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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 22 Feb 1940

Vol. 78 No. 13

Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1940—Second Stage.

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The purpose of this Bill is to continue in force for another year the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1923 to 1939, which will expire on the 31st March next. The preparation of the permanent Defence Bill, the desirability of which has been adverted to in this House on many occasions, was completed last year. It would have been introduced during the last Session had the present emergency not arisen, with the result that, in existing circumstances, the introduction of a comprehensive measure consisting of some 300 sections would have been inopportune. It was decided not to proceed with the permanent Defence Bill at present, but to promote a considerably shorter measure which, I hope, I may be able to introduce in this House later in the present Session. It will relate mainly to the marine and coast watching services, and certain other matters, provision for which the present emergency has rendered highly desirable. In former years the House was good enough to grant all stages of the Bill at the one sitting, and I trust it will be possible to give the same facilities this year.

I do not anticipate that the Minister's hope will be justified by events. I think the Minister might very well have given this House longer notice of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill this year, than he has seen fit to give. But that difficulty is aggravated by the announcement made by the Government yesterday, that they intended to discharge the Second Reading of the permanent statute and that they have now abandoned it altogether, and propose to substitute a skeleton measure to deal with coast watching services. That means that the permanent Defence legislation is indefinitely postponed. I shall not comment on the indignation with which members of the present Government used to criticise the last Government, for failing to make permanent provision for the Defence Forces when, after eight years of office, they find themselves constrained to come before the House and say they are unable to do so themselves. I do not dwell on that because I think graver issues are raised and that everybody feels an obligation in regard to certain public services to exercise discretion, and even forbearance, in order to enable the Executive to take such measures as they think necessary to put them in proper order, but I think the time has now come when discretion and forbearance impose on this House the obligation to challenge the Minister to render an account of his stewardship, and the stewardship of his predecessor in the Department of Defence.

He told us yesterday that he did not propose to publish the minutes of evidence of the Commission of Inquiry which sat and inquired into the disgraceful episode of the Magazine Fort. He told us that he would give no undertaking whatever to give the House any information that might have been brought under his notice as a result of that investigation. It, therefore, seems to me that the time has come to state quite openly in the House what is being stated widely throughout the country, and to afford the Minister for Defence an opportunity to restore public confidence in the Army, on the same basis that it enjoyed before the present Government accepted responsibility for that Army. The policy of the late Government was to have a small highly efficient Army with a full personnel of technicians. The object was to keep it small, and to raise its standard of perfection, so that in a time of emergency it might be used as the basis for a wide expansion into a larger fighting force, if the necessity for defending the integrity of the nation should ever arise. It was the policy of the last Government to establish in this country a professional Army, an Army which within its ranks would include no politicians, and have no interest in them, but that accepted as its exclusive duty the defence of the State under the authority of whatever Government the Irish people had by their democratic vote chosen to instal.

The present Prime Minister stated in public that he gladly acknowledged that there was handed over to his Government, when they came into office, a disciplined and loyal Army that was not concerned or interested in the political affiliations of the Minister responsible for the Department of Defence, but was solely concerned to carry out all legitimate orders given to it. The late Minister for Defence, the present Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, went out of his way to say that he was obliged to admit that although he took office with a certain amount of trepidation, he discovered that the Army gave him a measure of loyalty and co-operation which, in his most optimistic hour, he would not dare to hope for. That was the kind of Army we had; that was the kind of Army we were justly proud of; that was the kind of Army that reflected credit on those who manned it and those who raised it. Have we that kind of Army now? I am going to suggest to the House that a large number of people believe that we have not; I am going to suggest to the House that it is common talk in the country that the discipline, the morale and the confidence of the personnel of the Army is shattered; and I am going to suggest to the House that recent injections of personnel into the Army have seriously militated against discipline and morale, and that these injections in many cases have shaken the confidence of officers and men in their own colleagues.

The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is responsible for raising the sluaighte in this country. I fully appreciate that there did enrol in the Volunteer force a large number of disinterested and loyal young men who desired nothing but to serve, as they conceived it to be their duty, in the reserve forces of this State, but I submit that, in addition to that, there enrolled a substantial body of persons who had no such intention, but who joined that force believing it to be a political force and intending to discharge the function of political spies and political commissars within the ranks of the Army, and, proceeding on those lines, have wrought havoc with the confidence which is an essential prerequisite of morale and discipline in any army. I am told that occasions have been presented on which members of the sluaighte, when called to task by regular Army military police, have bade them defiance and told them that if they dared to interfere with them they would take the stripes off their sleeves, and the tragedy is that I am not certain that these military police were quite clear in their minds that it was beyond the power of these individuals of the sluaighte to make good their threat. There was a time when, if any member of the Army, be he general, colonel, major or private, dared to suggest that it was within his power to subvert the course of justice in respect of his conduct, that very suggestion on his part would have constituted an offence for which he would have been promptly and justly dealt with.

