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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate -
Thursday, 17 Feb 2005

Chapter 11.2 — Dublin and Cork District Milk Boards — Redeployed Staff.

Mr. T. Moran (Secretary General, Department of Agriculture and Food) called and examined.

Under Vote 31, we will deal with chapter 11.1 — Arrangements for Disposal of Meat and Bonemeal, and chapter 11.2 — Dublin and Cork District Milk Boards — Redeployed Staff. The relevant correspondence includes Nos. 4.6 and 4.10, with which we dealt in private session.

Witnesses should be aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege before this committee. Members' and witnesses' attention is drawn to the fact that as and from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons who are identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence; the right to produce or send documents to the committee; the right to appear before the committee, either in person or through a representative; the right to make a written and oral submission; the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents; and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part, these rights may only be exercised with the consent of the committee. Persons invited before the committee are made aware of these rights and any persons identified in the course of proceedings who are not present may have to be made aware of them and provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate and in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in the legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. They are also reminded of the provisions of Standing Order 156 that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister of the Government or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies.

Mr. Tom Moran is very welcome. I believe it is his first time before the committee as accounting officer. I congratulate him on his appointment. No doubt we will be seeing more of him as the years go by, at least on an annual basis. Will he introduce his officials?

Mr. Tom Moran

I am delighted to be here. I am accompanied by Mr. Denis Byrne, assistant secretary in charge of on-farm investment and forestry, Jim Beecher, assistant secretary in charge of crop policy and State bodies, Mr. Aidan O'Driscoll, assistant secretary in charge of financial control, and Mr. Seamus Healy, assistant secretary in charge of animal health and the wider area associated therewith. I am also accompanied by Pól Ó Duibhir and Eric Hartmann, who are from the Department of Finance.

Will Mr. Purcell introduce Vote 31 and chapters 11.1 and 11.2 together? The chapters read as follows:

Chapter 11 Department of Agriculture and Food

11.1Arrangements for Disposal of Meat and Bone Meal

Background

My Annual Report for 2001 outlined details of an audit carried out on the BSE Eradication Programme administered by the Department. The report referred to the various controls introduced in Ireland for managing and eradicating BSE including a ban on the feeding of meat and bone meal to all animals intended for human consumption. The report also referred to certain support measures including State funding for the rendering industry that were put in place to sustain the domestic and foreign markets for Irish beef during the BSE crisis.

Animal by-products are the parts of a slaughtered animal, mainly offal and bones, that are not directly consumed by humans and also animals that die on farms. Each year the meat processing industry produces approximately 550,000 tonnes of animal by-products, from the slaughter at meat plants and butchers' premises of some 1.8m cattle, 4m pigs, 3.5m sheep and 60m poultry, together with the carcases of the approximately 180,000 animal deaths on farms. The material is removed from animals at slaughter and disposed of by sending it to rendering plants where, through a controlled pressurised cooking process, it is converted into about 150,000 tonnes of Meat and Bone Meal (MBM) and approximately 60,000 tonnes of tallow. Prior to the BSE crisis, about 90% of the MBM produced in Ireland was exported for use in animal feed.

Following the detection of BSE in cattle herds in certain Member States, where the disease had not previously been confirmed, the EU, in November 2000, introduced a total ban on the feeding of MBM, which up to then could be included in animal feed for certain species and under certain conditions, to any farmed animals kept for food production.

In order to eradicate and prevent cattle acquiring BSE it is essential to prevent the material thought to contain the infectious agent from being fed to cattle. This material has been designated in Ireland as Specified Risk Material (SRM) and is separated and converted into MBM at four rendering plants designated for this purpose. MBM is also produced from low risk (non-SRM) material at five other rendering plants.

As there are no domestic disposal facilities available in Ireland, the only means of disposing of MBM has been by way of export, under contract, for incineration in the UK or Germany.

Assistance to the Rendering Industry

The immediate effect of the November 2000 EU ban on the use of MBM in animal feed was to transform what had been a valuable product making a positive contribution to the economics of livestock production into a waste product with significant disposal costs. In the aftermath of the ban, most EU Member States provided financial aid to maintain essential rendering and disposal of animal by-products in order to allow the continued operation of the livestock and slaughter sectors.

In January 2001, to address the situation faced by the Irish meat processing industry, the Department introduced a scheme of financial assistance to the industry. The original subsidy scheme paid approved rendering plants a fee per tonne of raw material rendered together with the cost of handling, transporting and storing the MBM produced. In May 2002 the scheme changed to a production based payment system whereby the renderers were paid on tonnes of MBM produced. A new modified scheme which, inter alia, incorporated a subsidy towards disposal costs was introduced in December 2002 to run to 2 March 2003. This was subsequently extended to 31 May 2003 when the scheme was finally terminated. Since then all costs relating to production, storage and disposal of MBM are borne by the meat industry. The Department supervises the renderers' operations under BSE eradication measures. The cost of production, storage and destruction is spread across the livestock sector. The renderers pay for storage and destruction. They pass the charges to the meat plants and butchers and the charges are reflected in the prices paid to farmers.

A total of €145 million was spent by the Department in the three year period 2001 to 2003 comprising €117 million on rendering and €28 million on the disposal of MBM.

Storage of Meat and Bone Meal Stocks

Under the modified scheme introduced in December 2002, the renderer at all times would retain ownership of and responsibility for and risk in respect of all MBM from the time of production to the time of destruction by incineration. For MBM produced prior to December 2002 the Department retained responsibility for its storage and ultimate destruction. In the absence of approved disposal facilities in the State and the high cost of disposal outside the State, stocks of MBM steadily increased to over 172,000 tonnes by November 2002. This was stored at 32 stores throughout the State.

The annual storage charges for the stocks that the Department had responsibility for amounted to approximately €3.75 million.

Storage of BSE Carcases

The Department has been storing the carcases of BSE positive animals in a cold store in Co. Tipperary since October 2000, when the on-farm burial of such carcases was outlawed. The Department purchased the facility in 2000 at a cost of approximately €1.2m. The running costs of the store amount to approximately €90,000 per annum. There are over 900 carcases in store at present. The Department estimates that with declining BSE numbers the store has capacity to the end of 2005. Efforts to dispose of the carcases have been unsuccessful to date.

Interdepartmental Committee

An Inter-Department/Agency Committee established by the Government in April 2002 to consider the options for disposing of MBM reported on 4 December 2003. The Committee concluded that several disposal options are acceptable in Ireland including co-incineration of MBM by the cement manufacturing industry, co-incineration of MBM in the generation of electricity, incineration, and the manufacture of certain categories of pet food. The Committee recommended that certain other disposal outlets for MBM including use of landfill and incorporation of MBM in fertiliser be kept under review especially in light of developments in relation to BSE in the future.

Contracts for the Disposal of Meat and Bone Meal Stocks

The Department commenced a tender competition for the disposal of approximately 172,000 tonnes of MBM on 7 October 2003. This volume was reduced to 164,000 tonnes, when following a fire at a store in Co. Louth, the Department had to quickly dispose of 8,000 tonnes of material in the interests of health and safety. The deadline for the receipt of tenders for the 164,000 tonnes was 28 November 2003 and 18 tenders were received by that date.

Table 45

Contractor

Tonnage of MBM

Contract Amount

Contract Signed

Start Date

Finish Date

Company A

89,284

12,796,793

1/3/2004

14/6/2004

July 2006

Company B

57,779

7,847,837

10/2/2004

17/2/2004

February 2005

Company C

17,062

2,341,770

30/4/2004

5/5/2004

December 2004

Total

164,125

22,986,400

Following a tender evaluation process, three successful tenderers were selected and contracts were signed.

Contract details are in Table 45.

The 2003 Estimates did not provide for the funding of the disposal contracts. During 2003 the Department identified sufficient savings within the Vote, mainly in regard to BSE compensation to herdowners, to meet the estimated €25m cost of disposing of the MBM. The availability of savings, together with declining incineration costs abroad, the risks associated with MBM storage (e.g. fire hazard) and the cost of continuing storage were the factors which led the Department to initiate the destruction of the MBM stocks under their responsibility.

The Department received sanction from the Department of Finance on 3 October 2003 for a proposal to invite tenders with a view to placing contracts for the destruction of MBM stocks and to make payment by escrow. This would involve payment being made to a nominated intermediary, who would hold the payment in trust for the contractor and only release the payment on foot of evidence that the MBM had been incinerated to the satisfaction of the Department. The sanction wasgranted on condition that before any payment was made the Department was satisfied that the terms and conditions of the contract resulted in a liability being incurred by the Department which constituted a matured liability under the provisions of Public Financial Procedures.

Funding Arrangement

In November 2003 the Department sought expressions of interest from three leading banking institutions regarding their terms and conditions for operating the proposed escrow accounts. Following an evaluation by the Department of the terms and conditions submitted by the three banks separate tripartite escrow agreements were concluded on 24 December 2003 between the Department, the selected bank (the escrow agent) and the three proposed disposal contractors. It was also noted that three payments totalling €22,979,232 were made to three escrow accounts in the bank on 31 December 2003 representing the value of the contracts to the intended contractors. An additional amount of €7,168 was transferred on 9 March 2004 bringing the total transferred to €22,986,400.

Timescale of Agreements with Disposal Contractors

·Ownership, responsibility and risk in regard to the MBM stocks did not pass from the Department to the three successful contractors until the disposal contracts were signed in February, March and April 2004

·Storage charges continued to be paid by the Department up to the date of the signing of the contracts

·Work did not commence on the destruction of the MBM until 2004 and the first payment from the escrow accounts was made on 4 May 2004. As of 28 May 2004 only one of the contractors has received payments, totalling €1,003,722 from the escrow accounts

·Contracts specify a timetable for the removal from storage and destruction of the MBM. The final batch is scheduled to be destroyed in July 2006.

Audit Concerns

As it appeared to me that the escrow arrangement entered into contravened the principle of matching expenditure to the accounting period in which the service provided is paid for I sought the views of the Accounting Officer.

