But there is a third factor which we must also take into account. If it is unrealistic to ignore our interests it would also be unrealistic to speak only of interests and not to recognise that other, less pragmatic, motives also move us. As a people we have certain fairly clear concepts of right and wrong in human relations. We believe that these values should apply to dealings between nations as well as between individuals. We owe these moral values largely to basic religious beliefs which permeate our culture. But we also have certain distinctive attitudes and sympathies which are shaped by our view of our own history—among them a strong fellow-feeling for any people who struggle to maintain their identity against greater force. As a people we always felt, during our own troubled history, that when and if we attained to independence ourselves, we would try to bring these values and sympathies to our dealings with other nations.
It is easy to be pretentious about this. We must not deceive ourselves or exaggerate. As a nation we are not necessarily more moral than others where our own direct interests are involved. Nor does our own historical experience necessarily make us more compassionate than others, where compassion requires more than mere sympathy. But it would also be wrong to neglect these motives and to take an entirely pragmatic approach to our foreign relations. These values and concerns are not necessarily well served by talking about them often and self-consciously. They are real to us. They do play a part in our decisions; and, even where they are not our primary motivation, they do give us a healthy distrust of policies based entirely on power—the so-called Realpolitik— which so often proves mistaken in its neglect of the spirit and values of a people.
I have pointed to three factors which a realistic view of our foreign relations must take into account. In every one of the many issues which make up our foreign relations, our decisions will emerge from some combination of these three factors; and no Irish Government can conduct their foreign relations without giving due regard to each. In my view, therefore, any account of our foreign policies which does not deal with each, is either too narrow and pragmatic, or too rhetorical and unrealistic.
There is sometimes debate as to whether foreign policy matters should be decided by reference to abstract moral principles, on the one hand, or national interest, on the other, as if the latter were a purely selfish interest. In my view, the antithesis is a false one. The welfare of one's fellowmen is involved in what serves the national interest as well as in dealings with other nations. True morality in international relations, therefore, cannot be something abstract and wholly disinterested. It consists precisely in trying to give due weight to, and achieve proper balance between, the three factors to which I referred.
Although our international relations must take account of all three factors, there are some issues where we have little option as to the weight to be given to each. In many areas, however, we do have a choice. We can decide which will predominate—immediate national interest as against common interest; more idealistic values as against interests of either kind. And it is in these areas that limited but real foreign policy choices are open to any Government.
I would make one further point which I consider of great importance. We are a democracy and a small and intimate one. The Government can guide and lead on these issues and must at times take courageous decisions. But in the long run neither the Government, nor anyone in my place as Minister for Foreign Affairs, can or should go too far ahead of public opinion in our society, since we do not act in our own name but in that of the society. We must do what we think right, but we are dependent ultimately on public sanction and support for what we do.
If, therefore, the public wishes us on any issue to give greater weight to the moral values to which it holds, as against its immediate interests, then it is right for public opinion to make this concern clear through its articulate spokesmen—individuals, organisations of various kinds, churches and, not least, Opposition spokesmen here in the Dáil. I do not say that the Government, or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, can abdicate our duty to lead or to do what we think right, but foreign policies without public support will not have real and lasting effect. And our role in the world in the long run should reflect the values to which our society is really committed.
How in practice do we carry these principles into effect? Like most small countries we are not equally involved with every country or with every world issue. In a sense, our relations with the world are a series of concentric circles of interest. Those closest are usually, but not always, of greatest concern. Importance is not always determined by geography or economic or power relations alone. Sometimes less tangible factors such as concern or compassion will involve even a small country like ours in an otherwise distant issue.
Within the first circle of interest, however, must always be our relations with our nearest, powerful neighbour Britain. The question of our relations with Britain is almost too large and too vital to be considered as one among many. In a sense, it involves the whole of our history, the whole of our effort to assert ourselves as a nation and find our national identity. The long relationship of self-assertion in opposition to assimilation and domination, has deeply involved our two peoples with one another—economically, socially, by mutual migrations and intermarriage; and by similarity of political institutions.
The tragedy is that one major problem remains between our two countries, preventing a healthier relationship from developing, and breeding misunderstanding and at times ill-feeling. I refer, of course, to the Northern question. The events of the past three and a half years, and of the past year in particular, have given us all pause, but the night is long that never finds the day. We must believe that light is, at last, beginning to appear.
