I understand that a period of three hours has been allotted for this discussion. At 7.30. therefore the question will be put.
Committee on Finance. - Raid on Magazine Fort—Motion for Select Committee.
I move:—
That the Dáil is of opinion that in order to allay public disquiet and anxiety a select committee consisting of seven Deputies to be appointed by the Committee of Selection and with power to send for persons, papers and documents should be established publicly to investigate and report to the Dáil on the following matters:—
(1) The causes of the failure to defend the Magazine Fort against the raid made thereon by armed persons on the 23rd December, 1939, and
(2) The extent, if any, to which these causes are attributable to defects in the general administration of the Defence Forces or any of its branches or in the general organisation, efficiency or discipline thereof.
This motion has been so long on the Order Paper that, I think, most of us have forgotten its terms, and some of us may have even forgotten what it refers to. The motion refers to a raid which took place on the 23rd December last year, six long months ago, and during those six months by every trick and Parliamentary device, the Government has dodged and evaded a discussion of that particular event. It has refused to take Parliament into its confidence and apparently has refused to allow Parliament or a Committee of Parliament, to investigate the conditions in the Army which led up to that particular catastrophe. Moreover, having left Parliament under the impression that an Army inquiry was to be held for the information of Parliament, we had a secret inquiry and the evidence, the findings and results of that inquiry were withheld from Parliament. In other words, we have every attempt by political chiefs to wrest the Army from the control of Parliament and to revive, in an official way, what can well be described as the greatest curse within the country, namely a secret Army, secretly controlled, secretly administered, with arms in its hands and not answerable to any elected body. It is generally accepted in every democracy that the army, unlike other Government Departments, is more intimately the concern of Parliament than it is the concern of the Government. In ordinary democratic States, it is usual and normal when a major blunder or a major disaster occurs in any of its Departments other than the army for the Department concerned itself to investigate, always on the understanding that the results of the investigation are reported to Parliament. But in the case of the Army, unlike any other Department of State, precedent, custom and commonsense direct that when a major blunder occurs or a major disaster takes place—the Army being the Army of the people and the instrument of the Parliament—a full, searching and public inquiry be carried out, not by people within the Department, not by people wearing the uniform of that Army, but by all Parties of the Parliament of the country. There is more necessity to adhere to the decent code in this country, in view of its history and in view of present dangers in the country, than there would be in any other country in the world.
One of the principal reasons why such a procedure was asked for is stated in the first line of the motion—"to allay public anxiety and disquiet"—to restore confidence in the Army, the shattered confidence of the people. Nothing could be better calculated to undermine public confidence than the despicable secrecy and shirking of Parliamentary investigation which has characterised the two Ministers during the last six months. This was something which no Minister attempted to minimise, which in varying tones each and every Minister agreed was a disgraceful catastrophe, a major disaster, a shocking occurrence, which took place six months ago. The shock it gave to the Minister was nothing to the reeling, staggering shock which it gave to the ordinary member of the public. Every citizen asked what was the cause, what it was about, why it took place, what was going to occur next; and everybody wanted assurances that, whatever rottenness there may be within the machine to make such an event possible, there would be a full, searching and impartial investigation—not by those who might be associated closely with it, not by those who rightfully might be blamed for the occurrence, but by a committee appointed by the whole of Parliament, working through the ordinary machinery of Parliament, and reporting back to Parliament.
The mere suggestion, the mere hint, that such procedure might be followed had, at least, the effect of temporarily restoring confidence. The belief and the impression created in the public mind and in the minds of Deputies, that the Army inquiry was merely a preliminary and that at all events the evidence and the findings would be submitted to Parliament and to the people, temporarily restored confidence. Then we learned, after waiting and expecting, that the result was to be suppressed, that the evidence was to be suppressed, that the findings were to be suppressed, and that the causes, if any were ascertained, were to be kept a closely-guarded secret. Whatever sore, whatever wound, had been created in the confidence of the public on the 24th December was reopened in an aggravated form.
Then, to make matters worse, to further undermine confidence, we had the long procession of victimised individuals—all victims sacrificed on the altar of Ministerial security. Remember, there is nobody inside or outside this House, and no decent-minded man or woman, who does not regard those unfortunate officers as scapegoats— scapegoats to save the positions of one or two Ministers. There is nobody on this side of the House or any other side of the House who has not agreed that, if any officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier was responsible and if the responsibility were pinned on him for what happened on the 23rd December, to ask him for his resignation, to place him on half pay, or even to dismiss him without any other penalty, would be leniency to the extent of folly. The idea that, without fixing responsibility, without having any evidence, without bringing any charge, without going through any trial, unfortunate officers—conscientious, upright, hard working officers with wives and families depending on them—would be made walk the plank, their careers blasted, their source of income removed, not because of any fault, not because of any connection with the disaster that the Minister or anybody else dare give a name to, but merely because action had to be taken against somebody, and if it were not taken lower down it might be taken higher up, is not a course of events calculated to give anybody confidence in the Army or in the administration of the Army.
There is a major disaster, a secret inquiry, a suppression of the evidence before that inquiry, a victimisation and a penalisation of individuals without any charge or without anybody having the courage to make a charge. Then we rely merely on the power of censorship to make people presume—like the Deputy who spoke last week from the Government Benches—that suitable action had been taken against those responsible for the disaster. The Deputy who spoke was a lawyer. I have rarely met a lawyer who had not a high sense of justice, a kind of inherent sense of justice. I feel that that Deputy had that sense just as much as any other lawyer, and that he made use of that particular statement in the belief that the responsibility had been pinned on these men. Certainly, he would have cut out his tongue rather than make use of such phrases, if he thoroughly understood that no charge ever had been made, that no opportunity ever had been given to them to put up any defence, and that they had been "turfed" out of their appointments merely because somebody had to go in order to save somebody else.
What is the normal procedure all over the world when an event of that magnitude occurs? There is no Minister of Parliament who would ask in a case like that for somebody underneath him to send in his resignation. Events of this kind occur, periodically, in different countries. If the blame can be clearly assessed, then the individual who is blameworthy suffers the penalty. If the blame cannot be clearly assessed, then the man who is in charge of the administration of the particular branch concerned says: "Then I must take the blame." He says, in effect: "Since there is no one underneath me on whom I can fix the blame anywhere, therefore I must take the blame myself." In that way, it is the man on top who resigns and, as far as possible, the men concerned with him tender their resignations also.
Here we have a departure. Here we have the case of men—whose political injection into the Army may well have been the cause of the whole disaster—not finding people beneath them guilty, but removing people beneath them, who may or may not have been guilty, in order to create the impression that they were guilty. Let us assume, for a moment, that there is a secret inquiry—a secret military inquiry—and that it finds certain officers guilty, or that even the evidence pointed in the direction of certain officers being guilty. Will the Minister deny, if even evidence was pointing in that direction, that a certain military law and military regulation laid it down that that individual should be sent for immediately, told of the charge against him, given an opportunity to be present throughout the inquiry, and given an opportunity to be represented at that inquiry, if he so desired? Is it not the case here that no information was given to the individual concerned that the evidence was pointing in his direction, that no opportunity was given to him to be there, and that, even the officers who were to be removed from the Army, temporarily or otherwise, were not informed as to whether or not there was sufficient evidence to be formulated against any one of them? If there was, I suggest that the Minister is following up one blunder by another. If there was evidence against anybody, no matter how exalted that person might be, the Minister would be failing in his trust if the charge against these officers was not followed up and fully investigated. The officers concerned should be proved guilty of the alleged offence or otherwise.
Here, however, we have a number of officers, with their livelihoods gone, their good names tarnished, and with no evidence against them, and along with that we have a whole queue of humble, private soldiers, put through a definite charge, I admit, but in every case, except one, found not guilty. We have put down a motion here for Deputies from all Parties to join together and, in accordance with the procedure laid down by this House by statute, to set up a committee of inquiry of this House to report back to Parliament. That has been delayed for six months. Even the discussion of it has been delayed for that time. Is not anybody entitled to ask, in such circumstances, what is the skeleton in the cupboard, or what cupboard is the skeleton in, or what is the Government either ashamed or afraid to disclose? If everything is all right, and if nothing is to be hidden from Parliament, why then should there be any objection to the setting up of the inquiry that is suggested here? If you think that there is no necessity for such an inquiry, and if you have already found out where the fault is, then why keep it secret, and why should we be left in the position of having to take action against men—innocent men and men against whom you are afraid or ashamed to bring any charge? Is it not right that these men should be given an opportunity of defending themselves?
I suppose there are occurrences in every State that bring discredit on the State and that bring Departments of State under the contempt of decent people and people with a sense of fair play and with a desire for decency. In that connection, I suggest that the behaviour of the two Ministers concerned here, for the last six months, has been despicable. Their treatment of the unfortunates under them has been contemptible. The position that we are in at the moment, with regard to decent, conscientious, hard-working officers—family men—who have given several years' loyal and faithful service to this Parliament under two Governments, is that they are being "turfed" out of the Army, disgraced and discredited, although no charge has been made against them, but with the impression left in everybody's mind that they must have been, in some way, culpable for what has happened. I say that that is a violation of ordinary decent procedure, and also a violation of what is due to a decent uniform. I suggest, however, that the harm was done outside the Army. The events, since January last, did incalculable harm. You have the case of men, with a devotion to duty and faith and loyalty to their duty, who would expect to be tried according to military law and regulation, if any charge were to be brought against them, being deprived of their livelihoods without any charge being brought or any opportunity being given to them to defend themselves.
In this motion, we are asking the Oireachtas to appoint a committee to inquire into this whole business with a view to removing the cause of the trouble. It was in order to do that that the motion was originally tabled. It is moved now for that purpose but also for the purpose of seeing that justice is done to decent, honourable, able, loyal and efficient officers who have been since discredited and victimised without cause.
I formally second the motion.
With your permission, A Chinn Comhairle, I should like to intervene here. I promised to make a statement about the raid and would like to do so at this stage.
The items of Government property which were taken by the raiders were as follows:—.303 machine gun ammunition, 472,111 rounds; Thompson gun ammunition, 612,300 rounds; .45 revolver ammunition, 12 rounds; total small arms ammunition, 1,084,423 rounds; four Lee Enfield rifles, three rifle slings, three bayonets, three oil bottles, four scabbards, three pull-throughs, seven rifle magazines, one revolver, Webley pattern; and one gas mask.
The circumstances of the raid were investigated by a military Court of Inquiry but before summarising the evidence taken by the court, I think it well to give some preliminary facts.
The Magazine Fort is a military post within the Eastern Command area. On the 23rd December, 1939, it was in the charge of an officer of the Ordnance Service who had held the appointment of officer in charge of the Fort since 1924. The officer resided in married quarters within the Fort. His duties as officer in charge, apart from the defence of the Fort, to which I shall presently refer, consisted in the receipt, storage, inspection and issue of ammunition and explosives. To assist him in these duties he had a staff of two non-commissioned officers and four privates.
As in the case of all other posts within the Eastern Command area the general responsibility for the defence of the Magazine Fort devolves upon the officer commanding the Eastern Command. In February, 1939, that officer made the officer in charge of the Fort immediately responsible to him for the defence of the Fort. Actually, the immediate responsibility had, except for a short period in 1929 and 1930, been vested in the officer in charge of the Fort since 1924, but until February, 1939, his responsibility was directly to the officer commanding, Islandbridge Barracks.
The entrance to the Fort consists of an outer iron barred gate and an inner wooden gate with a wicket and grille. In the day-time the inner gate is kept open and the outer gate locked. After nightfall, both gates are locked. In the courtyard immediately inside and directly facing the inner gate is a sentry post known as No. 1 post. To the right of the entrance and adjoining the inner gate is a room occupied by the military policeman on duty. The bell push on the outer gate is connected to a bell in this room. To the right of the policeman's room, from which it is separated by a dividing wall, is the guardroom. Approximately 30 yards distant is a block of buildings which includes the room occupied by the fire picquet.
The circumstances connected with the raid as elicited by the Court of Inquiry from the sworn evidence of the various witnesses were as follows:—
The personnel at the disposal of the officer in charge of the Fort on the night of the 23rd December, 1939, for the defence of the Fort was: A guard consisting of one non-commissioned officer and six men armed with rifles and one Lewis gun; a fire picquet consisting of one non-commissioned officer and four men armed with rifles; a military policeman armed with a revolver.
