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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 28 Nov 1957

Vol. 164 No. 8

Disapproval of Government's Foreign Policy—Motion.

I move:—

That Dáil Éireann disapproves of recent developments in the foreign policy of the Government as represented by certain statements and actions of the Minister for External Affairs at recent meetings of the General Assembly of the U.N.O.

There are some preliminary remarks I wish to make. The first is that, in charging the Government with having acted against the true interests of this country at recent meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations, I wish to state that I accept that the Government believes its policy would assist this country. Our charge is not that it acted mala fide, but that it acted wrongly. Our criticism is that its decisions were not dishonourable, but that they were wrong and that, although the reaction which they brought about was not intended by the Government, it was a reaction which, as reasonable men, they should have foreseen.

Secondly, I accept that the Government dislikes Communism as much as this Party does. I do, however, suggest that in its policy on two issues of great importance, it has left the inevitable impression abroad that our support for the Western democracies in the world's struggle at the present time is not as strong as they were entitled to expect or as our national interests demand.

The third thing I want to say is this: the strongest adverse criticism of the Government's policy in the United Nations this year has come from Catholic sources in the United States of America.

In referring to this reaction, I am not implying that there is a greater repository of faith in my Party than in the Government Party. I will refer to this reaction, however, as clear evidence of the effect the Government's policy has had on an important body of opinion in the United States of America, a body of opinion which, I would suggest, this country should respect.

Finally, I want to indicate that our criticism is not directed at everything the Minister said in the speech he made at the General Assembly. It is directed to two specific matters: firstly, the Government's proposals for a withdrawal of Russian and United States forces at present in Europe, and secondly, the support given the resolution favouring a discussion on the inclusion of Communist China as a member of the United Nations. Though we limit the debate to those two issues, both of them raise questions fundamental to the foreign policy of this country. On both of them the Government's decision was wrong and the combined effect of the decisions on these two issues has been damaging to this country's interests.

On the 10th September the Minister in the special session of the Assembly on the problem of Hungary saw fit to consider a proposal made by Mr. Khrushchev earlier this year and thought that this proposal presented a possibility worth considering for reducing the risk of war. In order to appreciate the proposals which the Minister made——

Would the Deputy quote that reference?

I intend to quote it.

Making a statement like that——

The Minister should conduct himself.

I am entitled to ask for a reference to the quotation——

I meant to quote the Minister——

On a point of order, if a Deputy makes a statement to this House on a matter of this importance I think we are entitled to a reference to the quotation when he makes the charge.

That is not a point of order.

The Deputy making the speech is entitled to make his speech in his own way.

And he need not make the speech the Minister would like him to make.

I submit that it is the usual practice in this House when a Deputy makes a statement of that kind which is inaccurate and is asked by the Minister concerned to give the reference, he should do so.

I am perfectly prepared to quote the Minister's words and indeed I intend to quote him extensively. I am referring, in fact, to page 8. As I was saying, the proposal the Minister referred to had been made by Mr. Khrushchev earlier this year and in order to understand——

That is not true, of course.

Order, order!

May I not say that a thing is not true?

The Minister may not. Let him keep quiet. If he knew how to conduct himself as a Minister——

The Deputy should conduct himself and not try to railroad this business through the Dáil because he will not be allowed to do it.

Who will stop us?

Order! Deputy Costello.

If I am wrong in the statement I have made I have no doubt the Minister will correct me but, from the researches I have been able to make, I find that Mr. Khrushchev made a proposal earlier this year and I wish to refer to that now. Through my researches I have been able to find that proposal was made in or about the month of April this year. I understand it was originally made on American television and was a proposal containing an offer by the Russian Government for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe if the United States would withdraw her troops completely from Europe——

That was not my proposal.

I agree. I am sorry if the Minister has misunderstood me. I accept that, as the Minister has now stated, it was not his proposal.

The Deputy now accepts it! Could he not have read the speech before putting down this motion?

I shall refer to the speech in due course but I would suggest that the Minister's anger would be better placed if he waited his turn to speak.

Hear, hear!

Stick to the truth.

I am now referring to the proposal which Mr. Khrushchev made earlier this year. It was a proposal for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe in return for the withdrawal of United States troops completely from Europe. This proposal was repeated in Pravda on the 28th April last. It must, of course, be said that if the cold war could be called off, if the nations of the world could agree to disarm, if the satellites were left free to form their own form of Government and if United States troops, safe in the knowledge that the threat from international Communism was gone. could go home, that would be a most desirable thing. Present circumstances indicate, however, that such a hope is a Utopian one.

It requires only a very slight knowledge of world affairs to ascertain why Mr. Khrushchev's proposal was turned down by the Western democracies and turned down for good reason. So long as there was no agreement on disarmament such a proposal could merely help the Soviet Government, leaving them with strong armies in a position to overrun Europe, with United States forces an ocean away. Secondly, such a proposal would leave unsolved the problem of German unification and thirdly, it would make possible the staffing of satellite armies by Russian officers and with the assistance, if necessary, of so-called volunteers in the event of a rising such as the tragic one that took place in Hungary last year.

The proposals were, in fact, turned down by spokesmen for the Western democracies, and I would like to refer in this connection to a statement which was contained in the Report of the General Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe which it presented in the early part of this year to the council.

It referred to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal and said:—

"This suggestion is akin to proposals which were entertained in certain circles. The American comment in this connection has been that United States withdrawal from Europe will seriously weaken the defences of Western Europe. The Russians will be withdrawing their troops only a few hundred miles, where the Americans would have to move back 3,000 miles. The withdrawal of American armed forces will indeed leave Europe in a dangerously exposed position vis-á-vis a heavily armed Soviet Union, and in your committee's opinion this will continue to be the case so long, at any rate, as there is no substantial reduction or removal of the threat, by a corresponding adjustment in the balance of armaments between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries. It would be suicidal to leave the protection of Western Europe entirely to the deterrent provided by the atomic weapons in the North American continent.”

The comment in that document is a comment that was favoured by the representatives of the member States of the Council of Europe. It was a comment that got general approbation subsequently in the Council of Europe. Later, in May of this year, an important declaration of policy was made by the American and the German Governments after a visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington. This statement of policy is of great materiality in the light of the Minister's and the Government's proposals subsequently in the United Nations. In the course of a joint communique issued after the meetings between the two heads of Governments in May, it was stated:—

"The President and Chancellor emphasised that NATO is essential for the security of the entire free world. They agreed that the defensive strength of NATO must be further improved in face of the continuing Soviet threat and absence of dependable agreement for major reduction in armaments. For the purpose of contributing its fair share in the defence of the North Atlantic area, the United States intend to maintain forces in Europe, including Germany, so long as the threat to the area exists."

The Russian proposal was reiterated subsequently in a joint communication made after a visit of the Russian Communist leaders to East Germany between 7th and 14th August. In the course of that joint communique, the Russian and East German Communist leaders stated that the relaxation of tension in Europe would be considerably helped by such means as the removal of all foreign troops from European countries.

Before turning to the Minister's proposals, it should be noted that there have been many proposals in the past for the drawing back of troops in Europe. Sir Anthony Eden, as Head of the British Government, two years ago made such a proposal. Mr. Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition in England, had a proposal on some such lines earlier this year. Only last Sunday, the distinguished Keith lecturer, Mr. Kennan, made a suggestion that would indicate the desirability of the drawing back of forces in Europe. What I wish to suggest is that all such proposals emanating from the West involved a solution of the problem on an agreed disarmament policy. It is of importance to note that, when we turn to the Minister's proposals, both these vital factors to any proposal for a withdrawal of troops in Europe have been ignored.

I now want to turn to the Minister's proposals. He has circulated to Deputies the text of his speech and on page 8 of the document, it is stated:—

"It is very easy, therefore, to understand the position of those who reject, or even decline to consider, Mr. Khrushchev's proposals. But to us, here, met to consider the case of Hungary—and not only, I assume, to express our moral disapproval, but to see whether we can do something to help—it is surely a question to consider whether those proposals do not present a possibility worth exploring."

Further down on the page, he states:

"I would urge, therefore——"

The Deputy had better continue that quotation.

If the Minister wants me to continue the quotation, here it is:—

"They declare Russia's willingness, but under conditions, to withdraw her troops from Hungary and the other captive nations. Those conditions were obviously advantageous to Russia, and it may be said they were designed to secure the out of hand rejection of the offer. But the possibility of winning freedom for the captive nations should weigh heavily when a reply or a counter offer is being made.

"I would urge, therefore, that we should make every effort to discover whether it is possible to reach agreement on a fair and reasonable drawing back of the non-national forces on both sides from the border of Russian-occupied Europe. If such an agreement can be reached along the lines I shall suggest, it would provide an opportunity—perhaps the only opportunity—for the peaceful liberation of Eastern Europe."

The next relevant part is at the top of page 9. The Minister proposed, in order to avoid prolonged negotiations —I am quoting:—

"... we suggest that the drawing back should take place along latitudinal lines from either side of the border for an equal number of kilometres. In other words, for every step Russian troops take to the East along a given line of latitude, American troops will take a step westwards along the same line of latitude."

A nice interpretation.

I am reading the speech.

What is the point of the interruption?

What is the mathematician's interpretation of "an equal number of kilometres?"

Perhaps the Taoiseach did not understand?

I understand it perfectly.

Deputy Costello should be allowed to proceed.

The quotation continues:—

"This drawing back might be, for example, a few hundred kilometres in the first stage. A second phase might be a further reciprocal drawing back, taking Russian officers and troops out of Hungary and the other captive nations west of the Russian border established at Yalta and Potsdam."

But not the United States out of Europe as the Fine Gael Party said.

I will refer to the point raised by the Minister in the next notes I have in my speech.

Does the Deputy admit that?

Would the Minister let me make my speech in my own way? I am going to deal with the point the Minister made and I intend to do so in my own way.

Deputy Costello.

I am not going to quote any further from the speech at this stage.

Would the Deputy quote what——

I will deal with the point the Minister made.

Deputy Costello should be allowed to make his statement in his own way.

As long as he sticks to the truth, he is all right.

I hope this debate will produce some truth.

Deputy Costello must be allowed to make his own speech in his own way, within the Rules of Order.

As I was saying, the rest of the Minister's suggestions favoured a proposal for a widening tone, subject to the supervision of United Nations observers. I want to say this about the Government's proposals in this regard. There was a very significant omission from his proposals concerning the second phase of the withdrawal. He made no mention of where he proposed United States troops should be in the second phase. The matter was left in the air.

I cannot help feeling that there must have been discussions on this at Cabinet level. I cannot help feeling that there must have been drafts of this proposal before it was finally delivered. There must have been discussions as to where the American troops would be, in the Minister's opinion, in the second phase of the withdrawal. The omission in regard to where he believed the American troops would be in the event of the second phase being reached is most unfortunate.

A reasonable interpretation, I think, of what the Minister was proposing is that he was expressing something that might be acceptable to the major Powers. It was clear from the earlier declaration of the Russian leaders that the Russians would not leave Europe, unless the United States forces would do so also. I would suggest a reasonable presumption is that when the Minister suggested that, in the second phase, the Russian troops would be behind the Russian border, he implied that the United States troops would then be out of Europe. This was the interpretation that our Party put on it.

They are stupid enough to put any interpretation on it.

Would the Minister wait a moment? My Party was not the only one that put that interpretation on it.

But you had a couple of weeks.

Surely the Minister ought to keep quiet.

I want to refer to the fact that other people, too, had the opinion we had on reading the Minister's proposals. For example, the diplomatic observer in the Irish Press had that opinion. The commentator in The Economist had that opinion and the National Executive of the Trade Union Congress had that opinion. The leader writer of the Irish Times had the opportunity. Their interpretation was the same as ours.

I should like to refer the Minister to what the secretary of the Trade Union Congress stated in his letter, as reported in the Irish Press of 10th October of this year:—

"The national executive desired me to express their congratulations on your recent statement to the United Nations concerning the phased withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territories."

The secretary was congratulating the Government, apparently, on a proposal which, in fact, the Government had not made.

May I refer now to the leading article in the Irish Times on 11th September last, when the full speech which the Minister had delivered was reported in the newspapers? It referred, first, to Sir Anthony Eden's scheme and went on:—

"Mr. Aiken's plan, however, is more ambitious than was Sir Anthony's; the latter called for the establishment merely of a predetermined and completely de-militarised no-man's land or buffer zone, whereas Mr. Aiken has in mind a process which would end with the complete withdrawal of Russian and American troops from continental Europe, presumably leaving national military forces intact."

That statement was never denied. If that was not the Minister's proposal, surely the Government Information Bureau—which has been active on other matters recently—could have made a statement denying that the Minister's proposals were as suggested in the statement given by the leader writer of the Irish Times.

And are we to deny every statement that appears in every paper?

If it is an ambiguous statement——

It is just nonsense.

What is "an equal number of kilometres"?

An equal number.

It is too much for the Deputy.

The mistake which the Minister blames my Party for having made—I presume he is alleging we did it dishonestly, but I do not know—was already made by the diplomatic observer in the Irish Press.

I should like to refer the Minister to the Irish Press of 19th September, if he has that paper handy, in which the political observer, referring to those proposals, said:—

"It will be remembered that his proposal for a simultaneous withdrawal of Russian and American forces from Europe arose in the particular context of Hungary..."

The Economist, which is a reputable paper, had an article on the United Nations from its correspondent in New York on 21st September. It had a few lines to say about the Minister. The first sentence was rather an ambiguous one. It stated:—

"On the first day the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, surprised everyone by making an important speech. Mr. Aiken wanted to accept Mr. Khrushchev's challenge, in a celebrated interview on American television, to withdraw Western troops from foreign soil in Europe, in return for which he would take the Soviet army away from the Satellites."

I think it was necessary to delay the House, perhaps, by giving these quotations in order to state that in these sources—not only from my Party —there was uncertainty in the minds of observers about the Minister's proposals. I think it should be elementary, speaking in an organisation such as United Nations on such important matters, that the Minister should at least make his meaning clear and should not leave himself open to what he now says—and which I accept—are the misinterpretations of his proposals.

I want to accept that the Minister did not mean in his proposals that the United States troops were to leave Europe completely.

The Minister's proposals were in two phases—(1) that there would be a latitudinal withdrawal of a few hundred kilometres and (2) that the Russian troops would be behind Russian borders. I now accept from the Minister that at that stage he did not intend that the American troops would be out of Europe. If that was his proposal, the first and obvious criticism was that it was unrealistic. The Russians would never agree to leave Europe unless the United States did so. In this regard, I should like to refer to a comment in the London Times of Monday of this week referring to this very subject. It stated:

"The Russian thought on the subject tends so show that they equate with their departure from East Europe the evacuation of all American troops from Europe and the winding-up of all bases."

It was not only unrealistic inasmuch as it would not be acceptable to the Russian Government; it was also impracticable as it was unacceptable to the NATO powers. It made no provision for the reunification of Germany. It left the great problem of disarmament unresolved.

I would also suggest that, taken literally, the Minister's proposal was almost nonsensical. He talked about a withdrawal along latitudinal lines as if the two armies were drawn up facing each other like tin soldiers on the floor. In fact, the United States bases are scattered throughout Europe. Perhaps, in replying, the Minister would give more information as to what, for example, is to become of the American bases in Italy and as to what is to become, in his proposal, of the American installations in Turkey? If it is to be taken literally, and if there is to be a latitudinal withdrawal, one kilometre would take the American forces in Naples into the sea. Did the Minister envisage that the American troops, at the end of his second phase, would be cooped-up in the South of France and that their bases in Turkey and Italy would remain intact? If that is to be taken as a constructive proposal, it seems hard to imagine how it would be acceptable to the major Powers.

