When this debate adjourned last Wednesday, I was endeavouring to set before the House my view as to what constituted the essential principle of arbitration. I was saying that, essentially, arbitration was a process whereby specific issues which had arisen between two parties were referred, with their consent and by their agreement, to a third party, who should endeavour, by expressing an opinion, to bring the two contenders in the disagreement or dispute into agreement with each other. I was going on to make it clear that, while there might be voluntary arbitration, and another process which is sometimes called arbitration by compulsion, the power of compulsion was in no sense an essential factor in any arbitration scheme. When discussing a motion of the kind now before it, which asks that certain matters in which the Government, as representing the whole people, has a primary and overriding interest, should be referred to what is described here as an independent arbitration board, it is essential for the House not to allow itself to be confused into assuming that there is in existence in this country any code or statute of law which provides for an arbitration board of the kind which is specifically referred to in the motion. There is, of course, at common law a process of arbitration which seeks, where differences have arisen between individuals as to their rights, say, under a contract or as to their rights in certain property, to have those differences reconciled without having recourse to the ordinary processes of the courts. There are statutes which give the courts, when those conflicts of individual interests arise, power to have them referred to an arbitrator, in order to assess the compensation which should be paid for some loss or damage sustained either when property has been or is to be taken by compulsion, or where a contract has not been fulfilled. Sometimes, as I say, where two individuals are at issue, the court will appoint an arbitrator for the purpose of assessing the compensation or adjudicating upon a particular narrow issue. But at common law, in the generality of cases where arbitrations take place, the submissions are by agreement. I have here Redman's Law of Arbitrations and Awards. Now, it may seem strange that I, a layman, should in a matter of this sort, endeavour to controvert the statements which have been made by the learned counsel——
Private Deputies' Business. - Civil Service and Arbitration—(Resumed).
The Minister would do anything.
——who would seem to have been retained almost to plead the case against the Government in this matter, but we have to remember that lawyers in their chambers giving advice to their clients as to their rights under the law are, I might almost say, different personalities to the lawyers when they appear as advocates before the courts. In the one case they are concerned to ensure that their clients shall not be misled. In the other, they are concerned to put the best face possible upon their client's case.
Like the Minister when he was in opposition.
While I should be quite prepared, if I were a private individual, retaining the services of either Deputy Costello or Deputy Lavery as my advisers, for a fee, to attach the greatest possible importance to their advice and to be guided by it, it is quite a different matter when they appear here as the advocates for one party in the dispute. Then neither I nor any member of the House is bound to listen to them or to take their opinions, even though they offer them to this House for acceptance as the opinions of experienced lawyers. They count in this matter for nothing more than I or any other layman in this Assembly. They are simply here to plead a case and not to advise us as to the law. That, possibly, will explain why we have heard statements made during the course of this debate by a former Attorney-General, as to the constitutional position, which, at any rate, were not in accordance with the principles upon which my predecessors acted during the period when Deputy Costello was Attorney-General and their law adviser.
Now, Sir, I was dealing with arbitration at common law, and the first point I want to make—and I make it on the authority of Redman's Law of Arbitrations, as edited by Mr. William E. Watson, Barrister-at-Law, and Honorary Standing Counsel (Past President) of the Institute of Arbitrators—the first matter to which he calls my attention is on page 78 of this volume which I have here, where he states:—
"The jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator are governed by the terms of the submission."
Then we go on to what he previously said on page 3, which is as follows:—
"At common law any agreement by which parties refer an existing or possible future matter in dispute between them to the judicial and final determination of a third person, who is named, is called a submission."
On page 6 he goes on to say that
"An agreement means the assent of both parties to the same set of terms."
Now, that touches—and I am merely going to touch on it in passing—upon one feature of our arbitration proposals which has been attacked and which was attacked on the last occasion upon which this motion was before the House by Deputy Lavery. He said that we had a veto at both ends. Of course, I think it is a misnomer, in connection with what is reserved to one of the parties to any arbitration which might be undertaken under the Government's proposal, to describe as a veto the fact that the Minister for Finance will have reserved to him by statute the ordinary rights which, under common law, every citizen enjoys—the right that he himself shall determine and agree that a matter in which he is a party shall be referred to arbitration or not. In general, it will be the staffs which will be putting forward demands, asking that they should be referred to arbitration. Their agreement is implicit in their demands. The only thing that we are bound to do, if we propose to pass a statute setting up an arbitration board for the Civil Service, is to ensure that we safeguard to the Minister for Finance the same liberty of action as the staffs have—this liberty that what will be referred to the arbitration board is a matter upon which we are prepared to arbitrate and nothing else. As I say, this liberty is the right to reserve it to oneself to say "There are certain matters which I shall refer to the arbitration board, and certain matters which, in my view, are not justiciable and which I must reserve," goes to the whole root of this principle of arbitration, which is that the whole reference to the arbitration board should be by agreement between the parties themselves—that is, voluntary arbitration as it is understood in this country.
Now, Sir, I was pointing out that the House must be careful to distinguish, first of all, between arbitration as it has existed in this country and as the courts have had cognisance of it under the common law procedure since, I think, about 1854, in regard to disputes between individuals, and secondly, industrial arbitration as applied to the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes as it has been in operation here since the Act of 1919. They are two separate processes. The House heard Deputy Alfred Byrne, on Wednesday last, referring to the fact that he was one of those who had advocated the setting up of the Whitley Committee, and he urged that the Government should provide for the Civil Service here such machinery as had been recommended by the Whitley Committee. Now, what attitude did the Whitley Committee take in regard to this question of arbitration? So that there shall be no doubt as to my authority, I am going to quote to the House what I think is an authoritative résume of the findings of that committee in regard to this question of arbitration. It is to be found in the 14th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and the article is written over the initials "F.W.L." It is all very well for Deputy Norton to laugh, but I think——
The Minister should have got that in 1932.
It appears to me, Sir, that Deputy Norton is not concerned to let the House understand what is involved in this issue. I am afraid that, though he has been clamouring for me to intervene in this debate, he is not prepared to listen to me. If that is so, I do not think there is much use in my continuing, and the general public will understand why.
Leave out the Encyclopædia and carry on.
I am not going to leave it out. I want to be precise in my references, so that any person who wishes may look them up. I want, if I may, and if the Deputy's almost invincible ignorance will permit me, to let him understand what is really at issue here.
Nobody is more ignorant than the Minister.
