out on a regular basis. Having spoken to quite a number of gardaí, I would also say that the figures do not reflect the work undertaken by the helicopter team because, frequently, that type of Garda work could not have been done without it. The gardaí are really only coming to terms now with what the helicopter can do and how successful it can be. They are learning from that but there are still serious issues to be considered. Mr. Dalton addressed the matter in one way when he stated, "This was a new project to us and there was a fair degree of trial and error".
Having read this damning report, I must admit there were many errors. In May 1995, a group was established to examine the helicopter issue. In March 1996, it came up with a report which decided to proceed with the recommendation for a single-engine helicopter. What happened? The group went to tender, left the tenders wide open and then changed its mind. Somewhere along the way that decision process went wrong. I am not talking about the level of equipment but the group simply could not recommend in advance what it required. It specifically went to tender saying "We'll have a single-engine helicopter and with regard to the aeroplane, it might be single-engine or twin-engine". The outcome was a twin-engine helicopter and a twin-engine aeroplane. It does not add up. The responsibility of the group was to know the technical requirements in advance. The time scale should have been short enough so that the technical merits would not have changed between making the decision and going to tender. It was not very different, even with the purchase of the second helicopter, on which a decision was taken in November 1998. The group advertised for tenders, received them in June 1999 and accepted one in August 1999. Within six months, however, the Department of Defence wrote to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform saying "Sorry lads, the helicopter you are picking, in our opinion, isn't necessarily the right one". From start to finish there has been conflict over this matter. From day one, there was no clear technical merit in deciding what system to choose. Having read the report from start to finish, I cannot see a technical consensus anywhere. Mr. Dalton need not answer these points again. The point has been made. The groups established along the way did not have the expertise, be it from other international organisations, police forces or whatever. They could not make and stick to a decision on technical merit and the timeframes did not allow it.
I wish to address a few questions to Mr. O'Callaghan specifically.
Did you want a reply to your previous remarks?
No, I will address this issue. Mr. Dalton can decide if he has anything additional to say. I feel strongly on this. Mr. O'Callaghan referred to the industry standard of 800 hours per annum or two hours a day. Was that an industry standard applying to helicopters and aircraft being used in this way? Was it the maximum number of hours available? If two hours a day was the maximum the craft could be used in safe conditions, was Mr. O'Callaghan alarmed in 1997 when the helicopter was doing twice the daily average? In 1997 it was doing four hours per day.
Mr. O’Callaghan
The figure of 800 is an annual one and is about the upper end of the capacity for an aircraft in this particular role.
I put it to Mr. O'Callaghan that the helicopter was flying four hours per day in 1997 and that he suggests that is twice what it should have been doing.
Mr. O’Callaghan
I am looking at the annual average and what the total was in 1997. I do not think it would have been in or around the 800 figure.
No, because it was not the full year. My point is that the helicopter was flying at twice the daily rate. Was it pointed out that, if the helicopter continued to be flown in that manner, the overall limit would be breached?
Mr. O’Callaghan
It is not that rigid. My point is that 800 hours per annum is respectable by international standards for a helicopter in this role.
If it were to fly twice that, is Mr. O'Callaghan saying it would be unsafe?
Mr. O’Callaghan
No I am not. I am saying that it possibly would require a lot more maintenance and a lot more re-equipping. We would require a lot more pilots because they can only fly a certain number of hours per week. There are additional costs with flying the helicopter more than 1,000 hours per annum.
Are they disproportionate?
Mr. O’Callaghan
I am not sure. I have not got those figures with me. It certainly would be a consideration for the Air Corps.
I would like to emphasise, because it may be of help, that safety is of paramount importance for the Air Corps. It may look bad that we changed the specifications having gone to tender, but there was an ongoing argument or debate between the Garda and the Air Corps about the twin engine, and the Air Corps argument prevailed. It was purely for safety reasons and I think everyone present accepts that.
I wish to return to the specific issue to which Mr. O'Callaghan referred. I do not wish to go over the same ground but there are two or three important aspects to this. Mr. Dalton said that there were deep cultural divisions. They must be very deep. I can only speak for myself, as I have no training in this area. What type of cultural differences would prevent an aircraft from flying to prevent crime? It is important the Garda obtained this aircraft because it is something everyone wanted. What type of cultural differences would delay something of such importance for more than two years, leaving aside price increases and related matters?