Can we say as much to-day? There was a time when if the forces of this State on duty were heard to indulge in political catchcries, or to hold themselves out as the uniformed supporters of an individual political Party, their conduct would have been severely censured and adequate steps taken to prevent a recurrence of such an abuse. Can we say that that has been consistently done in recent years? Can the Minister deny that, within the ranks of the Army at present, there exists, far from the spirit of absolute confidence between one officer and another, a considerable atmosphere of distrust? Does the Minister think that he contributed to the welfare of our Army, where there is a large number of young officers, blocked by the very nature of our Army from the ordinary rate of promotion that soldiers would normally expect, bearing in mind that all our officers when we started were young men and, therefore, the young man who went into low-commissioned rank found advancement unduly slow, by bringing in a large number of persons of comparatively high-commissioned rank who had never served a day in the Army? Does he think he contributed to the welfare of our Army by bringing in untried, undisciplined and untrained men and making them the commissioned officers of the Volunteer force which was to be the substance of our future armed forces? Does he think that has had no effect upon the morale of the remainder of the Army who had devoted their lives to, and made their careers, the improvement and uplifting of the national forces of the State? I cannot but think that that course of action was in itself calculated to injure the morale of the Army.

Does the Minister deny that the sluaighte, while containing individuals who were bona fide and enthusiastic public servants, were very largely constituted of politically-minded persons in whom he himself to-day has a very imperfect confidence? Does he consider that the disaster which overtook us at the Magazine Fort would ever have taken place if that arsenal were not partly protected by inadequately trained members of the sluaighte? Does he at this moment deny that in every camp in Ireland, where sluaighte form a part of the personnel, difficulties and disciplinary complexities are presenting themselves which were quite unknown when we were dealing with the regular Army and the regular reserve?

It is extremely difficult for anybody who has not available to him the confidential files of the Department of Defence, or who is not free to send for the responsible officers of the Army and to consult them, to know with certainty what the precise nature of the evil is. No such opportunity presents itself to me. I have no access to the files of the Department of Defence; I have no contact with the officers of the Army, and I am happy to think that if I had, they would not consider it becoming to bring their complaints about such matters to me. But I have access to the minds of the people up and down the country, and I know what they are thinking, and there is not a Deputy on the Fianna Fáil Benches who does not know what they are thinking and saying. Their general view is that things are not well with the Army and that view, I am sorry to say, got striking confirmation in the utterly shocking instance at the arsenal, to which reference has been made.

I have no doubt that if some of my colleagues who are military men were dealing with this matter, they might be able to go in deeper detail into it. I am glad that the occasion has made it necessary for a civilian member of this Parliament to raise this question, because I think it is a matter to which the civilian section of our community have primarily a right to refer. Let us never forget in this democratic State that the Army is the servant of the people's Parliament, and that it is the Army's duty, through their Minister, to satisfy, not only themselves, but the democratic Parliament of the people that they are delivering the goods. It is not enough for the Minister for Defence to say, as the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures has stated on a previous occasion, that he is not interested in civilians' criticism of Army matters. It is his duty to be interested. It is the bounden duty of the Minister for Defence to satisfy civilian members of the House that things are as they should be, and it is the duty of the Minister to remember in his own person, and to keep constantly before the minds of the younger officers of the Army who may require such reminder—I do not think that the senior officers do—that the control in all these matters must be always vested in Parliament and that Parliament must be satisfied from day to day, from week to week, and from year to year that its will and not that of the Army Council shall ultimately prevail in all matters relating to the Army, as it must in regard to every other Department of State.

I want to make a suggestion. I have emphasised twice, and I desire to do so again, that there were individuals who joined the sluaighte in good faith and have done their service in good faith and are anxious to live up to the high traditions established by the Army in this country during the earlier years of its existence. They were high traditions; they were traditions that any young country might be proud of. They were an Army built out of a revolutionary army, an Army confronted with all the trials and difficulties of a civil war in the first years of their existence and, nevertheless, after ten years an Army which reflected credit on the State. Therefore, I should be sorry if this House should condemn without discretion the entire personnel of the Volunteer force. But, I think the time has come to sort the wheat from the chaff, and I suggest to the Minister for Defence that the first step he should take is to invite the members of the Volunteer force either to join the regular Army or else to return to civilian life. I believe that that is a good rough-and-ready way of putting the wheat into the Army and returning the chaff to civilian life to convert itself into some useful material in whatever civilian occupation it may care to pursue. That done, I think it should be made perfectly clear that the day when there was any differentiation between the personnel of the Volunteer force and that of the regular Army is over and that there should be equal discipline and equal justice for all. Thirdly, that it should be made quite clear to the new force and to the old that the old standards of discipline must be maintained and improved upon, and that the Army has no room within its ranks for men not prepared to give of their best to the service to which they voluntarily belong.

I should like to see the Army of this country consisting not of an undisciplined rabble that I think certain elements in the Volunteer force would wish to turn it into; but I should like to see them what I am convinced the regular Army is capable of being made into, as highly disciplined, as highly trained, and as highly honourable an Army as there is in Europe. I should like soldiers in the Irish Army to be looked upon, in the commissioned ranks, as professional men of a standing second to no profession in this country, and, in the uncommissioned ranks, as skilled craftsmen as valuable, if not more so, as the members of any other skilled trade in the community. Discipline, confidence, and morale are, in our opinion, gravely shaken. I charge the Minister now to tell the House honestly what the true situation is and what steps he proposes to take to put it right. I want to ask the Minister another question. Large sums of money have been appropriated in this House during the last couple of years for the equipment of the Army. I want to know how has that money been spent.

On the Second Stage of this Bill policy may be discussed. The Deputy's speech so far has been mainly directed to policy. It is obvious that the Minister is not in a position to discuss administrative details which will arise on the Army Estimate and also on the Minister's Vote.