Accounting Officer's Response

The Accounting Officer stated that the escrow arrangement was entered into in order to protect the interests of the Exchequer while dealing with the need to dispose of the MBM in the hands of the State as rapidly and safely as possible. The escrow mechanism was suggested in discussions with legal advisers. It was a key element in a legally unified contractual arrangement that provided for the contractors to assume responsibility for the meal, including full liability for transport, storage and risks, immediately on execution of the contracts. At the same time it ensured that the Department retained sufficient leverage to ensure that the product was subsequently disposed of properly and on schedule.

In this process the Department was conscious at all times of the need to respect the Public Financial Procedures. There is no provision in the Procedures that forbids the use of escrow accounts. The requirement in the Procedures to pay matured liabilities was met by the mechanism used. The Department consulted fully prior to entering into these arrangements and received no indication from any source that escrow arrangements were not acceptable. The arrangement was sanctioned by the Department of Finance.

At the start of 2003, the Department was faced with significant difficulties in relation to the prolonged storage of over 170,000 tonnes of MBM at 32 stores around the country. There were particular concerns about the threat to food and feed security, the fire risk (a number of fires had occurred) and the ongoing financial and resource costs associated with storage and supervision.

Therefore, the disposal of the stocks of MBM became an increasing priority. The necessity to provide for the destruction of the stocks was raised in the context of the estimates for 2004 and subsequently in the light of savings which emerged on the relevant subhead in 2003, mainly due to improvements in the BSE situation.

Fortunately, 2003 also saw a fall in the price of incineration. Prices available were about half of those paid in previous years. It was in this context, and in view of the storage difficulties and the available savings on the subhead, that the Department concluded that the time was right to contract for the removal and destruction of all remaining MBM stocks. The Department consequently gave consideration to the options available to progress the matter. The following were among the options examined

·Deferred payment

·Payment in advance against a secured bond for 110% of contract value

·The escrow option.

Having considered the options open to the Department, an application was made to the Department of Finance for approval to issue the Request for Tender incorporating one of two of the payment options i.e. payment in advance or the escrow option. The deferred payment option was discounted on the basis that it would cost the Exchequer more. The Department of Finance granted sanction in respect of the tender competition and indicated that it had no objection to either payment methodology. It was decided that the escrow option was the best and most suitable business arrangement. A deciding factor was that escrow was considered by the Department to afford a much greater level of protection and security for Exchequer funds in the event of underperformance by a contracted company.

Eighteen companies tendered from which three were selected. The Department allocated each of the successful companies specific stores for which they would assume full responsibility up to the point of the destruction of the meal. These allocations formed the basis for calculating the precise amount of money that needed to be transferred into the escrow account. Once the contractors had accepted the allocation, and signed up to the escrow agreement, the required moneys were transferred into the escrow account. A liability to lodge these funds to the escrow account arose when the escrow agreements were signed with the escrow agents and contractors in December 2003. This aspect of the arrangement was recognised by the Department of Finance in their letter of sanction and was notified in the Request for Tender issued in October 2003 as the basis upon which the contracts would be funded.

Following the evaluation of tenders, and subsequent announcement of the successful tenderers, three separate escrow agreements were drawn up between the successful companies, the escrow agents and the Department. These agreements include the following provision: "The Minister agrees to transfer to the Escrow Account the sum of [x] (including VAT), being the amount based on the estimated quantity of Materials as of the date of the contract which the Minister agrees to pay to the Contractor for the provision of the services in accordance with the terms of the Contract." The escrow agreements were signed by all relevant parties on 24 December 2003 and arrangements were made immediately to transfer funds to the escrow account.

The signing of the escrow agreement, and consequent establishment of the escrow account, was a necessary step before the signing of the removal, transportation and incineration agreements which inter alia provided that: "The Contractor acknowledges that the Minister has pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, lodged the sum of [x] to the Escrow Account being the quantity of materials estimated to be in storage at the location of the Materials (and set out in Part A of Schedule 3), and which are the subject of this Agreement, by the relevant price per tonne, plus VAT".

The Department's view was that the escrow arrangement represented the best option given the scale and complexity of the operation. It allowed the Department through a precise legal arrangement to disengage fully from responsibility for the stock of MBM, and it provided the best protection for the Exchequer and was consistent with the Public Financial Procedures.

11.2Dublin and Cork District Milk Boards — Redeployed Staff

Background

I referred in my Annual Report for 1997 to the abolition of the Dublin and Cork District Milk Boards in 1994 and the sale of their businesses to two private companies in 1995.

The Report also outlined details of a rationalisation agreement concluded with trade union representatives to protect the interests of the staff of the former Boards. The agreement provided that some 50 staff were to be granted voluntary early retirement and that the remainder would transfer to the employ of the new owners on the sale of the businesses. The 69 staff who were in full time employment with the Boards were guaranteed the option of redeploying to the public service at a salary level analogous to their previous Milk Board salary in the event of their subsequently being made redundant by the new owners. As part of the conditions of sale the new owners were required to pay redundancy compensation at the going rate (as opposed to the statutory minimum entitlement) to any staff they might make redundant and who opted for redeployment. The staff, as part of the agreement undertook to hand this money over to the Exchequer as one of the conditions of their redeployment back into the public service.

The new owners began to make staff redundant from mid-1995 and staff exercised their right to redeploy to the public service. By the end of 1997, 22 such staff (20 in the Dublin company and 2 in the Cork company) had received only statutory minimum redundancy payments which they handed over to the Department upon redeployment. The Interim Board, which was established to sell the Milk Boards' businesses and property and discharge their liabilities, formulated a claim for over €1.27m against the new owners for redundancy compensation and took steps to initiate legal action against the two private companies for the recovery of this money.

Developments since 1997

Redundancies

During the course of audit it was noted that an additional 28 staff had been made redundant by the Dublin company. All received redundancy payments in the region of €12,697. All of the Dublin company's employees opted for redeployment to the public service and handed over their redundancy payments to the Department.

Legal case

The Interim Board initiated legal action against the two companies on the basis that they had not paid redundancy compensation at the going rate as had been set out in the rationalisation agreement. The Interim Board interpreted "the going rate" as the same rate that the Department paid to the former Milk Boards' staff who had opted for voluntary early retirement under the agreement, i.e. statutory entitlement plus four weeks pay per year of service. In the case of the 47 employees made redundant by the Dublin company at that time (one staff member was made redundant in 2002) this would amount to approximately €2.8m while in the case of the two former staff of the Cork company the amount would be €66,000.

High Court proceedings for the recovery of these sums commenced when a Plenary Summons was served on the defendants on 10 August 1998 and a Statement of Claim was served on 23 October 1998. The solicitors for the defendants responded on 27 November 1998, with a Notice of Particulars.

The Interim Board was abolished in 1999 and the case became the responsibility of the Department acting through the Chief State Solicitor's Office. The Department did not respond to the Notice of Particulars because of difficulties it had in substantiating points made in the Interim Board's Statement of Claim regarding

·Establishing how redundancy entitlements based on 4 weeks pay per year of service together with statutory entitlements is the redundancy rate usually applied in the sector operated in by the defendants

·Providing the names and addresses of all employers involved in the sector operated in by defendants who had paid redundancy payments at that rate.

Settlement of Legal Case

On 22 August 2001 the Chief Executive of the Dublin company submitted a proposal (having had previous discussions with the Department), without prejudice to settle its differences with the Department whereby the company would be prepared to pay €12,697 per redeployed employee to the Department. This would amount to a total of €596,759 in respect of the 47 redeployed employees less the amount of €342,974 already refunded by the redeployed employees to the Department. The Dublin company proposed to pay the balance in two instalments.

Following consultations with the Attorney General's Office and the Chief State Solicitor the Department concluded a legal agreement on this basis with the Dublin company on 12 January 2002. Both parties would bear their own legal costs. The first instalment of €126,973 was received in January 2002 and the second and final instalment of €126,855 was received by the Department in April 2003. The total amount received represented a shortfall of approximately €2.2m on the amount estimated by the Department to be due to the Department under the terms of the rationalisation agreement.

The case against the Cork company remains outstanding. The Department received the redundancy cheques from the employees made redundant but did not cash the cheques.

Redeployment of Staff

I also referred in my Annual Report for 1997 to the constraints on the Department's ability to find positions for the then 22 former Milk Board staff that had opted for redeployment on being made redundant. Constraints arose because under public service regulations the redeployed staff could not be appointed by a Department of State unless they were deemed qualified by the Civil Service Commissioners or were covered by a relevant Excluding Order or were appointed by the Government in the public interest.

Of the 50 staff in all that exercised the redeployment option, 44 who were in the equivalent of recruitment grades in the Civil Service were redeployed under an Excluding Order issued by the Civil Service Commissioners. However, their redeployment was not immediate. The 6 remaining staff, in grades equivalent to Executive Officer/Higher Executive Officer (EO/HEO), though on the Department's payroll, were not appointed to positions for a significant period of time.

Payments to staff while not working

The total amount paid to the 6 officers at EO/HEO level between the date of their redundancy and their retirement or taking up a position in the Department amounted to €1,063,972 and is detailed in Table 46.

Table 46

Date of Redundancy

Date employed in Department

Payment

30 June 1996

2 September 2003

260

31 August 1996

29 September 2003

214

28 November 1997

14 April 2003

186

28 November 1997

24 April 2003

165

31 August 1996

Retired 29 January 2001

129

25 August 2000

14 April 2003

108

1,063,972

The total amount paid to the remaining 44 staff employed by the Department from the date of the redundancy to their appointment to departmental posts was €751,271. Only 17 of the 44 staff received payments with the 2 highest payments being €143,339 (from 21 July 1995 to 31March 2002 when the officer was taken off the payroll for refusing to take up any offers of employment) and €135,115 (from 21 July 1995 to 11 February 2002 when the person concerned took up the Department's offer of employment).

