I was pointing out that in this particular amendment there is a very important principle involved, whether we should tolerate there being in any part of the legislature here an office-holder appointed from outside. I have heard many statements from the other benches as to the independence of this House, for example. I think if we want to have any feeling of confidence in the legislature here or any real respect for it as representing the will or the viewpoint of the Irish people, then we must have time, and time should be given for a discussion of this particular question. I now come to amendment 6, which, I admit, has a certain amount of relation to amendment No. 5. All the previous amendments, that is, up to amendment No. 5, dealt with distinct and separate things, but I admit that amendment No. 6 is more or less related to amendment No. 5. This amendment comes under the general idea that we ought to have representatives who in no sense can be regarded as having any particular allegiance to a foreign state—that is to say, a person who is a soldier or an officer in an army outside of Saorstát Eireann, whether he is serving full-time, on half-pay, or in an honorary capacity.
I say that that amendment has an important bearing on the independence of these institutions in so far as they are claimed to be independent by the Executive opposite. I think that when these questions come to be discussed the Executive, if it is consistent, will admit that a case can be made for these amendments, and I think that we should not now by means of this guillotine motion prevent a proper discussion or a proper decision by the Dáil upon them. The next amendment is the one which says that no member shall vote in any election unless he is certified as having voted in not less than one half the divisions taken in the House. You can easily see the idea that is behind that amendment. The effect of it will be to try and see that those who exercise the franchise will be people who have thought it worth their while to be present when decisions affecting the interests of the country were being taken here. Again, that is one of the amendments that ought not to be ruled out or prevented from being discussed by a motion of this sort.
The next amendment is more or less related to amendments 5 and 6, which I have already referred to. It deals with the independence of the electors. It is provided that no member of either House shall vote who is the holder of a title of honour conferred by the King of England. We have, I think, in the Constitution, a reference to titles of honour. It was made a point in the Constitution that no titles of honour should be conferred on citizens of this State except with the advice or consent of the Executive Council. I have not got the exact words of the Article beside me, but the effect of it is that the Executive Council is to have the right of veto on any titles of honour which it might be proposed to confer upon the citizens of this part of Ireland. This putting into the Constitution a limit on titles of honour shows that the Executive regarded it as important that they should have the right to veto these titles.
They were thought as being the means of corrupting, seducing or otherwise interfering with the patriotism of the persons on whom the titles were conferred. If that be so, I for one would like to go further than is proposed in the Constitution on that matter. If that be so, and if there is a fear, and a right fear, that these titles might be used to seduce Irish citizens from loyalty to their country, then it becomes a serious matter if the holders of titles veto here legislation in the Second House, and it is proposed to give them important powers. Again I make the point, that is a separate and distinct question, and it ought to be differently and distinctly discussed here, and we ought to have a separate decision on it. To prevent us doing that is to make futile all the machinery devised in the Standing Orders for the proper consideration of measures brought before this House.
The next and final one is the question as to whether this election is to be by secret ballot or by open voting. There again you have another principle, and a very important one. If that particular Article in the Constitution is going to be given any sanction whatever, the only sanction I have indicated as available is the sanction of the backing up of public opinion—public opinion to be used as an effective means of getting proper Senators for the Second House, who will be there from the point of view of having an independent judgment on matters of national importance.
If you are going to have public opinion used as a means of enforcing that particular viewpoint, then the Parties and individuals who take responsibility for voting for these Senators should be able to have their names and votes down on the records just as you have when we are taking any other important decision here. In taking important decisions there may be unpopularity attached, and there are personal interests sometimes alleged to be attached to them, and none of us should say we ought to hide from the public how we vote on these matters. That being so, can you not see that a good case can be made for having this voting open, and an individual record kept of the votes and not merely having the total vote lumped together? I do not propose to deal with this subject any further except to say I, for one, am altogether dissatisfied with the tactics of the Executive Council in connection with all these matters.
There are some of us anyhow that these midnight treaties or midnight pressures are not going to affect, and whether we have all-night or all-day sittings, or day and night sittings, we have a feeling that we can very easily manage so as to keep our wits about us. If we are not completely prevented by the guillotine from expressing our views, we do not care how long the sittings are. I have spoken to some about it, and we do not care how long the sittings are, or whether you have day or night sittings, or whether you sit Sunday and Monday, but what we do care for is, that we get adequate opportunity for those who have views on matters to express them, so that they may be able to convert those who may have open minds on the matters, and so that if the Press put them to the country the public may be able to form an opinion. A lot of people wished that we should come in here, not because they agreed with our policy, but they believed that the presence of a strong Opposition would cause questions to be discussed in a manner in which they would not be discussed in if there was no such Opposition. An Opposition is very little use here if the arguments that are put forward on the shortcomings of the Executive, on the things it does not do, and on the things it does badly, and on the things it neglects doing, are not taken out to the people. Then it is quite obvious that the Opposition is no use, for where you have disciplined parties, as we have, to oppose us here, the result of all argument, the result of everything you show as being wise or foolish is obliterated by the simple process of calling for a division, going into the division lobby, and getting a few votes of a majority.
The value of opposition is ended unless you are able by means of it to inform public opinion and get it alive to the pros and cons of questions that come up here for discussion. You prevent that absolutely by a motion such as that of the Minister for Finance. Personally, I am not surprised at the numbers of things that come from the opposite side, but the Minister for Finance, at any rate, has tried occasionally—I have been sometimes wondering, sitting here looking at some of the men on the opposite side, watching their tactics, but the plausibility of the Minister for Finance and the apparent reasonableness with which he tackles some of the questions, is more or less impressive, and I am surprised to find that above all the others he should have brought in a measure of this kind. All I can say is that if the one person who tries to give a semblance of reasonableness to his attitude is going to act in this particular manner, anybody who is opposing the present majority might as well not be here at all. There is no value to the country when it is predetermined the moment the Government brings in a Bill and whips up its majority; then discussion is vain and you do not even get it to the country. These are my reasons for opposing the Bill, and I hope members of the House who think in this matter will see what they are doing, and that they will oppose putting the closure in this particular manner. It is provided for sufficiently in a manner far more reasonable, and which will give better results so far as discussion is concerned, in its application, and will save time. If the object of it is to save time, it will save time just as effectively as this particular motion.