The question I wanted to raise was, what the policy of the Government was in the matter of getting supplies for the Army. Are we orientating our purchasing in directions where replacements and parts and ammunition for armaments already acquired can be readily secured, or has there been a policy in the Department of buying equipment indiscriminately anywhere without any due regard being paid to the possibility of replacing it or completing it with the necessary ammunition or spare parts which user would make necessary?

I have reason to believe that during the present emergency and even before the present emergency the Government had no policy in regard to this matter; instead of realising that Army supplies which are not bought with one's eyes wide open for two or three years ahead are worthless, and that Army supplies, replacements of which cannot be supplied when they are needed, are worthless, the Government have bought without advertence to these facts. But the Government are now discovering that much of what they bought is perfectly worthless because they are finding that they are quite unable to get the replacement parts which are necessary for the full user of these armaments.

Now, fortunately all this money has not gone, and if it is to be properly spent and if the Army is to be enabled to do its job, the Minister ought to tell us here to-day what plans he has in mind to provide the Army with the equipment that will fit it to do its job. There is no use in telling the Air Force to equip itself to do credit to this country in a time of emergency if you do not give them the wherewithal to fly. There is no use in providing the Air Force with equipment if every time they lose a king-pin they discover that it is impossible to replace it. There is no use in providing the Air Force or any other division of the Army with small arms if they discover later that the only place where they can get anything to fit these small arms is no longer prepared to deliver these replacements. There is no use in inviting the artillery to familiarise itself with the most modern instruments of war if you furnish them with instruments which, if it became necessary to expand the Army, it would be quite impossible for us to get for the Army. If you make up your mind to the fact that this country has to defend itself in arms as a sovereign State we have got to train the Army to use arms that we can buy and we have to make up our minds that these arms, armaments and munitions with which we are training our Army will be available from sources that in a time of emergency we can reach.

There was some talk one time of getting the Imperial Chemicals Company to build a munition factory in Clare. That has gone up the spout. Now that it has gone up the spout, let us come down to earth and make up our minds what we are going to do. Are we to make the Skoda works in Czecho-Slovakia our source of supply or are we to write a polite note to Herr Hitler that we want him to send us a shipload of armaments and munitions in the middle of a European war and, incidentally, in order to deliver that shipload to us, to sink the British Fleet? Or are we going to buy our arms and munitions in England, or are we going to buy them in America? I have no doubt that every loyal Fianna Fáil heart bounds when I suggest that we should buy them in America. But let us make up our minds that if we are to buy them in America, America will want to get cash and when we buy them the payment will have to be with sterling credit. Let us make up our minds that we will have that sterling credit wherewith to buy these armaments. But, if those who control sterling credit say that it is not to be used for that purpose, what is the position? Then if the United States say that they are supplying only on the basis of cash-and-carry, we would be left with guns, but with no munitions. Let the Minister tell us does he propose to get arms and the wherewithal to use them from the only place where we will always have credit to purchase them— that is from Great Britain? There is no use going on with the silly kind of codology, of which the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defence is so fond, conducting manæuvres on the Six-County Border in order to show his readiness to do or die.

When did such a thing happen?

The Minister ought to know more about that than I do.

But it never happened— why did the Deputy suggest it did?

I did not suggest it happened recently, but I know that manæuvres were held in the Northern part of this State, in County Louth and adjoining areas.

The Deputy said along the Border.

Is it not true that manæuvres were held some years ago in Louth?

Not adjacent to the Border.

Manæuvres were held in Louth.

The Deputy is now getting away from the Estimate. The question before the House is not what manæuvres were held three years ago in Dundalk, but should the Army Bill be continued.

I want to find what is the policy of the Minister in this matter. Has the Minister a policy of building up a highly-efficient Army, an Army that will protect the sovereign independence of this country and that will be supplied with the necessary equipment? I suggest that buying your munitions from sources that cannot be tapped in the hour of emergency is not the right way to set about defending this country from invasion; it is merely playing at arms. I submit that we ought to build up our Army on the basis that in any probable contingency where it would be necessary to use that Army, we would be able to get armaments and munitions to fit the supplies we already have, so that those out in the field would be assured of an adequate supply of arms and that they would not be told half-way through the battle that we could not get a supply of arms from Yangtse-Kiang or from Central Europe because we had no means of paying for them.

If the Minister says "I can get equipment for the Army from any part of the world and I can get credit to pay for them any time without any difficulty at all," that is a reasonable answer. But if he is constrained to say: "I admit that taking into consideration the question of credits for the purchase of equipment and the transport difficulties about getting that Army equipment here, there is only one rational source of supply and that is Great Britain", let him get up and say that to the House. Let the Minister say: "I have to face that fact and I am pursuing a policy boldly and coldly based on that fact because it is my duty to provide this State with an efficient Army and to provide that efficient Army with adequate means to do justice to the spirit that inspires it". Brave men cannot fight without arms and it is up to him to tell us how he is going to put into the hands of these men the wherewithal to do justice to their past and to the reputation I hope they will still acquire in the future. I have spoken freely and frankly because I am perfectly certain that much of what I am saying would be said under the rose not only by members on this side of the House but by members on the Government side too. I have no doubt if the Minister will get up and make a true and frank statement as to the measures he proposes to take to secure the state of efficiency that both he and I hope to see in the Army he will meet no captious criticism from any part of the House. If he is prepared to face this matter courageously and fearlessly I promise him all the help, moral and active, which he may require to restore the Army to that pitch of efficiency and excellence which the Minister for Co-Ordination requires, that competency which he acknowledged the Army had reached when it was handed over to him in 1932.

