Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 14 Dec 1948

Vol. 113 No. 11

Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill, 1948—Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Captain Cowan

When the Dáil adjourned on Friday I was dealing with the proposal to extend the provisions of the Defence Forces Act to 31st March, 1950. I expressed my objection to this continuing series of Bills being introduced for the purpose of continuing an Act which, in its nature, was temporary when introduced 25 years ago. This 1923 Act is responsible to a large extent for the fact that the Army is under strength at the moment and that it is incapable of performing any of the functions that, in the ordinary way, should be assigned to it. I just glanced over this 1923 Act, introduced, as I say, in a rush, and I looked at the 5th Schedule of that Act which makes provision for the billeting of officers and soldiers. Introduced as it was in 1923, that particular Schedule made provision for the meals that would be given to officers and soldiers billeted on the populace. It provided that for breakfast five ounces of bread, one pint of tea with milk and sugar and four ounces of bacon would be provided for every officer or soldier and it contained this very extraordinary provision: when an officer or soldier is not entitled to be furnished with a meal the keeper of a victualling house shall furnish the officer or soldier with candles, vinegar and salt and allow him the use of a fire and the necessary utensils for dressing and eating a meal. That in itself is an indication of that particular Act, which was the British Army Act dressed up in a hurry to provide for the government and administration of our Defence Forces. As I have said, and has been said in this House many times over the past quarter of a century, that Act is unsuitable. That Act should be revised and this House should have an opportunity of bringing into force an up-to-date Defence Forces Act that would govern and provide for the government of the Army, justly and fairly.

When I spoke on this matter before I dealt with court martial procedure, and I am glad to say that the Minister since that has made arrangements for its improvement and some of the very objectionable features to which I referred have been removed, but still there are provisions in this Act that are unjust and unfair. For example, if damage should be done in a barrack and if no person can be found to have done that damage, the Act provides that every soldier in the unit must put his hand in his pocket and pay for it. There is no question of his having any say in the matter; the amount he is required to contribute towards compensation for barrack damages must be paid by him. The Act did provide that that damage should be occasioned by the wilful act or negligence of a person or persons who cannot be identified, but that particular provision that it is wilful damage seems to have been forgotten and the result is that quite extensive maintenance works are done from time to time at the expense of units in occupation.

The Act also contains another very objectionable provision, a provision whereby the Minister can, by Order, provide for the deduction from the pay of an officer or soldier of specific amounts for particular purposes. My experience is that something like this happens: There is an accident, maybe an ordinary collision, in which a military vehicle is involved. That matter may be dealt with in the ordinary courts, but there is an inquiry into it afterwards. Evidence is taken and a letter is generally sent out by the secretarial end of the Department to the particular officer or soldier, telling him that unless he agrees to pay a particular sum the Minister will make an Order deducting that sum from his pay. I consider that a very objectionable provision. I consider that if we had an opportunity of going through this Act, section by section, we would not give to the Minister such power. The actual decision is taken in every case by a civil servant, who threatens the officer or soldier with the powers the Minister will exercise, and when it is sent to the Minister it appears to be an automatic action on his part to sign this decision of some civilian member of the Department of Defence. In all the cases I know of, once it reached the Minister the Order was made as a matter of course.

Mr. Keane

Would it be in order for me, Sir, to put a point of information to Deputy Cowan to explain——

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy will have an opportunity of explaining all that later. We cannot have a dialogue now.

Captain Cowan

That is an objectionable feature of this Act and if I were to take the time to go through that Act, as I might do, I would surprise this House with the number of instances where injustice can be done to officers and soldiers under its provisions. I make the case that the disgruntled state of the Army, the disgruntled state of officers, N.C.O.s and men, is due in a large measure to this unsatisfactory Act which should have been changed long ago.

The Act provides for disciplinary punishment of a summary nature. It provides maximum penalties, detention up to 28 days, and detention for a period of 28 days means the loss of pay during the period of detention. I remember lectures being given to officers who had the responsibility of imposing these punishments pointing out that the penalties laid down in the Act were maximum penalties, but the general practice, the substantial practice, was to impose the maximum penalties rather than some lesser penalties in the same scale. The punitive provisions the provisions in relation to stoppages from pay and the fines which could be imposed—all these things have helped to sour the Army, with the result that, when the emergency was over, there was a rush on the part of everybody who could get away from the Army. That has this detrimental effect, that the thousands of men who served in the emergency went home dissatisfied. They spoke about these conditions in their homes, in publichouses and in various places where they met together and the result is that, on the part of the young men of the country, there is now no desire to join the Army or to have anything to do with the Army. These provisions I have mentioned in the old Act have helped substantially to cause that spirit of dissatisfaction in the Army which has made recruiting an impossibility.

There are in the old Act provisions relating to promotions, and the Act authorises regulations to be made in that regard. There has been great dissatisfaction, particularly in the commissioned ranks, in regard to promotions. During the emergency period certain promotions were made from the Reserve and Volunteer forces, but the surprising thing was that the few high promotions that were made were not at all welcomed by the defence forces as a whole. There was a feeling, and I am sorry that it should have arisen, that a man's political viewpoint was of considerable importance in getting him promoted to a very high rank. That is one thing which must not be allowed to happen in the defence forces. It would be much better for the country as a whole and for the defences forces if promotions could be made in such a way that everybody would be satisfied that the promotion was due to military efficiency and ability.

Mr. Keane

On a point of order. I wonder is Deputy Cowan referring to Major Tuohy in making that statement?

An Ceann Comhairle

That is not a point of order.

Mr. Keane

Because if he is——

An Ceann Comhairle

That is not a point of order. The Deputy did not mention anyone, and he was wise in not mentioning anyone.

Mr. Keane

In case he may have any vague——

An Ceann Comhairle

Deputy Cowan is in possession.

Captain Cowan

Deputy Keane completely misunderstands me. If I should say anything anywhere in regard to the officer he has mentioned, it would be to pay him the highest possible tributes as a very efficient officer and I think that would be the viewpoint of everybody who had the good fortune to serve with him at any time during the past quarter of a century.

Mr. Keane

May I say in regard to that that I did not for a moment try to cast any aspersion on the officer mentioned?

An Ceann Comhairle

The point is that, once names are mentioned, other Deputies may mention other names.

Mr. Keane

This will be a means of paying him the tribute which he did not get in his official capacity.

Captain Cowan

It is absolutely essential that the matter of promotions should be based on military knowledge and efficiency and it would be wrong if the feeling got abroad—whether it was correct or not—that promotion was dependent on a person's political views or the influence of his political friends. If we had a Bill going through dealing entirely with the Defence Forces, and if we had an opportunity of revising this old Act of 1923, I think we would be able to put in provisions which would make it impossible for any complaint to be made or any misunderstanding to arise on these lines.

I spoke here on the previous day with regard to the military members of the Council of Defence and Deputy Vivion de Valera interjected that the Minister would have an opportunity of defending them. The suggestion which may arise from that interjection was that I was making some unfair attack on these officers. I want to disabuse the Deputy's mind on that point and to make my own position with regard to it perfectly clear.

Mr. Keane

That is what it looked like.

Captain Cowan

I made the point that, under the Ministers and Secretaries Act, provision is made for a three years' period of office for the military members of the Council of Defence. This House passed that Act in 1923 and it was put into force and kept in force from 1923 until after the change of Government in 1932. For some unexplainable reason, the new Government did not adhere to the provisions of that Act, except in this regard, that, when the period of three years had expired, they reappointed the particular officer for a further period of three years.

An Ceann Comhairle

I think the Deputy gave us that at some length already.

Captain Cowan

I want just to deal with the particular point now. It was necessary to refer to it in that way. As far as the particular members of the Council of Defence are concerned at the moment—the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General—I would say this, for myself, that when these officers were appointed and at the time they were appointed, I was perfectly satisfied that they were the best appointments that could be made at the time. I hope Deputy Major de Valera will not consider that as an attack on these particular officers. That was my view, from my own particular knowledge.

Deputy Traynor here mentioned certain matters on which he had been advised by the Army Headquarters Staff. The present Minister for Defence, Deputy Dr. O'Higgins, said he had been advised on matters which appeared, on the face of it, to be in conflict. There are quite a number of other matters that I could refer to in which different advice was given to different Ministers. One was in regard to the age limits of officers. Prior to the change of Government an age limit was put into operation and was enforced, and I take it that that age limit was recommended to the Minister by the Army Staff in the best interests of the Defence Forces. Since the change of Government the present Minister has, very wisely and very properly, amended the age-limit provisions and extended the period of service of certain officers. I think we can accept it that the Minister did not do that on his own, that the Army Headquarters agreed with him that it was the correct thing to do.

We had the position in regard to Captain Curran, of the Magazine Fort case, dismissed ignominiously by one Minister and one Government—I take it, with the approval of the Army Staff at the time—and, after a change of Government, reinstated with all the honours that could be given to him, and properly given to him—and very likely, at least I assume so, that was done by the Minister on his own authority but with the approval and with the advice of the Army Staff. These things establish, one point of view conclusively, that the Vice-President of the Executive Council in 1923 was perfectly right when he provided a period of three years' office for these particular officers.

Now, the Bill that we are discussing at the moment makes provision for the extension of service beyond 21 years in the, case of non-commissioned officers and men, it makes provision for the extension of service for a period of 10 years beyond 21 years, that is, it makes provision for an extension to cover a total period of Army service of 31 years in the case of a soldier. I would like to know whether such a scheme was recommended by the Army Council to the previous Minister. I take it that, when it is here before us, it is the recommendation of the present Army Council to the present Minister. But where are the ideas we had, the ideas expressed by the Leader of the Opposition, that the new Army in this country was to be a young man's Army? I am not taking any objection to this amendment. I know that there are very sound reasons why certain soldiers should have the period extended to 31 years, in certain cases. The whole trouble is that there has been so much toying with the ideas of the Army over all these years. A civilian Minister, a Government, can control the Army to a large extent from the point of view of the public purse; but beyond that, the Army should be governed and controlled by its own Army Staff, subject to the law laid down by this Parliament.

I said on a previous occasion that it ought to be our aim and ambition to prevent the Army being the plaything, the toy, of political Parties and political ideas. I do not see that we can do that if, every few years, with every change of Minister, we have completely new views in regard to matters that can be considered policy.

We have several Reserve forces at the moment. The original Army Act provided that no person would be on the Reserve unless that person served for a period in Army service, and was transferred to the reserve as a trained soldier. That was the original conception. But then, about 20 years ago, we began to monkey with the Act, and we made provision whereby you enlisted a man for a day in the Army, and you transferred him to the reserve then. That was only monkeying with the Act then. It was in pursuance of that monkeying that attempts were made to build up an officers' training corps in the different universities. It was not welcome at the time to some individuals, that formation of an officers' training corps; but, nevertheless, there have been developments and amendments of the Act dealing with this question of the Reserve, and now we have different classes of the reserve. What their numbers are I do not know at the moment, but as to whether that Reserve is an officient force, an effective force, whether it is capable of doing the work that it is supposed to do, these are matters that are of importance to us as a Parliament.

One would imagine that when these new Reserves, or Local Defence Force, or Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil, were being built up, there would be available to assist them in their training and in their administration all those officers and soldiers who had served with distinction in the Army for a great number of years. Across in Britain, even in America, with its present ideas in regard to world conflict, they are quite pleased and anxious to have the assistance of every person who is trained as a soldier and an officer. But what did we do with them? The moment a soldier or officer had completed his period of Army service, we gave him a pension, we put him out, and we made no provision whereby he would be liable for military service in the future. I say to the Minister that there is a great waste of public time in the training of these men and a great waste of public moneys if those officers and soldiers are not to be made available for the defence of the State until they reach, say, 65 years of age. Up to that age they can render valuable service as administrative officers in charge of depôts, as police officers, stores officers and can fill a hundred and one important posts that can be filled successfully only by steady officers and soldiers of their experience. I am to make this recommendation to the Minister, that he should introduce provisions whereby these officers and soldiers would be made available for service in those defence reserve organisations until such time as they have helped to build up an effective and efficient reserve.

It has been said here hundreds of times that we cannot afford a large standing army. That is perfectly clear. We cannot do it. We must do the next best things, which is to build up a citizen force. The only way that can be done is to have available all the trained material that, very fortunately, there is in the country. I know quite a number of officers who served in the Old Reserve, as it was called. There are roughly about 100 of them now. The great majority of them had been Old I.R.A. officers. They had served for a period of seven or eight years in the Regular Army. They had served a period of ten years on the Reserve, doing a month's excellent training every year. They came up at the commencement of the emergency and served with distinction during it. At that time the idea was that on retirement from the regular forces you went on the Reserve and remained on the Reserve until you reached a certain prescribed age limit. Completely out of the blue, the late Government provided that the age limits for the Reserve would be the same as for the Regular Army. The services of these officers, after all those years, were lost. I would appeal to the Minister not to follow that short-sighted policy, but to go back to the original conception and make use of all those officers and soldiers until they reach the age of 65 years.

