This is an opposed motion, and it is being taken now under the provisions of Standing Order 100 of the Standing Orders for Private Business.
Private Business. - Bank of Ireland Bill, 1929.
Message from the Seanad:—
Tá Seanad Eireann tar éis an Rún so leanas do rith agus ba mhaith leo go n-aontódh Dáil Eireann leis:—
Go bhfuil sé oiriúnach Có-Choiste den dá Thigh do cheapa chun Bille Bhanc na hEireann, 1929 do bhreithniú, eadhon, Bille dá ngairmtear Acht chun an Chairt fé n-a bhfuil Gobharnóir agus Cuideachta Bhanc na hEireann ionchorparuithe agus na hachtacháin reachtúla le n-a rialáltar an chorparáid sin agus a Banc do leasú, agus chun tuille comhacht agus comhachta eile do bhronna ar an nGobharnóir agus ar an gCuideachta san Bhanc na hEireann agus chun crícheanna eile a bhaineas leis an gCorparáid agus leis an mBanc san.
Seanad Eireann has passed the following Resolution in which the concurrence of Dáil Eireann is desired:—
That it is expedient that a Joint Committee of both Houses be appointed to consider the Bank of Ireland Bill, 1929, being a Bill entitled an Act to amend the Charter under which the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland is incorporated and the statutory enactments regulating that Corporation and its Bank, to confer further and other Powers on the said Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, and for other purposes connected with the said Corporation and Bank.
Motion by the Leas-Cheann Comhairle:—
"Go n-aontuighidh an Dáil leis an Seanad na Rún a cuireadh in úil don Dáil an 10adh Abrán, 1929 go bhfuil sé oiriúnach Có-Choiste den Dá Thigh do cheapa chun Bille Bhanc na hEireann, 1929 do bhreithniú.
That the Dáil concur with the Seanad in their Resolution communicated to the Dáil the 10th April, 1929, that it is expedient that a Joint Committee of both Houses be appointed to consider the Bank of Ireland Bill, 1929.
I thought it only fair to the promoters of this Bill that, as the present motion was equivalent to a Second Reading of a public Bill, some of us should make our position clear with respect to it. Ordinarily a case might be made for letting a Bill like this go to a Committee and be examined before the members of the House would deal with it, particularly as it is of a very technical character. It would hardly be fair to the promoters to allow them to incur further expense, particularly when the objections that some of us have are objections that would scarcely be met by any amendments in Committee, without indicating at this stage what our attitude is likely to be when the Bill comes forward for final consideration.
The Bank of Ireland occupies a very unique position amongst our banks. The other banks are joint stock companies operating under their articles of association. The Bank of Ireland is a bank founded by charter, and any changes it requires to be made in the laws under which it operates have to be made by Act of Parliament. The charter by which the bank was founded gave certain privileges and imposed certain restrictions. Some of the privileges have been taken away, and some of the restrictions have also been taken away. This Bill, as far as I can understand it, proposes to leave the bank whatever privileges it possesses now and take away all the restrictions. I know a case can be made out for that. I know that it can be said that the Bank of Ireland, having very little left in the way of privilege, should not be bound by any particular restriction and that it should be allowed to enter freely into competition with the other banks. To that aspect of the case I have little to say. The point that affects us in the matter is this: Fortunately, at the present moment there is one bank which cannot go completely out of Irish control and become controlled from abroad. I say fortunately, because there is scarcely any doubt that there is a strong tendency in that direction, and if we are going to have anything like economic independence here at all, if we are going to have any advance made in reconstruction, we must take care that financial control rests within this country. That is a principle that the members on the opposite benches held at the time that the Treaty was passing. I can quote statements that were made at that time which indicated very clearly that one of the aims which those who recommended the Treaty had in view was establishing economic independence and preventing financial penetration which, they pointed out, had been going on and was likely to continue.
This Bill in one of the main sections would make it possible for the Bank of Ireland to exchange shares, for example, and become a subsidiary institution, say, to some English bank. We think that if there is to be any legislation in the direction of dealing with restrictions, it ought not be to remove but rather to impose them. On account of the monopoly which the Bank of Ireland had in one form or another until 1845 certain circumstances arose. I think, first of all, the Bank of Ireland had an absolute monopoly of note issue in Ireland until 1821. In 1821 that monopoly was modified to a monopoly within a radius of 50 miles of Dublin. Finally, the monopoly was taken away in 1845. During the period 1821 to 1845, other banks were established. The result of the monopoly held by the Bank of Ireland during that time drove, for example, the National Bank to have its headquarters in London. The Provincial Bank. I think, was driven similarly to have its headquarters in London, with the result that of the nine banks that are operating in the Free State four have their head offices outside the Free State. The National Bank is now a London clearing bank. It has a large number of branches in England, Scotland and Wales as well as in the Six Counties. Of the remaining five banks, the Bank of Ireland is the most important. That Bank employs at least 70 per cent and, perhaps, up to 90 per cent. of its resources outside the Free State. The monopoly of the Bank of Ireland has, as I have said, resulted in driving the headquarters of the other principal banks out of the country, at least out of this area. If the Bank of Ireland were to be penalised to the extent of holding on to existing restrictions, I think it should be only right, in the national interests, in order that that Bank, whose monopoly had driven out the other banks, should be definitely retained here, so that it cannot become subsidiary to any foreign bank.
Perhaps the best way of dealing with this matter would be to take the sections of this Bill and comment upon them as we may think fit. I do not know whether many of the Deputies have copies of this Bill. In Section 2 you have sub-sections which are intended to remove the present restrictions on the number of directors and the number of courts. The number of directors was originally fixed at fifteen, with the Governor and the Deputy-Governor. Later on the number was reduced to thirteen. The number of courts was fixed at four within the year. They want to have these restrictions removed. These particular restrictions do not seem to us of very great importance except that if we were dealing with banking law at all, if we were going to deal under any Bank Act at present, in any matter dealing here with directors, the question of the citizenship of the directors would be of immense importance. I think the time has come, when, if there is to be any change whatever in the existing law, it ought to be dealt with in such a way as to insist that the directors of these principal banks should be Irish citizens, citizens of the immediate area in which the bank is operating. Section 3 deals with the capital stock. Originally the stock was, I think, limited to £600,000. By various enactments it was enlarged to its present figures which was put down, I think, at three millions Irish. This works out at £2,769,230 or something like that in English money.
Thirteen Irish to twelve English.