If we were talking on a debate on some other subject I might go into some detail to congratulate Deputy Dillon on his conversion to the policy of self-sufficiency. I hope that the very good principle that the Deputy enunciated here to-day in relation to the supplies for the Army will be kept in mind by him when talking about the supply of the necessities of life for the people. "There is no use in having guns without bullets." That is agreed. But there is no use in having gullets without food, a position in which we might have found ourselves if Deputy Dillon's policy of depending upon outside supplies of food for the people had been in operation in this country in recent years. The people of the country, the people on the opposite side of the House and the people here, have, I believe, the same fundamental idea of what the Army should be. We want it to be disciplined and controlled by the Government elected by the people. It is unfortunate that Deputy Dillon or anybody else should use language which would throw doubt upon the existence of that state of affairs at the moment because, by and large, I would say that the Army of to-day is as disciplined and as loyal to the Government elected by the Irish people as the army of any other country is to the Government elected by its people. That is not to say that there can never be in our Army an individual act of indiscipline. Nobody would claim that for any army in the world or for any organisation. Deputy Dillon himself has been disciplined by his own organisation in recent times, but I say that the Army is at present a disciplined Army, that it is giving full loyalty to the Government and that, as far as its resources permit, it is forming a protective force to defend the interests of the country.

Deputy Dillon threw some doubt upon the utility of the Volunteer force as an effective defensive force and said that we should have only a regular Army. But the question is: Can we afford, as a small country, to keep a standing Army of the strength necessary to give adequate protection to our people or can we afford a standing Army which will give the same amount of protection to the people as an Army composed half of regulars and half of reservists of one type or another? This question was discussed many times in this House. This Government and the last Government had the view that we should have, in addition to the regular Army, reservists of some kind. The last Government established a Volunteer force. They had a Volunteer reserve force in addition to the reservists who had passed through the standing Army. They had the "B" reserve force and, at least, half of the reservists of 1932 were what were called "B" reserve men who served three months with the standing Army, then went on to the reserve and came up for a month every year.

As regards the Volunteer force, before a man becomes a first-class Volunteer he has to do three months' training with the regular Army or its equivalent in local drills. He has to reach a three months' standard before he is recognised as a trained Volunteer. Up to that, he is an untrained man. Every military officer would like to see that three months' period extended to three years, but does Deputy Dillon or anybody else think we can afford to keep a fairly large defence force organised and trained on that basis?

Deputy Dillon alluded to the number of Volunteer officers and indicated by question that the fact that a number of Volunteer officers were commissioned created distrust in the Army because they were blocking jobs to which the regular personnel would be promoted.

That was not really what was in my mind. What I had in mind were the 20 men who were made captains in charge of regiments of Volunteers when the force was first instituted.

I got that point but the Deputy went on to refer to untried and untrained officers of the Volunteer force.

It was to these fellows I was referring, not to the young fellows you commissioned out of the Volunteers.

I am glad that that has been made clear. The officers to whom the Deputy alluded are members of the regular Army and subject to regular Army discipline. The young men who joined the Volunteers and were commissioned as Volunteer officers are not blocking promotion in the regular Army. They are two separate branches of the Defence force. If they were called out on permanent service, Volunteer officers of long standing might be promoted and put over the heads of junior regular Army officers but that is quite all right. You have the same thing in every country in which you have a territorial force and a regular army. The young Volunteer officers are a credit to the country and a credit to themselves. They are highly trained men. No man is ever commissioned as a Volunteer officer who has not done the equivalent of about nine months intensive study, and that is pretty good. Most of them have done a preliminary three months as privates. They have done a further three months as N.C.O's. After that, they did six months in the Officers' Training College in the Curragh Camp or an equivalent course under the regular Army instructors in Portobello Barracks. They are highly trained and are recognised as fully efficient to handle the number of men of which they have control. It has been arranged that if any of these Volunteer officers ever qualify, through length of service and initiative, to take charge of a battalion or higher unit they will have to do an extension course on "Command and staff" as other officers would have to do. Volunteer officers do not block promotion in the regular Army. They are an essential part of our Defence force so that we may have officers to take charge of an increased number of reservists in time of emergency.

Now, Deputy Dillon asked a question—and again I thought that, by his asking the question, he would have indicated to somebody that he had knowledge which he did not want to communicate directly and which he was imparting by way of question—and that was whether Volunteers bid defiance to regular Army officers?

Now, wait a moment. I said regular Army military police.

Military police? Well, if they do, and if the military policeman did not discipline them there and then, he was at fault himself. A military policeman has the same powers of discipline over a Volunteer as he has over a regular soldier or a member of the regular reserves.

Has the Minister himself heard of such cases?

I have not.

You have not?

No, I personally have not heard of such cases, but I am not prepared to say, knowing men and knowing soldiers, that somewhere or another no military policeman was ever called a son of a sea-cook by a Volunteer or by a regular soldier. There are probably such instances, but none came to my personal attention. However, even though it may be the fact that one or two cases of this kind occurred, it is not typical of the relationship of military policemen or regular military officers to the Volunteer force. If they are under their command, they are under their command, and there is the same power and authority over them as if they were regular soldiers. It is the same code of discipline that applies to both forces and it is the one Army Act that governs and disciplines both.

