Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army (Resumed). – Dáil Éireann (10th Dáil) – Thursday, 18 Apr 1940

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army (Resumed).

Debate resumed on the motion:—

That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration.

Dr. O'Higgins

Last night I was moved to enter a protest against the casual and non-informative manner in which this huge Estimate was introduced. We got the figures which we could read for ourselves; we got no information with regard to the position of this country, the defence plans of the country or the danger confronting the country. One very significant statement was made by the Minister and it was left at that. The Minister made a statement to the effect that, some 12 months ago or earlier, orders had been placed for warlike material to the extent of nearly £3,500,000, that since that time good to the value of about £700,000 had been received and that between this and April, 1941, he hoped to get £400,000 worth more of the goods ordered. In other words, he said that before 1941 we would not even get one-third of the warlike stores that the Taoiseach and the present Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures told us two years ago were urgently required, if the neutrality and independence of this country were to remain and if the people were to be left unmolested to carry out their ordinary avocations. I think that is a statement which needs some further explanation. If we have landed ourselves in such a mess that £3,500,000 worth of warlike stores were urgently required if our independence were not to go west two years ago and if we cannot get even one-third of those supplies by 1941, then some explanation is required.

What was the Minister for Defence doing from 1932 to 1938? Was there no sign of war? Every boob in every country could see the signs of war from 1935 onwards, and yet we waited until war broke out before we tried to fill up our stores, before we tried to equip our country, before we ordered even the minimum, according to the Minister, necessary to safeguard the independence of this country. And then we could not get it. Why? Because hatred of England submerged love of Ireland; because during all those years we were deliberately placing our orders in Sweden, in Belgium, in France and in America, so that actually goods were coming through the Kiel Canal in September, 1938. The policy of the Department was that not one pennyworth of goods was to be purchased from the only country near us and in a position to supply us. That policy was not reversed until, through the absence of the Minister, the Department was taken over by the Taoiseach; and then the European pot was boiling over and every country wanted all the arms they had, and more if they could get them, so we were left without.

If the Minister for War in Great Britain, France or Germany stood up last night to tell the Deputies in his Parliament that he had thought so little of the safety of his people that a year or so before he had placed an order for an immense amount of warlike stores urgently required as the very minimum necessary for the defence of his country and the homes of his people, but that he could not get even one quarter of his demands, and presumably would not get the whole of his demands until the war was completely over in Europe, how long would he be kept in office? How long would he enjoy the confidence of his Government or his Parliament? How long would he be tolerated by the people outside who had to pay the price and take the risk? But we are so unaccustomed to normal Parliamentary decencies that any gross negligence can take place in a Ministerial position, any major blunder can be made, any disaster can occur and, as long as there is a narrow prejudiced Party majority, the Minister will be either promoted or he will come back here smugly to ask for more and more money. I may say that my remarks have no direct reference to the present unfortunate occupant of the post. He is left with a legacy. He is left with the empty cupboard. He is left to stand the racket.

I may say to the Minister that times are changing inside and outside this House, and the time has gone by when gaily we can vote away millions without grasping or understanding the requirements. I want to make it very clear that the amount of information that any of us over here has with regard to Army policy, Army plan or national dangers is the amount we glean from the censored Press and the amount of information we have with regard to the necessity for this huge sum of money is the amount of information that was given to us by the Minister last night. In most normal democratic parliaments there is a committee for foreign affairs, a committee for defence, some machinery in private for all parties which helps them to deal with difficulties and to understand the dangers. Here we have such a committee to deal with the victuals that are eaten by the Deputies in the restaurant, but it is not worth while having such a committee to deal with national safety or national security. As I said last night, we are asked to vote this money in blinkers. We are asked to vote this money to an administration that has blatantly failed and broken down on the job. We are asked to vote this money to an administration that could not see any signs of war in 1935, 1936 or 1937. We are asked to vote it to an administration that would not even now have placed an order but for the accidental intervention of the Taoiseach, and that order was placed at a time when any grown up boy would know that no little country could hope to get arms even for solid gold. If we are to believe the statement made by the Minister for Defence in February, 1939, that £3,000,000 worth or so of warlike stores was the minimum required then for our safety, we are left now without a fraction of the minimum. We are left defended by nothing but the bleating cry of neutrality.

I believe that sooner or later we have got to grow up and face facts, even if they are politically awkward. We can at least read the papers and see what is happening other countries. It was the natural desire of every country and of the people in every country to keep out of war, to remain neutral, to be saved the horrors of war. Little countries on the far side of Europe, the Scandinavian countries, all desiring to be left in peace, to have their neutrality respected, were advised, and strongly advised, to get together and to stand firmly together or fall individually asunder. Many of them, not minding what happened their neighbour, as long as they might be saved themselves, and relying on the strength of a catch-cry or the appeal of a phrase, rather than the organisation of the people and a number of men, each one adopting a policy of isolationist neutrality, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Norway, went under, one by one. Standing together, with guarantees one to help the other, they might have all survived.

We are asked here to rely on empty armouries, empty arsenals, the cry of neutrality and, possibly, 20,000 troops and, as far as we are told, we have asked nobody to come to our assistance if our neutrality is violated. It is no departure from neutrality to have that neutrality guaranteed by every and any possible power. We have associations, long, sentimental, firm, historical, with the great Republic in the west. Have we even asked that Republic to guarantee our neutrality? The Taoiseach says naively, "Oh, if this country is attacked, other countries will be interested." It is the curse of this country that we will face an army but we are afraid to face words. What did the Taoiseach mean, when you parse it? That if this country is attacked Great Britain will be interested and will come to our assistance, not for love of us but for her own safety. That is sticking out. That is common sense. That is obvious. That is stated from the head of the Government. If that is so, is there anything wrong in having a prearranged plan for co-ordination, for speedy assistance, for efficient and harmonious joint co-operation in the event of this country being attacked? Politically it would be awkward but, remember, the Minister is not just responsible for the pay, equipment, food and drilling of so many soldiers, he has a responsibility for the safety of the lives and the sanctity of the homes of the people in this country. He is not going to claim for one moment that his Army of 16,000 or 17,000, even of the best men on earth, is going alone to safeguard this country if invaded. There is nobody sufficiently ignorant and insular to think that an army of that magnitude or of three times that magnitude could successfully repel or drive out of an island country the number of troops that any modern army of a major power would utilise for the invasion of a distant country. I have enough respect and confidence in the personnel of the Irish Army to know that they would fight with valour, they would sell their lives dearly, they would be true to the traditions of the country and, at best, they would delay any modern force for a week-end. It is not a heroic defeat that I would look forward to, if I were in the Minister's place. What I would look forward to would be a successful defence, even though the successful defence might not be as spectacular as a heroic defeat or a glorious failure. There is too much of that kind of thing in the history of this country—a history of glorious failures and heroic defeats— but, as a self-governing entity, I think that we should aim at successful campaigns, and, if I were in the Minister's position, I should like to get some assurance of effective assistance, in the event of an attack being made upon this country. I should like to get an assurance of assistance in the event of attack, even from a Hottentot country, or any other country, and I would not consider that I was doing my duty to this country unless I was using any weapon and every weapon to save the liberty of this country and the lives of the people of this country.

We are asked to vote money, and big money—money that is hard to get—to support a policy of isolation as a defence of those shores in the event of invasion. It is a fool who pretends to be a prophet in a time of universal war, and none of us can say what may take place in the present position of the world. That, however, is a danger that each Minister for Defence must keep in mind, and that danger cannot be met, I suggest, by a small, paid professional Army alone, and even if invasion should take place, that danger cannot be repelled by the inside strength of this country alone. In view of that, I should like to know if any arrangements have been made or if any queries or applications have been made to any country in the world to come to our assistance in case we should be attacked. Have any queries been addressed to any country in the world in that regard? Practically every country that is left amongst the neutral countries has some country, at least, at call to come to its assistance, if attacked, or some country to account for. Have we any such country that has promised to come to our assistance, if we are attacked? We are told by the Taoiseach that Great Britain will be interested in case we are attacked. Well, interest in such a case is no good, or very little good, if there is no understanding or no plan of co-operation beforehand. If 'planes advance on this country to attack it, passing over England, England might be interested, but only so far as her own safety is concerned. Have any arrangements been made to give us notice of such an attack? If, for instance, troops should land on the west coast of Ireland, England might be interested, or might simulate interest, to the extent of asking us to let her know of the landing of troops that was taking place; but when we ask for the defence plans of this country somebody bleats about neutrality. Neutrality, of course, is a good thing, but in the present circumstances of the world it seems to be only a pious hope, and what is wanted really now is a plan to meet attack in case our neutrality should be violated. We never got any plan, or any beginning of a plan, or any policy, and an Army can only design a plan behind a policy, and if there is a Ministry so muddle-headed as not to have a definite plan, or to have so many divergent plans, or a Ministry so cowardly as not to be able to face up to the plans they have, then, obviously, the Army is left without a policy and, accordingly, the country is left without a military plan of defence. That is the position. It is well known that that is the position in the country, and neither in public nor in private has the Minister for Defence, or his side-drummer, been able to convince anybody that there is any real tackling of the possible dangers that lie ahead.