The Fort is not garrisoned and the guard is provided by one of the infantry units of the command area. The guard on the 23rd December, 1939, was supplied by the 7th (Dublin) Infantry Battalion, a reserve battalion which some time previously had replaced the regular battalion stationed at Portobello Barracks and had taken over its duties. The guard was made up of a Volunteer corporal, two Class. A reserve privates, and four Volunteer privates. In accordance with the usual practice, personnel of the battalion intended for guard duties on the 23rd December were warned for duty on the night of the 22nd, but were not assigned to their particular posts until the morning of the 23rd when, on parading, they were detailed to the various guards—the non-commissioned officers by the battalion sergeant major and the men by the orderly sergeants. The Magazine Fort guard, having been thus detailed, proceeded to the Fort by lorry. The guard was mounted at 9.45 a.m. and was due for relief at the same hour on the following day. There were two sentry posts at the Fort, so that two members of the guard were on sentry duty at a time, each period of duty being two hours. The guard commander and the four men not on sentry duty occupied the guardroom.
The fire picquet was supplied from Islandbridge Barracks. It was drawn from personnel serving at Islandbridge Barracks or on the permanent staff of the Fort and was made up of a Volunteer sergeant, two privates of the regular force and two Volunteer privates. The same picquet was detailed for duty for the period 22nd to 29th December and, on the 23rd December, reported for duty shortly after 1 p.m. The picquet occupied a room known as the fire picquet room.
The military policeman was detailed from the No. 2 Garrison Company, Military Police Service, Islandbridge Barracks. He had been on duty daily at the Fort from 4 p.m. to midnight since the 18th December, returning to Islandbridge Barracks each night on completion of duty. His period of duty was due to terminate at midnight on the 24th December. He had done duty at the Fort intermittently for seven years—on an average on week in every nine.
The following orders were issued by the officer in charge of the Fort in 1929 and were in force on the night of the raid:—(1) A scheme of defence for the Magazine Fort, (2) special order for guard commander, (3) general order for sentries, (4) orders for military police.
These orders are rather detailed and I think it will be sufficient for the present, at any rate, to mention the following provisions:—
After nightfall only the wicket of the inner gate should be opened for any purpose. Before opening the wicket, either to permit anybody to leave the Fort or to answer the bell at the outer gate, the military policeman should call the guard commander and they should proceed together to the inner gate. The policeman should, en route, switch on the lights which illuminate the area between the inner and outer gates and the passage way between the inner gate and front courtyard. After the policeman had opened and passed through the wicket (accompanied by persons leaving the Fort, if such were the case) the guard commander should bolt the wicket and should not reopen it until the policeman, having admitted visitors or allowed persons to leave, had relocked the outer gate and returned. The orders for military police provided that during the absence of the officer in charge of the Fort, nobody should be admitted to the Fort except visitors to the officer or his family, who were identified by a member of the family. There was a later instruction of 1934 from the adjutant, Islandbridge Barracks, to the officer in charge of the Fort that the latter, whenever leaving the Fort, should direct the military policeman not to admit any person in his absence. The orders entitled "orders for Military Police" were, however, not amended in the light of this instruction. Finally, the orders provided that the inner door of the guardroom should be kept locked at all times. The guardroom in question has an outer wire door with a bolt and an inner wooden door.
The sequence of events at the Magazine Fort on the night of the raid as described in the evidence taken by the court was as follows:—At about 8.15 p.m. the officer in charge of the Fort left the Fort and proceeded to the city. To let him out, the military policeman on duty, having switched on the lights, opened half the inner gate. He did not call the guard commander. Passing through and without locking the inner gate, he opened the outer gate. The policeman stated in evidence that this procedure, which was contrary to the orders already mentioned, was that always followed by him in letting the officer in charge of the Fort out, and that the officer did not at any time check him for it.
Was the officer present when that evidence was given?
He also stated that he usually opened the inner gate, instead of the wicket, for the officer in charge of the Fort and his family and for other officers because the wicket was small and the step high. The officer in charge of the Fort confirmed in his evidence that the general practice was as stated, and that he did not check the policeman because he regarded the procedure as an act of courtesy to him. He did not, when leaving, direct the military policeman not to admit any person in his absence.
Having locked the gates after the officer in charge of the Fort left, the military policeman returned to his room. Shortly afterwards, the bell of the outer gate rang. He went out, switched on the lights, and, on looking through the grille of the inner gate, saw that the person desiring admittance was the son of the officer in charge of the Fort. He went out through the wicket, leaving it open behind him and admitted the visitor, then locking the gates—first, the outer and then the wicket—and switching off the lights. He did not call the guard commander in this instance either.
At about 8.35 p.m. the bell of the outer gate again rang. Once more, without calling the guard commander, the policeman proceeded to the inner gate, switching on the lights en route. On looking through the grille, he saw a man dressed in civilian clothes, and with a bicycle, standing at the outer gate. He opened the wicket, according to his own statement, and went to the outer gate, leaving the wicket open. The civilian said that he had a parcel for the officer in charge of the Fort, and the policeman replied that he himself would take it in. As he said this, he bent down and unlocked the gate. His own evidence of the succeeding incidents is that, as he stood up, the civilian pointed a gun at his face and said: "Stick them up." He tried to push the gate shut, but failed. He refused to put his hands up, whereupon the civilian said that if he did not, his brains would be blown out. He then obeyed and marched through the wicket with the raider behind. He made no effort to draw his revolver nor did he shout, or give any sign to the sentry because, to quote himself: "I thought the sentry had appreciated the situation and would open fire." He was marched past the sentry and, at the same time, a man in uniform of Army pattern rushed by him. He was taken to the rear of the sentry post, where he was disarmed and then marched to the guardroom. He noticed that by this time a number of raiders had entered.
The No. 1 sentry's account of this episode differs somewhat from that of the policeman. He states that the policeman, when going out, almost fully opened the inner gate—not the wicket. The sentry saw him converse with the civilian, after which he opened the outer gate. The civilian entered and then dropping the parcel, pointed what appeared to be a revolver at the policeman. The latter shouted loudly, turned and ran towards the inner gate. The raider followed him, shouting "Halt". The sentry alleges that the policeman ran past his post, saying: "You don't leave there". Just then, according to the sentry, a civilian with a revolver came up on his right and ordered him to hand over his rifle. The rifle was at the time resting on the corrugated iron breastwork as the sentry had been "covering" the gate. He refused to hand over the rifle and states that he tried to step back a few paces so as to be able to point it at the raider. The latter closed with him, pointed the revolver at his throat and gave him a minute to hand over the rifle. He then obeyed, and was marched towards the house of the officer in charge. He saw the military policeman being marched from that direction. When the two parties met, the policeman and sentry were marched in single file to the guardroom by two of the raiders, including the one who appeared to be the leader.
The raiders entered the guardroom by opening the outer wire door. There was a hole in the wire which enabled anyone entering to insert his hand and pull back the bolt on the inside. The military policeman stated that they then pushed open the inner door, which was unlocked, rushed in, pushing their captives before them, and ordered the guard, who were sitting round the fire, to put their hands up. The guards' rifles and bayonets were in a rack near the door. The guard commander stated that he was sitting by the fire with three of the four members of the guard not on sentry duty when a knock came at the inner door. The fourth man had temporarily left the guardroom to attend to the cookhouse fire.
The guard commander said that, on hearing the knock, he opened the door, which he confirmed was unlocked. On seeing the two raiders, he attempted to slam the door, but it was immediately pushed open by the raiders who entered, shouting "Hands up". One of the guard unsuccessfully attempted to get his rifle, which, with those belonging to the others, was in the rack near the door. Otherwise, the raiders' order was immediately obeyed. The raiders took possession of the guards' rifles, ammunition and equipment. While these incidents were taking place, another party of the raiders had gone to the fire picquet room, held up the members of the fire picquet and taken possession of their rifles and ammunition. There was no attempt at resistance. The time was now about 8.55 p.m.
After the raiders in the guardroom had taken over and counted the rifles, the man who appeared to be the leader asked: "Where is the other rifle?" The guard commander replied that the sentry on No. 2 post had it. The leader left the room, returned after a short while and ordered the guard commander to come with him and find the sentry. The guard commander obeyed and went out with the leader and a second raider dressed in Army uniform. The latter accompanied the guard commander to No. 2 post, on approaching which they were challenged by the sentry. The raider ordered the guard commander to reply and to bring the sentry up. On hearing the reply "guard commander, it's all right", the sentry gave the order "Advance, guard commander, to be recognised". The guard commander said "Come on down, it's all right", whereupon the sentry advanced at the "on guard" position. When about three paces distant, the guard commander ordered "slope your rifle", and the sentry obeyed.
The raider in uniform then stepped forward and pointing a revolver at the sentry said: "Hand over your rifle or I'll shoot you". The sentry at first refused, but the guard commander advised him to give up his rifle, saying: "You might as well; I'm disarmed", or words to that effect. The sentry then handed over the rifle and the guard commander and he were marched back to the guardroom. In his evidence, the guard commander stated that he made no attempt to disarm the raider while they were alone because he was confused and shocked and it did not enter his mind to do so. Shortly afterwards, the entire guard with the military policeman and the son of the officer in charge of the Fort, who had also been brought to the guardroom, were marched to the fire picquet room.
The officer in charge of the Fort returned at about 9.45 p.m. He was held up at the entrance to the Fort by the raiders and brought to the fire picquet room. A few minutes later, a gatekeeper of the Park was also brought to the fire picquet room, suffering from head injuries inflicted by the raiders. The party in the picquet room was detained there until 10.20 p.m. approximately, and during the time of their detention, no attempt was made to organise resistance to the raiders either before or after the arrival of the officer in charge of the Fort. During the entire period for which they were in the picquet room, they heard the sounds of lorries moving into and out of the Fort.
At 10.20 p.m., the entire party, with the exception of the Park gatekeeper, were removed to "C" magazine from which the ammunition had been taken by the raiders. Before they left, the leader of the raiders advised the party not to identify any of them subsequently, stating there were amongst them, the military, men who would tell if anyone identified them. Shortly after 11 p.m. the officer in charge of the Fort made his way out through a ventilator with a member of the guard and proceeded to inspect the Fort. He found that the raiders had gone, and that a relief party of troops had arrived.
To explain the arrival of these troops, it is necessary to go back a little in point of time to events which were taking place elsewhere. At 10.10 p.m. approximately, as the military policeman on duty at the upper gate of Islandbridge Barracks was opening the gate to allow an Army car to leave, he was fired on by one of a party of four armed men standing outside. After the shot was fired, the party ran away. The military policeman closed the gate without letting the car out and went to the hut just inside, where he telephoned the orderly officer's room and reported the incident of the shooting to the orderly sergeant. While the telephone switchboard operator at the Barracks was putting this call through, he noticed the Magazine Fort indicator on the switchboard drop. On plugging in, he found that the line to the Fort was dead. It may be mentioned that there was no telephonic communication between the Fort and outside, other than the line connected with the switchboard at Islandbridge.
At 10.20 p.m. the orderly officer (a second lieutenant of the Reserve of Officers) was informed of the shooting and proceeded at once to the gate where he received a report from the policeman on duty. While at the gate, he also received a report from the telephone switchboard operator that telephonic communication with the Magazine Fort had failed. The orderly officer immediately telephoned the orderly officer, Command Headquarters, Portobello Barracks, to whom he reported the shooting incident and the absence of telephonic communication with the Fort. He was put through to the command duty officer, a captain of the regular forces, to whom he repeated his report. The duty officer at once ordered the "stand-to" party at Portobello, consisting of one officer, two non-commissioned officers and ten men, to proceed to the Magazine Fort to investigate and report. The party left barracks by lorry at 10.50 p.m., the officer being seated in the driver's cab and the remainder of the party in the body of the lorry. They entered the park by the main entrance and as they turned into the road leading to the Fort the officer noticed in the beam of the headlights four civilians in a crouching position on the side of the road and about 30 yards in front of the lorry.
Calling on his men to follow, he jumped out and ran towards the men shouting to them to halt. Two halted and two ran away. Handing over the two men who halted to his non-commissioned officers, the officer proceeded down the road and met two Volunteers who had been sent from Islandbridge Barracks to ascertain the position at the Fort. While speaking to them the officer noticed a man in civilian dress crouching near the railings. The man came back on being called upon to halt and on being searched was found to be in possession of two loaded revolvers and 17 rounds of ammunition. The officer brought the man back to the lorry, finding, en route, a soldier's haversack containing five fully loaded revolvers and 36 rounds of ammunition. He then proceeded to the Fort.
At the house of the officer in charge of the Fort he interviewed that officer's wife, who told him that the Fort had been raided and that she did not know where the guard was. Leaving a non-commissioned officer in charge, the officer proceeded to Islandbridge Barracks with his prisoners and escort. He placed his prisoners in the guardroom and then, at 11.45 p.m. approximately, reported by the telephone to the command duty officer, Portobello, the capture of the prisoners and the fact that the Fort had been raided. He was directed to return to the Fort and to post a new guard. Accompanied by three officers, and with some of his own men and a party of men from Islandbridge Barracks he went to the Fort, arriving there about midnight.