The Deputy also asked:

"Can the Minister deny that there is a want of confidence and that there is an atmosphere of distrust?"

Well, the Minister for Defence can speak for himself, but I never found it when I was Minister for Defence, nor have I found it to be so since then in any contacts I have made. Again, there may be individuals in the Volunteer force who should not be there, but every care that it was possible to take in their selection was taken. The ordinary routine in regard to the enlistment of any soldier is that the local Gárdaí are asked for information about the man, and the same thing happens in regard to the Volunteer force. In spite of that, however, people may have got into the Volunteers who should not be there, just as in the case of the regular Army there are sometimes enlisted men who should not be allowed in.

Deputy Dillon asked a question as to whether the Magazine Fort would have fallen if it had not been partly manned by Volunteers. In my belief, that had nothing vital to do with the matter, but that is a question in regard to which certain men may have to stand trial and I do not want to go any further into it. From the general public point of view, however, I think that the people can have confidence that the Army will give a good account of itself. One incident did occur which, I am perfectly prepared to admit, did gravely disturb public confidence in the Army, but in my belief it is not typical of the state of discipline in the Army as a whole, and accidents do happen in the best regulated families on occasion.

The ammunition was lost.

It was got back, and if the action in the Magazine Fort, or the failure there, had been typical of the Army discipline generally, we would not have got back the ammunition as quickly as we did.

I am told that you would not have got it back only the fellows did not want it because they had not enough guns for it. That is the plain truth.

We never know what is the truth with regard to anything the Deputy says he is told, even though he says he has been told it, because he makes so many allegations here that no one knows what is the truth or whether or not he himself believes it.

Well, that is the truth.

They thought, evidently, from your public statements at the time, that you were going to declare war, and felt that you should not be left without sufficient ammunition.

People were disciplined over that statement, and so we will leave it alone.

Is that the Minister's version—that they simply threw the ammunition away and it was found dumped here, there and everywhere?

I do not think the Minister should go further into a matter of administration.

Well, these fellows seem to have thrown it away.

It is a matter of administration, and not of policy.

And I do not propose to go into it, Sir. With regard to the policy of maintaining the Volunteer Force, I think that it should be kept on. It may be that there should not be the same distinction in uniform that there is at the moment between the Volunteers and the regular personnel of the Army and that we should follow the same principle as in other countries where the uniforms are identical. That proposition is being examined in Defence at the moment.

In fact, the Minister is breaking the news gently, that you are going to incorporate them into the regular Army. If you do that you will do a very sensible thing—that is, with regard to the good ones amongst them, and throw the bad ones out.

It is a question of the use of words. As far as the Volunteers are concerned, they are portion of the defence forces of Ireland, and the question as to whether they will wear a different uniform from that of other portions of the defence forces is just in the same category as whether there should be the same uniform for the artillery as there is for the cavalry, or some other corps, and for some time the question of making the one service uniform for both has been under consideration. I do not want to go any further into the matter, but I have dealt with some of the points made by the Deputy.

With regard to the Minister's announcement about putting the Volunteers into the same uniform as that of the regular Army, is an opportunity going to be given to those amongst them who want to get out, now that the terms of service are to be slightly altered, to get out?

There is no alteration in the terms of service.

Well, they are going to wear a different uniform, and it is much better to get rid of the bad hats now and let the decent fellows be kept on.

In the concluding portion of Deputy Dillon's speech the Deputy put very strongly to the Minister a question of which the Minister must have taken a note because he made a reference to it in the beginning of his own speech. The Minister, however, gave no reply to that question, and refused to give a reply to it, quite obviously, by making a gibe at some alleged policy of Deputy Dillon's as regard food. Did the House, however, hear any reply to the question that was put at some length to the Minister: namely, where the ammunition was to come from? Not an attempt was made to reply to it. Does the Minister regard the question of the supply of ammunition for the Army as of no importance? Apparently, he does.

We did not have to have that question put by Deputy Dillon before consideration was given to it.

Why not tell the House where you are getting it?

The Minister for Defence has still to reply.

It was the first thing the Minister referred to in his speech, and yet he did not answer it. I am now given to understand that he pledges the Minister for Defence to reply to that question. I hope the Minister for Defence will honour his predecessor's pledge and tell us where he intends to get sufficient ammunition for an increased Army. It is important. I wonder whether the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, the Minister without portfolio—possibly that is the reason he lost his Magazine—attaches more importance to the question of a change of uniform than he does to the supply of ammunition. Why the change of uniform was stressed I do not know. We gather from what has been said that it is a matter that is getting the serious consideration of Defence authorities at the moment.

That was the most important thing, in a way, that emerged from the Minister's speech, in answer to criticism. But then, we understood that it did not signify anything at all except a change of clothes. It is quite obvious that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures regarded it as more important to tell us about that than to tell us what I thought he was going to tell us, where he was going to get the ammunition. The Minister objects to certain questions put to him, based, as he says, on rumour. Why have we to depend on rumour? This is a Bill that deals with discipline, among other matters. Take the matter that was referred to by the Minister as a great encroachment on discipline. What are we to depend upon except rumour when the Minister's colleague, the Minister for Defence, announced in the House yesterday that information is not going to be given to the House as to the state of discipline in the Army which enables such an event to occur.

I did not say any such thing.