Well, that is the position at the present time. Now there is the question there of whether, if there is going to be an enlargement of the capital or stock, there should be any restrictions as to the stockholders; whether this extra stock should be open for subscription outside our own area. The next section deals with a matter which is of very great importance for us, and that is with reference to the manner in which the moneys received by the bank might be utilised. At present from 70 per cent. to 90 per cent. of the bank resources are outside this area. Before I end I will give you some figures to indicate how much greater that proportion is. The proportion of the resources, for instance, that are used in loans—how much more the proportion by way of loans and advances of the Bank of Ireland is than say the banks that are operating in the Six Counties.
I think, therefore, that if there is to be any enlargement of the capital of the bank we ought to see that the shareholders would be Irish; that Irish interests and not foreign affiliations should be predominant in the bank. I am sure you will find, if you examine any kind of English bank, or in fact any foreign bank, that key men, like the directors of banks, are almost always citizens of the country in which the bank is operating. I do not know that there is any positive law to that effect. But it is an unwritten law, and I think anybody who considers the importance of the control of finance will agree that it is a wise law. In our case it would have to be not only an unwritten law but a written law on account of the peculiar conditions in which we find ourselves and because of the financial relations between this country and Great Britain as a result of the last one hundred years in particular.
Section 4 removes the restrictions on borrowing. It is rather difficult to make certain what the word "borrow" in that particular connection means. Originally, I think, the bank was limited in its power of borrowing to £600,000 and for any sum in excess of that amount, the members would be personally liable in proportion to their shares. That amount has been increased at a later period. I think the amount stands now at about two and three-quarter millions. The whole question turns on what the word "borrow" means. Does it cover the question of receiving money on deposit? Is it possible the word is introduced to clear up some particular point? If you refer to deposits, the Bank of Ireland has not been waiting for this Bill to settle this point. It settled it for itself acting on the advice it got. Until the whole question of banking is considered by the House in a general measure, that particular matter could be allowed to lie where it has lain for some time.
I now come to the most serious sections in the Bill, those which enable the bank to buy up and to acquire other banking institutions, to amalgamate with them and, consequently, to create a monopoly or something tantamount to a monopoly. One of these is Section 5 (c), which permits a bank "to acquire the whole or any part of the banking business and assets, whether within or outside Saorstát Eireann, of any person engaged in the business of banking."
It would appear that they want to get powers by this Bill which they have not got already. I say that from our point of view it is rather fortunate that we have one big bank in a position in which it cannot buy up its competitors, and also cannot be bought up by some outside bank as some of the Northern banks have been. The next sub-section is: "To acquire and hold shares in any limited or other company carrying on the business of banking whether within or outside Saorstát Eireann." The effect of that is practically the same. The next is: "To enter into and carry out partnership or other working arrangements with or lend money to or guarantee the contracts of any person carrying on the business of banking whether within or outside Saorstát Eireann." That is not as vital to the matter of amalgamation as are the other items. Then there is the question of reciprocity of interests in sub-section (f). That would appear to make it possible for the bank, by interchange of shares, to become practically a part of a foreign institution if it so liked. Then you have the promotion of subsidiary companies, which is in the direction of monopolistic powers also. There is another article which is to give the bank power to sell bullion. Our view is that the control of bullion ought to be definitely under State control with State regulations. We think that there ought to be established a central bank here that would have power of definitely controlling the volume of credit, and that we should not be dependent for our volume of credit and monetary changes absolutely on the policy of the Bank of England. The sale of bullion would naturally come in in that connection, and we think that until that matter is definitely settled we ought not to give this particular power to the Bank of Ireland.
I do not know what exactly is the meaning of giving power "for avoiding or helping to avoid disturbances prejudicial or which might be prejudicial to the financial interests of the community." It seems to me that what is stated here is wider than the powers which a bank would naturally seek to get. I had better read the whole of sub-section (s) of Section 5. It states: "To take or concur in taking all or any steps which may appear to the directors to be necessary or desirable for holding or supporting the credit of the Bank or for maintaining public companies or avoiding or helping to avoid disturbances prejudicial or which might be prejudicial to the financial interests of the community." I cannot tell by reading that paragraph what disturbances exactly are referred to and what exactly are the powers which the bank requires. It seems to me to be encroaching definitely on the functions of Government.
It proposes in the Schedule to repeal a number of enactments. It would take some time to find out precisely what is the nature of the enactments which it is proposed to repeal. We have in the Second Schedule mention made of Sections 6 and 7 of 21 and 22 George III. Section 6 refers to the power to borrow. The power to borrow was limited to a certain amount. This provision in the Bill means unlimited power to borrow. It also provided that where the borrowing was beyond a certain amount the individual shareholders would be responsible, to an unlimited amount, for the debt. There is also in Section 7 mention of the removal of restrictions of the rate of interest. The rate of interest was fixed at 5 per cent. per annum. I have not been able to find out definitely whether there was any removal of that restriction. I saw a reference in connection with it to the effect that it was removed by the Usury Act. The question of the rate of interest reminds one of a remark made by Mr. McElligott in the Minority Report of the Banking Commission. In that report it is stated that the difference between Irish and English money rates is a problem which would repay inquiry.
What date is that?
It is in the Minority Report of the Banking Commission, signed by Mr. J.J. McElligott, now Secretary to the Department of Finance. This Bill as a whole brings up a number of matters which, I think, ought to be the subject of a Public Bill here by the Government. Our opinion is that the question of banking was not completely dealt with in all its aspects by the Banking Commission. We all know that if there is to be any progress made in this country at all in regard to industrial reconstruction, it can only be done by having the proper financial machinery for doing it, and the existing banks and the existing system in our minds are not quite fitted for that. We also believe that we ought to seek and have complete financial independence, which means having a central bank with complete control of our own monetary policy. Some time ago I made a statement of that kind, and it was immediately suggested: "Oh, he wants inflation." The question of inflation and deflation would be a matter in these circumstances for consideration at home here. I would like to point out that our view is that this question ought to be considered by Irishmen with regard to Irish problems, and that we ought not be pulled at the tail of England and dragged into inflation or deflation according as its suits British commercial policy. We are told that it is very stable. Figures show that the Bank of England has changed its rate more often than any of the principal banks in Europe. The Bank of England, since the Act of 1844, has changed its rate 490 times, whereas in Germany the rate was changed 233 times; in Belgium 224 times; in Holland 203 times, and in France, 133 times. Therefore if you want stability of financial rates you ought not to let the Bank of England set a headline for you.