The Minister is entitled to make his statement, and he should be allowed to do so without interruption. Other Deputies were allowed to speak without interruption, and the Minister should be allowed to make his statement without interruption.
Let him make it, then.
The author of this article was, and perhaps still is, the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Labour. We have been told that our civil servants want everything which civil servants have in Great Britain; the existing system there is held up as something which we should imitate and upon which we should model ourselves. In any event, I want to put before the House an authoritative statement as to what the Whitley Committee did, in fact, recommend. I should like Deputy O'Neill, who has accused us of pledge-breaking, to bear with me for a while, just to hear what is the issue between us and the Civil Service. We have said we are prepared to set up an arbitration board. I want to say that the arbitration board which was contemplated was not one for compulsory arbitration, but is of the voluntary type which is generally adopted.
There were no conditions attached to the promise at all.
Who is going to write them in, then? The Deputy now wants to interpret this undertaking to set up the arbitration board as a sort of blank cheque.
They were all blank cheques, all the promises.
Dud cheques—there is some honesty about a blank one.
Do you think that is the sort of way a Government should conduct the business of this country? Would the Deputy, in any ordinary business undertaking, give to any person a blank cheque to be filled up as that person wanted?
I repeat that there were no conditions and it was a matter of personal honour.
Would the Deputy not feel, if he was in the habit of doing that sort of thing, giving blank cheques, that the best thing that could happen to him would be that some person who is near and dear to him and who held him near and dear, should apply to the court for the appointment of a guardian in lunacy? Yet, that is what the Deputy wants us to do, to say that we gave a blank cheque to any person to fill up. We said we would set up an arbitration board. The arbitration scheme is in draft. We are ready to fulfil our pledge, but we are not going to let Deputy Norton or Deputy Heron or any civil servant avail of our signature to fill in a cheque for something that was never intended, never contemplated, and is not in existence even on the other side of the water.
Let me now get back to the question of the Whitley Committee. The Whitley Committee made a recommendation against compulsory arbitration. Mind you, what is being demanded here is that we should have compulsory arbitration, that whether as I said before, a matter is deemed by the Minister to be arbitrable or not, without his consent or agreement it is to be placed before some independent board so that they may adjudicate upon it. The Whitley Committee, therefore, to which Deputy Alfred Byrne referred on Wednesday, made a recommendation against compulsory arbitration.
I want to ask the movers of this motion, or I should like to have it from Deputy Heron or Deputy Norton, does this motion advocate compulsory arbitration? I cannot read into it compulsory arbitration. If it does advocate it, and if that is to be read into it, then I will not vote for the motion. I want that made clear.
The Deputy must permit the Minister to be heard.
With all respect, I think that position will have to be cleared up, for some of us at any rate. If it advocates compulsory arbitration, I will not vote for the motion.
I will not allow Deputy Anthony to intervene in this way.
It is only fair to both sides, and I think the Minister will appreciate my inquiry.
The scheme which has been submitted by us to the Civil Service for their consideration provided for the setting up of an arbitration board. A question has been raised, and perhaps it would be useful to have it more specifically on record and, in the circumstances, I may as well read from the draft of the Bill how that board is to be set up.
On the appointed day there shall be established a board, in this Act referred to as the board, to be styled and known as the Civil Service Arbitration Board, to fulfil the functions assigned to it by this Act. The board shall consist of a chairman, in this Act referred to as the chairman appointed in accordance with this Act, a panel, in this Act referred to as the Minister's panel of such number not being less than four——
On a point of order. I understand the Minister to be quoting from an official document. If he is to quote from it, will it be laid on the Table of the House?
I am not quoting from an official document. I am quoting from a draft of the proposal which has already been submitted to the Civil Service.
The practice is that if a document is quoted, it must be made available to the House.
Then I withdraw that quotation and I will make available to the House the exact scheme submitted to the Civil Service. Deputy Norton has prevented the Civil Service from enjoying the benefits of that scheme.
The Minister cannot pass over that swindle on them.
It is a long document, and I do not want to occupy the whole time of the House in dealing with it. These are some of the heads of the scheme as circulated to the Civil Service organisations. The difference between the draft Bill and this is that the draft Bill is somewhat more precise as to how a chairman shall be appointed and other important matters. "(a) The arbitration board shall consist of a chairman, (b) a panel of not less than four persons acceptable to the Minister for Finance as his representative, and (c) a panel of not less than four persons acceptable to the staff side of the General Service Council. For the hearing of each claim the board shall consist of a chairman," who, I may mention—it is not in this document, but I may mention it—is to be appointed by agreement between the Minister for Finance and the representatives of the Civil Service, and in the event of the failure of these two parties to agree, to be appointed by a person as nearly independent as possible of both parties. I do not think that any fairer procedure than that could be devised for the selection and appointment of a chairman of an arbitration board. It is to be made, if possible, by agreement between the two parties concerned, and, in the event of their failure, upon the nomination of another official personage who is as nearly as possible independent of both parties. "For the hearing of each claim the board shall consist of a chairman, one member to be nominated by the Minister for Industry and Commerce from panel (b)"—that is, from the panel of four persons whom the Minister for Finance has indicated are acceptable to him—"and one member similarly nominated from the panel (c) " that is, the panel of not less than four persons acceptable to the staff side of the General Service Council.
The next feature of the scheme is: "The Minister for Finance shall prescribe the kind of dispute which would be appropriate for arbitration," and it is then intimated to the staffs: "It is proposed that claims which may be arbitrable are those concerning the emoluments, weekly hours of work, and leave of classes of civil servants, and for this purpose, the word ‘emoluments' includes allowances in the nature of pay, the application of bonus to basic pay, overtime rates, subsistence rates, and travelling and lodging allowances. Subjects that would be excluded are discipline and conduct regulations, political rights, promotions, superannuation, cost-of-living index figure as the basic of bonus payments, recruitment, grading of work and organisation of staff. This set of exclusions, however, must not be taken to be exhaustive."
A Deputy wanted to know whether our proposal was a proposal for a compulsory arbitration scheme. It is not; it is a proposal to allow an arbitration board to adjudicate upon disputes where both parties to the disputes are agreeable that the matter should be arbitrated upon. Naturally—and this is an important point-the Minister must, I think, reserve the right to agree, or disagree, as to whether a matter should be arbitrated upon, but if the Minister for Finance, or the Government, set up an arbitration board, they intend that arbitration board to work and they are not going to vexatiously prevent disputes from going to that board which obviously and plainly are matters upon which the board should be called on to arbitrate. The reason we have retained this reservation in the scheme is in order that the scheme should be one for voluntary arbitration, and not one under which we should be compelled to go to the board willy nilly, whether it is in the public interest or not, whether it is in the interest of the general citizens or not and whether we think it is, as I have said, a matter which is not justiciable.