Accounting Officer's Response

Legal case

Negotiating a rationalisation programme for the Dublin and the Cork District Milk Boards' staff and subsequently arranging for the sale of the businesses as going concerns was a complex and difficult process which, by its nature, took a considerable time. It was much more than merely privatising the business of a State body.

The guarantee of redeployment to the Public Sector in the event of staff being made redundant was part of the Staff Rationalisation Agreement between the Department, the Department of Finance and SIPTU and was put in place before the sale of the milk board businesses. The Interim Board inserted a requirement in the tender document that the purchaser would pay redundancy at the going rate, as opposed to the statutory minimum entitlement, in the event of redundancies ever arising. This was intended as a disincentive to the purchaser making the staff redundant in the knowledge that they would have an automatic right to be re-employed in the public service.

The Interim Board engaged the services of a firm of legal advisors and they had an input into drawing up the documentation for the sale of the businesses. The tender document did not include any definition of the "going rate", and at the time the businesses were being sold the Interim Board did not have any specific legal advice as to what constituted the "going rate" for the industry. When the purchaser began to make staff redundant, thereby activating their option of returning to the public service, the Interim Board at that stage decided to define "going rate" as that which was paid to temporary staff availing of Voluntary Early Retirement under the Rationalisation Agreement. The Board initiated legal action to enforce this in the light of the refusal of the purchaser to engage in negotiations on the level of redundancy payments.

The Department, having assumed responsibility for all outstanding business of the dissolved Interim Board, received strong legal advice, both from the Attorney General and from private counsel that the best option was to settle on the best terms available. The advice was based to a large extent on difficulties experienced by the Department in substantiating points made in the Interim Board's Statement of Claim equating the "going rate" with that paid under the original rationalisation agreement.

The Dublin company owns a one third share of the Cork company. Senior management in the Dublin company have undertaken to explore the possibility of the Cork company too being prepared to settle on the same basis as themselves. Their response is awaited. The claim against the Cork company is for some €66,000. A settlement on the same basis as that with the Dublin company would yield about €25,400. If the Cork company was not to settle, then the question of disengaging the Dublin company from the proceedings and continuing against the Cork company alone will have to be considered.

Redeployed Staff

All staff redeployed from the former Milk Boards have been appointed to posts in the Department.

This Department requested sanction for the issue of Excluding Orders by the Civil Service Commissioners, to cover all former milk board staff from the Department of Finance in April 1997.

An Excluding Order was issued by the Civil Service Commissioners in April 1998 in respect of staff of the former Milk Boards including technical grades and clerical staff. Appointments were made in June, July and August 1998. This brought the number of staff officially assigned to relevant posts in the Department to 44.

The Department of Finance were reluctant to sanction the issue of an Excluding Order for the remaining 6 staff as they were at levels above the normal Civil Service recruitment grades and it was not immediately clear that they were qualified for the full range of duties appropriate to their level. In the absence of the Excluding Order it was not possible to employ them or to request them to go to work.

An alternative policy recommended by the Department of Finance was to hold a confined recruitment competition for both grades. Two competitions were organised but proved unsuccessful as the majority of the staff in question maintained their opposition to such a course as they had no experience of undertaking such competitions.

The issue of an Excluding Order was sanctioned by the Department of Finance in 2003. The staff were then interviewed and allocated appropriate duties.

These staff were not paid any allowances other than basic pay in the period from redundancy to appointment to post. In regard to increments, all of the staff except one were on the maximum of the scale when redeployed. That officer was paid increments by the Department under the agreement which provided for the maintenance of conditions.

In the absence of an Excluding Order, which the Department had no option but to await, the redundant staff could not be officially assigned duties and therefore the questions of reporting for work or supervision did not arise. At the time, it was not possible to apply another mechanism to take the staff into the Department.

Mr. John Purcell

Chapter 11.1 draws attention to the arrangements the Department made for the disposal for meat and bonemeal stocks which had accumulated following the decision in November 2000 to ban the feeding of meat and bonemeal to any farmed animals kept for food production. The ban had the effect of turning what had been a valuable product making a positive contribution to the economics of livestock production into a waste product with significant disposal costs. To help the industry cope with the new reality the Government introduced a subsidy scheme to meet the costs of rendering and ancillary expenses.

The financial aid from the State continued in different forms up to 31 May 2003, when it was terminated. In the period 2001 to 2003, the Department disbursed a total of €145 million in financial aid, €117 million of which was on rendering. Some €28 million pertained to the disposal of meat and bonemeal. Throughout this period, the stocks of meat and bonemeal being stored were mounting. Under agreed arrangements, the Department was responsible for the storage and ultimate destruction of meat and bonemeal produced prior to December 2002. These stocks stood at 172,000 tonnes, stored at 32 locations throughout the State. The annual storage costs amounted to €3.75 million.

In late 2003, the Department organised a tender competition for the disposal of the stocks of meat and bonemeal. While this was in train there was a fire at one of the stores, resulting in the Department having to move quickly to dispose of 8,000 tonnes of material in the interest of health and safety. This left 164,000 tonnes to be dealt with under the contractual arrangements. Three firms were awarded contracts to take responsibility for the stocks, transport them overseas and arrange for their destruction. The total value of the three contracts was just short of €23 million.

The contractual arrangements were unusual in a public sector context and involved the Department opening escrow accounts into which the €23 million was paid in late December 2003. The idea was that payments to the contractors from the escrow accounts would take place in line with the verifiable destruction of consignments of the material. The contracts with the three successful bidders were signed in February, March and April 2004 and the first payment to a contractor was made in May 2004. The latest date for completion of the disposal of stocks is July 2006.

I had, and still have, a fundamental difficulty with the propriety of the arrangements entered into. In effect, money was issued from the Vote in 2003 to bank accounts to pay for services to be provided in 2004, 2005 and 2006. This method of financing expenditure circumvents the principles underlining Government accounting and, if used as a precedent, could have repercussions for effective Dáil oversight of the public finances.

Members will see where the Accounting Officer informed me that the escrow arrangement was considered by the Department to afford a much greater level of protection and security for the Exchequer funds in the event of under-performance by a contracted company and represented the best option given the scale and complexity of the operation. Perhaps I am missing something, but I do not see how a tightly drawn form of conventional contract with performance bonds would not have achieved the same objective. Perhaps the fact that savings were available on the Vote in 2003 to meet the cost had a lot to do with the convoluted arrangement entered into.

Chapter 11.2 picks up on a matter I first brought to attention in my annual report in 1997, which was the abolition of the Dublin and Cork District Milk Boards, the sale of the commercial part of their business to the private sector and the subsequent fallout in financial terms to the State in meeting the costs of the staff who were later made redundant by the new owners. Two main issues arise, namely, the liability of the new owners for meeting the redundancy costs and the efficacy with which the laid-off staff were redeployed to the public sector.

As part of the sale, the new owners were required to pay redundancy compensation at the going rate, as opposed to the statutory minimum entitlement, to any staff they might make redundant and who opted for redeployment to the public service. As part of the agreement, the redeployed staff undertook to hand this money over to the Department. In the event, the workers were only paid the statutory redundancy entitlement, with the result that the State was left short.

A legal claim for €1.27 million was formulated against the two companies concerned in respect of those made redundant up to 1997. This amount was computed by reference to the going rate based on statutory entitlement plus four weeks per year of service. Ultimately, the main case was settled with the Dublin company in 2002 with the payment of an additional amount of just over €250,000 in two instalments. The settlement was made in the context of the difficulty of substantiating what was the going rate for redundancy payment in the industry at the time of the sale of the business. Clearly, the failure on the State's part to define the rate of redundancy payable in specific terms in the conditions of sale led to a loss of nearly €2.2 million to the Exchequer. The case against the Cork company involves only two former staff and is not material in the context of those kinds of amounts.

The second issue involves the delay in redeploying some of the 50 staff who were made redundant to the public service and the consequent salary payments made for periods when they were not working. The total amount paid to 23 of those staff from the date of their redundancy to their appointment to departmental posts or in one or two cases retirement was in the region of €1.8 million. In some cases, the time lag in taking up positions extended to seven years. While I appreciate the difficulties which had to be overcome, undoubtedly a more pro-active approach to the problem on the part of all concerned would have reduced the extent of the payments.

Before I call on Mr. Moran, will Mr. Purcell again briefly summarise the arrangement regarding the private bank accounts into which this money was lodged, and will he inform the committee how it would differ from the practice of Departments dealing with surplus funds at year end, when those funds are voted for ongoing programmes?

Mr. Purcell

The normal contractual arrangements are to enter into a contract, in this case for the disposal of stocks, and to make arrangements for payments in instalments as and when they fall due. They were falling due in this case as and when there was certification of verifiable destruction of the meat and bonemeal stocks. As I stated, 164,000 tonnes were involved and the only available incinerator facilities existed in the UK and Germany. Therefore, this activity was going to happen in stages. The contract involved the contractors taking over responsibility for the stocks in storage in Ireland and absolving the Department from the risk at that time.

However, I would have imagined that it could have been dealt with under conventional contract arrangements which would have meant that the service would have been provided in 2004, 2005 and 2006, as the stocks of meat and bonemeal were destroyed, and the payments would mature at that stage. In this case it appears that one of the factors cited as giving rise to this solution was the fact that savings arose on the Vote because there was not as much BSE compensation to be paid that year. Normally, if there was a saving on the Vote it would be swapped where an excess existed on another item in the Vote, which might obviate the need to take a Supplementary Estimate or reduce the amount of a Supplementary Estimate. However, in this case, the three escrow accounts — which were bank accounts — were set up into which the whole amount of the €23 million, which would cover the transactions over the next few years, was paid on the last day of December.

I have stated that this could have repercussions for Dáil oversight of the public finances because if one has any contract and one makes arrangements like that, one does not get an annuality of returns and so on and it effectively gives Departments carte blanche in respect of the rules regarding surrendering moneys which are not used in a particular year.

Has the Comptroller and Auditor General come across precedents for this activity in any other audits?