Do I take it that, for some strange reason, halfway through the procurement process someone got it into their head that perhaps the expertise in the Air Corps was not good enough? I would never have ascribed to that because I believe, from everything I have ever heard about it, the Air Corps should have been good enough. Someone at some stage must have said that, given the cultural differences, perhaps they would have to go to the private sector. Will Mr. Dalton give us some flavour of those cultural differences?
Mr. Dalton
I wish to return to the issue of the two hours per day. This is the subject of a lot of misunderstanding. It is the case that the helicopter goes up for two hours a day. What happens is that it is in use for a few days, possibly in a row, and then has to come down for seven or eight days for maintenance. That is the way it happens. It is out of the air for longish periods but there is nothing unusual in that. That is to be expected if one is running a helicopter and is one of the main arguments for getting a second helicopter that requires less time on the ground. As anyone in the city knows, sometimes the helicopter is in the air for quite long periods by day.
The other point I wish to make generally and which goes back to an earlier point - I do not want to repeat it - is that we could have done very well and passed muster on all this had we gone for an unsafe aircraft. Had we gone for a single engine option, there would have been no criticism and everything would have been right, but I regret to say that I do not think that would have been the right thing to do.
What I mean by cultural differences is that it is really a difference of view as to when it is safe and not safe to undertake an operation. Gardaí had not been flying or using helicopters up to that time and had been getting support from the Air Corps, as needed, before 1997. Sometimes when there is a criminal incident, the natural instinct of gardaí is "Let's get after this now".
That is what one would expect of them.
Mr. Dalton
It is, but it might not always be safe to do it. The helicopter might be in the process of being maintained or there could be weather or other reasons. Some senior gardaí would take the view that they could take a risk and try it. That is what I mean.
That has changed. There is a much better appreciation now of each side for the other and there is growing experience in the Air Corps as well of what is and is not possible. If one speaks with gardaí, and the Deputy may well have done so, some would say that there were times when they would have liked to have done things that were not possible for safety reasons. One cannot blame one side or the other for that because we, the Department of Defence and everyone concerned are agreed on one thing, namely, that safety is of paramount importance. One might apprehend a criminal and do something terrible in the process. That is what I mean by cultural differences.
No one for one moment would question the safety aspect, but I assume the Garda would also want safety. Given all the police forces throughout the world that have this facility, I find it remarkable that it is only in Ireland that the Garda, for some strange reason, according to Mr. Dalton, was prepared to take unnecessary risks. I find that difficult to understand.
Mr. Dalton
Gardaí did not see them as unnecessary risks. They would take the view that the Air Corps was at times overly cautious. The Deputy is right. The Garda would talk to its colleagues in the UK and they would have a fair idea as to when an operation would or would not be undertaken. One of the reasons for looking at the private sector is that the average experience of Air Corps pilots is considerably less than the type of pilots who might be sourced from the private sector. It could be safe to go up into cloud with a pilot who has very long experience and less safe to do so with a pilot who has considerably less experience. These are variable factors.
My main point is that a lot of this has been gone through with experience and been discussed and it is considerably settled down now. The actual Air Corps-Garda relationship is working much better.
I think the public would find some of this mind boggling. Have we the facility of a Garda helicopter piloted by the Air Corps that can fly at night and follow a thug who, for example, goes from Dublin to Athlone?
Mr. Dalton
This is my point. Such criminals coming from Dublin commit much crime. It will be remembered that there were a number of important aspects of crime control over the years in which helicopters were used. I think one was targeted at Shannon and was particularly successful at intercepting these thugs on their way down the country in the middle of the night. There was hardly any other way to do it. We now find after all the money and years of expertise, we still do not have a Garda helicopter which operates at night. Our search and rescue have had a night facility for some years. What is the difference between the two helicopters?
Mr. Dalton
I do not know about the search and rescue helicopter. That is a matter for the Department of Defence. Night flying by Air Corps pilots was stopped on the basis of a safety recommendation in 1999. We had no choice but to stop. The reason was that Air Corps pilots as yet do not have sufficient night flying capability. We tried to address this and had talks with the Department of Defence. We even considered the purchase of another helicopter to provide night flying. We offered to make the helicopter available at certain hours of the night for training but it did not work out. Mr. O'Callaghan has told the committee the Air Corps is training for night flying capability but I cannot answer that.