I am sorry there has been this digression, Sir, and I want to get back, if I can, to this report of the Whitley Committee because it goes, I think, pretty deeply to the root of the difference which has arisen between us, on the one hand, and the Civil Service, on the other. The Whitley Committee made a recommendation against compulsory arbitration, but in favour of a standing arbitration tribunal as part of the voluntary machinery and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, which superseded the Conciliation Act complied with this recommendation. Our proposal here is to set up a standing arbitration tribunal as part of the voluntary machinery for conciliation and arbitration in the Civil Service. This article from which I have quoted goes on to say: "Cases are referred to the court by the consent of the parties..." All we are standing for is that we shall not be deprived of the right to consent, that our non-consent shall be effective and that, as I have said, if disputes arise as between the Civil Service, on the one hand, and the State, on the other, the claim will not go to the voluntary arbitration court unless our consent is secured, just the same as in an ordinary industrial dispute, the consent of the employees, of the workers, would have to be secured before the matter could be referred to an arbitration tribunal.
This article goes on to say: "... terms of reference as in all arbitration cases being agreed upon by the parties"—the terms of reference defining the issues upon which a decision is required—and then—which once again touches upon one of the points of difference between the Government and those who profess to speak for the Civil Service—"The awards are not of compulsory application." We are taking up the attitude that the Government is entitled, in a matter of this sort, to all the rights which the parties to voluntary arbitration in this country would have under the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. Under that Act, the awards are not of compulsory application. Naturally—and this is a point I want to bring out again—if the Government refers a dispute with the Civil Service to an arbitration board which the Government itself is setting up, the Government would be very slow indeed not to honour the award of such an arbitration tribunal. It would only refuse to honour that award under circumstances of compelling necessity, that is to say, that the award was going to impose such a substantial burden on the community or on the State that it could not be endured.
In dealing with this problem of arbitration as applied to the State service, we have to bear in mind another very important point, that in ordinary cases of arbitration in industrial disputes, if an award, in the opinion of the employer, of those who own the industrial undertakings involved in the dispute, is excessive, they always have the remedy in their own hands of closing the undertakings down. If the award is excessive and makes it impossible for him to carry on in the existing economic surroundings with some prospect of profit to himself, some return for his labour, and some return on the capital he has invested in the undertaking, the owner can close his concern down. He can throw his workers out of employment; he can cut his losses and get out, if the award is more than the industrial concern in which he is interested can bear. That is not the position in regard to the State. The State services have to be carried on and, therefore, no Minister for Finance could, in advance, bind himself under our Constitution—I do not care what the opinions of Deputy Lavery and Deputy Costello may be and, as I said, my experience of lawyers in regard to these constitutional matters is that their opinions vary very much according to what side of the House they are sitting on——
Lawyers are not the only people to whom that applies.
It does not matter——
We know that.
—— what their opinion may be, I say that no Minister for Finance could bind himself in advance, to honour the award of an arbitration tribunal willy-nilly. He must be fully free to exercise the responsibility which the Constitution imposes upon him to secure, so far as he can, the general financial well-being of the country and to ensure that the citizens and industry of the State are not called upon to endure heavier burdens than they can withstand. That is one of the essential difficulties in applying this principle of arbitration to Civil Service disputes. In ordinary industrial disputes the employer has the option of closing down if the award is in his view excessive. The State cannot do that. That is a fact that we ought to remember.
I want, Sir, again to remind the House that one of the points at issue between the representatives of the Civil Service and the Minister for Finance is that the award should be of compulsory application. I have already pointed out that that is quite contrary to the spirit of the Industrial Courts Act of 1919. I hope the House will bear with me if I occupy its time a little longer because I want to bring home to everybody this fact, that we have heard arbitration discussed here as if there was some general stereotyped form of procedure which was of universal application. I pointed out that there is no foundation for that assumption. Except the Industrial Courts Act of 1919 there is no arbitration code for setting disputes between employers and employees in this country.
Industrial disputes are not confined either to Ireland or Great Britain. Accordingly there are many codes of conciliation and arbitration to be found throughout the world. There are many codes of conciliation and arbitration, but I want the House to bear with me if I go into this matter a little further in order to show that those codes differ and vary in their principles and in order to make it quite clear beyond yea or nay that it is not universally true that the awards of arbitration boards are of compulsory application and that they have the force of law or a judgment, as Deputies Lavery and Costello endeavoured to suggest they had, when they referred to our scheme as sham arbitration. I want to show also that it is not universally true either, that one party to a dispute can have recourse to arbitration without the essential agreement of the other party.
Now in what I am going to say I base myself upon an authority that ought to be acceptable to the Labour Party. The International Labour Office, in series (A) of its Industrial Relations, Studies and Reports, published in 1933 a very exhaustive volume upon conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes. I am not going to read the whole of it to the House on this occasion but I do propose to try to make a brief summary of the main points which emerge from a study of that report in regard to conciliation and arbitration because it is essential that the House and the general public ought to be fully seized of the fact that this scheme which we have set before the Civil Service is an arbitration scheme in the true sense of the word and that it is unfair, unjust and quite indefensible to refer to it, as it has been referred to here by Civil Service spokesmen and Deputies opposite, as a sham arbitration scheme. The first thing that is pointed out in this volume in regard to arbitration is that
"as a rule two main stages can be distinguished in the procedure. The dispute reaches the first stage when it is so developed that certain special bodies, set up to undertake conciliation negotiations, begin to deal with it."
(Our scheme which we have submitted to the Civil Service provided for the setting up of special bodies to undertake conciliation negotiations.)
"This stage may be described as the conciliation stage. If no success is achieved there is, generally, but not always, another possibility of bringing the parties to agreement. One or more referees propose to the parties a formula on the basis of which it is hoped they may be able to agree. It is sometimes decided in advance that the parties will accept this proposal, which is generally referred to as an award. This section of the procedure may be called the arbitration stage."
Now mark this. We have been told that our scheme is a sham arbitration scheme because we do not bind ourselves in advance. For the reasons I have endeavoured to set before the House, we do not bind ourselves in advance to accept the proposal which will emerge from the arbitration board. But here you have the International Labour Office in this publication pointing out that it is not general and not universal for the parties to pledge themselves in advance to accept the award of the arbitration board. It is only done sometimes.