I do not think if, for instance, the Parliament which gave the charter to the Bank of Ireland originally, had continued, and the Bank of Ireland had developed possibly along the lines of being a State bank, that we would have anything like the changes indicated in the Bank of England. The figures for the Bank of Ireland do not indicate stability but indicate a change which is four times nearly as great as the change in France for example. Our position with respect to the Bill is that it deals with a number of matters which ought to be dealt with in a wider way as matters of national policy. In this case it gives, particularly, powers to the Bank of Ireland to amalgamate with foreign banks and also to get monopolistic control by taking over some of the small banks in this country. For these general reasons we are going to oppose the Bill. I think I have made it clear that our opposition is not likely to be affected by anything that will happen in Committee.
I did not hear anything from Deputy de Valera that seemed to me to be an argument against the motion, the motion being equivalent to a Second Reading of the Bill. This, being a Private Bill, can hardly be discussed as thoroughly at this stage as a Public Bill would be. A Public Bill is sponsored by some Deputy who must be, since he introduced it and sponsors it, prepared to justify every detail of the Bill. A Private Bill may be rejected if the House feels that the general principle of it, as far as it can see it, is bad, but there cannot be before the House a detailed exposition of a Private Bill. That is done by the counsel appearing for the promoters before the Joint Committee. Consequently I, for one, will not attempt to follow Deputy de Valera in referring to the details of the Bill or to defend any particular section. I would just put this to the House, that on the face of it there seems to be no reason why this Bill, promoted by a private company, should be rejected, should be denied a Committee Stage at which it would be fully explained and at which all questions will be answered by the representatives of those promoting the Bill. I think that generally should be the attitude we should take with regard to Private Bills here.
Deputy de Valera, it seems to me, objects to this Bill, not so much on the merits as because he believes that there should be general legislation in regard to banking, that the system here should be further examined and further dealt with legislatively. I have no doubt that the system will be further examined, and will be probably further dealt with, because I do not mind saying that I had hoped that the Banking Commission would have gone a little further than it did go, but, on the other hand, I do not deny that the Banking Commission was wise to recommend a measure of reform which met with general acceptance, and which was not going to cause any shock or panic in this matter. Deputies should remember that any sort of shock or panic may do a great deal of harm, not merely to the financial institutions directly affected, but to the community as a whole. Certain representatives on the Currency Commission wanted a central bank. That was the view of the representative of the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance also believe that there are too many banking institutions here, that there should be amalgamation, and that amalgamation would result in economy and better services, but those views did not commend themselves to the Commission. Consequently a Currency Commission was established which introduced an important new factor in our banking system, and which established an institution that will give many of the services, have many of the advantages, and exercise some of the influence that a central bank would exercise. It seems to me that Deputy de Valera can hardly have gone very closely into the effects that might be expected from the establishment of a central bank, or that he cannot have gone very closely into the question of the holding of bullion in this country or the question of financial independence. There is no such thing as financial independence. There is financial interdependence if you like, but I think it is altogether putting a wrong view of the position to suggest that under the system which is now coming into full operation in this country we are under the control of the Bank of England. If the Bank of England or the British Government departed from the gold standard—although that is not a stable thing, but it, apparently, is the most stable which could be found— then we would have to reconsider our position here, and reconsider our legislation. As long as they retain the gold standard, it seems to me that our financial independence is as great as it could be under any system.
I think that no system that we could put up, which was designed to prevent the influence of changing money rates in other countries from penetrating here, could be effective without involving disadvantages that would be much greater than the disadvantage of the changing money rates. It was not the Bank of England that recently decided on a change of rates. In fact it was influences and movements quite outside Great Britain that dictated and determined that. I am following Deputy de Valera, and I think that that is really all outside any question that arises in connection with this Bill, because there is no reason why one bank, on the face of it, whatever may appear from the examination in detail in Committee, should be denied the ordinary powers and privileges that other banks have. Deputy de Valera suggested that by denying these privileges we make sure that there is at least one bank in the country that cannot come under foreign control, but the rejection of this Bill would do no such thing. The Bank of Ireland at present could come quite effectively under foreign control, because if the requisite majority of the shares passed into the hands of anyone outside, as the position is at present, the bank would be as effectively under foreign control as if it were formally amalgamated with a foreign bank. So that it seems to me there is no real safeguard in the present position. There may be an apparent and formal safeguard, but no real, fundamental one. Whether the Bill is passed in its present form or not, it could happen that the bank would pass under foreign control. With or without the passing of this Bill, I think that there is not the slightest danger that this bank will pass under foreign control, for the reason that the effective privilege that it has now is that it keeps the Exchequer Account, and the bank that keeps the Exchequer Account, and consequently has the possibility of the pressure of the Dáil being directly applied to it, would know that it would not be good business to enter into an amalgamation with a foreign bank. They would know that there would be an outcry. I think that is an effective reason why the bank will not pass under foreign control. But nothing is secured in that respect by rejecting the Bill.
Deputy de Valera has, I think, indicated that such matters as the number of directors and the number of courts that must be held during the year do not interest him. Then he raised the question as to whether the capital stock should be held outside the country or not. For all ordinary purposes this is one of the ordinary banks, and if this Bill were being considered in Committee it would be, in my opinion, wrong and unjust to attempt to insert a provision whereby the stock of this bank could not be dealt in as freely as the stock of other banks. That is a general banking matter. I am again arguing that there is absolutely no reason shown in the Deputy's speech why this Bill should not get the ordinary run that a Bill which is sent to a Committee gets. With regard to the buying up of other banking institutions, the Bank of Ireland is only one of a number of banks that are operating here. The others have not shown any great precipitancy about the question of amalgamating or of creating a monopoly, and I do not see that any monopoly will be created as a result of giving these powers to one particular bank. I have already said that the view of the Department of Finance is that there ought to be an amalgamation. Of course there may be good grounds for having powers to enable the State to see that amalgamation did not go too far, if such a thing were happening.
Coming back to the point as to the bank getting under foreign control, as I have said, the Bank of Ireland can come under foreign control as effectively at present as the banks in Northern Ireland have come under foreign control. There is nothing existing to prevent that, and the passage of the Bill, for all practical purposes, will neither facilitate nor hinder that sort of thing. So that while the question of banking reform is a very big thing which the House might occupy a great many days in discussing, and on which a great number of very divergent opinions might be expressed, it does not seem to me that it has really anything to do with the question that is raised by this Bill. The fact that one particular bank cannot do certain things, or cannot alter its powers in a certain way without coming to the House, does not give the House any control, or any lever for control, over the banking system of the country, does not secure that there will not be amalgamations if the House were to object to amalgamations, and does not secure that that bank, or any other bank, will not come under foreign control. Although I have followed Deputy de Valera in his remarks, I think that nearly all of his speech was entirely beside the point.