Does the Air Corps have a helicopter which can fly at night?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Yes, for search and rescue.
If it can be done for search and rescue why can it not be done for crime prevention? It is the same dark night and the same helicopter.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Night flying in rural areas is the problem. There is no problem flying over urban areas, which are lit up, or flying off the coast, with coast lights.
It is as dark as they come.
Mr. O’Callaghan
It is pitch black in the country.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Not at sea - our instrumentation is fine out at sea for search and rescue. There are coastal lights.
Even 50 or 100 miles out at sea?
Mr. O’Callaghan
The problem is with rural night flying. One will not fly into a mountain out at sea. That is the difficulty.
This is mind-boggling. I cannot understand it.
Mr. O’Callaghan
By November this year the Air Corps will have the capacity for night flights.
I am delighted to hear that.
I ask Mr Dalton and Mr. O'Callaghan for details about the privatisation of the maintenance and piloting of the aircraft? In whose hands is the final decision on this? Is it a political decision for the Minister or is it in their hands? It would be incredible that in particular the piloting of essential State service aircraft would be lost as a resource in the public service and that there would be dependence on private companies. Would that not be a huge loss the public sector, a pooled expertise that would be expected to reside in the public service? That capacity should be there and the necessary training should have been done long ago for enough personnel to carry out the necessary missions.
Mr. Dalton
On privatisation an interdepartmental group is looking at this issue. The second helicopter is not an issue at present - for the reasons I explained it is a matter for the military. The merits of privatisation are being considered. Maintenance is already privatised due to lack of capacity in the Air Corps for the new aircraft but piloting is still with the Air Corps. No decisions have been made on that and if one has to be made it will be made by the Government.
I said already that we would move from the Air Corps with great reluctance because there is great merit, as the Deputy said, in using a State resource to help another. The considerations that might weigh in favour of privatisation, if that happens, would probably be cost considerations. The Air Corps will be trained in night flying and will gain expertise over the years, so obviously the case for remaining with the Air Corps is strong. However, I will not know until the group makes a recommendation.
Mr. Dalton
I do not know when it is likely to report. In the meantime, the Deputy's point about the common sense of having one State agency supported by another's expertise has substance. That is why we took that route.
Are the two Departments as one on this issue?
Mr. Dalton
Will Mr. Dalton comment on the efficacy of the helicopter system in terms of what it has brought to policing and crime prevention? For example, claims are still being made that visible drug pushing is going on in different parts of the city and the gardaí often say it is difficult to get evidence for successful court cases. Residents' groups complain about open drug pushing in different streets and so on. Is the helicopter facility of any use in enhancing intelligence in this area?
Mr. Dalton
Where the helicopter has advantages is in tracking people and vehicles on the ground. Obviously the people and vehicles it tracks have given rise to suspicion. There have been 800 arrests involving the use of the helicopter but I cannot say how many involved drugs. I can get statistics on that. The helicopter has been successful in the recovery of kidnap victims and so on as a result of its capacity to pursue objects on the ground, and 24 people have been rescued in that way. The helicopter also obviously had huge advantages in pursuing 259 stolen vehicles, and approximately €7 million in property was recovered. Overall the helicopter has paid for itself.
The fixed-wing aircraft has done a great deal of security work regarding dissident paramilitaries and organised crime. I do not have the same kind of detailed information to hand and might have to convey it in private to the committee in any case. There has been a significant record of success but I will have to come back to the committee on exactly how much was in relation to drug-related crime.
Has the Air Corps ever had to supply air support to the gardai since 1997?
Mr. O’Callaghan
Other than the service about which we are talking.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Does the Chairman mean other than the Garda air support unit? Yes, we use Alouettes and we have air surveillance on some cash escorts - a minority of them.
How many hours are we talking about? There appears to be duplication in the operation at present.
Mr. O’Callaghan
I do not have those statistics with me. There would not be as many as in the years prior to the Good Friday Agreement when we would have given a lot of aid to civil power activity along the Border and that sort of operation. There is a huge decrease in the amount.
About how many craft are we talking? In addition to the two craft here?
Mr. O’Callaghan
I think it is only one fixed-wing Cessna and one or two Alouette helicopters, which are of 1964 vintage.