Sheltering behind phrases about neutrality is merely a burking of the issue. What this money is wanted for is not in regard to our neutrality being respected, but only in view of our neutrality being violated, and if it should be so violated, we have been told by the Taoiseach already that it will only be violated by a great country that is at war with Great Britain. Assuming, as we must assume, that there is some danger of that happening—because, if there is no such danger, there is no justification for the huge demands that are made here—do we propose to face and beat a major Power with 17,000 troops with the Volunteers thrown in? The Minister knows that, if he has 17,000, or 30,000 troops, the most of that 30,000 that could be hurled in any one direction would be 10,000. He knows that, with the internal dangers which, we all know, threaten our internal lines of communication, our buildings, barracks, internal lines of supply, and so on—all of which have got to be defended and safeguarded from attack —even with 30,000 troops at his disposal, he would not have 4,000 troops to be thrown around the coast for its defence. You have one of the longest coast-lines in Europe in this country, and you have empty ports and idle forts beside these ports. As far as we know, no understanding, or no scheme of co-operation with any other country has been come to. Apparently, we are going to do what the Polish army of 2,000,000 men failed to do, and we are going to do it with an efficient and highly-trained Army of 8,000, and with a Volunteer force, 75 per cent. of whom, we are told, are reliable but not highly trained. It must be remembered, however, that the 25 per cent. remaining is a source of weakness.

Now, in this Vote we have made provision on a larger scale for the Volunteer side of the Army, and I want to know clearly from the Minister for Defence if he is satisfied that he is pursuing sound lines in this regard. Defence is becoming a serious matter in every country, and there is no use in us burking the difficulties that we are up against. The enemy that is nearest to you is the enemy that is most dangerous. Like most other countries, we have an enemy within our own shores—an enemy that is highly organised, working secretly, and in a position to strike in any place at any moment. That is the danger that is nearest to us, and that is the first enemy that an Irish Army has got to meet. An Army, living and existing under such conditions, must ensure that the soldier admitted to that Army is passed, not through one, but through a dozen sieves; must ensure that the soldier's loyalty is unquestionable, and that his affiliations are entirely with and for the State—that he has no affiliations with any bodies inimical to the State or that he has now served such affiliations, if he had any; in other words, that he has no entanglements with any anti-State bodies. One of the first essentials of our Army is that we should be able to swear to the reliability and loyalty of any man we take in, and then, having taken him in, we keep him there so that we know his most secret thoughts. Was it wise in those circumstances, in a country with our history, to throw the barrack gates wide open, to invite any agent of that enemy organisation to come into barracks, to supply him with a rifle and with equipment, to drill him, to train him, and to send him out as an information carrier to join his old pals or to keep him in as an enemy within the walls? When we see cases in courts of men offering big money to private soldiers to tell them simply at what hour the officer comes around to inspect the sentry, what the appearance of that officer is, and what is the plan of the barracks, can we not see the danger in throwing the secrets of our barracks open to any fly-blow that comes in for 17 days per annum and carries out all the information?

A still more venturesome and risky policy was embarked on some five or six years ago and I think the weakness and the flaws were visible even within 12 months. One of these was that the fellows you trained one year never came again; or a few of them came, that although you kept the numbers uniform, it was a different set of men each year and that you were passing through the Army and familiarising with Army routine 30,000, 40,000 or 50,000 men of whom you had no control. Remember that, in the early days of this movement, these men came in echoing the cries of the Ministers: "Up the Republic", "Cut the connection", and "Up the Republic and down with the Free State". Mind you, no matter what Ministers were, some of these men might have been honest, an odd one of them might have been sincere, and when the hierarchy turned in their tracks, they could not count on all those men turning in their tracks, and the affiliations and sentimental attachments of these men who were enrolled in our colours were exemplified by the cry on their lips at the time. I want to know if any reports were ever received from responsible officers with regard to the advisability or inadvisability of continuing that scheme; I want to know if any reports were ever asked for, and if all the military reports which the Minister got were to carry on. I want to know if he got no reports warning him of the wastage, warning him of the fact that there were leakages, warning him of the dangers and suggesting alterations, and if he did get such reports, what action was taken about them?

Everybody, the man in the street and the man living in any parish, knows that, of the nine or ten men who were enrolled one year, two turned up the following year, with an additional eight, and that, in the third year, three of those men turned up, with an additional seven. What was the justification for squandering money on material which was never available from year to year? What is the defence of squandering money on men who were only sufficiently blooded with the taste for soldiering to go into the British Army? What is the justification for carrying on with that scheme in view of what happened on Christmas Eve, in view of what is happening month after month down at the Curragh, and in view of what we see in the police courts month after month? Why, if we have enemies within this State, make it easy for them to come within the camp and within the barracks? That scheme was a faulty scheme from the beginning. It had its political uses at the beginning. It has its military dangers at the moment and the dangers must be as apparent to the Minister as they are to anybody else.

As I said, living in our circumstances, it is unsafe to take anyone into the Army, no matter how urgently men are required, without being able absolutely to swear by his reliability. What happened at the Magazine Fort could have happened at any barracks in Dublin. Remember that what happened at the Magazine Fort could much more easily have happened at Government Buildings, only that the material in Government Buildings was not considered as valuable as the material in the fort. It could have happened at any barracks in the country and do you think that the Minister can come along and ask for increased millions for a weapon that might be turned against ourselves? By reason of old association, by reason of close association and knowledge, I would be prepared to stake my life and everything I possess on the loyalty, the efficiency and the bravery of the youngest soldier in the regular Army. I would be prepared, not having the same amount of knowledge, to go as far as to say that 80 to 90 per cent. of the Volunteers are as reliable, but I would be prepared to stake my reputation for common-sense that, living in a country with our conditions, 10 per cent. of the new men rolling into barracks must be rolling in as the agents of the Irish Republican Army. If I could devise a plan to get rid of the 10 per cent., without interfering with the 90 per cent., we would all cheerfully adopt it, but if I had to choose between keeping the 10 per cent. in order to keep the 90 per cent., I would let the whole lot go, and I would feel stronger, safer, and more secure, and let them back by another entrance under other conditions.

We have selected this particular year to launch ourselves as a naval power. Was it the idea that as we could not get arms and equipment for the Army, and as the money was there, we might as well spend it in any case, that we might as well buy a navy, or was it the idea, rather belatedly, that the Government was convinced that the ports and forts were only of use for sheltering and harbouring of a navy, and seeing that that was the situation, they said: "Very well, buy a navy to put into them"? But there is just as big a mystery, and just as much reticence about our launching out as a naval power as there is about the arrival of our first Navy. The first six weeks were shrouded in mystery. Was it lost or was it captured? Was it disabled? What happened to the Navy from the date of delivery to the date of arrival in this country? How did it happen that the Navy got a civic reception in Waterford before it got an official reception in Dublin? Was the function of the Navy to report to the Mayor of Waterford or was its function to report to the Minister for Defence in Dublin? How did it happen that the crew of the Navy found themselves in the water on the night of its arrival? Was there any truth in the newspaper report that its arrival was greeted by the Irish Republican Army boarding the ship, or was it that the waters in Dun Laoghaire Harbour were too turbulent for the legs of the crew?

The thing that matters more than anything, however, is, what is the purpose of this particular Navy? What is the justification for spending tens of thousands of pounds at the present moment? What is the function of this Navy? What factor, defensive or offensive, did it fulfil since it arrived at Dun Laoghaire port? What important safety mission was it on for six weeks before it arrived there? It may be a very interesting thing to have a Navy as well as an Army, and I suppose we must have a Navy as well as an Army when we have a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, because he cannot coordinate an Army as Minister for Defence, but having got the ports we must get a Navy. Having got a Minister for the Co-ordination of the Defensive Measures we must provide different defensive measures. Is that the line of country?

We come to the cost of this Marine Coast-Watching Service amounting to about £319,000 for the coming year. There is £17,000 odd for pay, £58,000 for maintenance, £50,000 for stores, and £172,000 under the heading of capital. Are we going to purchase more naval vessels? What are their functions? What are they going to do? Is it the function of a craft, the size of the one lying at Dun Laoghaire, to repel invasion? Remember the Power that comes to invade us is strong enough to cross the seas in the teeth of the mightiest navy in the world. Is it for show? Is it because the money is there and it might as well be spent? These particular Marine and Coast-Watching Services are to cost nearly £500,000 for the year. I think any Deputy, no matter where he sits here, before he votes the money, is entitled to know what he is voting it for. What is the Coast-Watching Service? What are they watching through? Where are they watching from? What are they watching for? If they see anything coming, what are they going to do? It is nonsense to have a man here and there along the coast who, if a fleet is arriving, will telephone or signal. To whom?

General MacEoin

The Civic Guards.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Civic Guards, I am told. Could not the Civic Guards telephone? Is it necessary to spend £500,000 for men to become limpets on the rocks of our coasts? Is it a utility service, and are we to get value for it? If I were in the Minister's position, and had that £500,000 to play with, I would rather put it into aeroplanes if I could get them. I would rather put it into plain soldiers so that, at least, I would have people to keep order. It is rather symptomatic of the state of affairs, that you have an organisation anti-State, a rival army, able to order all the shopkeepers in the principal streets of our capital city to close down from a certain hour to a certain hour, and that nobody ventured to disobey the order. You have a subterranean army that, in our capital city, can order picture houses, and any business in the city to close down any night, and no business will dare disobey. Do you think with conditions such as that, that we can afford to flash money, and burst out as a naval Power with vessels so big that you could pass them by in the River Liffey without knowing they were there?

