It would have seemed, as Deputy Colley pointed out, that within the last three years we had reached some measure of agreement on the principle on which this Estimate and this problem in regard to defence was to be faced. One feels there is a certain doubt about it because in this debate some of the statements made are open to different interpretations. One is that the people who made these statements really do not believe in making any provision for defence at all and would consider that the economics of the situation demand that other things be given priority and that defence should simply not be considered. Another interpretation would be that adequate provision could be made on a narrower basis than is being made at the moment.
I think we cannot usefully consider these matters unless we get the basis of the problem clear. To do this will mean a certain amount of repetition of what has been said on many occasions such as this in the past. What is this problem of defence? Why do we want to spend money on it? Everybody realises—nobody more so than the the Government of the day that has to find the money—that the duty of defence is a burden and a problem for the community. It is a provision that has to be made at some cost. Quite obviously, the approach must be to make adequate provision, if that provision has to be provided, at the minimum cost. I think everybody would subscribe to that.
The first question that arises is what should be the provision or whether there is to be any provision at all. I think we should make the matter clear. Certain people, rather irresponsible to my mind, will go round the country and very naïvely point to the money spent on defence and say: "Look what is being thrown away. If we had that money it could be spent elsewhere." These same people will not face the problem as to whether or not we have to provide for defence at all. Presumably, if we are going to provide for it we will want to provide for it seriously. There is no sense throwing money down the drain and votingannual sums of money when you find you will not get a return for that money. It has been frequently mentioned in this House—it is now almost a hackneyed phrase—that defence is in the nature of insurance against a possible event. That is what it is.
It is a question of paying an economic premium on a policy that will give you a return when you need it. There is no sense throwing money down the drain on inadequate insurance. In that event you would have spent your money year after year providing against something but as you have not provided enough you have nothing on which you can get a return on maturity. The net result is that you are not only caught out when the event takes place but you have also thrown away money in annual instalments.
It is a very serious question to decide soberly in the interests of the community whether any provision is to be made for defence at all. I take it that everybody will agree—it is axiomatic—that if you are going to provide at all for defence, then you must make adequate provision. In fact, the first question one must ask oneself is whether there is a defence problem and whether there is a need to provide for the defence of this country. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, as most of us believe it will be—I have heard nobody on the opposite benches, when taxed with that question, say otherwise—we have got to ask ourselves a second question. Can we do anything effective to meet that problem? I think we all agree we can, and experience has shown we can. The fact that in any particular event we will be dependent to a large extent on fortune, as must inevitably be the case, does not vitiate the point that, in expectation of certain factors, you can make adequate provision for defence. We have experience to prove that that approach is justified. The Lord helps those who help themselves.
When you have answered these two questions, it is then a matter of ways and means. I could quite honestly understand the attitude of certain people if they said: "Well, on somedetails, you could do with a smaller Army in numbers." I think I could argue that out with them on a reasonable basis, but I am prepared, I think, to show conclusively why it is not possible to operate completely on that basis. I cannot, however, understand people who say: "Do not buy the equipment that is necessary if you are going to have a Defence Force at all." In fact, it all boils down to this, that as well as having these two general questions before which I have mentioned: (1) whether there is need for defence at all, and (2) even if there is, whether there is anything that we can reasonably do to meet the problem— whether, in other words, some method of approach is within our capacity— we have another question which can be put in a somewhat narrow way in relation to this particular Estimate, and it is: "Do we need a Defence Force at all in the sense of a Defence Force comprising various elements; and, furthermore, do we need to make provision for defence at all in the sense of national defence, or do we need merely an auxillary police force for the maintenance of internal order?"
Now, some of us have put that question before. I pressed it very hard when I was on the other side of the House and I understood that I got from one Minister, at all events, in the Government of that time, the statement that they were agreed that we wanted to approach this problem on the basis of national defence and not merely on that of having an auxillary police force. I am raising it now again because it is so hard to get down to a basis of argument on this. I can understand the man who says: "Forget about national defence; leave it to other people." One can understand the approach of a man who says that, who argues on that basis and then goes on to say: "Have an auxiliary police force." The man who takes that view can be understood. I do not agree with him, but I can argue with him, and I can also believe that he may be quite sincere in that point of view.