This publication then goes on to say that when one or other party to the arbitration has not accepted the award, that "a special set procedure is applied by which the actual situation can be clearly brought to light by unbiased observers. This inquiry procedure may be instituted when conciliation proves fruitless." These are very important points. "It is also possible, however, even after arbitration has failed and the parties refuse to accept the award. This means that a certain pressure is brought to bear on the parties which may lead them to an agreement which may pave the way for fresh attempts at conciliation or arbitration." Thus, Labour authorities, in regard to this principle of arbitration as applied to the solution of labour disputes, quite clearly have envisaged arbitration proposals the result of which both parties in advance do not bind themselves to accept and which, in fact, experience has shown may not be accepted. They go on even to point out what I have already endeavoured to convey to the House, that there are, one might say, myriad schemes for arbitration, all of which differ from one another in essential points.
"It will be found," this publication says, "as already mentioned, that there are many intermediate stages, differing very slightly from each other, between the pure conciliation method and the compulsory arbitration system." Then we are given—and this is important from the point of those who believe that all our civil servants are contending for is what civil servants already enjoy in Great Britain-two examples, one of the pure conciliation method, and the other, an example of the compulsory system, as they term it. The essence of the pure conciliation and arbitration is, as I have already shown you, that the award has not compulsory application. The example which is given of this method is the arbitration code of Great Britain, and the example of compulsory arbitration is the Australian code. "The last point," our Labour authorities go on to say, "to be considered is that of the conclusion of the proceedings and the application of any decision which may be arrived at by the conciliation or arbitration board. Here the differences (in the choice of method) in various countries will be clearly apparent. The description of the method by which the conciliation proposal or the arbitration award is arrived at, its form, content, and legal character will be followed by a discussion of the complex of problems connected with the enforcement of the award or other decision. Furthermore, special attention must be paid to the acceptance or rejection of the award, the power to declare it binding on the parties in advance or subsequently, the civil or penal guarantees for its observance, other forms of pressure or compulsion, and the right of appeal where such exists." Once again we have it quite clearly brought out that you may have—and you have in fact in other countries, most generally in the democratic countries—a form of arbitration where the award is not binding on either party, and where no sanctions attach except such sanctions as attach to a gentleman's agreement, the sanction of loss of public reputation, which is invoked when one man breaks faith with another.
This impartial study goes on, at a further stage, to say: "It is therefore natural that in the oldest industrial State of the modern type, England, many and varied arrangements for conciliation and arbitration should have been created by the parties concerned in close connection with the development of a system of collective agreements.... There is no need to go into further detail on this subject since even the English-speaking countries... have almost entirely adopted the system of putting official machinery at the disposal of the parties concerned in the dispute, at their own request, if the efforts of the parties themselves are unsuccessful."
Now, mark what is the practice. Arbitration machinery is provided in other countries just as we propose to provide it in the Bill which, as I have already told the House, is in draft, but it is only put into operation at the request of the parties concerned. What does that mean? It means this: that if one of the parties proposes to reserve to himself the right to say whether a matter is or is not arbitrable, as we propose to reserve that right to ourselves here, then the matter cannot go before the arbitration board. That is the practice in general in connection with this question. That is the essence of voluntary arbitration.
Again, addressing myself to this point—and if I labour it, it is because of a difference of opinion as to whether arbitration should be by agreement or by compulsion, or as to whether awards should be of compulsory application or not-it is because of the difference of opinion that seems to exist about these matters, that civil servants are without the arbitration machinery which was promised in 1932—the Labour Office study proceeds: "The form of the application is extremely varied"—that is the form of application to the board—"In most systems there is no prescribed form— in those of Austria, Finland and Germany, for instance, and apparently almost all countries such as Great Britain, and some other English-speaking States, where the proceedings are voluntary, and there is no compulsion. In systems, which on the whole dispense with compulsion, the conciliator or conciliation institution may invite the parties to submit to arbitration and assist them in their choice of an arbitrator or, in other ways, but cannot open proceedings against the will of the parties. This is logical, for according to most regulations the opening of arbitration proceedings naturally entails a readiness, usually pre-arranged, to accept such award as may be made." That is precisely our position. If we agree, as in general we are prepared to agree, to the opening of arbitration proceedings, there is a natural readiness to accept such an award as may be made. It is not right that we should go further than that and it is less than right that we should be pressed to go further.
This study of an international authority on conciliation and arbitration goes on to state on page 80: "Attention was drawn above to the principle of informality in conciliation and arbitration systems. The remarks made there are equally true of the actual proceedings and it is only necessary to add that conciliation and arbitration procedure is, as far as form is concerned, much freer than civil procedure but that this freedom decreases nearly everywhere with the growth of powers of compulsion." In fact, the more informal the procedure, the greater likelihood there seems to be of a decision acceptable to both parties. As I reminded the House arbitration between individuals is instituted when two people have a dispute and desire to refer it to a third party for his opinion in order to avoid the expensive, cumbersome, formal and sometimes prolonged processes of the ordinary law.
The study proceeds to make this important summarisation "Once the dispute has been dealt with on its merits, there are two main possibilities for the conclusion of the proceedings. One is that an agreement may be reached while they are still in progress without a formal proposal for conciliation or an award having to be made; the other that the institution may make such a proposal or award, in which case three further eventualities emerge. The parties may submit the proposal or award in advance, or decide the question of acceptance subsequently, or again the award may be legally binding or can be made binding." These three eventualities are what I should like the House to bear in mind. They make it clear that formal compulsion is not an essential element in arbitration. "The first group of systems comprises first of all certain English-speaking countries with the exception of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa." In fact, however, subsequent to the drafting of the first part of the report to which I am referring, New Zealand decided to abandon the principle of compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes. Therefore this system of arbitration where an award has not compulsory application and where the submission of the arbitration board is by agreement, extends first of all to "certain English-speaking countries with the exception of Australia and South Africa, that is to say Canada, Great Britain, and as far as can be established the United States of America... According to the legislation of these countries, acceptance of the proposal or award of a conciliation or arbitration institution creates no legal obligation but only the moral obligation of a gentleman's agreement." As I said time and time again in this House, we are prepared to accept the moral obligation of a gentleman's agreement if our arbitration is set up and, so far as we can to honour such awards as the arbitration board may make.