Having received the report of the officer in charge of the "stand-to" party, the command duty officer telephoned the orderly officer, McKee Barracks, informed him of the situation and requested that the Chief of Staff be informed. He sent a car for the command adjutant, who resided outside barracks. The car arrived at the house at midnight. At 1 a.m. he telephoned the acting officer commanding, Eastern Command, who resided at Howth. That officer directed that a car be sent out for him.
From this stage onwards it would be difficult to give clearly, in the form of a continuous narrative, the remaining events of the night and I propose, therefore, to deal separately with the movements of certain individuals and with certain other important incidents which occurred that night.
Shortly after 11.45 p.m. the Chief of Staff was informed by the orderly officer, McKee Barracks, that the Fort had been raided. He immediately left home for the Fort after first having arranged for the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General to be informed. He arrived at the Fort just before midnight and obtained reports from the officer in charge of the Fort and the officer in charge of the "stand-to" party. He ascertained that the police had been notified, but as they had not arrived and telephonic communication with outside was not available, he proceeded to the Gárda Depôt with the Quartermaster-General, who had also arrived at the Fort. At the depôt he spoke to the Gárda Commissioner by telephone and arrangements were made for all Gárda districts to be informed of the raid and to be directed to send out patrols to watch lorry movements. The Chief of Staff returned to the Fort at 12.30 a.m., gave instructions for the old guard and military policeman to be placed under arrest, had a discussion with the command adjutant who had arrived at the Fort at 1 a.m. went to his office at the Department of Defence where he wirelessed orders to all commands to take the greatest protective precautions for posts and ammunition and to assist the Gárdaí in the search for lorries. He telephoned all commands and brigades in elaboration of the radio messages and told them that the Gárdai, who were receiving separate instructions from their own headquarters would get in touch with them. At 1.30 a.m. he informed me of the raid by telephone and of the steps he was taking to deal with the situation. He remained in his office until 3.30 a.m. receiving reports from the commands and brigades as to the steps taken.
The command adjutant arrived at Portobello Barracks at 12.15 a.m. and was given details of the situation by the duty officer. He proceeded immediately to Islandbridge Barracks, where, however, no additional information was available, so he went to the Magazine Fort, arriving there at 12.40 a.m. The Chief of Staff, who was there, discussed the situation with him. He returned to Islandbridge at 1.30 a.m. and telephoned the command duty officer who informed him that the acting officer commanding desired to get into barracks and that a military car was not immediately available. He then proceeded to Howth in the Army car which he was using and there he met the officer commanding, and returned with him to Portobello Barracks. He went home at 4 a.m.
The acting officer commanding, Eastern Command, received a telephone message from the command duty officer at 1 a.m. He stated in evidence that the duty officer informed him that something had happened at the Magazine Fort and that they could not get into the Fort. He directed the duty officer to send out a car for him. He waited some time and as the car had not arrived went to Howth Gárda Station where he was informed by the Superintendent that a large quantity of ammunition had been taken from the Fort. He telephoned the duty officer, inquired why the car had not been sent and was informed that the command adjutant was on his way out. When the command adjutant arrived he received particulars of the situation from him. On reaching barracks at 3 a.m. he made transport arrangements for any troop movements that might be required and, according to his own evidence, having ascertained that the Gárda authorities had taken charge of the situation, he left for home, arriving there at 4 a.m.
The events in Collins Barracks, Dublin, on the night of the raid may now be related. On that night there were on duty in Collins Barracks the following officers:—A staff officer (a commandant of the regular forces) representing the officer commanding barracks; a duty officer (a captain of the regular forces); an orderly officer (a second-lieutenant of the Volunteer force). There was also a "stand-to" party consisting of two non-commissioned officers and 24 men.
One of the tasks of the duty officer is to visit at least once during the night the posts at which guards are provided by the unit in Collins Barracks. As these posts are scattered, it is necessary that the visit or visits be made by car. About 8.30 p.m., on the 23rd December, the duty officer telephoned to the supply and transport company at Islandbridge Barracks requesting that a car should be sent immediately to Collins Barracks to enable him to visit the posts. He was informed that the car intended for him was on other duty, but that it would he sent to Collins Barracks immediately it returned. Sometime later, the orderly sergeant at Collins Barracks again telephoned for the car and was informed that it had not returned up to that time. The car arrived at Islandbridge at 10 p.m. and left the transport yard for Collins Barracks at 10.10 p.m., the duty officer at Collins Barracks being informed by telephone at the same time that the car was on its way.
When, however, the car reached the gate of Islandbridge Barracks the shooting incident, previously mentioned, occurred. The car returned to the transport yard. Shortly after, a further telephone message was received at the supply and transport office, Islandbridge Barracks, from the duty officer at Collins Barracks inquiring why the car had not arrived. He was informed that something had happened at the gate and that the car could not leave for the moment. The duty officer thereupon telephoned to the orderly officer at Islandbridge and inquired as to the non-arrival of the car at Collins Barracks. It would appear that at this time two, if not the three, of the officers on duty in this barracks conversed with the orderly officer at Islandbridge, who informed them of the shooting incident and stated that the car had then left for Collins Barracks. This was about 10.30 or 10.40 p.m. The car duly arrived at Collins Barracks and, after questioning the driver as to the shooting incident, the duty officer proceeded on his round of inspection. Some ten minutes later, the orderly officer at Islandbridge again telephoned to Collins Barracks and asked for the orderly officer there. The latter was unable to understand the message and handed the telephone to the staff officer. He was informed that it was desirable that the adjutant of Islandbridge Barracks—who resides in official quarters in Collins Barracks— should report to his station immediately. The staff officer was, therefore, requested to send a message to the adjutant's quarters. After some conversation, the staff officer stated that the information regarding the shooting was too indefinite and suggested that further details should be obtained before the adjutant was sent for.
According to the evidence of the orderly officer at Islandbridge, he was informed by the staff officer that none of the officers in that barracks (Collins) was going to chase married officers for him. Shortly after, another officer in Islandbridge Barracks telephoned to the officers' mess in Collins Barracks. The call was taken by an officer who was not on duty. He was informed of the shooting, and was requested to send to married quarters for the adjutant of Islandbridge Barracks, which he did. The adjutant, however, was not at home. The officer who received the telephone call reported its substance to the orderly officer and the staff officer and was informed by the last mentioned that he, the officer who reported, was taking too serious a view of the incident and should forget about it.
About midnight the orderly officer at Islandbridge again telephoned to the orderly officer at Collins Barracks and stated that Verey lights had been seen over the Magazine Fort and requested that six men should be sent from Collins Barracks to investigate. The orderly officer at Collins Barracks, however, thought it wise to obtain the permission of the staff officer before sending the men. He (the orderly officer) reported the request to the staff officer, who was then in his bedroom, and was instructed to inquire from the orderly officer at Islandbridge if he had the authority of command headquarters to requisition the party. He did so and the orderly officer at Islandbridge informed him that he had no authority to requisition the party and that he was acting on his own initiative as he thought that the Fort had been attacked. On this being reported to the staff officer, he directed the orderly officer to inform the orderly officer at Islandbridge that the party would not be supplied. In passing, it may be mentioned that a similar request for men was made to the orderly officer at McKee Barracks and he at once complied with the request.
Meanwhile, shortly before midnight, the Quartermaster-General, who resides in Collins Barracks, was informed by telephone from the Chief of Staff's residence of the raid on the Magazine Fort. He immediately telephoned to the officers' mess in Collins Barracks and informed one of the regular officers not on duty of the raid and instructed him to get a party out at once to the Fort. The Quartermaster-General then proceeded to the Magazine Fort. The officer who received the telephone message informed the orderly officer of the Quarter-master-General's instructions, but the men were not sent to the Fort.
The staff officer, Collins Barracks, in his evidence, maintained that he did not hear of the raid on the Fort until lunch time on the 24th December. Both he and the orderly officer, however, must have known that something very unusual had taken place at Islandbridge. Barracks or the Magazine Fort —more especially having regard to the Quartermaster-General's message—and it would have been a simple matter for them to have sent personnel to either place to ascertain the facts.
We now come to the recovery of the stolen property. From the 24th December onwards the search for the ammunition by the Gárda Síochána continued incessantly. On the military side the fullest arrangements were made for any troop movements which might be necessary to aid the Gárda. It was not until the 26th December, however, that any information became available which enabled the military to be used. As a result of information received on that day, the City of Dublin and the Wicklow-Kildare area were cordoned by the military while an intensive search was carried out by the Gárda. This resulted in a portion of the missing ammunition being discovered. On the 28th December the military, in addition to holding the cordons, participated actively in the search, which continued until practically nine-tenths of the missing ammunition were recovered.
The quantities recovered to date are:—.303 machine gun ammunition, 368,165 rounds; Thompson gun ammunition, 607,365 rounds; total small arms ammunition, 975,530 rounds; two rifles.
The following quantities have not yet been recovered:—.303 machine gun ammunition, 103,946 rounds; Thompson gun ammunition, 4,935 rounds; .45 revolver ammunition, 12 rounds; total small arms ammunition, 108,893 rounds; two rifles; one revolver, one gas mask, and some small components.
Having dealt with the raid itself and indicated the circumstances in which it occurred, it remains to summarise for the House the causes, direct and indirect, which, from the evidence, enabled the raid to be successfully carried out, to indicate the manner in which responsibility for its success was assigned, and to state the disciplinary action which has been taken.
From the facts elicited by the court of inquiry I formed the conclusion that the successful raiding of the Fort was directly attributable to the following causes:—
"(1) The failure of the military policeman to carry out his orders as to the precautions to be taken when opening the entrance gates to the Fort after dark, and his failure to offer any resistance to the raider who held him up or to attempt in any way to alarm the guard.
"(2) The failure of the sentry on No. 1 post to fire on the raiders in the defence of his post or to make any attempt to alarm the guard.
"(3) The failure of the guard commander to ensure that the door of the guardroom was locked and his inaction when presented with the opportunity of disarming the raider at No. 2 post.
"(4) The failure of the sentry on No. 2 post to attack the raider who attempted to disarm him. This failure on the part of the Volunteer was largely due to the action of the guard commander who assisted in placing him in a position where he could be disarmed and advised him to hand over his rifle to the raider.
"(5) The failure of the officer in charge of the Fort to appreciate his responsibility as such in that after he was arrested by the raiders and fully understood the situation he made no attempt to organise resistance to the raiders in an effort to retrieve the position."
Indirectly responsible for the success of the raid was a spirit of laxity and a lack of observance of the orders for the defence of the Fort which had grown up over a number of years and had been permitted to go unchecked. For that position the officer in charge of the Fort, who was charged with its defence, and the officer commanding, Eastern Command, whose duty it was to ensure that the officer in charge of the Fort did not neglect his charge must be held responsible.
The orders for the defence of the Fort were originally prepared in 1929 and remained unaltered up to the date of the raid. With the passage of time, however, they had in many respects become considerably out of date and inapplicable. For instance, when they were issued the guard consisted of one non-commissioned officer and nine men, thus providing for three sentries on duty at a time, whereas for many years the guard had been reduced to one non-commissioned officer and six men, which permitted of only two sentries at a time. They also provided for a duty officer, which appointment had been unfilled since 1932. In addition to being out of date, they contained many glaring omissions and contradictions. Thus, while the scheme of defence provided for the employment of the fire picquet in the defence of the Fort, the duties of the picquet in this regard were not contained in fire picquet orders. The fire picquet commander on the night of the raid stated in evidence that he had no orders to reinforce the guard in the case of attack. At one point in the orders the military policeman was authorised to allow persons identified by the family of the officer in charge to enter after dark, whereas, elsewhere, the admission of any officer after 6 p.m. was specifically prohibited.
The evidence of the officer in charge of the Fort and that of other witnesses, showed clearly that in recent years, at least, he did not appreciate his direct responsibility for the defence of the Fort. He admitted that he carried out no systematic inspection of the guard or guardroom. Had he done so, he must have realised that his orders were not merely imperfect, but were, for the most part, being disregarded. Thus, although it was provided in orders that the guardroom should be kept locked at all times, it transpired in evidence that there was no key for the door for a considerable time prior to the raid. As previously stated, the wire of the outer door of the guardroom was broken, and it was possible for any person, by inserting his hand, to push back the bolt on the inside, instead of having to call a member of the guard to open the door.
At no time did he personally supervise the changing of the guard, or inspect the guard to satisfy himself that they were familiar with their duties and the scheme of defence.
The military policeman in his evidence stated that over a considerable period he did not comply with his orders regarding the procedure for the opening of the inner wooden entrance gate after dark. Not only did he fail to summon the guard commander to close the wicket of the inner gate while the outer gate was being opened, but he habitually opened half the inner gate, instead of the wicket, to allow the officer in charge and his family to enter or leave, and left it open while he opened the outer gate. This was a decisive factor in facilitating the entry of the raiders, and the officer in charge continuously acquiesced in this vital breach of his own orders.