The Minister made it quite clear that he was not going to publish the report of the Court of Inquiry. That is the report that we want, not a doctored account—I am not saying a deliberately doctored account —of that report. We want to know what the state of discipline is; we want to know that there is nothing seriously wrong as a result of the present administration by the Minister and by his predecessor—that there is nothing seriously wrong in view of that event. The point is that we, who are responsible to the people, are not to be allowed to know precisely what is wrong. Listening to the Minister's predecessor to-day, the House might imagine that there was nothing at all requiring investigation. What use is it to us to be told that there is a certain code? Of course there is a code, but what we want to know is, is it being enforced? We have seen the discipline and the effectiveness of another branch of the service undermined by interference from above, and we are aware that those who wanted to enforce discipline were almost frowned upon by the members of the Government.

What the people of the country fear —I am giving it not as my view, but as the view of the people I meet in the ordinary way—is that, as a result of Ministerial interference, the ordinary discipline has been affected. What we are faced with is a refusal to give us the material upon which we can found a decision. We were asked some time ago to leave over a discussion on this matter until the inquiry that was then proceeding would conclude. If we are not to get the evidence and the results of the inquiry placed formally before the House, what is the good of asking us to wait?

Was there not an implied pledge? I do not say it was exactly an explicit pledge, but was there not an implied pledge that the House would be put in possession of the full facts that led up to that particular episode? We have had no satisfactory explanation as to how this occurred. The Minister is naturally loyal to his own children, so to speak, the Volunteers. He believes that their presence there had nothing to do with it. Let us have the results of the inquiry to show that that is so, to show how it was that people, enemies of the State, got into the Magazine so easily. Does the Minister not recognise that it is harder for a Deputy to get into this House at the present moment than it was for enemies of the State to get into the Magazine? Yet, if you are to have an army, the ammunition stored there was of considerable importance. I regard it as a partial excuse and a proof of the excellent discipline that the ammunition was got back in a comparatively short time. What you have to explain is that the people who were so incompetent to keep what they had got were competent enough to get into the Magazine. The getting back of the ammunition makes the original episode—I suppose the Minister would like to call it that—all the stranger and more difficult to justify.

We are told that we want a larger Army. The Minister who has just spoken, and who was so long responsible for defence, never explained to us how that would really be effective for the purpose of defence in the case of a big European outbreak and a real invasion of this country. Leaving aside the question of ammunition for that force, I find it difficult to believe that the additional cost that is undertaken and the additional Volunteer units will make us more capable of resisting a real invasion from any of the two opposing sides, if they are able to carry it out.

Notwithstanding many things said by the Minister, I see no reason for changing my views. I cannot see why a properly disciplined, reliable Army, properly trained and consisting of 5,000 men, would not be as effective for all practical purposes as a bigger Army such as the Minister contemplates and for which no justification has been given. There is the feeling through the country that not merely has the existence of the Volunteer force not added to our defensive capacity, but it has had, if anything, the opposite effect. The Minister says that he does not believe that, but let me point out that apparently we are not going to get a definitely trustworthy document that will enable us to form an opinion as to what the real state of affairs is.

In view of the Government's attitude, I think it is rather daring—of course daring is to be expected from a Minister for Defence—for the Minister to object here because inconvenient questions are asked. If there are inconvenient questions asked, it is because the country and ourselves are kept in ignorance—I find it very difficult to avoid saying that we are deliberately kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs.

As I have said, I cannot envisage a situation in which the addition of these partially trained soldiers can add to our capacity to defend ourselves if our neutrality is violated. I have never been able to see that, and I must say the Ministry has always refrained from helping us to envisage a situation in which that can take place. Quite typical, I say, of the whole attitude of the Ministry was the line adopted by the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures in shelving the very definite and clear question put before him by Deputy Dillon—passing it off with a sneer. That is not good enough. It is not good enough for the public, and it will not help to increase confidence in the manner in which that Minister conducted the affairs of the Army while he was in charge of it.

I should like to take this opportunity of making a few observations on the policy of the Government with regard to the defence forces of the country. The Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures addressed this query to the House: "Can we afford to keep a standing Army of the strength necessary to give adequate protection", as an argument why there should be an addition to the standing Army—a Volunteer force. Now for the past number of years, until the Volunteer force was established, there was in existence a standing Army, a very efficient, well-disciplined, small, model standing Army; but, so far as there were any normal duties connected with the work of a soldier in the field, none had at any time to be performed by that standing Army. I have always regarded the existence of a standing Army here, and the justification for the expenditure of public moneys to support it, as being due to this: that it was for the purpose of meeting, at some time, the emergency for which that Army was being prepared. That emergency would arise either as a result of an invasion of the country by the forces of some outside State, or else be for the purpose of keeping order in the country during the existence of an emergency outside.

The only reason why the taxpayers of the country should be asked to pay for the maintenance of that standing Army year after year was this: that there would be in reserve some forces, existing for the benefit of the State, to meet such an emergency. But the policy of the Government has been, so far as I can make out, to operate and use the defence forces only for the purpose of increasing the size of the Army and the quantity of equipment that the Army would use, having regard to the European situation and to the general situation in the world at the present time. Therefore, this standing Army which has been in existence for some years is, as a result of the policy that the Government are administering, not effective for the purpose for which it has been trained over a very long period. If the standing Army has been kept in reserve just to meet the situation at the present time, if that is why it is there, and if it is not able to do that now, then obviously it was an unnecessary luxury for which we have been paying year after year. Now that the situation has arisen for which that standing Army has been trained, we find that we have to spend a great deal more money on it and also to increase its size. At least that is the policy of the Government.