The policy of the Government on the North is, of course, primarily a matter for the Taoiseach. I deal with it here only in so far as it directly affects our relations with another Government. The effect on that relationship is close and immediate, and we have constantly tried in the interests of peace and justice and the general wellbeing of the two islands, to influence the British Government and people in regard to policies pursued by them, or in their name, in Northern Ireland.
We have debated the North at length in the Dáil in recent months and I have frequently made plain my own views on what was happening there. I reiterated those views in forthright terms during my recent visits to North America and Europe following the killings in Derry. A forthright approach was warranted by the events. My sole purpose was to try to bring home, both directly and through countries friendly to both of us, that the policies then being pursued in the North are simply not solving problems with which they were supposed to deal. I should like to make it clear that on my visits to foreign countries I did not at any stage seek help against Britain. What I asked for was that those countries which had good relations with both Britain and ourselves should quietly make their concern known.
I was satisfied from the contacts I made that many governments who are well disposed to both our countries, were deeply concerned about the whole problem of the North. It was not expected that they should intervene publicly and directly, but the feelings of deep concern which I know that many of them had were not, I feel, without influence.
All of us, I think, would wish our relations with our near neighbour to be warm and friendly, as is natural between two countries who have been closely linked in so many ways. The initiative taken by the British Government a few weeks ago is a step forward in seeking a lasting solution to the remaining problem in this historic relationship.
There is freedom of movement and constant traffic between us. There have been for many years exchanges, contacts and consultations at every level of Government and throughout our social and political institutions. Britain is, and is likely to remain in the immediate future—even in the EEC—our most important supplier, our most important customer and our most important source of tourism and investment.
We are Britain's third most important customer after the United States and Germany. We are more important to her as a market even than France which has 16 times our population. And we are now likely to go into the European Communities together.
It is a pity then that the problem of the fears and loyalties of the Unionist population of the North should come between us for so long. There must surely be some better way of settling the old issues of relations between the people of these two islands, and some better way of meeting all the legitimate fears and concerns of the Unionist community. Fifty years have, after all, taught us something—about the folly of trying to meet those fears in a way which brought separation and instability and also about the naturally easy and friendly relations which can exist between the peoples of the two islands when such relations are not subject to any constraints. A solution reflecting the broader and more comprehensive national identity is, I believe, the only way to bring peace to Ireland.
As regards this first most vital circle of interest for our foreign relations, such a settlement would meet all three of the concerns to which I have referred. It would serve our national interest—not in a narrow sense but by bringing peace and stability at last to our island; it would serve our community of interest with Britain which is, and should be, real and close; and it would, I believe, promote values which are shared by Irish people of every tradition at their best and most generous.
I should like next to move to a second and wider circle of interests for us which is now about to become of prime importance. As the Dáil is aware, the Treaty of Accession to the European Communities was signed in Brussels on 22nd January, 1972. Since then, both Houses of the Oireachtas have passed a Bill for the amendment of the Constitution, and we have debated the White Paper which sets out the terms agreed for our accession. Subject to the people's decision by referendum we are about to join the new enlarged Communities and I think in this review of our foreign relations I should set out again in broad terms our reasons for doing so.
Our decision to apply for membership was taken ten years ago, and the application has been maintained since then despite disappointments. It is one of our most important single foreign policy decisions, certainly since the last war, and, perhaps, since the founding of the State. It was also a decision which, unlike many others, offered us a clear and definite choice when it was made. The Government in reaching their decision took explicit account of each of the three factors governing foreign policy to which I have referred; so that an account of our reasons for joining which omits any one of them is incomplete.
In the first place we are joining the Community because the Government believe that it is in our direct interest to do so, and it would be very much contrary to our interests to remain outside the European Community. Membership will provide a large and assured market and higher and guaranteed prices for our agricultural products; it will make us less dependent on a single British market with traditionally low food prices; and membership will, if we work to ensure it, open up new export markets for our industrial products.
Since it is now clear that the Communities are enlarging and Britain is joining, our real options do not lie between joining and remaining as we are; and no discussion is really honest which fails to recognise this. Our choice must be between joining or putting in jeopardy the special trading relationship which we have with Britain—the market for some 70 per cent of our exports. We would then at best be dependent on a trade agreement with the EEC or on some other negotiated concessions to ease our difficulties, and it would be a minor easement indeed which would be poor recompense for the loss of our traditional market for our agricultural products and the sacrifice of the much higher EEC prices which would be available to us as members. Most important, by staying out we would allow the unhappy boundary in our country to harden into a real frontier. Faced with such a choice the Government could hardly hesitate. They decided that our direct interests would be well served by joining and that it would be against our interests not to do so.