I think the proposal is worse than being merely unrealistic and impracticable. It was a proposal that ran directly contrary to the strongly-expressed policy of the principal Governments of Western Europe and North America and, in particular, contrary to the declaration in May, to which I have referred, of the Governments of Western Germany and the United States; a policy based on the simple principle that until there are effective disarmament arrangements and a solution of the German problem the Russian menace must be met by the maintenance of United States Forces in Europe through the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I am in favour of this Government or any Irish Government making constructive proposals at the United Nations. These proposals should, however, be practicable. They should not indicate a trend in foreign policy to which the Western democracies may object.

For historical, geographical and religious reasons, we found ourselves with friends from many parts of the world when we entered the United Nations, one of the closest of which, among whose friendship we highly prized, is the United States. Because the struggles of our nations in the past have been so similar, because each has inspired the other for many decades, we also had close bonds with the great Indian nation. Very early in the 12th Session of the Assembly, on an issue on which these two powers friendly to Ireland were divided, we had to choose which of them we would support. The Government decided to support India. Its decision we believe to have been wrong and not to have been in the best interests of our country. The issue was whether the Assembly would place on its Agenda for the current Session the question: The Representation of China. In fact, this was not a mere procedural point nor was it a minor issue. In fact, it was to be the first real trial of strength between the United States and western blocs in the present Session.

We have been accused of misrepresenting the Government and I want to say this clearly: the Government did not vote in favour of the Peking régime. The Government's spokesman specifically disclaimed any sympathy with the ideology or the actions of that régime. It is, therefore, urged that all that the Government did was to state that they favoured a discussion on the subject and that this was a reasonable attitude and that no real harm could be done by their vote on such an issue. Such an argument ignores the history of the subject; it ignores the manner in which the debate at the United Nations Assembly was conducted and it ignores the reality of what was happening at the United Nations on 23rd September this year.

The question of Chinese representation at the United Nations had been debated in the early part of this year. The Assembly voted then against including it on its Agenda. Ireland voted on that occasion with the Western democracies.

The American view of this subject was, of course, well known and it was reiterated some weeks before the General Assembly met in what the State Department called "a major policy statement" of Mr. Foster Dulles on 28th June, in San Francisco, and in the course of these remarks, the official American Government view was made clear, as follows:—

"The United Nations is not a reformatory for bad governments."

On a point of order, could I ask from what the Deputy is quoting?

I am quoting from column 15667 of Keesing's Contemporary Archives:—

"The United Nations is not a reformatory for bad governments. It is supposedly an association of those who are already ‘peace-loving' and are ‘able and willing to carry out their Charter obligations.'"

He went on:—

"Should a régime which in seven years has promoted five foreign or civil wars—Korea, Indo-China, Tibet, the Philippines, and Malaya; which has fought the United Nations: which to-day stands condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor— should that régime be given a permanent seat, with veto power, in the body which under the Charter has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security?"

The General Committee of the United Nations met on 18th and 19th September to draw up the agenda for the coming session. It was met by a request from India that it would include on the agenda the subject "the representation of China". This was opposed by the United States, and the United States suggested to the committee that it would adopt a draft resolution to be forwarded to the General Assembly. I want to read this draft resolution because it is of the greatest interest and importance in this debate. The resolution read as follows:—

"The General Assembly decides to reject the request of India for the inclusion on the Agenda of its twelfth regular Session of the additional item entitled ‘The representation of China in the United Nations.'

"Decides not to consider at its twelfth regular Session any proposal to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China, or to seat the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

The committee adopted this draft resolution by ten votes to three, with two abstentions, and the matter came for decision before the General Assembly on 23rd September. The resolution was introduced; the Indian delegate put his amendment and the discussion took place on the Indian amendment.

It is regrettable that the debate was not published in full in the Irish newspapers. It was not an academic one on the rights and wrongs of discussing the subject; it was, for the most part, a full debate on the rights and wrongs of the Peking régime. It was a debate in which the delegates from every Communist power and each of the satellites spoke praising the Communist régime in China and denouncing American foreign policy. In between the Russian, Yugoslavian, Rumanian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Byelo-Russian, Albanian delegates, the Minister stepped up and said in a one-minute speech that, in effect, he was voting with them. Two delegates from the Asian bloc supported the amendment—Ceylon and Burma. There was one delegate from the African group who supported it. Guatemala, Malay and Peru spoke against it and the Western case was put by the United States delegate, Mr. Lodge. Mr. Casey, Foreign Minister of Australia, said:—

"Ten months ago the General Assembly decided not to put this on the agenda. Since then, there has been no change in the Communist régime. In particular, the régime is not prepared to renounce force in Formosa."

The United Kingdom representative also spoke against the amendment.

The voting was 43 votes against the amendment and 29 for, with nine abstentions. With a majority of 14, a swing of seven votes would have meant that the amendment would have been carried, so that our vote might conceivably have been of very great importance.

It is also of interest to note that all the Western democracies, with the exception of the Scandinavian group, voted against the Indian amendment, that the Latin American group en bloc voted against it, that the Russian Communist bloc, together with some members of the African and Asian bloc, voted in favour of it.

The Indian amendment having been defeated, the American resolution which I have just read out was put and the Minister, having voted for the Indian amendment, then proceeded to vote against the American resolution. The resolution was not put first as a whole. It was put paragraph by paragraph and the Minister voted against the first paragraph and then he voted against the second paragraph.

Deputies will recall that the second paragraph read:—

"The General Assembly decides not to consider any proposal to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China, or to seat the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

By voting against this resolution, he indicated that the Irish Government were in favour of considering a proposal including the representative of the Government of the Republic of China and favoured considering a proposal to seat the representative of the People's Republic of China.

In the light of these facts, how can it be said that there was no harm in merely supporting the Indian amendment for a discussion?

There were, to my mind, three valid reasons why we should not have done so. The first was put by the Chinese delegate in the course of the debate, when he said as follows:—

"Right at this moment the forces of freedom are contending with the forces of international Communism for the allegiance of the minds and the hearts of the Asian people. A debate here on such a subject might tip the balance in favour of the forces of Communism."

The second reason, I believe, was that we were voting and speaking in direct opposition to the strongly-held views of the Governments of the Western democracies and, in particular, of the views of the United States of America; and the third reason was that by so voting, we left the impression in many parts of the world, perhaps unintentionally but nevertheless inevitably, that we in some way favoured the Peking régime and in some way lent our support to the arguments put forward by the Russian and other Communist States.

In view of the circumstances of the debate, in view of the tremendous pressure put into the debate by the Russian Government and its satellites, I do not think it would have been possible to dispel that impression abroad, but it might have been possible to mitigate it somehow, if strong arguments had been put forward by the Government as to why it was voting the way it did. The Minister adduced two arguments for voting for the Indian resolution. The first one was a negative one. He stated:—

"If, by merely refusing to discuss the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, we can do anything to improve the situation in China and Korea, we would vote without hesitation in favour of that course. We are not, however, convinced that refusal to discuss that question can now serve such a purpose."

The Minister's view was that if, by not discussing the subject, that would help to improve the situation in China and Korea he would vote for that course. He did not answer the positive argument put by the Chinese delegates that, in fact, by a discussion of the subject, by a full-scale debate on the subject in the United Nations at that particular time, positive harm might flow in the form of positive advantage to Communism in the Asian countries.

Secondly, the Minister stated that our aims would be to win acceptance of the principles of the Charter in China and to secure self-determination for the people of Korea. A very laudable end.

"The belief of my delegation is that for the present satisfactory progress can best be made to these ends by having a full and open discussion of the question of the representation of China in this Assembly."

What is the page?

Page 28. Does the Government believe that? Does the Government believe that a decision in New York, a discussion on the rights and wrongs of the Chinese Communist régime, will change by one jot the tyranny, the persecution and the injustice of the régime in Red China? A man is presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of his action. So it is with a Government. The Government failed in its duty in not perceiving that, by voting for the Russian bloc on this important issue, by putting forward negative and unconvincing arguments, its action would inevitably be construed as an unfriendly gesture to the Western democracies and as support for the Red régime which we all abhor.

On these two matters to which I have referred, we charge the Government with having spoken and acted in a manner calculated to cause offence to Governments friendly to this country. We charge them with having, in fact, provoked strong and adverse criticism of this country from sources whose friendship we value and whose criticism we must respect. We are a small country in the United Nations. It would not have been surprising if our remarks went unnoticed abroad.

Hear, hear!

Despite what Deputy McQuillan may think, they did not go unnoticed abroad. Even if they had, I think it would have been the duty of our Party to express our disapproval of actions which were calculated to injure our international prestige. As I have said, it is a measure of our importance, though Deputy McQuillan does not seem to share the view I have expressed, that what was said has caused some reaction abroad.

We do not know what the official governmental reactions have been. The Minister has told us that there were many conversations with representatives of foreign Governments, but these conversations, or any representations that may have been made, are shrouded in secrecy. We do know, however, of reactions from non-governmental sources and from statements and comments in the newspapers. And, in this regard, the Minister has assisted us too. Deputies who do not regularly get the departmental Bulletin may have been somewhat surprised to have found it in their post a few mornings ago and to have found not the current issue of the Bulletin but an earlier edition of three weeks before.

On opening the Bulletin, Deputies would have quickly perceived why the Bulletin was forwarded to them. It contained excerpts from eight newspapers commenting on the Minister's speech. By a strange coincidence, all these excerpts were friendly, if not over-enthusiastic, and in favour of some of the Government policy. The Minister, in preparing his Bulletin, displayed indeed a certain degree of modesty because he did omit from the Bulletin which he circulated a comment on his speech, which was probably the most friendly comment of all.

The Minister has stated that he regarded his proposals as constructive. There was one person who actually used that word about the Minister's proposals, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kuznetsov, and Mr. Kuznetsov, as reported in the Irish Press of 28th September, stated that “Ireland's proposal for an East-West military withdrawal in Europe was constructive in principle.”

It is my duty, I think, to give a clear picture of the international reaction that left in the Department's Bulletin. The comments in the United States were highly adverse, critical and strongly opposed to the Government's policy. Deputies are aware of the telegram that Archbishop Cushing sent to the President of the Oriel Society, in which he stated:—

"The Chinese Communist régime has never conformed to the practices of civilised nations. It gives no indication that it will do so in future. The encouragement given this diabolical régime by the Irish delegation at the United Nations shocked and saddened me and all the clergy and the faithful of the archdiocese of Boston."

Deputies may also be aware that the Auxiliary Bishop of New York commented in New York on the Minister's speech. He stated, as reported in The Catholic News of October 5th:—

"We cannot remain silent when a nation, for centuries unwaveringly Catholic...should...take action to treat as decent men, to accord an opportunity for lying propaganda to those butchers whose hands...are dripping red with the blood of thousands of Christian and pagan Chinese and who have given no promise nor shown any disposition to change their tactics."

There was editorial comment, too, in a number of American newspapers. The Catholic News, to which I have referred, had a leading article headed: “Recreant to Principle”.

"These are sad days, but there have been fewer sadder ones than the day last week when the delegation from Ireland to the United Nations joined the Communist bloc in voting to bring before the United Nations the question of admitting Red China and in voting against the United States resolution to continue for at least one year the exclusion of the Peiping Communist régime from the United Nations.

"The efforts on behalf of Red China were soundly defeated, but for the defeats we owe no thanks to Ireland's Secretary for External Affairs Frank Aiken or Ireland's United Nations Ambassador Frederick Boland. In their stand, the Irish delegation voted against the position of every country in the Western Hemisphere and against that of every non-Communist country in Europe except the Scandinavian nations under the shadow of the Kremlin."

There was also a comment in The Tablet of September 28th:—

"Wednesday morning when we picked up the newspapers we were shocked, then stunned and saddened. On the day before, we had read of the speech made in the General Assembly of the United Nations by Mr. Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs, strongly urging discussion of the admission of Red China to the United Nations despite its long history of contempt for and violation of all the freedoms for which the U.N. stands and for which Ireland has fought for countless generations.

"It is extremely difficult to believe that Mr. Aiken would be so naïve (which we do not think he is) as to be convinced that the Assembly could ‘win acceptance for the principles of the Charter, in China' by this method. It is the case of the woman marrying the criminal to convert him — with the usual degree of success. The purpose of the U.N. is not to admit nations to reform them. They must be reformed first to qualify for membership.

"But Wednesday morning, when the result of the vote to postpone U.N. action on Red China was published, we and thousands of others of Irish descent in this country were dismayed to note the company in which Ireland found herself in the Red China matter. We had not thought that we should have seen such a day."

I think these comments indicate a grave degree of disquiet amongst American Catholics at the Government's action.

The adverse criticism was not confined to American Catholics. The New York Post, in an article by a columnist, Mr. Joseph Lash, stated:—

"Frank Aiken, Head of the Irish Delegation to the General Assembly, has irritated the United States delegation on several counts. During the Hungarian debate, although Ireland was a sponsor of the 37-power resolution, Aiken suddenly sprang the idea of a mutual withdrawal of United States and Soviet troops from Mid-Europe as a way of helping Hungary.

"Last week, speaking in the general debate, he urged a four-power conference on the Middle East — a project which the United States does not seem to like. He supplemented that suggestion with advice to the effect that the great Powers, instead of competing for dominion over the Middle East, should keep hands off.

"But what really irked the United States was the assist he gave this week to Krishna Menon's effort to put the issue of Communist China's representation on this Assembly agenda. He was reported to have taken this position against the advice of his Delegation.

"Some delegates read into his activities a reflection of a changing viewpoint in the Vatican. But this theory was undermined when Catholic Latin-America unanimously backed the United States move to continue the moratorium on the discussion of the Chinese issue for at least another year."

The final comment to which I wish to refer this House, in order to give them a more balanced view of the comments which have been made, I have taken from a weekly newspaper which is widely regarded and of high intellectual content. It is called America and I quote from its edition of October 19th. The article is headed “Irish Neutralism” and it states:—

"Friends of Ireland are shaking their heads in surprise and even dismay at the way the Irish are talking and voting in the U.N. Frank Aiken, Minister for External Affairs, unveiled the new Irish approach in his address on September 10th when he proposed a withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Later he proposed a four-power conference on the Middle East.

"Finally on September 24th Mr. Aiken voted for India's Resolution to put the question of Red China's admission to the U.N. on the Agenda. Ireland also voted against the U.S. proposal to postpone this question for yet another year. Those seeking the key to this unheralded "neo-neutralism" point to the change of Government which took place this year...."

The article goes on to state that the Irish position:—

"is all the more unusual because of Ireland's known support of freedom and her detestation of Communism. The coming weeks in the General Assembly will provide a clear indication of just where Ireland really stands."

Deputies can choose for themselves between the quotations I have given and those supplied by the Minister. It does appear to me that weight should be given in this country to the views of important sections of the American people naturally friendly to this country and that their condemnation should concern us more than the opinions expressed in a Ghent newspaper circulated in the Department's Bulletins and the views of the Hindustan Standard. To solve our own national problem, we need the active support of our friends in the United States and to alienate, even temporarily, that support, as the Government have clearly done, is not wise politics.

The two issues to which I have referred and on which this debate takes place raise questions which, I think, are fundamental to the foreign policy of this country. Last year, in the debate on the Department for External Affairs, the previous Government made clear its policy when the Minister spoke in the Dáil on 3rd July, as reported in Volume 159, columns 142 to 144.

The previous Government indicated three broad principles of policy which should determine our attitude on specific issues arising in the United Nations. Firstly, it stated that it should be our aim to insist as strongly as we can on the integral application of the provisions of the Charter to any situation to which it is intended to apply it; secondly, that we should try to maintain a position of independence in the United Nations, judging on their merits the various questions on which we have to adopt an attitude. This position of independence would, of course, always reflect our National traditions, objectives, ideas and the beliefs which we in this country hold to be fundamental. The third principle it enunciated was that it must be our constant concern to preserve the Christian civilisation of which we are a part and, with that in view, to support, wherever possible, those powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of Communist power and influence.

