I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The object of this Bill is twofold. First of all, it proposes to provide for striking off the roll the name of a solicitor or his suspension from practice, or his admonishment in any case where he has been found guilty of misconduct. Secondly, the Bill, if enacted, will enable the names of solicitors which have been struck off the roll unconstitutionally to be struck off in a constitutional way, if the High Court decides that this should be done.
The need for this Bill has arisen because it has been decided by the Supreme Court that some of the provisions of Part III of the Solicitors Act, 1954—and, notably, those which provide for striking the name of a solicitor off the roll—are repugnant to the Constitution.
There will, I am sure, be general agreement that the position which has arisen as a result of this decision should be rectified with all possible speed. The solicitor's profession is one which brings its members into close and intimate association with members of the public and it is plainly in the public interest that a solicitor who is guilty of professional misconduct should be subject to severe penalities including, in proper cases, the penalty of being put out of the profession. This is the more necessary because a solicitor is often placed in such a position that he has in his hands money belonging to his clients which, if he is dishonest, he may dispose of to his own personal advantage and so defraud innocent people.
The 1954 Act purported to give the power of striking off or suspending from practice to the Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society with the right of appeal to the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court have now held that the right of appeal is not sufficient to bring provisions, otherwise unconstitional, within the Constitution. The Bill proposes in Section 3 to give the power of striking off, suspending from practice etc. to the High Court, which shall in addition have power to impose a fine, a power not given to the Disciplinary Committee by the 1954 Act. In particular cases, the matter will be brought before the High Court on a report by the Disciplinary Committee after it has held an inquiry. This inquiry is provided for in Section 2, under which the committee may inquire into the conduct of a solicitor alleged to have committed misconduct as defined in the section, and when the inquiry has been held the report of the committee is to be set down by the Law Society for hearing by the High Court.
Sections 2 and 3 are to deal with cases of striking off, etc., in the future. Section 6 covers cases where the Disciplinary Committee have already purported to strike off. In such a case, jurisdiction is being given to the High Court to strike off the roll any name purported to have been struck off. There are a number of these cases. In the instance of any solicitor concerned, the Law Society will apply to the High Court under Section 6 to have the solicitor properly struck off; and the High Court will have before it the evidence which was before the Disciplinary Committee. If satisfied with this evidence, the court may order that the name of the solicitor in question be struck off and any such order shall have effect from the date of the original purported striking off by the Disciplinary Committee under the 1954 Act. However, though the order of the High Court is being made retrospective, it will not affect the solicitor's right to collect costs for any work done by him before the date of the High Court order nor will it make it an offence for the solicitor to have practised as such before that order.
I now come to Section 9 of the Bill. This section confers an absolute privilege on any acts done by the Disciplinary Committee or their registrar in purported exercise of the powers conferred on them or him by the 1954 Act. This means that the committee cannot be successfully sued for libel or slander in respect of orders made by them striking off the name of a solicitor or suspending him from practice or in respect of the filing and publication of such orders. It is only right, I think, that a body which was acting in good faith in pursuance of statutory powers should be given this protection in the circumstances that have arisen.
The section also clothes with absolute privilege the making of reports to the High Court under the Bill or the setting down of such reports for hearing by the High Court. At this point it will be convenient to mention that there is a printing error in Section 9 (1) (b) of the Bill where the second reference to the Disciplinary Committee should be are reference to the Society. This can be corrected at the Committee Stage.
In addition to protecting the Disciplinary Committee and the society against actions for defamation, it is also desirable to protect persons, including the society, who make or have made applications to the Disciplinary Committee in regard to the conduct of a solicitor or who give or have given information in connection with such application. These persons are being protected in Section 9 (2) by what is called in law qualified privilege. This means that they will have a good defence to a libel or slander action unless they acted maliciously: that is to say, unless their conduct resulted from a wrong or indirect motive.
As provided by Section 8, the jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised by the Chief Justice or by a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court assigned by him, and Section 7 provides that an order of the High Court under the Bill shall be final and not appealable.
Section 4 of the Bill deals with the removal of a solicitor's name from the roll at his own request. Removal may be effected by the Disciplinary Committee or if they refuse to do so by the High Court. Under Section 5 the High Court may restore a solicitor's name to the roll where that name has been removed or struck off.
The remaining sections of the Bill are largely consequential and provide for the re-enactment of the existing provisions of the 1954 Act, which it is desirable to retain, and for the requisite repeals.
In recommending this Bill to the House, I should like to express my thanks to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society for their cooperation and assistance in helping me to frame the measure. It may be that I shall have to propose some minor amendments on the Committee Stage. However, they will not be amendments of substance and I do not propose to take up the time of the House by discussing them on this stage. They are at present being examined. As the House knows, our intention is to have this Bill through the Dáil this session.