That brings me to the matter of defence policy—something that we never had, as far as I know, except during the last war when the policy of this State was a policy of neutrality. That was a clear, well-defined policy and there was built up here a magnificent force to preserve that neutrality at all costs. What is our policy at the moment? What is the policy of the Government in regard to the Army? What is their policy in regard to another war? Is our defence policy a policy of neutrality? If it is, we must build up the forces to maintain that neutrality. The only way in which we can do that is by making available all that splendid, trained material that is there only waiting to be harnessed and organised. Will it be the policy of our defence forces that we must reintegrate our national territory by military force? Is that the policy of the defence forces? Is it to be built and organised for that purpose? Is the Department of Defence to take no official notice of that particular position? We can be insulted, we have been insulted, by the Ministers of the Six County Government. Are we to take those insults lying down? I would ask the Minister to consider that it is unfair to an Army Headquarters Staff not to have a specific policy for the armed forces of the State.

I would go so far as to say that at the present juncture in our history, provision should be made by the Minister and by the Government that arms would be available in every house in this country, that our young men, through rifle competitions and otherwise, would be trained in the use of arms, that in the event of an invasion of this country, our young men would fight on every hill, at every cross-roads. We know we cannot build up a defence force that will go out and meet the invaders here or there, but we must make it costly for them to land anywhere, to move anywhere. We can only do that by having every young man in the country armed and available to fight under local leaders. Any other defence policy, in my view, is a wasteful policy. Any other defence policy, in my view, would be a failure.

I had hoped that in introducing this Bill the Minister would have told us how many men are serving in the Army at the moment, how many officers, how many N.C.O.s and how many soldiers are in it; and whether they are able to carry out any course of training whatsoever. I hope that, in replying, he will give that information.

Dr. O'Higgins

It was all given here a fortnight ago in reply to a Dáil question.

Captain Cowan

Yes. However, as regards the particular Bill, I would have liked to have had readily available information as to the present strength in ranks of the Army. The Minister did tell us that there were approximately 4,000 deserters from the Defence Forces during the emergency.

By accident, I came across a copy of the Irish Times published in 1943 — I just found it in my Defence Forces Act, and how it got in there I do not know. This copy of the Irish Times is dated October 29th, 1943, and it reports proceedings here when the Minister for Defence was introducing the Estimate for the Department of Defence. This question of desertion was being discussed. According to the Irish Times, “Mr. Traynor said the impression seemed to be that there were large-scale desertions in the Army. I was surprised to be informed,” he said, “that it represents I per cent. of the total strength, and is something that we need not have to worry about.” Let us calculate. Four thousand deserters, calculated as 1 per cent., represent a defence force of 400,000 men. Now, obviously the information given to Deputy Traynor at that time, and which he gave to the House, was inaccurate.

Major de Valera

Four thousand men—that represents the total desertion from the beginning to the end of the emergency, and 1943 was in the middle.

Captain Cowan

I would say 1943 was sufficiently near the end. Four thousand deserters, calculated as 1 per cent., would represent an army of 400,000. I have yet to learn that we had that many armed men in our services during the emergency. There is a very useful heading in that paper to that report. It says, "No Backdoor Promotions in the Army." I have commented on the matter of promotions and I will not comment on that heading.

The Minister is getting this Bill—at least, I expect he will get it—from the House. It will bring this Temporary Provisions Act to the 31st March, 1950. No man knows better than the Minister the defects of this Army Act. Nobody knows better than the Minister how necessary it is to have this Army Act revised. I ask the Minister to press on the Headquarters Staff to provide a draft for him of this new Defence Forces Bill as early as possible. I do not know whether I will be in this House in 1950, but if I am, I hope sincerely that it will not be my duty to spend another hour criticising this Defence Forces Act. Deputy Traynor at one time told us the draft was ready and from my own knowledge I am aware that it was ready some 20 years ago. Why there is this objection to bringing in a Bill that will remove so many anomalies, do away with so many injustices, and make provision for a contented Defence Force, I cannot understand. I make a special appeal to the Minister, as one who is very sincerely interested in the welfare of the Defence Forces and who is anxious to give the Minister every assistance, to make up his mind that this is the last time when a Temporary Provisions Bill will be introduced here by him as Minister, or by this Government.

Major de Valera

Before dealing with some of the matters raised by Deputy Cowan, I should like to comment on the Bill more narrowly than he did. Generally speaking, it simply continues Army legislation for another year and introduces some relatively minor amendments, but Section 8, although in its nature it is a relatively minor amendment, nevertheless perturbs a number of Deputies here, and for this reason. Apparently in introducing this section, the Minister has some definite purpose in mind. I take it that he and the Department did not go to the trouble of incorporating a provision or pardon merely from general compassionate motives without having a particular contingency in mind. From that alone, I am inclined to conclude that there must have been some particular cases or general situation that the Minister thought it desirable to meet; in other words, it seems to me to imply that there are other people in the barred categories already in State employment, or there are people in these categories seeking employment now whom the Minister would like to facilitate.

The events of the war have passed and I would not recommend anything savouring of vindictiveness to anybody in this House; but it is not from that point of view that I object to the provision. I object to it from this angle. A number of soldiers, reservists and emergency, and discharged regular soldiers, have given loyal and faithful service to the State from the time they joined the Army until they left it. These men who served during the emergency and did not leave, these men particularly of the Reserve or emergency who reported for training and service and who served until they were duly discharged, have a claim on us. To my knowledge, many of these ex-soldiers are in need of employment. If my first deduction is right, there are vacancies which they would be entitled to in priority to people who deserted or failed to answer the call. For that reason, I do not so much oppose this measure as think it unnecessary.

Surely, if we have appointments in the State service or where the State has influence or some control, and if these appointments are available to men who deserted or failed to answer the calling-up notices, then these appointments are equally available to ex-soldiers who served and discharged the liability which they incurred by volunteering and serving during the emergency. These men have a prior claim, and, on their behalf, now, I put it to the Minister that, whatever may be said for granting pardons or removing the disabilities of people in a certain category, our first duty is to put such appointments as are available at the disposal of ex-soldiers who have served. There are certain organisations of these ex-soldiers recognised by the Minister's Department—more than one, I understand. The Minister, or anyone interested in the State service, can easily get the necessary personnel, whether they be technicians or common labourers, from amongst those who served during the emergency. In dealing with this section, the first thing I want to stress is the prior claim of these men who served loyally, and who have a claim prior to anybody who did not serve, particularly against those who broke their contract of service, whether by desertion or by failing to answer the calling-up notice. The Minister mentioned at one stage—he will correct me if I am wrong in this—that we did not know whether all these people got their calling-up notices or not. The Minister will pardon the expression, but that does not wash, for the simple reason if a man joins the Army—and he could not get a calling-up notice until he joined the Army——

Dr. O'Higgins

I do not think the Deputy is correct in that. A volunteer or a reservist may never have got his calling-up notice.

Major de Valera

Quite.

Dr. O'Higgins

I thought the Deputy was saying that if he ever joined the Army, he must have got it.

Major de Valera

I am not saying that. What I am saying is that to become a reservist in any category, he must have joined the Army. If he joined the Army, we must assume that he did so with his eyes open, knowing what he was doing, understanding the liability which he was incurring, and, presumably, most of these men actually did a certain amount of training. I think people who did not do certain training were not called up in many instances, but from the mere fact that he joined in the first instance, we must take it that a man knew what he was doing. He voluntarily undertook this duty. Very well; he did not require any special notice in 1939 and 1940 to know that there was a general call-up. I would say, whatever the law of the situation has been, the equity of the situation was that anyone who had previously joined had a duty, at least, to find out whether he was to report or not. Therefore, it is hardly an excuse to say that because a man did not get, as an individual, a calling-up notice in 1940 he could not be expected to offer himself for service. He must have known.

Dr. O'Higgins

Nobody suggested that.

Major de Valera

That is the only line of excuse that could be made.

Dr. O'Higgins

Every penalty that is imposed on men by any other European army remains on him, but one that we imposed different from any other army in the world I am asking to have removed.

Major de Valera

I am not quarrelling with that but what I am saying is that there is hardly much ground for distinguishing between the man who failed to answer the call and who deserted ab initio and the other man who answered for a period and then cleared off. Personally I do not want to face the section on the single issue of excusing or relieving certain penalties that have been imposed. In principle, I have some doubts as to its wisdom, having regard to the fact that one must hold that military service is the responsibility of anybody who incurs liability to serve and that we cannot countenance the failure of a person who repudiates that responsibility.

From the point of view of principle, I have grave doubts as to whether we should pass this section but, for the moment, I am waiving these doubts and granting to the Minister that there is something in the point that it is equitable to remove that particular liability. Supposing I go so far as to say: "All right we shall pass this section," what I really want to insist upon is that apparently there is State employment available, if not direct State employment in the narrow sense, State employment within the contemplation of the section, and the Orders in question. That employment has already, in fact, been secured by people in these categories. If such employment is still available, I strongly recommend to the Minister that it should be confined to people who have served loyally for the period they were held to the colours, that, in other words, a good discharge should be a prerequisite to secure these appointments. If, on the other hand, there are people in this category already in that type of employment, then obviously there has been to date a serious breach of the conditions laid down by the Government of the day; there has been something wrong in the administrative machine if certain people who were not entitled to them, in fact procured appointments to which other people were entitled.

People who have served have a prior claim. I would go practically so far as to say that there should be positions for people who served. Further, if it can be brought home to any official or administrative body that such persons were knowingly employed, in breach of the said provisions, then I suggest it is time for disciplinary action. It is not merely a problem of the past; it is a problem that the Minister's Government or other future Governments may have to face. If we are not loyal to people who gave loyal service to us, then we can hardly expect the return which we will need in times of emergency.

I, therefore, would press the Minister, in dealing with this section, to consider the point which I have raised, the question of ex-soldiers. There are organisations available who will give particulars of these men and there should be no trouble in getting suitable candidates, whether technicians or otherwise. Unless it can be positively shown that nobody except a certain individual, because of some particular personal qualification of a technical nature, is suitable for a particular post, the provisions of this section should not be fully availed of, if passed.

There is nothing very much left in the Bill before us for special comment except perhaps one matter. The provision for transferring an officer of one type of reserve to another is, I think, a wise one. It is no harm to have it at the Minister's discretion to transfer an officer from one category of the reserve to another. However, it perturbs me a little to feel that perhaps this section has come into the Bill because the Minister is so pressed for reserve officers that he is going to have to call on the L.D.F., both for regular and first-line units. If that is the situation, it is a serious one. The local defence officer will normally be of a good type. He will possibly have greater potentialities than officers in other categories, but even admitting that, he suffers from the defect of time —the time he will have for training— and the fact that he is so much absorbed in civilian employment while training.

There is also the tactical consideration that nowadays there is definite room for L.D.F., apart from first-line troops, who require their own officers and their own standards. You cannot sacrifice one category for the other. In these circumstances, if this provision really represents a weakness in our first-line officers, if it is a stop-gap measure to transfer officers, who have secured commissions through local training in the L.D.F., to the first-line reserve, then, I think, we have a serious problem to consider and we shall have to raise the whole question as to how the first-line reserve of officers is to be built up. It may be— I am not throwing my weight on one side or other of the argument—that initially it would be a good thing to take officers from the L.D.F., transfer them to the first-line reserve and then train them further, or it may be a good thing to select officers, say on a short-term service in the regular Army. The point that I would like to make is this: that, first, if that is the reason why the section has crept into this Bill, then, obviously, it is high time to consider how we are to have a first-line reserve of officers. That first-line reserve must be energetically organised and trained to be, in fact, a first-line reserve, in other words, to provide officers who can officer first-line units alongside regular Army officers with a minimum period of delay after mobilisation to take the field in all mobile operations as first-line troops. Secondly, if then you are to take L.D.F., officers and transfer them to the first-line reserve in order to fill deficiencies in numbers, I would suggest to the Minister that he must go a little bit further. It will not be sufficient simply to effect a transfer on paper without certain specific further training in order to make these officers capable of fulfilling their rôle with first-line troops rather than with Local Defence troops. That specific training should be provided for. I hope I am wrong in thinking that there is some reason like that impelling the Minister to do this.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Deputy is wrong.