With regard to the responsibility of the officer commanding, Eastern Command, it transpired in evidence that that officer, from the time of his appointment in June, 1935, to November, 1938, did not on any occasion inspect or visit the Magazine Fort, nor did any of his staff. In November, 1938, however, as a result of a change in the appointment of camp commandant, Islandbridge Barracks, the question of direct responsibility for the defence of the Magazine Fort arose. As a result, the officer commanding, Eastern Command, visited the Magazine Fort in November, 1938, and verbally informed the officer in charge of the Fort that, in future, he would be held directly responsible to Eastern Command headquarters for the defence of the Fort. In January, 1939, the officer commanding, Eastern Command, sent a staff officer to discuss with the officer in charge of the Fort certain matters arising out of the arrangements mentioned which was confirmed in writing in February, 1939. At the same time, the staff officer in question wrote for copies of the orders for the defence of the Fort. He stated in evidence that he was satisfied as to the adequacy of the orders. The officer commanding, Eastern Command, stated that he did not actually see the orders, but obtained a summary of their contents, with which he was satisfied. It is unquestionable, however, that had the orders been carefully examined by the officer commanding, Eastern Command, and by his staff, it would have been seen that they were in many respects out of date and required considerable revision.
The absence of regular inspections by the command headquarters staff was clearly instrumental in leading to the development of the serious spirit of laxity in carrying out the orders for the defence of the Fort. A further aspect of this matter was that, while such inspections were not carried out, no instructions were issued to the battalions supplying the guards for the Fort to ensure the carrying out of the orders (such as they were). The evidence showed that there was a very definite misunderstanding as to the responsibility of battalion and duty officers in regard to the inspection of the guards at the Fort.
The officers commanding the two battalions which supplied the Fort guards in recent years both maintained in evidence that since an officer of another unit (the ordnance service) was immediately responsible for the defence of the Fort, it was not within their province to interfere in any way with his arrangements, more particularly as he was not responsible to them.
In the case of one of the units, which supplied the guard up to December 5th, 1939, the Magazine Fort was omitted from the list of guard posts which the duty officer was required to visit and inspect daily. The orders issued by the officer commanding the other unit required that the duty officer should visit all guard posts once every day and at least five posts every night. Actually the Magazine Fort was visited by the duty officer of this unit only on seven occasions between December 6th and 23rd. None of the visits took place at night owing to the order of the officer in charge of the Fort already mentioned, that officers were not to be admitted to the Fort after 6 p.m. The officer commanding, Eastern Command, was, however, under the impression that the duty officers' visited the Fort as a matter of routine.
To sum up as far as the Eastern Command was concerned there was a complete absence of inspection of the Magazine Fort from the point of view of defence. For that absence of inspection, the officer commanding, Eastern Command, must be held responsible.
The incidents succeeding the raid also indicated in a number of cases failure on the part of certain officers to realise their responsibilities, and to take the action which the circumstances clearly demanded. The following may be particularly mentioned:
The acting officer commanding, Eastern Command (a colonel). This officer was informed of the situation at his home in Howth at about 1 a.m. on the 24th December. Owing to delay in having Army transport dispatched to his residence, he did not arrive at Command Headquarters, Portobello Barracks, until 3 a.m. On his own evidence he took no action beyond detailing "stand-to" parties and arranging for transport. As he was the senior executive officer of the command and was actually in charge at the time it is only reasonable to expect that immediately on his arrival he would have taken initial steps for the recovery of the ammunition or have sought instructions from the Chief of Staff. He did not even visit the Magazine Fort to see the position for himself. His inaction indicated that he was indifferent to his responsibilities.
The staff officer, Collins Barracks (a commandant). The forces at the disposal of this officer on the night of the raid consisted of a motor squadron of the cavalry corps, a "stand-to" party (two non-commissioned officers and 24 men) and the troops of the 5th Battalion in barracks. These might have been effectively used if the situation had been properly made known to him in the initial stages. While the information given to him may not have been of a definite nature, it might reasonably be expected that, in view of the numerous urgent messages received from Islandbridge on the night of the raid, he would have realised that something most unusual was happening. His failure to take steps to ascertain the real position showed gross indifference to his responsibilities.
The orderly officer, Collins Barracks (a second lieutenant of the Volunteer Force). This officer performed his duties in a most irresponsible manner. He made no effort to ascertain the real position at Islandbridge Barracks. His evidence at the Court of Inquiry was regarded as inaccurate and untruthful.
The proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry were duly considered and the following disciplinary action was decided upon:—
"The officer commanding, the Eastern Command, for the reason that, as such, he failed to ensure the adequate defence of the Magazine Fort, was placed on the half-pay list for a period of 12 months from 12th March, 1940. At the end of that period, his case will be reconsidered.
"The acting officer commanding, Eastern Command, because of his unsatisfactory conduct immediately following the raid was also placed on half-pay for a period of 12 months from 12th March, 1940, his case to be further considered at the end of that period.
"The officer in charge of the Fort was informed that for culpable negligence in his duties (the details were fully stated) it was proposed to request the Government to advise the President to dismiss him from the service. He was given an opportunity to make such representations as he thought proper within five days in relation to the proposed dismissal. He made no such representations and for the moment he has been placed on the half-pay list."
The staff officer, Collins Barracks, was informed that in view of his conduct on the night of the raid it was not in the interests of the Service that he should retain his commission and that while his conduct would merit retirement for misconduct or inefficiency, the Minister was prepared to give him an opportunity of resigning voluntarily on the appropriate pension and to recommend to the Government to advise the President that such resignation be accepted.
The orderly officer, Collins Barracks, was similarly informed. As a Volunteer officer he is not entitled to a pension.
Five other officers were censured or admonished.
In addition, as Deputies are no doubt aware, the military policeman on duty on the Magazine Fort, the guard commander and the sentry on No. 1 post were tried by general court martial in connection with the raid.
The military policeman was charged with neglecting to obey orders in that on the night of the raid he opened the inner and outer gate of the Fort without the commander of the guard being present, thereby enabling armed raiders to enter the Fort, and also with neglect to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in that when an armed raider had gained entry to the Fort he did not use his best endeavours to prevent himself from being disarmed. He was found "not guilty" of both charges.
The corporal guard commander was charged with having been guilty of an act to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in that he counselled the sentry on No. 2 post to give up his rifle to a raider. He was convicted and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment with hard labour.
The sentry on No. 1 post was charged with having been guilty of neglect to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in that when an armed raider held up the military policeman on duty at the gates of the Fort, he neglected to take any steps to defend the Fort. He was found "not guilty" of the charge.
From what I have said it will be evident that were it not for (1) the laxity displayed by the officer commanding the Eastern Command and the officer in charge of the Fort, and (2) the breaches of orders by the military personnel in the Fort, the successful raiding of the Fort could not have been accomplished. I am satisfied that these causes of the raid cannot be attributed to defects in the general administration of the Defence Forces or any of its branches or in the general organisation, efficiency or discipline thereof. I am prepared to admit that the discipline in the Magazine Fort and in Collins Barracks on the night of the raid was not what it should have been but the responsibility for this position lies with individual officers and reflects no discredit on the general behaviour of the Defence Forces whether Regular or Reserve.
Might I put a question to the Minister before he gets away from this discipline section? Was there any charge brought against any officer?
I want to conclude my statement.
I am asking a question.
The answer is "no".
Was there any charge brought against any officer?
I think it desirable at this stage to refer to certain matters raised by Deputy McGilligan on the 12th March last in the course of supplementary questions arising out of my reply to his question regarding the placing of an officer on half pay. The Deputy inquired whether the Court of Inquiry had been asked to report why the relative Defence Force Regulations had not been observed in so far as they require that a member of the forces whose character or military reputation may be affected by an inquiry should be given an opportunity of being present throughout the proceedings; of cross-examining witnesses and of producing evidence in defence of his character or military reputation. The Deputy also suggested that the court had given as one of the reasons for their failure to observe the regulations that the room in which the proceedings were held was too small to accommodate all the persons involved.
In my reply to the Deputy's original question, I stated that in view of the urgent military situation created by the raid, and the large number of officers and men involved, or likely to be involved in the inquiry, it was impracticable to relieve them all from duty for attendance throughout the inquiry. I also pointed out that it was essential that the Government should have the facts as early as possible. Lest, however, the impression may have been created that the position of the officers against whom disciplinary action was taken was prejudiced in any way by the failure to observe the strict letter of the Regulations mentioned, I propose to indicate in detail the facts of the matter.
The President of the Court of Inquiry was requested, immediately after the proceedings of the court had been submitted, to indicate why the provisions of the relative Regulations had not been observed in toto. In his reply the President stated that at the outset of the proceedings, it became apparent that the military reputation of a large number of officers and soldiers would be affected by the evidence. If the procedure prescribed by Regulations were observed in toto, it would have meant that a large number of persons would have been present during the hearing of the evidence of each witness and that each such person would have the right of cross-examination. This would have been very cumbersome, and would have prolonged the proceedings unduly. In addition it would have entailed relieving all such persons from duty for the duration of the proceedings. A further consideration was that if even one of them were unable to attend for any reason, such as illness, the proceedings would have had to be postponed.
In these circumstances the court considered that the spirit and intention of the Regulations would be met by first hearing the evidence of all witnesses, and then recalling witnesses whose evidence, in the opinion of the court, affected the military reputation of any other person, the person so affected being present and afforded an opportunity of cross-examination. This was done in every case, and each witness called before the court had ample opportunity of defending his character and military reputation.
While it was agreed that in the peculiar circumstances it was impracticable to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Regulations, the court was re-convened for the purpose of reviewing, and, if necessary, revising its findings in the light of that fact. The court duly reviewed its findings, and reported that any portion of its original findings which adversely affected the character or military reputation of any person were based on the evidence of the person concerned; the documents handed into court; facts admitted and not in dispute, and the court's inspection of the Magazine Fort. The court, therefore, adhered to its original findings.
There was no suggestion whatever from the court that the room in which the proceedings took place was too small to accommodate all the persons involved, nor, until it was mentioned by Deputy McGilligan, had such an aspect of the matter arisen in any shape or form.
As I already stated I have gone into this matter in detail merely to ensure that a false impression of the position will not exist.
Before concluding, there is one aspect of the affair on which I should like to say a few words. Nobody desires in any way to minimise the seriousness of this raid, but I think it very regrettable that certain Deputies should, in the course of various debates in this House in which the matter was mentioned, have gone to the other extreme and endeavoured to paint the blackest possible picture of the occurrence. I think that such a course was particularly objectionable when in doing so Deputies made statements which, to say the least of them, were rash and ill-informed but at the same time of a nature calculated to create uneasiness and to disturb the public confidence. I may quote, for instance, the following extracts from speeches made here by Deputy O'Higgins. Speaking on the 3rd January last in the course of the debate on the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, he said—the statement is reported at column 1415 of volume 78, No. 4 of the Official Debates:—
"I suppose in the whole history of armies since the world began there was never such a disaster as the picture of an army losing all its ammunition without as much as a blackthorn being used."
Does the Minister disagree with that?
In the debate on the Supplementary Estimate for the Army, on the 5th March, Deputy O'Higgins is reported at column 66 of volume 79, No. 1 of the Official Debates, as saying:—
"We had the dangerous state of affairs reaching its peak point at Christmas week when practically the whole ammunition reserve of the Army was passed out to people who would use it against the Army."
And at column 68:—
"... all the reserve of ammunition, 28 tons in weight, was loaded deliberately, slowly, and carefully in more than a dozen lorries and scattered throughout the country."
The fact is that the Army did not lose all or nearly all of its reserve stock of ammunition. Of the reserve stocks of small arms ammunition stored in the Fort alone, the quantity removed by the raiders was not much over 5 per cent. If we take the stocks stored in magazines and barracks throughout the country, the quantity removed was less than 3 per cent. I would remind Deputies that 90 per cent. of the ammunition taken has been recovered.
Deputy O'Higgins also said in the course of the debate on the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill on the 3rd January last, column 1416 of volume 78, No. 4 of the Official Debates:—
".... there was more ammunition lost in a couple of hours ... than could be bought by all the revenue which will be obtained from the revenue tax and the sugar tax put together."
The cost of the stolen ammunition was very far from the combined total of revenue and sugar taxes mentioned by Deputy O'Higgins. The cost was approximately £4,000, while the revenue figures given to this House by the Minister for Finance, when introducing the Supplementary Budget in November last were as follows:—
|
1. Anticipated increased yield during 1940-41 as a result of the increased income-tax imposed by the Supplementary Budget |
£780,000 |
|
2. Anticipated increased yield during 1939-40 as a result of the increased Customs duty on imported sugar imposed by the Supplementary Budget |
£243,000 |
|
Total: |
£1,023,000 |
If you held up the ammunition the way you held up the sugar it would be all right.