The Minister for Finance has stated that he heard no argument in Deputy de Valera's speech in favour of rejecting the motion, a motion which he himself described, and which you, sir, only a week ago stated, was tantamount to giving a Second Reading to a Bill. Now, when this House gives a Second Reading to a Bill—as, if it accepts this motion, it will do to this Bill—it accepts and endorses the principle of the Bill. And what is the principle contained in this Bill? This bank, as we were told, was established by charter, is governed by its own Acts of Parliament, or by the special provisions relating to it which appear in other Acts of Parliament, and, therefore, is to a certain extent outside the ordinary company law. It was modelled, very largely, upon the Bank of England, and it has, therefore, more or less the dualistic nature of that establishment; it has the rudimentary remains still of some of the functions of a central bank, but as contrasted with the Bank of England, which has developed mainly as a central bank, the Bank of Ireland, while possessing the rudimentary functions of a central bank, has developed very largely as a trading bank. In addition, when it was founded it was given a certain monopoly, as you have been told by Deputy de Valera. It appeared to those who were responsible for the foundation of this Bank that it was dangerous, that the special privileges with which this institution had been favoured were capable of great abuse and were pregnant with danger to the community. Therefore, in the words of Section 9 of the Act establishing the Bank—"to the intent that your Majesty's subjects may not be oppressed by such corporation by their monopolising any goods, wares, or merchandise," certain restrictions were embodied in the Act of Parliament establishing the bank.
Now, what does this Bill ask you to do? It does not ask you to modify the charter; it does not ask you to deprive the bank of any special privilege which still remains to it; it asks you to remove virtually every restriction which was originally imposed on it. The principle involved in this Bill, therefore, is the financial privileges it enjoys, in some cases even the monopoly, without reserve, without restriction, without safeguard, without security or without return to this House for the privileges which it still allows the bank to retain. But I would like you to bear this fact in mind, that though this State and the Exchequer of this State receive no return from the bank for the privileges which it enjoys under charter, another State does receive a certain return. It happens that the bank has lent to the Government of Great Britain something like £3,000,000, in Irish currency equivalent to £2,630,769, and upon that capital sum Great Britain pays interest at the rate of 2½ per cent., amounting altogether to £65,769 per annum. At the present moment the rate of interest that Great Britain would be charged for any loan in the open market is not less than 5 per cent., and the fact that Great Britain has a loan from the Bank of Ireland of £2,630,769 at 2½ per cent. is equivalent to this, that each year in return for the privilege which has been conferred upon it by this charter the bank is allowing Great Britain to retain indirectly £65,769. It is doing that year after year, but, of course, that £65,769 is being provided by the customers of the bank and by the trade and industry of this country generally.
The next point to which I would direct your attention is the question of the directorship of the bank. The fact that the bank comes to this House and promotes a Private Bill would seem to be a clear acceptance of the position that it is an Irish bank but, at the same time, it contravenes what has been described as the unwritten law, the law that the directors of the bank shall be nationals of the State in which that bank operates, shall be nationals, at least, of the country in which that bank has its head office. Now at the present moment I think that there are at least two directors of the Bank of Ireland who are not citizens of the Free State. I do not know how they could assume citizenship of the Free State, but I am certain they would deny that they are citizens of the Free State, and that they are at all amenable to its laws. These gentlemen, as a matter of fact, are men who, with their associates, have the most extreme contempt for, and are altogether antagonistic to, the opinions and ideals of the people of the Twenty-Six Counties.
Question.
If the Deputy for Wexford wishes to question the statement I will refer him to a statement made the other day by a man who was a political associate of one of these gentlemen; a man who, like them, derives a considerable sum each year from the trade which his firm carries on with the people of the Twenty-Six Counties; and a man who, ten days ago, when he had been adopted as a candidate for one of the constituencies that was formerly comprised in West Belfast, referring to the people of the Twenty-Six Counties, said that they were herded like Indians in a reservation. That statement expressed, I know, the mentality, at least, of Sir George Clark, one of the directors of this bank, because I remember the activities of Sir George Clark, not only in 1920 but in 1913, and I know that a person who had those opinions in regard to the people of the Twenty-Six Counties should be debarred by this House from having any part in the direction or government of the greatest financial institution in this country.
Now what justification is there for removing these restrictions which the wisdom of our ancestors imposed on the bank? It has been stated that the sole purpose of this Bill is to put the Bank of Ireland on an equal footing with other banks, but that is not possible, for because of the monopoly which this bank enjoyed for so long a period it has now become virtually all-powerful in the country. There is no other bank having its head office in Ireland which nearly equals the Bank of Ireland in resources. The one which comes next to it, the Munster and Leinster Bank, has, I think, resources which total only about half those of the Bank of Ireland. The very fact that the Bank of Ireland has attained that all-powerful position is a proof that the restrictions that have been imposed upon it have not hindered or hampered its development as a trading bank in any way. Therefore, in view of the fact that it has not been so hampered or hindered by these restrictions, is there any point in asking the House to assent to the principle of this Bill, which is to allow a privilege to remain while removing the accompanying restrictions and accompanying safeguards? I believe that if the House does assent to this Bill and does remove these restrictions, this bank, already so powerful, will become then all too powerful and will be able to dominate and to dictate to the other banks, and to dominate and to dictate to this Government, and I think that is what is behind this Bill. Another reason why the House should refuse to assent to the proposal of the Seanad is that this Bill is a particularly bad case of what is known as legislation by reference. I think if Deputies turn to the back of the Bill they will see in the First and Second Schedules a considerable number of references to various Acts, not only of the English but of the Irish Parliament, and a reference to the charter of the bank.