Mr. Purcell

Working from memory, the only time I came across the use of escrow accounts was when the State was investing money in the share capital of Aer Lingus. Given that an element of State aid was involved, it could not be given to Aer Lingus at the time until it had been cleared from Brussels. If my memory serves me correctly, the provision for the escrow accounts was provided for in the legislation which was passed at the time regarding Aer Lingus. I think is was an air companies Act. That is the only case which immediately comes to mind.

Will Mr. Moran make his opening statement?

Mr. Moran

With the Chairman's permission, I wish to make a few introductory remarks before addressing the issues raised in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. In 2003, the Department was responsible for approximately €2.7 billion of national and EU-funded expenditure, €1.2 billion of which is covered by the appropriation account and the remainder of which was direct EU-funded expenditure. The Department is subject to a considerable amount of auditing from a number of different sources on foot of this expenditure. This takes the form of both external and internal audits. The external audit of the Department in 2003 comprised work by the Comptroller and Auditor General, the audit services of the EU Directorate General for Agriculture, the European Court of Auditors and also an annual certification audit of the €1.9 billion of EU guarantee expenditure carried out by an external firm of auditors. The latter audit culminates in the completion of a detailed report on the Department's systems and controls accompanied by an audit certificate issued on the accounts. This material is sent to the EU Commission. The accounts for 2003, as in all previous years, were subject to an unqualified opinion by the auditors. In addition to this, both the EU Commission and the European Court of Auditors carry out audits of EU operations and measures of the Department each year. In 2003 there were four audit missions carried out by the agricultural directorate and three audit missions by the court.

It is also appropriate that I refer briefly to the report on the accountability of Secretaries General and Accounting Officers, known as the Mullarkey report, which was published in 2002 and which set out a number of recommendations to improve corporate governance in the Civil Service. The Department of Agriculture and Food was in 2003 well advanced in meeting the requirements of this report. The Department has a well resourced internal audit unit, together with a strong audit committee, comprising five external and one internal members, which operates under a charter and publishes an annual report. The internal audit unit completed some 22 audits in 2003 and also carried out a programme of scrutiny audits of companies in receipt of EU funding.

The Department monitors closely the results of all completed audits, both external and internal. This is done by both the accreditation review group, chaired by me, which reviews all EU related audits and ensures that the audit findings and recommendations are acted upon, and in the course of regular management committee meetings. During 2003 the Department continued the implementation of its risk management programme, which had commenced in 2002, and by the end of 2003, this programme had been rolled out to all areas of the Department.

Overall the Department is subject to a very significant audit process each year and has in place structures to act on the findings of these audits. We continue to enhance our control systems and risk management processes to protect taxpayers' funds. However, we are not complacent, and we continue our efforts to stay abreast of best practice in this regard.

I will now turn to paragraph 11.1 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the meat and bonemeal contract. The disposal of 172,000 tonnes of meat and bonemeal was part of the overall policy to alleviate the problems caused by BSE in 2000. With effect from 1 January 2001, an EU-wide ban on the feeding of meat and bonemeal to all farmed animals was introduced, thereby putting an end to the trade in animal by-products as a feedstuff commodity. The Department temporarily subsidised the rendering of offal and the disposal and storage of meat and bonemeal to ensure that there would be no interruption to the rendering service provided for the Irish meat industry. These subsidies were ended in May 2003 and since then the meat industry has borne the full commercial cost of the disposal of its waste.

The protection of the human and animal food chains against any risk from meat and bonemeal has been an imperative for the Department since the outset. Value for money was also a major consideration and in almost all cases tendering procedures to ensure best value were put in place. Responsibility for this meat and bonemeal, which had accumulated since the ban was introduced, was proving extremely onerous for the Department in terms of storage payments and the need to ensure proper control in each of the 32 locations in which the meal was held. An increasing fire risk — there had been a fire in a store in Ardee — and the overriding condition that none of this material should enter the animal or human food chains created urgency for the meal's disposal. Incineration was the sole acceptable means of disposal. In September 2003, with incineration prices falling, with costs and risks rising and with savings becoming likely in the Department's Vote, the Department considered it opportune to begin the process of disposing of this material once and for all.

The Department gave consideration to three different bases of payment for the incineration of the material: a deferred payment basis, an advanced payment basis secured by a performance bond and an escrow account mechanism. A deferred payment basis was discounted on the grounds of cost and value for money. The advanced payment against a bond procedure was considered but rejected on the grounds that the Department, having paid over the entire contract sum, would be at a disadvantage should the need arise to pursue a contractor for poor or non-performance. The escrow account mechanism was considered to be a more appropriate mechanism from a business perspective and on the grounds that it facilitated a more timely response to the situation, represented a more cautious payment arrangement from the Government finance point of view and provided greater leverage to ensure that the material was disposed of properly and on schedule.

All three formulations were examined in consultation with legal advisers and the escrow mechanism was chosen. The approval of the Department of Finance to proceed on this basis was received subject to our Department being satisfied that a mature liability arose. The tender document issued on 7 October and the escrow account payment mechanism was expressly referred to. The tendering process fully conformed with all requirements of the EU tendering procedures. Following adjudication of the 18 tenders, three were selected and those selected were informed on the 23 December 2003. Three escrow accounts, the terms of which were drawn up with legal advice, were separately established and each was signed on 24 December. The appropriate funding was transferred to each account on 31 December.

The funding of the escrow account arose from the escrow agreement which specifically obliged performance by both the contractors and the Minister. Clause B committed the Minister "to deliver funds into escrow as required under the contract for the purposes of paying the contractors in return for the provision of the services in accordance with the contract, upon the terms and subject to the conditions set out in this agreement".

The financial scale and technical complexity involved required the commitment and engagement of both sides at the time of the signature of the escrow agreement. It was and is the Department's view that a matured liability existed as and from communication of the acceptance of offers and acceptance by the companies and signatures by all three parties to each escrow account. The Department consulted widely prior to adopting the escrow mechanism and believed that in the circumstances a matured liability for the amounts of the three contracts had duly arisen.

The Department acted in the public interest at all times on this issue. In moving to secure the earliest possible destruction of this meat and bonemeal, while continuing to safeguard public funds, the Department has with maximum efficiency succeeded in addressing a significant threat to the food industry without breaching public financial procedures in what was a very urgent and unique situation.

In paragraph 11.2, the Comptroller and Auditor General refers to the Department's settlement of its legal proceedings against Progressive Genetics Co-op and Pendine Investments in pursuit of its claim for redundancy compensation and refund of pension contributions in respect of some 50 staff that have been redeployed to the Department. The interim board set up in 1994 to wind up the affairs of the milk boards initiated the action. This became the Department's responsibility after the board was dissolved in October 1999 and we received strong legal advice, both from the Attorney General and from independent counsel, that the best option was to settle on the best terms available. The advice was based to a large extent on difficulties experienced by the Department in substantiating points made in the interim board's statement of claim equating the going rate with that paid under the original rationalisation agreement.

In June 2001 the Department received an informal approach from Progressive Genetics about the possibility of a settlement. As the legal advice was that we settle, the Department proceeded to make an informal response to Progressive Genetics and received a written "without prejudice" offer in August of that year. It was agreed that the co-op would pay £10,000 per head in respect of all 48 staff it had so far made redundant. The sums agreed were duly received by the Department. Since the publication of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, the Department has settled its claim against Pendine Investments in respect of two former staff of the Cork company on the same basis as the settlement with Progressive Genetics and has instructed the Chief State Solicitor's Office to withdraw all proceedings.

Turning to the issue of the redeployment of the staff into the Department, sanction for the issue of excluding orders by the Civil Service Commissioners to cover all former milk board staff was sought from the Department of Finance in 1997. An excluding order was issued by the Civil Service Commissioners in 1998 in respect of only some of the staff of the former milk boards, including technical grades and clerical staff with analogous grades below that of executive and higher executive officer. It was, therefore, possible to appoint this group of staff to positions in the Department.

The Department of Finance was, however, reluctant to sanction the issue of an excluding order for staff with analogous grades to that of executive and higher executive officer. In the absence of the excluding order it was not possible to employ six former employees of the milk boards. An alternative policy recommended by Department of Finance was to hold a confined recruitment competition for both grades. Two competitions were organised but proved unsuccessful as the majority of the staff in question maintained their opposition to such a course. An excluding order was sanctioned by the Department of Finance in 2003 and the remaining staff were employed by the Department.

May we publish the statement?

Mr. Moran

Yes.

I welcome Mr. Moran to the committee. Members must get back on it every year but hopefully he will be attending for some time to come.

While some aspects of the handing of the BSE crisis have been long-fingered, an exceptional job was done overall. Approximately 180 animals have died from BSE each year, bringing the number of BSE-contaminated carcasses to 900. I appreciate that not all the animals are cattle. However, considering the numbers accumulated in the last few years, this is a relatively small number compared to the total number of dead animals. Are we certain that all infected cattle carcasses are accounted for and brought in?

Mr. Moran

I thank the Deputy for his good wishes and his compliment on how the BSE crisis was handled. It was an exceptional, unique and traumatic experience for all countries involved, especially for Ireland with its emphasis on beef production. Putting the issue of fallen and dead animals into context, the Department now funds the collection of fallen animals. All animals over 24 months old are now tested for BSE and all fallen animals are rendered. Up until that point, fallen animals had been left to be buried on farms. Whereas the cattle movement monitoring system accurately counts the number of animals, burying fallen animals on farm posed difficulties from a public and animal health and environmental viewpoint. Fallen animals, by definition, do not receive an ante mortem test. By bringing this into the system, it is yet another layer in how we deal with the animal sector. We are happy that we are catching the vast bulk of, if not all, fallen animals. A considerable amount is spent on this good scheme.

We are sure that all the BSE carcass cases are accounted for. They are held in frozen form in a dedicated store. Under EU law, they can only be disposed of through incineration. However, as Ireland has no such facility, they are buried under strict control conditions on the farm in which the disease occurred. In times gone by, this would have been the natural way of dealing with an animal that goes down with an illness. Now the carcass is removed from the farm. While the head is sent for examination, the carcass is held pending destruction. We are at an advanced stage of making arrangements with an incineration facility in the United Kingdom to take these carcasses.