I am sorry I have kept the House at length on this point, but its importance will be understood. It is quite clear from everything I have said, that there is no stereotyped well-defined or authoritative scheme of arbitration which has as two of its essential elements, reference to the arbitration board by compulsion, and a compulsory application of that board's award. Throughout the world there are systems of voluntary arbitration, such as it was intended to set up for the Civil Service here. It was stated that if we were returned to power we would have an arbitration board for the Civil Service, that is of the type of arbitration that exists in most democratic countries. There are systems of compulsory arbitration. Where do they exist? They exist in Italy, in Germany, in Russia, and also Australia. They used to exist in New Zealand. Compulsory arbitration was, I think, originally introduced in Australia at the behest of the workers. The strongest opponents of compulsory arbitration in Australia to-day are the workers. It was introduced in New Zealand also, but so unsatisfactory was the working of the system of compulsory arbitration there that it has been virtually abolished. A new measure has been passed which almost abolishes completely the compulsory element in arbitration, and lays greater stress on conciliation procedure.
It is right, from the point of view of the workers, that the stress should be on the conciliation procedure, and not on this reference to a third party because as once again this authoritative study of the problem by the International Labour Office, talking about the undesirability of undue compulsion in regard to arbitration, says on page 135:—
"This view is logically connected with an objection often raised by employers and sometimes also by workers, namely, that compulsory arbitration destroys the sense of responsibility of the parties concerned. No one experienced in the psychology of conciliation and arbitration can doubt that there is here no small degree of truth; and for this reason most systems which have both institutions separate the two completely, even when arbitration is based on an arrangement between the parties, in order that the possibility of an award may not endanger the chances of conciliation."
It is quite clear, I suggest, that if in your Civil Service scheme you have an arbitration board whose award will be of compulsory application, a board before which one party to the dispute can bring the other party, without the consent of that other, then you are not going to have any real attempt to settle differences between civil servants on the one hand and the State on the other hand, by discussion and negotiation. There is going to be a court of ultimate resort which will finally determine, and everything else will be made subservient to that. That is what is stated here by this authority on the question. If you want to make your conciliation machinery effective then you must make your arbitration voluntary. You must provide that resort to the arbitration tribunal can only be had by agreement between the parties, and that the award of the tribunal even in that event is not compulsory in application. Of course, on the other hand, we have the important factor that this machinery is not being set up ad hoc to deal with one specific dispute and then to be abandoned. It is machinery which is intended to exist for a long time, and is intended to work, and, therefore, I assume that both parties to the arbitration who value this machine are going to accept the moral obligations of it, and enter into a gentleman's agreement to fulfil that obligation and to honour an award where practically possible.
I should like to dwell upon another matter raised in the course of the debate. It was stated by Deputy Lavery, and was suggested by Deputy Costello—and it was quite clear from some speeches made that some members of the House were under a misapprehension—that the Government had deprived the Civil Service of any machinery for voicing its grievances, or bringing them before the Administration of the day. I am sorry Deputy Costello who, in moving this motion declared that he spoke particularly for the benefit of those newcomers to the House who were unfamiliar with the problem of arbitration in the Civil Service, did not put before the House certain facts which are vital to this aspect of the discussion. These are, first, that there is, and since March, 1926, has been, in existence machinery for the discussion of general Civil Service matters between representatives of the Government and representatives of the staffs. The second is this: that the staff organisations have been informed that it was proposed to set up similar machinery in each particular Department, and to provide, further, for direct negotiations between Ministers, or their representatives, and the staffs, so as to secure by discussion and conciliation, if possible, agreement upon the matters at issue between them. We have offered to replace, if necessary, the Civil Service Representative Council by similar machinery with, possibly, a somewhat wider ambit of activities so as to secure, as I have said, by discussion and conciliation agreement upon the matters at issue between the State and its servants; and we have, as I have already pointed out to the House, in draft a Bill for setting up an independent arbitration board to which, as I have said, in the last resort the questions at issue might be referred if the conciliation machinery failed.
The position, accordingly, is this: that notwithstanding the statements which we have heard from Deputy Lavery, Deputy Heron and others who have spoken on the motion, the Government has already provided, or is prepared to provide, for the Civil Service everything that could reasonably be demanded in the way of conciliation machinery or arbitration. It is quite true that the machinery is not in operation at the present moment, but the responsibility for that rests not upon the Government, but upon those organisations which, professing to represent the Civil Service, have refused to avail themselves of the facilities which the Government is willing to provide.
The position in regard to this question of arbitration in the Civil Service, therefore, is peculiar. The Government, let me emphasise again, is willing to provide machinery for arbitration. Those who profess to speak for the staff have refused to avail themselves of that machinery and to work it. Instead, they misrepresent and abuse the facilities which they refuse to use. Now, why cannot the Government's proposals be given a fair trial. If in practice they prove workable and fair, as they are intended to be, what have the staffs gained by this long and continued agitation to secure what the Government cannot concede? If, on the other hand, experience demonstrates that the Government's scheme is not being operated by the Minister for Finance in the spirit in which I have declared I would operate it, what more have the staffs lost than they are losing now by their attitude of nonco-operation?
It has been said that the Government has taken a mistaken view of its constitutional responsibilities as they affect this question of arbitration. I do not think it has. I believe that the particular feature of the scheme upon which the Government has taken its stand goes to the very heart of one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution: that is the principle that the Executive Government of the day shall have full discretion and full responsibility and be fully answerable to Parliament for the control and management of the public servants, and the public funds wherefrom those servants are paid. Power and authority go with the control of the purse. If the Government were to cede its final responsibility in regard to the cost of the Civil Service to an arbitration board it would cede its executive authority as well.
This is the position as it has been realised by us, not merely by us, but by our predecessors in office as well. In that connection, I would like to remind Deputy Costello, who was the principal law adviser to the Government of this country from January, 1926, to March, 1932, of the history of the Civil Service Representative Council. My predecessor, during 1924, occupied himself with devising a form of conciliation machinery for the Civil Service. As a result of his labours, the Civil Service Representative Council was set up. That body held its first meeting in March, 1926. It was composed, on the one hand, of representatives of the staff organisations, and on the other, as Deputy Heron has told the House, of the heads of the various Departments. Now, I would like those Deputies who are interested in this question, and who have said that they are only anxious that the Civil Service of the State should have some method of adjusting its differences, to ask themselves: what more representative machinery could have been devised for the discussion of Civil Service problems. On the one hand, you had those standing next to their Ministers, the heads of Government Departments, who in almost every case had risen by promotion from the ranks of the Civil Service themselves. They were familiar with every aspect of the matters to be discussed at the Representative Council With them, as representing the staffs, you had colleagues of theirs in the Civil Service, men who could speak with equal conviction, experience and ability on the problems to be discussed. Moreover, they could discuss the matters before the council with absolute freedom of expression of opinion. I want to emphasise that: that those who spoke for the staffs on the council could express themselves, as I have said here, with absolute freedom, without any reservation of any kind. I know that it has been suggested that in some occult way the representatives of the staffs were intimidated so that they dared not express their full minds on the matters before them. There is not a scintilla of truth in that suggestion. How much liberty the spokesmen of the staffs have in these matters is clearly evidenced by the continuous propaganda campaign which is being carried on in the Press and elsewhere by civil servants. So far has it gone that one civil servant has actually addressed a circular to members of the Dáil, asking the members of the Dáil to vote against the Government: to turn out the Government, because that is what it would mean.