Now I suggest, before this matter is allowed to go any further, that we ought to ask the promoters of the Bill, in view of the importance of the measure, to circulate a memorandum giving in full the charter of the bank and the various Acts of Parliament relating to it, showing what exactly the present position of the bank is under that charter and under these Acts of Parliament, because the position is in some respects a fairly strange one. I do not know exactly what the present position may be, but I do know this, that the original charter coerced the governor, the deputy-governor and, I think, the directors of the bank to subscribe to a declaration pursuant to an Act, of which the short title was "An Act to prevent a further growth of Popery." They also had to take oaths of allegiance and abjuration and supremacy. I observed in a recent printed copy of the charter a note to say that the oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration had been prohibited by an Act 31 and 32 Victoria, passed in the year 1832, entitled "An Act to amend the law relating to promissory oaths." I looked up the Act in question and I could see nothing in it which prohibited the governor, the deputy-governor or the directors of the Bank of Ireland from taking an oath of allegiance. It would be interesting to know whether, according to the statutes of the bank at present, the governor has to take an oath of allegiance, and, if so, an oath of allegiance to whom? I found when I went to search—I admit, of course, it was a layman's search—but I found, at any rate, when I went to the statute, to which I was referred by that note in the charter, that there was nothing in that statute which clearly prohibited the imposition on or exaction of these oaths from the governor, deputy-governor or any member of the directors.
There is another point to which I think the attention of the House should be directed. In Section 20 of the Act for establishing the Bank it is provided that in the event of the insolvency or winding-up of the Bank the stock must first be applied in liquidation of its debts, and if this be insufficient to satisfy or to pay all debts in full then the stockholders in their private capacity, according to the proportions of their respective interests in the Bank's capital stock, shall be liable for the said debts until the whole shall be discharged. I think I should direct the attention of the House to the effect of this section, which introduces what I may call the principle of proportionate liability, and goes much further than the ordinary Joint Stock Acts, in so far as limited liability of shareholders is concerned. It might be thought that so far as the debts or obligations or liabilities of the Bank of Ireland are concerned those who are the creditors of that institution have a much wider and larger security than the creditors, say, of an ordinary joint stock bank. But, apparently, in 1886 some discussion arose upon this matter, and a joint signed opinion was given by Mr. Justice Kekewitch, standing counsel to the Bank of Ireland; Mr. Arthur Webster, some time Attorney-General, and Mr. Hornell, to the effect that the holders of Bank of Ireland stock were not liable for any debts or engagements of the bank. It do not say that opinion is correct, but it has been given. It is the signed opinion of very eminent lawyers, and it leaves the position at least somewhat uncertain. I should have thought that one of the things that the promoters of this particular Bill would have been careful to do would have been to have clarified the whole of that position. The very fact that they have not done so, in my mind, immediately creates doubt as to their bona fides in the matter. We are told that there is nothing in this Bill; that it is only to put the Bank of Ireland upon a par with the other banks. But the fact of the matter is that you have a legal opinion, signed by some of the most eminent lawyers of the day, which shows that the stockholders of the Bank of Ireland enjoy an extraordinary immunity, and the question for this House is whether they will assent to this motion, which is tantamount to giving a Second Reading to the Bill, and, therefore, to accepting the principle of the Bill, which will allow the greatest financial institution in this country to retain that extraordinary privilege, while, at the same time, it removes every safeguarding restriction which was imposed upon it at the time of its foundation.
I have no particular interest in, as I certainly have no particular affection for, banking institutions. I never enter the portals of one of these places without a certain fear. It is true that, in my relations with the cashier, I exchange a very small piece of pink paper with a young gentleman, and he gives me in return a number of other pieces of paper, brown or green, which are certainly very useful to me, and with which he throws in, gratis, a portrait of a very beautiful lady designed by an eminent painter. I always am in the greatest possible dread that I may hear that the manager would like to see me. The manager, when I do see him, is always exceedingly polite. I regret to say that the substance of his remarks is frequently very displeasing. Therefore, if I venture to intervene in this debate, it is not out of love or affection either for the Bank of Ireland or for any other bank. Nor have I any special knowledge of the matters mentioned by Deputies de Valera and MacEntee. I certainly should not have spoken if it had not been for certain things that fell from Deputy MacEntee. I do not know anything about Sir George Clark—it is merely a name to me. But I do suggest very seriously that the House ought to be very slow, in dealing with the Second Reading of a Private Bill, to import into its consideration any matters not directly germane to the Bill itself. I speak, of course, under your correction, sir, but a Private Bill differs in this from a Public Bill, as I have always understood, that in connection with a Public Bill the House itself is the master of the situation. The Bill emanates from the House itself, and it is true to say that in passing the Second Reading the House definitely commits itself to the principle of the Bill, and to all that is contained in the Bill, that is not merely, so to speak, a matter of detail. That is not, I venture to submit, quite the position with regard to a Private Bill. A Private Bill is promoted, as we all know, by an outside body. The origin of Private Bill legislation is quite different and distinct from that of Public legislation. In relation to Private Bills, Parliament acts really as a court rather than a legislature. I think that proposition is sound.
In my long parliamentary experience I have always known it to be accepted that only in the most extreme circumstances, and only for the gravest public reasons, indeed, did the legislature ever refuse to allow a Private Bill to proceed before a Committee, because it is only before a Committee that the matter can be really easily and thoroughly gone into. But the House still retains control over subsequent stages. I venture to suggest—and that is all I want to say—very seriously to the Dáil that they would be establishing an exceedingly evil and most dangerous precedent, and one which might very seriously react upon the whole commercial life of this country, if they were to allow it to go out that on the occasion of the Second Reading of an important Private Bill they were allowing their judgment to be in any respects deflected. I am not suggesting it was so from anything Deputy de Valera said, but it appears to be so from what Deputy MacEntee said—by what are really external considerations.
I rise to emphasise what has been said by Deputy Law, and I think it will be agreed that when Deputy Law and I are on the same side the law is very likely to be right for once. It would be a very dangerous precedent, indeed, if it were to be accepted that this House, in giving permission for a Private Bill to go to a Committee, accepted the principle of that Bill. I rise to emphasise, as far as I can, the points which are in agreement in this House with regard to this matter, because there are some fundamental and very important points on which there is, I think, complete agreement between the Government that exists, its successor, and all Governments which are likely to succeed it in this House.