Major de Valera

I hope I am. In any event, I think it is a good thing to provide that the Minister should have the power of exchange. I will confine myself to the last recommendation that, if it is necessary to transfer L.D.F. officers to the first-line reserve, the necessary further training should be given to them in circumstances that will enable them to profit by it, having regard to their previous employment, and that kind of thing.

The remainder of the Bill does not call for very much comment. The extension of service has already been dealt with by others. The strength of the Defence Forces has given many people cause for worry, particularly the strength of the Reserve, but these are matters that probably had better be gone into on the Estimate for the Department rather than in this debate. On last year's Estimate, I dealt with them to some extent. I shall reserve what I have to say on them until the Estimate for the Department is before us next year. I would ask the Minister if, before the Estimate comes up for discussion, we could have the available data upon which to discuss constructively the question of the strength and composition of our Defence Forces, and of their equipment. Strictly speaking, I suppose that is all that really arises on this Bill.

However, other speakers, and particularly the last speaker, dealt with matters of broader import. The Council of Defence has been mentioned. It was mentioned more than once by the Deputy. A number of insinuations have been made. This should be realised: that the Council of Defence is a body which really is composed of the Minister, the Parliamentary Secretary, and, I think, the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. Generally speaking, it is a body for making representations on the military side to the Minister and the Government, and for dealing with general questions affecting the Army. Now that body has been of the same composition practically since the Defence Council was founded. The appointments thereto were automatic, once appointments to senior staff positions were made. The Deputy takes exception to the length of time which certain officers were left in these appointments. It must, however, be realised that the efficiency of a man and the question of keeping continuity in a particular task during an emergency period was involved in this.

Captain Cowan

Was there any other country in the world that had the same continuity of staff? Not another.

Major de Valera

If the Deputy will allow me, I shall deal with this in my own way. Another trouble that arises in a country such as this is that if you get the best people into these positions they may not necessarily be the people who are just up against their retiring age limit, and it would involve demotion, in effect, after a promotion in our case if you were to make frequent changes in these appointments which is a thing, generally speaking, to be avoided. Unfortunately, our Army is small. There are not a number of appointments of comparable value there. In fact, the trouble with the Council of Defence is that it embraces the three top appointments really, and no other. A man gets to a top appointment and it practically means demotion to put him out of that. The other course for him would be to go out on retirement. That would be very poor recompense for a man who had been selected for an onerous job because of his efficiency and ability. If he had to move into another category it would virtually mean demotion since there would be no equivalent appointment for him. What has been suggested might be a good thing in peace-time, but you must have reservations if you are dealing with an emergency situation. In peace-time it may be a good thing to have a change. Actually, during peace-time there were some changes in the Defence Council.

Captain Cowan

Pre-Fianna Fáil?

Major de Valera

After Fianna Fáil. We had three quartermaster-generals since 1932.

Captain Cowan

One retired.

Major de Valera

There were, as I have said, three since 1932. There is another thing which the Deputy must consider when dealing with this—that here you had an Army which had given a very fine example of loyalty to the State, whose senior officers——

Captain Cowan

In 25 years.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy should not interrupt. He spoke for over an hour.

Major de Valera

In any event, there were very good reasons why changes in appointments should not be made during the years before the war. Officers had already been placed in a number of appointments, and, unless they could be put in comparable appointments, there were very good reasons for not removing them into appointments that would, in effect, involve demotion.

The Deputy, in his speech, has commented a lot on this Act. I, for one, would have liked if he had been more specific. It is not enough to come along hinting, and so I would like if he had been more specific. He said that injustices have arisen under the Act, and that last year he mentioned the courtsmartial procedure. I thoroughly agreed with him on that. In fact, I supported him on that specific point. I would like to see some provision made for independent advice for soldiers. The Deputy is doing a service if he points out a thing like that, but he is doing a disservice if he comes along hinting, and will not tell us what precisely he has in his mind. He spoke about political appointments.

Captain Cowan

Promotions.

Major de Valera

Promotions. If anyone looks back at the history of the Army he will find that in 1932 a Government went into office practically every member of which had been in arms against the Army that they took over. To the credit of that Army, as I have said, they showed themselves to be loyal and faithful servants of this State. The Government appreciated that and no violent changes were made. The senior officers of the Army in 1939 were the same senior officers who were taken over in 1932 and who, in fact, had been in the opposite camp to the Government which took over in 1932. When the war broke out—or at any period during that time—certain changes in the staffs were made as between the senior officer personnel of that Army. In regard to political appointments——

Captain Cowan

Promotions.

Major de Valera

——or promotions —take promotion to Chief of Staff, to Adjutant-General, to Quartermaster General, to any Chief Staff Officer, to any brigade, to any command, take any promotion to the rank of colonel and you will find that in each and every case, without a single exception, the officers so promoted were officers who had been serving in the Army in 1932 whether as reservists or regulars. The officers, without exception, in these appointments and in these senior ranks, were officers who had served in the old Army Reserve. That really meant that they had served in the Regular Army at some period or that they were already serving in the Regular Army. If the Deputy can in any way show political preference in that he will display considerable ingenuity.

Captain Cowan

I did not deal with the permanent forces at all.

Major de Valera

The Deputy made an insinuation. Let us have the facts.

Captain Cowan

The non-permanent forces.

Major de Valera

That is the permanent force. I think that prior to the war there were practically no promotions to senior rank. In fact, a number of officers even in the regular forces were still second-lieutenants or lieutenants. Certain promotions, mostly in the Regular Army, were made before the war. There were some promotions to senior ranks before the war which again were all in the Regular Army. Then the war broke out. What happened? A large number of senior officer appointments immediately became available.

First of all you had, for instance, the filling of brigade staffs and battalion commanders on mobilisation. If my recollection serves me, and I think I am accurate because I have good personal knowledge of the matter, in every case, the officer who commanded a battalion or who held a higher appointment when the war broke out was appointed in 1939 or 1940. Every senior officer appointed to a senior officer's position was either a regular officer, with pre-1932 service or a Reserve officer of similar service. I recollect that at that time most of the units were commanded by regulars but I know of one battalion, anyhow, which was commanded by a Reserve commander or commander who later was promoted, and certain other appointments in depôts were filled by Reserve colonels of that pre-1932 service. In 1941 the final organisation of the Army was reached and a number of promotions to senior rank were then made. If anyone takes the list—and the Deputy can very easily get the list and analyse it—he will find that the bulk of these promotions were made from the Regular Army and the Old Reserve. A number of emergency and volunteer officers were also promoted at that time but only in the proportion, as one will find, that one would expect. If the Deputy makes any allegations of that nature I invite him to call for the information in respect of any particular officers about whom he has a question. I am sure the Minister will facilitate him by having the circumstances of promotion, and the Army recommendations, made available to him.

Let me take the second division staff I am relying on my memory, but I think that on that staff there was one Reserve officer, at the time I was there, who was a senior officer. He was the medical officer, an old reservist, who was well entitled to his rank. The rest of the officers were regular senior, and there was one volunteer Reserve officer on that staff, senior rank. In the brigade you will find the same. On the division, there was one senior Reserve officer. There was also a colonel. He was an old reservist, and nobody can complain of a political appointment in his case. I invite the Deputy, since he has made an insinuation, to have the matter investigated. He will find that, as I have proved by facts and figures, that insinuation is completely unjustified. The circumstances of promotion were as follows. Appointments were available. The Army people themselves, under the stress of the emergency—when, I can tell you, they were not very much worried about a man's outside qualifications—put in the best men they could find, without promotion. Generally speaking, the promotion followed afterwards on that man's unit, and on a recommendation that he should be promoted to fill the particular appointment that he was already filling. That was the usual procedure—practically invariably so in the case of senior ranks. Afterwards, that recommendation went to the higher authorities and was there sifted.

As far as I know, no promotions were made to higher senior rank unless the individual had undergone the proper courses and had passed them. Having done that, the matter then went to the Council of Defence and was submitted by the military authorities to the Minister concerned. As in the case of calling up retiring officers—taking them for service and promotion—all these things were dealt with by the Council of Defence on the recommendation of the military authorities and were then forwarded to where the final decision for promotions was made. Those promotions were invariably made on these lines.

The reason why I have gone into this matter in such detail is simply that I think it is a mistake for us here to bring such considerations to bear on the Army when there is no foundation for them. The Army in this country, from 1925 onwards, has had no contact with politics, and has not been the subject of political influence. It has been as far removed, perhaps further, from political influence than the Civil Service. It is a vital service for the State, and it must, therefore, continue to remain in that particular category. I think we should be doing a disservice to the Army and to the country if we were to make suggestions that the Army is a toy for politics. I think we should be doing a disservice to the Army and to the country if we were to make suggestions of political influence in regard to the defence forces. It is for that reason that I have dealt with the points raised by Deputy Captain Cowan. The difficulties in relation to the Army are of a totally different kind.

I agree with Deputy Captain Cowan that at various times there has been a certain element of dissatisfaction in the Army. It is inevitable that that should be so. Many officers felt that conditions in regard to pay, for instance, were not comparable with other branches of the State service. Most of the dissatisfaction in the Army is related to such things as scales of pay. Efforts have now been made to remedy that and I hope that as time goes on these matters will continue to be adjusted satisfactorily. A certain dissatisfaction was felt with regard to administration, particularly from the point of view of control of expenditure on warlike stores and so on. Deputy Captain Cowan and I have commented on these things in the past. The control of expenditure has given rise to a feeling of frustration on the part of officers and men who are really interested in the job. I admit that these things do exist but we should not try to pretend that the dissatisfaction is due to other causes. It is not. To go too deeply into these matters would entail a review of the entire field of administration, figures, numbers, finance and so forth. I think it would be better to deal with such matters on the Estimate.

In dealing with the Army one must appreciate that any dissatisfaction which does exist is due in large measure to the internal causes I have mentioned rather than for the reasons which Deputy Captain Cowan has mentioned. It may be that I am somewhat unfair to him in drawing such conclusions from his remarks; but that certainly was the impression he created on me. I do not think a contribution along those lines is helpful. It is bad for the Defence Forces as a whole.

I want to deal briefly now with the problem of retired officers. I have often thought that officers of the Regular Army who have retired should be considered as available for further service. That is done in other armies. There are appointments for which they might be eminently suitable. A captain who retires at 48 might well fill a post in an emergency. Officers on the retired list should be available for recall. Whether that should be extended to the Reserve is a question upon which I do not care to express an opinion here. It would depend on how the Reserve was formed. If the Reserve consisted virtually of officers with all the experience of regular officers a strong case might be made. If it were merely a reserve of officers trained for a particular task, but without any administrative experience, the same case could not be made. I think the retired list might usefully be one from which available officers could be recalled should the necessity arise.

Captain Cowan

That would be sufficient.

Major de Valera

Deputy Captain Cowan used the phrase that the Army was "the toy of political ideas." The Army has never been the toy of any political ideas either under the Cumann na nGaedheal Government or under the last Government. At the present moment, I am pretty certain that the Army is not subjected to political influence. In a particular sense, the Army is, of course, the toy of current political ideas. Governmental policy will inevitably have a reaction on the Army. But that is the only sense in which political ideas influence the Army. The sooner Deputies disabuse their minds of erroneous impressions along those lines the better. From 1925 onwards there has been very little political influence in the Army.

Deputy Captain Cowan has also suggested that the Army was never given a definite statement of policy. Having full personal knowledge of the Army I join issue with the Deputy on that.

Captain Cowan

I have some knowledge too.

Major de Valera

In these matters I have at least equal knowledge. I do not wish to enter into competition with the Deputy on this. I merely mention the fact to lend weight to what I am about to say. In 1926 the then Government gave a very reasonable direction to the Army on policy having regard to the general circumstances. Reasonable directions were given by successive Governments at various times since then. As far as general policy is concerned the Army has never been under any illusions as to what is required. What is required is that the Army should be prepared, as a first task, to account for itself here; in other words, to protect as far as possible the neutrality of the State if a decision were taken in any set of circumstances to maintain neutrality and, thereafter, to have the Defence Forces available for whatever rôle the Government of the day might indicate. Regard must always be had to the fact that in any event this country must be protected by the troops of this State. There are any amount of protection jobs to be done. There are installations and guards and so on. Whether one adopts a policy of neutrality or not, the Army must always supply a certain mobile force which must be immediately available to take the first shock of action. All subsequent considerations flow from that. I shall not go into details on that since another occasion will arise on which these matters can be dealt with more fully. It is, perhaps, desirable that I should confine myself within the limits of the debate here.

