I wish to speak about the "Seven Days" Inquiry as this is the first appropriate opportunity we have had to speak on this subject. Now that we have an opportunity to consider the matter in tranquillity, we should try to sum up what we have learned from this inquiry and whether it was, in fact, an appropriate exercise at all.
I submit that the inquiry was an inappropriate exercise having regard to the form it took, the terms of reference and the manner in which it was handled. It was based on the assumption that it is the duty of journalists in presenting programmes, articles or features to apply to their preparatory work the same standards and criteria that would be applied in the presentation of a case in court and the action in referring this to the tribunal to judge whether the allegations were justified inevitably tended towards that result. On this side of the House we endeavoured to mitigate the damage that quite evidently would be done to the whole concept of freedom of speech by introducing into the terms of reference an added criterion to be considered by the judges. However, we were conscious that that alone would be insufficient to undo the damage done by the basic approach involved.
That there should have been some inquiry into the conflict between the Minister and RTE was evident. However, the terms of reference were not drawn up as they should have been, to establish whether the Minister's allegations were true. The onus of proof should be on the person who made the allegation against a reputable, responsible State body. Instead, the Government shifted the onus of proof on to RTE—that everything in the programme was correct, factual and provable in a court of law. Such a shift in the onus of proof was indefensible and extremely dangerous. One can only hope that this has now become sufficiently evident to ensure that something of the kind will not recur. It is important that we discuss this matter here in as detached a manner as possible and make sure that in exploring it on this basis we guard against a repetition of what happened.
It is vital that the media—the press, radio and television—should be free within the limits properly imposed by the laws of libel to expose any social evils in our community, any inequities or injustices perpetrated by any individual or public authority. In carrying out this function it is vital that the free press, upon which depends live democracy, should be subject only to the laws of libel. In Ireland and Britain the laws of libel are extremely stringent —much more so than in continental countries or in the United States. I am not aware that there is any pressure to make them more stringent. On the contrary, I am aware that a good case has been made to mitigate the stringency of these laws to some degree because there is a danger that in their present form they may unduly inhibit the communications media.
So long as the law of libel stands it will safeguard the rights of the individual. If there is any abuse in this matter there is a remedy. In practice, when juries consider an individual has been done an injustice by a newspaper or other medium of communication, and if there is evidence of this injustice, they tend to be pretty tough with the organisation concerned. The jury will tend to err on the side of the individual against the institution. It is a human reaction and a sound one. This ensures that the necessary safeguards exist for the individual who considers he has been done an injustice.
However, to try to impose any further requirements on the press, radio or television with regard to the publication of material which criticises any private or public interests for possible abuses is to act against the interests of democracy, freedom and justice. Any pressure of this kind is, of its nature, anti-social if it goes beyond the provisions of the law. Nothing could be more calculated to prevent justice being done and to undermine democracy than to place the onus of legal proof on the media because this would inhibit disastrously the journalists concerned.
In this case the onus of proof was shifted on to RTE and judges in the High Court were asked a question they should not have been asked: whether every statement in this programme was factually correct and fully justified and whether the fullest care was taken in everything that was said. They were asked this despite the fact that, had there been any abuse of power by the medium, any person who suffered by this abuse could take action. One person did this and we know the consequences of that case—we know who won. The judges were asked to apply their legal minds to the question of whether RTE had proved, or could prove their case in a court of law, or had prepared themselves to prove it before the programme was put on.
There would be no journalism of any consequence in any country where this principle was applied—where nothing could be printed in a newspaper that could not be proved in court. I am surprised that the totalitarian regimes in countries such as Greece and Russia have not thought up this technique which would practically obviate the need for censorship. It would provide such countries with an easy legal way to protect themselves against any criticism. It took our Government to provide this ingenious way of undermining freedom of speech. I suspect that the Government did not set out to do this but that it arose out of the action of one member of the Government which other members considered they had to stand over. I suspect other members of the Government were unsympathetic to what was done but they have done damage by their solidarity with the man who acted improperly in the attack he made. The Government did wrong in the way they sought to cover that, by drawing up the terms of reference so that any failure to prove a point on the part of RTE would be shown to be a defect, the subject of criticism by the inquiry. In doing that the Government did a disservice to freedom of speech.
I want to sum up the conclusions of this inquiry. I want to list the main things that seem to me to have emerged positively from it. First of all, the inquiry report says that in making the programme RTE were activated by a desire to draw public attention to what they genuinely considered to be a serious social problem. They did not act mala fide. They believed there was a social problem and in making this programme what activated them was a desire to draw public attention to what they considered to be a serious social problem. They acted in good faith.
Secondly, the tribunal held that the decision to make the programme was justified, that they were right in making such a programme. Not only did they act in good faith, believing there was a social evil to be exposed but their judgement was correct in that such a programme needed to be made and they were justified in making it.
Thirdly, they said the programme was authentic in that illegal moneylending does exist and is a problem of serious proportions in certain areas. That is a very important conclusion indeed.
Fourthly, they said that—these are matters of detail but they are all important details—where moneylending does exist the rates of interest are excessive and that the programme was correct in saying this.
Fifthly, they concluded that children's allowance books are commonly taken as security for loans, as alleged in the programme.