It is about time that the Ministers, both of them, got down to a conscientious realisation of the fact, that independent countries are going pop month by month, that they are going pop with armies, many of them ten times as big as ours, but that if other countries dissipate their strength, and their wealth, on all kinds of fancy shop window trimming, the way we are doing it here, and if Ministers in other countries burked awkward facts the way they are burked here, these countries would be going pop every day, instead of every month. We have a demand for millions of extra money. We are told that supplies cannot be procured for the Army but that we are going to have an Army. Presumably when we get an estimate, so many of the men were to man aeroplanes which cannot arrive, and did not arrive, others were to man anti-aircraft guns which cannot arrive, and did not arrive, but having committed ourselves to a scale of expenditure, on the basis that the material was going to be procured, we still adhere to that basis of expenditure, even though the material cannot be secured.

The Minister tells us now in 1940 that we might get a fraction of our orders in 1941. The goods were ordered in 1939. No provision was made from 1932 to 1938. We are to express our confidence in that Administration by voting more money without being told the reason why, without getting any explanation as to why the goods cannot be secured, without getting any information as to whether any arrangements are made for assistance from any point of the compass if there is an invasion of this country. More information is given to a Fianna Fáil cumann in any country parish than is given to Deputies in this Parliament. I want to say to Deputies, irrespective of where they sit, that either in public or in private we have got to have some knowledge as to how money is to be spent and why before we are conscientiously entitled to vote away the money. Things are not booming in this country. We are aiming at a big Army in barracks. There is a huge army outside—the army of the starving, the army of the destitute, the army of the unemployed. We have got to turn a deaf ear to their demands because all the money is required for the Army in barracks. We are not even told what the Army is in barracks for, what threat it is going to meet, what plan it has to meet any threat, what arrangements are made, if the threat is immense, for assistance or co-operation from any other country.

This Army estimate would repay close examination. Apparently, in every phase of Army life—in every department, in every office, in every barracks—there is to be increased expenditure. More money and plenty of it. Some of these Votes in the way in which they are presented are rather confusing. We have under sub-head E—(Officers of the Medical Service)—a number of commandants, captains, and other ranks with a gross figure behind their names. If I understand things at the moment, these officers are on different rates of pay. There is a commandant attending on a certain set of beds who is paid, say, £800 a year. Another commandant serving these beds, with the same rank, the same duty and the same responsibility, is getting substantially less pay and placed in such a position that, no matter what promotion he ever earns, he cannot increase his income by a ½d. a year. That was one of the blunders of the previous Minister for Defence and, when that blunder was made very clear to him, he mistook mulishness for strength. Now, we have that mulishness succeeded by weakness—a fear of interfering with what was done by the Minister's predecessor. Even if the thing be unjust, the injustice has got to continue. Even if the thing be foolish, the foolishness has got to continue. Do you think that there is an army in the world which would enter upon a war situation by creating discontent and distrust in one of the important services of that army? Could the Minister, or either of the Ministers, put as much as one example to me where, when pay was considered too high in any Department of the State, the contract of serving officers or officials was violated? Very often, pay scales are altered for those who come in after the alteration but never were the prospects and contract of serving officers or officials violated. If that were to be taken as a precedent for commercial life in this or in any other country, we should have such a general break down in business that we would have continuous revolution. The Minister is, weakly, going to stand for that. The Minister is going to perpetuate the blunder of his predecessor in office and is going to make the thing more offensive and more hurtful.

As soon as the regulation was brought in, officers, with families, who had served 15 years and who had given loyal and conscientious service to two Governments, could not get an increase of a halfpenny a year in their income no matter what promotion they ever secured. A month after the regulation was brought in, in order to make a joke of the unfortunate men and their families, 20 or 30 of them were promoted. They were to provide increased amenities for their families by the extra bauble on the shoulder. Even that was done in a blundering, hurried kind of way. You had a dental service in the Army, like any other military service anywhere, with one higher than the others. You promoted all below and forgot the man on top. Would I be making an outrageous suggestion if I were to say that even now that should be rectified? It will not cost a halfpenny. Unfortunately, it will never cost a halfpenny. The only difference it would mean would be, that the man would have, perhaps, two years longer of Army service if he got higher rank. He has done his work conscientiously, efficiently, loyally and reliably. He has had custody of thousands of pounds' worth of easily transportable goods in the form of gold. He carried out those functions in the most difficult and turbulent days. He had the rank of captain and held that rank for 16 years; he had that degree of seniority, having been in first. He carried on very responsible duties. I take it that it was an oversight. I hope that particular oversight will be attended to.

We have the extraordinary position in connection with this Vote—I do not know if anybody has experienced it before—of one Minister being carried on another Minister's back. We have the Vote for the Minister for Defence moved and, tucked away inside it, we have the Vote for the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. We have never heard anything at any time about the functions, duties or responsibilities of that particular Nabob; we merely have the privilege of voting the money for the staffing of the office. We know that somewhere under his supervision there is a censor's department, and we also know that that censor's department is headed by an able, an experienced ex-Minister. The title is the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. The cost of the office in salaries is shown here as something about £15,000 a year. There are 200 and odd people employed, according to the book of estimates, and we get only the cost of the salaries of 15 of them. The other 185, we are told, are shown elsewhere. Anybody who has a week or two to spare can hunt the slipper through the book of estimates to find the total cost.

What is the total cost of that particular office and what was it created for? Where did co-ordination break down inside the Department of Defence? If the present Minister for Co-ordination, who was Minister for Defence for seven and a half years, was a success in his post, if he had the confidence of the Taoiseach and his colleagues, was not a war situation the very time when he should be left there? If, on the other hand, he had not the confidence of the Taoiseach or his colleagues, were there not vacant Ministries if it was necessary to retain his services? Why create a new Ministry with a big name? Such a Ministry was created in Great Britain when that country entered the war and such a Ministry was discontinued by Great Britain at war. At least we knew there was a multitude of independent defence and offence services to be co-ordinated there. The Air Force was independent of the Army and Navy; the Navy was independent of the Army; the Army was independent of both of the others. You had three Ministries of defence and offence. Co-ordination there might have been necessary.

With us, our Air Force, our Army and our Navy are all under the common management, control and supervision of the Minister for Defence. A Minister was appointed to co-ordinate that Ministry of Defence with what, with whom and for what purpose? What is the justification, what is the reason for it all? What are the functions of this new, costly office? Money is wanted acutely outside the Army. If we are to believe Ministerial statements, money is urgently wanted inside the Army. We have a new office, a useless office, that, if all were totted up, is costing perhaps £250,000 a year. It is rather an expensive pedestal on top of which to place even the worthiest object.

Mr. Norton

We are being asked to vote to-day the salary of the Minister for Defence and this provides us with an opportunity of reviewing the activities of the Minister and his Department and, generally, the standing of the Army in respect to the money which we are now being asked to vote for its maintenance. I had occasion in the Dáil some time ago to endeavour to elicit some information from the Minister as to the notorious raid which took place on the Magazine Fort last December and which profoundly shocked everybody in this country. That raid clearly indicated that the standard of efficiency in the Army was not as high as it should be. That may not be due, and I do not believe it was due, to any negligence on the part of officers, non-commissioned officers or the other ranks. It was probably due to the higher Army policy for which the Minister must be held responsible. Deputies will remember that on that occasion approximately 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition belonging to the State were taken away in a manner that would have done credit to a low-class pantomime at Christmas. The Army was put in a very false position in connection with the matter and the country had demonstrated for it the rather ironic spectacle of the chief arsenal in the State being raided by a party of armed men who felt it so unnecessary to conceal their movements that, according to Press reports, they were able to take between 30 and 40 heavy lorries, leisurely load them with State ammunition, and take them away to various parts of the country.

Arising out of that raid a military inquiry was held. Certain officers were required to attend the inquiry and give evidence in order to piece together the set of circumstances which led up to the raid. The officers attended, gave their evidence and, during the period in which they gave the evidence, no reflection whatever was made upon their characters and no reflection was made upon their conduct, either as citizens or as soldiers. They gave their evidence to the best of their ability. While that inquiry was in progress over a very substantial period, nobody in the court attempted to arraign the officers on any charge and, in fact, no charge was preferred against them. Army Defence Regulations provide that if a charge is made against an officer which in any way reflects upon his conduct he is given an opportunity of being present during the remainder of the inquiry to hear any case that may be made against him and he is finally entitled to have a definite charge preferred against him and an opportunity given to him to meet that charge. In this case the Minister for Defence; however slothful he may be in the matter of protecting State property, showed at least that he had certain mercurial qualities when it came to the administration of justice or injustice to people who were his subordinates. The result of that inquiry was that the Minister, without giving the officers concerned the slightest opportunity of defending themselves, without preferring any charge whatever against them, simply notified them that on the evidence which they had tendered, as witnesses and not as defendants, he had come to certain decisions which were then promulgated by him. We had, therefore, the rather extraordinary spectacle that certain military officers who had enjoyed the confidence of their chiefs were brought into the inquiry as witnesses and they left that inquiry as convicted offenders without a single charge being preferred against them.