I note from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report that there is no domestic facility for this process. Again, we are happy to export our waste. I appreciate the efforts made in providing new facilities in Edenderry. However, exporting our troubles is not a solution we can stand over. The Tipperary facility cost €1.2 million, with annual running costs at €90,000. The Department also paid for storage for bonemeal which amounted to €3.75 million per annum and paid a subsidy from January 2001 to May 2003, two years and five months, of €145 million for the rendering, handling and storage of the meat and bonemeal; €117 million for rendering and €28 million for storage. I appreciate the Department has a budget of €149 million for disease eradication. However, these figures seem to be exceptionally high. Is it an excessive figure or is it a case of having no alternative but to accept whatever price is asked?

Mr. Moran

There are two different elements——

I am happy with the two modest figures for storage. However, the figures for rendering are high.

Mr. Moran

In anyone's language, spending €145 million on the unusable part of an animal is a large cost. The Department was careful when dealing with this. Until 2001, meat and bonemeal was a legal feed. Up to 90% of Irish meat and bonemeal was exported for use in animal feed, such as, in controlled conditions, for pigs and poultry. The price for it would range from $130 to $150 per tonne, depending on market fluctuations. Overnight, it was banned, became a liability and had to be rendered. There is an associated cost with this. When it was a product used for feed, the costs were part of the process of manufacturing, with the profits from selling it as feed used to feed back onto the back of the bullock, as they say. Once it became a waste product, the reverse took place but the offal still had to be rendered.

Approximately 50% of a bullock cannot be used for meat and must be rendered. Large costs are incurred if this cannot be sold on at some value, particularly as an increasing amount of the animals' meat was being condemned for BSE management purposes. Large costs were being incurred when this had to be rendered as an inert, powdery dust which then had to be disposed of. Again, one is subject to the vagaries of international incineration space. As far as the EU is concerned, this occurred overnight, so there was a phenomenal rush to secure incineration space. The only option open to many states was to build up stores of the product until such time as incineration space could be negotiated.

The cost seems excessive in absolute terms. However, Ireland has a large livestock sector. Each year, it produces 500,000 tonnes of offal for rendering into 150,000 tonnes of meat and bonemeal. Storage, destruction, transport, export and insurance of this product must be paid. The Department believes it kept a tight rein on this expenditure. Like other EU member states, we went into the subsidisation of this process to keep the livestock sector afloat in the wake of the 2001 BSE crisis. We were quick to step back from it. To the displeasure of many of our clients, the Department has gradually put the costs back into the sector. It began at a high level, but it has been reduced.

While a good job was done in storing the bonemeal, this report has come back to the committee because of the escrow accounts. My question is directed at the Department of Finance because although Mr. Moran has gone to some lengths to outline why this type of account was used, the Comptroller and Auditor General does not agree. Anyone reading the sequence of events in this report could only feel that this was a mechanism for getting around the regulations on public utilities. Mr. Moran may say there was no alternative, but the rules exist. On 3 October the Department of Finance approved the Department's proposals to seek tenders. On 24 December agreement was reached between the Department, the banks and the tenderers on the establishment and operation of the escrow accounts. On 31 December the €23 million was banked. I compliment everybody on working throughout the Christmas season.

I have read through three or four sections of the regulations for public financial procedures and in every instance the sums on expenditure must come in course of payment in a year and be shown in the appropriation accounts for that year. All payments by a Department must be recognised in the appropriation accounts for that year and:

Payment procedures must be initiated where a liability has been incurred and when payment is due (matured). In the case of goods and services, payment is due when the service has been provided satisfactorily and the supplier has submitted his or her account and when optimum advantage has been taken of the credit terms, if any, allowed by the supplier.

The regulations also state:

To ensure the integrity of the Appropriation Account, all due payments (i.e. matured liabilities) should be settled at year-end and payments which are not matured should not be brought forward into the current accounting period.

Exceptions are built in for overseas suppliers and so on. No matter how often I read this I cannot find a justification for the term "matured liability". It did not exist. I compliment those who did this job. It may seem like nitpicking but I take the Comptroller and Auditor General's point that if one can set a precedent, one can carry on and ignore the rules. We do not do that here.

Does the Department of Finance accept that the escrow account system was used to ensure that money did not go back to the Department? I always worried about the system of end-of-year accounting. Will the new envelopes of financing for capital works remove some of these requirements? Our auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor General, disagrees with everyone, including the external auditors, who audited those accounts.

Pól Ó Duibhír

We were satisfied that the deal represented a good option for dealing with the problem confronting the Department of Agriculture and Food. It transferred the ownership of the stockpile of meat and bone meal, the associated costs for storage, security and insurance, and the risks, including the potential fire hazard and infectivity, from the State to the contractor, who would thereafter be liable for the material and its destruction.

We sanctioned the expenditure on the basis that it was a good proposal, and on condition that before any payment was made the Department of Agriculture and Food was satisfied that the terms and conditions of the contract resulted in a liability being incurred which would constitute a matured liability in the terms of the procedures to which the Deputy has referred, sections C5:3 and C5:7 of the public financial procedures.

It was clear that, irrespective of how this was handled, the meat and bonemeal would remain within the jurisdiction of the State for some time after the contractor had acquired the ownership and the risk with the liability transferred. For that reason we agreed it would be desirable that some mechanism should be used to protect the interests of the State in the event of the contractor defaulting on his obligations. The possible mechanisms that the Department of Agriculture and Food considered included the requirement for a performance bond to the value of 110% of the value of the contract or making the payment by escrow. We were advised that the Department's professional advisers recommended the escrow over the performance bond alternative as being more efficient. We indicated we had no difficulty with the use of either mechanism.

We saw the escrow account as a claw-back mechanism to ensure that the State could retrieve money spent in the event that the contractor defaulted on his commitment to have the material incinerated in accordance with the term of the contract, rather than constituting an advance payment. An escrow is exceptional and would have to be examined in the context of an individual process at the time. We would not sanction its use as a means to circumvent procedures. The Secretary General said that there was a matured liability, which was one of the conditions in the issue of the sanction.

The reasons given are laudable and we all subscribe to them. It was a situation in which something had to be done. I cannot accept, however, that under the rules of the Department of Finance a matured liability existed. I do not say that just because payment was effected on 31 December but because it looks as though the attitude was that there was money available and that it should be used in the best way possible. I appreciate the cost of incineration had dropped by 50% and the opportunity was there to be seized but one cannot change the rules because a difficult situation has arisen. There are other mechanisms for channelling funding. Will the move towards this capital works envelope of finance do away with many of these requirements for financial accountability which have existed since 1986?

Before Pól Ó Duibhír responds I would like Mr. Purcell to comment on the earlier intervention.

Mr. Purcell

The problem is in the financial arrangement. Like the members and everyone else, I laud the Department's alacrity in trying to dispose of the build-up of stocks. I have no problem with that. It was clear in my view, and there is documentary evidence to support this, that it was done solely to circumvent the need to surrender money. If one sets up an escrow account and enters into a legal agreement with three contractors to pay them, that is a mature liability in those terms because one has changed the playing field. One could get technical about whether it was a mature liability but that is not the point at issue. The fundamental mechanism was inappropriate. Ownership and storage costs and all those things did not revert to the contractors until 2004. One could argue about mature liabilities because any amounts due under the contract would in a sense not have become payable until then, until they had taken over. That is getting into fairly esoteric public financial procedures. The arrangements could have been made with good legal advice under normal contractual arrangements. There were performance bonds with the escrow accounts, which would have involved a normal contract. There would have been staged payments with a normal contract so that if they did not deliver, one did not pay, in the same way as one would not pay unless one got an architect's certificate on a capital project.

My point in doing this was not in any way to challenge the Department's actions in disposing of the stocks but there is a real marker to be put down in terms of setting up escrow accounts. I think that the sanction given by the Department of Finance was basically to say one could do it that way or by way of deferred payments, whatever "deferred payments" means. Deferred payments would, I suppose, be the normal way of doing things in terms of a contract, paying on foot of the service one receives. That is what is happening with regard to the escrow account because the contractors do not get the money until they have a particular consignment incinerated and have satisfied the Department or its agents that everything has been satisfactorily handled.

I am sorry for going on at length but I thought it useful in the context of what Deputy Dennehy said.

I have been worried that people have been put through the wringer at times for doing the correct or the good thing as they see it. Will there be a radical change with the new approach to financing?

Pól Ó Duibhír

In response to the Comptroller and Auditor General, one of the aspects was the transfer of risk in this case which may have made it slightly different from a normal arrangement where someone simply comes along and removes the consignment and is then paid. The Secretary General has commented on that.

When the Deputy asks about changes, as far as the public financial procedures are concerned, the sanction was in terms of a matured liability. I heard what the Comptroller and Auditor General and the committee said. The financial procedures are under constant review and if there is a need to clarify them with regard to escrow or any other aspect, we will take that on board in the consideration of the review of the financial procedures.

Regarding the Deputy's question on the capital envelopes, that system was introduced to enable multi-annual commitments to be made in the capital area and basically introduced a legal mechanism or path for carrying forward unspent amounts in order that they could be spent over a period, with the timing varied. We are in the first phase of that and one hopes it will allow some flexibility in the capital payments in particular, where required.

All that is underpinned by a legal system. In the particular case mentioned, this was done in the context of the existing public financial procedures and our sanction was issued in that context. The capital envelopes will impact on a broad area of capital expenditure and will allow moneys to be brought forward as a matter of course up to a certain limit.

I compliment Mr. Moran's Department again. I am anticipating that the envelopes may be a managing method to get the money spent. There are three individual contracts: a major one involving 89,000 tonnes and two others involving 75,000 tonnes between them. Two of them are due, if they are not already completed. Is Mr. Moran happy with progress on those? Are we now rid of all the dangerous material? I appreciate that there are 900 carcasses stored in Tipperary but have we dealt with the main problem?