I desire to take this opportunity of protesting against the policy of the Government in expanding the Army both as regards men and increased expenditure on equipment. Deputy O'Sullivan very sensibly said, I think, that a small force of 5,000 men would be just as efficient to withstand any invasion of any part of this country as the present force of, I think, 30,000 men which the Ministry envisage having. One does not need to have any great knowledge of military matters to know, because anyone reading the papers and taking note of what is going on in the world to-day must realise it, that this country could not afford to defend itself against invasion. That is not a nice thing to have to say, but we have to face the facts in this Assembly when dealing with matters of this kind. In order to have any reasonable hope of repelling an invasion of this country, we would need to have a very much larger Army than we have had up to the present, and a much better equipped Army. We would have to spend ten times or perhaps 20 times the amount of money that we voted last year for the upkeep of the Army and its equipment to enable us to do that. Therefore, the position, so far as repelling an invasion is concerned, is absolutely hopeless. Everybody in the country realises that. I can see no justification whatever for increasing the Army to the size now proposed or for expending additional money on it. It is for the purpose of making a protest on these lines that I have risen to speak on this Bill.

As regards discipline in the Army, I think it is a matter of regret to every Irishman that what happened a few weeks ago was a very serious breach of discipline. For the sake of the country we all hope that a thing like that will not occur again. Perhaps in a way it was a lesson, but at the same time I think that the harm that was done by the raid on the Magazine Fort will not be in any way lessened unless the Government take the country fully into their confidence and give the public a complete explanation as found in the report of whatever committee is investigating the matter. I think it would be very much in the interests of the public morale of the country, very much in the interests of good Government, and very much in the interests of the public welfare if that report were published in full, so that the public would know, first of all, what was the real cause of this unfortunate incident and, secondly, what measures the Government have taken to guard against a repetition of such an incident.

I am sorry that Deputy Dillon is not here, because if he were I might be able to answer some of his questions and ease some of the misgivings he appears to have been suffering from. I am also sorry that he spoke in the tone that he did to-day because I regard Deputy Dillon as a man who is widely informed on many subjects, but in this particular debate he satisfied me that he is most ill-informed. He spoke of matters of very great importance and, as far as I can find from his remarks, his only foundation for the statements he was making was based on rumours, on something that he heard outside, something that he heard in his meanderings around the country and something I am sure every Deputy in the House here has heard from time to time. It naturally follows, when an incident occurs of the magnitude of the incident which occurred recently at the Magazine, that all sorts of fanciful stories will follow in its wake.

I am afraid Deputy Dillon allowed his imagination to run riot here to-day on the general subject of the Army. The morale of the Army—as far as my observations show—has not been affected in the slightest, nor was it affected on the immediate occasion of the raid. The manner in which the other sections of the Army set out to recover the ammunition which was lost by one small section—and did in fact recover nine-tenths of it—was a proof that the morale of the Army is quite all right. There is no doubt that there have been a few undesirable people getting into the Volunteers. I suppose that is something which no machinery could provide against. There is a system whereby examination of the character of the individual applying for membership is undertaken. The system is that the Guards are given the name of the applicant and they are expected to inform the Army authorities of the character of the individual. If it is such that the Army authorities believe he is a suitable person to recruit, they recruit him into the Army. Having got in, if he is not all that either the Gárdaí or the Army authorities themselves thought he was, the Army authorities could only find that out in contact with the individual. There again, when the man is a member of the force, the Army authorities naturally operate the measures which they possess in respect of discipline for members of the Army.

Deputy Dillon spoke about the principal Act which the former Minister for Defence introduced last July, I think. It was the intention of the Minister to proceed with that particular Act: it was a voluminous document, running to something like 310 sections. When I was transferred to the Department of Defence and had to deal with this document, a state of emergency had been declared. War had been declared in Europe and emergency measures had been taken here at home. It appeared to me that it would be unwise to proceed with such a very important document in view of the emergency, and I deemed it advisable to postpone the moving of the Second Reading of that document because of the state of emergency. I feel pretty sure that by the time the state of emergency has reached its conclusion, it will have produced a certain state of affairs which will make it necessary to add very largely to the measures in that document. Therefore, I deemed it advisable to go ahead with a much smaller type of document, which I will be introducing here in the near future—a Temporary Provisions Bill to deal with matters such as coast watching and other necessary things of that kind.

In reply to Deputy Esmonde, while he may be honest in his view that we cannot possibly defend ourselves with a small standing Army such as we have, I think it is the duty of this nation—just as it is the duty of any other nation—to make provisions sufficient to deter any nation from attempting to violate our neutrality. We must not have a state of affairs existing here which might be an invitation to all and sundry to come within our shores. The Finns are a population no greater than ourselves and yet they have managed to put up a tremendous defence and withstand the assaults of a very much more powerful nation. I think that is a justification of the fact that we should be prepared from the point of view of having an Army on which we can rely.

Hear, hear; an Army on which we can rely.

I was just saying, before the Deputy came, that his speech was a most ill-informed speech.

And small wonder, for all the information I got from the Minister.

The Minister will not give any information.

I do not think Deputy Dillon requires any information, as he seems to have information long in advance of the Government. Naturally, I presume that in this case he does not require very much information, either. A lot of play has been made in respect of my statement that I would not be prepared to produce the report of the court of inquiry into the loss of ammunition from the Magazine Fort. There is nothing wrong about that. Courts of inquiry have been taking place continuously in the Army and no one has asked that the reports of the findings of those courts of inquiry should be produced.