In the second place, we are joining Europe because of what I described earlier as a concern for community interest, that common interest among nations which is really a form of enlightened national interest. We fully share the concern for these common interests which is evident in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome. We believe that measures at community level can bring economic and social progress and can ensure the constant improvement in the living and working conditions of our peoples and "harmonious development" for every member and to every region. We want to contribute to, as well as to benefit from, measures taken at community level to advance these common interests.
Thirdly, in joining Europe we hope to be able to advance certain values such as I spoke of earlier—values which our people, I believe, would wish to see promoted at the international level. I do not want to be pretentious or rhetorical about this. It is easy in international affairs to talk largely and eloquently about "values" and "contributions to civilisation". Because the debate in Ireland on joining has been largely in terms of interests, we may sometimes suspect that that is just what those concerned with the building of the European Communities think of, that they are, in fact, motivated solely by economic self-interest. To believe this would be quite wrong.
The Community is a curious mixture of bargaining and negotiation about prices and quotas, on the one hand, and efforts to build common institutions and to lay the groundwork for a closer unity in Europe on the other. Underlying all these activities, however, is a strong current of a more idealistic kind—a determination to promote certain common values; a strong will to ensure that western Europe which has so much in common and so much of worth in its culture will never tear itself apart again in internal hostilities. A strong motive of its founders was to promote these more idealistic concerns by knitting the members States of the Community together in a multitude of ways affecting their direct as well as their common interests. It would be a mistake to concentrate so much on each of these individual "stitches" that we do not see the larger pattern which they are slowly forming.
In each of the large and pivotal decisions of the Community these concerns have been, and will continue to be, an underlying factor whatever the hard bargaining and self-interest involved. We would do wrong to overlook these concerns or think that they receive lip service only. In joining with our new partners, however, we also bring with us as a nation certain distinctive values and concerns of our own. These are values which evolved from our history and which we can promote in the building of the structures of the new and enlarged EEC.
I do not wish to exaggerate our role. But it would be equally wrong to underestimate it. I believe that there are some at least among the Community statesmen who welcome us as members precisely because of this outlook, and these distinctive values which we will bring with us into the Communities. I would emphasise, however, that simply joining the Communities does not in itself serve the interests and the values to which I have referred. What joining does is give us an opportunity to serve them, an opportunity to promote our own interest, our common interest in community, and our ideals and values. It is up to us to use the opportunity well. It is a task for the idealist, the vigorous, the young. It is a task for enthusiasm.
I have spoken first of our relations with Britain and of our new role in the European Communities, because these are now our most vital concerns. We are involved also in a network of bilateral relations with many other developed countries. Though some in Western Europe and North America are of great importance to us, I do not propose to go into detail here in regard to specific countries in this broad survey of our foreign relations. But I would like to speak in general of that series of wider circles in which we are placed by our membership of international organisations other than the European Communities. We play a full part in various political, economic, cultural and technical bodies—in the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, OECD, the International Atomic Energy Agency and others.
If we are members of any international organisation I believe that we should be good members. This means, first, that we must show a certain seriousness of purpose in what we do there; we must show a concern for our reputation as a nation and concern for the organisation itself and its aims which we have joined in order to promote. It means, too, that our votes and decisions, like all others in our international relations, must give weight to the three factors I have mentioned —national interest, common interests and the moral and other values of our society.
The influence and respect which a small country gains in any organisation, and its real contribution to the work of the organisation, depends in particular on the extent to which it matches performance to rhetoric. In an international organisation rhetoric can diverge from performance in two ways: a strong speech which reads well at home may take precedence for that reason only; or a member country's speeches and votes may be quite at variance with its actions and decisions in the real world outside. This second kind of divergence is probably more damaging and, if widely practised, can make any organisation wholly ineffective.
As an example of what I mean, I will speak specifically of the United Nations since it is one of the most comprehensive international organisations and probably the most important. If I speak about it mainly in political terms, I do so simply because these are basic. But I also recognise fully the importance and value of its economic, social and humanitarian work.
The UN is a body which is idealised or denigrated according to the preference of the observer. Those who idealise it have an exaggerated notion of what it should be, and those who denigrate it, tend to abuse it for not living up to that notion.