But you have got to face the consequences of that point of view. Theyare all very immediate and important consequences that we should face here if that happens to be the view of any particular Deputy or a group of Deputies. If that is the view which they want to press, then they should press it unequivocally and definitely so that we may face the implications of such an approach. The first important thing about it is that if that is your approach I would join issue with you on two different bases: (1), as a general defence problem, the consequence of taking up that attitude means that in time of emergency, or in a time of crisis, if anything happens, you have surrendered the initiative immediately in the matter of defence to somebody else. Frankly, I do not think that the majority of Deputies in any Party in this House would accept that view. I am certain that the people outside do realise fully the implications of that view, and that they would not accept it at all.
That is one basis for argument with anybody who holds that view. The second is an immediate and very important question, particularly for anyone in Government. It is this. If you merely want an auxiliary police force, then the type of force you want is a different type from that which we have been maintaining in some form ever since the State was founded. It needs to be differently organised, to be differently trained and differently equipped, and it can be a much cheaper force. If that was to be our approach, and was the only way in which we were approaching it, that is to say to go on with the present system and to maintain a force designed to be merely an auxiliary police force on the present basis, it would be gross extravagance. The invitation which I would like to extend to anyone who wants to advovate that point of view is to say so unequivocably and clearly. When they do that, we can then join issue on these two points.
As I understand the situation after, if I may say so, years of probing, it is this: that national policy here, irrespective of the Government in power, is to be that we will make provision for our own national defence. That was accepted very clearly by the CoalitionGovernment, in principle anyway, as well as by the present Government. If we are to make provision for national defence, then that provision must be effective. It may be, as I say, dependent on the hope that certain fortunate factors will operate. We can be realistic and appreciate the fact that, in certain circumstances, any provision that we make for defence might be relatively futile, but weighing up everything and taking into account the fortunate factors that are likely to help—weighing all the considerations that are there—we decide that an effort to provide for national defence is worth while. If we decided that, then we have got to see that it is worth while.
That immediately brings us into the details of this Estimate as to what is adequate provision for defence. As I say, it is not a thing to be passed over lightly. There is a considerable amount of money involved, and no Government wants to spend any more money than is necessary on essentials. With regard to the Army, we are in precisely the same position as we are in regard to any other branch of the State service. Some Deputies have said: "Cut down the size of the Army and pay them more." I will deal with that point specifically later from another aspect, but the fact is that the number of people maintained in the Defence Forces for defence are dictated essentially by the same reasons as those which dictate the number of people who are maintained in the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Department of Local Government or any other State Department. These people are maintained in the Civil Service presumably because they are essential. Presumably, we are not maintaining, and do not wish to maintain any more people in the Civil Service than the community can afford, or than are necessary for the work that is to be done.
We had an Estimate before us yesterday which gave us the relative proportions. The same thing applies in regard to the Army or to the number of Guards, or any other persons in the State service. Presumably, they are there because it is necessary to havethem in order to discharge the various duties assigned to them. We must take it that the numbers are the minimum numbers required to do the work which is necessary effectively. Deputy O'Donnell and others might as well come in here and say: "Halve the Civil Service and pay them more" as a solution for what they advocate in relation to the arbitration award. We would like to pay the Army—we would like to pay everybody—more. We would all like to be paid more no matter what calling we have.
Unfortunately, one is up against the hard facts of life, whether it is the Government who has to find the money or a private employer. You might as well come in here and say: "Cut the staff of the Department of Industry and Commerce by half. You will save money and then you can pay the remainder more." You might as well come in here and say: "Cut the staff of the Department of Local Government and they will do the job just as well." I wonder if any reasonable Deputy would come in here and say a thing like that? If people believe that we are carrying too many in other Departments, that is another day's work.