The Army has always had a definite indication as to what was required of it. Any difficulties that arise are largely difficulties of implementation. For instance, there was a definition of policy without at the same time giving the Army adequate means of implementing that policy. Difficulty of implementation was the main difficulty rather than difficulty of definition.

It is not desirable at the present time that we should ignore our Defence Forces, but our Defence Forces are really only part of the general problem that has to be considered. That is the problem this country might have to face if another major crisis were to break. That problem involves the coordination of economic activity, industry and supplies with the more narrow aspects of defence. These things must be looked to and organised. Our fear at the moment is that, in our anxiety to try to provide for the problems of the present, we shall overlook the necessity for providing against any such emergency.

It is unnecessary at this stage, as so much work has to be done along that line, exactly to define the hypothesis upon which you are going to meet the crisis. But, whatever hypothesis you adopt, the preparation up to a certain stage is the same and, having regard to the fact that other countries are doing it and that nobody feels very happy about the peace, we should make these preparations and the most effective way of having such preparations made is with the unanimous co-operation of all Parties in the House. It is perhaps for that reason more than anything else that I should like us all to leave politics, in the sense that Deputy Cowan insinuated, out of consideration in dealing either with the Army or with the defence problem generally.

We shall have other opportunities of discussing these matters. I am of two minds as to whether or not general discussions on defence policy are a good thing. It might be helpful, however, if the Minister would give us the information some time and give us an opportunity of discussing the concrete problems which arise in that regard— because any Government charged with these matters has problems, notably problems of finance, supply and all those things—to see how best we can provide that essential assurance against the next crisis if and when it comes. One would like to think it was not coming, but the trend of affairs in the world is not so bright as to make one unduly optimistic.

Generally speaking, I think I have dealt with the matters which Deputy Cowan raised. This is going to turn up again on the Estimate, and I would ask him in future to be just a little bit more specific. I can appreciate, perhaps more than others, certain things that he has been pointing to, and I do realise that, in the past, the Army has suffered from that stifling sense of being unable to get the facilities for fulfilling its rôle. There are a number of points that can be debated intelligently and perhaps with profit. That can only be done if the thing is brought down to earth, to specific concrete examples, and general talk about it is not helpful. The Deputy perhaps more than anybody else, certainly more than anybody in this House, would have a particular knowledge of the purely legal end of the Army. He has had that knowledge from a large practice in connection with courtsmartial, and he would be qualified to speak particularly about the legal effects of the repercussions on the soldier personally. Frankly, I invite him to give us the benefit of his experience there. On these other matters I join issue with him, as I have already, in particular where such allegations were made in general terms. I think it is due to everybody concerned that they should be specified to the extent that they can be directly nailed and the allegations supported, or else an opportunity given for concrete demolition of them.

Mr. Byrne

Most of the points. I intend to cover have been covered already. I would make an appeal, however, to the Minister, as most of us are anxious to help him to build up a happy and contented Army—I am sure that is the wish of every Deputy —to give consideration to the regulations applying to marriage and marriage allowances. Within the last couple of years a very large number of young boys joined the Army at ages ranging from 18 to 21 years. To my knowledge, a number of them got married before they reached the age of 22. They must wait until they are 22 before they can get the marriage allowances. As I say, a number of these young boys got married and the young wife and her baby are living on a single man's pay. I am sure the Minister would not like to see a young Army man, who possibly would make the Army his means of livelihood, hoping to complete from 21 to 28 years' service, starting under the conditions I have mentioned, namely, that a boy of 20 years of age or a girl of 17 or 18 in the City of Dublin after getting married should have to live on a single man's pay. I put it to the Minister that we ought to show the way as regards encouraging young people to get married. There should be no handicap to a young soldier taking unto himself a wife. The Minister should amend the regulations, if there are regulations, so as to permit of a young soldier of 20 or 21 not having to wait until he is 22 to get the marriage allowance. In fact, I will go further and say that once soldiers get married they should be put immediately on the marriage allowance and not have young wives suffering hardship because their husbands are on a single man's pay while serving the country.

There were a lot of other points which I wished to make but I will rather confine myself to this one special point and make an earnest appeal, which I am sure other Deputies will support, that once a young soldier in the National Army gets married he should get the marriage allowances and, if possible also, be provided with a house. I would be happy if the Minister was able to cope with that problem, but I know he has difficulty already about the housing conditions of married soldiers. I am not specially emphasising that, because I know what the problem is. There are 30,000 people in Dublin at present looking for houses or even a one-room or two-room flat and they cannot get even a single room, not to say a cottage. I know the Minister's difficulty in regard to that matter. I ask for the support of the whole House, however, for my appeal that a young Irish boy with a young wife ought not to be kept on a single man's pay because the couple cannot exist on it and it means appealing to some other authority to keep that man who is serving his country.

Mr. McQuillan

As there will be a further opportunity of discussing this defence problem on the Army Estimate, I do not intend to detain the House very long. There were, however, a few points mentioned, particularly by Deputy Traynor, and it is only right that I personally should reply to them. I happen to be an ex-member of the Defence Forces who served for six years at the bottom end, not at the top end near the "brass hats" and I, therefore, can speak very authoritatively on behalf of the under-dog, as you might call him.

Criticism was offered by Deputy Traynor regarding the estimated standing Army required—the number, I think, he said was 12,500—and he was greatly worried because there was no recruiting and no method of joining the forces. I want to be completely non-political on this matter and to approach it as fairly as I can, but the present Government cannot be blamed under any circumstances for the lack of recruits now in the Army. We can trace that back a lot further than the last 12 months. The emergency years started in 1939 and went on up to 1945 or 1946. Up to 1942 we had an Army here which was unquestionably first class; the morale was perfect and the type of recruits in it were 100 per cent. From round 1943 on the morale of the Army, as far as I knew it personally, deteriorated. There were several reasons for that. For example, around 1943 G.H.Q. inspections were started. Soldiers will always say that inspections are unpopular, but in this case for three months before the inspection the unfortunate soldiers were going day and night in the barracks and they were kept out on exercises. I do not want to go into this at the moment but I can say that they were often kept up at night preparing for it. When the big test was over and the brass hats had left things went very slack for the next nine months. The following year the same test was repeated. It was repeated ad nauseam, repeated year after year. In other words, one of the main things contributing to the “browned-off” condition was the accursed monotony that existed, the complete lack of imagination with regard to pastimes or training.

The second thing that contributed, to my mind, was the type of discipline imposed on this Army. It cannot be questioned or denied that the type of discipline we have in this Army is taken directly from the British Army. The idea in the Army was that the commissioned officer was a being completely above the N.C.O. or private.

An Ceann Comhairle

I think that the Deputy has travelled very much into administration. I know that the debate has been very wide, but this is surely administration which would be quite relevant on the Estimate for the Department of Defence.

Mr. McQuillan

I am trying to make the point regarding the strength of the Army and the cause that has made it so small, and I am coming to that by reference to the reason for the lack of recruits in the Army. Deputy Traynor mentioned the matter and that is what put me on to it. I would not have discussed it otherwise. I will not pursue the question of our type of discipline too far except to give an example. Paddy and Johnny out of the one village join the Army. Paddy is a cadet and is commissioned, but Johnny becomes a private, although he is probably just as brilliant as Paddy. Since one is commissioned and the other is an N.C.O. they live in two different worlds. A commissioned officer cannot mix even after duty hours with privates, and if a private wants an interview with an officer he must get an N.C.O. to introduce him to that officer. This country is too small for that kind of petty discipline. To prove the truth of my words anyone who is interested can look at conditions in the American Army, the Australian Army or the New Zealand Army and see the type of discipline that is maintained in those three first-class armies. They will find that there is no comparison between it and the type we have here in this country. I can give examples from colonels right down along the line that privates and N.C.O.s do not exist except for the use and benefit of the commissioned ranks.

Our cadet school is constituted to my mind along the wrong lines. The debate, however, is limited to some extent and I do not propose to go deeply into that. There will be, I know, plenty of opposition from the conservative element of the Army. Men who have had power in their hands for 10, 15 or 20 years are bound to be opposed to the idea that the type of discipline should be changed, but that is for the Government to decide and they should have the last word.

In general, the main thing we are all concerned with here, apart from politics, is the defence of the country. One man wants a standing Army of 12,500 men, while others are opposed to having a standing Army at all. My personal belief in the matter is that we do not need a large standing professional Army. We were always looked upon as a nation in arms and every man in the country should be a soldier. Why should we have 12,500 or 20,000 soldiers paid in non-productive work to twiddle away their lives in barracks and lead a morale-degrading, dodge-the-column existence, for that is what it is? They are all waiting for something to happen or for us to be invaded. We will never have in this country an Army for attack, an Army to make war on another country. Our sole aim is the defence of our own country so why not turn round now and make use of a citizen army. You have the nucleus or form of it already in the F.C.A. The F.C.A. is in a deplorable condition at the moment, that is the only way to describe it. I meet members of the F.C.A. every day of the week and it has practically no life at all as a defence force.

On paper we have, I suppose, 50,000 members of it, but in actual fact where you have a club of 30 members, only five or seven turn up to meetings. The rest only come when there is a pair of boots or a set of tyres to be given out. There is no use in blaming that on the way it is administered, because the officers and N.C.O.s who are administering the F.C.A. are actually as fed-up as the men. We want a citizen army here on the same lines as the F.C.A. where every able-bodied man would have an opportunity of learning how to use the most modern weapons, and not alone the men but in the country areas the young women should be given an opportunity of learning first-aid. That should be part and parcel of the F.C.A. —call it what you like. The business of giving an F.C.A. man a rifle to sling on his back and for him to appear out of nowhere at night with no ammunition, is a bit of a joke.

If you are to look on the F.C.A. as a citizen army, it will have to get a complete overhaul. The position at the moment is that meetings are badly attended and some of the members attend them as social functions, more than anything else. The training material available is negligible. Take, for instance, the matter of demolitions in which the L.D.F. should receive training. In the west of Ireland I know the L.D.F. particularly well, and if tomorrow I wanted to get a bridge blown, trees knocked across a road or a road blown up, I think I would have to do it myself. There is no use in training these men from the theoretical angle. Bring down your gelignite, or whatever type of explosive you intend to use, and give them practical experience of the job—show then how it is done and let them handle the stuff. This theoretical training on which the Army worked when I was in it is no use. I remember being in charge of a demolition squad during a big manæuvre and the demolition materials available to me were about 40 pieces of a tree sawn in the shape of anti-tank mines. I dished these out in the defence areas and that was our complete demolition outfit. It is a matter of playing at soldiers, so far as I can see.

Our Army should be based on the countryside. The units should live in their own localities, because, if you have a battalion stationed in a particular area, the men will know the people and the terrain and will be able to support themselves in that area. They must have at their disposal the most up-to-date weapons. If it is machine guns and rifles, give them these and give them demolition material. Teach them how to use these materials and teach them methods of communication. I now make a practical suggestion with regard to the meetings. If there is an L.D.F. meeting once a month, the men should get some little remuneration. If a man attends 12 meetings in the year, give him some small remuneration and you will have a good attendance. When you give him his month's training, no matter where he is brought, pay him well for it and you will get good results. That will be a cheaper Army in the long run than a big standing professional Army.

I regard the L.D.F. halls now being built as very useful and the Minister should go ahead with the building of the particular halls which I have heard are about to be erected. They will be an inducement to the boys to join the force. I should like the Minister to consider my point—I think a lot of people in the House are thinking on the same lines—that a citizen army is the proper type of army for us and not a large standing professional army, which is non-productive, the men twiddling their thumbs for 24 hours a day for a number of years which is bound to get them down.

In the case of boys in the country who are working on the bogs and on farms, and, in the cities, in the factories and shops, if you give them the proper inducement and get them interested in a citizen army, and give them a month of the year during which they can be properly trained, when they go back, they are productive for the other 11 months of the year and you have a cheaper army in the long run. All the talk we have about defence and so on amounts to this, that we should first give them something worth defending here. I do not want to go too deeply into that point, but it is the real key to this problem. As we stand at the moment, it is a poor excuse for an army to look after.