The statement went on to say that we belong to the great community of states, made up of the United States of America, Canada and Western Europe and that our national destinies are indissolubly bound up with theirs. It continued:—

"It is in our national interest that this group of states should remain strong and united, and that being so, it should be part of our policy, as I conceive it, to do what we can, consistently with our own views and policies and with our duty as a loyal and independent member of the organisation, to strengthen the influence of this group to resist efforts aiming at its disintegration and to lend support and co-operation wherever possible to its individual members."

The Minister, who was a former Minister for External Affairs and presumably the spokesman of his Party on this subject, rose to reply to Deputy Cosgrave's remarks. So that I cannot be accused of misrepresenting the Minister, I will have to quote him at some length. I am quoting from column 148 of Volume 159. Before coming to these remarks, the Minister stated that there would be little objection to the first two principles enunciated by Deputy Cosgrave, but then he turned to the third principle which I have just indicated, and he stated as follows:—

"I think the Minister in the third principle he outlined departed to some extent from the first and the second which he announced. It seemed to me, from what I could hear and as I was able to follow him, that he was rather tying himself up in his third point of policy. There is no doubt but that one of the reasons why Communism has had success in some parts of the world is because the non-Communist nations have not behaved as they should. There are sins that are common both to the communistic States and to non-communistic States. Our acid test for all nations, no matter on which side of the Iron Curtain they may be, should be the test the Minister stated in the beginning of his speech he would apply to Russia, namely, that it is what is done that counts and not what is said. That, I think, should be our acid test and the acid test of our representatives in regard to all countries inside the U.N.O. or outside it. Indeed, our own case and the support other nations are prepared to give it should be our acid test as to their bona fides when they talk about the freedom-loving nations and the desire to support and defend freedom-loving nations.”

What did the Minister mean when he stated that his predecessor departed to some extent from the first and second principles? What did he mean when he stated that in his third principle his predecessor was tying himself up? What is meant by the phrase: "our own case and the support other nations give it should be our acid test" as to the bona fides of the nations at the United Nations? Does it not mean that at least the Minister was hesitant in accepting the third principle of policy which was an integral part of the last Government's foreign policy? Does it not mean that he was in favour of judging the bona fides of all States or groups of States in the United Nations, presumably before supporting them in the United Nations, by seeing whether they would support us in our effort to end Partition? This was the interpretation I put on it last year and I was criticised for so doing; and the Minister, I suggest, has now an opportunity to explain what he means.

I do not think that the interpretation I put on it was wrong. I do not think that the Government fully accepts our obligation to strengthen the hands of the group of nations composed of the U.S.A., Canada and Western Europe and to lend support to its individual members. By voting on the Chinese issue in the way it did, by its suggestion for a withdrawal of armed forces, it was certainly not lending support and co-operation wherever possible to its individual members. The Government's actions and the present Minister's speech of last year lend support to the view that the present Government believes that it should take up a more neutralist attitude than that advocated by its predecessors, that it should take up a position something akin to India. If this is not the Government's view, we would be glad of an assurance that those deductions are not correct. If it is the view of the Government, then there is a sharp conflict between Opposition and Government on a fundamental matter of foreign policy.

There is a strain in Irish public opinion—fathered by the fact that, by God's grace, we remained neutral in the last war and because we have not entered into any military pacts since the last war — that we can in some way remain aloof, apart, uncommitted in the great struggle of our times. We cannot and we should not. We can sympathise with India's position in the world, with the difficulties created by its enormous population and its great economic problems, with its close proximity to Communist China—India which, for reasons valid for it, plays a neutralist role in the United Nations and refuses to give constant support to the Western democracies. We can, as I say, sympathise with its decision. we can respect its integrity: we should not emulate its example.

We have our differences with the countries of the Western community. There is our national dispute with Great Britain over Partition; we disagreed with French and British action last year over the Suez adventure; we disagreed with current British policy in Cyprus; we may have doubts about the actions of our friends on the mainland of Europe; we may differ with some aspects of American foreign policy from time to time. We would naturally like it if those countries of the Western community supported us in our own great national problem. But these differences, and the fact that our friends abroad decline to assist us actively to end Partition, should not deflect us from our plain duty and clear responsibility to assist in the United Nations, wherever possible, the countries of the Western community, in the great struggle against international Communism.

The things that divide us are infinitesimal compared with the things that unite us. Our disagreements fade into insignificance compared with the importance of the world struggle in which they and we are involved. If we can get a clear and specific agreement on these principles from the Government, if we can get an assurance that they will be practised and not merely preached, that the departure from them which occurred last September will not be reiterated, then, although the Division Lobby will record the defeat of this motion, it will be a defeat which this Party will gladly accept.

I propose to second this motion. When called upon to second a motion of this kind, which has been moved in a speech of such moderation and objectivity sustained by detailed reference, it does not behove the seconder to say very much; and yet I think it no harm at this stage of our debate to consider some fundamentals in regard to the matters involved.

I wonder if we could get general agreement on the proposition that the primary function of Irish diplomacy should be to serve the vital interests of Ireland. That sounds platitudinous. Whether it is or not, it is a very important principle to keep in mind when our Minister for External Affairs carries the responsibility of representing his country in any business he transacts, but most especially when he speaks for Ireland at an international conference. If we accept that principle, I think there logically flows from it the conclusion that any policy, however well-intentioned, which has failed to serve that end, has itself failed in toto. Deputy Declan Costello very properly emphasised that neither he, nor anyone on his side of the House, was concerned to paint the Minister as a scarlet Communist, or to suggest that the Fianna Fáil Party desired to be gathered into the fold of Khrushchev.

We are quite prepared to consider that the Minister's intentions were the best, but it is no harm to recall the homely saying that hell is paved with good intentions, and that a bull in a china shop, with no more reprehensible intentions than to pass peacefully through, which reduces all the stock of china in the shop to trash in the course of his peaceful progression, will probably not be slaughtered as he emerges through the backdoor, though it is highly unlikely the consternated tenant on whom he has called will yearn for his early return.

I know of no better test of policy than to ask myself what are the results? I judge the policy of the Minister for External Affairs, not by my surmise as to his intentions, but on the results as I see them. Just as the bull in the china shop is dismayed and consternated as each new shelf of china falls, so I have no doubt the Minister for External Affairs was dismayed to hear of the concern of Washington at his demarche and was consternated and bewildered to receive the accolades of Moscow and Peking. If we are to judge policy by results and not by intentions, the results of these demarches in the United Nations was that Ireland's attitude dismayed our friends and rejoiced the hearts of those whom we were least concerned to please.

Of course, it is true that from time to time as the affairs of the United Nations engage our attentions, we must find that the vital interests of Ireland will on occasion conflict head on with the vital interests of some friendly nations, such as the United States of America, when it will be our duty to take the opposite side; but this is one of the urgent reasons why, in anticipation of the possible duty devolving upon us of aligning ourselves against Canada or the United States, against India or France or any if our traditional friends, we should, by our general line of conduct, carry conviction to their minds that where the issue is one of indifference to us, and even where it is not of vital interest for us, when we learn from them that it is a matter close to their hearts, then they can depend on us to lend a hand. Thus, when a day arises when in a matter of substance it is our duty to part company from them, they know that in this difference we are not sympathising with their enemies, but simply doing the least that our duty imposes upon us in the defence of a vital interest to our own country.

I remember myself, in a less-exalted sphere than the United Nations, just such a problem confronting us when I was privileged to represent this country at a meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations in Washington. My instructions were as clear as crystal. They were to go there and work with our friends, always subject to the overriding consideration that the vital interest of Ireland must take precedence over every other consideration. I remember in 1949, at a meeting in Washington, the Government of America urgently wanted the permanent headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organisation to be fixed in Washington. There were various other candidates who sought the privilege of having that establishment in their country, and among the other applicants was Italy.

At that time, it appeared to us that the Government of Italy was under very heavy pressure from the Communist Party and the Cominform in Europe; that anything that would assist it, or contribute to its prestige, and bring some aid to it through the influx of foreign funds and foreign resources, would be of a material benefit, not only to Italy but to Europe and to the anti-Communist side in Europe for which we stood. So, after protracted debate and eager contest we actually carried by one vote the proposal to transfer the headquarters of the F.A.O., which were temporarily in Washington, to a permanent place in Rome where they are now, and I remember the American delegation were not pleased because their view had not prevailed. They fully understood, however, that it was no unfriendliness to America that actuated our course, because they had learned by experience that, wherever we did not feel the vital interest of ourselves was involved we were on their side, and where we felt we had a duty and a profound conviction, they did not take up the attitude that, if you are a friend of the United States, you do what the United States does. That is the Russian attitude.

The satellite of Russia must not have vital interests and must not act or speak except as Moscow wishes it. In contrast, the difference in opinion with a great power like the United States is never in doubt from such motives, but, though the democracies, I hope, will ever treat one another with a mutual respect, which has been the practice heretofore, it still remains utterly true that in all human relations, "handsome is as handsome does," and one judges the value and quality of one's friends by the consistency with which they show friendship, not by the isolated instance in which your paths may temporarily diverge.

I do not want to follow the detailed, detached and objective analysis to which Deputy Costello has submitted the statements and actions of our Minister for External Affairs at the United Nations. I do not want to add to or subtract a word from his analysis of what transpired there. I only want to judge the action of the Minister on its apparent result. By that test I think it has rightly and truly failed. But by another test which we should apply, I think the policy of the Minister for External Affairs and the Government — which presumably instructed him because I cannot think the Minister for External Affairs went to New York on this important occasion without instructions from the Government —has failed. No country in the world can afford to be without a friend. Even so powerful a nation as the United States cherishes her friends and, if that be true of great countries, it is doubly true of small countries who want to be free.

I should like to ask the Minister for External Affairs and the Head of the Government to test the efficacy of the foreign policy pursued by our Minister for External Affairs at the United Nations by this question. When he was finished had we more or fewer friends? Amongst the nations where we would wish to have friends, I think we had fewer friends and amongst the countries whose friendship we do not want — for it is offered to us on terms we would not be prepared to accept— we appear to have more. Could there be any more disastrous indictment of a policy judged by results? If a mistake has been made, as it has, which may be in some degree due to a misapprehension as to the Minister's intentions, let us jointly take steps here to-day to repair the damage done.

Let me, in conclusion, remind the Minister that it is not enough for him to mean well; he must appear to do well. It was once wisely said by a Lord Chief Justice on the Bench—"In this court it is not enough for us to do justice; we must appear to do justice so that all the watchers can see and understand". It is not enough for the Minister to wish to do right. It is not enough for the Minister to desire to perform on that public stage, with the astuteness of a Talleyrand and the resources of a Machiavelli, if the appearance he presents to his friends is that of a frantic bull smashing all the china in his neighbour's kitchen to the plaudits of those who are trying to smash the kitchen windows from without. Perhaps that is what is happening and the Minister has been made to appear to be doing what he never wanted to do. But I think Deputy Costello has established the case that his activities were widely misunderstood. He was shocked to-day at the suggestion that anyone could, bona fide believe his proposals in regard to the mutual withdrawal of troops ever contemplated or ever envisaged the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.

The first to formulate that view was the diplomatic correspondent of the Irish Press. The Taoiseach is the controlling director of the Irish Press. He had the right to direct the correction of that paragraph or to require the suspension of that diplomatic correspondent just as he had the right to shift the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, when he got into trouble, into a safe haven of refuge, and leave it to somebody else to answer the parliamentary questions addressed to him to-day. He had that power as Taoiseach but, as controlling director of the Irish Press, he could pluck the diplomatic correspondent out and put him on the ladies' page if he had misreported the mind of the Minister for External Affairs. Did the Minister for External Affairs notice that interpretation put upon his speech in his own newspaper? He had the Government Information Bureau, I believe with a leader writer of the Irish Press as principal officer, and so there was intimate contact between the Information Bureau and the Irish Press through that channel. Could their combined resources not have corrected this interpretation in the Irish Press of two months ago?

We are discussing statements made at the United Nations and not what appeared in the Irish Press.

By jove, we are. Remember the Minister for External Affairs has expressed dismay that anyone could be so mistaken as to understand that his statement meant that he had in mind the withdrawal of American troops from the Continent of Europe. I am drawing attention to the fact that, two months ago. the diplomatic correspondent of the Fianna Fáil Pravda said it and that there were abundant resources at his disposal to get him to correct it, to remove him or to censure him in public but nothing was done. Leave out those who draw inference from that in this country and let us not forget that in every Chancellery in the world the Irish Press is known as de Valera's Pravda and is read there to find out what he really means by his pious affirmations in public. This is the repository of his “hatchet men”. When he really wants to do a dirty one, look to the columns of the Irish Press and there you will find what he is up to.

That is the interpretation that was read all the world over of the Minister's speech at the United Nations by his own "hatchet men." The assumption, I take it, everywhere was that this was his kite flying and the tail was made of the paper of the Irish Press, controlled and directed by the head of the Government of which the Minister is a member. If there was any doubt about the Minister's authority to speak at the United Nations, if there was any doubt in anyone's mind that he might have gone somewhere beyond his brief and taken a line that had not the full approval of the Government, here the matter was resolved because in the columns of the diplomatic correspondent of the Taoiseach's own newspaper, not only is the Minister's speech commented upon, but it is interpreted. Everybody wants to see is there any correction, is there any comment, on this interpretation from the Department of External Affairs, and as the days pass, there being none, why does the Minister think it unfair that until we saw his indignant repudiation to-day, we, in common with everybody else, should have assumed that the interpretation put upon his remarks by the diplomatic correspondent of his own newspaper was a substantially fair interpretation of his speech?

I do not want to comment in detail on the analysis made by Deputy Costello of the Minister's one-minute intervention in preparation for his vote on the question of placing the matter of the admission of Red China into the United Nations on the agenda for the United Nations discussion. However, I think Deputy Costello makes it manifestly clear the vital interest of Ireland was not served by that vote. Does any Deputy doubt that that vote cost us the confidence of many of our friends? Rightly or wrongly, that is the price we have paid for that vote. What vital interest of Ireland has been served? Have we got anything for it in return? That is the criterion by which I judge the Minister for External Affairs.

It seems to me hard to believe that any Irish Government would send our Minister to New York on this, his first appearance there, to vote for that resolution and to elicit the kind of comment that Deputy Costello has read out for the House from our friends throughout the length and breadth of the United States of America. It is no use our saying that they misunderstood the Minister's intention and there is no use in our saying that they were unreasonable thus to complain. The fact remains that it is the purpose of our diplomacy to multiply the number of our friends and to consolidate those on whose friendship we set the highest value. Every friend who matters has condemned that vote and those of whose company we are ashamed, with one exception, India, whose freedom and friendship mean a lot to us, approved of it. Our place was on the side of America and the free democracies in that vote. There was no vital interest involved for Ireland in the placing of this item on the agenda now, and where it meant something of great importance to the United States of America, we ranged ourselves against them in such strange company.

We are not indicting the Minister for being a Communist. We are not alleging that the Government has gone over to the Cominform, but I think it was our duty to direct the attention of the House and of the world to the fact that our Minister has been acting like a bull in a china shop, and that so far the Government have given no sign that it is their intention to warn him to keep away from crockery in the future. It is our opinion that if we cannot act with greater circumspection and with greater respect for the fundamental principles of foreign policy, which I think were well stated by Deputy Cosgrave last July, the Taoiseach should undertake an operation in the Department of External Affairs similar to that which he has just undertaken in respect of the G.P.O.

Possibly if this motion had never been moved, there might not have been any evacuation of the Custom House and the Minister for External Affairs might have peacefully floated over to Merrion Street from Stephen's Green, but that plan may have been frustrated by this motion. It may be a blessing for the farmers but a disaster for the nation. There may be some other niche and I propose—and I think I am authorised on behalf of the Opposition to say we will raise no objection to it —that the Taoiseach propose to the House a new Ministry to which our present Minister for External Affairs could with dignity and distinction be removed. The one I am proposing for him is one where he will find no china to break, no households to disturb and no trouble to create. Let us make him our first Minister without portfolio.