The coldness and inhumanity of the treatment they received is quite unworthy of the Minister and unworthy of a public department. One officer with an unblemished national record, going back for years, was notified that on the evidence he gave he was to be dismissed the service without the payment of a ¼d. gratuity. Another officer was called upon to resign in circumstances which did not entitle him to compensation. Another officer did resign so that he would not be dismissed and that he would get such compensation as his services entitled him to. Two other officers unconcerned in any way with the matter were placed on half pay. If there was any proven evidence against these officers they should be dealt with by a military court of discipline. If these officers had been tried and found guilty after a fully formulated charge against them I could understand their being dealt with. But in this instance the officers had no charge preferred against them. They were given no opportunity of defending themselves. They went into this inquiry as witnesses and came out as convicted offenders. That is the procedure which the Minister adopts and which has been adopted in the case of people higher up. I want to ask the Minister why, if these officers were guilty of offences, they were not tried by court martial? Why was not a charge or a number of charges preferred against these officers if the Army authorities felt that it was possible to sustain charges against them? Why were they not informed of what they were deemed to be guilty, and given an opportunity of defending themselves? Instead of that obviously fair procedure the Minister adopts the most unusual and cynical procedure of finding officers guilty on the evidence they tendered at an inquiry. With that evidence he came with cynicism in excelsis and said to the officers concerned: “I have decided to ask the Government to recommend to the Uachtarán to terminate your commissions and, though I have decided to do that, please let me know if you have any reasons to urge why I, having come to that decision coldly and deliberately, should change my mind?” I would like to ask the Minister why these officers were not given, as they had a right to expect, trial by court martial with an opportunity of meeting the charges preferred against them; why they were not given an opportunity of meeting these charges and defending themselves and given an opportunity of showing that the responsibility for the mess that resulted in the raid on the Magazine Fort was the responsibility of the people higher up and not the responsibility of officers of their rank?

I hope the Minister when replying in this debate will give us information on that point, because the punishment meted out to these officers has left a very bad flavour in the public mouth, a flavour from the taste of which the Department of Defence will not recover for a long time—if indeed it will ever recover from this unsavoury business. I want to know if it is possible in discussing the Estimate, Votes 64 and 63 will be taken together, or whether 64 will be taken independently of 63?

Mr. Traynor

Vote 64 is following immediately after.

This is a rather peculiar situation that has arisen. May I point out that the Minister for Defence is responsible for sub-head AA in this Vote as he is responsible for every other sub-head in it, and there is no sub-head in the Vote that cannot be discussed in the Dáil. I submit that the question of the point of order raised should be considered. While I bow to the ruling of the Chair, I cannot accept in principle, without a protest, the ruling given. On the general motion to refer back the Vote, I think at no time in the history of the country has a Vote been submitted to this House in such a haphazard fashion as this Vote has been by the Minister who introduced it. It is only fitting, therefore, that it should be referred back for reconsideration. When the Estimate for the Department of Defence was moved in the Dáil last year, the Minister told us that it was essential that an increased sum should be given. The Taoiseach also spoke, and I understood him to say that it was proposed to spend immediately substantial sums upon supplies, and in particular on munitions, but despite the time that has since elapsed no headway, as Deputy O'Higgins has pointed out, has been made in procuring the essentials required for the defence of the country. It appears to me that the Minister is in a position similar to that of a thatcher turning up to thatch a house without straw. That is the position that has been created, and it is that situation that makes Defence, with its two Ministers, the laughing stock of the country. We are being asked to vote this large sum of money which is so urgently required for other matters. I suggest to the Government that, before they do that, they should agree to a reconsideration of the whole case, and take the House into their confidence in secret session, or by some other method, and then, having got a unified policy for the defence of the country, the House would be entitled to vote whatever sum was required.

I want to pay a tribute to the Army in the sense that it is efficient and loyal. Deputy O'Higgins, when speaking, put the percentage of Volunteers who are disloyal as high as 10 per cent. I would not go so far as that, but at the same time I want to say that even a much smaller percentage would be dangerous. I feel that the Government, the Minister for Defence and the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures are responsible more than anybody else for that disloyalty, if disloyalty there be, and that they should take steps at the earliest possible moment to eliminate out of the minds of those people any thoughts that are in them of disloyalty, to the State. Mobilisation took place, troops were thrown hurriedly into barracks where no arrangements had been made for their reception, and it is something to the credit of the Army that nothing serious happened in the way of illness, indiscipline, or outbreaks of any kind. They were mobilised and came into position under very great difficulties. I must say that so far as I saw them, and I have seen them all over the country, they have done well, and I think that the Army is to be commended for the things they have done well. The housing accommodation for the Army is very bad, and some arrangements should be made during the summer time, if they are going to be kept over the winter, for the welfare of the Army generally.

I am dissatisfied with the Minister's conduct of the administration of the Army and Army matters generally. Some time ago he told us here that he would not produce the findings of a court of inquiry or give us the contents of it—that it was not customary to do so. Yet, last night, when it suited his purpose to bolster up an injustice done to a widow and orphans, he quoted from the evidence given before a court of inquiry without the slightest compunction. I think that that was unfair. I might say that in raising that question last night I had no intention except to put the facts before the Minister. He did not accept them. I am not going to go into the matter now, but I hope that he will reconsider it and remember one point in particular—that he relies upon the evidence of an officer in the case who came up a considerable time after the incident had occurred, and therefore did not see it, although there is the evidence of two soldiers to the contrary. I just want to remind the Minister of that and, in the interests of justice, I appeal to him to reconsider the matter.

In connection with the allowances for the wives and families of serving soldiers there has been and continues to be grave delay in their payment. Citizens of this State answered the Minister's call to join the Volunteers and when the mobilisation took place they immediately responded leaving behind their wives and families. In scores of instances it has been brought to my notice that wives and families were left practically penniless and had to appeal to the local authorities for assistance to prevent them from starving. I could understand that happening some years ago, but under the present organised condition of the Department of Defence that is a situation that should not arise now. A similar situation arose in regard to the emergency supplies that had to be procured in certain towns. Even the vegetables that were provided for the troops were not paid for until weeks or months afterwards. Again, that is a situation that should not have arisen at this stage.

I notice that there is increased expenditure on Army transport. I feel that the Minister should have given us more details of the use that transport was put to during the last six or seven months and what it is intended to do in the future. There have been grave complaints of extensive driving of lorries by people who were being taught to drive; that these lorries were being driven on the public roads by learners, which is the only word you can use to describe them, and that they were a menace to the other users of the road. Surely there are places in barracks and in the Curragh Camp where that training could have been given without endangering either the drivers or the public at a time like that. However, it seems that nothing serious happened, except that a number of other road users got severe shocks and some of them suffered from nerves for some time afterwards as a result of meeting these lorries driven by learners on the roads, particularly in the Midlands.

I feel that the expenditure of such a sum as this on an infantry force is hardly justified. I believe, if this country is attacked, that the defence that would be most effective would be by means of aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. The expenditure, if we must incur it, should in my opinion be utilised in that direction, but there is no indication that we are going to be in a position to get either sufficient aircraft or anti-craft guns to be effective. The Minister will recollect that, when speaking on the Army Vote before, I said that a ground army would only be effective against another ground army that would invade our territory. I pointed out that before a ground army of any strength could come in here the British Air Force and the British Navy would have to be defeated, and that if any Power succeeded in coming in here after doing that we would have very little use in putting up a force to oppose them. As a matter of fact, I said, in a jocose way, that the then Lord Mayor should be sent out to shake hands with them as being the best method of defence. I said that only an air force and an anti-aircraft gunnery force would be of any use for defensive purposes and that this expenditure was a waste of public money. I, therefore, suggest to the House that this Vote should be referred back for reconsideration and that a meeting of members of the different Parties should be held at which the Government would show their hand so that there would be a positive unified policy that every section of the country could support.

Mr. Esmonde

I should like to say a few words on this Vote. I have consistently opposed in this House the amount proposed to be spent on the Army and I oppose this Vote on two grounds. First of all, I think the amount involved is too much. Secondly, even though the amount is too much, the taxpayer has not been and will not be getting value for his money. For years past, there has been an annual expenditure for defence purposes and, ours being a little State, the defence forces which we had and the money which was spent on their upkeep, could only be considered more or less in the nature of an insurance against some future possibility, a possibility such as the state of emergency which exists in Europe and, in fact, in the whole world at the present time. Our only justification for expending annually these large sums on the maintenance of a defence force—apart of course from whatever forces would be necessary to maintain internal order— was the danger of an emergency such as has occured during the past 12 months. The emergency has now arisen and we find that, what was for many years past a national luxury, and should now be a useful instrument, cannot be converted into such a useful instrument without an enormous expenditure of extra money. For that reason I think the expenditure which we are asked to approve, together with other sums which have been voted during the past 12 months, is very much too high and should not be voted.

Another aspect of the matter is that during past years, when the defence situation was considered, it must have occurred to the people in charge of affairs to look ahead and to anticipate what the situation of the country would be and what they would do in time of emergency. So far as I can see, no plan appears to have existed. I think it was the duty of the Defence Department to look forward and to find out exactly what was the correct position for a State of this kind to adopt in a general conflict such as is taking place at the present time. They ought to have considered whether the job could be done at all and if so what it would cost to do it. Without wishing to say anything derogatory against the country or its status, my view has been that the country is so small, that our resources are so limited, that while we would be prepared to defend our liberty and our independence to the last man against any aggressor, no matter where he came from, we would be unable successfully to do so having regard to our limited resources. I think I put forward that view in this House before. On the last occasion on which I did so we had not the advantage of the knowledge that we have now. We had not illustrations of the three attitudes adopted by three different States during the past 12 months.