The Minister for Finance put the position, in my opinion, perfectly clearly, when he said that what this House did, in giving this permission, was to refuse to deny a Committee Stage. That is radically different from accepting the principle of the Bill. It has been laid down for us by the Minister for Finance that owing to the peculiar nature of a Private Bill it cannot be sponsored and defended in detail upon Second Reading in the same way as any ordinary Bill introduced into this House. Therefore, that being so, the significance of the acceptance of this motion cannot be the same significance as in the case of the acceptance of a Second Reading motion in relation to an ordinary Bill. That is the first thing that, I think, we want to get perfectly clear, and if this debate has done no other good, it has done great fundamental good in clearing up that position—that this House, henceforth, in giving permission for a Private Bill to go to a Committee, does not endorse the principle of the Bill, and that it has provided private machinery for the examination of that Bill in a Committee of this House. If that position had been clear from the beginning, this debate might not have taken place, because when this motion was first put to the House there was a suggestion that we should reserve our opinion in relation to this matter to the Committee, and that we should reserve our activity, in the sense of amending it, to the Committee, but the Ceann Comhairle, in my opinion, very wisely warned the House that there may be, and that there has been, a convention, or that there had been some understanding that motions of this kind were equivalent to Second Reading. That equivalence to Second Reading in relation to this Bill we are not prepared to give. I suggest that this House should not give anything equivalent to a Second Reading to this Bill, while the House might be perfectly prepared to see that this Bill was thoroughly examined when it was going to the Committee Stage.
The first point of agreement—a fundamental and important agreement—that this debate has shown, in the speech of the Minister for Finance and the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, is that the banking position as altered or as stereotyped, whichever you like to call it, by the Banking Commission, is not a permanent solution or an acceptable solution of that position. It is the universal judgment of this House that the banking position—the whole question of credit organisation, use and manipulation—in this country is still an open question. That is the second point of value which I think this debate has brought out. The number of people who are experts in banking, in its largest sense—I do not mean banking in the sense of pawnbroking, because that is what banking is in this country at the present moment—in the sense of envisaging a system of credit as between individuals in a State, and as between States, in the sense of being able to set out a system for a particular State, and the particular conditions of that State which would enable that State to meet probable changes in that condition, are very few. I doubt if there is any man in this House who possesses that peculiar qualification. Certainly there is not—and I think I speak for both sides of the House now—anybody in this House who is prepared to take up any doctrinaire attitude in relation to that matter.
So long as it is clearly understood that the banking position, as it has grown up in the circumstances which have dictated its present actual nature, is not a banking system which is regarded as sacrosanct, is not regarded as immutable, but is simply a system accepted for the time being because it exists, and which will, in the wisdom of this people and their gradually growing experience of these matters, be altered to fit in with the changing conditions of this House—so long as that position is made clear as the opinion of the whole House on this matter, valuable work has been done in this discussion by the Leader of the Opposition and the Minister for Finance in the speeches they have made.
It has been said, on the question of amalgamation, that broadly speaking amalgamation may be desirable. I believe without any doubt that amalgamations are desirable. Competition does not cheapen goods unless and until one particular condition is met; the charges common to every competitor in business are added to the price of the goods, and competition does not operate to cheapen commodities. Now, if we have a half-a-dozen banks in Ireland, if we have a branch bank of every one of those banks in every town in Ireland, and if we have their competition with surplus staffs and all the rest of it, all those charges have to be added to the cost of the commodity of credit which is consumed in this country. To that extent it is desirable that amalgamations should take place, but that is a very different thing from saying that the State has no interest in the nature and direction of those amalgamations. Take the Irish banks. The Bank of Ireland has total resources of £43,000,000, the National, with headquarters in London, £42.8 million rapidly coming up on the Bank of Ireland; the Munster £26.7 million, and the Provincial 17 millions. Now, it is a very different proposition from the point of view of the country whether the £43,000,000 of the Bank of Ireland amalgamates with the £17,000,000 of the Provincial, or whether the £26,000,000 of the Munster amalgamates with the £13,000,000 of the Hibernian. It is a question which the House and the Government should consider very carefully, not whether amalgamations per se are desirable, but whether power should be given for particular amalgamations.
In accepting this Bill in the ordinary sense of a Second Reading we would be accepting the principle that, if they were in the position to bid over the others, it was desirable that the Bank of Ireland should gobble up the Hibernian, and I think that is thoroughly undesirable. I, for one, am not in favour of improvising where you can use the existing machinery. I am in favour of using the existing banking system of Ireland until it proves that it will not do the work of the Irish nation. I can see very great benefits arising to this country if two of these banks which did very nearly amalgamate, and whose amalgamation broke down upon very small points of difference, did amalgamate. But I cannot see that it is in any way desirable that the Bank of Ireland, 64 per cent. of whose resources are visibly invested outside the country, and 34 per cent. of whose investments are partially invested in and outside the country, should be allowed to gobble up a bank 46 per cent. of whose investments are at present outside the country and 52 per cent. of whose investments may be within the country.
If you examine the other banks in relation to the money which they use for the development of their country, you will find amazing differences. Turn to the Northern Bank in the Twenty-Six Counties. 33 per cent. of its resources are invested outside and 65 per cent. are invested inside. Now, with figures of that kind, it cannot be a matter of indifference to this House what the direction of the amalgamations shall be. Therefore, while the general principle of cheapening credit, by cutting out unnecessary, overlapping and foolish and futile expensive competition is desirable, it is not desirable to accept in principle, on the Second Reading of this Bill, that any amalgamation is desirable in itself; and the power which is claimed in this particular Bill, to amalgamate any other bank in this country with the Bank of Ireland, in face of the relative strength of the existing Irish banks, is undesirable. I understand that four out of five of these banks have their head offices in London, and it is necessary for us in any policy that we have—I mean any preliminary policy—in relation to banking in this country, to concentrate on strengthening and helping those banks which have a local relation.
I should like, if the Minister or someone could tell us, to know what the proportion of the Free State share-holding of the Bank of Ireland is as compared to its outside holding. I am asking that question purely for information, and without any desire to impute anything. I agree with the Minister for Finance that absolute financial independence is impossible. That is a relative term, but there are extraordinary differences in the degrees of that relative term. France, for instance, as well as Belgium, Holland and America, have an entirely different ratio of independence in their financial control compared with the financial control of independence in this country. Our financial independence is conditioned by our actual condition of trade. As long as we are in the position of exporting half the total produce of our main industry to a single market, to that extent we will be hampered either in obtaining or exercising financial independence. As long as we are in the position of having, as we have in this country, compulsory exports, because you have to export goods to meet annuities, you have to export goods to meet ground rents, you have to export goods whether you like it or not to meet pensions, to that extent——
The Deputy is now travelling some distance outside the Bill.