The motion which Deputy Declan Costello has moved and which Deputy Dillon has seconded reads as follows:—

"That Dáil Éireann disapproves of recent developments in the foreign policy of the Government as represented by certain statements and actions of the Minister for External Affairs at recent meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

I want to say at the outset that, having studied carefully the criticisms as well as the approvals, both at home and abroad, I see no reason to regret anything I said or any vote I cast in the United Nations. I have read all the comments that were made upon my speeches and my votes that have been read to the House by Deputy Costello and referred to by Deputy Dillon, but I am as convinced to-day as when I spoke that the policy I advocate represents the right approach for this nation to adopt to the troubles that bedevil the world.

Indeed, in view of the struggles and sacrifices of our compatriots, from Colmcille to Columbanus, to Tone and Davis and to Pearse and MacSwiney, I should have regarded myself as betraying our national traditions had I allowed myself to be pushed, persuaded or palavered into adopting a contrary course or a contrary approach. When I spoke at the United Nations, there were no signs of a sputnik circling the globe, but there were mounted on the ground and flying in the lower levels of the earth's atmosphere sufficient weapons of destruction to obliterate everything alive in the northern hemisphere.

When I spoke, there were many situations which threatened to bring about the holocaust. As I said then, and as I now repeat, "I can see no material gain that is worth the cost for any participant in this war which threatens us. Neither do I see any moral satisfaction to be gained by anyone other than that of dying in a fight for the demonstrable and unequivocably clear purpose of establishing the rule of law based on justice and applicable universally to all mankind."

Everything I said at the United Nations was said for one sole purpose: to get the nations represented in the Assembly to realise their mortal danger, to urge them to reappraise their policies in the light of that danger, and to plead with them progressively to eliminate the causes of conflict and progressively to enlarge the areas in which disputes, including our own, would be settled on a basis of law and justice.

At the United Nations, I spoke as representing a nation that was free to urge a change in the policy of either the great groups of powers or any member of these groups without committing any of them to the acceptance of what I said. I endeavoured to speak understandingly and without rancour, but without fear or favour, to urge that certain positive but limited sacrifices should be made which would relieve international tension, and give an opportunity to negotiate real peace and prevent a suicidal war.

Like many other people I have long been convinced that the growing destructiveness of modern weapons demands and necessitates the establishment and enforcement of a world rule of law based on justice, not only in the interests of the small nations but in the interests of the great powers as well. Since the beginning of time reasonable men have advocated the acceptance of such a rule over ever widening areas and over increasing numbers of people as the striking power of weapons and military forces became more deadly.

When a man could bar himself in his cave and be reasonably certain of defending himself and his family he could afford to be a law unto himself, but with the invention of the bow and arrow men had to combine into clans, and accept the law making and law enforcement authority of the head of the clan. As weapons and military organisation improved, clans grew into principalities and principalities into nations. In our own time, groups of nations have combined into grand world wide alliances. As the present monster alliances are capable of mutual and total destruction, wisdom dictates that they should agree upon a single authority to decide their disputes on the basis of law and justice, and upon a combined authority to enforce the law.

It is impossible to foretell whether such a system will be agreed upon without one side grinding the other into the dust, but I feel deeply that it would be wrong and cowardly not to take the responsibility, and whatever unpopularity goes with it, of advocating the negotiation of such a system on the basis of reason. We are all only too painfully aware that seldom in human history has the rule of law been extended over a larger area without the use of overwhelming force. But as in our day and circumstances the use or attempted use of overwhelming force may lead to the total destruction of mankind, it is our duty to try to win acceptance for the extension on the basis of reason, and to pray that God may guide our endeavours.

There are, as Deputies are aware, many situations in the world which could lead to the explosion of general war if tension is not relieved forthwith. We have appealed to the leaders of the nations concerned, as the Taoiseach did before the last war, to make the limited sacrifices necessary to relieve tension, and allow negotiations to start. We have urged them to forget past hatreds, to overcome the desire for vengeance for past injustices, to abandon the never-never-never and unconditional surrender attitudes, and to reassess their policies in the light of the possibility that the over vigorous and uncompromising pursuit of them might lead to general war. We have urged them to put every policy to this test: whether they are quite sure that if it brought about a general war they would not regret when the gamma rays were shooting that they had not agreed to such delays and adjustments as might have prevented the slaughter.

It is particularly urgent, that this gamma ray test should be applied to the policies of all concerned in the dangerous situations in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the Far East. As far as I can learn, the intercontinental missile in spite of the sputniks will have little relevance to the military situation for some time yet. But the short and medium range missiles with atomic warheads are already operational weapons. When they are mounted in strength on either side of the border of Russian-occupied Europe, some overwrought switch-happy commander, misinterpreting a message or hearing a false alarm, can send them roaring to the targets at which they are aimed, and so set in motion the war machines around the world.

I have discussed this situation with many people, and I have yet to hear any good argument for prolonging it, if an agreement, along the lines I suggested to the United Nations, can be reached, that is, an agreement that Russia should withdraw her 40 to 60 divisions out of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, and the United States draw back her six divisions to France and Italy.

There is not now, and there never was, any secret as to what the step-by-step withdrawal meant. It is open to any junior officer to take a map of Europe and then to draw the line of Russian occupation, and on along a latitudinal line, to measure the number of miles it would take to get Russia out of Poland, and see, on the same latitudinal line, how far back the American troops would have to get to the West.

It was pointed out in the New York Times on the morning after I had spoken — and this is one of the most authoritative daily newspapers on political matters in any part of the world — that my proposals, if fully accepted, would mean that if the Russian troops would get out of all these countries I have mentioned the American troops would still be in fifteenth-sixteenths of France and in nineteen-twentieths of Italy, and that the number of their strategic massive retaliation bases would be untouched.

In the Fine Gael statement of October 9th, which falsely and irresponsibly alleged that I had advocated the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe, it was also said "it is little wonder that this proposal obtained the support of the Russian Government." So far as I know the Russian Government has not approved of my proposals. Some of them passed off newspaper inquiries by saying that the proposals were "constructive," or "worth looking into". But I sincerely hope that both the United States and the Russians will have the wisdom to agree on these or some other proposals which will relieve the ever increasing tension before it is too late.

As the proposals for a diplomatic drawing back in the Middle East and for the ending of situations such as Algeria have, so far, not been the subject of the ‘profound disagreement' of the Fine Gael Party, I have nothing to add to what I said at the United Nations regarding them. Neither have I anything to subtract.

I may turn, therefore, to the vote in favour of putting on the agenda for discussion an item entitled "The representation of China in the United Nations", which has been the subject of divided opinions. It has been the subject, too, in a by-election pamphlet, issued by Fine Gael, of an ugly and contemptible effort to play upon the deep religious feelings of our people for Party political purposes.

During the recent Dublin by-election, the Fine Gael Party reprinted and circulated in the constituency and throughout the country their "profound disagreement" statement. In the same pamphlet they reprinted and circulated as a Party political document a letter from a missionary priest, who had undergone great suffering and long imprisonment in Communist China. On the basis of whatever report reached him in the Philippines, the missioner made a violent denunciation of my vote and a charge of being soft on atheistic Communism. I am not blaming him: I do not know what report he got. He wrote:—

"Think of what a mockery this vote of the Irish delegation in New York makes of that angelic Vox Hiberniæ which the wide world has traditionally identified with Christian fidelity to spiritual ideas, Christian fortitude and perseverance with Christ and His Church under rack and rope. Is that voice, that has ever been raised on behalf of the down-trodden and the oppressed. now, all of a sudden, to go on record, before a surprised world, to champion the most barbaric system of slavery that history records?”

Fine Gael did not add underneath that letter that they were not accusing me of Communism. In another part of the letter, he asked:—

"Well, let us put it this way — for the parallel is identical — does Mr. Kadar and his Government represent the Hungarians?"

Although the Fine Gael Party used the emotional and unequivocal denunciation of the Reverend Missionary Father in their election pamphlet, they did not themselves denounce my vote in favour of putting "the representation of China" on the agenda as a mockery of the traditional Irish Christian fidelity to spiritual ideas. Nor did they say it was championship of Communist barbarism and persecution.

They will wash their hands of such allegations. They printed them only in an election pamphlet. They did not say they reprinted them and circulated them only around the country. I do not know whether they did not send it also to other countries to show that they were Defenders of the Faith against Fianna Fáil Communism. They did not even say that my vote was "gratuitously hostile to the United States policy", although they did use that phrase later in relation to my actions and speeches in the Assembly.

In fact, in expressing disagreement with my vote they were as delicately cautious as a cat stealing fish. My vote, they said, was "at this time" a wrong one — merely "a wrong one" at this time, not a "startling divergence" from Fine Gael policy as they said later on in their profound disagreement pamphlet. "No doubt," they said, "the Assembly, sooner or later, will have to debate this issue". But this was "not the time" because it was a question "on which large States friendly to this country are divided". They didn't identify one of the "large States friendly to this country" as Great Britain, and for their own very good reasons they studiously avoided saying themselves that I voted on the same side as Communist Russia and its satellites to have the representation of China put on the agenda for discussion.

In order that Deputies may decide whether they should approve or disapprove of voting to put the question of Chinese representation on the agenda, let me review briefly the relevant facts of the situation.

For the last nine years, the Communist Government has dominated the mainland of China, and the Chiang Kai-Shek troops withdrew to the Island of Formosa. Both the Government at Peking and the Government in Formosa claim to be the legitimate Government of the whole of China.

In 1951, Chinese and North Korean troops armed with Russian guns, tanks and planes attempted to conquer South Korea. A United Nations force, consisting largely of American forces, drove back the invaders from South Korea and finally made an armistice with them. North of the dividing line the Chinese and North Korean Communist troops are in control. The American forces are still in the south. The truce was made in spite of the fact that there was a deep division in the United States on the matter. Indeed, many Americans at the time advocated a continuance of the war to drive the Chinese forces out of North Korea, and some went as far as to advocate an all-out atomic war to overthrow the Communist Government in China.

The Communist Government in China is, of course, an atheistic materialist government. It has persecuted, imprisoned driven out and deported Christian missionaries, including members of the Irish Mission to China. The Northern Koreans have acted in a similar manner.

When Chiang Kai-Shek withdrew to Formosa the question arose as to whether the Communist Government in Peking should or should not be recognised as the de facto Government of China. Of the 82 members of the United Nations to-day, more than half of the major countries have recognised the Communist Government in Peking, and many more have opened up trade relations with it. Of the 82 countries represented in the United Nations at least 75 per cent. of them have either recognised the Communist Government in Peking or are trading directly with the Chinese mainland under its control. Like a number of the smaller countries and like the great United States, we have not recognised the Communist Government in Peking nor have we a trade agreement with it.

The United States, unlike Great Britain and other major powers, has always been slow to recognise a revolutionary government, even though that government is in full de facto control. In the case, for instance, of Russia, we all remember that Britain recognised it quickly; it recognised the Communist Government in Moscow in 1921, shortly after certain outside troops were withdrawn. America did not recognise it until 1933. There is, of course, the difference between the two situations in that the White Russian refugees who escaped from Russia did not organise or maintain a government in exile. Chiang Kai-Chek, on the other hand, maintains his government in Formosa, and claims to be the legitimate government of all China. His government still retains its seat on the Security Council of the United Nations.

It was this situation that I voted to have discussed in the Assembly. My predecessor in the previous year had voted against discussion at that session, because, as he put it, of the world's "grief and horror at what it had witnessed in Hungary" a few weeks before. But he added:—

"We admit that there is a problem. We recognise that sooner or later in this Assembly we have got to make up our minds whether we are going to leave the de facto Government of over 500,000,000 people without representation in the United Nations, or whether we should try to come to some arrangement acceptable to the conflicting views which exist among us on this matter.”

That was not quoted in the Fine Gael election pamphlet. But they did quote the missionary father who denounced my vote to put a question described by my predecessor in these terms on the Agenda for discussion.

When I spoke at the present session the Hungarian Revolution, which we all deplored, and the repression of which was denounced by me at the United Nations, was more than just a few days old. It was over a year old —October, 1956. This year, I found that all the major powers were in diplomatic relations with the new Government in Hungary; indeed it is probably due to the presence of the United States Embassy in Budapest that Cardinal Mindzenty is alive to-day. It should be noted that the representatives of the new Hungarian Kadar Government installed by Russia in October, 1956, were admitted without question by any of the major powers to this year's United Nations meeting.

In the debate as to whether the United Nations should discuss the representation of China, I made a very short speech. Indeed, it would not have been too long to put on the Fine Gael election pamphlet because the back of it was blank. After making my short speech, I voted in favour of discussing this very important question. This is what I said, all of what I said and every word of what I said in the United Nations on that matter.

"Mr. President: Like many others here, we have no sympathy whatever with the ideology of the Peking Government. We condemn its aggressive policies in China itself and, particularly, its conduct in North Korea. No country has a greater horror of despotism, aggression and religious persecution than Ireland has. On all these grounds we reprobate the record of the Peking régime.

If merely by refusing to discuss the question of the representation of China in the United Nations we could do anything to improve the situation in China and in Korea, we would vote without hesitation in favour of that course. We are not, however, convinced that refusal to discuss the question can now serve such a purpose.

Our aim should be to win acceptance for the principles of the Charter in China and to secure self-determination for the people of Korea. The belief of my delegation is that in the present circumstances progress can best be made to these ends by having a full and open discussion of the question of the representation of China in this Assembly. We are voting, therefore, in favour of the amendment proposed by the delegation of India."

That ends what I said and, as I say, that short speech was all I said in relation to this matter.

Before the debate took place it was, of course, known that the amendment would be defeated. But it was not because I knew it was going to be defeated that I voted for it but because I believed a matter of such importance should be discussed as my predecessor had said that it should be discussed only that the Hungarian suppression by the Russian tanks was only a few days old.

If the Assembly had agreed to discuss the question of the representation of China there would, of course, have been several points of view expressed. Some representatives would have said that the Peking Government was Communist, and while it remained Communist it should not be admitted, and the question of its admission should not even have been discussed; that it was persecuting Christians and members of other religious faiths; that it was cruelly oppressing the Chinese people; that only a few years ago it had killed 35,000 United States troops in its invasion of North Korea; or, they might have used the phrases quoted by Deputy Costello against its admission, taken from Mr. Dulles. They would have said that it should not be permitted among law abiding nations in the Assembly; that to give it a seat in the United Nations would raise its prestige and encourage Communism among the people of Chinese extraction all over the Far East, in Burma, Malay, Singapore and the Philippines and elsewhere; that it was wrong to give up hope that Chiang Kai-Shek could not at some time reconquer the whole of China, and that the only hope for religious freedom in China depended upon his victory.

Delegates representing countries which had already recognised the Communist Government in Peking would have said that the Communist Government had firm control of the whole of the Chinese mainland; that like other dictatorships in the past any attempt to change it by outside force or pressure would only have the effect of confirming it in power, and of bringing on more stringent persecutions; that if given time it might, like Poland and Yugoslavia, evolve towards tolerance of religion; that it would be as wise to admit the Communist Government in Peking as to allow retention of membership by the Communist Governments in Moscow, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland and elsewhere; that no tto admit the Peking Government was to drive it further into the arms of Russia, and to forgo the advantage of keeping contact with the people of China.

Apart from these two sets who would have taken very violently opposing views, other delegates would no doubt have said, and I would have been one of them, that while they strongly reprobated the despotism, aggression and religious persecution practised by the Peking Government, they felt that an effort should be made to discover whether it was possible to get from the Chinese Communists not only the usual signed pledge which includes the promise that they would "practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours," but whether as an earnest of the pledge they have to sign they could be persuaded to give religious freedom to the Chinese people, withdraw from Korea, and allow a free united Korean Government to be elected, under United Nations supervision, for the whole of Korea.