The reality is that the UN of today is a second and improved effort by nation states to promote their common interest in survival and order. There are now some 130 members. Because its members are all nation states, jealous of their sovereignty, the interests it serves are largely those of established nation states. And because it mirrors the world, the world's conflicts are reflected in it.
Those who idealise or denigrate the UN, however, tend to see it as something entirely apart from, and above, its members. They want to see it as a supreme moral arbiter which will judge justly, and impose its judgments in human affairs. When the UN proves less than this, in their view, it fails and they condemn it as futile and impotent. Unfortunately, the UN is a good deal less than a supreme moral arbiter—the world is full of gross injustices with which it cannot deal.
It would be wiser in my view to see the UN as a forum where nation states can, when they choose, meet to work out their differences. Sometimes the UN debate may take the place of actual conflict; sometimes both proceed simultaneously and sometimes the problems and injustices may be debated for years without obvious effect.
Because the UN mirrors the world in this way, it also mirrors the disagreements in the world. It is unrealistic to blame the UN as an entity for not solving conflicts, if the countries represented there remain in real disagreement or do not choose to settle their conflicts there.
Although it is not a supreme and impartial moral arbiter, the UN is of value in helping to promote peace, justice and order in the world. All of its members have subscribed to a common code of conduct—the Charter —under which they accept certain principles of international morality. Even if they do not always act by them, they must try to justify their behaviour in terms of these principles. Because of this, and because members may have to vote on problems where their direct national interests are not involved, there is a growing idea of an international moral community with interests in common.
On the other hand, where more than 130 states debate world issues in terms of a moral code for several months each year, there is a certain amount of empty moralising and often the debate itself has little effect on the outcome since delegates act under instructions from their home governments, based on considerations not always material to the debate.
Because UN members must take positions on all kinds of issues, and because the real power of the General Assembly is quite limited, it is easy for a delegation to vote by reference only to what I might call "the UN reality"—that is the resolutions of previous years and the pressures of the current Assembly—without regard to "the outside reality", that is what it can or will do to implement a resolution. This lack of seriousness of which I have spoken already in general terms, soon becomes apparent, and the member's real influence diminishes. More important, the UN itself suffers. It slips a degree further out of connection with any reality beyond its own and it becomes a degree less effective and less useful in dealing with difficult issues.
Perhaps the recent admission of the Peoples' Republic of China to its place in the UN—which we supported fully by our voting—will bring greater relevance and effectiveness to the organisation by making it more representative of world realities.
While we should be clear-sighted about these and other weaknesses of the UN, I still consider it a useful and at times indispensable organisation.
It is sometimes said here at home that our own UN role was more prominent and independent in the late 1950s than it has been since. I do not think this criticism makes enough allowance for the enormous changes in the UN since that period.
Before 1960, at the height of the Cold War, the UN was divided into two large blocs, and it had a limited number of members from what we could call the Third World. Cold War issues as well as great issues of decolonisation were debated. In that situation we had a particularly useful role to play for a period. How we from an independent viewpoint voted on divisive questions was then of added importance because the two blocs chose to regard their UN victories and defeats at that time as important—or at least as useful propaganda. Our support for anti-colonial resolutions was important then, even at times, perhaps, decisive, and these resolutions themselves made a difference.
But the UN has changed. The Cold War blocs have largely dissolved; and the Great Powers have less interest. The great oppositions have died away and the Great Powers play defensive or apathetic roles. Most of the decolonisation battles have been won. Some 50 newly-independent African and Asian members have joined since the early 1960s and Ireland's role as an independent member with anti-colonial sympathies is no longer unusual. These newly independent countries can and do promote most vigorously their own interests and those of the remaining colonial territories and they put forward their own resolutions on such issues as apartheid and the remaining problems of colonialism.
As real great power interest in UN voting has faded with changes in the rigid two-bloc structure, these resolutions have become of less effect. In frustration their sponsors have made them stronger in tone each year. But stronger resolutions have been even less acceptable to, and more easily ignored by, the Great Powers, wherever their interests are involved. A series of strong resolutions with less and less real effect has fostered the idea that the UN itself as an organisation is generally ineffectual. This, to my mind, is harmful and even dangerous.
I consider that this growing belief that it lacks relevance and effectiveness is now the UN's single and greatest problem. It is more basic even than financial problems, because it makes the solution of financial problems seem less urgent. The total cost of running the organisation is high but it is really nothing in Great Power terms—scarcely more than the cost of a single aircraft carrier and much less than that of a single moon-shot. Financial issues would quickly be solved if the effectiveness and relevance of the UN were clearly established.