Yes, and I will come back—to that extent these things do inevitably link, and in the attempt to get financial independence it is not through the symptoms—banking and that kind of thing are largely symptoms in this matter—you will have to deal, but with the fundamental links which bind you to another country. It is to the extent to which you break those fundamental links that you can attempt to build up your financial condition. I think the idea that in sending this Bill to a Committee this House approves of its principle is bad. That idea is finished and done with in relation to this Bill, and in relation to all future Private Bills. I think that we should condition it mentally with the idea that we do not want particular amalgamations in particular directions; that we do not want further amalgamations of our existing banks with foreign banks, and that we do not want anything done that would weaken the possibility of the building up of the position of native banks; and that we do not want alien directors upon banks functioning in this country. Whether that will have to be written, or whether that law will remain unwritten but effective, as it does in every other country in the world, if we cannot have an unwritten law accepted to that extent, then that law should be written.
If the Bank of Ireland wants its charter let it have its charter, but if it wants both its charter and the full liberties and powers of a commercial bank, then it is asking something more than the other competing banks in this country are getting, and to the extent of its asking more to that extent more it may be required in other particular matters to meet the desires of the State. We want our banking system slowly and conservatively re-organised. There is no Party in this State which is reckless in matters of finance. There is no Party in this State which is anxious to make experiments for the sake of making experiments, but it is a commonly accepted opinion by all parties in this State that the existing system of banking in Ireland, grown up and conditioned by the history of its growing up, is not a final solution of the banking problem, and that banking system, whether by this Bill or by another, whether by a banking commission as distinct from a bankers' commission, or by some other means, slowly and steadily we will alter and re-condition to make it an instrument of benefit to this country instead of being a very questionable servant at the present moment.
There was one question dealt with by Deputy de Valera which I would like him to make clear. He referred to the importance of ensuring that any extra capital of the Bank of Ireland should be Irish capital. I presume he would not exclude North of Ireland capital. Deputy MacEntee objected that certain directors of the Bank of Ireland were resident in the North of Ireland. I think he said they were not citizens of this State. As a matter of fact, by a curious oversight in the Constitution, they are citizens of the State. A study of Article 3 will show that the people of Northern Ireland are at least honorary citizens. I understand the Northern Government does a considerable business with the Bank of Ireland, and I think it is only fair that there should be on the Board of Directors a representative of the North of Ireland. When Deputy de Valera spoke of Irish capital did he include North of Ireland capital?
I cannot allow Deputy Flinn's remarks to pass without comment. He seemed to me to lay down a general principle, and finished up by assuming that that general principle had the full acceptance of the House unless it was disclaimed. It is quite true that most of his speech related to a criticism of what I might call the details of the Bill, which might be more properly suitable to the Committee Stage of the Bill. I for one dissent entirely from the view that this stage of the Bill is not equivalent to the ordinary Second Reading of a Bill. It is hard to say what is the general principle of this Private Bill. It seems to me perfectly clear that no matter how the Bill is modified in Committee the Deputy would still be opposed to it. The position should be made clear. The Deputy in accepting this Bill only accepted it in this way, that if he is unable to secure on the Committee Stage what he desires to secure, then he reserves to himself the right to vote against the final acceptance of the Bill. But I think you, sir, laid it down that this stage is equivalent to the ordinary Second Reading Stage of a Bill. I for one still adhere to that point of view.
The difficulty is that we may want to go into a number of details for examination in another stage. It has been laid down that we cannot get the details here, and the difficulty is that we might be bound to resist Bills to which otherwise we would say, "Let them go to Committee."
It has been pointed out by a number of Deputies that by passing this motion it is the equivalent of a Second Reading. I understand that the procedure as far as a Private Bill is concerned is distinct from that of a Private Member's Bill, and that no detailed explanation is given at this stage. This Bill has been promoted by the Bank of Ireland. Although that Bank is more or less a private concern run on a profit-making basis, at the same time it should be realised that the Bank of Ireland is a concern which takes a very big interest in the financial affairs of this State. I understand there are at present 112 branches of the Bank of Ireland within the Free State.
Reference has been made to the fact that three or four of the banking institutions operating in the Free State have headquarters outside the Saorstát. Reference has also been made by Deputy Esmonde to the fact that Sir George Clark has been co-opted as one of the directors of the Bank of Ireland. I do not mean, though I could if I desired and had the time, to go into the political activities of Sir George Clark. Recently he became Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Great Northern Railway. He had not been in that position long until the Board of Directors decided, on his suggestion, that their headquarter offices should be transferred from Dublin to Belfast. Were it not for the fact that publicity was focussed on this matter at the time doubtless the headquarters would have been transferred from the Saorstát to the Six Counties, which, as anybody acquainted with the railway station knows, would be detrimental to railway interests within the Saorstát. We have no guarantee that the same thing will not be attempted as far as this Bill is concerned. We have no guarantee that Sir George Clark, as one of the directors is not going to try and control the finances of this bank, not in the interests of the Saorstát but in the interests of Northern Ireland. That is a matter regarding which we should be very careful. Deputy de Valera pointed out that according to the charter there are certain restrictions which prevent the Bank of Ireland being merged in cross-Channel concerns. That, I think, is a very important restriction. I have not heard any Deputy, and I have not heard the Minister for Finance, putting forward any suggestion why this motion should be passed. The Minister has insinuated, in the course of his remarks, that this Bill is not giving very much additional power to the Bank of Ireland, but at the same time it is giving additional power to it which has not been properly explained in this House, and on that ground, if for no other, I believe the House should reject the motion.
Before the question is put I would like to be clear as to what we are doing. I, for one, am going to vote against the Bill getting a Second Reading unless the other view is taken. The question really is whether we are going to let this Bill get a run through Committee to be examined there. I indicated when this matter first came before us that I took the view Deputy Flinn has expressed here, that our passing of the resolution simply meant we were allowing the Bill to go for examination to the Committee, reserving our full right as to what we wished to do afterwards. It is only when the Ceann Comhairle made it clear that this stage in effect corresponded with the Second Reading I purported to speak at all. So you see the difficulty is this—if Deputy Flinn's view is taken I would not feel bound to vote against this motion or against the Bill going to Committee, having indicated clearly what my views are. But if we are to be regarded as in any sense endorsing this Bill in a general way, such as we would endorse the general principle of a Bill on the Second Reading Stage, then I would have to vote against the motion. Therefore, I would like the Ceann Comhairle to make the position clear.
What happened on last Thursday, 11th April, when the Leas-Cheann Comhairle formally moved the motion before us? Deputy de Valera said:
"We will not oppose this particular motion, but, of course, we reserve our full rights to oppose the Bill when it comes before us again.