I want to give one example of what happened in my time in the Army and it is no harm for the Minister to know it. It was a regulation which made the men completely fed up with the discipline imposed upon them. About 1943 or 1944, an order relating to the wearing of greatcoats was made, providing that a soldier had to wear his greatcoat and Deputies know what an Army greatcoat is like when it is pulled up around the soldier's neck like a big bag. A conference took place amongst the Army brasshats as to how the soldier should wear his coat. One brasshat said that the soldier should be allowed to wear it with the lapels open during the summer because it was not fair to him to make him wear it closed. A bigger brasshat said no and the bigger brasshat naturally won the day, with the result that soldiers went about in the middle of summer with their overcoats buttoned up around their necks. I met these soldiers and I had nothing but the greatest sympathy for them. I think it is my job, having had experience of the Army for a number of years, to expose these matters, to bring them before the House, so that the House may judge the type of discipline imposed on a little Army where everybody knew everybody else.

It is playing at soldiers to have, as we have at the moment, an officer for every four or five soldiers. Go down to Athlone, Renmore or any other barracks and you will find that the officer strength is practically the strength of the N.C.O.s and men. I suggest that in my idea for a citizen army we have the solution of the problem at our disposal. We have available any number of first class officers who could be billeted on the country in the different areas and put in charge of citizen battalions—F.C.A., if you like to call them so. They will be doing a good job there, instead of being stuck in barracks and nobody will be knocked out of employment as a result. I do not wish to go too deeply into details and I will discuss other aspects of the matter on the general Estimate.

Mr. Colley

I wonder if the Minister has fully considered the effect in the future of Section 8 of the Bill. It is, to my mind, very serious if it is to be put on record that the Parliament of this nation considers that deserters should be given better treatment than men who served loyally in the Army.

Dr. O'Higgins

Of course, that is not true.

Mr. Colley

Let me develop my point. The section provides that men who deserted from the Army will be able to secure employment in Government and local government concerns, and that, if they have been there contrary to the law for the past few years, they will be secured and confirmed in that employment. There are a number of men who served loyally in the Army who have not got any such security or confirmation in the matter of their employment, if they have been fortunate enough to get employment. We are actually providing that people who have been illegally in employment for some years will be secured and confirmed in that employment, these people being men who deserted during the height of the emergency.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Deputy should read the section before he makes a speech along wrong lines.

Mr. Colley

I have read it.

Dr. O'Higgins

It does not secure them in employment.

Mr. Colley

It confirms the man who has already secured employment.

Dr. O'Higgins

Perhaps I might correct the Deputy. It does not confirm him in his employment, but it does retrospectively prevent the employing Department from having been guilty of an illegality. He can go out of his employment the day after this section has passed.

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

It only protects the employer.

Dr. O'Higgins

The State or the county council, as the case may be.

Mr. Colley

We are doing this for these men who deserted, and some of whom actually joined armies who might at any time have been in conflict with our Army. We are taking away from them these penalties, at a time when we are dismissing from employment in the Department of Defence itself, 1916 men and other I.R.A. men who founded this State. Only to-day the Minister gave me a reply which shows that 54 men, 19 of whom were 1916 men, have been dismissed since the 1st August from the Department of Defence. Under this Bill, we are making it easier—to put it very mildly —for deserters to secure public employment here. That is something I, for one, cannot stand over. At a time when the economy axe is falling to the detriment of 1916 men and Old I.R.A. men, at the stage they have now reached in life, we are trying to open up employment in public services for deserters. I wonder, now that we are all republicans, if it is to go out as the policy of this republic, that the men who founded it are to be dismissed and we are to open up employment for men who deserted in the emergency a few years ago.

I am particularly concerned about not giving the benefit of this section to men like those the Minister mentioned the other day. If it can be proved that a man did not receive his calling-up notice, the Minister should have power not to impose these disabilities on him. However, on the figures he gave us, if my recollection is right, there is only about a quarter of the total deserters who were in the reserves or who could possibly come under that; and surely all the reservists that are down as deserters were not deserters on the ground that they did not get the calling-up notice? The number genuinely concerned in that must necessarily be very small. It would be very deplorable, particularly for the future, if we say we are going to open up public employment for deserters from the Army, two years after the end of the emergency. That is what we are asked to do in Section 8.

The other disabilities that are mentioned in the explanatory leaflet, disabilities which will still apply, are just the ordinary thing one would expect. We could not make it a virtue that we refuse to give a pension or a gratuity to a deserter. No one would expect anything else. In view of our circumstances during the emergency and in view of the fact that some of those men went because they could secure higher pay in another army, I think it is right that we should take some steps against them. The steps that were taken in 1946 were not at all too drastic and now, in 1948, we should not rescind them.

In his opening statement, the Minister did not refer in any way to the policy he was going to pursue in the Army. We should have had some statement on that, particularly in view of the fact that hitherto we have had many divergent statements from himself and his colleagues as to Army policy. Ten months after he has taken office, he should be able to give some general outline.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Deputy got it in April, on the Estimate. I will read it out for him again if he likes.

Mr. Colley

We have been told in the past that we should have only an armed police force and should not attempt to have an Army for defence purposes.

The Minister said, at column 51, Vol. 105:—

"Our peace-time Army is an Army required for the same purposes as most other peace-time armies are required in small States —to stand by and behind the civil power, to give necessary and very desirable training to our young men, to set standards in health, physical development, hygiene, etc., to the young men of the country—a small force to play its part in the ordinary essential ceremonial of the State. That is what in fact we want an Army for."

I wonder are those the Minister's views now? He also stated that our resistance could not in any circumstances be more than a token resistance. I think I am entitled to take from that that the Minister does not think that we could possibly put up any worth-while resistance in case of attack. Is that to be the policy or are we going to set out to do the very best that our numbers and resources enable us to do, if we are attacked? We have had that view from the Minister. We have had other views expressed and a sum of money named that would not keep even a police force. One Deputy mentioned that £250,000 should be sufficient for our Army.

Mr. Davin

Who mentioned £1,000,000 at one time?

Mr. Colley

The £250,000 was mentioned by Deputy Giles. On the other hand we had the present Minister for Agriculture telling us a few years ago that we should go into the war to save America. We had the Taoiseach, a couple of months ago, telling us that we should go to the aid of Canada in eventualities. How we are to do all that if the Minister is now carrying out the policy that he enunciated in that statement, I do not know, but I think we are entitled, at any rate, to know what is to be the policy.

The international position to-day is certainly not such that we can sit down quietly and imagine that everything will be safe for a very long time. Only yesterday the British Commander-in-Chief was reported as having said that putting up the greatest defence possible is the best way of avoiding having to go to war. Whatever our policy may be as regards entering a war or remaining neutral, it is right that we should know exactly where we stand as regards the Army. I understand that the numbers are very considerably reduced and that is natural in view of the statements that were made here by the Government early in the year. I think the policy put forward by the Fianna Fáil Government, who were as much concerned with saving pounds as anybody else in this House, of having a nucleus of 12,500 with the ability to spread out and to take control of the young men of the country who would be called to the colours or who would volunteer in an emergency, is the proper one. The previous Government thought to do something similar on an Army of 5,000 but when the emergency came it was found to be practically unworkable. But for the time we got by the Grace of God, we would never have been able to meet any invader.

We must learn from that. It is absolute waste of money to spend any number of millions on an Army unless you do the right thing, unless you so provide that the Army will be effective when the call comes. The Army Staff, who are the men charged with this responsibility, recommended that figure of 12,500 as the very lowest on which they could undertake to do the job properly. Is there any of us here in a position to say that he knows better than they?

Captain Cowan

It has been said very often to them.

Mr. Colley

We do not think it. We should be able to come to some agreement on that matter. We all know that Irishmen will not sit down quietly in case of invasion. Our history teaches that. It is our duty in this House to take steps to see that resistance in such an emergency would be properly organised and that the most effective use would be made of every man. We can do that only by providing a proper nucleus in the Army.

I notice that the Minister is creating extra ranks in the Naval Service. I wonder has he now changed the views he expressed here about that service— I hope he has—when he referred to the corvettes as rubber ducks. There were other Deputies at that time who thought that we should not have a Navy at all unless we could have one like the American Navy. We were never to make a start. We were always to be at the top. Let us hope that this indicates a change in that respect because this country, situated as it is, must make a start some time on a Naval Service. We cannot do very much in any one year but I hope that there is an end to twitting at our Navy and that every year, under any Government, it will grow and build up.

The Minister also said:

"We have been buying warlike stores in a frenzied, panicky kind of way, anywhere we could get them, at any price, for seven years... but we were not utilising or expending, and surely we must have amassed very ample quantities of those stores."

Will the Minister now tell us if other such stores have been purchased since he went into office; if so, where they were purchased and of what they consist? I have reason to believe that some stores have arrived.

On Section 5, about the extension of service for men who have already serve 21 years, do I understand that the three months' notice that a man hitherto was entitled to give if he wanted to get out after that period has been withdrawn, and that he must serve for two years unless he is released on compassionate grounds? That is my understanding of it at any rate.

Dr. O'Higgins

That is correct.

Mr. Colley

I would like the Minister to ensure that any man in that position who might secure employment that would carry him on for the rest of his life would have no barriers put in his way.

Dr. O'Higgins

You can have that guarantee.

Mr. Colley

That is quite understood. In view of the statement about the Cork rececourse, will the Minister say whether he has got a written statement from the staff recommending or even accepting the changed plan? I will wind up by appealing to the Minister to reconsider Section 8. I think it would be a terrible thing if it went out from this Parliament just at this moment that we were facilitating deserters while dismissing the men who helped to found the State.

Mr. Connolly

Some of the aspects of general policy referred to by Deputy Colley deserve consideration. I expressed a view on another occasion, when we had a Temporary Defence Forces Bill before us, that the ultimate idea in regard to the Army was not at all clear. I was pleased to hear Deputy McQuillan making such a cogent advocacy of a citizen army, a subject to which I devoted a considerable part of my speech on that other occasion. It is true, as Deputy Colley pointed out when he was quoting the Minister, that we could make only a temporary resistance in the case of an invasion. That would be more from the point of view of professional armies, and professional armies only. From the point of view of Irish resistance being carried out by a professional army against an invading professional army, it is perfectly true, as the Minister stated, that there could be only a token resistance. Like Deputy Colley, however, I believe that Irish men and women would not be content with that; that more would be expected of us and that more would be forthcoming from us, whatever Government happens to be in power at the time of such invasion.

The point of view I expressed then, and I think it is opportune to reiterate it, was criticised by speakers on the Opposition Benches as asking for the disbandment of the Army and asking for things which were against the national interest along that line. I strenuously denied that and I believe now, when the situation is a bit calmer and there is not so much war hysteria, that the view expressed by Deputies like Deputy McQuillan and myself might receive greater consideration from the Minister. What I ask is that the responsible heads of the Army should sit down to consider whether the present form of military defence is the best form, the form from which we can expect the maximum resistance.

Judging the development of military technique, every army is likely to continue as an organised force in a rut. What it has been doing for ten, 20 or 30 years becomes sacrosanct and the Army authorities consider this is the best and only possible form of organisation. I want the Minister to break away from that tradition and, in consultation with the military chiefs of other countries on a similar scale to ours, with the experience of the war, or with our own native genius, to consider whether or not the ideas expounded from these benches, with reference to a citizen army, are not more likely to produce greater results on a more economic scale than the present form of a professional army organisation.

There have been statements that the military defence of this island is impossible while the island remains divided and while there is Partition. While that may be correct from a professional point of view, there is no excuse why we should consider that we can make only a token resistance in the case of an invasion. It does not exculpate us from taking other measures to provide the best possible defence for our people in any emergency. I urge that the ideas propounded by Deputy McQuillan are worthy of consideration in so far as they refer to the citizen army—a widespread organisation of our youth, the men and women of the country, based locally, with local knowledge and a local organisation, stiffened and strengthened, if you like, by a professional background, a professional group of officers—highly trained men and skilled technicians who are able to make the most of whatever little military stores we have and able, in the shortest possible time, to provide for the greatest amount of training for those whom they can gather into such a widespread organisation.

I would urge furthermore that the best form of a fighting organisation, as is well known by those who have any experience, is that form in which there is some kind of camaraderie. In this country, the trade unions play a very important part in the economic life of the country and there is no reason why they should not play a prominent part in the defence policy of this country. Their sympathy, their assistance and their organisation could be enlisted in building up a citizen army. Many of them are familiar with the Army; many of them know the idea of workers and citizens generally springing to arms whenever the occasion demands it.

Instead of having a spontaneous resistance of a desperate form, seeking out, at the last possible moment, ways in which to maintain our national sovereignty—to maintain the republic which we were so enthusiastic in declaring—now is the time I think when the military chiefs and the Minister for Defence should consider laying the basis of a practical organisation, so that resistance will be, not hopeless and desperate, not merely heroic, but such as will achieve success by the measure in which it will make any invasion of our shores so costly to the invader that they will pause before attempting it.