In this situation I consider that the member States who best serve the United Nations concept and are most respected in the organisation today, are not those who speak most often about international morality or those who vote most strongly on resolutions on colonialism and other issues but those who try to maintain relevance and seriousness of purpose in their own actions there. This means, in particular, trying consistently to maintain a close congruence between speeches and votes on the one hand and subsequent willingness to give effect to the resolutions adopted on the other. I would like to see Ireland play such a part in the UN at all times— not that we should speak or vote less strongly on difficult issues but that we should ensure that whatever we are willing to vote for we should also be willing to put into practice.
I have said that we must weigh three factors in all our foreign policy decisions—national interest, community interests, and moral concern. In the UN, our direct interests are not at stake in every issue. But we do have a common interest as part of world community in maintaining an effective and relevant United Nations. We, like other members, should always keep this in mind. Without this sense of real interest and concern to give seriousness of purpose to our actions, we might lapse, as others have sometimes done, into moralising, as distinct from truly moral judgments, and so contribute, as others have done, to the failure to take the UN seriously.
Having spoken of our relations with Britain, with the European Communities and the developed countries generally, with international organisations and specifically with the United Nations, I should like to deal briefly with our relations with the countries of the developing world. In recent years, we have made considerable economic progress, but we do not usually think of ourselves as a wealthy country. Nevertheless, even now, among about 150 countries in the world, we rank among the top 30 in income per head; and by comparison with the vast majority of the world population we are wealthy indeed.
At one time, it was an easy assumption that great discrepancies in living standards between 25 per cent of the world's population on the one hand, and the 75 per cent that are close to, or below, subsistance level on the other, were due to superior virtue or industry on the part of the developed nations. This is no longer accepted. There is now more awareness of how the cards have been "stacked", so to speak, on the side of a minority of countries in the economic exchanges between nations. We should be able to see from our own internal history in Ireland, that a society—or in this case a world—in which a dominant minority prospers from a system which exploits the misery of a majority, is neither just nor stable.
Our direct national interest in giving aid to developing countries is not so great perhaps as that of major powers and former colonial countries whose trade and investments may be at risk. But we are pledged to increase our aid as our resources permit. In addition, we share with every other country in the world a strong common interest in helping to remove the present gross inequalities which inhibit the economic and social development of the Third World. We also share an appreciation of the complexity of the problems which they have to solve. There are no ready answers. Persistent efforts at national, regional and international level alone can make progress towards the desired end. By our participation in the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at present in progress in Santiago, Chile, we contribute to that essential process.
I have spoken so far of basic principles in our foreign relations and of areas of interest which are of greatest importance to us. There are also, of course, more general or functional aspects of our foreign affairs which I should mention. Such issues as trade, information activities, cultural exchanges and consular protection of the interests of our citizens, for example, are part of our relations with all those countries with which we have dealings.
I will speak briefly here of two of these—trade and information activities—because they are of particular importance at present. Trade with other countries is a series of individual exchanges and contacts in which private interest, or at least mutual benefit, is usually of greater importance than the broader principles and concerns to which I referred earlier. But, taken together, the foreign contacts we have developed in trade and foreign earnings form a whole network of relations which link us as a nation with almost every country in the world.
The role of Government in a society such as ours in relation to foreign earnings is to help to stimulate exchanges organised at the private level, as far as it can, to the general benefit. In doing so it must, of course, have regard to certain more general issues arising from national economic and social development policies.
For the most part, however, the Government's foreign policy involvement in the matter of export earnings is designed to smooth the path for existing exchanges and to promote opportunities which the private sector can exploit. The promotion of trade in foreign markets and the attraction of foreign investment and tourist earnings are essential functions of our missions abroad and the business community can count on their full support.
Another aspect of our relations with other countries in general which has become a focus of attention recently is our information and publicity work abroad. In general, the activities of my Department, and of our missions abroad, complement the specific promotional and other interests of semi-State bodies such as Bord Fáilte, the Industrial Development Authority, Córas Tráchtála and others. We try to make Ireland better known and to maintain a good general image of the country abroad which will help to advance our specific, economic and other interests.
Recently, however, a more immediate concern of information work at Government level has been to ensure that the realities of the situation in the North, and Government policy towards it, are widely known and understood. Here I must say something briefly in regard to recent suggestions that we are failing in this and "losing the propaganda war".