Mr. Moran

I will come to that question. Regarding the comments made by the Comptroller and Auditor General, obviously I take the point that there were many ways in which this could have been done. The circumstances in this case were unprecedented in many ways. One could have used different options. It is true that savings were available and became apparent as the year went on in the areas we were dealing in with regard to BSE controls and so on. Clearly it was a factor but not the most important one. We note the concerns. I stress to the Comptroller and Auditor General and to the committee that there was no attempt to do anything underhand in this area. All was done in full and open consultation with all concerned.

The other options with regard to bonds and so on could have been availed of. We have a lot of experience of using bonds in export refunds and the like and we are well aware of the potential downside of a bond. The key point of a bond is that the person has the money and one has the bond. If the person carries out the service, well and good, but if not, one is involved in chasing the person for the bonded money. In the case in point, if the job was not done, one was left with the meat and bonemeal physically there.

There are pros and cons to all the mechanisms. However, I note and understand the concerns. Regarding the question of the progress made, as I understand it, roughly half the meat and bonemeal is gone from the lofts. After February, March and April, all of it will be outside the responsibility of the State. Clearly we would have liked the period to be telescoped so that the gap would disappear but the contracts involved were complex. Half the product is physically gone and the other half is in the process of being shifted over a time schedule. Ownership risk and responsibility, however, are gone and are now in the hands of the contractors. All the high-risk material is gone. There was, for example, at the time, some unsterilised product but that is all being dealt with. That would be the priority in terms of disposal.

All the product still on the land is subject to veterinary control. Even though financial responsibility, risk and so on have passed, as indeed has ownership, the product remains subject to veterinary control by the Department's officers. We are therefore happy that the material cannot get out and be put to use. At this stage we have belt-and-braces control on it.

I want to ask a few questions on Chapter 11.2.

We will come back to that.

I welcome Mr. Moran and the other officials. They probably picked a good day to attend, as the committee members are a little tired after this morning's tangling.

I will restrict my few questions to Chapter 11.2. Having gone through it, in my view it comes down to the agreement that was or was not made by the legal advisers to the interim board. Generally speaking, the problem stems from that. There was lack of definition when it came to the agreement made between the businesses involved and the interim board. I suppose it is accepted to a certain extent that the problems arose from that. Is there any redress from the Department's standpoint when it comes to those legal advisers?

Mr. Moran

I hate to say this again, but it is complex. A deal was done with the staff of the Cork and Dublin District Milk Boards. Some were offered voluntary retirement, and 50 of them took that route. Those who did not do so were to go with the rest of the commercial business of the milk boards as part of going concerns. Part of the deal that staff were offered at the time, which was tied into a partnership arrangement in the late 1980s, was that if the commercial companies that took over the businesses of the milk board had to rationalise and make people redundant owing to business failure, those affected would be given the option of joining the public sector. That is the kernel of the situation.

When the businesses were being sold by the interim board, it was clearly open to anyone buying them to make those people redundant the next day at the lowest possible cost, knowing that they could avail of the offer to enter the public sector.

A disincentive was included.

Mr. Moran

Yes. That is the origin of the clause. If one stipulates that redundancy payments should be made and sets the rate, one does not know how far in the future the eventuality will arise.

They did not define a going rate at the same time, did they?

Mr. Moran

No, the interim board deliberately did not define the going rate, since it was not possible. It could have arisen in one, ten, 15 or 20 years. Subsequently, when people began to be made redundant, they equated the going rate, acting as a disincentive, with the terms of voluntary redundancy granted to the original people. That is how one computed the amount that was the subject of the court case. It was deliberate.

Surely they had to base it on something. There must have been something on which they could have based their definition of the going rate. There must have been some substantive measure within the industry. Essentially, there was no basis for any going rate they concluded, and that was established very quickly after they had finalised that rationalisation agreement. Is that correct? I suppose, when it comes down to it, the legal decision was very bad. Was there a lack of oversight from the standpoint of the Department?

Mr. Moran

It was not an oversight. The interim board was a separate body.

It included the Department of Finance and the consultants.

Mr. Moran

It was a stand-alone legal entity given the job under the Act of selling and rationalising the milk boards. It was not an oversight. As I said, it was impossible at the time to define what the going rate would be and put a monetary value on it. For example, if one put the same value on it as received by the original staff who accepted voluntary early retirement, VER, that would have been discounted in the price the purchasers of the business would have paid. They were buying a very clearly defined liability. It was thought best at the time as a commercial decision by the interim board to leave that undefined. The thinking would have been that if and when — it was a possibility and by no means certain — it was activated, the going rate would have been the redundancy levels applicable in the artificial insemination business. When it came to defining that, there were no redundancies in that sector.

Let me ask another question. I do not expect Mr. Moran to understand or know the history of different Departments, interim boards or rationalisation agreements across the entire spectrum. Is there any precedent for an agreement between an interim board made up of two Departments that ultimately held water? Was it plucked out of thin air? Is there any precedent for proceeding with such an agreement?

Mr. Moran

I am not aware of any precedent for this, other than to say I have some experience of dealing with the milk board from long ago, and it was itself in the realm of the unprecedented. Two semi-State bodies were operating in Dublin and Cork that restricted the sale of milk in those areas. They were found to be illegal under EU law and the Department therefore had no option but to abolish them. It replaced them with what is now established as the National Milk Agency, which applies across the State.

However, apart from the milk boards' regulatory function, they had grown a plethora of businesses and activities, some commercial and others seriously loss-making, around them, particularly the Dublin District Milk Board. When it came to moving from two illegal entities to a new legal one, the National Milk Agency, and the sale of the boards as going concerns, that was relatively unprecedented. When one adds a deal worked out involving several Departments on the edge of partnership, which included a guarantee of people entering the public sector in the event of their not taking the VER, being sold off and being made redundant, one sees that the complexity was unprecedented, certainly in my experience. I am not sure whether the Comptroller and Auditor General might have——

The way that I would describe it as a layman is that it was a completely genuine attempt to protect workers that went wrong.

Mr. Moran

I agree.

That is fair. I would now like to speak of the cost. I suppose that the point that the Comptroller and Auditor General made in previous years going back to 1997 in his report of that year was the cost of IR£750,000 for staff not actively employed. My comment, to which Mr. Moran may respond, is that it should have served as a warning to the Department of Agriculture and Food and the Department of Finance to ensure that all further staff redeployed were employed very quickly.

Mr. Moran

I can only agree. Any comment from the Comptroller and Auditor General is seen as more than a warning, and it was taken seriously in a Department such as our own. Incidentally, the original deal did not necessarily specify the Department of Agriculture and Food. It stipulated a return to the public sector generally. Ultimately, however, it became the practice that the people would return to the Department. All that I can say is that no one in his or her right mind would sanction or want to see staff being paid but not assimilated or working for it. The people involved would themselves share those sentiments since those who are back in the Department we are delighted to have.

If that is the case, that is fair enough. Perhaps Mr. Moran might explain the delay, between April 1998 and 2003, when the exclusion order was made by the Department of Finance to employ those six people, which ultimately cost €1.7 million or €1.8 million. Is that accepted?

Mr. Moran

I can accept that there was a delay and that it was regrettable. The reason was that there are very strict legal procedures governing the appointment of civil servants that involve the Civil Service Commission and the issuing of what is known as an exclusion order, which on various grounds excludes people entering from having to go through its process. That exclusion order was not available regarding six of the original staff of approximately 44. That is what caused it.

That is plain to see from the report. Looking at this from a layman's viewpoint, a great many people have been hanging around doing nothing over many years. When does common sense come into the equation and when do Department heads and their officials decide this cannot go on because it is costing millions? People were hanging around, doing nothing and getting paid for it through no fault of their own. However, the Department involved could not resolve this issue and it carried on for six or seven years. Surely common sense must prevail within a Department, regardless of the orders, the requirements or the new regulations that had been introduced regarding hiring or whatever. Surely, after costing so much money, somebody should have said the situation was untenable.

Mr. Moran

I cannot disagree with anything the Deputy has said. It makes perfect sense. We did not agree with it. We were doing our best and trying to get the necessary procedures in place. We were already bringing in the other people and assigning them to various types of work throughout the Department. The kernel of the problem as regards the excluding orders for the last six being difficult to issue was that they were in executive grades, at the higher executive officer and executive officer levels. I believe everyone in the Civil Service would agree with the Deputy that no one would condone people being paid for not working, especially when there was always such a demand for personnel. In the absence of an excluding order, any Department of Government, including ours in this case, simply cannot employ the people.

Who had the responsibility to issue an excluding order in this case, knowing the facts?

Mr. Moran

As I said, the procedure is one in which the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Finance are involved. There were difficulties involved in making arrangements to bring these six people in, given their level. The introduction of the strategic management initiative, SMI, with its performance management and training level process helped resolve the situation from the viewpoint of the Department of Finance. When the excluding order was issued, that enabled them to be trained and brought into the system. The only point I can make in this regard is that this was the subject of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report before. We would have preferred if it had been different. I do not disagree one iota with the fact that it is not the way to do things.

That is fine.

It was not a case of just six employees, as Mr. Moran said. There were six very bad cases, two other middle cases and about 23 more.

Mr. Moran

A series of people were being made redundant at the time. As they were being made redundant, excluding orders were being issued and they were assimilated. From time to time there were delays in assimilating and assigning them and so on, but the ultimate problem related to six or eight, I believe.

I must go back to this issue. The Secretary General has explained it by saying that if the excluding order had been issued, this could have been taken care of. However, the Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted this six years ago. Who was responsible ultimately for the failure to issue that excluding order? Given the amount of money involved, the question must be asked on whose desk this falls in terms of the issuing of this excluding order while hundreds of thousands were being wasted.

Mr. Moran

An excluding order is issued by the Civil Service Commission under section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Act 1956. It allows the employment of staff in an unestablished capacity. I understand that excluding orders are issued with the consent of the Department of Finance.

The Department of Finance.

Mr. Moran

As I understand it, that is the process.