If the defence of this island rests purely on a professional army, which could not be equipped with the same skill as the army of a great power, because the efficiency of a modern army depends on its industrial backing —the amount of steel that can be put to warlike purposes—in a conflict of that type, balancing our weight against the weight of others, it is quite obvious that we do not count. It is by turning to other ways, ways in which this country showed a great example to other countries, ways with which this country is quite familiar, that these forms of resistance could be given a more organised shape. If the Minister would get his military staff and those competent to consider this matter, to come to the question with open minds, not to consider it merely on a hide-bound professional army basis, not to bring to bear on it the mind which Deputy McQuillan instanced—the mind which considers the buttoning-up of greatcoats—but fertile minds to consider what are the potentialities of this form of defence, I think the Minister would be doing a great day's work for the country.

There is little more I have to say except on the one question of the introduction of ranks in regard to the Navy, which permits a discussion on the question of the Navy. Deputy Colley hoped that year by year we would be able to provide some funds for the building up of a Navy so that we could strengthen our maritime defence, but we must consider this question in a realistic manner. From the small beginnings which we now possess, can we possibly hope to build up a Navy of any strength before the Navy perhaps becomes obsolete? It would appear to me, having regard to our very restricted resources, that the work which it is intended to have done by the Navy—the safeguarding of our shores, protecting our fisheries and other activities of that kind—might be much better done by strengthening the air forces of the country. There is hardly any function that I can see, apart from ceremonial functions and apart from our traditional desire to have some maritime force, that could not be more efficiently discharged by the Air Force. To hope to expand our naval forces seems to me a policy that is fantastic. The Navy, such as it is, is sufficient for our needs, and if there is any expansion required for other functions, I submit the expansion ought to come by training the Air Force of the country to take over functions such as are taken over by the Air Forces of other countries in regard to maritime defence.

Mr. A.P. Byrne

I just want to appeal once more very earnestly to the Minister on behalf of ex-soldiers who find that they have no housing accommodation when they leave the Army. I would ask him to give early consideration to the possibility of setting up some machinery whereby, when a man has done his term in the Army, he will be provided with a cottage or flat in which he can take up residence with his wife and children on the day he leaves the Army. It is a matter which it will not be very easy to solve but I would earnestly appeal to the Minister to see that such machinery is set up or, alternatively, to confer with the Minister for Local Government with a view to providing houses for ex-soldiers.

Mr. de Valera

This debate has widened far beyond anything I thought was possible under the Bill. The subjects which have been raised are ones upon which I should like to have something to say, both from the point of view of the Party, from the personal point of view and from the point of view of the experience I have had in connection with the Defence Forces. I am at a loss to know exactly whether it was intended that this Bill should give us an opportunity for a general debate on defence policy. My opinion is that it was not.

Dr. O'Higgins

I was hoping, seeing that we had an Estimate last March and that we shall have another before next March, that this would be treated as the annual renewal Bill and that the main debate would be on the Estimate when I would be bringing facts and figures before the House.

Mr. de Valera

I must say that was my own view but a number of things have been raised in the debate and the question is how far it is wise to follow them because they are subjects of very great importance. For the moment, keeping close to the Bill, I think the Minister made a mistake in introducing Section 8. Desertion is a very serious offence, as I am sure he will be the first to admit. According to the regulations, it is a matter for which every deserter is liable to be court-martialled and get very severe punishment. At the end of the war I think we were very lenient in making it known that courts martial were not going to take place. That was an act of very great leniency and we wondered whether, in fact, we were justified in adopting it, seeing the danger that arises from leniency in matters of that sort. We had to show that this offence was one which could not be tolerated.

After all, the people who are involved were people who came voluntarily into the Defence Forces. They were trained, and it was at a period of great national emergency that they actually left the forces.

I think, also, it would be a bad thing if it were to get about that when there is a change of Government there will be something like a general amnesty for those who had broken the law. It is bad because it means that people who are about to commit offences and thinking of the penalties involved, will say: "Well, these will go once there is a change of Government". I think we ought to approach these matters from the point of view of continuity: continuity in the State and continuity in ideas with regard to what is right and what is wrong. I do not think the penalty in this case was very severe seeing that the alternative would have been a court-martial. I cannot, at the moment, recall exactly what the penalties in the case of a court-martial would be but I do know that the penalties that could be inflicted for desertion in a time of emergency like that would be very great. To have these disqualifications simply means that those concerned failed in a fundamental matter with regard to their citizenship. They entered the service at a time of grave emergency; when they deserted they took away with them the knowledge that they had gained at a time when the State looked upon them as certain props. By deserting, they took away these props. I think it would be carrying leniency too far if we are now to go and remit the punishments which had been imposed in lieu of court-martial and its punishments.

I was not able to be here when the Minister was speaking, but I understand the reason he gave for this is that there were some technical desertions which he wants to cover. It ought to be possible for him to deal with these. If there are some cases of purely technical desertion, he ought to be able to deal with them and make it clear that he is only dealing with that particular class. If a notice was sent out, and if the person concerned says he did not get the notice, well there ought to be some investigation of that. I think it ought to be possible for the Minister to distinguish between purely technical cases of desertion and cases of gross desertion of the country at a time of danger. On the part of those people there was a violation of their pledges. I do not know to what extent their oath involved a pledge to remain with the colours, but I suppose it did. I would again urge on the Minister not to insist on Section 8. Apart altogether from the considerations that have been mentioned by other Deputies, the really serious consideration for us is that what is proposed here seems to suggest that this is an offence which can be lightly pardoned, and that pardons of this particular type are likely to occur when there is a change of Government. That is bad. I would urge on the Minister what has been said from our side here, that he should not continue with that section in the Bill.

I come now to some of the wider matters mentioned by other Deputies. There is no more serious matter that can be discussed, and no more serious matter I would say for any small State, than the question of its defence forces and defence policy. It is always a question of what is the best you can do, and whether that is going to be at all adequate for your needs. Every small nation has to face that. My own answer to that question has always been that one has to do the very best that one can. It is a bad argument to say that you have taken such and such measures, that you have done your best, but that it is all useless because it is insufficient. I know that a good deal can be said on that, but what it simply amounts to is that you are putting up your hands and saying that the country is at the mercy of any forces, big or small, that come against you. I think, therefore, that we ought to make up our minds to do the best we can with the manpower that we have and with the equipment that we can get. I know that in modern times international guarantees may not be sufficient. I know that we have examples of small States so guaranteed which have escaped miraculously. They were protected by certain international agreements which did not, however, prove of real value to other small States. Through their military organisation, those that were saved enjoy the position which they still occupy as independent States. If they had not been careful to take measures to defend themselves, I doubt very much if the international guarantees they had would have been sufficient.

Their defence measures were very expensive. I have not the figures before me, but I know that at one time when I looked at them their defence expenditure represented a very high proportion of the national expenditure. It is doubtful whether, in our circumstances, our people, not being accustomed to such expenditure, would be prepared to face it, but if we are to do our best, we have to think of things in the way in which they are thought of in these States.

The question of age—a young Army —has been raised. There is always that difficulty. In the case of anybody that has to be active, you have always to balance the question of experience with the physical ability to do the things that are required. I think most people will admit that a young Army is in general desirable. In the case of the higher ranks, the age to which you can keep experienced people is a matter of opinion. It is generally felt that in modern war, except in the case of those working at headquarters, you do want your officers to be sufficiently active and, therefore, sufficiently young to be able to keep pace with the younger men. It was on principles of that sort that the suggestion was made to the Government that we should have, as far as possible, a young Army. That is why the ages were cut down.

The question was raised as to whether we could not use some officers, who would be too old for the regular Army, on the Reserve. Our general idea was that we had a standing Army which was to be the central skeleton of a force that could be expanded, and that when it was expanded you would have the main body of your Army. If a large portion of the Reserve was to be included the members of it, too, must be young. That is a matter that was considered, and we came to the point at which it was felt that the Reserve force ought to be practically as young as the regular Army. I say, practically, because there might be some slight difference for those who would be engaged in peace-time training.

Captain Cowan

For certain functions?

Mr. de Valera

There is a definite limit to the number that you can use in that way. I do not think anyone can speak definitely on the question of age. You have only to look at those who are in charge, doing various types of work, estimate their average age and ask yourself whether they are really capable of doing the work they are called on to do. I may say that during the emergency period the feeling was that we had a number of people who had been kept on in the Army and who, through no fault of their own, but merely through advancing age, were unable to do the work required of them. In that connection I do not think you can have anything hard and fast but the tendency ought to be, as far as possible, to depend upon youth. At the top a certain number are required to supply the necessary experience. The trouble is that in war the tactics, weapons and so forth change so rapidly that very often the experience of a previous occasion is the very worst equipment for the new war. However, that applies only if it is carried too far. In war as in other operations some things remain constant while other things change. The important thing as regards war is to know to what extent you have to change— weapons, tactics and so forth.

Another criticism was that we had kept on the chiefs of the Army, such for instance as the Chief-of-Staff, for too long a period. Our trouble is that unlike some other States, we have not posts into which we can easily fit ex-Army officers. What is very badly needed here—if you are going to have a young Army and if the officers leave at an early age and at a time when it is very difficult to begin life all over again—is a system whereby they would be given preference in regard to some State posts. We were considering whether that could be done but unfortunately in our particular circumstances it is not easy. Large States which have colonies, etc., have posts into which they can fit the retired army officer and use his experience and his administrative ability—if he has had experience of administration—in a continuing way which would be of value. We have only a very small number of posts of that nature. If we are to have a young Army, with officers retiring at a fairly early age, we must try to provide some openings for them.

There is, first of all, in regard to higher officers in the Army, the question of individual ability. In the case of an extremely able officer who is filling his post properly I do not think it is wise, because of some sort of general routine rule, to change him. The emergency through which we have passed was of vital concern to this country. We are satisfied that our senior officers were the best we could get; we found that they did their work excellently. I do not think, therefore, that because of some general routine rule such officers should be changed every two or three years. What are you going to do in the case of a man who, say, has reached the rank of Chief-of-Staff? He has a certain position, and he enjoys certain emoluments. Where can he be fitted in the Army?

Captain Cowan

It used to be done. You could send him down to the Curragh, or somewhere else.

Mr. de Valera

This is not a new problem. It is well to remember that people have been struggling with it for some considerable time and that they are very anxious to get a solution. When one tries to find out where he can fit a man in it very soon becomes apparent that suitable openings are very limited. It is not a good thing, in the case of a man who has reached the top, to send him down to the Curragh or somewhere else in such circumstances. It would be all very well if the Army were a religious order because these things could then be done——

Dr. O'Higgins

It is far from that, yet.

Mr. de Valera

——but you are dealing with human beings who have to contend with the things that affect people who are out in the world. They have not given up a lot of the things which members of the religious orders have given up. In the case of religious orders, if a man is at the top and then changes that is all about it. I am not so sure that that would work——

Captain Cowan

It did, for 11 years.

Mr. de Valera

I do not know of any case in which it did. I have no experience before our time——

Captain Cowan

What about General MacEoin?

Mr. de Valera

My experience during our own time was that theoretically it looked all right but I do not think that fundamentally it is a good principle. When a man had reached the top you could undoubtedly send him to some other post but when he is at the top he is recognised and he would not be there if he were not recognised as being outstandingly fit for that position. He is demoted then and becomes a subordinate.

Captain Cowan

That would apply to one only.

Mr. de Valera

Yes, but it applies to that one. The point is that that is the one that is affected by the rule suggested. If you do not accept the rule then you have to act on some other principle. The principle we worked on at that time was that— whilst we admitted and generally recognised that it would be well to have changes—so long as the work of the nation, so far as the Army was concerned, was being well done by the individual concerned it was more important than a mechanical rule —even though the mechanical rule might, in a long period, have been held to work out better. If I personally were to have anything to do with it, I would stand for the rule we had during the emergency. I would stand for that rule, in the case of promotion, until we would have a situation where, in the case of a man who reaches the top, he would retire or go into some other position in which he could serve the State equally well. Mention has been made of extension of service. That is a matter which is related to the question of age.

Another matter which was referred to was the subject of political appointments. I do not know of any political appointments and I do not think the Deputy would be able to point out any. I do not think it has ever before happened in history that a body who had been in arms against an Army became the Government and took over that Army and whose subsequent relations were as harmonious as they proved to be in our case. It is quite obvious that that state of affairs could not have lasted if, as the Deputy suggested, there had been political appointments. Appointments were made generally on the recommendation of the Army.