I think that with the examples of, and with the results of the attacks on, these three States before us we ought to reconsider our position in so far as it affects the Defence Estimate. The outbreak of the war in Europe was signalised by an attack on Poland by Germany. Poland and this country cannot very well be compared with each other because Poland is a very much larger State than this country. The Polish Army put up a resistance to the invader and were overcome. Another State that was attacked was Finland. The army there also put up a resistance, a very gallant resistance, a resistance, I suppose, that will go down in history, but in the end they gave in. The third State invaded was the State of Denmark and it put up no resistance at all. Of all States in Europe, in fact of all States in the world, Denmark is the one that approximates most to our own. Is there any thinking man in this country to-day who, if he had the courage to say so, would not admit that Denmark had chosen the better part, in not spending unnecessary sums of money on defence purposes which, when the emergency arose, were found to be useless? I think that is very largely our position here.

I suppose I shall be attacked for having given expression to these sentiments and for having suggested that we are not capable of defending ourselves but, be that as it may, I think we ought to face realities. If we wish to defend ourselves adequately and properly it would not be an expenditure of £3,000,000 that would be required; it would be an expenditure of £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 that would be necessary. Why spend this money for the simple purpose of suggesting that we are capable of dealing with any challenge that may come and so make our country a battlefield in which other nations would settle their quarrels? It may be that I am wrong in stating that the people are not getting sufficient value for this expenditure. A member of the Opposition could not possibly have the information which the Government has in matters of this kind. It may be the opinion of the Government, having consulted their advisers, that this expenditure is necessary but I do not see how we are getting sufficient value for it.

We have a magnificent little regular force, an Army well trained, which looks very well on parade and very smart in the streets, but the duties of the Defence Department do not finish with that. I do not think there is a single individual in this country who has received any instruction from the Government, or any information from any Government Department, informing him of what he is to do in case of an invasion, in case of an attack or in case of some sudden emergency which had not been foreseen. Whatever plans are to rule in this country in case of an invasion or an attack upon our shores, these plans are evidently locked in some safe in the offices of the Department and are not known to any single individual. I am not now suggesting that the Government should tell the country what their general plans are, but I do think if we were to wake up to-morrow morning to find that some enemy had landed on our shores, the general public should have some information beforehand as to what is to be done by them as individual citizens in case of an emergency of that kind. So far as I can see, the Department of Defence have confined themselves to ordering—or arranging to order; I do not know whether the goods have arrived yet—vast quantities of warlike material.

They are also increasing the size of the Army, but they are doing nothing else whatever towards solving the problems which are bound to arise. I think this point is material upon this Vote and upon the point which I have just stated. The Government asked us to consider that the duties of defending this country were not confined to training and equipping military forces, but also included outside measures of defence. So much did they consider that that a new Department was brought into existence and a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures was appointed to that position from the Department of Defence. It was so important that we had to have a new Department and a new Minister. I do not think we should be guided very much by comparisons with other countries; but, at all events, the British, having brought such a Minister into existence, later ended his existence. However, I do not quarrel with the existence of the Department of the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures nor with the Minister over that Department, if the public is going to get some value from it. I understand that his position was created to prepare the country generally for such an emergency as is envisaged and to give each individual member of the public some knowledge, some information and some guide as to what to do in a time of emergency. No such information has been given.

It is in no spirit of hostility to the Army or even to the Department that I have made these remarks. Discussing a question of this kind, discussing the Defence Vote, everyone realises that we are dealing with realities. This time last year, I do not think any individual here could have believed that within 12 months the face of Europe could and would have changed to present the picture which it presents at the present time. If there had been a prophet here 12 months ago who could state that Poland, Denmark, Norway and parts of Finland would have disappeared within 12 months, I think such a prophet would have been laughed out of court. In dealing with this Vote, we are dealing with grim realities, we are dealing with a situation that has not existed in the world since the Barbarians broke down the outer walls of the Roman Empire, and the civilisation that ruled the then known world—and which has left its imprint down to the present day—disappeared almost completely. In such a time and in such circumstances as exist at the present day, and when all modern civilisation is in jeopardy, I think it behoves us in this little outpost of Christendom to consider very carefully every step we take lest we be embroiled in the general conflagration.

I can only say that, as the result of holding ourselves out as a militaristic power—even if only in a minor way— we are merely putting down the drawbridge, opening the doors and inviting the belligerents from every part of the world to settle their quarrels, not in our backyard, but in our front garden. We need only read what is happening from day to day in the strategy of the world, when all the belligerents are looking for someone else's soil to fight upon, to realise that the only way in which we can keep ourselves from invasion is by showing that we are in reality men of peace. Instead of that, we have this increased expenditure, and the possibility of invasion is given as the excuse. We should create the opposite attitude in the world; we should endeavour to show the neutrals and the belligerents that we are neutral indeed. In my sincere submission the only way that we can do that is by continuing the policy of the Department of Defence as it existed in peace time, by limiting the amount of our supplies to that Department as they existed in peace time. If we did that, we would be going a fair way to show the world that this would not be the proper place in which to carry on the war.

I should like it to be understood clearly that I am not hostile in any way to the Department of Defence or to our National Army. I appreciate and realise the seriousness of the situation in Europe at the present time, when countries are disappearing evernight; but it is a very serious thing indeed to suggest that the situation which has arisen in Europe makes it necessary for us to order one extra rifle or one extra machine gun, or additional equipment of that kind.

Mr. McGilligan

This is a rather enormous Vote—the biggest, I think, that Deputies will have to consider during the year, and I wish to ask a few questions regarding some items. I understand a ruling has been given here that, notwithstanding the matter carried under sub-head AA., any discussion of the administration of the Offences Against the State Act is out of order. If that is the case, I should like the Minister to tell us what he wants £15,000 for, under that heading. I have no wish to discuss the matter which I understand Deputy Norton wished to discuss, and I think it would be unwise to discuss it in this House, but it is going to add fuel to the fires of propaganda which people are trying to light outside if this House presents the appearance of being unwilling to have a matter of that kind brought up for public discussion. This House as an institution will fail in the eyes of the people if it is believed that the Government and the Deputies are not capable of standing up to a discussion on that matter.

Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures (Mr. Aiken)

If the matter is out of order now, surely it could be dealt with by way of a motion of some description.

Mr. McGilligan

I do not see why it is out of order, but it has been so ruled. I say that if the ruling of this House means that this institution on a critical occasion cannot discuss a matter such as that of the £15,000 required for the administration of that particular Act then the House is reduced to futility.

Mr. Aiken

All I say is that if a matter that is of general interest to a number of Deputies is out of order on a particular debate there is a way of raising it by motion.

Mr. McGilligan

The ordinary way in which matters are raised here is on an Estimate, particularly when the matter that I understand Deputy Norton wanted to raise, to my mind, falls clearly inside the scope of the administration of this Act. I know what is going to be said outside—that this House is afraid to carry out its obligations and that in this House there is an attempt to baulk discussion. It is a matter which, if it were allowed to be discussed, I would not discuss. I have already said more about it than I would say if it were free for discussion. If we are a parliamentary institution, and if this country is still ruled by reason, and if debate and argument are not to be allowed to all Deputies to raise a matter that is concerned with administration, I think we have had a very bad day.

We are asked here to pass a Vote of £3,355,000 odd for the upkeep of an army and to provide for certain stores for that army in the coming year. I would like to get that into another context. When we pass this Vote a certain number of Votes will have been taken by this House and we will have voted something like £10,000,000 worth of money. About one-third of the whole bulk Estimates will have been voted when we pass this £3,355,000. If we contrast the particular sum in question with what was on the 1931-32 Estimates for the particular group of Votes, the Estimates are up by £3,500,000. We have been told when we began to criticise the extra expenditure that the people of this country had to face, that there are social services. In that sum of money, roughly one-third of the Estimates, which show an increase over 1931-32 of £3,500,000, I can find two big items classed as social services—the amount for widows' and orphans' pensions and the sums of money included in the Local Government Vote by way of free milk and feeding for children, which come to about £1,000,000. Taking those out, we have an increase in the one-third of the total Votes which we will have reached to-day of £2,500,000. That is apart altogether from social services, and yet we are told there is no saving.

In this Vote we are asked to find this enormous sum of money. There is one item in regard to which the minds of the people have definitely been disturbed—an item on page 323—warlike stores. The sum this year is £123,000. That is contrasted, on page 323, with a sum of money alleged to have been voted for the purpose last year which is stated to have been a sum of £381,000. When I turn to the Estimates for last year it is not £381,000; it is £1,120,000. Something like £800,000 has somewhere disappeared. We know how that happened. The Ministry last year came in and asked for £1,120,000 for warlike stores which were represented as being urgently required. They got the people to vote the money and they taxed the people for these warlike stores which were supposed to be so urgently necessary. Then, in the autumn, they came in with a Supplementary Estimate for a Token Vote of £10, because the money required for warlike stores could not be spent. We could not get the warlike stores. Year after year that item —warlike stores—has appeared in every Estimate. Year after year some sums of money, different amounts, have been voted. Roughly, they were under £250,000. They ran about the £200,000 or £250,000 mark.