That is not true. Where is the suggestion in the circular to turn out the Government?
The circular concludes:—
"It is the earnest wish of the alliance that the opportunity provided by the present resolution should not be allowed to pass, and therefore an appeal is made to every Deputy to vote, without consideration of Party politics, in its favour."
Where is the suggestion in that to turn out the Government?
Of course, like a lot of other things, it speaks by implication. What does it mean? The Government is taking a stand in this matter. The Minister for Finance, who is responsible to this House, made clear during the last general election where he stood. If this motion were carried against the Government, what does it mean according to the Constitution? Of course, I know that Deputy Heron and the Labour Party do not give very much for the Constitution, but the ordinary people of this country, the majority of those who voted at the last general election, have accepted the Constitution. What does this mean?
To compel the Minister to abide by majority rule.
We are abiding by it. That circular has only one meaning. That is, that those civil servants who, we have been told by Deputy Heron and Deputy Norton, are muzzled, controlled and gagged at the Civil Service Representative Council, who have left the Civil Service Representative Council because they alleged they were muzzled, controlled and gagged, have taken so much liberty——
You are taking the liberty now.
—that they actually come along, intervene in a matter which is at issue between two Parties in the House, ask Deputies to break their pledges to their constituents, to disobey their Party Whips and to turn the Government out. We have been told by Deputy Norton and by Deputy Heron that the Civil Service Representative Council and other devices have failed because these spokesmen of the Civil Service were afraid to express their true views and real opinions.
You are trying to intimidate them now.
I am not.
Perhaps you are encouraging them.
I am not trying to intimidate them, nor to encourage them. I am explaining to the House the situation as it exists to-day. And I hope, before I conclude, to show, by reference to some evidence given before the Brennan Commission of Inquiry, the position as it might exist if Deputy Heron and Deputy Norton succeed in working out the policy upon which they are now engaged. Let me get back. It is quite true—I do not want to make any bones about it—that the Civil Service Representative Council has no power to come to formal, binding decisions upon the matters before it.
It has no power to come to any decision.
That is because the law and the Constitution have reserved that power to the Minister for Finance. In that connection, I do not think I could put the position before the House in a better way than it was put by Deputy Cosgrave when, as President of the Executive Council, he spoke on the 17th July, 1924, on the staff demands for conciliation machinery in the Civil Service. Referring in particular to the proposal that Whitley Councils be re-established, with power to bind the Government by their decisions he said:
"The Ministry are not prepared to give any bodies, other than bodies of a consultative and advisory character, the power of decision being in all cases reserved to the Minister. It is true that the Whitley bodies can only arrive at decisions by agreement and the official representatives on the bodies can always prevent a decision by refusing to agree. But it is not right that Ministers should divest themselves of their powers and responsibilities by leaving it to such bodies to say what salaries will be payable in the Civil Service or not. What the staff should have, and what the Ministry is prepared to give, is every facility for making known its views on matters affecting the Civil Service, for considering Governmental proposals affecting the Civil Service, and giving their views on such proposals before the Government finally confirms a proposal into a decision."
It will be noted that Deputy Cosgrave held in 1924 that
"it is not right that Ministers should divest themselves of their powers and responsibilities by leaving it to such bodies to say what salaries will be payable in the Civil Service or not."
That is precisely the principle we are endeavouring to maintain in regard to the arbitration board—that we should not divest ourselves formally, fully and legally of our powers and responsibilities. We have accepted the principle of arbitration because we are quite prepared in these matters to have the opinion of a third independent party. But it must be an opinion only. It must not be a judgment with compulsory acceptance. The fact that we do agree to refer a matter to this third party-again, I want to emphasise that the reference must be by agreement— puts upon us a moral obligation to abide by the opinion, when given. Apart altogether from the question whether or not it would be contrary to the explicit declaration of any article of the Constitution, it would be contrary to the spirit of our Constitution for Ministers to divest themselves, as Deputy Cosgrave so well put it, of their responsibilities by
"leaving it to such bodies to say what salaries will be payable in the Civil Service or not."
If Deputy Cosgrave were prepared to get up here and criticise us for having agreed to arbitration, he could, on the basis of that statement, make a very good case. We have agreed to set up an arbitration board but there is something we cannot do. If the Civil Service want to see arbitration in operation within the lifetime of this Government or, I believe, within the life time of our successors—for if such successors are sensible of their responsibilities, as I believe they will be, they will recognise that the limitation which binds us binds them—they will have to realise the limitations which their responsibilities to the State and to the citizens impose upon Ministers.
An attempt has been made continuously—principally by those who have not been at the Civil Service Representative Council—to belittle the value of the council to the Civil Service. We have been told by Deputy Lavery that it was unfair that the Civil Service had not even a medium for expressing their grievances or putting them before the Government. I have said that the Civil Service Representative Council could not come to binding decisions but, if they could not arrive at a decision, a full report of the proceedings was submitted to the Minister for Finance. That report was in terms agreed upon by the official side of the council and the staff side. I may say that, in later years, a verbatim report of the proceedings was taken and that this report was also available to me in my consideration of the matters which had been discussed by the council. Speaking for myself—I cannot speak for any other person—I may say that I regarded it as one of my first obligations as Minister for Finance to study these minutes very carefully and in regard to the matters dealt with therein to come to a decision upon the merits as disclosed in these extensive reports. That machinery for the discussion of Civil Service matters between the heads of Departments, on the one hand, and representatives of the staffs, on the other, remains in existence for those who desire to avail of it, and it was in fact, I may say, invoked in 1935.