That is a good argument. It will thus be seen that the cost of the stolen ammunition was approximately .39 per cent. (point thirty-nine per cent.) of the revenue mentioned by Deputy O'Higgins. Actually, the cost of the materials taken was one of the least serious aspects of the affair.
It is a pity Ministers cannot take the same interest in the rest of their arithmetic.
The statements of Deputy O'Higgins which I have quoted are typical of those indulged in by a number of Deputies whenever the question of the raid arose in any way in this House. Beyond once again deprecating the thoughtlessness which prompted such statements, I do not propose to comment on them further.
I have said on previous occasions, and I now repeat it, that I do not wish in any way to minimise the seriousness of the raid. It was extremely serious, and should not have been possible. In its own way it was a salutary lesson, because it will, I hope, effectually dispel that feeling that everything is safe and nothing can happen, a feeling which results in laxity and the disregard of routine but essential precautions. I can assure the House that all steps which are humanly possible have been taken to ensure that such an event will not easily occur again.
May I ask again, if any charge has been brought against any officer.
I have made a complete statement.
Which does not contain an answer.
That is the question, and Parliament is entitled to an answer. Has any charge been made against any officer?
No charge has been made.
Beyond scandalous insinuations.
The disciplinary action necessary was taken.
I would have hardly thought, even though I have had some experience of the Dáil, that we would ever have such a spectacle as we had here to-night. If the Minister for Defence was chairman of a commission that this resolution asks the House to set up, and was somebody completely apart even from the ranks of the Government Party, and that commission were to come along with a series of findings as black as those which the Minister has read, you could not expect an independent chairman of a commission to speak of that particular series of charges with such detachment as the Minister showed to-night. He did not cause a flush or a quiver of embarrassment to spread even to his colleague, although he must have known, and must have seriously considered, they were the most definite condemnation of both himself and his colleague that anyone could make. If the Minister had set the seal of sincerity on that speech by a particular addition, one could have said that the statement of fact, prejudiced, biased, inconclusive and bad as it is, would have some weight in the House, but there was one necessary postscript omitted. It should have been, of course: "After this, my resignation has been accepted." The only difficulty about it is whether precedence in getting out should be accorded to the Minister's colleague. It should be a matter of some scrupulosity between the two as to which should get out first, but both should get out. Anyone who listened to that recital could not have the slightest doubt of that. There used to be an old tale told of a Prime Minister who, when addressing his colleagues in the Cabinet, said: "We had better hang together on a particular statement inside the Cabinet Council, lest we should all hang separately outside." The Minister has now decided the best way of causing public distrust of subordinates, but he has no appreciation whatever, apparently, of the repercussion of that statement on himself personally and on his colleague.
The energy and the zeal which he displayed in going through this category of casualness, inefficiency, and irresponsibility was most illuminating. It seemed to me that his attitude was that since he himself and certain members of the Army are down, the only way he could gain a relative advantage was by pushing subordinates down further in the mire than anybody was likely to push him. Through it all there was a complete air of detachment, and an absence of appreciation that he himself was being criticised or that his colleague was being criticised. If it is possible for two people to grow hides so armour-plated that they can behave in this way, they should teach the country how it is done, and there will then be no necessity for concrete shelters. If they can stand the assailing that that statement puts upon them, they can stand anything, but they should surely remember that there is an army at their disposal. Men have put their professional lives at the disposal of these people, and they are responsible for their professional faith. They should really have felt that when coming here and exposing what can only be described as a discreditable political manoeuvre to save themselves and their positions by blaming certain people who have served loyally in the Army, who have not been found guilty in the proper way, and who, apparently, have not even had a charge brought against them. These men are to be sacrified to save two worthless people like these. That is a thing this House ought not to tolerate, and I hope it will not be taken as a precedent and that nothing like this will happen again.
The Minister winds up his statement by saying: "I have found the following conclusions." Right in the forefront of his conclusions, condemned as he is himself by all these findings, he passes judgment on others. The first person on whom he passes judgment is the military policeman. He was one of the few people who got a chance of appearing in public before a court and he was acquitted. The second man on the Minister's roll is Sentry No. 1. He also got a chance. He was the second of three people who got a chance to make their case publicly in the way the regulations demanded. He comes second in the Minister's list of those who ought to have some action taken against them. And he was acquitted. Two out of the three in the forefront of the Minister's conclusions did get a chance to appear publicly, represented as people ought to be represented before a court martial, and both were acquitted. Anybody else found guilty has been found guilty in some secret, hugger-mugger kind of way, found guilty by the Minister or the colleagues of the Minister. The report to the Minister is kept secret so that the House does not know to what extent these people were allowed to defend themselves at all, how far they realised that charges would be made against them, how far charges, or even insinuations, were made against them, how far they were allowed, if they were recalled—which I doubt— to go through the ordinary run of the regulations in respect of the people who had given any evidence that had touched upon them. It would be interesting to know whether the people sacrificed by the Minister were not complimented by certain of those who sat on the court of inquiry. Anything done outside the charge laid against three men in open court is done in such a way that neither the House nor the public is going to get any knowledge of it. Of the three brought before a court, only one person has been found guilty. Then, this thing is so lightly passed over that we are told that only .39 of the revenue of the State was involved. But it was a source of shame to Ministers when they spoke here on the 3rd January. The whole thing, which was such a source of shame on the 3rd January, has ended, so far as the public is concerned and so far as any public taking of evidence is concerned, with one man getting 18 months.
I suggest that this is not treating a serious matter in the way in which it should be treated. The men who enlisted in the defence forces of this country are in a rather difficult position. They are, like military men in any other country, subject to two codes of discipline. They are liable to the civil courts for anything done contrary to the civil law and, added to that, they have a disciplinary code of their own. They know, when they enter the defence forces, that they are taking on themselves a double burden of responsibility. So far, they have been protected by a statute of the Oireachtas. One clause of that statute reads:
"No charge against an officer, non-commissioned officer or private soldier shall be heard or investigated save in the presence of the accused. The accused shall have full liberty to cross-examine all witnesses called against him, and to call any witnesses in his defence and to make a statement in his defence. If the accused shall demand that the evidence against him shall be taken on oath, the investigating officer shall cause all witnesses to be sworn before giving evidence."
That Act is evaded by the happy device of saying that no charge was brought against these men, that the Minister is taking action. On what? The result of the court of inquiry? Anybody who entered the Army having behind him the fortification of that particular section knew also that there were certain regulations governing military courts— good regulations, in accord with natural justice and the ordinary rules as known in the courts. One of the general rules with regard to procedure is Rule 12. That is detailed in separate sections, all tending towards this—that if a man in the forefront of an inquiry has his military reputation or honour assailed, he is entitled to be present, to be represented, to contradict people, to cross-examine, to give evidence on his own behalf and to produce witnesses at his own discretion. The rule goes even into more detail than that. When it appears probable, apart from any charge, that the character or military reputation of an officer or soldier will be affected, the same regulations apply and, finally, even though no charge be made and although, in the forefront of the proceedings, it might not appear probable that anything in the nature of assailing of reputation might result, if it should transpire during the sitting of a court that the character or military reputation of an officer or soldier is affected, the same regulations apply. That is a good code. The intention is that no officer shall be put out of the Army as the result of a charge unless given the opportunity to meet this charge, to produce witnesses, to put those who assail him on oath and cross-examine. Whether it is a court-martial or a court of inquiry, the same type of regulation holds. The man who goes into the Army goes in with the knowledge that his professional life is protected if these rules and regulations are fairly carried out. We know what happened on this occasion. Only .39 of the revenue of the State was involved. So far as the Minister is concerned, that is the conclusion he swings before the House at the end of his statement.
In other words, for 1 per cent. of the national revenue you could have another raid on the Magazine Fort, and a somewhat smaller one of the same kind. You could have the raid repeated once again, with another smaller raid, and you would find that no more than 1 per cent. of the national revenue was involved.
There was a different view of the matter taken on the 3rd January. Four Ministers spoke in the course of the debate in this House on that occasion. Two things emerge from a re-reading of what they said. One is this. People have been asked not to discuss this discreditable matter—and it was admitted by everybody to be discreditable. We are asked not to discuss it on the grounds that an inquiry was being held, and that the House would later be supplied with the findings of that inquiry. Secondly, right through that debate on the 3rd January, and later, next day in the Seanad, in the untterances of Ministers and the Taoiseach, there was an undercurrent that it was only subordinates were responsible, that a mere matter of routine was missed. We had a conflict in these statements. We were asked not to discuss the matter while the inquiry was being held, yet nearly every Minister, and the Taoiseach particularly, went out of his way to say that it was only a matter of routine, that some little bit of routine was missed. The military policemen, Private Henry Brady and Corporal Andrew Dunne, were for it on the 3rd and 4th of January; it was a matter of routine. The two Ministers were kept carefully in the background, although that night shame was the tone that was expressed in this House.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce, speaking on the 3rd January, talked about recent events and, referring to the raid, said:—
"No doubt the question of responsibility for the recent occurrence will have ultimately to be settled by this House. No doubt members of the House, in more quarters than one, feel very strongly in regard to that aspect of the present situation. But that aspect of the question cannot be debated adequately to-day nor is it, in point of time, the most urgent."
Then, later, taking up a phrase of Deputy Norton, the same Minister said:—
"No doubt that raid upon the Magazine Fort was a grave incident."
Here is the charge introduced in this phrase:—
"But its gravity did not lie, and does not lie mainly, as Deputy Norton wished to imply, in the fact that certain laxity was indicated on the part of those who were placed in charge of the Magazine."
There is the first stab at the subordinate—laxity on the part of those placed in charge of the Magazine. At a later point I asked why was not some Minister sacked for it, and the Minister said:—
"That is a matter which no doubt will be discussed later."
When he returned to the subject later he said:
"Whatever may have been our failings or our weaknesses or laxity in the last two or three months, the Dáil can always call us to account for it. I assume that in due course the Dáil will do so, and it will be for us to satisfy the Dáil and, what is more important in my view, the country, that we were not guilty of any culpable neglect. But that is not the immediate issue."
There is the first speaker amongst the Ministers in that debate on the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940. He put two things in the forefront—"We will have to account for it in the House; there is an inquiry going on, and there will be a report as to the laxity on the part of those who were put in charge." A little later, when somebody wandered in the debate, an application was made to the Ceann Comhairle to rule out certain statements on the ground that a military inquiry was proceeding and that we would have to wait until the result of the inquiry was before the House before the matter could be discussed.
The Minister for Justice was next in the field, and he said: "Whatever blame may be attached to those who were in charge of the Magazine——" and again he goes on with a statement the gist of which is that we would get a chance of discussing the matter. "I quite admit," said the Minister for Justice on that occasion, "that this thing has happened on the most vital post in the whole service, and it is a shameful thing that it did happen.... We have had a shaking up that will serve us for many a long year to come." That is not exactly the tone of the statement to-day, in which we were told that there was only about .39 of the national income involved.
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, speaking the next day in the Dáil, said:
"I hope that this stunt that took place in the Magazine Fort will do good to the country in the long run. I find great difficulty, owing to the great shock, in seeing any silver lining in the cloud, but if it brings home generally to the people the need for discipline——"
Here is the tendentious matter:
"——if it brings home to the Army that no officer or soldier can dare for one instant to depart from the routine laid down for the guarding of posts, or other matters like that, if it brings home to the Guards throughout the country that they must be particularly active in tracing down people who might disturb the peace of the country, or tracing down arms which might be used against the people of this country, then there will be some little silver in the lining."
The Minister for Local Government did not feel that he was justified in referring to the occurrence because he "felt precluded, while these courts of inquiry are sitting, from referring to them in any way."
The Taoiseach took the matter further in the Seanad the next day. He opened by saying:
"I do not like to go into it in any detail for the same reason, that an inquiry is taking place. The Government is, of course, responsible, and I wish to say that we share a feeling—perhaps it is too strong a word to use—of humiliation that such a thing should have happened."
Then he talked about Lord Northcliffe's order to a motor driver whom he engaged. Lord Northcliffe gave the driver full control, but he was told that if anything happened he would be sacked. I was hoping that somebody would have noticed the expression on the faces of the two Ministers concerned when that phrase was used. Lord Northcliffe would have sacked his driver if an accident happened, but the Taoiseach was humiliated about what happened. "From time to time," the Taoiseach continued, "these things have been done because simple routine was not followed regularly. Suppose, for example, that you have two doors and put two men on them, and one man is to open one door and is responsible for the keys." Remember, these words were spoken on the 4th January. Those who heard what the Minister said to-night can form their own opinion as to whether there was anything premeditated about the statement of the Taoiseach on that occasion. "Suppose you had two doors," he said, "and put two men on them and one man is to open one door and is responsible for the keys. Having opened the door, he lets a man out and the moment the man leaves, he is to lock it; then the man may go to the other door and see who is there, and if the person who is there has a right to come in, he lets him in and then locks that door; that door is to be locked as soon as the man passes through. You carry out that routine regularly, and ten men will hold the position against 1,000; you make a mistake and carelessly, through laziness, through want of appreciation of the value of the routine, you either have only one man instead of two, or one man is saving himself the trouble of locking the door after him, and leaves it open while he goes to open the other one, or any such mistake, and the whole thing is finished." If that is not based on knowledge, and if it does not represent a judgment on facts that were then within the possession of the Government, then it is a very intelligent anticipation of what the Minister read here as being his judgment after he had received the evidence from the Court of Inquiry.