But whatever might have been said during a full debate on the representation of China, and the related Korean problem, it is altogether unwise not to keep open for discussion a question so intimately and dangerously connected with world peace, and which, as my predecessor very rightly pointed out to the United Nations Assembly, affects the lives of about a quarter of the world's population.

Let us consider for a while the usefulness or otherwise of the United Nations, because as Deputies are aware, there is a good deal of controversy around the country as to whether a country such as ours should ever have joined or should now continue its membership.

The reasons I have heard against continuance are that the United Nations Assembly is merely a broadcasting station for violent propaganda; that its public discussions merely embitter difficult situations, which might otherwise be solved by normal diplomatic negotiations; that the name United Nations is a dangerous fraud, as there is no unity of purpose and there is irreconcilable and uncompromising conflict of interest; that members are allowed blatantly to flout the principles of national and personal freedom contained in the Charter, as Russia was in Hungary last year, and still retain their membership; that the prolonged discussions lull nations into a false sense of security; that the major powers dominate and rigidly control every word and action of their associates; that there is no real freedom of discussion; that the smaller countries are afraid to say what they think less "the heat be turned on them" directly or indirectly by the larger powers or their associates; that the control of block votes divides power from responsibility, which not only deceives the public but leads to the dangerous self-deception on the part of a major power that it is not to blame for a situation for which it is in fact solely responsible; that the veto prevents any real progress being made towards the rule of law based on justice, as the members of the Security Council will always use the veto to prevent action when they or their friends are guilty of a breach of the Charter.

But when all is said against it that can possibly be said, I am in favour of continuing our membership. Even though the United Nations is far from perfect, it is at least some sort of foundation for a better world order. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe U.N.O. as a seed or a plant, for I think we must depend upon organic and almost imperceptible growth for its perfection, rather than upon a mechanical process of building according to elaborately prepared plans. This process of organic growth has already commenced. It was a United Nations force, even though for the most part American, which put a limit to Chinese aggression in Korea. It was the United Nations that stopped the attack on the Egyptians, and it is a United Nations force and armistice inspectors that are keeping the peace, even though an uneasy one, in Korea, between the Israelis and the Arabs, and between the Indians and Pakistanis.

Some people are inclined to despise the United Nations force as makeshift and ineffective, because it is merely able to keep the peace temporarily between the smaller countries, and is ineffective in situations like Hungary. But everything has to have a beginning. Democracy and the rule of law was a very gradual process in the older European countries. It took Great Britain many centuries to evolve from the dictatorship and religious persecution of Henry VIII and Cromwell to tolerance and adult suffrage. It is better also to have temporary peace than total war, and war between very small countries in certain parts of the world would almost certainly bring on a general war.

The United Nations, as I see it, is the only instrument through which the conscience of mankind can be brought to bear on an aggressor. Through it small nations, if they do their duty, can compel a hearing for their opinions and their desires. There is a great deal of criticism of the veto, but I believe it will gradually tend to disappear like the Divine Right of Kings provided we can stave off war and secure the opportunity to establish real peace based on law and justice, and to establish an effective United Nations force to enforce the law.

I want to return now to the Fine Gael "profound disagreement" statement, and to their allegations that my actions and speeches at the United Nations were "gratuitously hostile to the United States policy", as they put it, and that the drawing back of forces in Europe would, again as they put it, "immeasurably strengthen international Communism by breaking up the defence of the West".

The purpose of my actions and speeches was to suggest the introduction of some elasticity into the policies of the major powers. I believe that these policies must be reviewed in the light of the development in weapons since they were decided upon, some of them several years ago. Those who see the major powers making headlong for destruction, like two express trains speeding against each other on the same track, are in duty bound to put the danger signals on the rails.

Deputies will have noted in recent weeks that many frozen military and diplomatic policies are being urgently reassessed in the light of the situation to-day; and, by the light of the situation to-day, I do not mean the light of the Sputnik, but in the light of the situation on the ground and in the lower levels of the atmosphere. If it were true, as Fine Gael said, that my actions and speeches were "gratuitously hostile to the United States policy," then a great number of eminent Americans and eminent people in other countries are due for indictment on the same charge. However, I do not believe that, even to secure a political advantage against the Government, the Fine Gael Party will charge the Democratic Foreign Policy Committee with being gratuitously hostile to the policy of its own country. Neither do I think they will prefer that charge against George Kennan, Professor of History in the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton, and former American Ambassador to Moscow, an American who has made over a great number of years an intense study of Europe on both sides of the Russian occupied border.

After a meeting on September 28th — that is, after I had spoken on the representation of China in the United nations because I read the report in the following Sunday's New York Times— the Chairman of the Democratic Party Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, gave an interview on the work of the committee. He said that “the American administration had been lax in re-examining old policies and formulating new ones to meet a change of situation”. He commented on the China policy, and said: “there are many areas where trouble might occur abruptly and the United States should be prepared for each contingency.... The China policy is something that needs completely new study.” In fact, he agreed with my predecessor in External Affairs and myself.

Professor Kennan, to whom I alluded earlier, in a series of lectures given over the B.B.C. during the last two weeks, made a plea for an urgent reappraisal of the American policy in the heartland of Europe, as he put it, and in other parts of the world. Here are a few of the things he said:—

"It is true," said Mr. Kennan, "that armaments can and do constitute a source of tension in themselves. But they are not self-engendering. No one maintains them just for the love of it. They are conditioned at bottom by political differences and rivalries. To attempt to remove the armaments before removing these substantive conflicts of interest is to put the cart before the horse."

Read what I said at the United Nations and then read that on disarmament.

Again, he said:—

"A wise Western policy will insist that no single falsehood or distortion from the Soviet side should ever go unanswered."

Read the reasons I gave that the Americans should pick up Khrushchev's proposal to get out of Europe and that they should put a counter proposal to him and not let him get off with the propaganda that he was offering to free East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania if the Americans would only get back to America. I think the Americans were very unwise to allow the prosposal to have been made and not to counter it with a reasonable proposal. George Keenan agreed with me and any other sensible man not seeking to make Party political points will agree also.

Professor Kennan went on:—

"The state of the satellite area to-day, and particularly of Poland, is neither fish nor fowl, neither complete Stalinist domination nor real independence. Things cannot be expected to remain this way for long."

Later on, he said:—

"I can conceive of no escape from this dilemma that would not involve the early departure of Soviet troops from the satellite countries. Recent events have made it perfectly clear that it is the presence of these troops, coupled with the general military and political situation in Europe, which lies at the heart of the difficulty. My proposal was to get them out of the heart of Europe."

Mr. Kennan continued:—

"It was plain that there could be no Soviet military withdrawal from eastern Europe unless the entire area could in some way be removed as an object in the military rivalry of the great Powers. That at once involved the German problem, not only because it implied the withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Germany, but because so long as American and other western forces remain in western Germany, it would be impossible for the Russians to view their problem in eastern Europe otherwise than in direct relation to the overall military equation between Russia and the west——"

Would the Minister not read the next sentence of Mr. Kennan's statement?

If the Deputy wants to read it he can go ahead. I have not got it.

He says:—

"Any solution of the problem of the satellites is thus dependent on the solution of the German problem itself."

The German problem is this. The American forces are in Western Germany. They went in there to stop the Russian troops in Eastern Germany from moving over Europe. There are 60 Russian Divisions in East Germany, Poland and these other countries. What I proposed was that they should have a talk about it. I could not enforce my will upon them. But I proposed that they should have a look at this situation and see if anybody was going to get anything out of a situation which would bring on war and whether it would not be better for the Americans to sacrifice whatever military advantage they think they have by keeping their six divisions in Western Germany and whether there would not be a counter over balancing advantage to them, perhaps, if the Russians took their 60 Divisions out of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and the rest. If that were done, the unity of Germany could look after itself.

Professor Kennan continued:—

"The unlocking of the European tangle was not to be achieved except at some sort of a price."

It is interesting to note what Professor Kennan had to say about a drawing back of forces in Europe in view of the Fine Gael charge that the proposals I made "would immeasurably strengthen international communism by breaking up the defence of the west." He said:

"The second feature was the common assumption that western powers would be placed at a hopeless military disadvantage if there were to be any mutual withdrawal of forces from the heart of Europe. It was impossible to discuss this question in specific terms unless one knew just what sort of withdrawal was envisaged—from where to where, and by whom and when. There were many possible combinations, and he was not sure that all had really been seriously explored by planners."

I do not think my suggestions have been seriously explored by the Fine Gael Party. I hope they will be explored more seriously by others. Professor Kennan also said this:—

"He had the impression that calculations continued to rest on certain questionable assumptions and habits of thought; on the over-rating of a likelihood of a Soviet effort to invade western Europe, on an exaggeration of the value of the satellite armies as a Soviet offensive policy, on a failure to take into account the implications of a ballistic missile; and on a serious underestimation of the advantages to western security to be derived from a Soviet military withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe."

Commenting on Mr. Kennan's broadcast, the London Times of the 25th November supported the suggestion for a drawing back of forces. It said editorially:—

"But a solution of the East European problem postulates a solution of the German problem, and Russia is certainly not going to agree to German unity unless she feels that her strategic position is not thereby weakened. This leads to the question of N.A.T.O. garrisons on German soil, ‘which lies at the heart of the difficulty'. Having reached this point Mr. Kennan suggested two lines along which western thinking might be directed: first, whether it is actually politic and realistic to insist that a future all-German Government must be entirely free to determine Germany's military orientation, and, secondly, whether the advantages to the west of a mutual withdrawal of forces from the heart of Europe have not been underestimated."

The London Times leading article went on to say this:—

"The main lines of this argument are by no means new (though they are seldom heard from America), but on this occasion they were presented with urgency and lucidity. They deserve the closest attention."

In view of the quotations I have given from Mr. Acheson and Professor Kennan, I think there is little necessity for me to spend further time refuting the Fine Gael charges that my actions and speeches were "gratuitously hostile to the United States policy". Much as I admire the generosity, genius and energy of the American people, and I have many dear friends in all parts of their great country, I do not hold it as an article of faith that they are infallible on political matters. I am neither "gratuitously hostile" nor gratuitously favourable to the policy of the United States or any other Government. I tried to represent the best interests of our own people, and to remember in relation to all countries what MacSwiney said: "Our enemies are our brothers from whom we are estranged."

I think I know the people of the United States as well as any Deputy in this House, and considering the terrifying responsibility which has suddenly been thrust upon the American Government and the American people, I admire how they are adapting themselves so quickly to their new role in the world.

The generosity of the American people could hardly be exaggerated. It did not begin nor did it end with Marshall Aid. We in Ireland owe many Americans gratitude for all they did to assist our country when it needed friends. We are bound in honour to respect that friendship, but I hold it as displaying little respect for friendship to become "yesmen", as Fine Gael would have us, and from what I know of Americans they despise sycophants. We can afford from time to time to have disputes with them on policy, as we had during the last war, but we cannot afford to lose their respect.

Before I conclude, I want to say to the Dáil that there are troubles, evils and confusions in the world to-day which are growing hourly, and for which force is no remedy, indeed which the use of force will spread and acerbate. I see no hope for the happiness and prosperity of mankind in large nations or small, in poor nations or rich; indeed, I see little hope for the survival of civilisation, unless the use of force by one nation against another, or by one group against another group, can be substituted by a system genuinely accepted by all, in which disputes between nations will be resolved by a common authority whose decisions are based on law and justice, and enforced by a common police force.

It would be presumptuous to expect God to grant us miracles. The building of such a system will require not only the exercise of great skill but will require free discussion, and much patience and charity. No world organisation of nations, no combination of nations, can for long act unitedly for their mutual defence and their mutual prosperity, unless these aims are wholeheartedly and unequivocally accepted and unless these virtues are generously exercised.

Let me conclude by saying that I believe my actions and speeches at the United Nations were not only in the best interests of our brothers, the American people, but in the best interests of our brothers who are all mankind without any distinction of person.

Since I came into the Dáil, it has always been my endeavour and my hope to secure that, on matters of foreign policy and external affairs generally, there would be the widest possible measure of agreement between all Parties and all sides of this House. It is, therefore, a matter of great regret to me that this division of opinion, very fundamental and very profound, has arisen between the Government Party and ourselves on very vital issues.

Having listened to the long and carefully-prepared speech of the Minister for External Affairs — being what I could call a post factum defence of his actions, ill-thought out and ill-considered, at the United Nations—I have come to the clear conclusion that the profound dissatisfaction which we expressed with the policy and action of the Minister at the United Nations was entirely justified.

We do not object to the Minister for External Affairs, whatever his Party may be, giving utterance, when occasion requires it, in the Assembly of the United Nations to the general principles to which he gave utterance here in his speech, on the necessity for the maintenance of peace and for the spread of goodwill amongst mankind. There is no country in the world that more urgently requires a long period of peace and tranquillity than Ireland does. When I read a garbled account of the Minister's speech in a provincial newspaper in France in September, I felt there must have been something wrong with the report of the speech, that he could not have made that speech or taken the actions ascribed to him.

We do not object to the Minister making these statements of principle, or even urging big nations to change their policies when circumstances require it, but what we object to is taking action of the kind he took and making speeches and defining policies of the kind advocated by him, without consultation with these very groups of nations who are the bulwarks of peace and who are standing between us in this country and total war. As pointed out by the mover of the motion, it was one of the fundamental principles that we laid down, that would guide, inform and direct our actions in the United Nations, that we should so far as possible strengthen the hands of that group of nations — Western Europe and the United States of America and Canada — who are really standing between us and a disastrous world conflict. We object to the policy advocated and to the action taken because it gave comfort to our enemies, the enemies of peace, and disturbed our friends who are the bulwarks of peace and the bulwarks against war.

I do not intend, in the course of my remarks this afternoon, to cover the merits of the proposal with reference to the withdrawal of troops in Europe. When I read it first, my mind went back to 1948 when I was first appointed Taoiseach, and to the circumstances then confronting us when we had to take the decision, as a Government, whether we would direct our foreign policy on the basis that there was going to be a war, or whether we should gamble on whether there was going to be peace. At that time, nothing stood between Moscow and London. There was free passage for Russian troops. Western Europe was still down in the dust following the world war. France was inept and unprepared. Italy was facing an election the result of which looked very like the triumph of communistic government in that country. Great Britain was still suffering from the extraordinary efforts for survival and for victory that she had put forward in the conflict that had concluded only a few years previously, and there was nothing between us and Moscow. I do not want that situation to come again.

Three times in my life, and in the lifetime of most people in this Dáil at the moment, the United States was appealed to, to come to Europe and save western civilisation, and three times she responded. What I feel is that the proposal of the Minister for External Affairs is open to the suggestion that America is to get out of Europe. He has said we misconstrued his statement and that his proposal was for a phased withdrawal of American troops in Europe and not out of Europe. I do not care whether it was in Europe or out of Europe. The suggestion was equally dangerous, in my view. "Phased withdrawal of American troops in Europe"—is not the logical conclusion of that that they will get out of Europe some time and we will be faced with a situation in which, even if Russian troops withdrew to Moscow, even if they withdrew into Siberia, even into the far ends of the Soviet Union, it would be only a matter of hours for them to overrun Europe and overrun us, and it would he a matter of weeks or months, if ever, for the United States to come to our assistance?

It is that situation that might have been envisaged by the Minister's proposal which disturbed me. The real seriousness of his proposal was that it disturbed America, Western Germany, Great Britain, France and the other nations who are endeavouring to build up defences against total war the prospect of which is a daily affliction to us. If we had this phased withdrawal, does that not really play into the hands of the Soviet Union? We have them going back so many kilometres a day, and every day, and every hour is fraught with some incident that will bring about a great degree of international tension and lead nearer to war. Does the Soviet Union not want some excuse to localise war, to take away from the fact that though they may have at the moment this preponderance of atomic, hydrogen and inter-continental missiles, it is only a matter of time for the United States to catch up with them? Their concern is for localised conflict and the Minister's suggestion would certainly give great material for the Soviet Union to have its localised conflicts. These are matters dealing with the military aspect of the proposal which have already been demonstrated to be impracticable and to be almost infantile.