Those were general matters concerning the Army; this concerns the whole country; there is no analogy between the two.

There is, of course. The actual position is that one small unit of the Army lost a certain amount of ammunition. An inquiry has been held into the reasons for the loss of that ammunition. If it were only the loss of half a dozen rifles, a similar type of court of inquiry would have been instituted and investigations would proceed; and no one, I think, would ask for or be interested in the report. The matter will be dealt with in the ordinary way as with every court of inquiry that has been held in the Army since it was established. I do not want to say too much in respect of the Magazine Fort, as the matter has not yet come to a conclusion. I think I have answered all the questions which have been raised.

The Minister was asked twice—by Deputy Dillon and by Deputy Professor O'Sullivan—about supplies of arms and ammunition for the Army. The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures undertook to the House that the Minister for Defence would answer that question, but he has not mentioned it.

That particular reason is that I have not come here armed for a debate on this Bill, which is of a very minor character. In the very near future—possibly next week; I am not certain— the Supplementary Estimate will be before the House. This is the first time, to my knowledge, that such a debate has taken place on this very minor type of Bill, which merely asks for the continuance of the Defence Forces Regulations Act for another year. The Army is not short of supplies. I can say that. There is no question of a shortage of supplies.

That is not the question that was asked.

There is no question of difficulty with respect to ammunition for foreign guns, which we do not possess. The Deputy's imagination was running riot, and that is about the only answer I can give.

I should like to ask the Minister a question. The Minister has come before the House asking for the annual Army Bill, and we are asking, in regard to policy, where does he propose to get supplies for the Army. There must be one man in Éire who knows that, and that is the Minister for Defence. If the Minister for Defence does not know it, then nobody in Éire or anywhere else knows.

The Deputy rose to ask a question. He should not make a speech.

I want to ask the Minister is there anybody in Éire who knows where we are going to get our supplies? If there is, would he be kind enough to refer me to that man?

Yes. I will refer the Deputy to myself.

Very well. Will the Minister kindly give me the information now?

It is not necessary for me to give it now. I will give it either on the Supplementary Estimate or on the Estimate proper. As I said here in the beginning, I came into this House believing that the facilities—I asked for the facilities in the beginning— which were granted in former years would at least be granted this year. They were not granted. The Deputy, of course, went off the handle and proceeded to tell us all about it.

Parliamentary procedure provides some safeguards for the Opposition, one of which is that reasonable inquiries in regard to legislation passing through the House will be civilly answered by the Ministers responsible to Parliament. The Minister for Defence says that he asked for facilities which have been refused. Yesterday, he asked would we give him the Second Stage of the Defence Forces Bill to-day. We said: "Yes," at 24 hours' notice. I am not asking him to go into the detailed matter of some individual case where he might have to consult a file. I am asking the only man in Ireland who must know what the policy of the Department is in regard to equipment for the Army, as to what that policy is, and you told me, Sir, that this is the occasion upon which to raise it, as distinct from the Estimate, when you say matters of administration must be dealt with; to-day, matters of policy; on the Estimate, matters of administration.

The Deputy is making another speech.

You have ruled that this matter is not relevant to a debate on administration. You have said that policy is to be discussed to-day. I have raised a matter of policy, and the Minister says: "I will not tell you". Does the Minister think that his rebuke to me about being ill-informed is justified when, in the next moment, he says: "I will not answer your questions"? I asked him. Where else am I to get the information, except try to pick it up from rumours circulating in the country, when the Minister refuses to answer?

The Deputy has made his protest.

He asked the same question and got the answer several times from me here in this House.

I am asking the Minister for Defence now, and my colleague, Deputy Professor O'Sullivan, has asked him—it is not a personal matter; the Opposition ask—to tell us what the Government policy is in this matter, and surely if Parliament is not to be made a farce he should tell us.

Without having the slightest intention or desire to interfere in this discussion, I will suggest that the question as to where and what supplies of ammunition are bought might reasonably be considered a question of administration in the Department.

I want to say that our intention and desire was to give the Minister every possible facility in regard to this Bill, as usual. If the Minister takes up this attitude, we will refuse to give him the later stages of this Bill to-day.

Ammunition has been purchased everywhere it was purchasable. That is the simple answer.

Everywhere it could be bought?

Yes; everywhere it could be purchased; anywhere it could be purchased.

Where is that?

Mostly in England; if we could secure it, in America; if we could secure it, in France; wherever we could secure it, we purchased it.

Could the Minister get ammunition and equipment, to match the existing ammunition and equipment, from a variety of countries such as he has described?

We have not failed so far.

Have you in fact got supplies from France, the United States and England?

We have got it in France: we have got it in England. I cannot say for certain that we have got it in America; I do not think we have.

Perhaps the Minister would give an undertaking to make a statement on this question of supplies on the Estimate?

I will consider that.

Will the Minister give that undertaking?

Yes; I will consider that.

I take it the Minister will give a full statement on the matter of supplies?

I am not saying I will. I am saying I will consider that.

Then I will not give the Minister the later stages of the Bill to-day.

Question put and agreed to.

When will the Committee Stage be taken?

I should like to get it now.

I object.

This day week then.

Committee Stage fixed for Thursday next, 29th February.

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