There is one other matter to which I must refer before I sit down, and I am referring to it now lest I may, by reason of the lapse of time, be prevented from mentioning it. It will be remembered that when the Fianna Fáil Government took office I set up a Commission of Inquiry into Civil Service problems. I set it up in order that the introduction of arbitration might not be unduly deferred by the fact that the Government had also to deal with more urgent and, if I may say so, from the point of view of this country and of the people, more important problems than that of arbitration in the Civil Service. The Commission of Inquiry was set up in June of 1932, and amongst its terms of reference was a request to report upon "methods by which arbitration can best be applied for the settlement of questions relating to pay and other conditions of service." In my letter of appointment to the members of the commission I notified them individually that the commission was expected to consider first and to submit an interim report on that part of the terms of reference relating to the application of the principle of arbitration already accepted by the Government.
This commission and its members have been subjected to unwarranted attacks in this House and elsewhere. Now I want to emphasise that when the commission was set up to report upon the methods by which arbitration could best be applied for the settlement of questions relating to pay and other conditions of service, and when its members were informed that the application of arbitration for this purpose had already been accepted in principle by the Government, no objection was taken to the course proposed by the members, or by those who professed to speak for the members, of the Civil Service. It was recognised by them, as it was recognised by us, that this question of arbitration was a difficult one, that, as I have already been at pains to demonstrate to the House, there was no cut-and-dried scheme of arbitration, that indeed there was no scheme of arbitration which was obviously suitable to the conditions of our Civil Service. Even the scheme of arbitration which we are told the English civil servants enjoy is one which was hastily improvised during the War period in 1915, when machinery which was intended to prevent industrial disputes was applied to quite a different purpose. That machinery, I may say, in Great Britain is proving itself to be unsuitable even from the point of view of civil servants who are now demanding that this arbitration board of theirs should be set up by statute. When it does come to be set up by statute, I will tell the civil servants, and those who are speaking here and demanding that the British procedure should be applied here, that there will be written into it, and there must of necessity be written into it, the same limitations as we have found essential and as have been in practice imposed upon the operation of arbitration in the British Civil Service.
I was saying that when this Commission of Inquiry was first set up even the staffs recognised that the matter for investigation was a difficult one and that it was desirable that their views in regard to the proposal should be ascertained and considered. The commission was attacked on Wednesday last because of the time which elapsed between the setting up and the preparation of this report. For that delay the staffs themselves were in great part responsible. The commission was set up in June, 1932, and it was only, I think, at the end of March, 1933, that the last of the staff memoranda relating to arbitration was submitted to the commission. The commission sat. Naturally, the members of the commission, who were giving their services voluntarily, had other concerns and other interests, and the summer holidays came. In any event, the commission, to which the staffs had only furnished their final memoranda on the 31st March, 1933, presented its report to me in the February of 1934.
As I said, the commission has been attacked many times since the publication of this report. But, leaving the pronouncements of Deputy Norton, which in matters of this sort are sui generis, out of consideration, I have never heard a more unjustifiable attack upon any body of publicspirited citizens than was launched against the members of this commission by Deputy Costello in the course of his speech moving this motion. Might I direct your attention to it? The reference is Volume 70, col. 1202:—
"That report came as a complete disappointment and disillusionment to the Civil Service because, while it pointed out that, apparently, the Government had accepted the principle of arbitration, that did not prevent the members of the commission from really torpedoing the whole principle of arbitration for the Civil Service, for the reasons they purported to set forth in the interim report, and they accordingly set themselves out really to nullify the entire principle of effective arbitration for the Civil Service."
Was there ever a serious charge levied more light-headedly? I have pointed out to the House that the terms of reference of this commission gave an explicit direction to it to ascertain the methods by which arbitration can best be applied for the settlement of questions relating to Civil Service pay and other conditions of service. I have told the House that I wrote individually to the members of the commission telling them that the Government had accepted arbitration in principle.
I am afraid I have wearied the House by pointing out at length that the element of compulsion is not an essential factor in any arbitration scheme; that, in fact, all over the world you have in one country and another schemes which make a reference to the arbitration tribunal a matter of agreement between the parties concerned, and that you have other countries where the award of the tribunal is not of compulsory application. That is the position in Great Britain. The Brennan Commission which went voluntarily into this matter, and which had before it the views of the staffs and other people, devoted not merely a few minutes to glancing through a brief, but, as investigators requested to examine the problem and make an authoritative report to the Government upon it, but spent from March, 1933, to February, 1934, investigating the question. The conclusion which the great majority of the commission arrived at was that if the Government was going to set up an arbitration scheme it would have to provide, first of all, that matters could only go to the arbitration tribunal when both parties were agreed that they were properly arbitrable; and secondly, that because of the constitutional position here, the awards should not be made of compulsory application—two conditions which are found in many arbitration schemes the world over. Yet, because the majority of the members of the commission, having voluntarily spent, as I said, 11 months of their valuable time, presented me with a report which provided for these conditions, which are, I emphasise, of very general application, Deputy Costello comes in here and accuses them of nothing less than a breach of good faith. Those people were told that the principle of arbitration had been accepted, and were set up to advise as to how that principle could best be applied; yet, according to Deputy Costello, "that did not prevent the members of the commission from really torpedoing the whole principle of arbitration for the Civil Service, and they accordingly set themselves out really to nullify the entire principle of effective arbitration for the Civil Service." That is a very serious charge to make against any body of men. I think it will be admitted that it becomes more serious when the circumstances under which it was levelled are taken into consideration. It was made by a Deputy who held a responsible position under a former Administration; who was one of the chief law officers, and who possibly may, in the ordinary course of time and circumstances, eventually occupy a high judicial position in this country. I say that this charge, by reason of the circumstances in which it was uttered, becomes of very serious importance, indeed. I think that there has been too much of this sort of thing going on in regard to this arbitration controversy. I know that Deputy Norton started it, but Deputy Norton has not a very high standing in those matters——
I have a much higher standard than the Minister.
——and for that reason many of his public utterances are heavily discounted by those who have to listen to them.
The Minister should not talk nonsense all the time.