Presumably the Department of Agriculture had requested that the excluding order be made.

Mr. Moran

Yes, that is correct.

When did it do that?

Mr. Moran

I believe in April 1997 a request was made to exclude all staff made redundant by the milk boards.

Will the Department of Finance respond? Was it the case that the Comptroller and Auditor General had made this clear in his report and the Department of Agriculture had taken it up and made a request concerning the issuing of that order? Why did it take so long and why has the State lost so much money?

Mr. Eric Hartmann

My understanding is that at the time the Department of Finance believed it could not recommend the application for an excluding order to the Civil Service Commission. I must apologise to the committee for not knowing the precise details of those concerns. I am happy to respond in writing if the Deputy so wishes.

With respect, I would expect an official of the Department of Finance to have this information when called as a witness. We are not dealing with some esoteric point in the Vote. We are dealing with one of the chapters which was listed for discussion and is essential to the issue.

Mr. Hartmann

I am here from the organisation, management and training division of the Department of Finance. The personnel and remuneration division normally takes care of this area. Unfortunately, there was no one available and I stood in at the last minute.

I am not criticising Mr. Hartmann but I am criticising the Department of Finance for coming here to address a chapter which has been in circulation since the 2003 report. The Department should be well aware of the issues and the Deputy is questioning a procedure which is central to our ability to scrutinise the witnesses. It is not good enough. I do not blame Mr. Hartmann and I appreciate his position.

Mr. Hartmann

I am sure the Department of Agriculture and Food has all the details to hand of the concerns the Department of Finance had at the time. To follow on from the Chairman's question, the Department of Finance suggested at the time that a confined competition be held. Apparently the people concerned were reluctant to take part in that, so in the meantime, efforts were made by the Department of Finance to suggest a solution. Ultimately, the introduction of the PMDS was instrumental in allowing my Department to agree to the sanctioning of an application for an excluding order. That has resolved the situation, apart perhaps from a few issues.

I do not mean to give anyone a hard time. Mr. Hartmann's explanation is fair enough as regards the Department in general. From my standpoint, looking through this material on a peripheral basis, it seems to be another example of incredible inertia when it comes to the resolution of an issue by a Department — in this case it might be the Department of Finance — that is costing the State a great deal of money. I request that the Department of Finance be asked about this and that it detail the communications on this issue that came from the Department of Agriculture and the types of decisions made or not made at the time when it came to issuing this order. That appears to me to be the crux of the issue. I thank Mr. Hartmann and Mr. Moran.

Is that possible?

Mr. Hartmann

Yes, it is.

Before I call Deputy Dennehy, I have a few issues I would like Mr. Hartmann to deal with. One is at the request of committee members who are not present. We have correspondence associated with the Vote. We received correspondence from the managing director of Micron Optical Company Limited which was excluded from tendering for equipment for the Department of Agriculture and Food's new premises at Backweston in Dublin. On the face of it, it appears to be a reputable company. The tendering was for the supply of microscopes and cameras. While it was included in the provision of six cameras, the main contract was for a large number of microscopes and it was excluded from that. On the face of it there seem to be no good grounds for this exclusion. Will Mr. Hartmann explain?

Mr. Moran

I am aware of the issue involved. The Department is involved in equipping our new lab facilities in Backweston, near Celbridge. The equipping of the lab is a major process and the amount of money involved is quite considerable. The estimate for this work is around €15 million. The procedures involved for selecting the suppliers are being carried out in line with the normal EU tendering process. One aspect of the method used is that a pre-tender questionnaire is sent out to all those interested in supplying the technical equipment for these labs. The answers to those questions are assessed by an expert team and companies are ranked on the basis of the responses. The company in question, Micron, did not fall within the top ten companies to which tenders would be granted. There is a strict formal procedure involved in selecting tenders and in assessing the tender offers from the companies. That procedure is in line with the EU tendering procedure. On the basis of the questionnaire, the company mentioned was not among those companies asked to tender for the equipment.

What Mr. Moran is saying does not correspond with the correspondence received from the medical director. Can he review the position again and communicate such a review in writing to the committee?

Mr. Moran

I would be delighted to do that.

I know that Horse Racing Ireland has been transferred to the Department of Arts, Sports and Tourism, but the Department of Agriculture and Food had responsibility in 2003. When Horse Racing Ireland was under the latter Department, we obtained commitments that certain legal contractual arrangements would be entered into as quickly as possible to protect the assets of Punchestown. It seems to have got into a tangle with Punchestown and nothing appears to have happened. Does the Department of Agriculture and Food have an explanation?

Mr. Moran

I can confirm that the revised legal arrangement between the Department and the Punchestown companies was completed in April 2004. There is a dispute taking place within the Punchestown group of companies involving VAT on leases. It would be in everyone's interest if that were resolved as soon as possible. My predecessor in the Department has written to the chairman of the hunt, which is the body responsible along with Horse Racing Ireland, and has been given assurances that the legal agreements with the companies are sound, irrespective of any dispute involving the Revenue Commissioners and the companies in question.

These issues are now a matter for the Department of Arts, Sports and Tourism. Is that correct?

Mr. Moran

They are with regard to horseracing. The issue involved a dispute between a number of the trading companies within the Punchestown group of companies.

That is about the validity of leases and their liability for VAT.

Mr. Moran

Yes. That is being resolved among themselves and with the Revenue Commissioners.

Has responsibility for the racing aspect of Punchestown been transferred to the other Department? Does the Department of Agriculture and Food still hold residual responsibility for other activities in Punchestown?

Mr. Moran

Yes.

Does it have responsibility for the big display centre?

Mr. Moran

The legal agreement that we still have is between the Department of Agriculture and Food and the three Punchestown companies. That is despite the fact that responsibility for horseracing has been transferred to the other Department. The agreement with Punchestown covering this facility is still with the Department of Agriculture and Food.

If the committee sent the correspondence we received from Horse Racing Ireland on the difficulties with Punchestown to Mr. Moran's Department, would he then be in a position to comment?

Mr. Moran

We would in so far as they relate to our Department.

It is about the challenge to the validity of the leases and the possibility of whether a tax liability accrues.

Mr. Moran

The Chairman can send that correspondence to us and we will have a look at it.

We will do that. I notice that the farm retirement on the Vote is underspent. There is a group representing retired farmers who feel disappointed and disaffected that their expectations were not realised when farming policy changed. Is Mr. Moran familiar with that particular group? Does he have anything to say which would ease their concerns?

Mr. Moran

This is about people who had been participating in the farm retirement scheme during the base years which established the single payment. The issue involves the extent to which they could avail of the single payment in the future. The single payment was established in three years. If people had been participating in the farm retirement scheme, then they were clearly not farming during those three years. Someone else was farming for those three years and that person would normally benefit from the single payment because he or she established the premium rights that went on farming activity. That is the primary concern that these people have.

There is a different issue with inheritors, or people related to the person who had leased out land in the farm retirement scheme. These people would naturally have a difficulty with the fact that the farm had been leased by someone belonging to them but someone else had established the single payment for the future. We negotiated a facility in the single payment arrangement with Brussels so that the inheritors would have some access to the national reserve.

Are there not other difficulties with those who availed of the retirement scheme? At the time they had the expectation that they would be leasing a quota on an ongoing basis. As there is now a movement away from quotas, they are deprived of the income from leasing it. In the normal leasing of land, the expectation was that regardless of whatever one could derive from it over the 11 months it was leased, at the end of the year it would revert to the owner. I know that there are longer leasing arrangements under the retirement scheme. However, we now have a situation where the leasing value of land is decreasing while the credit for the product of that land is being attributed to the lessee rather than to the owner. Therefore, those who took the retirement scheme were misled.

What has occurred has fallen considerably short of expectations because those involved have been deprived of the milk quota lease income and they are also deprived of the valuation of the product for payment under the new scheme. In leasing the land, their expectations of rental income would be significantly reduced with the way the market is now. They may not have read the small print, but there are many disappointed people who are elderly and who had retired from farming on a bona fide expectation of a certain income. Despite this, they do not receive it. The Department has an obligation to approach them as fairly as possible.

Mr. Moran

When there is a dramatic change in policy, as with the single payment or, particularly, a payment based on the events of a couple of years, say, 2000 to 2002, some of those involved in a scheme who anticipated it would continue in a certain way might encounter difficulties. There was a similar situation in 1984 when milk quotas were introduced. At the time some farmers did not produce milk for the base year, which meant that for the rest of their milking careers they were trying to catch up. For one reason or another, their production in the base year was lower than it would normally have been. It is one of the inevitabilities of a change in policy that one cannot make predictions, particularly given the way the CAP has changed format.

I accept that those involved entered the early retirement scheme in good faith. They expected that at the end of their participation in the scheme they would have land of a particular value, whether for sale or, more probably, lease. However, nobody knows how the market in land will react following the introduction of the single payment. There is uncertainty and nobody can predict whether there will be a hunger for land or more land will become available. Much depends on the development of the products others are producing.

In the first month of this year offers for leased land under the 11 month system were fewer than for many years across the part of the country from which I come. Elderly farmers retired on the basis of schemes they had accepted in good faith. There was the expectation of an income flow, not only from annual pension payments but also from the renting of land and the leasing of quotas. Their expectations have been dramatically reduced, despite having entered the schemes in good faith.

The persons concerned are elderly and have no options left. One cannot tell them to return to the labour force. If he considers the Vote, Mr. Moran will notice that the Department is running a surplus that has not been spent. I suggest one of the reasons for this surplus is that the farmers who availed of the farm retirement scheme got burnt. While I know it was not the Department's intention, it gave assurances which were not fulfilled. It has an obligation to revisit the issue to find out whether, within the scope and elbow room of the EU regulation, there is anything it can do for these farmers. If Mr. Moran can give the committee a commitment he will address this issue, I will move on.