To speak in this way is doubly wrong. First, we are not engaged and we should not try to engage in a so-called propaganda war. Secondly, those aims which we are in fact trying to advance are, on balance, being advanced gradually and on the whole successfully in world public opinion.
The general aim of Government policy is unity, by agreement, in a friendly relationship with Britain, in such a way as to bring peace and stability to all in this island. An all-out propaganda war in the sense in which that expression is usually understood might be emotionally stimulating as wars sometimes are. However, our real aim is not triumph but reconciliation. Our purpose is not simply to indulge in emotional condemnations but to persuade all concerned that a peaceful political solution is vitally necessary. Our aims would be ill-served by an all-out propaganda effort which would inflame emotions and inhibit constructive thought on the complex problems involved.
This does not mean that we refrain from bringing home the truth of the situation in the North and the truth of such tragedies as Derry to world public opinion. We can and do make every effort to see that the truth is known.
The best means of doing this and of obtaining the support of influential world press and public opinion is not necessarily to launch a flow of detailed press releases in distant parts of the world, even though activity of this kind is sometimes necessary. Usually much more useful work is done indirectly, or in ways which are not publicised. It is generally true, I think, that the most useful public relations work is that which is least obtrusive. Where the public relations effort itself becomes a main item of news, it has failed in its primary purpose. The North and Ireland generally have been a focus of attention for world news media now for several years. Large numbers of highly professional journalists and correspondents from the resident foreign press corps in London and from world capitals are frequent visitors to both parts of the country and they are by now quite well informed on the realities of the situation. Government Ministers here, as well as Opposition party spokesmen, regularly give interviews and engage in background discussion on the problems with visiting journalists of all kinds. My Department and our missions abroad are active in such matters in varying ways.
We sometimes find particular articles and reports in the foreign press which are inaccurate or sensational and show a lack of understanding of the situation. In general it is clear that there is, by now, a widespread appreciation by the world press of the issues involved. An increasing number of perceptive commentators around the world are also coming to see, as we do, the general direction that a lasting solution must ultimately take. The progress in understanding this in the world press in general over the past two years is quite surprising.
I do not suggest simplistically that our information services at Government level are responsible for this. The facts of the situation speak for themselves when they are exposed to the scrutiny of the world press over a period as the North has been. Our information services have done a good deal. It would be ill-advised to engage now in an emotionally satisfying propaganda war which would not advance our real aims and which could damage what has been and is being already achieved.
I have tried to give a broad survey of our foreign relations rather than a detailed account of the activities of my Department. I have spoken first of the basic aims we have had as a State taking its place in the world; then of the general principles of which we must take account—and, in particular, the three factors of national interest, the interests of international community and concern for moral values which must be a part of all our dealings with other countries. I dealt with the main areas of concern and interest to us— our relations with Britain, with the European Communities, with international organisations like the UN and with the developing world. Finally, I have dealt with two of the more important general aspects of our foreign relations—trade and information activities.
Throughout I have stressed the view that the foreign policy of a small democratic country like ours is not a single grand design. It is rather a network of relations, exchanges and contacts of every kind. The Government here should not and could not impose an arbitrary and abstract foreign policy on these relations. What it can and does do is try to develop and facilitate them. In doing this, my Department works through our Embassies and Consulates abroad.
Our foreign service, and the spread of our diplomatic missions abroad, is quite limited even by comparison with other countries of our size and general position. Our missions are primarily placed in those countries which are closest to us geographically, or in countries where there has been a particular historic or other link which seemed to require formalisation by means of exchange of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, within limits, I think our real interests abroad have been generally well served by our foreign service. But Ireland's "foreign relations" in the true sense are broader than anything done by my Department. They must include the more specific economic and promotional activities of semi-State bodies such as Bord Fáilte Éireann, Coras Tráchtála and the Industrial Development Authority which work under general Government direction to promote very specific economic interests. Beyond that again, our international relations in the broadest sense will include all the many individual contacts and exchanges of our citizens with other countries.
The Government, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, can guide and try to develop all of these relations with other countries. In some matters, it is necessary to take courageous decisions and initiatives at Government level. As I said at the outset, no Government can move too far ahead of its own society. In the last analysis then, because of this and because our foreign relations are much more than merely Government level contacts, it is the concern of our society, as a whole, for the interests and values which it holds which will determine our nation's place in the world. Our foreign relations and our foreign policy should, after all, in the long run, express the character, values and concerns of the Irish people in their dealings with the world.