Chairman: Has the cost for that service been quantified?
Mr. O’Callaghan
We have costs but I have not got them with me.
Would you agree that all the costs of this start-up service that is being provided by the State should be ring-fenced?
Mr. O’Callaghan
I think the air support we supplied to gardaí up to now has been very much aimed at subversives, dissidents and paramilitaries along the Border. That was the bulk of it. There was also occasional flight surveillance of large amounts of cash, which were also possibly linked with subversives. There has been a huge decrease in that activity. I do not think there is any overlap as such. We were never into crime-busting or crime prevention to any large degree prior to the provision of Garda air support.
Could you furnish the committee with the details? It is important information we should know.
Mr. O’Callaghan
Has the agreement between the Garda and the Air Corps concluded on the hangering arrangement for the new craft?
Mr. O’Callaghan
That has not been agreed yet but a final draft is being discussed. A service level agreement has been drafted. We have cleared it at our end.
It seems quite extraordinary that we have not got an agreement. Up to now we talked about the disagreement on the acquisition and now we are talking about non-agreement on where the craft is going to go, whether to the Garda or the Department of Defence. That is extraordinary.
Mr. O’Callaghan
We have a temporary arrangement in place at the moment. As Mr. Dalton said earlier, everything is working satisfactorily at the moment. There are no problems whatsoever.
It amazes me how an agreement could not be reached in one day on where the helicopter will be accommodated.
Mr. O’Callaghan
The service level agreement would be a fairly technical and precise document. It would talk about guaranteed response times to various different types of scenarios.
This is even more mind boggling than when we started.
I want to make two observations. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report is damning regarding procedures followed. I agree with Deputy McGuinness. Firstly we were permitted to use the restricted tender procedure which must be sanctioned by the EU. Then we saw tenders for an unspecified commodity. Quite a number of tenders were rejected because after they were received it was decided they did not meet requirements. This itself was not good business.
The other observation I make is in case only the bad figures would go out today. Nobody can dispute the benefits of the helicopter to the gardaí. Have any lessons been learned from this issue? We are working in various areas trying to promote, within Government and nationally, inter-agency action on difficulties and problems - an interdepartmental approach to problems. It would appear that this debacle is just the type of thing one would want to avoid.
It would appear that the answer to my question is that nothing has been learned from the previous effort of 1996 if we cannot reach agreement on the latest question. Mr. O'Callaghan pointed out how long it can take to sort out the conditions for delivery, servicing and so on. I ask both Secretary Generals whether anything has been learned, in the context of interdepartmental co-operation, which would benefit others.
We will take a reply on that before moving on to the next item.
Mr. Dalton
A lot has been learned. One thing one might say that should be obvious from the beginning is that when two separate Departments and agencies try to manage something like this, using different approaches, there are inherent difficulties. Because of all that has been learned since, including the purchase of a second helicopter, we would probably go about things differently. If somebody came to me and asked me about a third helicopter I would look at it differently. Some sort of unified structure could be looked at with, probably, the involvement of more external expertise. We did what we thought was right at the time. We got Aer Lingus in, a highly reputable organisation recognised internationally as a quality airline. It gave technical advice. Without being able to say exactly what we would do differently, we would probably try to source more external expertise if we were to do it again. A certain amount of research was done by committees at the time. I do not have a magic formula but I acknowledge, and say without hesitation, this was not the ideal way to do things. There is no point in pretending otherwise. There were reasons for what happened. I hope that if we have to go about it again that we will do it differently.
Would Mr. O'Callaghan like to comment on that?
Mr. O’Callaghan
I would just get back to the service level agreement which documents what is already in practice. It is not that there is no agreement. The current operation is working smoothly and well.
The question I asked is important. For years people with mental and intellectual disability have suffered because of the gap between the Departments of Education and Science and Health and Children. It took a Supreme Court decision to rectify that. I wonder whether a forum is needed for interdepartmental head-banging, if we wish to call it that. Somebody mentioned turf wars. That can be unfair as we all have expertise. Where difficulties arise is there need, as I believe there is, for some kind of forum other than just leaving it to people who are perhaps dug into their own patches?
We have just proved that there is a huge need for that. If there are no other questions I propose to dispose of Paragraph 19. Is that agreed? Agreed.