Mr. Moran

I understand the point and the sentiment behind it. The new arrangement is being introduced and causing uncertainty across the board. The Chairman made the point that, in particular, older people who entered the scheme had expectations that may or may not turn out to be true. I understand the point he makes on conacre, namely, that rents are low. However, this depends on the perception of the takers of conacre as to how the market develops and what the products are. However, I note the point and will consider the matter.

A further point arises from the discussion on the milk boards and staff being paid a full salary while doing nothing for five or six years. Given the substantial change in policy, many of the Department's staff must be under-employed. While this is always denied publicly, the grapevine says that some of Mr. Moran's staff find it difficult to punch in the day due to the major changes which have taken place. Does he have plans to examine the position, or to redeploy or reorganise personnel in the Department?

Mr. Moran

The short answer is yes. However, before I elaborate, I am not aware that many staff cannot find work to do in the Department and would be very concerned if that was the case. The Chairman is correct that we are in a transition period. There is no doubt but that the new arrangements will involve considerably fewer on-farm checks. To give one example, many of the checks of stock on farms will be removed. We anticipate that over time this will result in our being able to free up many staff. We will take account of this.

The Department is operating two schemes. While the single payment will apply from the end of this year, we have still not finished with the old system; we are in transition between one and the other. It is too early to make a judgment. However, we know, for example, that we will be removing work from the area aid unit which is currently based in Hume House but which will move to Portlaoise, I hope this year. We are addressing the changes to staff numbers. Issues also arise in our local office structure because some areas of work in that structure specifically related to the CAP and income support systems in place were based on animals and otherwise but that will change. We will have to consider this.

We are looking at our structures. In the context of our move to decentralise, we will also be able to address the issue of staff restructuring at local and head office level.

Is the Secretary General not understating the issue? Surely the movement to single premium payments will make for an enormous change? Many payments are based on production and headage but that element of checking and cross-checking will be removed from the Department. Therefore, it should be able to operate with far fewer staff, rather than simply sending them from Hume House to Portlaoise. That is not the point I make. Unless there is a quantum of work coming into the Department of which I do not know, it seems there is room for significant savings on staff.

Mr. Moran

I agree that there is room for savings on staff. We are already talking about a figure of at least 400. We are not being conservative in our approach to this.

The other element of the single payment — this is a point worth mentioning — is that it is not simply a payment on the basis of established entitlements; there is a another side to the single payment in what is called the cross-compliance area. Farmers must deliver to the taxpayer and the country at large a range of public goods which must be checked and affirmed in order to draw down the payment. They range across issues such as animal welfare, cattle movement systems and environmental controls. This all must be taken into account.

The Chairman is correct in that this does not necessarily mean the same numbers will be involved but we will not dispense with all controls due to the single payment. This is the other side of the coin Commissioner Fischler had in mind when he introduced the system, which is what stuck. However, I would not like to be conservative in regard to the numbers. We are considering some savings. It will be our aim in the coming years to ensure they are not forgotten.

Does Mr. Moran have a figure for total staff numbers?

Mr. Moran

There are approximately 4,500 staff.

Is that the full complement across the country?

Mr. Moran

That is the full complement. As at February 2005, the figure is 4,535, comprising 2,445 administrative staff and 2,090 on the technical, veterinary and inspectorate side.

Has the Department already identified approximately 400 staff members who are surplus to needs or who will be considered for redeployment?

Mr. Moran

I am not saying there are any surplus to needs. However, depending on how the situation develops, it is possible that up to 400 staff could become available in the course of 2005 and 2006. In such an eventuality, we will act quickly.

I have a query in regard to Chapter 11.2 which deals with the redeployment of milk board staff. This committee has always impressed on witnesses that lessons must be learned from any mistakes made. As Deputy Deasy observed, it is obvious no lesson has been learned from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report of 1997, which was extensively reported in the media.

Mr. Moran has been defending the case but it is not his bailiwick. In April 1997, his Department asked the Civil Service Commission for exclusion orders for the 44 non-executive staff. It was 12 months later, in April 1998, before the commission put forward a scheme. The Department of Finance was asked for exclusion orders at the same time in regard to the six members of staff in question and took five years to respond. A casual approach was taken, therefore, by both the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Finance. The commission should report to the committee on this issue. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report of 1997 had indicated that €500,000 was already gone. It must have been embarrassing for the employee in receipt of €143,000 to read the details of how this money was paid when no work was being done.

In regard to subhead C.4, the Vote for the national beef assurance scheme, there was an underspend of €2.5 million, or approximately 25%. As Chairman of the Joint Committee on House Services, I am regularly and incorrectly accused of permitting the sale of Argentinian beef in the restaurant in Leinster House. We have certification to authenticate the origin of our beef. However, I hear allegations about the sale of foreign beef throughout the country. In this context, is the Department satisfied that only 75% of this fund was spent? There is extensive anecdotal evidence of consistent breaching of the scheme.

Mr. Moran

The saving on the 2003 Vote for the national beef assurance scheme arose from the slower than anticipated introduction of a computerised animal movement system. Implicit in Deputy Dennehy's question and his comment about Argentinian beef is a concern in regard to overall controls. I am generally satisfied with how this area has developed. There has been comment on beef labelling and imports but the context must be clear. In any given year, we produce approximately 550,000 tonnes of beef, of which public consumption accounts for 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes. The balance, approximately 500,000 tonnes, is exported. The vast bulk of this goes to EU countries, with only 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes exported to Russia.

In terms of the overall structure of the industry, therefore, we are significant exporters of beef. Import figures are small, with the latest figures indicating that approximately 7,000 tonnes come into the country annually. This brings us to the question of labelling so that consumers are aware of what they are eating, including Members for whom Deputy Dennehy is responsible in his role on the Joint Committee on House Services.

Many of the Members who raise this issue have an advantage over me in that they are farmers and can tell me what is right and wrong. I am hearing anecdotal evidence that foreign beef is available. Is Mr. Moran satisfied the restrictions and controls in this regard are adequate?

Mr. Moran

I am satisfied the system for labelling and tracing beef right through the chain of supply is extremely comprehensive from the animal to the retail sale. The one lacuna in the system relates to the area of catering. Beef is traced and labelled up to the point at which it is sold to a restaurant. However, there is no legal obligation on the restaurateur to indicate the origin of beef to customers. This is the only small gap in the system of beef labelling and traceability.

If restaurants are Féile Bia approved, does this impose a legal requirement that beef served must be Irish?

Mr. Moran

No, Féile Bia is a successful but voluntary initiative. We raised this issue with the Commission in an attempt to get the labelling system extended to cover this small gap. I agree that a restaurant customer is entitled to know where the beef has come from so that informed choices can be made. We cannot abolish legal imports but we are working on a legal mechanism to extend the labelling system. The Minister clearly outlined her commitment in this regard in the Dáil.

I have a question on the nitrates action programme which Mr. Moran's Department is trying to establish. What level of penalties might we face if an acceptable programme is not put in place and how would these penalties be collected?

Mr. Moran

This is primarily the responsibility of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government which has submitted the proposed action proposal to Brussels. The Commission has raised a number of issues with the proposal, which are being considered by my Department and the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. There is an onus on all of us to ensure this action programme is operational as soon as possible.

In regard to penalties, the first difficulty we could encounter might relate to the negotiation of the new rural development package, for example, which is due this year. In the absence of an acceptable nitrates action programme, the Commission might be less open to Ireland's concerns in regard to a range of measures in this area. We could be faced with a refusal on the part of the Commission to fund REPS and the various measures we operate under that wider development programme.

In the longer term, the single payment under which we draw money down from the EU could be put at some risk. The value of this payment in any one year can be as much as €1.7 billion, including the provisions for on-farm investments. Ultimately, if a member state does not implement an EU directive of this type, it leaves itself open to fines from the Commission. We are not at that stage yet, however. The first repercussion would be that the renegotiation of the rural development package might be jeopardised. The fine we could face in the future might be in the region of €30,000 per day, or €11 million per annum.

Is the Secretary General saying there is already a potential risk in regard to the withholding of payments?

Mr. Moran

No, there is currently no withholding of payments on the basis of the nitrates directive.

Would this be the first step in penalising us if we did not put an agreed action programme in place?

Mr. Moran

The first step would affect the rural development package, a range or envelope of measures including forestry, on-farm investment and REPS. These measures are to be renegotiated this year in the wider context of the EU funding and Ireland will try to tailor these measures to suit itself. If we are dealing with specific areas that fund environmental control and do not demonstrate good faith by having a workable nitrates programme in place, then we will have put obstacles in our own path to achieving our desired package.

We had a cut at Teagasc, specifically Noel Culleton. He has suggested that he has not been approached on this issue. Will the Department of Agriculture and Food make an approach to him? He drew up the original guidelines and did much work on them but he has not been asked for his views.

Mr. Moran

Teagasc is working closely with the Department of Agriculture and Food regarding the nitrates issue. As I stated earlier, the Commission has indicated that certain areas of the action plan are unacceptable to it. Discussions are taking place between the Department of Agriculture and Food and the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, and also between the Department of Agriculture and Food and Teagasc. A meeting is taking place this afternoon between the Department of Agriculture and Food and Teagasc in which nitrates will be discussed.

If Mr. Culleton was one of the original architects, or part of the design team, one would expect him to be involved. He thinks a solution is available if the Departments of Environment, Heritage and Local Government and Agriculture and Food reach agreement. He emphasised that he was not asked for his views. Has that changed in the last four weeks?

Mr. Moran

The Department of Agriculture and Food deals with Teagasc as a body. We spoke to the director of Teagasc yesterday. Although I am not aware of who specifically is on its team, I assume Teagasc will use the expertise available throughout its organisation, of which there is a great deal.

Mr. Purcell

I have nothing to add to my previous statements.

Perhaps the committee might note Vote 31. Is that agreed? Agreed. I propose that we dispose of chapters 11.1 and 11.2. Is that agreed? Agreed.

The witnesses withdrew

On Thursday next, 24 February, we will consider the 2003 annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and appropriation accounts: Vote 35 — Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism.

The committee adjourned at 3.25 p.m. until11 a.m. on Thursday, 24 February 2005.

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