In the years of peace we have had from 1931-32—to take that period—up to the present I cannot conceive that there was £250,000 worth of warlike stores either used or rendered obsolete in any year. What happened to these sums of money that year after year were voted for warlike stores? Was there any accumulation of material and, if so, what happened it? In any event, we appear to have faced the situation in the early part of last year like this, that whatever we had required year after year for the purpose of purchasing warlike stores and whatever stocks we had already in hand, we required £1,120,000 for extra purchases and we could not achieve those. Now we see—and we are told that the proper contrast is to compare the figure with last year—that a sum of £123,000 is put down this year. Where is the reality of this? Last night we were told that stores to an amount of £2,400,000 had been ordered. We had not been promised delivery by any specified date and any person would be a fool, under present circumstances, who could believe that delivery could be promised by any particular date. We have not been told anything with regard to the moneys. Have we paid out anything or are the moneys to be paid on foot of deliveries when the stores arrive? If so, what is the rate at which the best hopes will allege that these warlike stores will come into our possession? One is tempted to take the ordinary easy course of saying, "We may spend £400,000—another figure quoted by the Minister last night—this year, for warlike stores, which will arrive at our shores this year and therefore, at the end of six years, we will have spent the £2,400,000." If the war does not last that length any number of nations will be ready to pass over to us all the obsolete and no longer required ammunition they have accumulated. Does anybody believe that this country is going to expend over a period of about six years this sum of money and, if that is not the situation, does anybody believe that this country is going to get ammunition to the amount of the sum of money named last night by the Minister, that is, nearly £2,500,000? What is the situation with regard to these warlike stores? What have we in hand? What is the amount that there should be in hand from the old expenditure? What was wasted through use or deterioration in any particular year or over the eight years? What was the situation we had here with regard to warlike stores, say, at the end of 1938 or last year when we began to realise the fact that a war situation was about to come?

That is the big item on which public attention has been riveted. We have a situation at the moment in which grants for housing have been cut down and an attempt has been made to stabilise the salaries given to certain people. The Secretary to the Department of Finance addressed the civil servants the other day and told them as far as last year's figures are concerned that the Exchequer is short £2,000,000 on the year. Everybody knows that business is deteriorating. The numbers of unemployed are increasing. People are certainly coming back, but not for the reasons the Ministers used to state. In these circumstances, with everything being tightened, credit being restricted, development that was of some good being retarded, we are asked to expend these extra moneys. We are not told when it is expected that the goods will come home and, as Deputy Esmonde and Deputy O'Higgins have said here to-day, we are not told for what purpose these stores, even if they could be got, are required. The policy of the Government is summed up in a couple of phrases. At the moment they are engaged in a certain amount of apology, making the excuse that, as a result of the outbreak of war last autumn, a certain number of people had to be mobilised, and we are now told by the Minister that a certain number of these people have been discharged. We are told that there is a decrease of 29 officers and 6,793 of all other ranks—a demobilisation of, let us call it, 7,000 people; and the impression that was left by the Minister last night was that the partial demobilisation that had taken place up to that was to continue. Apparently, therefore, the situation is that we are now demobilising men who, apparently, were required last September, and who are now no longer required, and at the same time increasing expenditure on the supply of warlike stores of ammunition and so on for men who are no longer required. What do we want this vast accumulation of stores for, when we are demonilising men? If we wanted these men, what stores of ammunition, and so on, were to be at their disposal and, if the men were no longer required, what did we want the stores for? Was it just a pretence so that the people might assume that the Army would be properly run and properly used? If we are demobilising these men because they were useless and unnecessary, and because the expenditure on these people was useless and unnecessary—since they cannot very well go out to fight with their bare hands—and if there is to be nothing in the nature of belligerency here, why are we now increasing our efforts here to deal with other countries that are now making and producing the munitions of war and selling them at famine prices? These are the conditions to which we have been brought by seven or eight years of Fianna Fáil watchfulness over the interests of our country.

In addition to that particular matter, which has already been laid before the House, we have this, which is the most important matter of all. What are we preparing against? Is there any speculation as to who the possible or probable enemy of this country may be? If we are faced with the possibility or probability of attack—and, in any case, that is what we were told this money was so sorely needed for— have we made any contacts or associations with other people in regard to our defence? I remember being definitely incredulous as to whether the statements made by the Minister for Finance on the Emergency Budget last autumn were correct, and being shocked also. The Minister for Finance told us then, in set terms, that certain sacrifices were being asked for, because there was a terrorist gang in existence, because that particular terrorist gang had to be put down, because that particular terrorist gang had attempted to embroil us in war with our neighbour, Great Britain, and that, as a result of the activities of that terrorist gang, two things were in jeopardy, namely, the neutrality of this country and its independence. The Minister for Finance, in the speech that he made on the 9th November last —it is in the Official Reports—mentioned the fact that within our own terrorities we had certain subversive elements and organisations which have not hesitated to make attacks upon the lives and properties of the citizens and which had developed a technique of terrorism which presented a most difficult problem to the forces of the law, and he went on to say that the efforts of those people might mean embroiling us in war with a country with which, apparently, we did not wish to be at war, and that, therefore, a certain partial mobilisation had to take place in order to protect ourselves against these people.

I remember another occasion on which we were told that we need not have any great anxiety about the future European war because, if any attack upon us by anybody were foreshadowed it would only be regarded as an attack on Great Britain, in which case Great Britain would be more anxious to defend herself than we ourselves, possibly, would be to defend our own country. I should like to know if that is the prevailing mood at the moment. Have we made any arrangements for the meeting of such a danger? If this country had any realisation that it was in any danger of attack, then, obviously, the money to be spent on an army certainly should have been stated to us some months ago—perhaps, with a certain amount of timidity, but at any rate it would be the best policy to pursue. If it had been put before the people in that way, and if the people were told definitely that there was a danger of attack, then the money would be voted, if not with enthusiasm, at least willingly. That would be so if the people could be brought to see what danger there is—whether a remote possibility of danger or a probable danger—and from what quarter the attack is likely to come. Without that assurance, there is not going to be any enthusiasm or any national endeavour for anything that is being kept in the dark, as this matter is, or for anything that is shrouded under the cloak of secrecy.

We have statements from various Ministers as to the quarter from which this danger of attack on our country may be feared—probably, as varied as the places from which they speak—but in the end they all fall back on the one thing, and that is this matter of neutrality. Neutrality is spoken of in this House and outside this House as if it were some sort of a closed compartment in which people could hide, and as if people, having opted for a policy of neutrality, could have the assurance that that neutrality would be respected by everybody else. We all see what is happening in the world generally at the moment, but, apart from that, it should be realised that neutrality is actually nothing in the way of a policy. It means nothing more than this: that if people realise their right to fight for their own independence, and if certain countries are forbidden by law to interfere in a quarrel, then, if they are hoping to stand out of a conflict, they have got to stand well out of it. I can quite understand that this country has opted not to fight. I can agree with that, but to hold neutrality out as a policy behind which we might crouch is only deluding the people, to my mind. What else have we? For some reason or another this country, last autumn, thought fit to mobilise some 6,000 or 7,000 men in order, presumably, to preserve our neutrality. At the present moment, for some reason or another, some 6,000 of these people have been demobilised, but at the same time that the man-power of the country is being decreased, the munitions and stores requisite for that man-power are being increased. We were told that our chances of getting these stores and ammunition were very remote, and that we should therefore avail of whatever opportunity presented itself. That may be so, but still we are faced with this thing: that we are now demobilising 6,000 or 7,000 people since last autumn and at the same time increasing the amount of stores and ammunition for the Army. That is the sacrifice that we are asked to make, in view of the European war, and it is a sacrifice that is not lightly to be borne.

There is just one last item. This Vote contains a new sub-head, P (2)— Marine Coast Watching Service—and the details of that sub-head show that we are to have patrol vessels and torpedo boats, and certain establishments for these, together with extra sums for allowances, clothing and provisions. On vessels, we have a capital sum, represented as £172,000. The country is aware that one of these vessels came home, but the country is under some mystification as to exactly how it came home. I am here as a Deputy of the Dáil, and all I know about that particular boat which did come home is what I saw in the newspapers. The information I have from the newspapers is that, on one occasion, I saw a picture of that boat being blessed in England and our High Commissioner in England hoisting the flag on it. I thought that meant that the boat was ready to sail, and I awaited its arrival in this country immediately. Many weeks passed before it came here, and one would have thought that the boat, which was really the foundation of the Irish Navy, would have come here, but the next thing that an astonished public found was that there was a public reception for the boat at Waterford. The Mayor of Waterford had ready a number of leather jerkins to present to the crew of the boat, and, since then, although it took some little time to get to Dun Laoghaire, it is possible to observe this boat lying at anchor there.