Interrupted by a member of the Seanad on the point about the responsibility of the High Command, which the Senator said was the main point, the Taoiseach's reply was:
"I do not want to minimise it. I think the more we realise that this was a most damaging thing, a most dangerous thing to have happened, the better for us all. At the same time, I do not want people to take fright and to imagine that, because it did happen, everything is completely wrong and upside down in the Army. I do not think it is at all."
It was pointed out that that was not suggested. Senator Dr. Rowlette intervened in this matter later and said:
"The Taoiseach has, I must say, shown bad example. He has told us that he and his Government take entire responsibility; that he will not shirk any responsibility. The Minister for Justice last night went further. He said the responsibility might, if we liked, be put on the Minister for Defence. To-night the Taoiseach has thought fit to throw the responsibility, in the first instance, on the subordinates furthest from the Minister for Defence."
That is a quotation from what occurred in this House and in the Seanad during those two days. Dr. Rowlette continues:
"It would be improper for us to discuss that, and I think it is unfortunate that he has taken a line which leads every one of us here to-night to the opinion that there was gross neglect of regulations, gross indiscipline, taking place in the Magazine Fort. I think that is unfortunate. The one person responsible to the Oireachtas is the Minister for Defence, and nobody else."
It is quite permissible to quote in either House what a Minister says in the other House. The Chair deprecates the quoting in the Dáil of a speech made by a Senator in the Seanad.
On the 4th January a debate took place in the Seanad which was a continuation of the debate which took place in this House the day before, where the policy of the Government was made up of two things: to prevent any discussion of the Magazine raid and incidentally to suggest that, whoever was responsible, it certainly was not the Minister, but his subordinates. I might point out that, when that particular defence was closely questioned in the Seanad by Dr. Rowlette, the answer of the Taoiseach was that which I have just read. The Taoiseach, interrupting, said:—
"If I may interrupt at this stage I should like to say that nothing was further from my mind."
That is an old trick—to inject a poison and then to complain when people say that it has been administered. There is a withdrawal, or no attempt to explain the damage which has already been done by a statement which has been made. The old practice was continued here. The Taoiseach continued:—
"What I was trying to do was to give an illustration of how important it is to attend to routine, and the importance of instilling that could go back to me or to the Minister for Defence or to the Chief of the Army or anywhere else. I have said again that we regard it as no excuse."
It is the whole excuse to-night. He continued:—
"We do not know exactly if that was the cause even, but when people are so anxious about the whole situation, I think it would be serious that anything of the kind should be said at the moment."
That is about the general conduct on that night. I intend to quote now from the speech of Dr. Rowlette on that occasion. He made a point which was made here that, in any democratic country, the first thing which would have happened in the event of such an instance as occurred in the Phoenix Park, would be that the resignation of the Minister would go into the hands of the Chief of the Government.
That was the way the situation was left on the 3rd and 4th January last. It was a shameful thing, one which caused humiliation, and the cloud was so dark that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures could see no silver lining. On the other hand, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures could well see that it would do a little good if the subordinates were taught a lesson, and the Taoiseach could see some value in it if the value of routine on the part of the subordinates was emphasised. In the whole debate an attempt was made to prejudice, right from the start, even the court which was set up—to prejudice it against the subordinates. Remember, right from the start, public notice was given, and given other than by speeches here, that the public generally regarded the people here as the people primarily responsible for what happened and the two men at the head of the Army as being the men responsible for what happened.
There was a court of inquiry. On the 21st February, Deputy MacEoin asked the Minister for Defence if it was proposed to publish the evidence. Right through the debate of the 3rd and 4th January, anyone could read— and nothing was made clearer than this—that there was a definite assurance that the Army inquiry would be reported upon and that the report would be placed before Deputies. A question was put then and the Minister for Defence answered that it was not customary to publish the evidence and findings of military courts of inquiry. He said:
"I do not propose to depart from the normal procedure in this case."
There was a certain amount of cross-examination on that point, in the middle of which the Minister offered this statement:
"The court of inquiry has finished its work but the consideration of its findings has not yet been concluded."
A little later, in column 1678 of the Official Debates of the 21st February, 1940, the Minister for Defence said:
"I might mention that the procedure followed in connection with all former courts of inquiry has been followed in this case."
That, as we know now—whether it was stated with the intention to deceive or not—was definitely false. That was a false statement made in this House—that "the procedure followed in connection with all former courts of inquiry has been followed in this case." We know to-night that the court which had been set up had to be re-convened for the purpose of saying why they had not followed the normal procedure. When that was not known, and in answer to a question on the 21st February, the Minister for Defence committed himself to the statement that "the procedure followed in connection with all former courts has been followed in this case." The Minister would have got away with that statement if the matter had been put aside. It has been brought up again, with a result which is not creditable to the Minister. On the 5th March, Deputy Norton asked the Minister for Defence whether the military officer who had been given notice of dismissal and the two officers who had been called upon to resign in connection with the raid had been tried by court martial or given an opportunity of defending themselves, and, if not, whether the Minister would say why they were denied the right of trial which they were willing to undergo, and whether he would arrange that such trial be afforded to them. The answer given was:—
"The officers to whom the Deputy refers were not tried by court martial, but they were given a reasonable opportunity to make such representations as they thought proper in relation to their proposed dismissal or retirement."
Later he said:
"The Magazine Fort raid has been the subject of prolonged investigation by a military court of inquiry, and the Government considers that, on the facts revealed, it is now for them to decide whether the officers involved are suitable for retention in the Forces."
He was asked then when those particular representations had been made, and he replied: "Last Thursday." It was pointed out then that on the Thursday referred to the officers had received notice of dismissal, so that, apparently, the findings of that court martial had been concluded on the Thursday, the officers had been given the opportunity to make representations on the Thursday, and the notice of dismissal had been served on them on the same day. If the Minister worked as quickly in other matters as he did on that particular occasion, there would be but little complaint about the efficiency of his Department, or about his efficiency in connection with his Department. He was asked later if he would reconsider the matter, so as to give the officers concerned an opportunity to defend themselves, and he said he would not. Remember, right through the answer given to that question, there was no suggestion that these people, as was stated to-night, had been called in secondly before the court of inquiry, and that more or less the points of the evidence supposed to weigh against them had been picked out and gone over again, to see if they were given the opportunity to defend themselves, and to see if the procedure on the part of the Army were carried out in accordance with regulations.
On 12th March I myself asked a question about two of those officers, and got the answer then that, apparently, the Government had decided was the best one to stick to in this mixed and confused situation:
"In view of the urgent military situation created by the raid, and the large number of officers and men involved, or likely to be involved, in the inquiry, it was impracticable to relieve them all from duty for attendance throughout the inquiry. Furthermore, it was essential that the Government should get at the facts as early as possible."
Then the Minister gives it as his opinion that:
"Had the court adopted any other procedure the delay would have been such as would have created justifiable public concern, and be highly pre-judical to the public service."
Again, the Minister here has told us that an attempt was made to carry out the regulations in part by recalling the court, and having the evidence reviewed in the presence of the men whose position was jeopardised. Not a word about that occurs in the answer to the question put on the 15th March; we were told that it was impracticable. I suppose that it is worth while examining this and giving particular attention to it here.
There is a code with regard to the Army courts of inquiry based upon natural justice, as we know it, and as we are used to it here in all our social disputes, personal disputes, and in the courts. If there is one thing which lies at the root of all proper administration of justice, it is that the person should know, first of all, that he is being charged with something; secondly, that he should know precisely with what he has been charged; and, thirdly, that he should be given an opportunity to confront those who charge him or those who are giving the evidence upon which the charge is based. The ordinary way in which justice in a rough and ready way is administered in this country is that people are allowed to have those who give evidence against them subjected to a process of cross-examination, and that, ordinarily speaking, that cross-examination is conducted on oath. I cannot imagine any situation in the courts in this country in which the courts would solemnly declare that the procedure of letting a man know the charges which were being made against him, and of giving him an opportunity to confront those who were making the charges, would be too cumbersome to be carried out in a particular instance, and that therefore the procedure should collapse, and that the courts should conduct the case almost in the absence of the accused. But that is the excuse given here, on the 12th March for the first time, and repeated in the House to-night: that the procedure would be cumbersome. The regulations do not allow for the setting aside of the regulations. They are made by an order issued and promulgated as Orders and Regulations Binding Courts of Inquiry. We have the situation revealed in this House that, after an inquiry was over, the court had to be reassembled and asked to record as part of its findings why they had not obeyed the regulations governing their own procedure. That is the lame excuse which is given in the House to-night. I wonder—and I hope that we will be told—how many men were involved. Supposing that the whole lot had to be brought in and given sufficient room and time to have the regulations carried out, what number of men were involved, and how many would have had to be released from duty in order to have justice done, and what would have happened if this particular crisis occurred at the time when these men were being demobilised?
The Minister told us last September that we had a certain number of people standing to, and that a certain number of people had been mobilised. Later on we were told that a number of them were being demobilised, or, at least, were in process of being removed. Could not that demobilisation have been halted in order to release these men for duty in such an emergency? What was the reaction on that occasion? There was the question asked as to whether these men, now being demobilised, would ever again be used for the Army, although the result of the inquiry that was conducted in their absence might be that they would not be allowed to serve at all. The Minister, on that occasion, told me—or, at least, when I asked him, he did not attempt to make any suggestion otherwise—that this putting of an officer on half-pay is not known as punishment. There is such a thing as half-pay, but so far as I know there is no penal code in the Army that makes half-pay a punishment, and I suggest that the putting of an officer on half-pay as a punishment is a thing unknown to the Army code.
What has happened is that, in regard to two officers, they have been put on a punishment that is unknown to the ordinary Army code, and that is not in accordance with any of the regulations and, in fact, a breach of the regulations, and this House is asked to accept that with the same complaisance that the Minister has shown with regard to the conduct of this inquiry for which we have asked. It must be remembered that on the morning following the night of the 23rd December it was realised that the whole Government, and particularly two Ministers of the Government, were involved in what had taken place, and that what had happened was something that had embarrassed and made shamefaced the whole Government, and particularly the two Ministers concerned. We hear that certain subordinates were alleged to be guilty of laxity, but what happened? Certain charges were brought forward. Charges were brought forward against, I think, four people, and I understand that the charge against one of them has been dropped. However, that will be inquired into later. I understand that charges were preferred against four privates and a corporal—in other words, the lowest ranks in the Army— and that there was to be a court of inquiry.
When I first heard of that court of inquiry being about to be set up, I mentioned the matter in a debate here, and the Minister told us that we would be informed shortly as to the constitution of the court. I then asked what would be the rank of those who were sitting on the court of inquiry, and also asked whether or not it would be reasonable to expect that people who were hoping to remain in the Army for the rest of their lives, sitting on such a court, would bring in any verdict that might be contrary to what Ministers would expect from them—particularly where this matter of rank was concerned. I wonder whether or not these ranks were deliberately chosen to be a buffer between the Minister and people of higher rank and between the people of higher rank and lower rank. Was it necessary to introduce a sort of a buffer, such as the kind of people referred to by Senator Dr. Rowlette, in order to lessen the shock that might otherwise come when the corporal, the acting-corporal, and the four privates, were to be brought to a court martial, if men of much higher rank were also to be brought to court martial? It seems that men of a higher rank are left out by the terms of reference, but the one and chief impact of this whole thing seems to be that those officers concerned would not report with regard to any rank higher than that of a colonel. That, of course, left a rather welcome basis as between the people to be reported, of one rank or the other, and as between the Ministers. So it was that the Ministers were being criticised when the first impact of this court of inquiry occurred. But it must be remembered that there is a gap between even the statement read out to-night by the Minister and the statements made by other people, who are not mentioned. We go down to another rank in the Army, and we find that there are two or three people charged—the Minister has himself slid out of the matter—and then there is the court martial of two or three individuals, loyally-disposed so far as we know, against whom charges were brought, and who have been acquitted, and a charge brought against another individual which, we understand, has been dropped.
If people are acquitted, then let them know forthwith that they are acquitted. Why should there be this discrimination between people, or between ranks? Why, if an inquiry is to be set up, should there be this reluctance— and this definite reluctance—to bring these matters before the whole people, and allow these matters to be discussed before a properly-constituted parliamentary committee? If such a committee were to be set up, it could question the things that have taken place, and could even question the policy of concealing matters that came out before the court martial.