But let us consider what is this commission which has been attacked in such terms by Deputy Costello. Of whom did it consist? First of all there was Mr. Joseph Brennan, the late Secretary of the Department of Finance, the late Chairman of the Civil Service Representative Council, and present Chairman of the Currency Commission—a high public servant, with no axe to grind, and with no interest but the public interest to serve. Who else? The Reverend J. E. Canavan, of the Society of Jesus, who has shown great interest in the matter of arbitration in the Civil Service as an advocate of the staffs claims, and an authority on social questions—and he is charged with having endeavoured to torpedo this principle of arbitration. Then we have Mr. James R. Coade, former Managing Director of Messrs. Cantrell and Cochrane, Ltd.; Mr. T. Condron Flinn, a member of a large accounting firm with wide experience of commercial concerns; Mr. A. M. Fullerton, former Secretary of the Valuation Office; Reverend Brother J. S. Galvin, M.A., a noted authority on education; Lord Glenavy, former Secretary to the Department of Industry and Commerce, bank director, director of large business concerns, and Barrister-at-Law; Professor Joseph Johnston, M. A., Trinity College, Dublin; Senator Sir J. Keane, Barrister-at-Law, and Director of the Bank of Ireland; Professor William Magennis, M. A., Barrister-at-Law, ex-Fellow, Royal University of Ireland, Professor of Metaphysics, University College, Dublin, and member of the Senate, National University of Ireland; Mr. John J. O'Leary, Managing Director of Messrs. Cahill and Company, printers, and Miss Nelly Ryan, county councillor, with experience of the administration of local bodies. Those citizens of high reputation and prestige have been accused here in this House by the former Attorney-General with having, in betrayal of the trust reposed in them by the Government deliberately set themselves out to torpedo the proposal of applying the principle of arbitration to the Civil Service. I think that charge was unjustifiable, and should not in any circumstances be stood over. I hope that Deputy Costello when replying will, with full advertence to the positions of trust which those people occupy, at any rate have the good grace to apologise for what was, I think, an unwarranted reflection upon them.
Why not bring him before the Military Tribunal?
Now, Sir, I want to say in conclusion——
In conclusion! Oh, do not spoil the ship for a ha-porth of tar. The Minister has been at it for two hours.
It is time the Minister said something after speaking for two hours.
If I had the benefit and inspiration which I could have drawn from Deputy Norton's speech, I do not think even two hours would have sufficed to controvert all his ridiculous statements.
I wish something would happen to cause expiration instead of inspiration to the Minister.
I am only sorry that I have not been able to devote as much attention as I might have to the statements which were made by Deputy Heron, because he is the first Deputy in this House who has really shown his hand in this matter. He made it quite clear in the course of his speech that, if he had his way, so far from the civil servants being kept out of politics, the civil servants would be in politics and would be sitting in this House.
On the contrary I suggested that the Minister should take them out of politics.
That is only consistent with the evidence which Deputy Heron gave to this Commission of Inquiry which has been so unjustifiably attacked by Deputy Costello.
What about the 1932 handbill?
We have been contending that it is not possible for us to concede what the civil servants want unless we are going to give the civil servants control over the Government.
They would need to have it.
Perhaps, Sir, it would enliven the proceedings if I were to call for a count of the House?
Well, I suppose, Sir, Deputy Heron's somewhat peculiar views about the position of the Executive in regard to finance and in regard to the Civil Service will wait another day. Before I sit down, however, I just want to say this: that the attitude of the Civil Service organisations on this matter has been the cause of very great regret to me, personally, and to the Government. As I have indicated already, we believe that the scheme of conciliation and arbitration we have proposed is a reasonable one and that, in its main principles, it goes as far to meet the claims of the Civil Service as we can go consistently with our duty to the Dáil and to the taxpayers. I have pointed out already to the House our grounds for that belief. If the Service is prepared to work our scheme in the spirit in which we offered it and intended it, we are still prepared to proceed with our proposals to set up an arbitration board to which, with our agreement, Civil Service disputes may be referred. Furthermore, we are willing to consider sympathetically any case which may be made for the amendment of the scheme which we have submitted, in such of its details, as do not touch the essential principles—such as that which Deputy Cosgrave stated in 1924 when he said: "It is not right that Ministers should divest themselves of their powers and responsibilities by leaving it to such bodies"—he was talking then about the Whitley Councils—"by leaving it to such bodies to say what salaries will be payable in the Civil Service or not."
Quoted for the third time.
Yes, why not?
In order to take up the time of the House.
I was saying, Sir, that we were prepared to consider sympathetically any case which might be made for the amendment of our scheme in its details.
Provided the representation is made after 2 o'clock on Friday, April 8th.
That, Sir, has been our attitude all along. From the beginning, we have been ready to give full consideration to any suggestion for the improvement of the scheme which might be made by the Civil Service organisations, and the present impasse has arisen because the organisations refused to submit the detailed observations for which they were asked. In order, however, that the Service may have every opportunity of ascertaining directly our views as to the way in which the machinery which we are willing to set up will be operated, I am prepared to arrange for a discussion to take place between a small group of civil servants, representative of the organisations which are entitled to participate in the deliberations of the Civil Service Representative Council, on the one hand, and a group of civil servants appointed by me on the other. I should like to point out that that does not exclude civil servants who are representative of any substantial body or grade in the Civil Service and that, therefore, no interest need be overlooked in this discussion. I want to say furthermore, that the discussion which I envisage can be a full and frank discussion. If it results in suggestions which can be accepted without departing from the fundamental principles on which our arbitration proposals are based, I am prepared to consider such representations very sympathetically indeed.
Now, I suppose that we may as well keep our eyes open to what is a commonplace of human experience, and that is that no matter what scheme is proposed it is not going to satisfy everybody. Even a scheme which we might introduce, after having heard the representations of representatives of the Civil Service, may have deficiencies and may have defects. I can only say this: that we have drafted our proposals with the honest intention of making those proposals work—of trying, if we can, to find some way of getting a third opinion upon the very vexed questions in relation to pay and allowances which arise from time to time in the Civil Service. I should like, if I could, to relieve my Department of some part of the strain which these demands and these disputes and differences often impose upon it, and, therefore, as I say, I would quite spontaneously welcome the opinion of a third party. I am prepared, within the limits which I feel bind me, as I have said, to try to apply the principle of arbitration in these matters. We have drafted a Bill which, I think, does provide effective machinery-machinery which will operate. It rests, as I have already indicated, with the civil servants to say whether they are prepared to accept that machinery in the spirit in which it is offered, and to operate it as it might have been operated here since 1935, or whether they are going to spend further long years in trying to compel this Government to give what it cannot concede and what I believe no other Government would find itself able to do or would find itself willing to do: that is to be abandon what Deputy Cosgrave held to be, and what, I think is the overriding principle in this matter, to wit, that no Government can divest itself of its duties and responsibilities to keep control over the public purse and thereby over the public service.
I move the adjournment of the debate.