Would the Minister tell us what happened that boat? Was she ready when the ceremony which was depicted in the newspapers of the hoisting of the flag and the christening took place, and, if so, what caused the delay in getting her here, and why was it that boat put into Waterford instead of coming straight to Dun Laoghaire? When the Minister is on that, will he tell us the exact fact with regard to what was described in the newspapers as an attack on the boat while she lay in Dun Laoghaire? There are various stories told about it. One is that some sort of party from shore tried to get on board, and another is that it was a party of an entirely different type. Most people are disinclined to believe the second story. It was put out too lightly and too casually, and it is regarded merely as an excuse, but, arising out of whatever incident, a certain number of people were put to the discomfort and embarrassment of having their cars stopped and searches made in the region of Dun Laoghaire. Would the Minister tell us what happened on that occasion, and will he also tell us if this £172,000 which is being asked for in this year is the expenditure upon one boat? I notice that the heading is in the plural: "Vessels—capital, £172,000." Have we reached the end of the expenditure upon these craft, and, if not, what is ahead of us? Would the Minister tell us, again with regard to this particular side of his establishment, if there have been any orders placed forward for further craft, and, if so, to what extent, and when does he expect delivery?

Mr. Hughes

We are asked to vote the enormous sum of £3,355,420 on this Estimate, which gives the House an opportunity of reviewing the activity of the Minister's Department and the usefulness of the Army in the service of this country. We on this side are vigorously opposed to this expenditure because we believe that the bulk of the Vote is sheer waste of public money. That there is no justification for it is beyond question, and the Minister has not made the slightest effort to justify such an unwarranted charge. I am no authority on Army policy or defence matters, and I do not propose to dictate policy, but, as a member of this House, I am entitled to question how the taxpayers' money is being spent. Recognising the fact that we are a sovereign and autonomous State, I appreciate the necessity for maintaining our Army to preserve our status and our integrity as a nation and to preserve internal order, but, in my opinion, our national integrity is in far greater danger from economic and financial stringency within than from invasion from without. We are suffering from a grossly excessive and unjustifiable taxation for the financing of Government services, and this Vote is an outstanding example of it. This relatively poor country is groaning under cruel burdens of unnecessary taxation, and the worst feature of the situation is that we are getting very bad value for our money.

The Minister, when introducing this Estimate, gave us details of the strength of the regular Army and the Volunteers at present, the strength a few months ago, the numbers of men demobilised and the proposed strength of the Army for the coming year. He mentioned torpedo boats, patrol boats, coast watching services, postal censorship and A.R.P., but he made no reference whatever to Army policy. He made no attempt to justify this expenditure or to deal with the considerations which have determined Army policy and, consequently, the justification for this huge sum of money. What is the position, and what has happened? In an atmosphere of panic last September we had a huge mobilisation, and every available man in the regular Army, the reserve and the Volunteers was called up, many of them being called from the harvest field, where their services were urgently required. We had tremendous Army activity all over the country, indicating the high state of panic existing—going down to a motor factory in Cork and commandeering every available motor vehicle there. We had a huge number of motor lorries on the Curragh standing, if one might use the term, to attention, and being started up every hour, as if war was imminent and as if the enemy was at our very throats. We had young fellows, learners, driving lorries all over the country, with the result that people on the public highways, particularly in County Kildare, were in imminent danger of being killed.

We were told by the Minister for Supplies that sufficient supplies would be available and were warned against hoarding. The greatest offender in the way of hoarding was the Government. The Army hoarded huge quantities of coal on the Curragh in a most disgraceful manner. Sufficient accommodation was not available in the ordinary sheds, and a huge amount of coal was dumped in green fields some time last November. In the ordinary way that coal would be delivered from the rail head, but in this instance it was packed into hired lorries and the coal was then dumped in fields. Naturally, at such a time of the year, when the lorries went in on the soft grass, they sank in it, and the drivers simply let down the side boards and shovelled the coal under the wheels. In other words, the lorries actually made a road of coal into the coal dump. That is what actually happened at the Curragh, although the public were warned against hoarding. As the coal was out during the winter, and exposed to the weather, anyone with any experience knows that it could only become a heap of slack and dirt. That is how the business is done. It is just an example of how the Army stores are handled.

We were told that huge orders were placed abroad for warlike stores, but that they have not arrived. Huge sums of money were also expended on the black-out and in protection for the civil population. Then when the atmosphere became calmer a decision was reached to reduce the personnel of the Army. We were told that over 6,000 men were to be demobilised. The present strength of the Army is about 14,000. The Minister said it was the intention to reduce it during the coming year to 12,000 officers and men, and that there was likely to be a further reduction to what was considered a safe margin. We want to know if there is any Army policy, or if the Minister and his Department know where they stand in that respect. We have not been told the Minister's intentions. What does he anticipate may happen? If he anticipate danger, where is it likely to come from? Has any attempt been made to associate other friendly Powers with the defence of this country if it is in danger? Even at the present time, is the position being examined?

If German aggression continues, when will our turn come? If the German Army invades Holland and Belgium, is it possible that our turn might come next? In that event, is anything being done to protect this country against the possibility of an invasion? No assurance was given by the Minister to indicate that any measures have been taken to protect this country, even in the limited way that we could protect it. It has been pointed out from these benches that a standing Army of 14,000 or of 20,000 men would be utterly useless in the face of a modern army of a major Power attempting to land here. The best proof of that is to remember what happened recently in Denmark. Denmark had a standing army of about the same strength as our Army, but scarcely a shot was fired when that country was invaded. We may take it, more or less, that if we were unfortunate enough to be similarly circumstanced the situation would be the same. We are not in a position to defend ourselves at the present time as we have no warlike stores. We have an Army practically with bare hands or at best a few rifles. What good would they be in face of a modern army? It was pointed out previously from this side of the House that if money was to be spent to protect the country, we should develop an air arm, as money spent on aircraft would be usefully spent, as well as on anti-aircraft guns along the coast.

I noticed a report in the Press recently which stated that a threat was made against this country if we continued to supply foodstuffs to Great Britain, and that certain measures might be taken to prevent us doing so. That might mean a visitation from bombers. In that event, is it not obvious that the aircraft wanted here are a few fighters to meet any bombers that may come across? They might be useful in such an eventuality. It appears to me that no attempt whatever has been made to study that problem and to spend the taxpayers' hardearned money to any useful purpose. It is simply squandermania all the time. Under sub-head P (2) £319,000 is to be spent as against £118,000 last year on marine and coast-watching services, or an increase of £200,000. The House has not been given any information about the purpose of such costly services. Are they intended to protect fishing? What are these boats going to do if we are attacked? Under sub-head P (1) £116,000 is to be provided for the protection of the civil population against air and gas attacks, as against £94,000 last year. How is that money being spent? Is there any danger of an air attack here? What is the strength of our air offences? How many anti-aircraft guns and how many fighter machines have we?

There is a sum of £121,000 down for warlike stores, Last year, the sum was £375,000 and there was a Supplementary Vote of about £1,000,000, making a huge sum for warlike stores which have not arrived yet. Are we going to wait until the war is over and then take delivery of these stores? It appears to me that there is no intelligence whatever behind this demand, that it is sheer waste of public money at a time when the unfortunate people can ill-afford it. What is the usefulness of this Army? Is it merely an ornament? Would the Minister, in replying, give us some idea of the source from which danger might be expected, the measures being taken in the event of that danger becoming imminent, and state if any representations have been made to any friendly country to come to our assistance or if we are simply sheltering behind our neutrality? Our neutrality at present is everything. Does the present position simply mean that we know that, if the Germans attempt an invasion, the British will be interested and that we can rely on the British Navy to defend this country, not because they have any interest in us but to prevent their enemy using this country as a jumping-off ground? It is an extraordinary state of affairs that, on a very important Vote, involving a huge sum, the responsible Minister should come in and simply give us a few figures as to the strength of the Army, making no reference to Army policy or to our position at the moment. For these reasons, I support the motion by Deputy O'Higgins to refer the Estimate back. Under no circumstances would a Vote of this magnitude be justifiable. If we are going to spend money at all, let it be spent in producing something we can sell. The country is crying out for credit. Credit is limited and money is difficult to get. In these circumstances, the spending of a huge sum of money on the Army is, to my mind, a disgrace.

Mr. Brodrick

I am rather disappointed that, in the year 1940, we still have no Army policy. It is high time that we had a policy. Our Army has been established for, at least, 17 years, and we should know what the policy of the Army is. What is the policy of the Minister and of the Government in this regard? Members of the Army are, like the rest of us, human, and unless they know the policy of the Minister or the Government I do not think you can expect really good soldiers. Since 1923 we had a good little Army. It was small in numbers but big in other respects, and it was loyal to any Government charged with responsibility by the people. In order to maintain that loyalty it is but fair to the Army that they should know the policy of the Government, that it is not a shifting policy from one day to another, that it is not a policy that changes with every Minister. If the Army knew that, I believe the defence of this country could be effected at much lesser cost. Throughout the country I find that the members of the Army are somewhat disgruntled—I do not mean a large number of them. They are not the same men we knew some years ago. They are one day trying to satisfy one Minister for Defence and another day trying to satisfy another Minister. That is not right in respect of an Army. So far as I can see, that is the position, and it is being intensified every day. The men are getting more disgruntled.

I think there should be greater co-operation between the Volunteer Force and the other section of the Army. The co-operation that I should like to see is not present. It is no harm to mention that in this House. This is really the place to mention it, and it is the Minister's job to see that there is greater co-operation between the two forces. These forces are paid to protect this country and, unless there is co-operation between them, where are the people? I should like the Minister to see that, in future, there is greater co-operation between these forces. It is all right for the Minister to say that the increase in the Army Estimate is due to the war. What effort has he made, or what effort have his officers made, to preserve or protect this country as a result of the increase in expenditure from £1,250,000 to practically £3,250,000? The country wants some reply to that question. The people would be pleased to pay for defence or protection if they knew they were going to get it, but, so far as I know, the people in the west are doubtful as to the protection they are to get.