At the court martial, when it was dealing with the case of Corporal Andrew Dunne, a witness said that the position of the sentry would be that of standing in the light and looking into the darkness. Who was responsible for that? Has the Minister any duty of seeing what is the way in which sentries are placed on such an important place as the Fort?
None whatever.
None whatever? I see. Nor people who are higher than colonel. Does it just stop there? It is the job of a colonel and nobody higher. There were no regular Army members on duty that night. Why?
Before the Taoiseach leaves, may I raise a point of order? I understand it is ordered that this debate will conclude at 7.30. That is because the Government are allowing only three hours for it. It is a semi-suppressed debate.
The Deputy has raised no point of order.
The point of order I want to raise is that, in view of the obvious inadequacy of the time, as shown by the trend of debate and the fact that apparently other Ministers want to speak whom we would be anxious to hear, and that, at any rate, Deputy Costello and myself are anxious to intervene in this debate, could the time be extended?
I am afraid it could not be done to-night in any case. Is there any particular reason for continuing it further?
If the Taoiseach and the Ministers do not see any reason after what has been heard here, then let them suppress the debate.
I have heard nothing which impressed me in any case.
The question will be put at half-past seven.
A witness in this case said that there were no regular Army members on duty that night. In 1938, the accused—that is, Corporal Andrew Dunne, who has been found guilty—had done a month's annual training and three weeks on manoeuvres. He was called up in September, 1939, and had not done much training since. The sentry on duty at the No. 2 post was not 17 years of age. Who was responsible for there being no regular Army members in the Fort that night? Who was responsible for these people, who had done a month's annual training and three weeks on manoeuvres, being put in charge of the Fort? Was that anything in the nature of administration? Had the Minister anything to do with it? A sergeant-major, called for the defence of Henry Brady, who was acquitted, said that the first time he saw Volunteers on duty in the Fort was in September last when the guard was composed half of regular soldiers and half of Volunteers, and he said that 24 hours' continuous duty, followed by 48 hours off duty, must impose an abnormal strain on the men of the unit. The accused himself, giving evidence, said he joined the Volunteers in 1939, did a month's training in Athlone, and was three weeks on manoeuvres; reported for duty on September 8th, and from then until October 4th he was in Longford learning how to slope arms. That is the gentleman somebody put in charge of the Fort that night—a man who was, after four weeks' annual training and three weeks on manoeuvres, learning how to slope arms. Who was responsible? Has the Minister anything to do with it?
I suggest, Sir, that much that has been said indicates clearly that there is a duty on this House, and that duty is to agree to this resolution calling for an inquiry, and in the forefront the matter to be investigated is the extent to which this failure to defend the Magazine Fort is attributable to defects in the general administration of the defence forces. This country owes a duty to the Army. It is one of the things, if there is anything in this country, on which there ought to be a national policy, and that national policy should include two things: one is that the Army should know that it will be supported and that its code will be carried out, and the second is that if men enlist in the defence forces of this country and get into trouble, they will be tried in accordance with the conditions under which they were induced to enlist. Both have been broken in connection with these men.
The two speeches which have been made in support of this motion must, I think, have been calculated to make even the most sanguine of us despair of the future of this country.
On a point of order, may I ask if we could hear the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures instead of the Minister for Industry and Commerce? What does he know about it?
That is not a point of order.
Might I ask the Minister for Industry and Commerce, as a matter of decency, in a debate in which time has been specially limited by the Government, if he would allow a Minister who ought to know something about it to speak on this matter?
I propose to address myself to this motion with your permission, Sir. I hope that I may be permitted to continue without these attempts on the part of members of the Opposition to waste the time of the House. I was saying that the speeches which have been made on this motion might make even the most sanguine of us despair of the future of this country. When I first learned of this episode which is now under discussion, I will not conceal from the House, and I did not conceal from the House, that I took a very grave view of the situation. I thought it was a portent, an indication that there were forces in existence here which might endanger, not merely the future of the State, but the future of our whole people. I felt that it was a matter that warranted the most searching investigation, and the most serious consideration of the Government, and I said so. I thought that even those who, by their opposition, often factiously expressed here, had made the task of the Government over a series of years much more difficult than it might have been, would have seen in this not an opportunity to try to make political capital out of a grave and serious event, but an opportunity when all Parties in the House might come and might take counsel together to see what were the best means to prevent a repetition of such an outrage, and what steps we might take to deal with the menace to the State which that occurrence showed to be in existence here.
What opportunity have the Government offered for such counsel to be taken?
I must protest against these interruptions of Deputy Mulcahy. They have only one purpose, and that is to keep this debate upon the low and humiliating plane on which those who put down this motion have chosen to place it.
Will the Minister ——
Deputies must give as good a hearing as they got.
If the Minister does not want to be assisted in the point he is making——
The Minister must be allowed to make his own points.
It is quite clear that this was a matter which warranted our serious consideration. I think it is a matter which ought to be approached with open minds. It is a matter where we should have tried to divest ourselves of all idea of shabby partisanship. It is a matter to which we here, as the great council of the nation, ought to have addressed ourselves with the utmost sincerity of which we are capable.
How has this motion been put to us here to-night? First of all, the occurrence itself has been exaggerated, and exaggerated not in order to make people properly concerned about it, but rather to prejudice the Government in dealing with it. Any time this occurrence has been referred to in the House, it has been referred to most extravagantly. Deputy O'Higgins, as the Minister for Defence pointed out, went so far as to say that all our reserve stores of ammunition had been stolen. The Minister, in order to substantiate the charge that this matter had been exaggerated— and exaggerated, as I have said, not in order to impress the gravity of the occurrence upon the House, but simply in order that the utmost political capital might be made out of it— pointed out that, so far from all our reserves of ammunition having been stolen, in fact the amount now missing was infinitesimal. Deputy McGilligan twists that statement into this, that the Minister for Defence had endeavoured to defend himself and the Government—which is, of course, responsible for the Army—by saying that, after all, the thing did not matter because only 39 per cent. of our reserve had been taken. Whether it was 39, or even a smaller fraction than that, of our store, I should still regard the incident as one which warranted our most serious attention, and that, as the Minister for Defence has told us, is the attitude of the Government.
Again, take the speech which Deputy O'Higgins made here this evening. In moving his motion, he said—and it is merely the straw which shows the mentality which the Opposition have expressed in their speeches—that this incident had occurred over six months ago and that, during that period, the Government had endeavoured to burke discussion. The fact of the matter is that it is just over four months since the incident occurred, that the House has had very long adjournments in the interval and that on occasions when we were ready to take this motion, members of the Opposition were not prepared to speak on it.
On this motion?
That accounts for the lapse of time which has taken place.
Does the Minister suggest that any day was ever offered to the Opposition for the discussion of this motion, and that they refused it?
It must have been suggested, and it has been conceded that it would be mutually convenient, convenient to ourselves and to the Opposition, that the motion might be taken this week rather than in other weeks. That is the position, but Deputy O'Higgins——
Does the Minister say——
I am in possession, Sir, and I hope I shall be allowed to proceed.
The Minister can misrepresent as much as he likes.
Deputy O'Higgins, in moving the motion, said that for six months we had been endeavouring to burke discussion of it. I mention that point only to show how, in dealing with this whole matter, grave and all as it may be, Deputy O'Higgins could not be even fair or accurate in regard to that simple question of time.
Deputy O'Higgins stated a fact.
The Deputy, in relation to this question of time at any rate, did not state a fact.
He did.
On a point of personal explanation——
The Deputy's speech is on record. He said that that is why——
My name is to this motion. I take it that I was familiarised with any discussions with regard to the motion.
That is not a point of personal explanation. I am dealing with this question of six months.
I have been accused of misrepresenting the position. Ever since the motion first appeared on the paper, I have been pressing for discussion at the earliest date, subject to a minimum of three hours.
I am dealing with the one net point, that Deputy O'Higgins stated that the Government has been burking discussion on this motion for over six months.
Yes.
The episode to which the motion refers occurred on 23rd December. That is just over four months ago. The Deputy can reconcile his statement with the facts.
The Minister is deliberately wasting time in a short debate.
I have, at any rate, shown that one of the weapons used during the whole of this discussion has been an absolute exaggerration of the facts of the situation, even in regard to that simple question of the time which has elapsed since the episode occurred.
What is the next weapon? Blatant misrepresentation of the position in which the Minister for Defence stands in relation to the Army. The case for the motion has been based upon a most extraordinary principle. We have heard from Deputy O'Higgins, and we had it repeated ad nauseam by Deputy McGilligan, that the Minister for Defence has been guilty of victimising his subordinates. I do not think the Minister for Defence wears even a lance-corporal's stripe, let alone a general's epaulettes. He is not in command of the Army. He is a civilian like the rest of us in this House, and there is no member of the Army who is subordinate to any one of us. He is here to serve the State, and the whole basis of this attack has been that the Minister for Defence was, in some way, a generalissimo who was singling out for punishment subordinate members of a corps of which he was the head.
Did the Minister listen to him?
Everybody in the House knows that that is a gross misstatement of fact, but all the time we had Deputy McGilligan and Deputy O'Higgins harping on this word "subordinates". It was "subordinates" all the time; that was the word dragged in in order again that this matter might be misrepresented, and that they might create a demand outside for a political victim, and not for an investigation. A victim for sacrifice is what the Opposition want, and not a fair investigation into this matter at all. A fair investigation into this episode has already been made, but it is not to act on the result of that investigation, it is not to improve the discipline of the Army, it is not to ensure that steps will be taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident that Deputy McGilligan and Deputy O'Higgins want, but merely a scapegoat out of whom they can make political capital. That is what they are looking for; that is why the motion was put down here——
Would the Minister tell us when the investigation took place?
——and not for the benefit and advantage of the Army, the officers of the Army or the men of the Army. It is simply in order that they may get a victom whose condemnation will bring them, they think, some political kudos. That is what they have been out for—that and nothing else. It is, in my view, a grave abuse of their responsibilities as an Opposition. They, like us, should have been concerned to see that what happened on that occasion could not happen again, and, instead of attacking the Minister whose duty it was to see that it did not happen again, this laxity having once been shown, they should have——
Attacked the officers.
——upheld him in enforcing discipline in the Army——
Sack them without charge.
——because the one fact that emerges as a result of that investigation——
There was no charge.
——is that there was certain laxity for which neither the Minister nor any member of the Government could have been held personally responsible.
Show us the file.
Take the absurd statement made by Deputy McGilligan. He read an extract from a newspaper account of the trial. There it was disclosed that, apparently because of the manner in which the door was lighted —and it is difficult to see how it could be lighted in any way other than by having, as I assume there is and was, a light over the door—whoever happened to be at the door and to be between that light and the outer gate would have been illuminated, and, of course, the person standing beyond the outer gate would have been in darkness. Deputy McGilligan said: "Was not the Minister for Defence responsible for that?" Leaving that, he went on to talk about the boy of 16 or 17 who happened to be posted on guard that night. Does Deputy McGilligan imply that it is part of the Ministerial duty to go around and inspect every barracks and every light in every barracks to see that, for the purpose of defence, that each particular light is properly positioned and that each particular post is properly illuminated; or is he to go along and ask every private in the Army what his age is; or is he to go around and see every commanding officer and say to him that such privates or other men in his personnel are to be placed at such and such posts? Is not that the full implication of everything Deputy McGilligan said here, that it is the personal responsibility of the Minister for Defence to be the O.C. of the Army?
The fact is, of course, that the Army is divided into separate commands, and the head of each command is the particular individual who is responsible for the management of the personnel entrusted to him. It is his duty to see that the job is done properly, and to ensure that persons who are not fitted to be posted on guard duty will not be posted on guard duty. The individual who is responsible is supposed to be sufficiently versed in the arts of war and in his profession as a soldier to know whether or not a sentry upon any particular post is placed more or less in danger because of arrangements which may be made for lighting that post. How is the Minister for Defence to be held responsible for that sort of thing? And yet that is the basis upon which Deputy McGilligan's charge was laid against the Minister for Defence.
The Minister for Defence is an ordinary civilian holding responsibility to this House for the general administration of the Army, but not for a particular episode like the one under discussion, which is, of course, the concern of the Army and those who are the responsible officers in the Army. Do not those of us who are familiar with the history of the past 18 years know that, in fact, the whole of the Army Act has been so devised as to make it quite certain that, in relation to executive command, the Minister for Defence has got very little to do, and that position—let not the Opposition forget it—was brought about here as the result of a commission which found that the Minister for Defence had much too much to do with the ordinary management of the Army?