The real seriousness of the situation is that a proposal of that kind, which the Minister must have known was not acceptable to our friends in the United States, Great Britain or Western Germany, was made without any consultation with them and has, as I have said, caused great disturbance amongst our friends. The Minister for External Affairs, in his closing remarks about his administration, said that he was not going to be a "yes-man" for America, and that the Americans would not have any respect for a "yes-man." I have repeatedly said, over the years, that since we are not in a position to have military alliances, or other alliances, we must have friends. We have jeopardised the friendship of powerful nations who had tremendous respect and friendship for us, and that is the gravamen of what has been done.

I asked a question here in the Dáil on the first day after it reassembled, designed to elicit information as to whether or not the Minister's speech and his action had been approved of by the Government before he left Ireland for the United Nations Assembly, or after he went there. I assumed, as it must be assumed, that when the Minister for External Affairs speaks on such an important matter in the United Nations as that with which he dealt, he is expressing Government policy and that every member of the Government is responsible for that policy. What I wanted to know was whether that policy had been discussed and indicated before he left, or was it done after he went over there, because there would be a very vital difference.

I have some experience of attending international conferences. At such conferences, there are informal discussions, outside lobbying, if you like to put it that way, at which various suggestions are put forward by certain nations who are friendly, though not in a bloc. I want to know if these proposals were put forward in lobbying, if you like, with America, France, Western Germany and Great Britain or did the Minister make the proposal on his own, without any consideration as to how it would be received either as an act of friendliness or unfriendliness by the nations in the Western bloc. I have my own belief that this was done without any consultation, without the lobbying that goes on in international affairs. Otherwise, the Minister must have known the proposal would be unacceptable to the United States and the other countries concerned.

Surely it would have been the proper thing for the Minister for External Affairs, or for our Ambassador to the United Nations, to put out feelers, to say: "Will this help you? We are an independent nation, pledged to take independent action in the United Nations, but desirous of helping America and other nations defending peace against atheistic Communism, if we can. Will this help you or will it be an embarrassment to you?" It could have been easy to leave out these sentences that occur in the Minister's speech, and let him curtail himself with giving utterance to the principles he referred to to-day. Far from this being any contribution to peace, it has, in my view, been a disturbance and a distinct danger to peace, because it has given comfort to our enemies and tended to give the impression, at all events, that there were some rifts between the various members constituting the Western bloc.

I spoke at Yale University on the subject of our foreign policy in this country. The interruptions that began here this morning really displayed ignorance and are deserving of no passing comment, except that they show outside people we are not accustomed to international affairs; we have not got the tradition in this country of international affairs and international policy, and of taking our part in international affairs. Everywhere I went I was asked to speak on one topic and on one topic alone and that was Ireland's foreign policy.

I had a speech prepared for Yale University when I was there as Sherrill Lecturer, and it was on foreign policy that I spoke at Georgetown University and at the lunch that was given to me by the United Nations Correspondente in New York and also at the Foreign Affairs Association in New York. Everywhere they wanted to know what was our foreign policy. There was tremendous interest and respect for us and a great desire to know how we would act in the United Nations Assembly. I laid down this principle and it is this principle that was jeopardised by the Minister for External Affairs in the United Nations Assembly this year.

I quote from my speech at Yale University as Sherrill Lecturer:—

"Ireland cannot be expected, therefore, as I have already indicated —and this will be a guiding principle of its action in the United Nations— to act in any way likely to strengthen the forces making for disintegration. The things that divide us from the rest of the West are fewer far than those that unite us. While we will naturally seek justice in each situation, a primary consideration for Ireland must be to see that the antiCommunist forces are not weakened. Ireland will never allow herself to be used as a tool to serve Communist Imperial interests no matter how cleverly these may be camouflaged. When I refer to the dispute Ireland has with Great Britain on the question of the Six Counties, please bear in mind that our contention, as European Christians, is that Partition, which gives rise to that dispute, weakens the West. But Ireland will never act so as further to subtract from the relative power of the West. In the issues which arise in the U.N.O. this will be a touchstone to Ireland's action."

I believe the Minister's speech and actions contravene those principles which I believe arc the touchstone of our actions and should be the touchstone of our actions.

The Minister purported to give reasons why he had voted for the inclusion in the agenda of the representation of China at the United Nations. It is a pity he did not give those reasons in the Assembly. As I said, in his speech — it was a short one and he read the whole of it this afternoon— there is not a single reason given justifying his vote—not one single reason. This country had placed on record a few months before in the United Nations Assembly its decision not to vote even for the consideration of the question of the representation of China at the United Nations. Deputy Aiken doubtless misunderstood, in the course of his speech, that his predecessor had said that this question should be discussed. He said nothing of the sort. What he said, even taking what the Minister quoted to-day, and I took it down, was: "We admit there is a problem, but sooner or later there will have to be some arrangement acceptable to the conflicting views that exist amongst us on the matter."

There is a sentence between the two parts the Deputy read out.

I had to take it down very quickly.

The quotation is:—

"We admit that there is a problem. We recognise that sooner or later in this Assembly we have got to make up our minds whether we are going to leave the de facto Government of over 500,000,000 people without representation in the United Nations, or whether we should try to come to some arrangement acceptable to the conflicting views which exist among us on this matter.”

That underlines what I am saying. The problem is there. It is still there but you have got to get an arrangement acceptable to the conflicting interests. You will not get that by getting up and saying: "We voted eight or nine months ago against this proposal; we now vote for it without giving any reasons and without consultation between the various members of this Western bloc." Was it not known to our people, to the Minister and his advisers that — if I may perhaps overstate the position although I do not think I am doing so — the people of America are hag-ridden with the fear of Communism? They are bearing a tremendous burden fighting Communism and fighting our battle here in this country to keep us in peace.

Surely it would have been a proper thing for the Minister for External Affairs, before he gave that vote, to consult with the nations with whom we are friendly and say: "Would this weaken you or help you?" Instead of that, without giving a single reason for the change of attitude from the time Deputy Cosgrave was Minister for External Affairs and Ireland's representative at the United Nations, and the time that Deputy Aiken became Minister for External Affairs and Ireland's representative at the United Nations, he votes and merely says in the course of his speech that it was the belief of his delegation that "in the present circumstances progress could best be made to these ends by a full and open discussion on the question of representation of China in this Assembly". That was the nearest thing given to a reason or an argument, but there was no other reason given at all for the vote. He does not say, even if it is on the agenda, how he will vote. There is no indication that he will vote either against the admission of the Red China Government or that he will extract safeguards or conditions as a quid pro quo for support of their admission to the U.N.O.

I want to conclude by summing up the attitude that I believe exists in the United States of America amongst our friends. There was a distinguished American citizen here in the late autumn and he told us that the Irish in America, the Americans of Irish descent, had not suffered for many years such a severe blow to their prestige and standing in America as they received from this vote of our Minister for External Affairs in the United Nations Assembly this year. The other comment was made by a man experienced in diplomacy and versed in the arts and crafts of that calling. He asked: "How can we expect a sympathetic hearing to our demands for trade concessions from countries we have offended by our diplomatic opacity?"

As I have said before in this House, our vital economic interests are closely bound up with our diplomatic policy and our diplomatic activities. We are asking foreigners to come here and help us develop our industries and our undeveloped resources, by their capital, experience and "know-how". We want to have a trade agreement with Western Germany and to get them to accept our cattle and other produce; we want to sell our lobsters and other classes of fish to France and to have continued trade agreements with Great Britain. Does it help us to secure our economic interest by making these fatuous observations which can have no effect other than a disturbing one on our friends?

Does this entice anybody or make them more amenable to come to us and help us here if we take up that attitude, when we act in an independent and, I may say, irresponsible fashion? We have offended our friends and comforted our enemies. There has been no adequate or cogent reason offered here by the Minister in his long speech this afternoon to justify what he has done. He might have achieved the same purpose in a different way, but certainly to have put forward proposals which have profoundly disturbed, not to say outraged, all kinds of American opinion at a time when we needed help, when we needed friendship and assistance from our friends in America, is something that has profoundly disturbed us and continues to do so.

I think we can start from the premise that there is no suggestion that the present Government is in any way pro-Communist. Before this controversy started, the Minister for External Affairs, in his short speech in the United Nations, which he has quoted here, made perfectly clear how Ireland stands in relation to that ideology and in relation to those who practise it.

The Fine Gael attack in this matter started at a stage when the reports of what the Minister for External Affairs had said at U.N.O. were still only short and incomplete reports. The Leader of the Opposition in referring to what the Minister had done as ill-thought out and ill-considered might well have directed those remarks to the initial Fine Gael attack in this matter. It did appear that the Fine Gael Party, having got these short reports of what was said, gleefully exploited the situation as one offering political advantage to them. The fact that they followed their denunciation of the Minister's actions in New York with a pamphlet— which certainly was not incomplete; it contained a copy of a letter written to the Irish Independent by a missionary priest, and they circulated that during the course of the recent by-election — only lent colour to the belief that this campaign was purely for the purpose of making political capital and not so much as expressing abhorrence of the departure from a line of foreign policy which they say was established by the then Minister for External Affairs on his first visit to U.N.O. in 1956.

Having read the full text of the Minister's speeches at U.N.O., one would well have imagined that this campaign would have ceased, but Fine Gael, in order to justify their actions, brought this motion before the Dáil and we now find ourselves debating what I think is common cause amongst us, that we in Ireland, that all Parties in the House abhor Communism and that any action we take inside or outside the country will not be accepted as in any way assisting Communism or the Communist States.

With regard to the relative importance attributed to the two issues, if they are issues, which the Fine Gael Party have put before the House, that is, the suggestion for a withdrawal in Europe by the opposing armies and the question of the placing on the agenda of a discussion on the admission of Communist China to the U.N.O., one can only assume that the main attack against the Minister's statements is directed against his suggestion with regard to Europe.

First of all, I should like to deal with the attack on the vote on the admission of Communist China. The Fine Gael pamphlet says that the decision to support the resolution was at this time a wrong one. The Leader of the Opposition seemed to suggest — I do not know how he came to that conclusion — that there was no significance attached to the words "at this time". It is quite clear, not only from the Fine Gael pamphlet but also from the words of Deputy Cosgrave in the United Nations, that he and they recognised that there was a problem in relation to the people dominated by the Peking Government as regards their membership of the United Nations.

The Fine Gael pamphlet goes on to say that our aim should be, firstly, to secure the observance of the Charter of the United Nations; secondly, to maintain a position of independence, judging each question on which we have to vote on its merits; and thirdly, to do what we can to preserve the Christian civilisation of which we are a part and, with that end in view, to support, whenever possible, those powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of Communist power and influence. Those were the words as quoted by Deputy Costello, perhaps at some greater length.

Let us take the first principle first. I think that we can all agree that our aims as members of the United Nations should be, as is indicated in the pledge that a nation is asked to sign on becoming a member of the United Nations, to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. That is a prerequisite for any nation that would command the respect of its fellow nations, whether as a member or non-member of the United Nations. It is perfectly obvious that if every nation in the world realised that fundamental principle, the practices which apparently occur in communist-dominated nations would not occur.

Perhaps Ireland's most direct interest in the mainland of China is the number of Irish missionaries who have gone there in the past to spread the Catholic faith. Many of them were imprisoned; many of them suffered, and most of them were expelled. We believe that if Red China could be induced to practise tolerance, there would be new hope for these missionaries, and not only for the missionaries but for the people who are dominated by the Peking Government.

We believe that if Communist power and influence could be weakened in China by refusing to discuss that motion in the U.N.O. there is no doubt that we, as a free nation, would want no discussion to take place. Meanwhile, however, is it not reasonable to assume that, without any interference or anything being done in relation to the dominance of the Peking Government in China, the power and influence of Communism will only increase in that country? If a situation is allowed to develop in which no nation on earth can have access to the minds of these 500,000,000 people except the U.S.S.R. and the Peking Government, is it not only reasonable to assume that the Communist mind and Communist practices will solidify and expand in that unfortunate country?

Mention has been made of these 500,000,000 people as representing about a quarter of the world's population, Surely there is an elementary principle that if any organisation purports to represent the entire world, an organisation that excludes 500,000,000 people is not, in fact, a united nations organisation. I do not mention that as an argument in favour of the point that representation should be given to Communist China. Within that number of people there are several millions, uncounted millions, who do not agree with the Government that dominates them or with the system under which they are forced to work. Twenty-five million people in China alone have been put to forced labour.

Is there to be no hope for these 25,000,000 people because the world turns its back on their problem if only for the reason that it disagrees with the régime? Is there to be no hope for these people unless the régime changes in that country? Deputy Costello did say that a problem exists. He said that sooner or later we have to make up our minds whether we are going to leave the de facto Government of China out of the United Nations or whether we should try to come to some arrangement on the matter. The Fine Gael statement is perfectly consistent with what Deputy Costello said, that there is no doubt the United Nations Assembly will sooner or later have to debate this issue.

The question is: when will the evils that now exist be faced? Can it be suggested that by ignoring these evils, that by ignoring a problem, the problem will settle itself? If a cancerous growth is left unattended, is it not certain that no medical or other power on earth will prevent that growth from consuming the victim? If the cancerous growth of Communism is left to grow and develop in the mainland of China is it not only reasonable to assume that the millions of people who still resist the Peking Government will ultimately be consumed by that Communist growth?

One can readily understand the feelings of the American representatives at U.N.O. in seeking to delay a debate on this question. As the Minister for External Affairs pointed out, American troops mainly composed the army that resisted Communism in Korea, and 35,000 American soldiers lost their lives in that terrible war. At this stage I want to repeat what I have already said—that it was not the giving to China of a seat in the United Nations Assembly that was to be discussed; what the Minister voted for was a discussion on whether the matter should be put on the agenda. If such a discussion took place the question would then arise as to what attitude Ireland would have taken in the matter.

I think the Minister, in his reply, made it clear what his approach would have been and that his intentions were that if by such a discussion. Red China could be got to agree to the rule of law, to the principles of freedom of religion and of freedom of movement of missionary priests, a wonderful stride forward in relation to the stemming of Communist influence in Asia would have been achieved. To suggest that all American opinion was shocked by such a speech is not nearly the truth. I can quote from the Washington Post of February of this year in which a leading article makes it pretty clear that there was new thinking in America. This leading article states:

"This sort of head-in the-sand policy is bound to lose, and the longer we stick to it the more we endanger our prestige and our stake in the Far East. Friendly relations, and an overall settlement with Communist China may not be possible at this stage. But it is altogether possible to start bringing American policy back to reality."

Again, let me repeat that I am not producing this as an argument as to whether Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations. I do question whether the Minister, in voting for a discussion on the motion, was so at variance with considered and informed American opinion. This leading article goes on to give what it describes as two quotations from a most interesting book published in 1950. It says the two quotations are apposite. They are as follows:—

"Peace is not a static and stagnant condition of the world, but it can be and should be, a condition of selective change. In the past, war was partly a consequence of the fact that change was inevitable and that, internationally, there were no means of change except war."

"If the Communist Government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations... if we want to have a world organisation, then it should be representative of the world as it is."

The leading article gives the author of the quotations as John Foster Dulles.

Again, I want to repeat, in case there is anything misunderstood in what I say, that I am not advocating that the present Peking Government should be recognised as it is or given a seat in U.N.O. What I am saying and trying to show is that there is a considerable volume of thought in America, despite the actions the Americans have taken since 1951 in relation to this question, that a new approach by the Americans themselves should be made. We have the 1950 statement of John Foster Dulles who is now responsible for American foreign policy. There are other references to indicate that such an approach might not be out of place in America. To suggest that we have so outraged all American opinion that we have seriously prejudiced our position vis-a-vis the United States is, I think, ridiculous.