At the same time it is important to remember that the Army is a part of the civil executive's arm; that national policy must be decided by the Government subject to the approval of the Dáil; that it must be the civil authority that is in control and that must take responsibility for everything that is done; and that in the case of every military action that is taken there is generally some political objective—it may be that of maintaining the peace or of defending the country.

Anything that would suggest in principle something different to that would, I think, be quite wrong. We must proceed very firmly on the principle that the Army is at the disposal of the civil executive of the day, the Government, and that it is their right, so long as they act legally in the ordinary way, to decide policy— adopted and supported by the Oireachtas. There has never been any question about that so far and I think it is very important that that should be understood by everybody. The Government of the day has to take responsibility and must act in accordance with its best judgment. It should, of course, in all these matters in regard to defence, hear the views and technical advice of the Army authorities and take them fully into consideration. I think, however, it would be very bad indeed if there should be any suggestion that the last word in all these cases does not lie with the Government. It must lie with the Government.

Whether it be a question of appointments or anything else the Government must have the authority. They are open in this House to criticism in regard to their actions. I do not think we can have it any other way. If they are wise of course they will listen carefully to the advice given to them by the Army authorities and they will consult with them on all matters of defence. However, ultimately it must be accepted that the final authority in all these matters is the Government. If we have any criticism, if anything is done, we must hold the Government responsible. That does not mean that they are to interfere in matters in which they ought not to interfere. But they must have the right inasmuch as any military action that may ultimately be taken has always as I have said a political objective. I do not think that it is proper that I should on this Bill deal with the entire question of defence, the part that should be played by the Navy, by the air force and by the land force, and the extent to which we should dip into the pockets of the taxpayers in order to give us an efficient defence force; these are all matters of grave import for the country but I think they should be dealt with directly instead of as a side-wind on a Bill of this particular kind.

With regard to the Bill, I have often asked myself whether it would not be desirable to have the position reviewed every year. I think that is done in some other countries. The Bill is reviewed annually and there may be slight changes made from time to time. I think just prior to the outbreak of war there was a permanent Bill drafted here. I know we intended bringing one in but I do not know whether it was intended to operate over a period of years or whether it would be reviewed annually. The purpose of it in the countries where it is passed annually is to ensure that Parliament is in control and has the necessary power. That, in turn, compels recognition by everybody of the fact that it is a Parliamentary Army.

Captain Cowan

There is a traditional reason for that.

Mr. de Valera

In one country there is probably a traditional reason for it. The question is whether it might not be a good principle. It is a matter for consideration. I do not think we should on a Bill of this kind enter into a more or less desultory discussion of the fundamental policy of defence. There are many things I would like to say if the time were appropriate but I think this is hardly the occasion. I would, however, urge upon the Minister the desirability of reconsidering Section 8.

Dr. O'Higgins

Practically every speaker in this debate made mention of the advisability of introducing a permanent Army Bill. Deputy Traynor, who opened the debate on the opposite side, more or less suggested that I was guilty of some unreasonable hurry in introducing this Bill at this particular date. He said it could very well wait until next March.

The reason why I am introducing this Bill in December rather than in March next is to give the Department of Defence 15 months in which to bring forward a permanent Bill when next a Bill affecting the Defence Forces is introduced. Irrespective of when that Bill will be introduced, I think there is a lot to be said for the view expressed by the Leader of the Opposition that, even though it may be a permanent Army Bill, there should be an opportunity given annually to Parliament to discuss the Bill. There is a considerable amount of weight in that argument. We are a two-House Parliament and Estimates do not go before the Seanad. If there were not some Bill coming before the Seanad annually in regard to the Army the Second House would never get an opportunity of expressing any views they may have on the defence system and the Defence Services of the country. My attitude on that matter is that there is nobody sufficiently experienced in this Parliament to claim to be the last word as an authority on defence. The more suggestions, the more discussion and the more advice available to the particular Minister for Defence the more likely we are to have a proper defence system in the country. Every Minister for Defence will try to do his job under the immense disability of our being a small country and a poor country. When all is said and done, at least in the period between wars, finance—and nothing else—will decide the strength of the Army, and the Army defence plan will have to be organised within the sum available. One Government may make more available than another. That is only a difference of degree. The world has progressed very, very far away from the time when one could build an army out of men and muskets.

Even in a small country in the past it was easy enough to mobilise a fairly formidable army with men and muskets, and possibly horses. Now the smallest and, indeed, the cheapest factor in any army is the human element. I was amazed recently when I was told by an experienced officer from a neighbouring army that to equip one division on modern lines would cost a fantastic number of millions of pounds—more than we could ever dream of spending even in peace times on the whole Army over a period of ten to 15 years. The modern unit is a very expensive unit. The equipment is nearly beyond our compass so far as price is concerned. The best we can aim at is to purchase the more expensive type of equipment year by year in order that we may have enough to train our troops in the handling and use of particular types of equipment. The previous Government was progressing steadily in that direction in endeavouring, when material and money were available, to build up within our Army at least one fully equipped unit around which to train the rest of the Army so that we could expand further if the necessity arose. The real limitation with regard to a modern defence force, whether it be land, or sea, or air, is the absolutely prohibitive cost of the equipment evolved as a result of the recent war. I venture to say that the equipment of an army unit to-day on modern lines is 50 times as expensive as the equipment of that same unit on modern lines in 1939, and that is really the big problem and the big headache that confronts any Minister for Defence. The smallest part of the difficulty, the thing that should in fact in the modern world give rise to the least uneasiness is the number of men, either the number available or the number actually in uniform.

If I were disappointed at any particular trend in this discussion it was the amount of words and time devoted to the numbers of men. If you look out on this particular State of ours you will find that, in proportion to our numbers, it would be true to say that we have the highest percentage of trained men, higher than in any other country, due to a great extent to the fact that we were not in the last war, that we escaped it. We had not the high percentage of casualties that other populations suffered. We put through our own Army at home here something in the neighbourhood of 60,000 men; we put through our reserves an equivalent number. We have ex-Army men who are not included in that particular figure and we have a great number of people who returned home from other armies. The percentage of trained men in this population at this moment I would say would be higher than in most European countries, and we have a higher percentage of young and middle-aged males left than in most other countries.

Therefore, the least important thing and the aspect of the Army that we should spend least time arguing about is whether in fact we have 8,000 or 9,000 men with the colours. The military strength of any country in modern times is its man-power potential and the extent to which the man-power potential is trained, semi-trained and available. In proportion to our population, we have a very high trained or semi-trained man-power potential in this country. In addition to that, I would say, that, if there were a shadow across the country or a threat to the country, we would certainly have very little trouble in having a very high percentage of that potential available, if and when required.

In times of peace, to keep marching around barracks, knocking sparks out of the cobble stones in barracks, a great number of men is not sound national economy, and I doubt if it is sound military policy. I have heard it argued from different sides of the House, and I heard it from behind my back in the course of this debate, that the ideal thing would be to have the very greatest number of young men, in particular highly trained and available, but proficient in the use of arms over and above the rifle which was sufficient 30 years ago. I believe, without being wedded to the system as it exists at any particular moment, that, properly handled, we have within the idea of the F.C.A. the filling of that particular function. I have ensured for the last seven months that very much more attention should be given to that particular force than was possible to give to it in the earlier years. I have doubled the number of regular officers attached to that particular force. I have made an arrangement that a high number of the most senior officers in general headquarters, including two members of the general staff, would be out every single week-end moving about and investigating different units of the F.C.A. That has been going on for months. They are, as it were, engaged in the study of that particular organisation with a view to making recommendations as how to make it more real, more reliable and more effective. I expect before the next year's Estimate is introduced that I shall have available for the Dáil the result of these investigations.

At the present moment I think nobody knows exactly to what extent that is a force on paper and to what extent it is a force which could be counted on as being effective in the event of an emergency. The figures show a strength of approximately 50,000 officers and men. Personally, I do not think that more than two-thirds of that number could be regarded as the effective strength. It is difficult, however, to know exactly when a man should be knocked off as ineffective. There may be a number of men who, for some months, never turned up at parade or drill or instruction or anything else, and then, at the end of four or five months, they begin turning up and eventually they become perhaps the most regular attendants and the best of the lot. All that side of the F.C.A. is being studied and investigated, but at the moment I candidly confess that I am unable to say to the Dáil to what extent that is an effective force.

Reference has been made to halls. Every effort is being made to get halls built, and a certain amount of progress has been made throughout the country in getting halls built or, pending the building of permanent halls, the transportation and utilisation of huts for that particular purpose. There is at least the germ of a very large volunteer force or citizen army within the four corners of the F.C.A. in course of time. There is a lot of balancing to be done as to whether it is desirable to increase the number of officers and N.C.O.s attached to that force.

There is a difference of opinion amongst even Army men. Some say that if you attach too many officers and too many regular N.C.O.s, it will never develop its own officers and N.C.O.s and its own sense of responsibility. Others hold that a unit fades away or practically fades away, unless there are regulars moving in and out through it the whole time. There is a certain amount of study going on in that direction. We have units here to which we are attaching regular personnel to a heavy extent and we have units there to which we are attaching the minimum number of regular personnel. At the end of some months, or some reasonable period, we will compare these two units and judge by results, and we will be wiser after we have got these results.

I think it is rather idle and useless to be arguing here in terms of whether our regular Army with the colours is 8,000 or 10,000 strong. The difference is a difference of degree, not worth wasting a minute's breath in discussing. On that point, there seems to be an amount of misunderstanding which I cannot understand. Deputy Traynor, the ex-Minister for Defence, the man who, as Minister, was responsible for bringing in this Book of Estimates, representing, as it must have done, the decision of his Government with regard to the strength of the Army for this present year, prepared that Book of Estimates and provided for an Army of 9,000 odd. Yet, when we were discussing the Estimates last year, he opened the debate and said that his provision had been for an Army of 12,500, and he walked his leader and every Deputy who followed him into that mistake. I ask him to look at the Book of Estimates, as a Minister of considerable experience and as a man who obviously understands the Book of Estimates and that, on pages 378, 379 and 380, he would find that he had made provision for 10,982 N.C.O.s and men, costing £1,100,000. The next line in that book reads: "Deduct in respect of numbers below strength during the financial year, £310,000." That meant that you were to deduct one-quarter of the strength. That was the book which was presented to Parliament and that was your Army for this year.

Mr. Traynor

What was the strength of the peace establishment?

Dr. O'Higgins

That is the strength you were providing for in this financial year. It does not matter whether your peace establishment was 1,000,000 men. That is an ornament on the wall of G.H.Q. This is the number of soldiers you were going to pay.

Mr. Traynor

With the right to go up to 12,860, if we so desired.

Dr. O'Higgins

If you brought in another Estimate, but, so long as this Estimate was passed and approved by Parliament, you or any other Minister could not have one man more than you were providing for, and this was the number you were providing for. I went to considerable pains last April to correct the debate and to correct Government and Opposition Deputies on that particular point, and I have all the corrections in this booklet. Yet, six months after, the whole debate is led off on that same point. If we are to accept the incorrect contention of Deputy Traynor that what is down here does not matter in the least, that it is your peace establishment that matters, I can claim to have the very same Army strength as the Deputy. It is the same peace establishment as is there in G.H.Q.

Mr. Traynor

That is the establishment to which we can go.

Dr. O'Higgins

You cannot, Deputy. You can go only to the amount of money voted under each sub-head of your Book of Estimates and I am amazed to think that, after so many years as a Minister, the Deputy thinks otherwise. If I adopted that Book of Estimates and passed through what is there, I could not have 10,500 soldiers in this financial year, without coming a second time to the Dáil.

Mr. Traynor

You could do that. Is that not a possibility at any time?

Dr. O'Higgins

It is a possibility for me as well as for the Deputy. That is what I have in the Book of Estimates and that is what the Deputy had in his Book of Estimates. I am not going to do the duck and say that what I have in my book does not mean anything because I can come to the Dáil any day I like and look for more. I am going to stand over my Book of Estimates, be it right or wrong, and I would expect the same from my predecessor.

Mr. Traynor

Certainly.

Dr. O'Higgins

There is your Book of Estimates and that is the strength you are looking for. The difference between it and the present strength is not worth arguing about. With regard to the peace-time strength of the Army, I went back and got a return of the peace-time strength of the Army in every year prior to 1939 when we mobilised our wartime Army, for comparison with the present strength. The total strength of the Army in 1932 was 5,793; in 1933, 5,823; in 1934, 5,763; in 1935, 5,582; in 1936, 5,799; in 1937, 5,885; and in 1938, 6,519. In 1939, it was mobilised as a wartime Army and the strength of the Army at the present moment is 8,039.