An Ceann Comhairle: This is a motion which is equivalent to a Second Reading. Of course, the Bill will come on again after it has been considered by the Joint Committee and by the Seanad.
Mr. de Valera: We will oppose the Bill when it comes before us again."
The question, as to when opposition in this House to any Private Bill should manifest itself has arisen in a previous case. A Private Bill is a Bill to promote private interests. Therefore, it differs fundamentally from a Public Bill, whether introduced by a member of the Government or by a private Deputy. This Bill was, in accordance with Standing Orders, introduced into the Seanad and there got a Second Reading, and a message has been sent to the Dáil in the terms set out now on the Order Paper. Deputies must make up their minds for themselves, as to what they are going to do about this motion when they have been told what the procedure is. It is not competent for me to say if this motion has been passed that Deputies have approved of something or have not approved of something. But it is correct to say at this particular Stage, when the question of sending the Bill to a Joint Committee is before us, that the discussion takes the form of a Second Reading Debate.
The position is, that if this motion is passed now the Bill will go to a Joint Committee. It will there be considered in a rather judicial manner, as Deputy Law said. That is, the promoters of the Bill will be heard by counsel or otherwise. They will be asked questions and the Committee will, in a judicial manner, endeavour to make up its mind as to whether or not the Preamble of the Bill has been proved. Then they will proceed to consider the Bill, going through it and perhaps making amendments. It would be very undesirable, speaking in general, that a Bill, having been subjected to that process, should be opposed in this House on the Fifth Stage and rejected. It would, I think, sap the confidence of persons who desire to promote Private Bills if we adopted the method of allowing the Bill to go to a Joint Committee and then defeating it on the Fifth Stage because the majority of the Deputies had what they considered to be a radical objection to the Bill.
If a Deputy has what seems to him to be a radical objection—that is, an objection which in his judgment could not be got over by an amendment in Committee—I think he ought to make that clear on this particular stage.
That is my view of the line the House should take; but when it is said "We reserve our rights on the other stages," what has to be remembered is that our rights exist whether we reserve them or not. On the other stages of the Bill the House has absolutely a right to reject a Bill. There is no question about that. The question is whether it would be desirable in general to exercise these rights. It seems to me it would be undesirable, unless something extraordinary happened in the interval, that we should on the Fifth Stage defeat the Bill in this House, seeing that it had passed a Second Reading in the Seanad, that a motion such as we are now discussing had been passed in the Dáil, that a Joint Committee had considered the Bill and had, in agreement with the promoters, amended the Bill, and that the Bill, having passed the Fourth and Fifth Stages in the Seanad, had come to us for its final stages. That would tend, if it were a common practice, to undermine the whole Private Bill procedure.
When a similar matter arose on a previous occasion, I held that if a Deputy's objection is radical it should manifest itself at this stage, which is equivalent to a Second Reading. The question then arose in a case where a Bill had passed the Second Reading in the Seanad, and when a motion similar to this came before us it was opposed here by the Executive on grounds of public policy. The case was made that that was the wrong time to oppose the Bill and that all Private Bills should be allowed to go to Committee. It was the view of the Chair then, and it is still my view, that especially in that particular case, where the opposition was such that, in ordinary Parliamentary conditions, it would be practically certain to kill the Bill, that the opposition should manifest itself at the earliest possible moment. I am not able, and indeed nobody would be able, to say precisely to what Deputies commit themselves when they give a particular vote in the House. If a radical objection is in the mind of a Deputy, and particularly in the mind of a whole Party, it seems to me that this stage is the right stage at which to give expression to that objection. Certainly if the official Opposition in any House has any radical objection to a Private Bill, this is the proper stage on which to give expression to that objection.
Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 71; Níl, 56.
Tá
- Aird, William P.
- Alton, Ernest Henry.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Blythe, Ernest.
- Bourke, Séamus A.
- Brennan, Michael.
- Brodrick, Seán.
- Byrne, John Joseph.
- Carey, Edmund.
- Cole, John James.
- Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
- Conlon, Martin.
- Connolly, Michael P.
- Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Craig, Sir James.
- Crowley, James.
- Daly, John.
- Davis, Michael.
- De Loughrey, Peter.
- Doherty, Eugene.
- Dolan, James N.
- Doyle, Peadar Seán.
- Duggan, Edmund John.
- Dwyer, James.
- Egan, Barry M.
- Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Good, John.
- Gorey, Denis J.
- Hassett, John J.
- Heffernan, Michael R.
- Hennessy, Thomas.
- Hennigan, John.
- Henry, Mark.
- Hogan, Patrick (Galway).
- Holohan, Richard.
- Jordan, Michael.
- Kelly, Patrick Michael.
- Keogh, Myles.
- Law, Hugh Alexander.
- Leonard, Patrick.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
- McDonogh, Martin.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- Mongan, Joseph W.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- Myles, James Sproule.
- Nally, Martin Michael.
- Nolan, John Thomas.
- O'Connell, Richard.
- O'Connor, Bartholomew.
- O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
- O'Hanlon, John F.
- O'Higgins, Thomas.
- O'Leary, Daniel.
- O'Mahony, Dermot Gun.
- O'Sullivan, Gearoid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
- Roddy, Martin.
- Shaw, Patrick W.
- Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
- Thrift, William Edward.
- Tierney, Michael.
- White, Vincent Joseph.
- Wolfe, George.
- Wolfe, Jasper Travers.
Níl
- Allen, Denis.
- Anthony, Richard.
- Blaney, Neal.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Seán.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Broderick, Henry.
- Buckley, Daniel.
- Carney, Frank.
- Carty, Frank.
- Cassidy, Archie J.
- Clery, Michael.
- Colbert, James.
- Colohan, Hugh.
- Cooney, Eamon.
- Corkery, Dan.
- Corry, Martin John.
- Crowley, Fred. Hugh.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Davin, William.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Rowell, Thomas P.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Sexton, Martin.
- Fahy, Frank.
- Flinn, Hugo.
- French, Seán.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Goulding, John.
- Hayes, Seán.
- Hogan, Patrick (Clare).
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Jordan, Stephen.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kent, William R.
- Kerlin, Frank.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Kilroy, Michael.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- McEllistrim, Thomas.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Mullins, Thomas.
- O'Connell, Thomas J.
- O'Kelly, Seán T.
- O'Leary, William.
- Sheehy, Timothy (Tipp.).
- Smith, Patrick.
- Tubridy, John.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Francis C.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P.S. Doyle. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Question declared carried.
Message to be sent to the Seanad accordingly.