The second, and I think the main, point of the attack was against the withdrawal proposal. Without going into details, I should like to reflect a little on whether or not we, as a nation, should merely go into the United Nations and "sing dumb" without offering any worthwhile solution to world problems. Everybody realises that there are two powerful forces in Europe at present — Russia on the east and the western nations, largely represented by America, on the west. In between, we have a divided Germany and, on the east, the occupied satellite countries. I say "occupied" deliberately because I believe that were it not for the presence of these Russian Armies the uprising of the freedom-loving Hungarians 12 months ago would have been successful. Were it not for the importation and continued presence of Russian tanks and guns that ground the unfortunate Hungarians into the earth I think the uprising would have been successful. At that time the Hungarians looked to the United Nations for help which for many reasons the United Nations were unable to give with the result that, apart altogether from the effect of Russian guns and tanks, the feeling of hopelessness, and the inactivity of the United Nations were greater reasons for dispiriting that nation than the power of the Russian Armies.

I believe other satellite nations in the neighbourhood of Hungary are dispirited by the presence of Russian Armies and if in some way we could assist in or prompt a scheme whereby these nations could be freed, would it not have been, not only in our own interest as a moral force in the world, but also in the interests of these unfortunate people?

Deputy Declan Costello, in introducing the motion, made reference to sources which he said denounced the Minister's proposal in relation to the drawback. It might be said at this stage that the Fine Gael pamphlet gives only one side of the suggestion when it mentions only the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. He said, and the Leader of the Opposition said, that the Minister's remarks left room for doubt as to the terms of that withdrawal but an editorial in the Chicago Sunday Tribune on 7th October, 1957, did not seem to interpret the Minister's remarks under any cloud of doubt as to what he meant.

I quote:—

"The Irish Minister, Frank Aiken, has figured out that if the Russians got back behind their border a corresponding move westwards by American forces would mean their withdrawal from West Germany and North-eastern France but would still leave them free to take up a line running from the vicinity of Paris to the Swiss border and thence across Northern Italy to the Adriatic. The drawback from the Soviet viewpoint would be that it would still leave American forces in Europe while compelling Soviet withdrawal from East Germany, Poland, Hungary and other Soviet puppet States which are obviously unreliable from the Soviet viewpoint if not held down by Red troops. It could be anticipated that the Hungarian rebellion would revive in short order once the Russians were gone, and the chances of similar development in Poland and East Germany would be equally good. Mr. Aiken implied that much when he said that his plan would be a tangible means of helping the Hungarian people. As there is nothing here that would help the Kremlin, Mr. Aiken's plan seems fated to win no Communist favour."

Again, the well-known United States writer, Marquis Childs, stated:—

"The objective should be to find a way by which Moscow can pull back rather than to hold inflexibly on the cold war lines until sooner or later an explosion occurs. Perhaps another Hungary — in East Germany or in Poland — could not be contained. Ireland's Foreign Minister, Frank Aiken, performed a notable service in sounding just this note. He proposed that the United Nations General Assembly declare, in principle, in favour of a phased withdrawal. Virtually, the Russian armies would move out of the satellite States and the armies of the United States would withdraw to a line marked on the map across France, Northern Italy to the Adriatic."

These are clear indications that two responsible papers of the time were in no doubt that there was no suggestion as to the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and to suggest that the Minister for External Affairs, in proposing this solution, contemplated only the partial withdrawal of Russian troops even back to the boundaries of Russia, and a complete withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe, is making a suggestion that certainly was not in the mind of the Minister and it was not interpreted, as Fine Gael would like the Dáil to believe, in that way in the United States.

Coming nearer home I should like to quote some extracts regarding what occurred in the United Nations. Hibernia, in its issue of November, 1957, referred to a point made here by most speakers that, if we as a nation are to command respect, we must act with some degree of independence of mind in these international assemblies. Hibernia, in its leading article, said:—

"Realising our opportunity and our responsibility we must recognise a necessity for definite constructive thinking and unambiguously independent policies. For these reasons we welcome the contributions of Mr. Aiken to the discussion on the occupied countries of Eastern Europe, and on Algeria. We see in the former a hope of relief for the countries now oppressed by Russian occupation. We cannot gladly acquiesce in a status quo which means Marxist tyranny for so many millions of Poles and Hungarians. No other plan so far mooted affords any prospect of improvement.”

Later on the article refers to the vote on China:—

"To the second question we would answer that it is the wish of the Irish people to see an end of tyranny in China. The Irish people will support whatever steps are best calculated to attain that end. Mr. Aiken, explaining the attitude of the Irish delegation, said in U.N.O.: ‘The belief of my delegation is that in present circumstances progress can be best made... by full and open discussion of the representation of China in this assembly.' People may disagree with that view, but there is nothing in it to warrant the indignation voiced in some quarters.

Ireland's position in U.N.O. and her future influence with the younger republics will depend on her being free from any predetermined conformity to the policies of America and Britain while at the same time not sacrificing to any undue individualism her solidarity with the great non-Communist powers."

I think that is a very fair and very apposite criticism of what the actions of the Minister were and what our rôle ought to be in the United Nations. While I am quoting from this paper, Hibernia, I should like to refer to an article written in this same edition of November, 1957, by a priest who signed himself Rev. Michael O'Neill. He has this to say about the vote on the discussion in relation to the admission of Red China:—

"On reading Mr. Aiken's speech, one feels that some of the criticisms levelled against him seem unreasonable or at least premature. He did not vote for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. He voted that there should be a discussion on the whole question of who should represent China, and he justified his vote by his belief that such a debate might help towards the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter by the Chinese Communists and towards the unification of Korea."

These are a few comments from responsible sources. They ought to refute the suggestion that there has been universal abhorrence of Ireland's actions as represented by the vote and speeches of the Minister for External Affairs during his last visit to the United Nations.

I believe, as the Minister believes, that if we are to go to International Assemblies and vote as "yes" men to any Power, not only will we lose the respect of those whom we would like to have as friends but they will come to despise us. So long as our suggestions are made in good faith and without any intention of injuring those people who are our friends, it ought to be our duty, if we see in our suggestions and actions a means of promoting world peace, of curbing the spread of Communism and of creating freedom of action for free peoples and for the missionaries we have who want to spread the Gospel abroad, to take such action.

I believe this motion is the result of Fine Gael's early ill-thought out and ill-considered actions in criticising the Minister's proposals and vote in the United Nations. I believe, too, that a good many of the members of the Fine Gael Party did not and do not agree with the action taken by the Party. I believe that they certainly do not agree with the placing of this motion for discussion on the Dáil agenda to-day. If that is still their belief I would ask them to show what they think of the actions of those who put down the motion by not going into the Division Lobby in support of it. I believe that the Division Lobby will prove what I have said is correct when the vote is taken.

Before calling on Deputy Corish, I should like to inform the House that there are just 55 minutes left for the conclusion of this motion. I take it that the mover of the motion, Deputy Declan Costello, will require 15 to 20 minutes to conclude.

Would the Taoiseach be allowed to speak after Deputy Corish concludes? The Taoiseach could then speak and have whatever time he wants. The Government would give him the time and then after the Taoiseach spoke, Deputy Declan Costello could have his 15 or 20 minutes or whatever time he wants to reply. Could that be agreed to?

I do not agree. There are more points of view to be expressed than the viewpoints put forward by the Fine Gael and Labour Parties. I believe that all points of view should be heard on this matter once it has been placed on the Order Paper. I see no reason, when the Taoiseach has his say, why I should be precluded from making some comments. I shall not take long.

There are many others besides the Deputy.

I know. I do not want to stop the debate.

If the House agrees, I would suggest that Deputy Corish make his speech, then the Taoiseach and then Deputy McQuillan and finally Deputy Declan Costello.

I want to say that I have sat here all day awaiting an opportunity of saying a few words.

The trouble is time.

Without interrupting, I suggest that the time be extended.

The time has already been extended. Five hours are allowed for this motion.

All the Deputies want to get in now.

The merit I see in this motion is that it has initiated a debate on foreign affairs the likes of which we have not had in this House for some time. I think that most of the speeches have been informative and on a higher level than what we have been used to in debates on external affairs.

When I read the newspaper reports of the Minister's speeches in the U.N.O., I was not so alarmed as many of the Deputies who spoke here this morning appeared to be. I do not say that the Minister behaved badly or like a bull in a china shop or hurt in any way the normal feelings of the people in this country.

Emphasis this morning was placed on his attitude and his speeches on the withdrawal of forces from the satellite countries in Europe and on the question of placing on the agenda the admission of Red China. The Minister also made reference to many other matters in the world, matters which were much more delicate than that of Red China and the withdrawal of forces in Central or Eastern Europe. I think the attitude of the Irish people and any Minister for External Affairs in these matters would be similar to the attitude adopted by the present Minister for External Affairs. But would all of us have the same attitude to the question of the Middle East, French Algeria or the different other things he spoke of in the United Nations?

Are we to assume from the silence of those who moved the motion that they agree with the proposals which the Minister for External Affairs made in respect of French Algeria and the Middle East? I was under no misapprehension as to what the Minister meant when he spoke of the withdrawal of forces in Eastern Europe; neither was I under any misapprehension as to what he meant and what his attitude and the country's attitude was on the question of the placing on the agenda the admission of Red China.

It has been said here that we offended many people and many sections of people in the United States of America because of the action of our Minister for External Affairs on the question of Red China. We offended the United States of America when we adopted unanimously a policy of neutrality in the year 1939 and there is no comparison in the wide world between the action we took on that occasion and the relatively simple action the Minister took in voting for the amendment sponsored by India. If we offended them in 1939 on our neutrality and non-participation in the war, America did not interpret it as meaning that we were in favour either of Hitler's Germany or Communist Russia.

With regard to all those who expressed dissatisfaction in America at the Minister's speech, I think there is not much of a ring of sincerity about them. Nobody can be under any illusions or misapprehensions as to the attitude of practically 100 per cent. of the people of this country on the question of Red China or Communist Russia. I agree that, as far as possible, we should ally ourselves with what is described as the Western bloc—the group of what are described as free countries—but I do not think we should appear to be led by the nose and vote willingly for every resolution sponsored by this or that particular power. Our stand on the question of Suez was an admirable example of that. If we were pledged to a policy of supporting this or that bloc, it could well have been that we would have found ourselves supporting the attitude of the British and French on the question of Suez and their subsequent action.

So long as our Minister for External Affairs expresses honestly and clearly the viewpoint of this country and is guided by the Christian principles which we have adopted and practised in this country he cannot go far wrong. If, before he speaks at the United Nations, he has to try to decide what the United States will think about his speech or the way he will vote or what this or that nation will think about his speech and the way he will vote, then I do not believe he will be speaking honestly or freely representing the point of view of this country.

If we have a contribution to make, it should be made honestly and without any reference to blocs or groups. That is one of the things that has done more to ruin the United Nations than anything else. The Minister was very direct in his approach and in his concise speech when he said that there was no use in "dickering" around with this problem and that if we are to discuss whether or not Red China is to come into the United Nations we should discuss it and clear up the matter. He indicated clearly — and I say this as against what some people on the Fine Gael Benches implied, without saying so in as many words—what his attitude would be and what the attitude of the Irish nation is towards the behaviour of the Peking Government. He did that in the second paragraph of his short speech when he spoke on this amendment.

Another thing that has brought the United Nations into disrepute is the manæuvring not so much to put things on the agenda as to keep them off it and its refusal to act in certain cases. Manæuvring to have this done or that done and this placed on the agenda or taken off it has brought the United Nations into a certain disrepute. If we get, as we did get here, concrete proposals in respect of matters which are the concern of the countries of the world then I think we can justify our position in the U.N.O., especially as a very small country.

As far as I can see, the criticism appears to be more or less a storm in a tea cup. Its merit is that it has initiated a fairly wide level of debate on foreign affairs. Too much is read into the Minister's speech and too much, by inference, is added to it. His proposal in respect of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the satellite countries and the consequent withdrawal of Allied and American forces from the other side of the satellite countries is sound. It may be that Mr. Khrushchev made a somewhat similar proposal but that does not necessarily imply that the Minister for External Affairs accepts absolutely the Russian proposal. He made a somewhat similar proposal, if you like, but he never suggested, as was represented by certain people in newspaper articles and other places — as far as I can read — that American troops should go out of Europe entirely. I do not think he did, and it is wrong that that interpretation should be placed on the speech contained in this little booklet which all of us have read.

Briefly, that is our attitude on this particular question. We propose to vote against it because in my opinion the Minister made perfectly clear what was in his mind and in the mind of his Government when he spoke on the two questions which have been the subject of debate this morning.

I believe this motion is much ado about nothing. Whatever views may have been expressed by Deputy Aiken as Minister for External Affairs, the views and statements outlined in the pamphlet given to each Deputy are reasonable. I find nothing wrong with them. I can see no reason to criticise the Minister's suggestion with regard to the position in Europe or his suggestion with regard to the problem in relation to China.

My main criticism of the whole business to-day is the length of time that has been given by the Government to the discussion of this motion. Deputy Corish has very clearly put the Labour Party's point of view. I think the majority of people outside this House will subscribe to the views he put forward. It is a tragedy that, at a time when the economic situation is so dreadfully bad, when emigration is more serious than it has ever been, when our domestic situation and the problems that face us need the full and undivided attention of the people in power, so much time is spent in discussing what the Minister for External Affairs said about China or about Algeria, and so on.

This House has sat on seven days since the Dáil reassembled. The public should realise that, after a bare seven days in which to discuss important business, we then have almost a full day devoted to this petty discussion which was opened by Deputy Costello. It would appear from his remarks that the whole world should spend their time looking to the Irish nation as a leader of thought and as the final arbiter on whether we should have peace or war. Anybody listening to-day to the former Taoiseach and to the other members of the Fine Gael Party who spoke would think, as they strutted across the world stage as self-appointed statesmen, that they had the solution in the palm of their hands for the grave ills that beset the world at the moment. We should cut our cloth according to our measure.

At the present moment, some of the most prominent clergymen in the country are criticising members of this House for suggesting that we have a spiritual empire abroad and that the influence which we have as a nation is of the extent alleged by Deputy Dillon and others here. The leader of the mission in China, in a speech last week, said that it was contrary to Irish interests to boast that we had a spiritual empire abroad, that that was being misinterpreted by people behind the Iron Curtain for their own sinister ends. We should remember that the days of the Skibbereen Eagle are gone and that it is doubtful whether any warnings that we issue from these benches to the gentlemen who sit in the Kremlin ever reach their ears.

Whom do the members of the Fine Gael Party and others in this House think they are "codding"? They will not "cod" the Irish public any longer with the kind of claptrap we had here to-day. In ancient days, when the economic situation was serious, the people were fooled by circuses. All sorts of amusements were provided for them. To-day in Ireland, when things are serious and when the economic situation is bad, this red herring is introduced of the danger to Ireland in the international sphere from the remarks made by its Minister for External Affairs.

Deputy Costello, by his talk here about blocs and about our close affinity with Western groups, would give the impression that in the United Nations we should be tied in completely with one group or another. This House would never agree to Ireland being represented in the United Nations, if we were to allow ourselves to be tied down in that fashion. If Deputy Costello is serious about his submission in that regard, that our safety and our future depend on how closely we align ourselves with these groups, then he should go the whole hog and say that we should take our part as a member of N.A.T.O.

Deputy Costello and others want jam. They want all the good things that can come from being close friends of the Western nations, but at the same time Deputy Costello is not prepared to suggest that we should play a responsible part in N.A.T.O. Of course, the argument that he would come back with is that we cannot join the defence units now stationed in Europe or play our part in this defence bloc because Ireland is divided.