If there are defects in the relationship which exists between the Minister for Defence and the Army, if the Minister for one reason or another is thought not to be in a position sufficiently to influence the manner in which the commanding officers of the Army do their duty, that is traceable more than anything else to the Act which was passed here after the 1924 mutiny.
Might I suggest that Deputy O'Higgins be allowed 20 minutes in which to reply?
I am going to deal——
On a point of order——
I must protest against these continued interruptions.
I want to raise a point of order. I want to direct the attention of the House to Standing Order 46:—
"A Deputy who persists in irrelevance or repetition in debate, and who, in the opinion of the Ceann Comhairle, or the Chairman, is speaking for the purpose of obstructing business, may be directed by the Ceann Comhairle, or the Chairman, to discontinue his speech after the attention of the Dáil or of the Committee has been called to his conduct."
I submit that the Minister for Industry and Commerce has been continuing in irrelevance and in repetition simply for the purpose of using up the time of the House, where a limited time has been allotted by the Government to an important debate.
I cannot rule on that at the moment.
Only for the reason that you have not been listening. Unfortunately, the Ceann Comhairle, who was listening to the debate, has left the House.
What the Deputy has said is a reflection on the Chair. Take the other case that was made; take the other ground upon which this motion has been based. One of the facts which emerged from the statement made by the Minister for Defence is that a court of inquiry was established to inquire into the circumstances and to ascertain exactly and precisely what happened on that night. This court of inquiry, consisting of senior officers of the Army, reported to the Minister that certain things which ought to have been done on that night, certain precautions which should have been taken and certain steps which should have been taken were, in fact, neglected or were not taken.
The court martial found that?
The court of inquiry arrived at certain findings, and disciplinary action was taken against a number of officers. In addition a number of men who were concerned with the incidents which led up to the invasion of the Fort and the seizure of the ammunition were tried by court martial and two of them were acquitted. Why were they acquitted? They were acquitted because the court took the view that, in fact, those men had not been properly posted on guard that night; and that those men had not had read out to them the orders for the defence of the fort. Whose responsibility was that? That responsibility lay with one of the officers, with the commander of the fort, in connection with whom, as the Minister for Defence has stated here, it is proposed that the Government should advise the President to take certain action; in other words, to dismiss him from the Army.
God help us!
Deputy McGilligan talked about sentry No. 1 and the military policeman. He said that they were acquitted and one other man was found guilty by court martial. They were acquitted on the ground that the officer in charge of the Fort had not done his duty in ensuring that these mon were properly posted and that they were properly charged with their duties upon that night and, of course, as the investigation disclosed, upon nights preceding that.
Let me get back to another point. It has been charged here that the real gravamen of the attack which has been levelled against the Minister for Defence and the Government is that this court of inquiry was not a fair court. Suggestions have been made that the regulations have not been complied with. It was said that men were put on trial, and they were given no opportunity to defend themselves. That is a complete misrepresentation, even of the functions of the court of inquiry. The functions of the court of inquiry were not to try men in respect of charges, but to find facts, so that the Minister for Defence might act upon the facts as this court of inquiry ascertained them.
The Minister for Defence was fully entitled to act without further ado upon the facts when they had been ascertained by an impartial and equitable tribunal for this reason: It is upon the advice and recommendation of the Government that every officer in the Army holds his commission. The Government has in respect of every officer holding a commission in the Forces of this State to take upon itself the responsibility of advising the President to grant that commission. If as a result of the facts that are brought to its notice by the member of the Government who is specifically charged with that obligation, the Government finds that an officer because of a charge of negligence proved against him, or for some other reason, is no longer worthy to hold his commission, then the Government is perfectly entitled to advise the President to withdraw that commission.
What happened in this case? A court of inquiry was set up to ascertain facts. Of whom did the court consist? Of the comrades and brother officers of the officers concerned, men who served with them during 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1923, and who have served with them ever since; men who were the comrades of Deputy O'Higgins and Deputy Mulcahy. And it is their honour that is impugned here in this House. The charge that is being made here is that the Minister for Defence did play on the fears of these officers, or the hopes of these officers —that on the one hand they would be victimised, or on the other that they would be rewarded, if they set themselves to find scapegoats who would save the faces of the Minister for Defence and the members of the Government. That is the charge made here to-night by Deputy McGilligan, that these men did, in fact, become the slayers of their own brothers in order that they might curry favour with the Minister for Defence.
Might I point out——
I am not prepared to give way now.
I want to raise a point of order—that this debate is confined to three hours and that the mover of the motion is entitled to 20 minutes to reply.
Only by arrangement.
Deputy Mulcahy has interrupted so often that I do not think I have been thirty minutes speaking.
On a point of order, is the arrangement, as announced from the Chair, agreed to between the Government and ourselves to be violated?
The Minister is in possession.
The Minister for Defence will bear me out that I opened the debate with that understanding that the mover of the motion was to get time to reply.
I have no knowledge of what the arrangement in respect of the conclusion of the debate was, but I expect that there would be given an opportunity to conclude.
I will not detain the House any longer except to emphasise that——
Sit down.
I want to emphasise the point that the Court of Inquiry was set up to ascertain facts, and that if anything arose from the findings, action might be taken against those who were responsible. The court made such a report to the Minister for Defence that he was compelled, in order that the indiscipline and laxity which was exhibited on that night might not again occur, to take action which, if it erred at all, erred on the side of mercy. Now, Sir, I cannot understand the attitude and the inconsistency with which the Opposition approached this matter.
Deputy O'Higgins said at the beginning that a grave and serious disaster has occurred, affecting the Army; that in other countries, when such a grave and serious disaster has occurred, a Parliamentary inquiry is at once held. He said that this was the gravest disaster that had overtaken the forces of this country. Now, in the same speech in which he used these words, he talks about these officers in regard to whom the court of inquiry which was constituted, and constituted not, mind you, of civil servants, not outsiders, not political supporters of the Minister for Defence, but a court of inquiry constituted of officers of proved service, of high rank—
Is the Minister going to violate the agreement arrived at between the Government and the Opposition?
The Minister for Industry and Commerce is going to see that our mouths will be shut.
May I ask the head of the Government if the agreement is to be flouted by the Minister for Industry and Commerce?
It would be a good job if all this energy were turned towards providing employment for the army of 120,000 unemployed.
I understand that there was an agreement that three hours should be given. I am not aware of any arrangement come to for concluding, but I think it is usual that the mover of the motion should be given some time to reply.
I would have been much shorter if Deputy Mulcahy had not interrupted. I have pointed out that Deputy O'Higgins held that this was the gravest disaster that has overtaken us since 1922, but that when the court of inquiry find who was responsible for these occurrences, and when the Minister for Defence has to act upon their findings, then Deputy O'Higgins comes along here and talks about the officers responsible for this occurrence as if they were knights in shining armour without reproach, long-serving, unselfish, zealous, patriotic officers. At the end of his speech I thought he was about to suggest that we ought to form some order of merit in this country, and that those officers who were concerned in this raid should be suitably decorated by the House.
Early in January, referring to this occurrence, the Taoiseach spoke of it as a disgraceful humiliation under which the country was reeling. That was the result of the raid on the Magazine Fort. Tomorrow any man with a sense of decency can refer to the disgraceful humiliation piled on this country by the speech made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. You have a Minister in an Irish Parliament, greedy of time, anxious for more time in order to pour buckets of mud on the men who wore Ireland's uniform, trying to absorb the last minutes of the debate in implying to the Deputies and to the public outside that the court of inquiry had found certain officers guilty of culpability, or negligence, or anything else, in connection with the raid on the Magazine Fort. But the findings and the evidence and the whole procedure of the court of inquiry has been kept secret and suppressed. If the Minister were uttering truths, why not circulate that report of the court of inquiry and satisfy us that there was evidence against any officer? The result of the whole thing is that it was a secret inquiry; that no findings were published, and that no charge was made against any officer. The whole hysteria of the Minister for Industry and Commerce to-night was pointing the finger at others so as to keep attention away from his own Benches. This was a despicable, discreditable attempt to slander and belittle the names of decent men who wore a clean uniform long before he came in with his belated attempts to tarnish that uniform. The officers of the Army, our comrades in the past, are honourable men. If the Minister can find one of these officers guilty in any way in connection with what happened on the 23rd December last, why suppress the report? I asked the Minister for Defence had any charge been made against any officer, and he refused to answer my question. I ask the head of the Government now to say if any charge has been made against any officer except the charges made solely by the Minister for Industry and Commerce?
May I tell the Deputy that all the action that has been taken by the Minister was based upon the findings, and in no case was any disciplinary action taken of a graver or more severe character than that which was recommended.
There are secret findings suppressed from this Parliament, and action is taken without formulating a charge, or without giving any officer an opportunity of defending himself.
The Minister has the right to see that discipline is maintained. He set up an independent inquiry of senior army officers, and acted upon its findings. It is the only way in which discipline can be maintained.
But Parliament has the right to see that there is fair play in the Army of Parliament. The secret trial that has taken place, and this vindictive action that has taken place, would stir up recoil and reaction even in Russia. We have reached the point that this Parliament 18 years after its establishment, has to approve of secret trials.
It was not a trial. It was a Court of Inquiry.
Held behind the back of the officer concerned.
Not at all; he was brought before it.
And no charge made against him. He has been deprived of his livelihood.
According to law.
According to law?
Yes, according to law.
This is the first time that the Minister has opened his mouth, and he is now opening it as a lawyer. We were anxious that he should speak as the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. He is going to speak now as a lawyer. I suppose that is his next portfolio. However, there is a motion here asking for a committee of Parliament to investigate the whole thing. If officers have been found guilty, if there is sufficient evidence to support a charge against any officer why not bring it before that committee and place the facts before it and that committee will satisfy the Dáil? We have a thing now that nobody can stand over. No charge has been made.
It was all stood over before, and other officers have been dismissed in similar circumstances.
No charge has been made against any of those officers. No evidence pointing to them has been placed before Parliament, and yet officers have been deprived of their livelihood.
The Deputy said all that before.
And I will say it many times again.
We are pretty sick of it now.
You ought to be.
As regards what took place, I could not even get that much out of the dumb pals in front. They were asked for an inquiry. Two Ministers spoke, but neither of them referred to the motion. One of them read out a whole litany of suggestions against different soldiers and different officers. Any person not familiar with what happened in the last few months, and listening to the Minister for Defence, would believe that there was a clear case of guilt against three or four N.C.O.s and men, and four or five officers. We find that three of them were placed on trial, and that two of them—of the N.C.O.s and men—were found not guilty. We find that no officer was placed on trial, that no charge was made against any officer, but that four or five of them were found guilty. Officers were found guilty in the absence of evidence, in the absence of charge, in the absence of trial, and the findings, suggestions and recommendations of the court of inquiry are suppressed. Why? I say that the findings of the court of inquiry were suppressed because the findings of the court of inquiry pointed higher up than to any man in uniform.
The statements which I gave to the House were based on the sworn statements of witnesses at the court of inquiry.
Selected extracts from the court of inquiry, but not a single finding and not a single recommendation. It is common knowledge that the finding of the court of inquiry pointed higher up, and it is because it pointed higher up that the understanding given to the Dáil last January— that the report would be reported and circulated—has since been violated, and it is necessary in the interests of political people, civilians and Ministers. I notice the Taoiseach smiles.
I have to laugh at this.
The Taoiseach always smiles when he is in an awkward corner. The Taoiseach always smiles when he has to stand over dirty, discreditable work. Perhaps he has often to do it.
That is dirty, discreditable talk.
The Taoiseach has never had to stand over anything as discreditable as he is standing over at the moment—victimising the under-dog so as to save pals. There are people over here who will stand over their old pals against all the power and might of the Government.
That has been a splendid performance, a performance very helpful to democracy.
As helpful as the dummy beside you.
Motion put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 31; Níl 50.
Tá
- Bennett, George C.
- Benson, Ernest E.
- Brasier, Brooke.
- Burke, Thomas.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Cogan, Patrick.
- Corish, Richard.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Costello, John A.
- Davin, William.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Esmonde, John L.
- Everett, James.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Giles, Patrick.
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Hughes, James.
- Hurley, Jeremiah.
- Keating, John.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacEoin, Seán.
- McGilligan, Patrick.
- McGovern, Patrick.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- Nally, Martin.
- O'Higgins, Thomas F.
- O'Sullivan, John M.
- Pattison, James P.
Níl
- Aiken, Frank.
- Allen, Denis.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Carty, Frank.
- Childers, Erskine H.
- Cooney, Eamonn.
- Crowley, Fred Hugh.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Flynn, John.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fuller, Stephen.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Humphreys, Francis.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kissane, Eamon.
- Little, Patrick J.
- Loughman, Francis.
- Lynch, James B.
- McCann, John.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- Munnelly, John.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Loghlen, Peter J.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Doyle and Bennett; Níl: Deputies Smith and T. Crowley.
Motion declared lost.