One thing which is exciting the minds of the people has been mentioned by a few other Deputies. I refer to the increase under sub-head AA—Expenses in connection with the Offences Against the State Act—from £4,000 to £15,000. That is an indication by the Government that these crimes, or whatever you call the activities of a particular organisation, are going to increase three-fold in the next 12 months. I should like the Minister to make clear whether or not he has that organisation in hand or whether the country is to expect in the next 12 months three-fold activity by whatever organisation he has in mind. If that be so, it does not bode well for the country.

Going back on the subheads, I find that there is an increase of £22,301 in the cost of protecting the civil population against air and gas attack. Outside of Dublin, what education or training have the people got in regard to protection against air and gas attacks? So far as I can see, they have got none outside of the City of Dublin. What is the idea of such a sub-head, which shows an increase of £22,301? The estimate for this year is £116,855 and the amount for last year was £94,554, yet the people throughout the country generally are getting no benefit from that expenditure.

What would happen throughout the country—outside Dublin City—if there were a gas attack? Has any provision been made for the proper protection of the people? So far as I know, no provision has been made for the protection of the people in the country. If such an attack were made, the people would be completely helpless, although you are estimating for an expenditure of £116,855 for the protection of the civil population. The people in the country require some explanation and they are entitled to get it. We hope that Ireland will long be spared from such attacks, that we will get along in the future as we have in the past few months and that we will be kept out of this war. At the same time we are paying heavily for certain measures of protection and the people are entitled to know, if such an attack is made, what they are going to do.

We are making great preparations as regards the number of men we are recruiting and we are supposed to be accumulating stores. As regards warlike stores, a rather strange thing seems to have occurred. If we are preparing to defend this country, it seems rather peculiar that under sub-head Q —Engineer Stores—we are estimating for an expenditure of £18,655 less than last year. In 1939-40, the estimate amounted to £25,650 and in the current year it has gone down to £6,985. Does that indicate that we are going ahead? There is an increase of £10,000 for the co-ordination of defensive measures and you are reducing a most important department to the extent of over £18,000. If anything were to happen in this country, the most important department would be that dealing with engineer stores and yet you are reducing expenditure there. You are increasing your general estimate by over £2,000,000 and that increase is spread over practically every arm of defence except this particular one, the engineer stores department, which I believe is a most important one.

I do not think the Minister is really serious when he allows an estimate like that to be put in. Why should there be a reduction in the engineer stores? When you are increasing the expenditure in your Army you have certainly to increase the expenditure in the engineer stores department proportionately. Instead of that you are reducing the expenditure by about one-third.

The House is also entitled to know how the expenditure is distributed in the Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. The salaries, wages and other allowances have increased from £7,000 last year to £15,000 for the current year, showing an increase of something over £8,000. The House is entitled to some information about that. Why is it necessary to have two Ministers to look after the defence of this little country with such a small Army? I must say that from my knowledge of the two Ministers, I do not think that this country is at all safe. You have two men organising an Army, and they have not a weapon nor an ounce of ammunition to put into a soldier's hands. We have two men who are drawing £1,700 each of the taxpayers' money——

Mr. Traynor

The Deputy is not serious in that statement.

Mr. Brodrick

Do not get vexed. I am quite serious. Has it not been mentioned time and again this evening, on the subject of warlike stories, that you are not able to get arms or ammunition, that you made no preparation sufficient to meet the situation? Ever since 1931, the Army Estimate has been increasing each year, even when there was not a war on. The Army Estimate increased from something over £1,000,000 in 1932 to £1,700,000 in 1937. There is certainly a terrible lot of waste in the Army at the present time, and the Ministers responsible to this House are the two Ministers opposite. The Army was not in a panic, but certainly the members of the Government were in a panic last September. Men were mobilised and called to the barracks and they had not a uniform to wear. There were men at points along the railway lines for a week last September, and they did not know what they were there for. There were blackouts in every little village in the country, and you had the Civic Guards holding up cars and making motorists shade their lights. What was all that panic for?

The Government are just the same to-day as they were a few years ago; they are panicky. I advise them, no matter how long they keep in office, and I suppose it will not be very long, to keep cool. There is no purpose served by getting panicky now. Keep cool and get the Army on a right footing. Save and have no waste. You have a good standing Army. You had a good reserve force, but you were not satisfied with it; you had to bring in your own men in order to spy on the others, who were found to be good Irishmen and good soldiers. Now you have not such a good Army. I am doubtful whether you have the loyalty in the Army to-day that you had when you took over office ten years ago. The old loyalty would have continued if you had treated the men in a fair way. That Army was prepared to remain loyal to the country, to serve it, and not to have waste. If anything happens, the two men responsible will be the Minister for Defence and the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

Mr. Cosgrave

It is rather surprising that such little interest is taken in a Vote totalling such a very big sum as we have been asked for here for the Department of Defence. Last year when the Army Vote was under consideration we were honoured by the attendance of the Prime Minister and many other Ministers. It is left now to the substitute Minister for Defence, who was appointed only last September, to shoulder the entire responsibility. One would expect in a case of this sort, having regard to the case made this time 12 months and the changes that have taken place since, that at least the House would have the benefit of the opinions of some Ministers as to what the policy is with regard to this matter. There is scarcely a country in Europe at the present moment that is in a state of complacency. But with very few exceptions one thing distinguishes them all and that is their being aware of the fact that it is a time of crisis and emergency and they are seeking common ground in respect of the great big problems that are facing them. These problems were never more troublesome, complicated or dangerous for at least 25 years than they are to-day.

Now, here is a case where the Government has a comfortable majority in this House. It is a majority of the most easy going "yes-men" that any Government has in any part of the world. No matter how much the policy differs from any promises made either in ancient or modern times, the Party lines up as if it were a drilled, disciplined branch of the Prussian Army, with not a discordant voice amongst them. Surely with such loyalty the Minister should give them some excuse for following him into the Lobby on this Vote. We had a statement last night with respect to the personnel of the non-commissioned officers and men in the Army. That statement told us what sum of money was to be spent. I could not make out from the statement as reported in the press whether it was this year or last year and there was practically no other comment. Is not that a manifest failure on the part of the Government to endeavour to get public confidence in the country, when every other Government in Europe is endeavouring to inspire its people with confidence in the policy they have got and in the soundness of that policy, so as to enable them to stand in support of it?

We have had a change of policy here. Twelve months ago, that is, before the war, the Government's policy was to buy munitions. Very large sums were asked for and voted for that purpose. We were told by the Prime Minister that there was £1,000,000 to be spent on guns and aeroplanes. What has happened? There was never before such a quick change of policy practised in any Legislature or before any Assembly. No other Party but that disciplined Party opposite would stand for it and that is because there could not be collected in any other part of the world 77 or 78 "yes men" of that character. Their loyalty is to be admired even if we have contempt for all the other attributes which they have got. That is the one and only thing about them that can be admired. If that loyalty were to one thing we would be satisfied. If it were a policy of "yes" there would be something to commend it. The only loyalty I see is that they are going to hang together instead of hanging separately, but they will hang.

Mr. B. Brady

The Deputy has not got that loyalty in his Party.

Mr. Cosgrave

I would prefer to have brains and common sense than that sort of thing. I could not stand that sort of thing. The Scripture tells us that there is wisdom in a multitude of counsellors. But there is none over there. I would like to see it. I would like to see wisdom on those benches, because, after all, this is our country. We have a party of Irishmen here, and if Deputies on the opposite side could say the same they would be in a happier frame of mind. The Minister is bound to produce some sort of policy in this House. There is none on this Vote. Compared with the policy we had last year, there is a complete change. Last year we had not got the war situation in Europe. We have a war situation now in which the Minister could have the support of all sections in the country. There is no Party in this House that would not prefer agreement on a policy rather than the present position. The present position makes us a laughing stock, and it is pitiable. One almost regrets to be a member of this House, such as it is, in the circumstances with which we are faced.

Let us take one particular item and see where we are. Deputies opposite will at least have been supplied with the Book of Estimates, even if they have never looked at it. Let us look at page 319. Deputies will find at the top of the page there in the two columns 1939-40 and 1940-41, that there is involved in that sub-head £76,000 more this year than there was last year. That is to say, the pay of the officers and men this year comes to £622,000, as against £546,000 odd last year. Now let us look at the figures opposite those moneys in the same page, and it will be seen that there are 72 men less on the strength this year than last year. Now, with a personnel of 72 less than last year of officers, non-commissioned officers and men, there is set down an expenditure of £76,000 more. What public confidence can there be in these circumstances? Does it not require some explanation on the part of the Minister? That is a fairly big sum of money. We have not prospered so much during the past 12 months that we can afford to dispense with £76,000 additional without one word of expword of explanation. With a smaller personnel of 72 less people than in 1939-40, it is costing us £76,000 additional. Now I will go on to another item. The Minister, according to a report in the Press, told us last night that the ordinary stores cost £334,607, and the warlike stores £460,651. I have not been able to find those figures. Perhaps the Minister would give us some information as to where we could find them.

Dáil Éireann debate - Thursday, 18 Apr 1940