That brings me to the kernel of the whole position here, that while the Minister for External Affairs, in my opinion, said nothing wrong, that the policy he outlined is correct, charity begins at home and, before he took off for the bamboo curtain, or before he lifted the Iron Curtain or had a go in Algeria and elsewhere, he should, first of all have said: "My first function is to look after the interests of the Irish nation and the first duty upon me is to bring before the United Nations Ireland's case for ending Partition."

I thought the days of the Skibbereen Eagle were gone.

I do not follow.

I thought the Deputy said earlier that the days of the Skibbereen Eagle were gone.

Not while Fine Gael are here. The real force this country can give to the United Nations is to put before it Ireland's problem. There is no good at this stage in suggesting we will be a sore thumb in the United Nations if we deal with Partition. The danger is that we will become a sore thumb in the United Nations if we deal with the problems of every other country, while our own main problem is left undiscussed and no attempt is made to get support for the removal of troops from our occupied territory.

I agree that the situation in Algeria is a sad one. The time has come when colonialism in any shape or form should be finished. But why should we criticise France for her position in Algeria while we ignore the position at our own doorstep and while occupation forces are on our own territory? Is it not rather foolish for us to spend £80,000 to £90,000 a year using the United Nations as a forum to criticise conditions that obtain in every other country, although we went there originally in order to ensure, first of all, that Ireland's interests would be looked after?

Deputy Dillon here to-day said that every Minister who left this country for any international gathering has as his first and main duty to ensure that the interests of this country are looked after first. My criticism is that, since we joined the United Nations, Ireland's position and interests are the last things that have been dealt with.

One point emerges from this discussion which will have to be closely examined — have we been justified up to the present, and will we be justified in the future, in continuing our membership of the U.N.O.? It would be well worth while to have that matter considered. It cannot be denied that the Taoiseach and the ex-Taoiseach on numerous occasions made it quite clear that they believed that the U.N.O. is a place where Ireland's case for the ending of Partition should be moved, that the problem should be explained and that the help of freedom-loving nations that are members of the U.N.O. should be obtained in this matter.

Was there any attempts made so far? The Minister has discussed conditions in other parts of the world and even on yesterday's paper there appeared an announcement that Ireland wants the partition of New Guinea ended. One of our permanent representatives in the last few days has demanded in the United Nations that the partition problem of New Guinea be solved. I must confess to a limited knowledge of geography as far as New Guinea is concerned. I always thought there were a lot of headhunters in that territory until recent times. If it is considered that partition should be ended in New Guinea — and I have no criticism to make of that — and that we should pay a permanent representative in the United Nations to put up the case for New Guinea, it is not unfair to suggest that the primary case he should be putting forward is for the ending of Partition in Ireland.

What about page 24 of what the Minister said?

Five or six lines buried in the middle of a long speech. That is my reply to the Deputy.

Was it first or last? It was first.

May I put it this way for Deputy Flanagan: suppose the Minister did make a serious statement in the course of that speech to the United Nations outlining Ireland's case for Partition, will he now explain to me why the Taoiseach, at the Árd Fheis, made the statement quoted in the Irish Press of 20th November in connection with a motion moved at the Árd Fheis, that Ireland's case should be brought there and that observers should be brought to the Six Counties?

The Taoiseach had this to say: "I assure you that I would be very chary from my experience and knowledge of international organisations to put at their disposal a decision on a question that is our national problem." That is the statement made by the Taoiseach at the Árd Fheis: he would be chary of bringing before international organisations, such as the U.N.O., the problem of Partition because he regards it as a national one.

Suppose the decision were against you?

I agree that is quite possible.

So, we have now reached the position that the Taoiseach believes that we should not take Ireland's case before the U.N.O.

I say when the proper time comes and when one has a chance of being successful.

The Taoiseach can quibble any way he likes but he cannot get away from what is written down here and from what he said to his own delegates: he would be very chary, from his own experience, to put at the disposal of an international organisation a decision on Partition. Either we are going to put the case for Ireland's unity before the United Nations and have confidence in that organisation to give us back the Six Counties or we should be frank now and say that we are afraid we have no case. It would appear from the Taoiseach's own statement recently and from the statements made by the Leader of the Opposition that they have now reached a particular conclusion, namely, that while the majority in the Six Counties say they will not come in the Taoiseach is prepared to accept that as a constitutional approach.

That does not fall for discussion on this motion.

I know, sir.

If the Deputy knows, he should not offend. The question for discussion is the foreign policy of the Government as represented by certain statements and actions of the Minister for External Affairs. The Deputy can relate his remarks to that.

I am relating it to this: in so far as we are members of the U.N.O. our first duty, in the words of Deputy Dillon, should be to ensure that Irish interests come first. The time of our representatives, including that of the Minister for External Affairs, has been taken up by discussing problems before that assembly such as obtain in New Guinea, in Algeria, in China, in Hungary and in the Middle East. We have heard nothing whatever about the main problem confronting our country, namely, the reunification of the country as a whole. That is the real criticism I have to offer to the Minister for External Affairs. I have nothing against what he did say in its proper context, but I believe that first things should come first. He should have dealt, first of all, with Ireland's problem and then he could have dealt with these other matters.

In so far as the motion itself is concerned, the Fine Gael Party are trying, but have not the courage to go ahead with it, to put the cloak of Communism on the Fianna Fáil Party. As far as I am concerned, and people like me, they will try that out on us, but they know that the Party in Government at the moment is too strong for that kind of label to be pinned successfully on them. When they moved the motion here to-day, they had not the guts to go ahead and say: "We, in Fine Gael, believe that Government policy should be directed by pressure groups in Britain or the United States and, if we were back in office as Fine Gael, we would take dictation and become the 49th or 50th State."

I think the first question we ought to ask ourselves is why are we in the United Nations? When the United Nations was formed shortly after the war we here at the time, the Government in office, applied for membership. We applied for membership because we believed in the principles which were set out in the introduction to the Charter signed at San Francisco and because we believed in the aims that the organisation had set itself to achieve.

Before the Taoiseach gets into his stride, may I ask at what time the Deputy concluding will be able to get in?

I understood it was agreed that after Deputy Corish and Deputy McQuillan had spoken the Taoiseach would speak and Deputy Costello could then take whatever time he wanted to conclude. That was agreed.

Is the debate concluding at half-past three?

Questions will come on at half-past three.

Do we go back to the motion then?

That is agreed.

And the concluding speakers are the Taoiseach and Deputy Costello?

That is understood.

I was saying that we applied for membership because we believed in the principles and purposes of the United Nations as set forth in their Charter. These principles were stated to be to try to save the world from another conflict such as those which had occurred in the lives of the older members of this House. We have seen two World Wars. We have seen a second World War and the devastation that it caused. We have seen all-out war in which cities were destroyed and there was no question of any difference as between combatants and non-combatants. We had the experience of awful bombs raining down on the peoples of different countries, countries which were at war, and sometimes even on countries which desired to avoid being involved in war.

We believed it was desirable that nations should associate together in the hope of finding other ways of settling international disputes besides recourse to war. We knew, of course, that attempts of that kind had been made many times in the past, and had failed. Yet, the need for such a remedy was so great that to try again was not unnatural, and we hoped that more success might attend this latest effort than had attended those that had gone before. One of the organs essential to achieve that object was an assembly, an assembly in which disputes could be discussed, an assembly which would have the power of setting up some machinery of conciliation, some machinery for a judicial settlement or some machinery for arbitration. All these were contemplated in the Charter and in the aims of the United Nations.

For a number of years we were excluded from membership, although our whole attitude on any occasion on which we were members of an international body proved our sincerity to the principles adumbrated. When one is sincere in one's principles, when one tries to adhere to one's principles and act fairly and justly, one is liable to come in for considerable criticism both on the world stage and on the home stage. I remember coming in for criticism when I represented this country at the League of Nations because on a certain occasion I voted for sanctions against a nation which appeared to be acting contrary to the principles of the League of Nations by a deliberate act of aggression against a small nation.

We had a debate here and I was accused of ganging up with Britain because it did happen that, on that occasion, the vote which I cast, representing this country, was on the same side as Britain. Of course, I was immediately accused of taking dictation from Britain and of going into the Lobby with Britain because Britain wanted me to do so. I had to defend myself from this very seat. I remember trying to point out what the position really was. I asked, if Britain should on certain occasions be going heavenwards, was I, in order to show our opposition, to go in the opposite direction?

When you are in an international assembly and when you come to vote, there will be some opposed to you. Those who are opposed to you, if they are very earnest in their opposition, will feel you should not have voted in that particular way; but, if you go into an international assembly, as we have done in U.N.O., and if you are to play any decent part in it and be of any value, you have to vote as you think right, having regard to the principles on which the organisation is founded. If you do not do that, if you are simply regarded as a servile tool of any nation, then, not merely will that nation lose respect for you and believe they have you in their pocket and regard you as such, but you will also lose the respect of all the others, and your power and influence to be of any value, whether it is big or small, disappears.

When we applied for entry to U.N.O., in the first instance, I knew that, if we were accepted, there would be occasions on which the vote which we had to give on principles of justice would give offence to some people who might be our friends. We had to face that. If we were to believe in this organisation and play our part in it, we had to make up our minds that it would be worth while and that we should apply.

As I said, we were kept out for a number of years by the veto. During those years, I watched the action taken by U.N.O. and I saw very quickly that we had not a United Nations at all. I saw that we had two very definitely opposed groups who, when it came to the big questions on which peace or war depended, on most occasions approached things in an opposite way.

During that period, I often said to myself: "If we were there, I wonder would we stay there under those circumstances." Was it worth while for us to stay there? If we were to remain independent outside the blocs, which I felt was the proper place for us—not to be tied up with them, but to be able to take an independent attitude—I asked myself could we, as a small unit, do very much at all when we had these two closely knit hostile blocs. I had almost come to the conclusion that, if I had been the representative of this country and had got the approval of the Government for it, I would have proposed to stay at home.

However, the opposite view was that at least the assembly served this purpose: it enabled views to be expressed and public opinion throughout the world to be informed. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be able to reach the plain people in some of the countries, but it was put forward as a reason why the United Nations and its assembly was still worth holding on to. As long as matters were being discussed there, it was felt that the guns might be kept from roaring and the bombs from falling.

I was wavering between the views as to whether it was of any value and whether we should go in or not until suddenly it was found that our application, which had not been withdrawn, was accepted and we found ourselves almost suddenly a member of the United Nations. We were not the Government in office at the time and I think I expressed regret, when in opposition, that at that time there was not, as there would have been on a previous occasion, had it happened, a full discussion of the value of U.N.O., the value of membership of it and whether it was in the interests of our country that we should be members of it or not.

However, on the whole, I took the view that it was better to try U.N.O. out and to see whether, as time went on, there was any possibility of its being an effective instrument of collective security and of maintaining peace. When the old League of Nations existed, one of the criticisms of it as an organisation was that it was not universal. The great United States of America with all its potential industrial and other strength, was not a member of it, and the power of the league to enforce peace and to prevent wrong-doing was thereby considerably diminished.

One of the ideals of the United Nations is that it should consist, if at all possible, of all the nations—all the nations who would be prepared to accept the principles of the Charter. Unfortunately, accepting principles and acting upon them appear to be two different things, and although the United Nations has in it all the nations who have signed acceptance of these principles, we know in fact that quite a number of these nations have openly flouted these principles. Should they remain in U.N.O. and, if they do not remain, what good is U.N.O. except as a mere league of Powers with certain aims in common?

What have we in U.N.O. at present? What is it? As I have said, it is what you might call two opposing armed camps. At first sight, it is the very reverse of what a United Nations Assembly should be in accordance with the Charter.

The principal value of the Assembly, then, is not that you have nations which completely and sincerely believe in the principles and are prepared to act upon them, but that you have opposing groups which are at least ready to talk. To that extent, war has been postponed. When we are talking here about what happens at the United Nations, we are inclined to forget the position of the world as a whole, the immense danger there is that the world as we know it will be simply blotted out. We are talking of the interests of this country as the prime interest. Surely it is of prime interest to us here to see that we, in common with other nations and other peoples, have not the hydrogen bomb and other nuclear weapons of various kinds used here in destroying our population. Surely it is a national interest that this threatening and threatened war should be put off, if possible, and some other means arrived at for the settling of differences.

In the past, of course, when what were called peaceful means were not successful, peoples had recourse to force, and each side went in hoping that it would make its view supreme and dominant by means of a military success. What are the hopes, on either side, of that to-day? We saw in the last war the curious spectacle of nations joining as allies and after the war being the most bitter of opponents.

We tried to keep out of involvement in the last war because we believed just that, that war would be made in spite of us and without consulting us, that war would be ended without consulting us and that the terms on which the war would be ended would not be the terms that we would have wished for but the terms which would suit the interests of the large Powers engaged in the war. We deliberately chose the policy of neutrality on that basis. It was not chosen because of any favourable attitude towards the Hitler régime. It had nothing to do with that. The attitude of our people as a whole was against that. Nobody suggested it. We kept out of the war because we believed that anything we did in it would not influence it, that in fact the larger Powers were going to enter upon the war, wage the war and settle the war in the manner that they thought suited their interests and that we as a small nation would be regarded as insignificant and would be brushed aside. It was for these reasons that we adopted, during the last war, the policy of neutrality; but, as has been remarked here, we offended some good friends by doing that.

I remember a parting message I had given to the United States, when as representative of this country, I had received from the United States, from the people of the United States, support which was very valuable to our nation at the time. I was deeply grateful for it then, as I am now, but I did not think, when I expressed gratitude and made the statement that we were never going to forget it, that it was expected that we would go to war as a sign of our gratitude. We did not ask the great United States of the time to go to war in our interest: we asked them to use their influence in various ways to recognise us, as it was their independent right to do, to recognise our freedom. That was not thought by the Executive of the United States, the Government of the United States at the time, as consistent with American interests, as consistent with their conception of international law; or for a number of other reasons they did not think it was desirable that they should go to war — or even that they should give recognition, as recognition did not mean war at all. We would have been very foolhardy and impudent, perhaps, to ask the United States to go to war on our account. Consequently, when we remained neutral in the war, we did so not because we were not duly grateful to the United States but because we knew that the fate of our country and our people was involved and we had never asked anything of the United States that involved such a sacrifice from them.

This motion refers to speeches which our Minister for External Affairs made and actions which he took at the United Nations. What our Minister did, he did believing that it was his duty as the representative of this country so to act. I believe that his actions are well in accordance with the principles of the Charter, with the principles which induced us to be members of that organisation.

It is suggested that there has been a violent change in the foreign policy of this country. What is the violent change? If there has been a violent change, it is because the previous Government must have had some views very different from ours and from the views which they expressed. We have had quoted to us — from debates of last year, I think — the basis of the foreign policy of this country. One point was that we should act as good members of the United Nations. That is what it amounted to, though it may not have been expressed in those words. The other point was that we should act independently. Then, tied up with that, was something which could be tied up with it if it was really consistent with independence, namely, that we would not go out of our way to injure other countries of the Western bloc, as their main outlook upon life accorded with our views and, consequently, it would be our natural aim to help them as far as we could. If that meant that we were simply to do everything we were told by the leading members of the group, I do not think anyone here would have supported it. If the Government of the day had put that forward in that way, I do not think anyone in the House but themselves would have supported it. It was put in such a way that it seemed to be more or less consistent.

I think it was objected by the present Minister that it seemed a bit inconsistent to act independently on the one hand and then to suggest — I do not think there was much more than a suggestion in it — that we were to be tied up with other nations. If there is a change in policy it is simply this, that the previous Government, when they said they were associated, meant that they were going to be a part of a bloc and would take dictation and do things even though they themselves thought they were not wise.

I move the adjournment of the debate.

Debate adjourned.
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