Mr. Traynor

That is the regular Army?

Dr. O'Higgins

Yes.

Mr. de Valera

Might I suggest that the Minister might look up the difficulties we had to face when the crisis came?

Dr. O'Higgins

I can assure the Deputy that I have information available as to the difficulties which faced the previous Government and that I am conscious of them. The point I am making is that the provisions which have been made for the Army this year provide for an Army 30 per cent. greater than was ever carried in this country in peace time before. Of even more importance than the strength of the Army, which, of necessity, must be small, whether it is Deputy Traynor's 10,000 men or my 8,000 odd—either number is so tiny that it would not be a factor one could lean on except as a skeleton around which to build—is the strength of the Reserve available. Here are the strengths of the Reserve available in the different years. In 1932, 8,800—I am giving round figures; in 1933, 9,000; in 1934, 9,000; in 1935, the second Reserve had been formed and the strength was 18,000; in 1936, 17,000; in 1937, 16,000; in 1938, 15,200; in 1939, 15,000; at the present moment, 51,900. The immense growth and expansion of the Reserve between the pre-war period and the post-war period means that our potentials are very much greater than they were in the past. That, of course, is due to the stimulus of danger and the amount of nationalist and militaristic spirit that naturally flows from a period of danger.

Within the last six months, the strength of the F.C.A. itself has grown by approximately 5,000, showing that you still have that sense of military responsibility among people who are in their normal way of life civilians. That is healthy and gratifying and it is because of that immense number and the fact that new recruits are coming forward in such great numbers, that I consider it is of the utmost importance from the defence point of view, that every possible attention should be given to that force and that the most satisfactory plan should be adopted for its equipment.

Mr. Aiken

Could the Minister say now whether he will be able to give them their annual training next year?

Dr. O'Higgins

They will be called up next year. I explained earlier this year, on the Estimate, that the reason they were not called up was all the examination that was going on, but they will certainly be called up next year.

References have been made in the course of this debate to barracks. I am as well aware as anybody else that when the Army was mobilised there was a shortage of barracks and I think there always will be. I have never heard that any country in the world, even the great military nations, had ever enough barracks to house a fully mobilised army. The reason why the position did not become impossible in other countries was that when the army was mobilised, it took the field. The peculiar and acute difficulty arose with us because we mobilised the Army but had not to take the field. The usual thing all over the world is that when the army is mobilised encampments or hutments must be brought into use and buildings commandeered all over the country.

During the last two wars, you could walk from Piccadilly to Fulham and scarcely see a building that was not occupied by troops or by some army formation. I do not think that anybody would really make the case that we must have, down through all the years of peace, sufficient barracks to house every soldier we would mobilise in a time of emergency. The great difficulty with the Army in normal times is the high number of barracks they have to maintain when they have not the troops. At the moment in Dundalk, Kilkenny, Waterford, Wexford, Duncannon, Cavan, Boyle, Buncrana, Castlebar, Longford, Templemore, Tralee and Nenagh there are barracks unoccupied and having to be maintained. There are an equal number of barracks elsewhere with just small maintenance parties in them. I was criticised vis-a-vis that particular situation for considering the surrender of Rock Road Barracks to a housing authority for the purpose of housing the people. I think if Deputies would give the matter a moment's impartial consideration and consider that all through the war years on account of the lack of materials and the fact that the Army had to get priority, not a cottage was built and the appalling housing conditions which have arisen in country, town and city, they would admit that it would be in human for the Army to hold on to the empty barracks on the flank of Cork City, a barracks that is capable of being readily converted into 400 residences for families, which was unoccupied and in fact, as far as one can see, unwanted. That was the position, and I do not think, no matter what geographical positions we occupy in this House, when that demand was made vis-a-vis the appalling housing situation, that any Government, the war being over, would have refused that particular barracks. The reason I say “that particular barracks” is that it was not built on the barracks system. It was built on lines of so many separate, selfcontained, permanent hutments or houses, two sides to a single street. For that decision I take full responsibility, but that decision was not taken without very full and generous acquiescence of the General Staff. It was not a thing I had to argue about or even put up to them.

Mr. de Valera

Has it been handed over completely or for temporary purposes?

Dr. O'Higgins

It will always be in our power to get it back. It was given temporarily.

Captain Cowan

There will never be a hope of getting it back from the people using it.

Dr. O'Higgins

Until there is ample housing elsewhere, we cannot get any barracks back, even Portobello or Collins, from the civilians there. The two Deputies Byrne, both members of the Dublin Corporation, which is the housing authority for Dublin, asked me to make provision for ex-soldiers and their families. I am tired asking the two Deputies Byrne and their colleagues to make provision for ex-soldiers and their families, but the Dublin Corporation has adopted the extraordinary attitude that they are not responsible for such people. The Housing Acts lay it down that, when a house is overcrowded to a certain point, the housing authority is responsible for giving those people priority. There is a considerable number of houses in the military barracks in Dublin occupied by civilians, where there are three generations at the moment, the original family and sons and daughters married, remaining in the houses. There is an appalling, a serious and a rather discreditable state of overcrowding in those houses in our barracks and I cannot get the Dublin Corporation, the housing authority, even to admit that such people have any right to a house outside.

I would like very much to be able to meet the request put up by Deputy Byrne that I should make provision for ex-Army men, but my difficulty at the moment is that I cannot make provision even for married soldiers who are serving at the moment. There are hundreds of soldiers married and who are unable to live with their wives and children because there are hundreds of civilians occupying the married quarters in our barracks. Nobody likes evictions and it certainly is a problem as to what will have to be done. There are serving soldiers, living apart from their families, and their families are living under appalling conditions: and they must have the first claim on the Department of Defence. If the day comes that we have to force out all or some of the civilian families, the appropriate housing authority in the area must take responsibility for them.

Far from being in a position to look after the married man leaving the Army, we are not in a position even to make provision for the married serving soldiers, who have an implied right by contract. Our public advertisements and so on imply a right to the Army to carry a marriage establishment and provide them with houses up to the strength of that establishment. That we cannot do at the moment, on account of the number of civilians.

Mr. Byrne

Would the Minister say anything about the young married soldier who is on a single man's pay?

Dr. O'Higgins

That is a matter of pay and not of housing. It is a thing I am not prepared to reply to in the way the Deputy would like it to be replied to straightaway. It will have to be looked into.

Mr. Byrne

Will the Minister consider it?

Dr. O'Higgins

I certainly will consider it.

Mr. Aiken

There are very grave limitations to what the Minister should do to meet Deputy Byrne.

Mr. Byrne

The young married soldier on a single man's pay is not a credit to the country.

Mr. Aiken

He should not be married.

Mr. Byrne

Who can stop him from getting married?

Dr. O'Higgins

There was considerable reference to Section 8, which deals with deserters. When introducing this Bill, I expected that much would be said about that section and did not anticipate that I would have to go over again all the ground covered in the Estimate last March, which will be covered again, presumably, next March. On this particular question of deserters, I will put this to the House. I made the fullest inquiries that I could as to whether there was any other army in the world that asked for a continuing penalty of this kind, that asked that military offences be punished by county managers, town clerks and corporation secretaries. From a military point of view, there is something offensive to the esprit de corps of an army that for military offences we ask the various county councils, town councils, town commissioners and corporations to deal with them. I would consider it of a certain amount of importance, by way of precedent or guide, if I had been able to ascertain that there was any other army that, for such offences, even at the height of war or when they were actively engaged in war, carried such continuing penalties and disabilities as we had in the Emergency Order and have incorporated since in the law.

Mr. de Valera

Surely the maximum penalties that would be inflicted for desertion in these cases would involve long terms of imprisonment?

Dr. O'Higgins

I hold and held that we should deal with our military offences in a military way and that we should not pass the baby to various civilian bodies. I consider that it is wrong to have civilian authorities writing to the Department of Defence about John Brown or John Black. It is bad for the Army and it is bad to have the Army publicising through the different councils that this is a group of men who infringed Army regulations, defied Army rules and that we wanted them to be punished by the local authority. I would still believe in the advisability, if those men showed up, of having them tried by military courts. Let military men deal with soldiers for military offences. Military men should not ask civilian authorities up and down the country to deal with them. Another point, one which I put to Deputies opposite, is that if there were a reservist in some county with a wife and eight or nine children, absolutely destitute and starving, and if there were a minor relief scheme in that area, and if this situation were brought before any of those responsible ex-Ministers opposite and they were asked "Are you going to deny that man work, though there is a minor relief scheme in the area?

"Are you going to insist that the families starve?" there is not one Deputy opposite who, if he were up against that decision, would not say: "Give work to the unfortunate man. We do not want to punish the wife, we do not want to punish the children, because that man infringed the regulations when he was in the Army." That is the decision that faces me in a number of cases and there is no good in anyone trying to evade that decision by waving the green flag and saying: "Here is what they did and there is what is happening the old-I.R.A." I have as much regard for the old-I.R.A. as anybody else. These men are not going to get work under the Department of Defence or under any State Department, because they are ineligible for employment in any State Department if they have not a clean Army discharge. I am thinking of work on the bogs, minor relief schemes, a drainage scheme across one of our provinces and work passing by the door of that father with the starving children, and saying: "Because of the law that was introduced or the amendment carried in Dáil Eireann last December, you cannot get work and you must starve."

That is what I ask Deputies to consider. I am suggesting there continuing every military penalty and continuing all the punishment that any modern European army imposes on soldiers but removing this seven years' disqualification that they are to be seven years unemployable, pariah dogs. Has not the ex-Minister for Defence considered the question and will he take responsibility for leaving the father or the husband in the case I pointed out in the position of being denied the right of employment under a minor relief scheme, say, a Christmas relief scheme or a winter relief scheme, because, seven years ago, he deserted or because seven years ago he did not leave his address?

I invite the Deputy, as a military man, to differentiate between the regular Army soldier, who knew the full gravity of the offence, and the reservist who was never a week with the colours. Would the Deputy consider that it is fair to have that penalty for seven years on the young street arab that we practically conscripted into the Construction Corps, a corps that was formed with the idea of trying to reform this kind of young street arab?

Mr. Traynor

The Minister referred to the Construction Corps. Does not the Minister know that the Construction Corps is not a unit of the Army?

Dr. O'Higgins

The Construction Corps are under the legal definition of deserters at the moment and I suggested when I was opening this debate, and I believe it still, that none of us realises the breadth to which lawyers could extend that legal definition. Years ago, when we were making that Order to govern deserters, we were thinking of the men in our uniform, with the colours, occupying a bed in one of our barracks, who went over the wall and scooted out of the country and joined another army. That type of men are only a fraction of the whole lot that have been covered by the official or legal term "deserter".

Mr. Traynor

I think I suggested to the Minister in the course of my own speech, when he had pointed out the numbers that deserted, that it would be possible to deal with the deserter who was in the regular Army and who deliberately deserted from the colours and joined a foreign army, and that he could consider ways and means for dealing with the other people.

Dr. O'Higgins

I did suggest that I would look into that, and, having looked into the whole question, what I am putting to the Deputy and to his colleagues and to his leader at the moment is, is it really Christian for us to carry out this five years' policy of certain men being unemployable, no matter what their matrimonial circumstances are and no matter what their family circumstances are, no matter if they are completely destitute and absolutely starving and there is relief work in their area? Is that a policy that we are going to embark on and still call ourselves a Christian country?

Mr. de Valera

If a man is in prison, have you not the same difficulty? Has the State to do something with regard to his family?

Dr. O'Higgins

If he is in prison, when he is released from prison he would not be a pariah dog for seven years. In fact, on his release from prison, there are all kinds of benevolent organisations that try to hook him up with some employment centre. I think that is the policy of the State now, and from the beginning of time, wherever and whenever possible to find employment for the unfortunate fellow, exprison.

I think the Leader of the Opposition will conscientiously agree with me that even though these orders are legitimate and defensible and necessary in time of war, in order to prevent the melting of an army in face of danger, in order to strike home to every soldier and every reservist the responsibility of a soldier's calling and the gravity of the crime of desertion, nevertheless, when all that can be said for such an order in time of war or in time of grave emergency, on full consideration of the reactions, even if the reactions apply to only one family, to six or seven human beings in one family, there is nobody opposite, facing, as we hope, a period of peace, that would take responsibility for the continuation of that order.

Question put and agreed to.

Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 15th December.